This document provides an overview of the Suez Crisis of 1956 through a series of lecture objectives and main events. It examines the structural causes of rising Arab nationalism and the roles of key figures like Nasser, Eden and Dulles. The origins of the crisis began with Nasser nationalizing the Suez Canal. Britain, France and Israel then secretly agreed to an attack on Egypt in the Protocol of Sèvres. While the war was initially successful, international pressure and US opposition led to a ceasefire. The crisis had major geopolitical consequences and marked the end of Britain and France as major powers in the Middle East.

1. Empire and Its LimitsEmpire and Its Limits

2. Lecture ObjectivesLecture Objectives
► Case study in historical methodology.Case study in historical methodology.
► Suez is good example of how patient work inSuez is good example of how patient work in
the archives gradually amends conventionalthe archives gradually amends conventional
wisdom and politically motivated contemporarywisdom and politically motivated contemporary
accounts.accounts.
► Also a good example of how contemporaryAlso a good example of how contemporary
historians have gone beyond traditionalhistorians have gone beyond traditional
diplomatic history to understand the context indiplomatic history to understand the context in
which events were occurring.which events were occurring.
► The whole process is rather likeThe whole process is rather like restoring arestoring a
frescofresco. Gradually bring to light hidden details. Gradually bring to light hidden details
until you have auntil you have a richer picturericher picture than before.than before.

3. The Suez CrisisThe Suez Crisis
Main EventsMain Events
► What was the Suez Crisis?What was the Suez Crisis?
► A small war fought by Britain, France and Israel against EgyptA small war fought by Britain, France and Israel against Egypt
first week November 1956.first week November 1956.
► Cause?Cause?
► Structural causes and immediate onesStructural causes and immediate ones..
► Rise of Arab nationalismRise of Arab nationalism in the M.E. endangered British clientin the M.E. endangered British client
regimes and the French presence in Algeria. Presence of Israelregimes and the French presence in Algeria. Presence of Israel
since 1948 gave a focus to Arab resentment. Gamel Abdelsince 1948 gave a focus to Arab resentment. Gamel Abdel
Nasser emerges after April 1954 as a charismatic leader.Nasser emerges after April 1954 as a charismatic leader.
► M.E. source of Europe’s oilM.E. source of Europe’s oil & in 1950s oil overtakes coal as& in 1950s oil overtakes coal as
main source of energy.main source of energy.
► Intellectual structuresIntellectual structures: Egyptian leader Nasser portrayed as a: Egyptian leader Nasser portrayed as a
new Mussolini by British and French leaders; lessons ofnew Mussolini by British and French leaders; lessons of
appeasement.appeasement.
► Imperial HumiliationsImperial Humiliations: GB had had to leave India and Palestine: GB had had to leave India and Palestine
with her “tail between her legs.” France had been humiliated inwith her “tail between her legs.” France had been humiliated in
Vietnam in May 1954 with the military defeat at Dien Bien Phu.Vietnam in May 1954 with the military defeat at Dien Bien Phu.
► I stress these structural causes because it is easy toI stress these structural causes because it is easy to
personalize the war as a clash between Nasser and British P.M.personalize the war as a clash between Nasser and British P.M.
Anthony Eden.Anthony Eden.

4. NasserNasser

5. Anthony EdenAnthony Eden

6. Origins of the CrisisOrigins of the Crisis
► After Nasser takes power in 1954, he successfully moves toAfter Nasser takes power in 1954, he successfully moves to
close British bases in the canal zone (October 1954). Heclose British bases in the canal zone (October 1954). He
refuses the British offer to join therefuses the British offer to join the Baghdad PactBaghdad Pact. In 1955, he. In 1955, he
begins to make overtures to the Soviet bloc. September 1955begins to make overtures to the Soviet bloc. September 1955
signs arms deal with USSR.signs arms deal with USSR.
► At the same time, he asks the US and GB to finance the AswanAt the same time, he asks the US and GB to finance the Aswan
dam project. Playing off two superpowers against each other.dam project. Playing off two superpowers against each other.
The trigger for the crisis comes onThe trigger for the crisis comes on 20 July 195620 July 1956 when thewhen the
Americans, tired of Nasser’s double game, pull the plug on theAmericans, tired of Nasser’s double game, pull the plug on the
Aswan project.Aswan project.
► In retaliation Nasser nationalizes the Suez canal. The canalIn retaliation Nasser nationalizes the Suez canal. The canal
would have become Eygptian anyway in 1968. But the rest ofwould have become Eygptian anyway in 1968. But the rest of
the world feared that Eygpt would not abide by the 1888the world feared that Eygpt would not abide by the 1888
Constantinople convention, which specified that the CanalConstantinople convention, which specified that the Canal
should remain open, even in times of war, to ships of allshould remain open, even in times of war, to ships of all
nationalities.nationalities.
► Also: Nasser had his hands on the West’s windpipe. Could cutAlso: Nasser had his hands on the West’s windpipe. Could cut
off oil shipments.off oil shipments.

7. Nasser on the day of nationalizationNasser on the day of nationalization

8. Eisenhower and J.F. DullesEisenhower and J.F. Dulles

9. From Diplomacy to WarFrom Diplomacy to War
► Under the influence of Eisenhower and J.F. Dulles, the SuezUnder the influence of Eisenhower and J.F. Dulles, the Suez
issue was initially dealt with at diplomatic level.issue was initially dealt with at diplomatic level.
► In August, via Australian P.M. Robert Menzies, the creation of aIn August, via Australian P.M. Robert Menzies, the creation of a
non-profit company that would guarantee Egypt a secure andnon-profit company that would guarantee Egypt a secure and
rising dividend is proposed.rising dividend is proposed.
► After failure of this attempt, US propose the SCUA (Users’After failure of this attempt, US propose the SCUA (Users’
Association) to collect tolls. But this plan is blocked in theAssociation) to collect tolls. But this plan is blocked in the
Security Council on 13 October by the USSR.Security Council on 13 October by the USSR.
► US policy? Elections first week in November – Want noUS policy? Elections first week in November – Want no
problems. Also, issue of US attitude towardsproblems. Also, issue of US attitude towards imperialismimperialism..
► British memoirs (e.g. Eden’s, which in places is a harangue)British memoirs (e.g. Eden’s, which in places is a harangue)
have generally tried to portray the US as not having been clearhave generally tried to portray the US as not having been clear
about its opposition to war. Scholarly research, by Wm Rogerabout its opposition to war. Scholarly research, by Wm Roger
Louis and Scott Lucas has shown this to be unlikely.Louis and Scott Lucas has shown this to be unlikely.
II

10. US Policy FearsUS Policy Fears
► J.F. DULLESJ.F. DULLES: PRESS CONFERENCE 2 OCTOBER 1956: PRESS CONFERENCE 2 OCTOBER 1956
► ““THE UNITED STATES CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO IDENTIFY ITSELF 100%THE UNITED STATES CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO IDENTIFY ITSELF 100%
EITHEREITHER WITH THE COLONIAL POWERSWITH THE COLONIAL POWERS OROR THE POWERS UNIQUELYTHE POWERS UNIQUELY
CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM OF GETTING INDEPENDENCE AS RAPIDLYCONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM OF GETTING INDEPENDENCE AS RAPIDLY
AND AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE…”AND AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE…”
► J.F. DULLESJ.F. DULLES: MINUTES NSC 1 NOVEMBER 1956: MINUTES NSC 1 NOVEMBER 1956..
► ““FOR MANY YEARS NOW THE US HAS BEEN WALKING A TIGHT-ROPE BETWEENFOR MANY YEARS NOW THE US HAS BEEN WALKING A TIGHT-ROPE BETWEEN
THE EFFORT TO MAINTAIN OLD AND VALUED RELATIONS WITH OUR BRITISHTHE EFFORT TO MAINTAIN OLD AND VALUED RELATIONS WITH OUR BRITISH
AND FRENCH ALLIES ON THE ONE HAND, AND ON THE OTHER HAND TRYING TOAND FRENCH ALLIES ON THE ONE HAND, AND ON THE OTHER HAND TRYING TO
ASSURE OURSELVES OF THE FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING OF THEASSURE OURSELVES OF THE FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE
NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES…UNLESS WE NOW ASSERT AND MAINTAINNEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES…UNLESS WE NOW ASSERT AND MAINTAIN
OUR LEADERSHIP,OUR LEADERSHIP, ALL OF THESE NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIESALL OF THESE NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES
WILL TURN FROM US TO THE USSRWILL TURN FROM US TO THE USSR ….”….”
► SOURCE: WM ROGER LOUIS, “DULLES, SUEZ AND THE BRITISH,” IN ED., RICHARD H. IMMERMAN,SOURCE: WM ROGER LOUIS, “DULLES, SUEZ AND THE BRITISH,” IN ED., RICHARD H. IMMERMAN, JOHN FOSTER DULLES ANDJOHN FOSTER DULLES AND
THE DIPLOMACY OF THE COLD WARTHE DIPLOMACY OF THE COLD WAR (PRINCETON UP, 1990).(PRINCETON UP, 1990).

11. The British Lion at SuezThe British Lion at Suez

12. WarWar
►
After the UN vote, Eden seemingly decides that diplomatic means are exhaustedAfter the UN vote, Eden seemingly decides that diplomatic means are exhausted
and that Britain needs to pass to military action. Convinced of this by the French,and that Britain needs to pass to military action. Convinced of this by the French,
who were anxious to involve the Israelis, at a meeting at Chequers. No formalwho were anxious to involve the Israelis, at a meeting at Chequers. No formal
minutes taken; senior officials excluded; No mention inminutes taken; senior officials excluded; No mention in Full CircleFull Circle. First revealed. First revealed
by Anthony Nutting (Min. State Foreign Office) in his memoirs,by Anthony Nutting (Min. State Foreign Office) in his memoirs, No End of aNo End of a
LessonLesson (1967). Eden could “scarcely contain his glee.”(1967). Eden could “scarcely contain his glee.”
► The area of Anglo-FrenchThe area of Anglo-French collusioncollusion with Israel is the one where historicalwith Israel is the one where historical
researchers into the Suez crisis have established the most important truths.researchers into the Suez crisis have established the most important truths.
► It is theIt is the key issuekey issue because at the time Eden did not explicitly tell the cabinet ofbecause at the time Eden did not explicitly tell the cabinet of
the extent to which the war had been planned with Israel; lied to Parliamentthe extent to which the war had been planned with Israel; lied to Parliament
about the plans; denied any collusion in his memoirs and tried to eliminate allabout the plans; denied any collusion in his memoirs and tried to eliminate all
extant copies of the compromising Protocol of Sèvres (24 October) that plannedextant copies of the compromising Protocol of Sèvres (24 October) that planned
out the joint military action. “Massive attempt to deceive” (Avi Shlaim).out the joint military action. “Massive attempt to deceive” (Avi Shlaim).
► The Sèvres accord was inspired by two men:The Sèvres accord was inspired by two men:
►

13. Christian PineauChristian Pineau

14. David Ben-GurionDavid Ben-Gurion

15. SèvresSèvres
► The Sèvres accord was reconstructed from various sources byThe Sèvres accord was reconstructed from various sources by
Keith Kyle in his 1991 book,Keith Kyle in his 1991 book, SuezSuez. Before then, Christian Pineau. Before then, Christian Pineau
(1976), a British civil servant, Donald Logan (1986) had(1976), a British civil servant, Donald Logan (1986) had
published their accounts. Mordechai Bar-On, secretary of thepublished their accounts. Mordechai Bar-On, secretary of the
Israeli delegation to Sèvres, published a detailed history inIsraeli delegation to Sèvres, published a detailed history in
English in 1994 (English in 1994 (The Gates of GazaThe Gates of Gaza). Ben Gurion’s personal). Ben Gurion’s personal
copy of the protocol was published in 1996.copy of the protocol was published in 1996.
► The whole business is brilliantly summarized by Avi Shlaim inThe whole business is brilliantly summarized by Avi Shlaim in
his article “The Protocol of Sèvres, 1956: Anatomy of a Warhis article “The Protocol of Sèvres, 1956: Anatomy of a War
Plot,”Plot,” International AffairsInternational Affairs 73 (1997), 509-530.73 (1997), 509-530.
► In substance, Britain, France and Israel agreed that IsraelIn substance, Britain, France and Israel agreed that Israel
would attack Egypt on 29 October; that Britain and Francewould attack Egypt on 29 October; that Britain and France
would intervene to “protect” the Canal by asking both sides towould intervene to “protect” the Canal by asking both sides to
withdraw to at least 10 miles from the canal zone.withdraw to at least 10 miles from the canal zone.
► Shlaim: “The Protocol of Sèvres was thus a monument toShlaim: “The Protocol of Sèvres was thus a monument to
French opportunism, Eden’s duplicity and Ben-Gurion’sFrench opportunism, Eden’s duplicity and Ben-Gurion’s
paranoia.”paranoia.”

16. The Suez Crisis 1956The Suez Crisis 1956

17. Seem Familiar?Seem Familiar?

18. Stabs in the BackStabs in the Back
► The US wasThe US was horrifiedhorrified by Anglo-French support of Israel.by Anglo-French support of Israel. 2 November2 November,,
Dulles introduces a Security Council Resolution condemning the war. 4Dulles introduces a Security Council Resolution condemning the war. 4
November, ONU demands cease-fire + peace-keepers (proposed LesterNovember, ONU demands cease-fire + peace-keepers (proposed Lester
Pearson, Canadian P.M.)Pearson, Canadian P.M.)
► British public opinion divided. Popular dailies gung-ho. Eden makesBritish public opinion divided. Popular dailies gung-ho. Eden makes
“man of peace” broadcast; Gaitskell replies, “It is not a police action;“man of peace” broadcast; Gaitskell replies, “It is not a police action;
there is no law behind it. We have taken the law into our own hands.”there is no law behind it. We have taken the law into our own hands.”
ObserverObserver: “We had not realized that our government was capable of: “We had not realized that our government was capable of
such folly and crookedness.”such folly and crookedness.”
► 5 November5 November, Britain and France land troops at Port Said; the USSR,, Britain and France land troops at Port Said; the USSR,
which was brutally oppressing the Hungarian revolt, warns Suez crisiswhich was brutally oppressing the Hungarian revolt, warns Suez crisis
could turn into a third world war.could turn into a third world war.
► 6 November6 November, British Chancellor Harold Macmillan tells Cabinet that, British Chancellor Harold Macmillan tells Cabinet that
$280 million dollars (£100m) had been lost on the Forex markets in a$280 million dollars (£100m) had been lost on the Forex markets in a
week and urges GB to accept cease-fire (despite having been a hawkweek and urges GB to accept cease-fire (despite having been a hawk
throughout the crisis). Eden announces cease-fire for midnight.throughout the crisis). Eden announces cease-fire for midnight.
► War ends Eden’s career. Goes to Jamaica to recover from nervousWar ends Eden’s career. Goes to Jamaica to recover from nervous
breakdown & loses premiership to Macmillan in January 1957.breakdown & loses premiership to Macmillan in January 1957.

19. Harold MacmillanHarold Macmillan

20. Role of MacmillanRole of Macmillan
► Is another area where historians have been at work. TheIs another area where historians have been at work. The standard accountstandard account
assumed Macmillan was telling the truth. That he had discovered the position ofassumed Macmillan was telling the truth. That he had discovered the position of
sterling and changed his mind.sterling and changed his mind.
►
► The work of Diane Kunz (The work of Diane Kunz (The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez CrisisThe Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis, 1991) called, 1991) called
this into question. She argued that less than $100m had been lost. In Kunz’s viewthis into question. She argued that less than $100m had been lost. In Kunz’s view
the sterling crisis only began afterwards when the US refused to allow GB tothe sterling crisis only began afterwards when the US refused to allow GB to
draw upon IMF funds until GB withdrew from canal zone. Macmillan’s statementdraw upon IMF funds until GB withdrew from canal zone. Macmillan’s statement
to cabinet had been “either knowingly or accidentally” untrue. On the basis ofto cabinet had been “either knowingly or accidentally” untrue. On the basis of
this argument, the “sensational loss of nerve” school gained ground. In brief,this argument, the “sensational loss of nerve” school gained ground. In brief,
Macmillan either chickened out (possible), or wanted to be on good terms withMacmillan either chickened out (possible), or wanted to be on good terms with
the US in order to replace Eden (impossible given that Macmillan was an Englishthe US in order to replace Eden (impossible given that Macmillan was an English
gentleman).gentleman).
► Latest research complicates this picture, however. Klug and Smith, “Suez andLatest research complicates this picture, however. Klug and Smith, “Suez and
Sterling, 1956” (Sterling, 1956” (Explorations in Economic HistoryExplorations in Economic History 36 (1999), 181-203 argue that36 (1999), 181-203 argue that
while Kunz is right to say only abt $100m was lost from British reserves in thewhile Kunz is right to say only abt $100m was lost from British reserves in the
first week of November, overall July-November 1956 saw a “total underlying loss”first week of November, overall July-November 1956 saw a “total underlying loss”
of $883m in British reserves. Suez was the most serious postwar challenge to theof $883m in British reserves. Suez was the most serious postwar challenge to the
£ until 1967, even greater than 1949, when the £ was devalued.£ until 1967, even greater than 1949, when the £ was devalued.
► The conduct of Macmillan remains strange, however. Documentation shows heThe conduct of Macmillan remains strange, however. Documentation shows he
was persistently warned of the danger to sterling throughout the crisis. Why didwas persistently warned of the danger to sterling throughout the crisis. Why did
he choose the heat of the battle to give a false figure to cabinet?he choose the heat of the battle to give a false figure to cabinet?

21. A.J.P. Taylor on SuezA.J.P. Taylor on Suez
►““ The moral for British governmentsThe moral for British governments
is clear. Like most respectableis clear. Like most respectable
people, they will make poorpeople, they will make poor
criminals and had better stick tocriminals and had better stick to
respectability. They will not berespectability. They will not be
much good at anything else.”much good at anything else.”

22. Revisionism?Revisionism?
► Perceptible shift towards rehabilitating Eden and BritishPerceptible shift towards rehabilitating Eden and British
government. E.g. D.R. Thorpe,government. E.g. D.R. Thorpe, EdenEden (2003). Does so in(2003). Does so in
three ways:three ways:
► A) By putting Suez inA) By putting Suez in contextcontext. Eden one of the great. Eden one of the great
statesmen of the 20th century; Suez a blip.statesmen of the 20th century; Suez a blip.
► B) By emphasizing that Gb and F did nothing untoward.B) By emphasizing that Gb and F did nothing untoward.
Were victims of American moralizing.Were victims of American moralizing. Compare US actionCompare US action
against Mossadeq in Iran in 1953against Mossadeq in Iran in 1953..
► C) By putting blame on other members of Eden’s cabinet,C) By putting blame on other members of Eden’s cabinet,
especially R.A.B. Butler and Macmillan, who is rapidlyespecially R.A.B. Butler and Macmillan, who is rapidly
becoming the villain of the piece.becoming the villain of the piece.
► Other scholars, e.g. Gordon Martel, are calling intoOther scholars, e.g. Gordon Martel, are calling into
question the accepted view that Suez was a “watershed”question the accepted view that Suez was a “watershed”
in postwar world history (certainly British history).in postwar world history (certainly British history).
► This kind of revisionism, in Geyl’s great phrase, is whyThis kind of revisionism, in Geyl’s great phrase, is why
history is “argument without end.”history is “argument without end.”

23. What We KnowWhat We Know
► Yet also true that the Suez crisis is proof of a cautiouslyYet also true that the Suez crisis is proof of a cautiously
“objectivist” view of history. We do not know (and cannot“objectivist” view of history. We do not know (and cannot
know) THE truth about Suez, but we do now know that manyknow) THE truth about Suez, but we do now know that many
former beliefs are wrong; that leading politicians lied; that theformer beliefs are wrong; that leading politicians lied; that the
US had complex motives; that collusion took place; that the £US had complex motives; that collusion took place; that the £
was under pressure.was under pressure.
► Historians are now also at work on the social history of theHistorians are now also at work on the social history of the
crisis. Recent work has been done on film and newsreel duringcrisis. Recent work has been done on film and newsreel during
the crisis; work is being done on public opinion; somebodythe crisis; work is being done on public opinion; somebody
needs to do work on the political parties since the only work onneeds to do work on the political parties since the only work on
the subject is Epstein’s 1964 classicthe subject is Epstein’s 1964 classic British Politics and theBritish Politics and the
Suez CrisisSuez Crisis..
► A provocation: We may eventually even know more about theA provocation: We may eventually even know more about the
Suez crisis than the leading actors did at the time. The frescoSuez crisis than the leading actors did at the time. The fresco
restoration metaphor is a powerful one. Our knowledge of therestoration metaphor is a powerful one. Our knowledge of the
past is necessarily incomplete, but it can still be richer andpast is necessarily incomplete, but it can still be richer and
more vivid than contemporaries could know.more vivid than contemporaries could know.