The Philosophy of Disobedience in Military History

1. The Philosophy of Disobedience in Military History
Three articles on the subject
A.H Amin
Disobedience of orders in war to achieve the operational aim
was a purely German military philosophy developed in 19th
century and boldly accepted till First World War and also

2. practiced in Second World War , sometimes with deadly
consequences as in case of General Sponeck.
On the other hand this philosophy had no existence in US or
British Armies which were orders oriented.
The original article Orders and Obedience was written in
Pakistan Military Academy Kakul while I was in first term to
assist my old class fellow CQMS Aamir (64 Long Course) my
class fellow from Saint Marys Academy Lalazar then in fourth
term in writing his military essay.
Aamir was commissioned in 7 Baloch Regiment in October 1981
as he had joined the army two year earlier than me.I lost track
of him after that .As I remember he was a fine soul.
Another class fellow from school was Waqar who was also 64
Long Course (Aviation/Punjab Regiment) . I met him last in July
1994 when I had retired and he was serving as staff officer with
Major General Saeed uz Zafar at the staff college quetta.
Another class fellow from FC College was Naushad Kiani (65
Long Course) who I met in July 1994 while he was doing the
staff college.
Taimur Aslam Khan a very dear class fellow from Siant Marys
Academy and FC College , son of Brigadier Aslam Dandy
(Artillery) has just disappeared from the scene.

3. The first draft was sent to Pakistan Army Journal for publication
in October 1989.The editor Colonel I.D Hassan asked me to
complete endnotes and finally the article was published in
Pakistan Army Journal in March 1991 when Lt Col Syed Ishfaq
Naqvi was the editor.
Also initially Pakistan Armys brilliant Bachelor Phd editor
Colonel I.D Hassan asked me to send me a letter to editor on
DISOBEDIENCE to test the pulse of the readers and the army.

4. FIRST LETTER
PUBLISHED IN AN ARMY
JOURNAL
LETTER TO EDITOR
PAKISTAN ARMY
JOURNAL PUBLISHED
AFTER SIX MONTHS
CORRESPONDENCE IN
PAKISTAN ARMY
JOURNAL DECEMBER
1989 ISSUE BY LIEUT
COL I.D HASSAN

6. LIEUTENANT COLONEL SYED ISHFAQ NAQVI AUTHOR OF THE
CLASSIC ON SIACHEN FANGS OF ICE WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN
GETTING THIS ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN THE PAKISTAN ARMY
JOURNAL IN MARCH 1991 DESPITE OPPOSITION FROM
OFFICERS OF IG T AND E DIRECTORATE.
AN EDUCATION CORPS OFFICER WITH BROAD EXPERIENCE IN
TEACHING HE WAS A MAN OF WIDE KNOWLEDGE AND
INSIGHTS.
ORDERS AND OBEDIENCE PUBLISHED IN
PAKISTAN ARMY JOURNAL MARCH 1991
THIS WAS NO MEAN ACHIEVEMENT AS EACH
ARTICLE WAS VETTED AND CLEARED BY THE
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE. THE
ATMOSPHERE OF GLASNOST AND
PERESTROIKA AT THAT TIME UNDER
GENERAL ASLAM BEG AFTER THE EXIT OF
USURPER ZIA WAS ALSO THE MOST
IMPORTANT FACTOR. THE PAKISTAN ARMY
INTELLECTUALLY DECLINED FROM 1993 A
UNDER GENERAL KAKAR ETC.

14. BRIGADIER JAMSHED ALIS ARTICLE ON
DISOBEDIENCE THAT I CRITIQUED-1997

22. ANALYSING GENERAL FRANCOIS BRILLIANT
DISOBEDIENCE OF ORDERS AT TANNENBERG
JUNE 2000
Francois’s Disobedience at Tannenberg
Columnist A H AMIN recounts how a German Corps
Commander risked his career to win a battle during World War
I.
Von Francois was one of the outstandingly genuine higher
commanders of World War I. His “Magnum Bonum”
achievement being his role in the famous “Battle of
Tannenberg”.
Francois played a decisive role in “complete destruction” of the
Russian Army at Tannenberg by disobeying General
Ludendorf’s orders of attacking in a north easterly direction.
Francois assessed that if he attacked northeastwards as he was
ordered most of the Russian Army would escape. Thus Francois
disobeyed Ludendorf’s orders and attacked south eastwards thus
ensuring that the vast bulk of the Russian Army was encircled.
Francois’s action resulted in a complete German victory but also
ensured that Francois was not promoted to the rank that he
deserved because Francois’s mission oriented disobedience of
orders annoyed Ludendorf who made it a point that Francois
was sidelined !

23. The Battle of Tannenberg
The Battle of Tannenberg was a classic battle in the history of
warfare! Its significance did not lay in the fact that the Russians
were decisively defeated but in the fact that Germany was saved
from instant defeat in 1914. Initially two Russian Armies
invaded East Prussia which was defended by just one, much
smaller German Army. The German Army Commander Prittwitz
lost his nerve and wanted to withdraw east of Vistula River. This
was refused by German General Staff and Hindenburg was sent
as a replacement army commander. In the meantime the
brilliant staff officer Max Hoffman had formulated a brilliant
plan (rehearsed in pre-war games but forgotten once Prittwitz
was exposed to the friction of actual operations!) to leave a
cavalry screen opposite the Eastern Russian Army
(Rennenkampf) and concentrate the bulk of the German troops
to destroy the Southern 2nd Russian Army (Samsonov) in
general area Tannenberg. It was a brilliant but highly risky plan
but Hoffman took the calculated risk based on intercepted
Russian telegraphic messages which indicated that
Rennenkampf (who had earlier resorted to fisticuffs with
Samsonov at Mukden railway station in Russo-Japanese War of
1904-5) was in no hurry to advance. Ludendorf arrived in the
operational area as Chief of Staff with Hindenburg the new army
commander. Hindenburg was a retired general and had been
recalled for active military service. The duo were briefed by
Hoffman the acting Chief of Staff and Hoffman’s plan was
approved. Von Francois was commanding the corps which was
to function as the right most corps in the attack on the Russian
Army of Samsonov at Tannenberg. Francois was a highly
independent minded commander. Francois assessed that if he

24. attacked as he was ordered to by Ludendorf now firmly in seat
as the chief of staff the bulk of Samsonov’s army would succeed
in withdrawing southwards. Initially Francois’s 1st Corps had
been ordered as per the plan evolved by Hoffman to attack south
eastwards towards Neidenburg.1 Ludendorf was a man who lost
his nerves at the last moment and vacillated and procrastinated.
Once the Tannenberg battle started the German centre 20th
Corps ran into difficulties. Ludendorf ordered Francois to “close
northwards to Lahna”2. Francois disobeyed this modification in
orders and continued advancing towards Neidenburg leaving a
part of his corps to watch Lahna. Francois had a close
understanding with Hoffman, kept Hoffman posted about his
plans and on his own decided to divide his corps into two parts
“left half where it was, and strung out the other in a screen of
small posts and patrols”.3 This was in direct disobedience to
what Francois was ordered to do but Francois was a “Von” and
the Prussian Army had the tradition of Seydlitz disobeying
Frederick his king to win a battle! The result — Francois’s corps
captured 60,000 out of the total 92,000 Russians which were
captured at Tannenberg! 4
Analysis of Francois’s Disobedience of Orders at
Tannenberg
Francois’s disobedience at Tannenberg led to a decisive victory
while obeying orders would have merely resulted in pushing the
Russians backwards!
While Francois’s disobedience did endanger the German 20th
Corps, Francois was convinced that he must attack towards
Neidenburg, which he did! There was a reason in Francois’s
outward madness! Had there been a general of any of the British

25. or the Indo-Pak armies in Francois’s place no victory would
have been achieved! The Germans of that time were an
altogether different breed! They thought in terms of
“Envelopment” “finding the true flank of the enemy” not about
“what would happen in the next promotion board”! Francois was
“competent” but he was also a “NOTORIOUSLY UNRULY
SUBORDINATE”.5 Ludendorf knew this fact well and was all
set to ensure that Francois obeyed his orders. Thus he made it a
point to visit Francois to over insure that his orders were being
obeyed. Francois proved sharper! He adopted a policy of
“passive resistance”6. He outwardly obeyed Ludendorf but in
reality went his own way i.e Neidenburg! Francois writes in his
memoirs “On the 25th of August Hindenburg and Ludendorf
called upon me at battle headquarters. I was instructed to make a
frontal attack upon the hills of Usdau on the morning of 26th. I
objected that by that time the bulk of my artillery and
ammunition columns would still be on the way, and that
consequently my corps would not be ready for action.To this
Ludendorf replied ‘In that case you must attack with the
infantry alone’. There followed a somewhat acrimonius
discussion which Ludendorf concluded by saying ‘The Corps
must attack’. At the same time he referred the matter to
Hindenburg saying ‘the final decision, however, rests with the
C-in-C. The latter made no remark and both left my battle
headquarters. At 8.30 p.m, I received orders in writing, signed
by Hindenburg, instructing me to attack the lines of Usdau, on
the 26th not later than 10 a.m. Once more I voiced my objection,
but once more was overruled. To attack Usdau without artillery
and ammunition would have been a tactical blunder which might
have led to the annihilation of my corps, for the Russians were
holding the position with three divisions”7. Francois then

26. narrates the fateful incident about the Lahna affair i.e “a new
order arrived instructing me to take the pursuit of the Russians
in the direction of Lahna.Lahna is six miles north of Neidenburg
and would have led me into wooded and hilly country where
artillery would have been useless and the troops would have
advanced very slowly. The gravest objection, however, was that
such a movement would have afforded the Russians a golden
opportunity of escaping towards the south. Consequently I did
not change the orders I had already given and gave instructions
to have this non-compliance with orders reported with my
reasons to army headquarters”.8
Thus Francois pretended that he was attacking on 26th towards
Lahna but in reality he delayed everything that anything to do
with moving towards Lahna! This does not mean that Francois
was selfish but simply that he was mission oriented! Francois
took the precaution of asking the German 20th Corps on the
night of 25th “whether they were really so hard pressed that he
must make an attack without artillery support (having
deliberately delayed his artillery deployment!) and before he
was ready, in order to save them!” 9 The 20th Corps “replied
reassuringly that they were alright and that there was no need
for him to compromise his preparations.”10 Ludendorf only
realized on the evening of 26th that he had been fooled by
Francois!11 Thus while Tannenberg was a great German
victory, it also sealed Francois’s future advancement! But
Francois was a blue blooded Prussian Junker for whom self-
advancement in rank was not as important as for a man with a
middle class or more humble origin! Here comes the difference
in the British and German tradition! The British generals waited
for orders while the Germans were mission oriented! The

27. Indians who the British commanded were worse since they were
mercenaries!
Ludendorf took Francois disobedience to heart and started
actively gunning for Francois. Francois was naturally cheesed
off and unfortunately for German Army only partially disobeyed
Ludendorf’s orders at the Battle of Masurian Lakes as a result of
which the German victory was not as complete as it could have
been!12
The Aftermath of Tannenberg
Ludendorf was a highly self-centred man and claimed the entire
credit for Tannenberg. Hindenburg his army chief during
Tannenberg was a large hearted man and did not take any credit.
It was only after the war once Hoffman’s two volume memoirs
were published that the world came to know about Francois’s
role at Tannenberg. Ludendorf and Hindenburg had not aimed at
making the Tannenberg battle an encirclement battle! They were
happy that the Russians were checked thus they sent a signal to
the German Supreme Headquarters on the night of 28th “The
battle is won; pursuit will continue.The surrender of the two
Russian Corps may well not be achieved”.13 In reality
Francois’s disobedience which cost him his advancement, his
service achieved surrender of both the Russian Corps. Samsonov
being a man of honour despite not being from a subcontinental
martial race chose to commit suicide with his military revolver
in a remote part of the East Prussian forests rather than
surrender! Churchill’s verdict is not wrong when he states “The
credit of the victory belongs in large measure to General
Hoffman, but its glory must be associated with General Von
Francois, who though commanding only a single corps acted

28. with that rare alternation of prudence and audacity which is the
characteristic of true soldierly genius”.14 Francois’s true
contribution was realized some two decades after the battle
when Hindenburg, by then elected President of Germany, to
make Francois sit in the centre while sitting on his right in the
group photograph of the decennial celebrations of the Battle of
Tannenberg.15
Carl Tschupik after the war defended Ludendorf and criticized
Francois asserting that Francois did nothing extraordinary!
Tscuppik went on to compare Francois with General Steinmetz
who had been sacked by Moltke the Elder for disobedience in
the Franco German War of 1870-71. The exact occasion being
the Battle of Saint Privat which the French may have won
because of Steinmetz’s blunder!16 Thus the sacking of
Steinmetz! The comparison was fallacious since the Commander
German 1st Army’s Steinmetz’s disobedience had led to a
serious operational failure while that of Francois had led to a
great victory! Tschupik’s line of thought was not supported by
biographer of Hindenburg Emil Ludwig who also thought that
Ludendorf did lose his nerve at the critical moment in the Battle
of Tannenberg and changed the original orders of advancing
towards Neidenburg!17
Conclusion
Its an irony of history that Tannenberg was the foundation of
Ludendorf’s fame and future rise in the German military
hierarchy as the principal staff officer who made all critical
decisions of WW One! On the other hand the real hero was
sidelined! Many years earlier, while serving in the Tactical
Wing of the School of Armour Nowshera, I had a discussion

29. with then Colonel Naeem (now Major General) on this topic.
Naeem observed that in the Indo- Pak scenario mission oriented
orders would lead more to retrogade and negative results than
positive and offensive movements as had happened in Francois’s
case! May be Naeem had a point! The army was not just a career
like WAPDA for the Germans of Francois’s generation! Those
men were the product of a historical process in which the
Fatherland was more important than personal self-advancement.
Fear of forfeiture of rank had little meaning for men of that
breed!
End Notes
1Page-286-Tannenburg-The First Thirty Days in East Prussia-
Major General Sir Edmund Ironside -William Blackwood and
Sons Limited-Edinburgh and London-1933.
2Ibid.
3Page-218-Great Military Battles-Edited by Cyril Falls-George
Weidenfeld and Nicholson Limited-London-1964.
4Ibid.
5Page -197-The World Crisis-The Eastern Front- Rt Hon
Winston.S. Churchill-Thornton Butterworth Limited-15 Bedford
Street-London-1931.
6Ibid.
7Pages-15 & 16-Quoted in Ludendorf-The Tragedy of a
Specialist-Karl Tschupik-George Allen and Unwin Limited-
London-1932.

30. 8 Page-17-Ibid.
9 Page-197-Winston Churchill -Op Cit.
10Ibid.
11Ibid.
12Page-254-Ibid.
13Page-205-Ibid
14Page-206-Ibid.
15Ibid.
16Page-102-A Genius for War- Col T.N Dupuy-Macdonald and
Janes-London-1977.
17Page-62-Hindenburg- Emil Ludwig-Windmill Press-
Kingswood -Surrey-1935.