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Unauthorized Wireless
    Connectivity

           John Rhoton
      Mobile Technology Lead
            HP Services

                               1
Risk Benefit Analysis
• Weak Protocols       •   Uncertified Devices
• Poor Configuration   •   Insecure Infrastructure
• Careful Monitoring   •   No User Guidance
                       •   No Administrative Control




                                                  2
Agenda
•   Unmanaged Bluetooth
•   Rogue WLANs
•   WWAN backdoors
•   Underground IPv6

• Best Practices


                            3
Bluetooth Threats
• Poorly configured devices
  – Compromise device
     • Sensitive data
     • Credentials
  – Compromise network
     • Unauthorized access
     • Denial of Service
• Default configurations insufficient


                                        4
Bluetooth vulnerability
• PIN Attack
  – Often hard-coded
  – Usually short (4-digit)
  – Passive key interception
• Bluejacking
  – Virus Propagation
• Bluesnarfing
  – Bluesniping




                                  5
Bluetooth Configuration




                          6
Rogue Access Points
• Highest risk when
  WLANs are NOT
  implemented
   – Completely unsecured by
     default
   – Usually Connected by
     naïve users
   – Can be strategically placed
     by intruders




                                   7
Decoy Access Points
•   Troubleshooting nightmare
•   Denial of Service
•   Credential interception
•   SSL redirection




                                8
Unauthorized Wireless
       Bridge

         Private LAN




                   Public Network



                                    9
Trojans, Crawlers and Bots




                             10
Port Forwarding




                  11
Reverse
Network Address Translation




                              12
Bridge device
• No need for integrated WWAN
• PCMCIA card sufficient
• Modem
  – Bluetooth phone
  – USB / RS-232 phone


• Virtually impossible to prevent unless
  desktops/laptops are locked down!
                                           13
Rogue IPv6
            Devices / Networks
            What you don’t know will hurt you

• Unauthorized IPv6
  devices
  – Windows XP: ipv6
    install
• Unauthorized                                   Hijacked
  Networks                                       Computer
                                                            Private
  – Internal tunnels           Public Internet
                                                            Network

• Compromised
  Perimeter                                                            Victim
  – External tunnels      Intruder

                                                                      14
IPv6 Transition Exposure
•   IPv6 is available
•   IPv6 is in use
•   IPv6 is on many private networks
•   IPv6 magnifies the wireless vulnerabilities

• Corporate Security
    – does not monitor IPv6
• Corporate IT
    – is not familiar with IPv6

• This is irresponsible!
                                                  15
Threat Identification and
         Intrusion Prevention
• Intrusion Detection Products
  – Manual
  – Sensors
  – Infrastructure
• Network Monitoring
• Revised Security Model


                                   16
Refined Network Access
• Binary Access Insufficient



              Access   Intranet   Internet




• Health checks become mandatory (NAP/NAC)
• Complete Access Layer secured (e.g. 802.1x)
                                                17
Role-based Access Control
• Bluesocket           • Aruba
• Perfigo (Cisco)      • HP ProCurve
• Cranite                (Vernier)


User       Role
Time                Access
         Schedule             IP Address   Port
                    Control
VLAN     Location



                                                  18
Network Compartmentalization
Adaptive Network Architecture




                                Virus Throttling
                                             19
User Education
•   Danger awareness
•   Caution on interfaces
•   Configuration guidance
•   Corporate policy




                              20
Mobile Device Security
          Management
• Platform selection
  – Software/Firmware Upgrades
  – Patch Management
• Configuration Management
• Policy enforcement
  – Passwords                                Security
  – Device lock
  – Policy updates
• User support
  – Device lockout               Usability
  – Backup/restore
                                                  21
Summary
• Security concerns are the greatest inhibitor to
  mobility
• Wireless networks and devices introduce new
  risks
• Ignoring these technologies does not make
  the risks disappear!
• The key to mobile security is a thorough
  reevaluation of existing security


                                                    22
Questions?
         Contact me at:
http://www.linkedin.com/in/rhoton
                                    23

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Unauthorized Wireless Network Connections

  • 1. Unauthorized Wireless Connectivity John Rhoton Mobile Technology Lead HP Services 1
  • 2. Risk Benefit Analysis • Weak Protocols • Uncertified Devices • Poor Configuration • Insecure Infrastructure • Careful Monitoring • No User Guidance • No Administrative Control 2
  • 3. Agenda • Unmanaged Bluetooth • Rogue WLANs • WWAN backdoors • Underground IPv6 • Best Practices 3
  • 4. Bluetooth Threats • Poorly configured devices – Compromise device • Sensitive data • Credentials – Compromise network • Unauthorized access • Denial of Service • Default configurations insufficient 4
  • 5. Bluetooth vulnerability • PIN Attack – Often hard-coded – Usually short (4-digit) – Passive key interception • Bluejacking – Virus Propagation • Bluesnarfing – Bluesniping 5
  • 7. Rogue Access Points • Highest risk when WLANs are NOT implemented – Completely unsecured by default – Usually Connected by naïve users – Can be strategically placed by intruders 7
  • 8. Decoy Access Points • Troubleshooting nightmare • Denial of Service • Credential interception • SSL redirection 8
  • 9. Unauthorized Wireless Bridge Private LAN Public Network 9
  • 13. Bridge device • No need for integrated WWAN • PCMCIA card sufficient • Modem – Bluetooth phone – USB / RS-232 phone • Virtually impossible to prevent unless desktops/laptops are locked down! 13
  • 14. Rogue IPv6 Devices / Networks What you don’t know will hurt you • Unauthorized IPv6 devices – Windows XP: ipv6 install • Unauthorized Hijacked Networks Computer Private – Internal tunnels Public Internet Network • Compromised Perimeter Victim – External tunnels Intruder 14
  • 15. IPv6 Transition Exposure • IPv6 is available • IPv6 is in use • IPv6 is on many private networks • IPv6 magnifies the wireless vulnerabilities • Corporate Security – does not monitor IPv6 • Corporate IT – is not familiar with IPv6 • This is irresponsible! 15
  • 16. Threat Identification and Intrusion Prevention • Intrusion Detection Products – Manual – Sensors – Infrastructure • Network Monitoring • Revised Security Model 16
  • 17. Refined Network Access • Binary Access Insufficient Access Intranet Internet • Health checks become mandatory (NAP/NAC) • Complete Access Layer secured (e.g. 802.1x) 17
  • 18. Role-based Access Control • Bluesocket • Aruba • Perfigo (Cisco) • HP ProCurve • Cranite (Vernier) User Role Time Access Schedule IP Address Port Control VLAN Location 18
  • 19. Network Compartmentalization Adaptive Network Architecture Virus Throttling 19
  • 20. User Education • Danger awareness • Caution on interfaces • Configuration guidance • Corporate policy 20
  • 21. Mobile Device Security Management • Platform selection – Software/Firmware Upgrades – Patch Management • Configuration Management • Policy enforcement – Passwords Security – Device lock – Policy updates • User support – Device lockout Usability – Backup/restore 21
  • 22. Summary • Security concerns are the greatest inhibitor to mobility • Wireless networks and devices introduce new risks • Ignoring these technologies does not make the risks disappear! • The key to mobile security is a thorough reevaluation of existing security 22
  • 23. Questions? Contact me at: http://www.linkedin.com/in/rhoton 23