"Show me the incentive and I'll show you the outcome" – Veripath Farmland Funds Q4 Investor Letter: Investing in a World of Financial Repression, Negative Real Rates, Valuation “Challenges” and Inflationary Forces.
Do G7 governments have an incentive to attempt to keep inflation higher for longer and real rates lower for longer? Negative real rates across a broad spectrum of credit assets are a graphic sign that we inhabit a world of financial repression orchestrated by central banks at the formal/informal behest of sovereign borrowers. In a normally functioning market, lenders do not provide capital to borrowers for negative yields – i.e., they do not pay for the privilege of lending. It goes without saying we are not in a normally functioning market.
MTBiz is for you if you are looking for contemporary information on business, economy and especially on banking industry of Bangladesh. You would also find periodical information on Global Economy and Commodity Markets.
To
help senior executives weather this economic storm, the Economist Intelligence Unit has updated its
answers to some of the questions most frequently asked by clients, following the publication of the
four previous editions of Global crisis monitor. In answering each question, we outline our current
forecast, explain our thinking, and highlight any key risks or alternative scenarios.
Western governments are hopelessly addicted to deficit financing while refusing to address looming funding issues - with apologies to the embarrassingly foolish Angela Merkel, politicians can no more successfully “battle” the markets than you and I can successfully “battle” gravity. Petrocapita is an investment trust built around the premise that demand for energy will continue to move prices higher over the long-term. Petrocapita was created to allow investors to add professionally managed oil & gas assets directly to their portfolios.
Charting the Financial Crisis: A Narrative eBookShavondaBrandon
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and subsequent Great Recession constituted the worst shocks to the United States economy in generations. Books have been and will be written about the housing bubble and bust, the financial panic that followed, the economic devastation that resulted, and the steps that various arms of the U.S. and foreign governments took to prevent the Great Depression 2.0. But the story can also be told graphically, as these charts aim to do.
What comes quickly into focus is that as the crisis intensified, so did the government’s response. Although the seeds of the harrowing events of 2007-2009 were sown over decades, and the U.S. government was initially slow to act, the combined efforts of the Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, and other agencies were ultimately forceful, flexible, and effective. Federal regulators greatly expanded their crisis management toolkit as the damage unfolded, moving from traditional and domestic measures to actions that were innovative and sometimes even international in reach. As panic spread, so too did their efforts broaden to quell it. In the end, the government was able to stabilize the system, re-start key financial markets, and limit the extent of the harm to the economy.
No collection of charts, even as extensive as this, can convey all the complexities and details of the crisis and the government’s interventions. But these figures capture the essential features of one of the worst episodes in American economic history and the ultimately successful, even if politically unpopular, government response.
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and subsequent Great Recession constituted the worst shocks to the United States economy in generations. Books have been and will be written about the housing bubble and bust, the financial panic that followed, the economic devastation that resulted, and the steps that various arms of the U.S. and foreign governments took to prevent the Great Depression 2.0. But the story can also be told graphically, as these charts aim to do.
What comes quickly into focus is that as the crisis intensified, so did the government’s response. Although the seeds of the harrowing events of 2007-2009 were sown over decades, and the U.S. government was initially slow to act, the combined efforts of the Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, and other agencies were ultimately forceful, flexible, and effective. Federal regulators greatly expanded their crisis management toolkit as the damage unfolded, moving from traditional and domestic measures to actions that were innovative and sometimes even international in reach. As panic spread, so too did their efforts broaden to quell it. In the end, the government was able to stabilize the system, re-start key financial markets, and limit the extent of the harm to the economy.
No collection of charts, even as extensive as this, can convey all the complexities and details of the crisis and the government’s interventions. But these figures capture the essential features of one of the worst episodes in American economic history and the ultimately successful, even if politically unpopular, government response.
Agcapita is Canada's only RRSP and TFSA eligible farmland fund and is part of a family of funds with almost $100 million in assets under management. Agcapita believes farmland is a safe investment, that supply is shrinking and that unprecedented demand for "food, feed and fuel" will continue to move crop prices higher over the long-term. Agcapita created the Farmland Investment Partnership to allow investors to add professionally managed farmland to their portfolios. Agcapita publishes a monthly agriculture briefing.
MTBiz is for you if you are looking for contemporary information on business, economy and especially on banking industry of Bangladesh. You would also find periodical information on Global Economy and Commodity Markets.
To
help senior executives weather this economic storm, the Economist Intelligence Unit has updated its
answers to some of the questions most frequently asked by clients, following the publication of the
four previous editions of Global crisis monitor. In answering each question, we outline our current
forecast, explain our thinking, and highlight any key risks or alternative scenarios.
Western governments are hopelessly addicted to deficit financing while refusing to address looming funding issues - with apologies to the embarrassingly foolish Angela Merkel, politicians can no more successfully “battle” the markets than you and I can successfully “battle” gravity. Petrocapita is an investment trust built around the premise that demand for energy will continue to move prices higher over the long-term. Petrocapita was created to allow investors to add professionally managed oil & gas assets directly to their portfolios.
Charting the Financial Crisis: A Narrative eBookShavondaBrandon
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and subsequent Great Recession constituted the worst shocks to the United States economy in generations. Books have been and will be written about the housing bubble and bust, the financial panic that followed, the economic devastation that resulted, and the steps that various arms of the U.S. and foreign governments took to prevent the Great Depression 2.0. But the story can also be told graphically, as these charts aim to do.
What comes quickly into focus is that as the crisis intensified, so did the government’s response. Although the seeds of the harrowing events of 2007-2009 were sown over decades, and the U.S. government was initially slow to act, the combined efforts of the Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, and other agencies were ultimately forceful, flexible, and effective. Federal regulators greatly expanded their crisis management toolkit as the damage unfolded, moving from traditional and domestic measures to actions that were innovative and sometimes even international in reach. As panic spread, so too did their efforts broaden to quell it. In the end, the government was able to stabilize the system, re-start key financial markets, and limit the extent of the harm to the economy.
No collection of charts, even as extensive as this, can convey all the complexities and details of the crisis and the government’s interventions. But these figures capture the essential features of one of the worst episodes in American economic history and the ultimately successful, even if politically unpopular, government response.
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and subsequent Great Recession constituted the worst shocks to the United States economy in generations. Books have been and will be written about the housing bubble and bust, the financial panic that followed, the economic devastation that resulted, and the steps that various arms of the U.S. and foreign governments took to prevent the Great Depression 2.0. But the story can also be told graphically, as these charts aim to do.
What comes quickly into focus is that as the crisis intensified, so did the government’s response. Although the seeds of the harrowing events of 2007-2009 were sown over decades, and the U.S. government was initially slow to act, the combined efforts of the Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, and other agencies were ultimately forceful, flexible, and effective. Federal regulators greatly expanded their crisis management toolkit as the damage unfolded, moving from traditional and domestic measures to actions that were innovative and sometimes even international in reach. As panic spread, so too did their efforts broaden to quell it. In the end, the government was able to stabilize the system, re-start key financial markets, and limit the extent of the harm to the economy.
No collection of charts, even as extensive as this, can convey all the complexities and details of the crisis and the government’s interventions. But these figures capture the essential features of one of the worst episodes in American economic history and the ultimately successful, even if politically unpopular, government response.
Agcapita is Canada's only RRSP and TFSA eligible farmland fund and is part of a family of funds with almost $100 million in assets under management. Agcapita believes farmland is a safe investment, that supply is shrinking and that unprecedented demand for "food, feed and fuel" will continue to move crop prices higher over the long-term. Agcapita created the Farmland Investment Partnership to allow investors to add professionally managed farmland to their portfolios. Agcapita publishes a monthly agriculture briefing.
Mercer Capital's Bank Watch | April 2020 | Ernest Hemingway, Albert Camus, an...Mercer Capital
Brought to you by the Financial Institutions Team of Mercer Capital, this monthly newsletter is focused on bank activity in five U.S. regions. Bank Watch highlights various banking metrics, including public market indicators, M&A market indicators, and key indices of the top financial institutions, providing insight into financial institution valuation issues.
As the Chinese authorities inject a fresh $1trn in new credit in the first quarter of 2016, Economist Marcus Wright examines this latest development and what it means for China and the world economy.
The US Fed has raised rates for the first time since June 2006. But was it needed? Rupert Seggins & Marcus Wright look at the following key aspects of the US economy: inflation, the labour market, growth & the global backdrop to establish whether a rate rise was necessary and some of the pros & cons of doing it now.
Monetary policy is an important public policy, but it is not the only one to stabilize our economy and reduce its business cycles. The leading central bank, the Federal Reserve of the U.S., has introduced, after the 2008 global financial crisis, new instruments and unusual facilities to implement its new innovative monetary policy. The financial world and mostly the social scientists watch as the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decides on a target interest rate in the federal funds market for the next period. The framework that the FOMC uses to implement monetary policy has changed over the last twelve years and continues to evolve today. Here, we try to evaluate the new instruments and their “effectiveness”. Before the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers used one set of traditional instruments (tools) to achieve the target rate. However, several policy interventions, introduced soon after the crisis, drastically altered the landscape of the federal funds market and the traditional economic theory. This new and uncertain environment, with enormous reserves and even interest on reserves, necessitated a new set of instruments by the Fed for its monetary policy implementation. Lately, after seven years of zero interest rate, the FOMC began in December 2015 to increase the target rate and then, went back again to a lower one, but many questions arise. How did they evaluate the effectiveness of these new instruments? Is the current federal funds rate the appropriate one for our economic wellbeing? How efficient was so far this ZIR monetary policy after the latest global financial crisis? Why the Fed put all these burdens of its ‘innovated” new monetary policy to the poor taxpayers (bail out) and to the risk-averse depositors (bail in)? Is it possible for the Fed’s policy to prevent the future financial crises? The federal funds rate was very low and affected negatively the financial markets (bubbles were growing), the real rates of interest (it is negative for twelve years), and the deposit rates (they are closed to zero for twelve years). The redistribution of wealth of depositors and taxpayers continues, which means the true economic welfare is falling and a new global recession was in preparation, if the current unfair easy money policy will persist, ignoring the necessity of a prevention of financial crises. Then, it came as an unexpected plague the coronavirus pandemic, following with a new but, the worse in economic history global crisis (chaos).
Growth in emerging markets is slowing. This is concerning. Senior Economist Marcus Wright considers two questions. What are the problems in emerging market economies? Why does that matter to us?
As the global financial crisis entered its most dramatic phase, in the second half of 2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), many governments and several distinguished scholars advocated expansionary fiscal olicy as the second most effective tool (after monetary stimulus) to fight deep recession and deflation. Now, more than a year later, the previous excitement surrounding the supposed power of fiscal stimulus largely disappeared and instead has been replaced by ising concerns over the sustainability of public finances in many countries. Unfortunately, the previous enthusiasts of the active counter‐cyclical fiscal policy have not always realized the causality between the two.
Authored by: Marek Dąbrowski
Published in 2009
The next President will need to confront a number of budgetary challenges and will likely sign into law many federal tax and spending changes. Yet too often, election campaigns are about telling voters what they want to hear rather than what they need to know. To separate fiction from reality, the new Fiscal FactChecker series will monitor the 2016 Presidential campaign on an ongoing basis. To start with, we have identified 16 myths that may come up during the campaign.
The presidential campaign can be an excellent opportunity to engage in a frank, constructive dialogue about the nation's fiscal challenges and what to do about them. Of course, it is much easier to rely on well-worn myths than to explain complex concepts and propose ideas that voters may not like. That’s why we published "16 Budget Myths to Watch Out for in the 2016 Campaign."
Mercer Capital's Bank Watch | April 2020 | Ernest Hemingway, Albert Camus, an...Mercer Capital
Brought to you by the Financial Institutions Team of Mercer Capital, this monthly newsletter is focused on bank activity in five U.S. regions. Bank Watch highlights various banking metrics, including public market indicators, M&A market indicators, and key indices of the top financial institutions, providing insight into financial institution valuation issues.
As the Chinese authorities inject a fresh $1trn in new credit in the first quarter of 2016, Economist Marcus Wright examines this latest development and what it means for China and the world economy.
The US Fed has raised rates for the first time since June 2006. But was it needed? Rupert Seggins & Marcus Wright look at the following key aspects of the US economy: inflation, the labour market, growth & the global backdrop to establish whether a rate rise was necessary and some of the pros & cons of doing it now.
Monetary policy is an important public policy, but it is not the only one to stabilize our economy and reduce its business cycles. The leading central bank, the Federal Reserve of the U.S., has introduced, after the 2008 global financial crisis, new instruments and unusual facilities to implement its new innovative monetary policy. The financial world and mostly the social scientists watch as the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decides on a target interest rate in the federal funds market for the next period. The framework that the FOMC uses to implement monetary policy has changed over the last twelve years and continues to evolve today. Here, we try to evaluate the new instruments and their “effectiveness”. Before the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers used one set of traditional instruments (tools) to achieve the target rate. However, several policy interventions, introduced soon after the crisis, drastically altered the landscape of the federal funds market and the traditional economic theory. This new and uncertain environment, with enormous reserves and even interest on reserves, necessitated a new set of instruments by the Fed for its monetary policy implementation. Lately, after seven years of zero interest rate, the FOMC began in December 2015 to increase the target rate and then, went back again to a lower one, but many questions arise. How did they evaluate the effectiveness of these new instruments? Is the current federal funds rate the appropriate one for our economic wellbeing? How efficient was so far this ZIR monetary policy after the latest global financial crisis? Why the Fed put all these burdens of its ‘innovated” new monetary policy to the poor taxpayers (bail out) and to the risk-averse depositors (bail in)? Is it possible for the Fed’s policy to prevent the future financial crises? The federal funds rate was very low and affected negatively the financial markets (bubbles were growing), the real rates of interest (it is negative for twelve years), and the deposit rates (they are closed to zero for twelve years). The redistribution of wealth of depositors and taxpayers continues, which means the true economic welfare is falling and a new global recession was in preparation, if the current unfair easy money policy will persist, ignoring the necessity of a prevention of financial crises. Then, it came as an unexpected plague the coronavirus pandemic, following with a new but, the worse in economic history global crisis (chaos).
Growth in emerging markets is slowing. This is concerning. Senior Economist Marcus Wright considers two questions. What are the problems in emerging market economies? Why does that matter to us?
As the global financial crisis entered its most dramatic phase, in the second half of 2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), many governments and several distinguished scholars advocated expansionary fiscal olicy as the second most effective tool (after monetary stimulus) to fight deep recession and deflation. Now, more than a year later, the previous excitement surrounding the supposed power of fiscal stimulus largely disappeared and instead has been replaced by ising concerns over the sustainability of public finances in many countries. Unfortunately, the previous enthusiasts of the active counter‐cyclical fiscal policy have not always realized the causality between the two.
Authored by: Marek Dąbrowski
Published in 2009
The next President will need to confront a number of budgetary challenges and will likely sign into law many federal tax and spending changes. Yet too often, election campaigns are about telling voters what they want to hear rather than what they need to know. To separate fiction from reality, the new Fiscal FactChecker series will monitor the 2016 Presidential campaign on an ongoing basis. To start with, we have identified 16 myths that may come up during the campaign.
The presidential campaign can be an excellent opportunity to engage in a frank, constructive dialogue about the nation's fiscal challenges and what to do about them. Of course, it is much easier to rely on well-worn myths than to explain complex concepts and propose ideas that voters may not like. That’s why we published "16 Budget Myths to Watch Out for in the 2016 Campaign."
This paper investigates the barriers to innovation perceived by Polish manufacturing firms. It refers to the heterogeneity of innovation active firms. We introduce a taxonomy of innovative firms based on the frequency with which they introduce commercialised innovations using data from both CIS4 (for 2002-2004) and CIS5 (2004-2006). Two groups of innovation-active firms are distinguished: those which introduced innovation in both periods covered by both CIS (which we call persistent innovators) and those which introduced innovation either in CIS4 or CIS5 (which we call occasional innovators). We use a four step analysis covering binary correlations, Principal Component Analysis, probit model and correlations of disturbances. Two types of explanatory variables describing firms’ characteristics and innovation inputs used are considered. The paper shows that there are considerable differences in sensitivities to the perception of innovation barriers and in complementarities among barriers between persistent and occasional innovators. In the case of occasional innovators, a kind of innovation barrier chain is observed. This has an impact on differences in the frequency of innovation activities between the two groups of innovators and results in a diversification of innovators.
Authored by: Ewa Balcerowicz, Marek Pęczkowski, Anna Wziatek-Kubiak
Published in 2011
Agcapita is Canada's only RRSP and TFSA eligible farmland fund and is part of a family of funds with over $100 million in assets under management. Agcapita believes farmland is a safe investment, that supply is shrinking and that unprecedented demand for "food, feed and fuel" will continue to move crop prices higher over the long-term. Agcapita created the Farmland Investment Partnership to allow investors to add professionally managed farmland to their portfolios.
Veripath has over 90,000 (2021) acres across its Canadian row-crop portfolios and its principals have been investing in the Canadian farmland space since 2007, including creating the first RRSP eligible Canadian farmland fund. Minimum and zero tillage methodologies have very high penetration in Canadian prairies (AB, SK and MB). These tillage techniques are accepted to increase carbon/biomass in the soil and are a key component of conservation/regenerative agriculture practices. Veripath portfolios have minimum and zero tillage usages levels that on average are materially higher
than baseline provincial levels
Veripath Research "As people in the emerging economies of India and China make the transition to western standards of
living there is an often-overlooked issue – their water
consumption is rising dramatically.
Veripath Farmland Partners Research - portfolio optimization using farmland a...Veripath Partners
A review of the Canadian farmland market over the last 30 years reveals: a farmland holding would have improved the financial performance of typical investor portfolios; realized volatility that was lower than stocks; realized returns that were greater than bonds; a low correlation to traditional financial asset returns; and most importantly domestic institutional and retail investors are clearly under-invested relative to efficient frontier analysis.
Are fiscal/monetary conditions affecting the macro thesis for Canadian farmland investments? Do publicly traded equity investments hedge all inflation regimes? Canada's debt to GDP - looming threat or irrelevancy?
Equicapita Announces Acquisition of Majority of CCMETVeripath Partners
Equicapita Income Trust and Equicapita Income LP (collectively “Equicapita” or the
“Fund”) are pleased to announce the completion of the acquisition of a 70% equity ownership of CCMET
Group of Companies, a leading provider of integrated, full service materials engineering and testing
services throughout Western Canada, by an affiliate of the Fund.
Equicapita Reaches $100M in Subscribed Trust Capital Veripath Partners
Equicapita Income Trust announces it has completed the raise of $100M in subscribed preferred trust capital.
Stephen Johnston, a partner at Equicapita reports, "Equicapita is pleased to have passed the $100M mark in subscribed capital. Equicapita is part of a group of innovative Calgary based alternative funds seeking alternative investments. As managers we seek to deliver superior investment returns with lower volatility than public markets through private equity investing that combines strong underlying asset fundamentals and a disciplined value style. In practice we look for investments with: established macro drivers (typically in the form of a favourable supply/demand situation) and: a margin of safety (in the form of discounted asset prices, ability to acquire cash flow cheaply). To date, we have successfully deployed capital in multiple investment strategies via a group of funds – in farmland, SME PE, energy and non-bank lending – and currently have approximately $300M in unlevered AUM.
Agcapita is pleased to announce that Agcapita Fund IV has launched. Agcapita Fund V is a $20 million offering and is the only RRSP eligible farmland investment vehicle in Canada. If you would like to receive information about Agcapita Fund V please feel free to contact us at Fund5@agcapita.com or register online at the Agcapita website.
Stephen Johnston, co-founder of Agcapita, commented "Agcapita believes that prices of Canada farmland, in particular Saskatchewan farmland, are discounted to world averages for a tonne of productive capacity. Part of our investment premise is that this gap will close and with the attention that Canadian farmland is receiving from investors it can obviously happen quite quickly. It is this "margin of safety" return driver that attracted us to Canada and Saskatchewan in the first place.”
Investigating the Long Run Relationship Between Crude Oil and Food Commodity ...Veripath Partners
"Crude oil price is believed to be one of the factors that affect food commodity prices. It is an
agricultural production input, therefore the prices of fertilizer, fuel and transportation are affected by the crude oil prices directly, and subsequently they influence the production of grain commodities. There is another dimension to how oil prices can affect food commodity prices, and it is from the derived demand for biofuels. With rising oil prices, demand for biofuels increase and the production
of these fuel is highly dependent on the availability of agricultural feed stocks. So it is primarily because of the above two dynamics that I want to investigate if there is a long term relationship between crude oil prices and food commodity prices. This is an important issue in present times because of the rising prices and volatility in the oil and food commodity markets. I will try to examine if there exist a cointegrating relationship between crude oil price and food commodity price for the period between 1980 to 2011. The food commodities selected are maize, rice, soybean and wheat. Time Series econometric techniques were applied to find our results. The Engle-Granger Co-integration test revealed that there is long run relationship between crude oil prices and maize, soybean, wheat. But, rice prices were not found to be cointegrated. I also carried out the traditional Granger Causality test to check whether causality exist between the two prices. We find that there is unidirectional causality, with only crude oil prices ‘Granger causing’ each of the four food commodity prices. The reverse was not true, as crude oil prices were not found to be influenced by price of food commodities. So from our results we can confirm the significance of oil prices and the impact it has on the food commodity prices."
VBA Journal: Farmland, Reaping the Reward of IlliquidityVeripath Partners
Farmland is an asset class that provides a legal claim on land, and the agricultural produce that is grown on that land, in perpetuity. The returns from farmland are like those of a perpetual bond, with the proviso that operational farming returns show high volatility, being largely driven in the short term by climatic conditions and commodity prices. Bonds are typically priced at between 20 and 50 times returns, which is consistent with farmland price multiples. In contrast, equities in a moderate growth sector generally trade at a price to earnings ratio of approximately 10, making farmland look less attractive if perceived as a stock. Like other real assets farmland is protected against inflation, as is farm production. Farmland is thus similar to an inflation-protected perpetual bond with a variable yield, where both principal
and coupons are protected against currency depreciation.
Agcapita Update – Canadian Growing Season Lengthens 2 Weeks Over Last 50 Year...Veripath Partners
According to a recent Bloomberg article: "Corn is the most common grain in the U.S., with its production historically concentrated in a Midwestern region stretching from the Ohio River valley to Nebraska and trailing off in northern Minnesota. It had been ungrowable in the fertile farmland of Canada’s breadbasket. That is changing as a warming climate, along with the development of faster-maturing seed varieties, turns the table on food cultivation. The Corn Belt is being pushed north of what was imaginable a generation ago. Growing seasons on the Canadian prairie have lengthened about two weeks in the past half-century.
Agcapita Update - Canadian Farmland Values Increase 22% in 2013Veripath Partners
On Monday, April 14th, 2014 Farm Credit Canada ("FCC") released its 2013 analysis of farmland price trends across Canada by province. In all provinces, farmland values either increased or remained stable. Saskatchewan experienced the highest average increase at 28.5%, followed by Manitoba at 25.6% and Quebec at 24.7%.
Improving profitability for small businessBen Wann
In this comprehensive presentation, we will explore strategies and practical tips for enhancing profitability in small businesses. Tailored to meet the unique challenges faced by small enterprises, this session covers various aspects that directly impact the bottom line. Attendees will learn how to optimize operational efficiency, manage expenses, and increase revenue through innovative marketing and customer engagement techniques.
Falcon stands out as a top-tier P2P Invoice Discounting platform in India, bridging esteemed blue-chip companies and eager investors. Our goal is to transform the investment landscape in India by establishing a comprehensive destination for borrowers and investors with diverse profiles and needs, all while minimizing risk. What sets Falcon apart is the elimination of intermediaries such as commercial banks and depository institutions, allowing investors to enjoy higher yields.
Business Valuation Principles for EntrepreneursBen Wann
This insightful presentation is designed to equip entrepreneurs with the essential knowledge and tools needed to accurately value their businesses. Understanding business valuation is crucial for making informed decisions, whether you're seeking investment, planning to sell, or simply want to gauge your company's worth.
RMD24 | Debunking the non-endemic revenue myth Marvin Vacquier Droop | First ...BBPMedia1
Marvin neemt je in deze presentatie mee in de voordelen van non-endemic advertising op retail media netwerken. Hij brengt ook de uitdagingen in beeld die de markt op dit moment heeft op het gebied van retail media voor niet-leveranciers.
Retail media wordt gezien als het nieuwe advertising-medium en ook mediabureaus richten massaal retail media-afdelingen op. Merken die niet in de betreffende winkel liggen staan ook nog niet in de rij om op de retail media netwerken te adverteren. Marvin belicht de uitdagingen die er zijn om echt aansluiting te vinden op die markt van non-endemic advertising.
"𝑩𝑬𝑮𝑼𝑵 𝑾𝑰𝑻𝑯 𝑻𝑱 𝑰𝑺 𝑯𝑨𝑳𝑭 𝑫𝑶𝑵𝑬"
𝐓𝐉 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐬 (𝐓𝐉 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬) is a professional event agency that includes experts in the event-organizing market in Vietnam, Korea, and ASEAN countries. We provide unlimited types of events from Music concerts, Fan meetings, and Culture festivals to Corporate events, Internal company events, Golf tournaments, MICE events, and Exhibitions.
𝐓𝐉 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐬 provides unlimited package services including such as Event organizing, Event planning, Event production, Manpower, PR marketing, Design 2D/3D, VIP protocols, Interpreter agency, etc.
Sports events - Golf competitions/billiards competitions/company sports events: dynamic and challenging
⭐ 𝐅𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐣𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬:
➢ 2024 BAEKHYUN [Lonsdaleite] IN HO CHI MINH
➢ SUPER JUNIOR-L.S.S. THE SHOW : Th3ee Guys in HO CHI MINH
➢FreenBecky 1st Fan Meeting in Vietnam
➢CHILDREN ART EXHIBITION 2024: BEYOND BARRIERS
➢ WOW K-Music Festival 2023
➢ Winner [CROSS] Tour in HCM
➢ Super Show 9 in HCM with Super Junior
➢ HCMC - Gyeongsangbuk-do Culture and Tourism Festival
➢ Korean Vietnam Partnership - Fair with LG
➢ Korean President visits Samsung Electronics R&D Center
➢ Vietnam Food Expo with Lotte Wellfood
"𝐄𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐲 𝐞𝐯𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐢𝐬 𝐚 𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐲, 𝐚 𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐣𝐨𝐮𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐲. 𝐖𝐞 𝐚𝐥𝐰𝐚𝐲𝐬 𝐛𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐞𝐯𝐞 𝐭𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐭𝐥𝐲 𝐲𝐨𝐮 𝐰𝐢𝐥𝐥 𝐛𝐞 𝐚 𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐨𝐮𝐫 𝐬𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐬."
What is the TDS Return Filing Due Date for FY 2024-25.pdfseoforlegalpillers
It is crucial for the taxpayers to understand about the TDS Return Filing Due Date, so that they can fulfill your TDS obligations efficiently. Taxpayers can avoid penalties by sticking to the deadlines and by accurate filing of TDS. Timely filing of TDS will make sure about the availability of tax credits. You can also seek the professional guidance of experts like Legal Pillers for timely filing of the TDS Return.
VAT Registration Outlined In UAE: Benefits and Requirementsuae taxgpt
Vat Registration is a legal obligation for businesses meeting the threshold requirement, helping companies avoid fines and ramifications. Contact now!
https://viralsocialtrends.com/vat-registration-outlined-in-uae/
Discover the innovative and creative projects that highlight my journey throu...dylandmeas
Discover the innovative and creative projects that highlight my journey through Full Sail University. Below, you’ll find a collection of my work showcasing my skills and expertise in digital marketing, event planning, and media production.
[Note: This is a partial preview. To download this presentation, visit:
https://www.oeconsulting.com.sg/training-presentations]
Sustainability has become an increasingly critical topic as the world recognizes the need to protect our planet and its resources for future generations. Sustainability means meeting our current needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs. It involves long-term planning and consideration of the consequences of our actions. The goal is to create strategies that ensure the long-term viability of People, Planet, and Profit.
Leading companies such as Nike, Toyota, and Siemens are prioritizing sustainable innovation in their business models, setting an example for others to follow. In this Sustainability training presentation, you will learn key concepts, principles, and practices of sustainability applicable across industries. This training aims to create awareness and educate employees, senior executives, consultants, and other key stakeholders, including investors, policymakers, and supply chain partners, on the importance and implementation of sustainability.
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
1. Develop a comprehensive understanding of the fundamental principles and concepts that form the foundation of sustainability within corporate environments.
2. Explore the sustainability implementation model, focusing on effective measures and reporting strategies to track and communicate sustainability efforts.
3. Identify and define best practices and critical success factors essential for achieving sustainability goals within organizations.
CONTENTS
1. Introduction and Key Concepts of Sustainability
2. Principles and Practices of Sustainability
3. Measures and Reporting in Sustainability
4. Sustainability Implementation & Best Practices
To download the complete presentation, visit: https://www.oeconsulting.com.sg/training-presentations
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only. Ultimately, gravity asserts itself even in the fi-
nancial markets. Central banks can control exchange
rates (inflation/purchasing power of the currency) or
interest rates. Indefinite control of both is impossible.
INFLATION/NEGATIVE REAL RATE INCENTIVE #1 –
Sovereign Balance Sheets are in Poor Condition.
Stripped of all the elaborate economic jargon, once
sovereign debt levels become excessive (or more
cynically merely servicing the interest on the debt
becomes unmanageable) and access to the private
capital markets begins to evaporate, the options fall
into four basic categories in some semblance of
increasing political palatability:
• De jure default – formal debt default and restruc-
turing
• Reduce government costs – reduce entitlements
• Increase government revenue – increase taxes
• De facto default – via inflation
It goes without saying that inflation (with some sec-
ond order efforts to raise taxes) is invariably chosen
as the most expedient plan of action as its causes can
usually be obfuscated for some period (often protract-
ed) while lenders/taxpayers suffer the consequences
immediately. The other options come with undesir-
able political consequences at the ballot box and so
are usually never even seriously considered.
SHOW ME THE INCENTIVE AND I’LL SHOW YOU
THE OUTCOME – Investing in a World of Financial
Repression, Negative Real Rates, Valuation
“Challenges” and Inflationary Forces
After seeming to slumber for over 30 years, inflation
is waking up and as this is a year-end update forgive
us if we inject some philosophical observations about
these matters on top of the more prosaic and techni-
cal musings such letters inspire.
We want to start with a question. Do G7 governments
have an incentive to attempt to keep inflation higher
for longer and real rates lower for longer?
Negative real rates across a broad spectrum of credit
assets are a graphic sign that we inhabit a world of
financial repression orchestrated by central banks at
the formal/informal behest of sovereign borrowers. In
a normally functioning market, lenders do not provide
capital to borrowers for negative yields – i.e., they do
not pay for the privilege of lending. It goes without
saying we are not in a normally functioning market.
There is a silver lining to negative real rates. For the
borrower, negative real rates erode the value of the out-
standing obligations over time. In effect, protracted
periods of negative real rates help the borrower de-le-
ver. In addition, inflationary monetary policy (monetis-
ing fiscal deficits without recourse to borrowing from
the capital markets) is a source of funding that takes
capital from savers/taxpayers/lenders/pension plans
and redistributes it to government. Think of inflation
as a reverse redistribution program for government.
The largest borrowers on the planet are sovereign
governments which, if they have the desire, can for a
period impose such financing conditions on the mar-
ket. The caveat is that this is possible for a finite period
“At first inflation stimulated production
because of the divergence between the internal
and external values of the mark, but later it
exercised an increasingly disadvantageous
influence, disorganizing and limiting
production…. It provoked a serious revolution
in social classes, a few people accumulating
wealth and forming a class of usurpers
of national property, whilst millions of
individuals were thrown into poverty.”
– The Economics of Inflation – A Study of Currency
Depreciation in Post War Germany
“When you want to help people, you tell them
the truth. When you want to help yourself,
you tell them what they want to hear.”
― Thomas Sowell
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Even with the unprecedented magnitude of the surge
highlighted above, this accelerated pace of debt accu-
mulation appears to be set to continue for the foresee-
able future:
These increases come on top of already historically
unprecedented G7 sovereign and private debt levels.
Canada, to its shame, is one of the worst offenders.
29
26
23
20
17
14
11
8
5
2
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021
Change in B/S
$2.4 trillion
7% of GDP
$13 trillion
30% of GDP
Dec-22
$29.6 trillion
Chart 2: G4 Central Bank Balance Sheets – Projection
(USD Trillion)
Source: Haver Analytics, IMF, Morgan Stanley forecasts
Debt as Govt debt as Private debt
% of GDP % of GDP as % of
GDP
Japan 444.7 237.1 207.6
Canada 356.1 89.9 266.2
France 351.4 98.4 253
US 318.7 106.9 211.8
UK 310.8 86.8 224
Italy 301.6 135.5 166.2
South Korea 283.7 37.9 245
China 258.4 50.6 207.8
Australia 236.9 41.4 195.5
Germany 215.8 61.7 154.1
Russia 211.4 14.6 196.8
Turkey 200.1 30.2 170
Mexico 170.1 35.4 134.7
Brazil 157.5 87 70.5
South Africa 128.5 56.7 71.8
India 122.9 68.1 54.8
Argentina 108.4 86.1 22.3
Indonesia 70.3 30.1 40.2
Average 235.96 75.24 160.72
Chart 3: Debt to GDP (%)
Source: Icecap Asset Management, IIF
Chart 1: 1970 – 2020 Global Debt Levels
(2020 represented the largest increase in 50 years)
Sources: IMF Global Debt Database and IMF analysis (note – the estimated ratios of
global debt to GDP are weighted by each country’s GDP in US dollars)
250
200
150
100
50
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Total Debt
Public Debt
Household Debt (HH)
Nonfinancial
Corporate Debt (NFC)
Global
financial
crisis
COVID-19
pandemic
Private
Debt
2020
Public:
99%
2020
HH:
58%
2020
NFC:
98%
2007:
195%
2009:
215%
2019:
227%
2020:
256%
“I do not think it is an exaggeration to say
history is largely a history of inflation, usually
inflations engineered by governments for the
gain of governments.” ― Friedrich von Hayek
Source: Bloomberg, Crescat Capital
Chart 4: Central Bank Balance Sheets Assets to
Nominal GDP (YoY Growth)
450%
350%
250%
150%
50%
-50%
2005 2010 2015 2020
+456%
Bank of Canada
Reserve Bank of Australia
Federal Reserve
Bank of Japan
Swiss National Bank
European Central Bank
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Chart 5: Government of Canada Debt held by
Bank of Canada
Source: Bloomberg
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
BoC Holding of GoC Debt (LHS) CAD 396bn
As % of Total Gov. Debt (RHS) 33.2%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
“It is no crime to be ignorant of economics,
which is, after all, a specialized discipline and
one that most people consider to be a ‘dismal
science.’ But it is totally irresponsible to have
a loud and vociferous opinion on economic
subjects while remaining in this state of
ignorance.” ― Murray Rothbard
Canadians are now in an economy where the Bank
of Canada is the marginal buyer of all Government
of Canada debt via the printing press – i.e. Canada is
now a direct monetisation economy with no observ-
able inclination to stop on the part of the government.
…However, so is the US…
…and so is the EU…
I believe the monetisation of these ongoing massive
fiscal deficits will prove to be highly inflationary. In
fact, using previous CPI calculation methodologies
(which do not use dubious hedonic adjustments, own-
er equivalent rents etc.) inflation is well over 10% and
climbing.
Chart 7: ECB Funding of EU Deficits (>100%)
Source: ECB
1000
800
600
400
200
0
-200
-400 2020 2021 2022est.
Net bond issuance (EUR bn)
After ECB QE purchases (EUR bn)
Chart 8: US Inflation (Using CPI calculation methodology
which was employed prior to 1990)
Source: Shadowstats
Official CPI-U Experimental C-CPI SGS Alt. 1990-Based
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
2006 2011 2016 2021
Chart 6: Federal Reserve Funding of US Deficit
Sources: Haver, IIF
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2004 2008 2012 2016 2020
Q3
‘21
QE1: $300 bn
QE2: $600 bn QE3: $790 bn QT
Fed
Money market funds
Mutual funds
Banks
Foreign
Pension funds
State & local government
GSEs
Dealers
Households
Other
Total
Issuance of
US Treasuries
vs demand by
sector, in $ bn 4-
quarter moving
average
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Chart 9: US inflation (Using CPI calculation methodology
which was employed prior to 1980
Source: Shadowstats
SGS Alternate CPI, 1980-Based CPI-U
15
10
5
0
-5
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2001 2016 2021
Chart 10: Inflation vs. Money Supply Growth
(Dec 2019 – oct 2021)
Source: Bloomberg
40% change in M2
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-2% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8%
Japan Switzerland
R2
=0.83 Canada
US
UK
“Socialism in general has a record of failure so
blatant that only an intellectual could ignore
or evade it.” ― Thomas Sowell
“If socialists understood economics, they
wouldn’t be socialist.” ― Friedrich von Hayek
The Canadian government, and to be fair many others,
is arguing it has no policy “tools” to deal with inflation
as it’s a global phenomenon driven by supply chain
disruptions (which certainly is a contributor) and a
base line comparison issue from the COVD drop and
bounce back (also certainly a contributor) but even
some simple analysis shows this is disingenuous at
its core. The primary cause is the fatal combination of
massive increases in fiscal deficits funded via money
supply growth (the printing press).
Deutsche Bank’s research shows that real yields con-
sistently move deeply negative when sovereign debt
suddenly spikes.
In addition, Deutsche Bank’s research shows that CPI
invariably spikes when sovereign debt spikes – in
fact in each of the previous debt events spot inflation
reached 20% or higher.
To the average person inflation is a pernicious and de-
structive force but to heavily indebted sovereign bor-
rowers, negative real rates driven by high inflation are
a marvellous opportunity to reverse the overspending
Chart 11: Smoothed 10yr Real Yields (using 5yr rolling
overage of CPI) and the Debt-to-GDP Ratio)
Source: Deutsche Bank
SmoothRY (LHS) Debt/GDP (RHS)
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Chart 12: US CPI Inflation and the Debt-to-GDP
Source: Deutsche Bank
CPI (LHS) Debt/GDP (RHS)
30
20
10
0
-10
-20
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
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In practice, there is virtually no place to escape this
financial repression – long term, short term, real or
nominal.
Short-term real rates are negative:
Long-term real rates are negative:
Chart 13: Global Central Bank Policy Rates
Source: Compound, CharlieBilello
Country Rate
Central
Bank
Rate
(Today)
CPI
YoY
Real
Central
Bank
Rate
Last
Move
Last
Move
Date
Switzerland Target Rate -0.75% 0.9% -1.7% Cut Jan-15
Denmark Deposit Rate -0.60% 1.8% -2.4% Hike Mar-20
Eurozone Deposit Rate -0.50% 3.0% -3.5% Cut Sep-19
Japan Policy Rate Bal -0.10% -0.3% 0.2% Cut Jan-16
Norway Deposit Rate 0.00% 3.4% -3.4% Cut May-20
Sweden Repo Rate 0.00% 2.1% -2.1% Hike Dec-19
Poland Repo Rate 0.10% 5.5% -5.4% Cut May-20
Australia Cash Rate 0.10% 3.8% -3.7% Cut Nov-20
UK Bank Rate 0.10% 3.2% -3.1% Cut Mar-20
US Fed Funds 0.13% 5.3% -5.2% Cut Mar-20
New Zealand Cash Rate 0.25% 3.3% -3.1% Cut Mar-20
Canada Overnight 0.25% 4.1% -3.9% Cut Mar-20
Thailand Policy Rate 0.50% 0.0% 0.5% Cut May-20
South Korea Repo Rate 0.75% 2.6% -1.9% Hike Aug-21
Czech Republic Repo Rate 0.75% 4.1% -3.4% Hike Aug-21
Hong Kong Base Rate 0.86% 1.6% -0.7% Cut Mar-20
Peru Policy Rate 1.00% 5.0% -4.0% Hike Sep-21
Saudi Arabia Reverse Repo 1.00% 0.3% 0.7% Cut Mar-20
Taiwan Discount Rate 1.13% 2.4% -1.2% Cut Mar-20
Chile Base Rate 1.50% 4.8% -3.3% Hike Aug-21
Colombia Repo Rate 1.75% 4.4% -2.7% Cut Sep-20
Malaysia Policy Rate 1.75% 2.2% -0.5% Cut Jul-20
Philippines Key Policy Rate 2.00% 4.9% -2.9% Cut Nov-20
South Africa Repo Rate 3.50% 4.9% -1.4% Cut Jul-20
Indonesia Repo Rate 3.50% 1.6% 1.9% Cut Feb-21
China Loan Prime Rate 3.85% 0.8% 3.1% Cut Apr-20
India Repo Rate 4.00% 5.3% -1.3% Cut May-20
Mexico Overnight Rate 4.50% 5.6% -1.1% Hike Aug-21
Brazil Target Rate 6.25% 9.7% -3.4% Hike Sep-21
Russia Key Policy Rare 6.75% 6.7% 0.1% Hike Sep-21
Turkey Repo Rate 19.00% 19.3% -0.3% Hike Mar-21
Argentina Benchmark Rate 38.00% 51.4% -13.4% Hike Nov-20
Chart 14: Real Fed Funds Rate
Source: Deutsche Bank (using 3m T-Bill yield before July 1954)
25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2011 2021
“The first lesson of economics is scarcity:
There is never enough of anything to satisfy
all those who want it. The first lesson of
politics is to disregard the first lesson of
economics.” ― Thomas Sowell
mistakes of the past and discretely de-lever their bal-
ance sheets. Negative real and even negative nominal
rates are endemic across the global credit markets.
Chart 15: US 10-Year Real Yield (10-year nominal yield
minus CPI YoY (%))
Source: Bloomberg, Crescat Capital
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
-2.0
-4.0
-6.0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
-5.3338
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will mean an extension and perhaps even an increase
in the unfriendly nature of conditions for the holders
of cash and bonds. Sovereign borrowers have little
choice (as they perceive their choices) and in fact are
obviously incentivised to do so.
INFLATION/NEGATIVE REAL RATE INCENTIVE #2 –
Persistent Sovereign Fiscal Deficits and Historically
High Asset Valuations Are Unlikely to Support Higher
Nominal or Real Rates.
G7 fiscal and monetary policy is the most accommo-
dative since the 1950s – both the short and long end
of the nominal and the real yield curves are low or
negative. According to Jim Reid of Deutsche Bank,
real yields have been lower during other periods of
rapid debt accumulation, “However, that was with 20%
inflation.”
Central banks have been actively suppressing nominal
yields to support the massive supply of sovereign debt
issuance. In doing so, they have created a pervasive
negative real yield environment. Combined with debt
levels that are at historically high levels, global mone-
Junk-bond real rates are negative:
Even nominal bond rates are negative in parts of the
market:
The global credit markets, rather than providing risk
free return are providing return free risk and given their
tenuous balance sheets, sovereign borrowers are cer-
tain to attempt to extend these favorable borrowing
conditions via their fiscal and monetary powers. This
Chart 16: Junk Bonds Real Yield – US corporate High
Yield (Yield to worst minus CPI YoY (%))
Source: Bloomberg, Crescat Capital
10
15
10
5
0
-1.9919
1990 2000 2010 2020
Chart 17: Negative Nominal Yielding Bonds (market total
($ trillions))
Source: FT
20
15
10
5
0
2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2019 2020 2021
Chart 18: 200-Year History of US Real Interest Rates
(10-year real interest rate = treasury yield – CPI YoY %))
Sources: Bank of America Global Investment Strategy, Global Financial Data
20%
10%
0%
-10%
-20%
1789 1809 1829 1849 1869 1889 1909 1929 1949 1969 1989 2009
Oct 21
1812-15
War of 1812 1850-51
Oversupply
crisis
Panic of
1907
1914-18
WWI
1973-74
Oil crisis/OPEC
oil embargo
1939-45
WWII
1973-79
Long
Depression
1861-65
US Civil War
1837-43
Panic of
1837
Panic of
1796-97
“How did you go bankrupt?” Two ways.
Gradually, then suddenly.” ― Ernest Hemingway
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tary authorities seem to be arriving at their Hobson’s
choice moment.
• Choice 1 – Stop financial repression = fiscal defi-
cits may not be fundable and asset valuations
may drop.
• Choice 2 – Continue financial repression = infla-
tion rises but sovereigns de-lever.
Remembering that incentives drive outcomes – what
path do you think will be followed?
Just how tenuous is the G7 sovereign funding posi-
tion? The G7 has effectively never been this indebted
and at such low nominal as well as real interest rates.
In the past two years the United States has borrowed
approximately $6 trillion. Despite such a large in-
crease in debt, the federal government’s net interest
payments have remained below 2% of GDP – a trend
that has persisted since 2001 on the back of low inter-
est rates.
However, according to the Congressional Budget Of-
fice (CBO) if short-term rates rose to 2.4% in 2031 and
long-term rates to 3.5%, interest costs for the federal
government would double – from 1.5% of GDP in 2021
to 2.7% of GDP in 2031. Looking out over the next 30
“The life of the inflation in its ripening
stage was a paradox which had its own
unmistakable characteristics. One was the
great wealth, at least of those favored by
the boom. Many great fortunes sprang up
overnight… Side by side with the wealth were
the pockets of poverty. Greater numbers of
people remained on the outside of the easy
money, looking in but not able to enter. The
crime rate soared.”
― Jens Parsson – Dying of Money
“Blessed are the young for they shall inherit
the national debt.” ― Herbert Hoover
Chart 19: Net Interest Costs (% of GDP)
Sources: Peter G Peterson Foundation, CBO
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
years, the total of US net interest payments is project-
ed to be more than $60 trillion.
According to the CBO’s long-term outlook, by 2051,
interest payments will take up nearly half of all US
federal revenues and measure close to 9% of GDP.
This is a pattern repeated throughout the G7. Such
trajectories are not sustainable.
Turning the page to asset prices, just how tenuous are
they? Bond yields are at historic nominal and real lows
which needs no further explanation. At the same time,
equity valuations by many metrics are also at histori-
cally elevated levels.
Chart 20: Net Interest Cost (projected to 2050 as a
percent of federal revenue)
Source: Peter G Peterson Foundation, CBO, (excluding any federal funding of 2050
Net Zero targets)
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
8% 8%
10%
17%18%17%
11%
8% 9%
7%
10%
7%
12%
21%
27%
35%
45%
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Valuation
Metric Current percentile ranking
(relative to history)
S&P 500 forward P/E |
S&P 500 trailing P/E |
S&P 500 5-year normalized P/E |
S&P 500 price/book value ratio |
S&P 500 price/cash flow |
S&P 500 dividend yield |
Shiller’s CAPE (cyclically-adjusted P/E |
Rule of 20 |
Equity risk premium (10-year Treasury yield) |
Equity risk premium (Baa corporate bond yield) |
Fed Model |
Tobin’s Q |
Market cap/GDP |
Chart 21: S&P 500 Valuation Metric Current Percentile
Relative to History
Source: Charles Schwab, Leuthold Group
Chart 24: Total Enterprise Value of Firms with EBIT
less than Interest Expense: (“Zombie” companies as
coined by Seth Klarman are companies which cannot
pay interest without cheap debt)
Source: Kallash Concepts
6 ($Trillion)
5
4
3
2
1
0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
38.69
Source: Robert Schiller
Chart 22: Schiller CAPE
Chart 23: S&P Forward P/E Ratios and Subsequent 10-
year Returns (total annualised returns in percent)
Source: IBES, Refinitiv Datastream, S&P. JP Morgan Asset Management, FT
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
8x 11x 14x 17x 20x 23x
Current level
“The way to crush the bourgeoisie is to grind
them between the millstones of taxation and
inflation” ― Vladimir Lenin
Schiller CAPE is one of the metrics with the most
extreme reading. Something to bear in mind as its
predictive utility has been quite good.
INFLATION/NEGATIVE REAL RATE INCENTIVE #3 –
Use Inflation to Fund 2050 Net Zero?
Below you will find some selected excerpts from the
recent, influential report of Bank of America – ““Tran-
swarming” World”. The report is a detailed analysis of
the expected costs to reach 2050 Net Zero – along
with a light-hearted real time translation tool. The syn-
opsis of the report is that the 2050 Net Zero targets
will require a minimum (emphasis mine) of $150 tril-
lion in capital – approximately 2 times current global
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GDP. Our expectation is this estimate will prove highly
optimistic given the complex and unprecedented na-
ture of the undertaking.
Q: What is the economic impact of net zero?
A: Elevated net zero funding could be inflationary, but
the impact looks manageable at 1% to 3% per annum
depending on central bank monetization rates, partic-
ularly if government spending is targeted and contrib-
utes to accelerate the rate of global GDP growth. The
IEA also has a productive outlook for their net zero
scenario, where the change in the annual growth rate
of GDP accelerates by somewhere between 0.3% and
0.5% on a sustained basis over the next 10 years as a
result of a shift to a green economy. (Emphasis mine)
Translation – This is an explicit recognition that Net
Zero 2050 is expected to be funded in a highly infla-
tionary manner. While Bank of America forecasts
that 2050 Net Zero expenditures will generate up to
0.5% nominal GDP growth, if funded by 50% moneti-
zation (which is reasonable given the direct taxation
challenge), they are also expected to generate approx-
imately 2% annual inflation for the next decade (i.e.
in addition to the already elevated inflation rates that
are unfolding). Net Zero targets will therefore create
modest GDP growth but material inflation growth over
the next decade – i.e. they are forecast to reduce real
GDP which intuitively makes sense as it will involve
Chart 25: Increase in Inflation Relative to Baseline
Assuming Various Levels of Cost Monetization
Source: Bank of America, Haver, assumes $500billion of spending in 2021
increasing by $500 billion every year until reaching $5 trillion in 2030 for perpetuity
(emphasis mine)
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
2023 2026 2029 2032 2035 2038 2041 2044 2047 2050
$1tn (20%) $2.5tn (50%) $5tn (100%)
the stranding and early retirement of US$ trillions in
legacy capital.
Q: How much will it cost?
A: The energy transition to a net zero greenhouse gas
(GHG) economy by 2050 will be a very expensive exer-
cise, (emphasis mine) estimated by the IEA at $150tn
of total investment, over a period of 30 years. At $5tn
p.a, the IEA see it costing as much as the entire US
tax base every year for 30 years. BNEF has a higher
estimate that the total investment needed for energy
supply and infrastructure could be as high as $173tn
through 2050, or up to $5.8tn annually, which is nearly
three times the amount invested on an annual basis
today.
Translation – This cannot be funded by from tax reve-
nues, certainly not without a taxpayer revolt. Inflation
is the most expedient way forward.
Q: Who will pay for it and how?
A: A combination of corporate bond issuance, com-
mercial bank balance sheet capacity, government debt,
and carbon taxes will likely be required to achieve full
decarbonization. It will be very challenging to boost
funding resources to the $5tn a year required to get
to net zero emissions, …Decarbonisation bill of $5tn a
year is equivalent to 25% of current global tax revenues
($20tn); assuming that global tax revenue grows at the
10y average over the next 30 years and a progressive
spending path, the decarbonization bill would amount
to 15% of global tax revenues by 2030, meaning ac-
commodating climate action finance likely required far
beyond fiscal budgets.
Translation – The taxpayer will pay for all of it, through
the redistribution effects of inflation and taxes.
“The problem isn’t that Johnny can’t read. The
problem isn’t even that Johnny can’t think.
The problem is that Johnny doesn’t know
what thinking is; he confuses it with feeling.”
― Thomas Sowell
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INFLATION AND THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
How might current and forecasted real rate/inflation
conditions effect the agriculture sector? Inflation
tends to manifest quickly in the agriculture complex.
The two major transmission mechanisms being 1)
fuel and fertilizer input pricing combined with the 2)
the inelastic demand curve for food.
Following the recent run-ups in agriculture commod-
ity prices, the long-term price trend in the agriculture
space seems to indicate sustained upward pressure
is possible and that agriculture commodity prices may
have entered a cyclical bull market. This would make
sense given demand growth and inflation expecta-
tions.
Rotation out of long duration, inflation sensitive assets
may provide an additional impetus to agriculture com-
modity returns. While commodity prices have moved
materially in the last 24 months, commodities are
still historically undervalued in relation to other asset
classes such as public equities:
To conclude this update, we believe a reasonable
working hypothesis is that the economic incentives
for sovereign borrowers to attempt to continue finan-
cial repression via negative real rates and inflation will
trump the need for sound economic policies for the
foreseeable future.
Despite the destructive outcome this is bound to
unleash, if history is a guide, when government finds
this is the last option, there is typically no hesitation to
attempt to use it.
In practice, if you think of inflation as a source of
funding when all others have been exhausted, then
you will clearly see the path forward. So, while central
banks and governments may make superficial, highly
publicized attempts to appear to be dealing with the
problem, these will at most be made with a view to
keep the repression to a politically tolerable level to
extend the benefits for as long as possible. Expect
there to be an attempt to boil the frog slowly in the
inflationary water so to speak.
Chart 26: Agricultural Commodity Price Trend – $DBA ETF
Source: Bloomberg, Crescat Capital
40
30
20.1074
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023
Chart 27: Commodities to Equity Ratio: S&P GSCI Index /
S&P 500 Index
Source: Bloomberg, Crescat Capital
10
8
6
4
2
0
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
.568
1972 Nifty Fifty
Stock Bubble
Tech Bust
?
Oil Embargo &
Inflationary Bust
Gulf War &
S&L Crisis
2008 Peak Oil &
Global Financial
Crisis
“An age of loose money not only destroys
savings; it corrodes character.”
― Theodore Dalrymple
“There are two ways to be fooled. One is to
believe what isn’t true; the other is to refuse to
believe what is true.” ― Soren Kirkegaard
12. #300, 4954 Richard Rd SW,
Calgary, AB T3E 6L1
www.veripathpartners.com
About Veripath
VeripathisaCanadianalternativeinvestmentfirm.Members
of Veripath’s management team have been investing in
farmland since 2007. Veripath is focused on risk first and
invests in a way that seeks to reduce operational, weather,
geographic and business-related risks while capturing the
pure return from land appreciation for its investors. Our
goal is to partner with farmers for the long-term using
innovative lease arrangements and/or land-unit swaps to
give certainty to farming operations.
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Past performance does not guarantee future results. This document contains statistical data, market research and industry forecasts that were obtained
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