2. Defining Governance
❖ A very general concept; as a result of this generality it gets defined
narrowly and refers to
❖ Level of governance associated with Type of organisation – public governance,
corporate governance, non-profit, global etc
❖ Field of governance associated with type of activity or outcome –
environmental governance, IT governance, internet governance
❖ Model of governance derived through normative or practical theory –
participatory governance, regulatory governance, multi-level governance, meta
governance, collaborative governance
❖ Term from the Greek verb κυβερνάω [kubernáo] (meaning to steer -
Plato)
❖ Term was re-minted as recently as the 1990s by economists and
political scientists, and disseminated by institutions such as
the UN, IMF and World Bank
❖ Charles Plummer’s 'The Governance of England' (published in 1885 as
a translation from the original 13th century Latin of John Fortescue’s
'The Difference between an Absolute and a Limited Monarchy'
3. Defining Governance
❖ Governance refers to "all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a
government, market or network, whether over a family, tribe, formal or informal
organization or territory and whether through laws, norms, power or language."
❖ It relates to "the processes of interaction and decision-making among the actors
involved in a collective problem that lead to the creation, reinforcement, or
reproduction of social norms and institutions."
❖ a government is a formal body invested with the authority to make decisions in a given
political system.
❖ the governance process, which includes all the actors involved in influencing the
decision-making process (such as lobbies, parties, medias), is centered on the relevant
"governing body".
❖ Whether the organization is a geopolitical entity (nation-state), a corporation (a
business or organization incorporated as a legal entity), a socio-political entity
(chiefdom, tribe, family, etc.), or an informal one, its governance is the way the rules,
norms and actions are produced, sustained, regulated and held accountable. The
degree of formality depends on the internal rules of a given organization.
4. Defining Governance
“Governance is a method through which power is exercised in the
management of a country’s political, economic and social resources for
development.” World Bank, 1992
“Governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of
a country’s social and economic resources for development.” Asian
Development Bank, 1995
“Governance is the exercise of economic, political, and administrative
authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the
mechanisms, processes, and institutions, through which citizens and groups
articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and
mediate their differences.” UNDP, 1997
“Governance is the process whereby societies or organizations make
important decisions, determine whom they involve and how they render
account.” Canada Institution of Governance, 2002
5. Defining Governance
❖ Paths of development of definition
❖ First definitional path – international organisation - State centric
❖ “Governance, as distinct from government, refers to the relationship between civil society
and the state, between rulers and the ruled, the government and the governed. […] It is this
latter aspect – the relation of civil society to the state – that distinguishes the study of
governance from other studies of government.” (McCARNEY, HALFANI & RODRIGUEZ 1995 :
95, 96)
❖ Second definitional path for the most part to a group of U.S. political scientists. At this
juncture governance is broadened by integrating ideas of democracy and legitimacy
as well as to recognize alternative power concentrations instead of traditional
government
❖ the third definitional track relates to the concept of urban governance that evolved
from the work of the GURI (Global Urban Research Initiative) starting in the early
1990s.
❖ including elements mostly considered to lie beyond the public-policy process. Thus illegal
operators, informal-sector organizations and social movements were incorporated,
recognizing that theses elements are nevertheless contributory in the development of third
world cities as well as having a significant influence on the urban landscape (McCARNEY
2003 : 37).
6. Defining Urban Governance
❖ United Nations Human Settlements Programme defines urban
governance as:
❖ “[...] the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and
manage the common affairs of the city. It is a continuing process through which
conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be
taken. It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social
capital of citizens.” (UN HABITAT 2002a : 14)
❖ This definition does not only distinguish between government and
governance but also recognizes the variety of different
stakeholders partaking in the urban governance process.
❖ The term “government” refers to a political unit in order to
implement policy making while the word “governance” specifies an
overall responsibility for political and administrative functions.
7. Actors in Urban Governance
Central & State
Governments
Municipal
Government
Agencies of
Central & State
Governments
Traditional
Authorities
NGOs
Formal Civil
Society
Organisations
Informal Civil
Society
Organisations
Utility
Companies
Business
International
Business
Local
Households
in poverty
Informal
Sector
Businesses
8. Urban Governance
Urban governance refers to the management of civic affairs by institutions to
improve the quality of life in an inclusive, transparent and accountable
manner. Municipal Corporations, as institutions of local government, are
constituents of the third tier that play an important role in local economic
development;
The quality of urban governance is the single most important factor for the
eradication of urban poverty and for prosperous cities UN HABITAT launched
the Global Campaign on Urban Governance in 1999 –
The campaign’s goal is to enhance the quality of life in cities as well as to
contribute to the eradication of poverty through improved urban governance.
There is an emerging consensus that good governance is the ‘sina qua non’ for
sustainable human and settlements development – UN HABITAT 2002
9. Good Governance
"Good governance" implies that mechanisms function in a way that
allows the executives (the "agents") to respect the rights and
interests of the stakeholders (the "principals"), in a spirit
of democracy.
Good governance is an indeterminate term used in international
development literature to describe various normative accounts of
how public institutions ought to conduct public affairs and manage
public resources. These normative accounts are often justified on the
grounds that they are thought to be conducive to economic ends,
such as the eradication of poverty and successful economic
development. Unsurprisingly different organizations have defined
governance and good governance differently to promote different
normative ends.
11. What is Local Government?
Local Governments refers to specific institutions or
entities created by –
National Constitutions (Brazil, India, Chile, Uganda, South
Africa, Japan, Sweden, Denmark, France , Italy)
State Constitutions (Australia, USA)
Ordinary legislation by Central Govt (UK, NZ, Indonesia,
Kazakhstan, Poland, most of the countries )
Ordinary legislation by State Govt (Canada, Argentina,
Pakistan)
Executive order (China)
to deliver a range of specified services to relatively
small geographically delineated area
12. What is Local Governance?
Governance by local government
It is a broader concept
The formulation and execution of collective action at the
local level. It encompasses
the direct and indirect roles of formal institutions of local
governments and government hierarchies
the roles of informal norms, networks, community
organisations and neighborhood associations
In pursuing collective action by defining the framework
for citizen-citizen and citizen-state interactions, collective
decision making and delivery of local public services.
13. What is Local Governance?
It includes the diverse objectives of vibrant, living,
working and environmentally preserved self-governing
communities.
Good local governance is not just providing a range of
local services but
Preserving the life and liberty of residents,
Creating space for democratic participation and civic
dialogue
Supporting market-led environmentally sustainable local
development
Facilitating outcome that enrich the quality of life of
residents
Concept of ‘Good’ and ‘Self’ Government
14. Local Governance – Changing
Dimensions
Concept of local governance as old as human
civilization but has recently received place in academic
and practical literature
Broader concept of local governance is yet to embraced
by development economics as it still concentrates on a
local government or community organisations
Globalization and information revolution are forcing a
reexamination of citizen-state relations and roles and
the relationships of various orders of government with
entities beyond government – and thereby an enhanced
focus on local governance.
15. John Stuart Mill on Local Government
“It is obvious to begin with, that all business purely local, all which
concerns a single locality, should devolve upon the local authorities.
The paving, lighting, and cleaning of the streets of a town, and in
ordinary circumstances the draining of its houses, are of little
consequence to any but to its inhabitants. But among the duties
classed as local or performed by local functionaries, there are many
which might with equal propriety be termed national, being the
share, belonging to the locality, of some branch of the public
administration in the efficiency of which the whole nation is alike
interested: the goals, for instance – the local police – the local
administration of justice”.
John Stuart Mill. 1848. Principles of Political Economy. Parker London and Mill 1910
“Representative Governments” in Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government,
Everyman Edition. Dent. London.
16. Dillon’s Rule
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the
following powers, and no others: first, those granted in
express words, those necessarily or fairly implied in or,
incident to the powers expressed granted; second,
those essential to the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation – not simply convenient, but
indispensable. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt
concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the
courts against the corporation, and the power is denied.
J.F. Dillon. 1911. Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations. Little Brown and Co.
Boston
17. Why Local Government?
Connolly, Brunori, and Bell assert that
“the acceptance of strong autonomous local self
government is a normative good that provides the
foundation for our federal system of government”.
18. The Theory of Local Governance
Rationale for Local Government
Principal of fiscal equivalence
Principal of correspondence
Principal of decentralisation
Principal of subsidiary
Principal of residually
19. The Theory of Local Governance
Rationale for Local Government
Stigler (1957) – two principles of jurisdictional design
The closer a representative government is to the people,
the better it works
People should have the right to vote for the kind and
amount of public services they want
Decision making should occur at the lowest level of
government consistent with goal of allocative
efficiency
Optimal size of jurisdiction varies with specific
Economies of scale and benefit-cost spillovers
20. The Theory of Local Governance
Rationale for Local Government
The Principle of fiscal equivalency – the public choice
perspective – Olson 1969 –
Equating the political jurisdiction with the benefit area
overlaps
To overcome the free rider problem
Marginal benefit equals marginal cost of production –
ensuring optimal provision of public services
It requires a separate jurisdiction for each public service
21. The Theory of Local Governance
Rationale for Local Government
The correspondence principle – Oates 1972
The jurisdiction that determines the level of provision of
each public good should include precisely the set individuals
who consume the good.
It requires a large number of overlapping jurisdictions
Frey and Eichenberger (1995, 96, 99 – concept of
functional overlapping and competing jurisdictions (FOCJ)
Individuals and communities could be free to choose among
competing jurisdictions
School communities of Swiss Canton of Zurich and Special
districts in North America
22. The Theory of Local Governance
Rationale for Local Government
The decentralisation theorem – Oates 1972
Each public service should be provided by the jurisdiction
having control over the minimum geographic area that would
internalize benefits and costs of such provisions because –
LGs understand the concerns of local residents
Local decisions making is responsive to the people for whom the
services are intended
Unnecessary layers of jurisdiction are eliminated
Interjurisdictional competition and innovations are enhanced
Ideal decentralised system ensures a level and
combination of public services consistent with Voters’
preferences while providing incentive for the efficient
provisions of services
23. The Theory of Local Governance
Rationale for Local Government
The subsidiarity principle –
taxing, spending and regulatory functions should be
exercised by lower levels of government unless a convincing
case can be made for assigning them to higher levels of
government.
Evolved from the social teaching of Roman Catholic Church
– Pope Leo XIII in 1891
Pope Pius XI – advocated it as third way between
dictatorship and laissez fair approach to governance
Maastricht Treaty adopted it as guiding principle
24. The Theory of Local Governance
Rationale for Local Government
Principle of Residually
Opposite to subsidiarity principle
Residually principle is applied in unitary country under
which local governments have assignments / functions
that higher level governments are unwilling or unable to
perform
25. Implementation Mechanism
Achieving the optimal number and size of local jurisdictions
requires community formation process
Voting with feet –
Tiebout (1956) people consider tax costs and the public services
menu offered by a jurisdiction in deciding where to live. Thus,
voting with feet leads to the formation of jurisdictions, creating a
market analog for public service provision.
Oates (1969) argued that if people vote with their feet, fiscal
differentials across communities are capitalized into residential
property values.
Brueckner and Shah - optimal provision of public services is not
ensured by voting with feet alone but depends also on rational
voting behavior.
26. Implementation Mechanism
Voting by ballot. - collective decision making may not
ensure maximization of the electorate’s welfare, because
citizens and their governmental agents can have different
goals.
Voluntary associations -Buchanan (1965) postulates that
the provision of public services through voluntary
associations of people (clubs) ensures the formation of
jurisdictions consistent with the optimal provision of public
services.
Jurisdictional redesign. An important process for
community formation in modern societies is redrawing the
boundaries of existing jurisdictions to create special or
multipurpose jurisdictions.
27. Urban Governance Model – Different
Perspectives
Five perspectives on roles and responsibilities of
local governments
(a) traditional fiscal federalism,
(b) new public management (NPM),
(c) public choice,
(d) new institutional economics (NIE),
(e) network forms of local governance - concerned with
institutional arrangements to overcome both market and
government failures.
Market Failure
Government
Failure
28. Urban Governance Models – Fiscal
Federalism Perspective
Traditional Fiscal Federalism – treats Local government
as a handmaiden (subordinate) of a higher
government order –
• Depending on constitution and legal status – state
governments assume varying degree of oversight
Dual federalism – LG as extension of State Govt. – UK,
USA, Canada, India
Cooperative federalism – Brazil
In unitary state – LG act on behalf of central govt.
29. Urban Governance Models – Fiscal
Federalism Perspective
The assignment of public services to local or
regional governments on the basis of –
economies of scale,
economies of scope
cost-benefit spillovers,
proximity to beneficiaries,
consumer preferences, and
budgetary choices about the composition of
spending.
30. Urban Governance Models – Fiscal
Federalism Perspective
Two-tier structures for metropolitan governance
special-purpose agencies or bodies deliver a wide
range of metropolitan and regional public services,
including education, health, planning, recreation, and
environmental protection.
Proliferation of SPB can undermine accountability and
budgetary flexibility at local levels
Accountability and responsiveness to voters are
weakened if members of SPB are appointed rather than
elected.
Budgetary flexibility is diminished if a majority of local
expenditures fall outside the control of local councils
31. Urban Governance Models – Fiscal
Federalism Perspective
Guiding principles for assigning taxing powers to various
government –
Economic efficiency – taxes on mobile factors and tradable
goods that have a bearing on the efficiency of the internal
common market should be assigned to the center.
If given to subnational may adopt ‘beggar thy neighbour’
approach
National equity – progressive redistributive taxes should be
assigned to center to limit subnational adopting perverse
redistributive policies to attract high income people to repeal
low income ones
32. Urban Governance Models – Fiscal
Federalism Perspective
Administrative Feasibility -taxes should be assigned to the
jurisdiction with the best ability to monitor relevant
assessments to lower compliance and administrative cost.
property, land, and betterment taxes are good for local
assignment
Fiscal need or revenue adequacy - to ensure accountability,
revenue means (the ability to raise revenues from own
sources) should be matched as closely as possible with
expenditure needs
Fiscal federalism literature also tell that -
long-lived assets should primarily be financed by raising
debt, so as to ensure equitable burden sharing across
generations
Large and lumpy investments typically cannot be financed
by current revenues and reserves alone
33. Urban Governance Models – Fiscal
Federalism Perspective
Fiscal federalism literature suggests following taxes and charges for local
governments –
All types of user charges
property and land taxes;
frontage and betterment taxes and charges;
poll taxes and charges;
single-stage (retail) sales taxes;
piggyback flat tax on residence-based national income taxes;
duties on hotel rooms, airport use, entertainment, taxis, and rental cars;
vehicle registration fees;
single business or profession permits;
resource royalties;
severance taxes;
local conservation charges;
taxes on local “bads” (BTU taxes, congestion tolls, parking fees, and effluent charges);
and
“sin” taxes (taxes on betting, gambling, lotteries, racetracks).
34. Urban Governance Models – Fiscal
Federalism Perspective
the case for decentralizing taxing powers is not as
compelling as that for decentralizing public service
delivery because
Lower level taxes can introduce inefficiencies in
allocation of resources across the federation and cause
inequities among people
Higher collection and compliance costs
Tradeoff between increased accountability and
increased cost due to decentralisation of taxes
35. Urban Governance Models – Fiscal
Federalism Perspective
In developing countries the practice seems to
emphasize fiscal federalism’s structures and
processes as ends rather than as means to an end.
The FF structures were designed as a response to
market failures and heterogeneous preferences
Little recognition of government failures and role of
entities beyond government.
36. Urban Governance Models – New
Public Management Perspective
NPM - Local government as an independent facilitator of
creating public value
Two criteria emerged from NPM - What LG should do
(Role of LG) and how they should do it better?
Moore (1996) – the government as an agent of the people
to serve public interest and create public value.
Public value - measurable improvements in social outcomes
or quality of life.
With local/municipal services it is possible to measure such
improvements and to have some sense of attribution
The concept is useful in evaluating conflicting and
perplexing choices in the use of local resources.
37. Urban Governance Models – New
Public Management Perspective
Rather than diverting resources from the private sector,
local governments use some of the resources that come
as free goods— resources of consent, goodwill, Good
Samaritan values, community spirit, compliance, and
collective public action.
Local Government Managers to create value that is to
tap free resources and to push the frontiers of improved
social outcomes beyond what may be possible with
meager local resources
NPM argues incentive environment in which
Managers are given flexibility in use of resources and
Are held accountable for results
38. Urban Governance Models – New
Public Management Perspective
Top-down controls are thus replaced by a bottom-up focus
on results
First NPM Model – New Zealand – making managers
manage – new contractualism - whereby public managers
are bound by formal contracts for service delivery but
have flexibility in resource allocation and choice of public
or private providers.
Second NPM Model – Australia - USA - creating
incentives to let managers manage – new managerialism -
government performance in service delivery and social
outcomes is monitored, but no formal contracts, and
accountability is guided by informal agreements.
39. Urban Governance Models – The
Public Choice Perspective
Bailey (1999) conceptualised four LG models
Benevolent despot model – a LG that assumes it knows
best and acts to maximise welfare of its citizens
Fiscal exchange model – a LG that provides services
consistent with local residents willingness to pay
Fiscal transfer model – a LG that focuses on public service
provision to advance social objectives
Leviathan model (public choice perspective) – a LG that is
captured by self interested bureaucrats and politicians
40. Some terms clarified
Leviathan model of government (1651)
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) – structure of society and
legitimate government
Argues for Social contract and rule by an absolute
sovereign.
Social contract or political contract theory
individuals have consented, either explicitly or tacitly,
to surrender some of their freedoms and submit to the
authority of the ruler or magistrate (or to the decision
of a majority), in exchange for protection of their
remaining rights.
the 2nd Century BC text of earlier
Buddhism, Mahāvastu.
41. Urban Governance Models – The
Public Choice Perspective
Brenton (1995) – two broad types of governments
First embodies – doctrine of the common good
Second acts – to preserve the self interest of the
governing elites and can assume
◼ A monolithic structure – LG subject to capture by bureaucrats
or interest groups. LG may maximise economic rents to
dominant interest groups or may advance compulsion and
coercion
◼ A composite structure – may encourage Tiebout type
competition among local governments
42. Urban Governance Models – The
Public Choice Perspective
Local government as an institution to advance self-interest
and argues that various stakeholders involved in policy
formulation and implementation are expected to use
opportunities and resources to advance their self-interest.
LG to have complete local autonomy in taxing and
spending and they must be subject to competition within
and beyond government. (Boyne 1998)
It advocates strengthening exit and voice mechanisms in
local governance to overcome government failures (Bailey
- 1999)
Easing supply-side constraints for public services through
wider competition will enhance choice and promote exit
options and that direct democracy provisions will
strengthen voice
43. Urban Governance Models – The New
Institutional Economics Approach
NIE approach draws implications of opportunistic behaviour by
government agents for the transaction cost to citizens as
principals
NIE provides a framework of analysing fiscal systems and local
empowerment for comparing mechanisms for local governance
The government as a runaway train
various orders of governments (as agents) to be created to
serve the interests of the citizens as principals.
The jurisdictional design should ensure that these agents serve
the public interest while minimizing transaction costs for the
principals.
Existing institutional design does not permit such optimisation as
principals have bounded rationality as they are ill or
inadequately informed about government operations
44. Urban Governance Models – The New
Institutional Economics Approach
Enlarging sphere of knowledge involves higher costs
which citizens (principals) are not willing to incur
As a result Agents (govt) are better informed than
principals and have incentive to withhold information and
to indulge in opportunistic behavior or ‘self interest
seeking with guile (Williamson 1985)
Thus principals have only incomplete contract with their
agents
Weak and extant countervailing institutions, path
dependency, inter dependency
NIE framework stresses need to use various elements of
transaction costs in designing jurisdictions for agencies
and in evaluating choices
45. Urban Governance Models – The Network
Forms of Governance
Dollery and Wallis (2001) extended NIE approach as
follows -
NIE approach provides guidance in dealing with
government failures in a hierarchical form of public
governance.
NIE provides framework for examining local government
involvement in a partnership of multiple organizations.
Dollery and Wallis (2001) argued that a structure of
resource dependency vitiates against collective action in
the interest of common goods
This results in failures in horizontal coordination in a
multiorganisation partnership
46. Urban Governance Models – The Network
Forms of Governance
There can be two solutions for failures in horizontal
coordination in multi-organization partnership
First to introduce a market mechanism of governance,
whereby a contract management agency enters into binding
contracts with all partners.
Second is the hierarchical mechanism of governance, which
relies on institutional arrangements to clarify roles and
responsibilities and to establish mechanisms for consultation,
cooperation, and coordination, as is done in some federal
systems.
But this option has high transaction cost and high degree of
possibilities of failure due to conflicting interests of partners
47. Urban Governance Models – The Network
Forms of Governance
NIE advocates a network mechanism of governance as a
possible mode of governance for such partnerships—the
kind to be managed by local governments.
Networks formed on the basis of shared interests (interest-
based networks) can provide a stable form of governance
if membership is limited to partners that can make
significant resource contributions and if there is a balance
of powers among members.
Repeated interaction among members builds trust. Hope-
based networks are built on the shared sentiments and
emotions of members.
Local government to play a catalytic role in facilitating the
roles of both interest-based and hope-based networks in
improving social outcomes for local residents.
48. Urban Governance Models – The
Network Forms of Governance
LG require a new public management paradigm
which requires –
Separation of policy advice from program
implementation
Assuming role purchaser of public services but not
necessarily as provider of them
Outsourcing of services which have higher provisioning
cost
Making in-house providers subject to competition from
out-side providers.
49. Issues with existing System of Local
Governance
Incentive and accountability framework faced by
governments is not conducive to a focus on service
delivery consistent with citizen preferences
Top down hierarchical structure with preeminent
federal legislation – micromanagement
Internal rule based focus than mandate focus to
hierarchical control by various govts.
No regard for client orientation, bottom up
accountability or lowering of transaction costs
Zero sum games for control by various govts.
Shared rule is a source of confusion and conflicts
50. Issues with existing System of Local
Governance
LG are handmaidens of state or province
With straight jacket mandates
Given limited home rule in their competencies
Get crushed under intrusive controls by higher governments
Citizens have limited voice and exit option
Governments suffer for agency problem and incomplete
contract, undefined property rights
Universalism and port barrel politics results in a tragedy
of commons
Various orders of governments compete to get higher
share of common pool resources
Citizens are treated as agents rather than principals
51. Issues with existing System of Local
Governance
No clear pattern in the autonomy and range of
services provided by the local government deriving
their status from different sources
Local governments created by the legislation are in
general weaker
Ratio of local expenditure to consolidated public
expenditure – OECD countries – 28%, china 51%
Poland 38%, South Africa 28%, India 3%
Local expenditure as share of National GDP – OECD
countries – 12.75% China 10.8%; Poland 10.6%,
Brazil 7%, South Africa 6.5%, India 1%
52. A Synthesis – towards responsive, responsible,
accountable local governance
How to make governments responsive, responsible
and accountable ?
Different perspectives emphasised following
Subsidiarity principal
Fiscal equivalence principal
Creation of public value
Results based accountability
Minimisation of transaction costs to citizens
How to integrate these themes in to broader
framework of
Citizens centred governance to create incentive
structure with bottom up accountability,
53. A Synthesis – towards responsive,
responsible, accountable local governance
Citizen centered Local Governance – Andrews and Shah
– 2005 – features of this model
Citizen empowered to right based approach ( direct
democracy provisions, citizen charter)
Bottom ups accountability for results,
Evaluation of government performance as facilitator of a
network of providers by citizens as governors, taxpayers
and consumer of public services
Citizens as principals and creation of incentives for
government agents to comply with their mandates and
to overcome commitment problem
54. Reference Books
Local Governance in Developing Countries – Edited
by Anwar Shah – World Bank Publication
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resourc
es/LocalGovernanceinDeveloping.pdf