Exploring Trade dynamics between Russia and Turkey - Denis Varaksin - ICIS Ba...Denis Varaksin
Exploring Trade dynamics between Russia and Turkey
- Russian base oils exports 2010-2015
- Main Russian base oils exporters
- Turkey base oils imports from Russia and Greece
- Lukoil, Rosneft, Gazprom refineries modernisation plans
- Group II and Group III base oil exports from Russia
- Base oil exports from Belarus,Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan
- Taneco refinery start-up, N.Novgorod refinery closure
- Main export routes for Russian base oils
- Russian base oils exports in flexy containers, rail tank cars and bulk tankers
- Group I mineral base oils
- SN80 SN100 SN150 SN500 SN900 SN1200 Brightstock 2 cst 4 cst
Mediterranean Gas & Energy Week - Southeast Europe Energy Opportunities Intro...George Kovacic
Presented at the IN-VR Summit on January 21st, 2021.
Abstract: Since the first Energy Summit in 2013 Southeast Europe has made tremendous progress. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline and LNG Croatia projects were built and commenced operations in early 2021.
Current global industry focus is on the Adriatic Sea where, in 2021, ENI and Novatek are spudding two offshore exploration wells in Montenegro. Hydrocarbon E&P will allow the region to address energy poverty and security as well as climate concerns. Regional E&P results in: lower cost energy and increased competition, decreased import dependency, tax revenue and jobs. Meanwhile climate concerns are addressed via carbon capture, utilization and storage; decreased use of coal and wood, extended use of assets and repurposing of infrastructure. Plus hydrocarbon E&P will address naturally occurring oil and gas seeps throughout the Adriatic Sea. Provided are German comparison examples - Nord Stream 2 and Mittelplate as well as US offshore production examples from Santa Barbara and Long Beach. A regional Greek example is provided from Kavala Bay.
Exploration and production policies Of Oil & Gas in NorwayAbhishek Rajvanshi
Exploration and production of oil and gas in Norway, laws related to E & P, Petroleum laws, lease licence for exploration,Tax regime, reserves and production data
Presented by Chloé Le Coq, Professor of Economics, University of Paris-Panthéon-Assas, Economics and Law Research Center (CRED), during SITE 2023 Development Day conference.
Exploring Trade dynamics between Russia and Turkey - Denis Varaksin - ICIS Ba...Denis Varaksin
Exploring Trade dynamics between Russia and Turkey
- Russian base oils exports 2010-2015
- Main Russian base oils exporters
- Turkey base oils imports from Russia and Greece
- Lukoil, Rosneft, Gazprom refineries modernisation plans
- Group II and Group III base oil exports from Russia
- Base oil exports from Belarus,Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan
- Taneco refinery start-up, N.Novgorod refinery closure
- Main export routes for Russian base oils
- Russian base oils exports in flexy containers, rail tank cars and bulk tankers
- Group I mineral base oils
- SN80 SN100 SN150 SN500 SN900 SN1200 Brightstock 2 cst 4 cst
Mediterranean Gas & Energy Week - Southeast Europe Energy Opportunities Intro...George Kovacic
Presented at the IN-VR Summit on January 21st, 2021.
Abstract: Since the first Energy Summit in 2013 Southeast Europe has made tremendous progress. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline and LNG Croatia projects were built and commenced operations in early 2021.
Current global industry focus is on the Adriatic Sea where, in 2021, ENI and Novatek are spudding two offshore exploration wells in Montenegro. Hydrocarbon E&P will allow the region to address energy poverty and security as well as climate concerns. Regional E&P results in: lower cost energy and increased competition, decreased import dependency, tax revenue and jobs. Meanwhile climate concerns are addressed via carbon capture, utilization and storage; decreased use of coal and wood, extended use of assets and repurposing of infrastructure. Plus hydrocarbon E&P will address naturally occurring oil and gas seeps throughout the Adriatic Sea. Provided are German comparison examples - Nord Stream 2 and Mittelplate as well as US offshore production examples from Santa Barbara and Long Beach. A regional Greek example is provided from Kavala Bay.
Exploration and production policies Of Oil & Gas in NorwayAbhishek Rajvanshi
Exploration and production of oil and gas in Norway, laws related to E & P, Petroleum laws, lease licence for exploration,Tax regime, reserves and production data
Presented by Chloé Le Coq, Professor of Economics, University of Paris-Panthéon-Assas, Economics and Law Research Center (CRED), during SITE 2023 Development Day conference.
The IER has released the new issue of the Macroeconomic Monitoring of Ukraine (MEMU), which outlines key figures, trends, and events of July 2023.
According to the IER estimate, real gross value added (GVA) in agriculture increased by almost 5%
yoy primarily due to the lower statistical base of July 2022.
The grain harvest in July was close to last year due to higher yields.
The flooding of territories in June due to the destruction of the Kakhovka dam by russians slowed the pace of crop recovery.
The mining industry grew insignificantly compared to last year.
At the same time, we estimate that the processing industry grew by more than 20% yoy due to the recovery of all sectors from a low base.
The growth rate of real GVA in transport slowed to 9% yoy, while the GVA in trade continued to grow rapidly (about 27% yoy).
However, the real GVA was significantly lower than in 2021 in all sectors.
Global LNG Navigating Risks in a Dynamic MarketCTRM Center
Liquified natural gas (LNG) has been a traded commodity for more than a century. But only in the last couple of decades has the market expanded to meet the ever-increasing demand for energy, through low carbon emissions energy sources. With the development of the massive Qatar LNG facilities in the mid-1990s and the increasing demand for imported gas, global LNG trading has grown from about 50 MTPA in 1990 to more than 350 MTPA in 2020.
Most energy commodities struggled with lower trade and consumption volumes under the pandemic-induced industrial shutdowns in 2020. LNG trade was, however, up slightly at 0.4% during the year, continuing its uninterrupted streak of year-over-year growth since 1996. However, that growth was far below rates in the preceding years which averaged 7% since 2004.
EY Price Point: global oil and gas market outlook, Q2 | April 2022EY
The theme for this quarter is rearrangement. The loss, or potential loss, of Russian oil and gas supplies is forcing producers, refiners and traders to rethink the flow of crude oil and refined products from the wellhead to the gas pump in light of sanctions, potential sanctions and the risk of reputational damage. Countries, companies and consumers will all be searching for ways to adapt, and the outcome of the race to bring alternatives to market could alter the global energy landscape for years to come.
It is likely crude oil and LNG prices will remain elevated for some time. The process of diverting Russian oil through countries unwilling to sanction it will take time and there is little indication OPEC members are willing (or able) to increase production to make up for the loss of Russian crude. Spare capacity sat at 3.7 mbpd at the end of 2021, just above where it was in January 2020. Currently, sanctioned Venezuelan and Iranian production (about 3 mbpd below their peak) could fill the gap, but political and commercial obstacles remain. At today’s prices, US shale production is attractive, but the fastest the industry has been able to grow is between 1mbpd and 2mbpd per year. The LNG infrastructure was already stretched before the war in Ukraine and there is little prosect of finding new supplies soon.
As the largest buyer of Russian energy, Europe will be the epicenter. There is a deeply embedded bias there in favor for renewable energy, and the current crisis is certain to result in an all-out effort to accelerate the build-out of wind and solar power. The capacity to add new green energy is limited though by the project pipeline and supply chains for solar panels and wind turbines, and it is likely that much of the shortfall will be made up with the new LNG infrastructure.
With the beginning of the millennium,
Most of the world countries started to turn
toward the natural gas as an alternative
energy resource instead of crude oil and
harmless resource for the environment.
Global conflict signs started to shape
because of the countries’ interests
encounter - specially, in the near and
middle east regions.
In this presentation, I will try to explain
these signs by dividing the related
countries to three categories:
1- Consuming Countries.
2- Producing Countries.
3- Transit Countries.
The president of Russia is considered the head of th.docxgabrielaj9
The president of Russia is considered the head of the state and the government, while the prime minister serves as his deputy (the equivalent of a Vice President in the United States of America). They are co-heads of the government, and they both belong to the same political party – United Russia (though Putin ran as an independent in 2018).
The president of Russia has a central role in the government’s political system. The president mainly influences the executive branch’s activities. He also appoints the prime minister and other members of the government, chairs the cabinet’s meetings, and gives orders to his deputy and other members regarding governance. He can also revoke any act or law passed by the government.
Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (left) with Russian President Vladimir Putin (right)
“Russia needs to radically overhaul its administrative and judicial systems and embrace new technology otherwise economic stagnation could threaten its security, Vladimir Putin’s chief adviser on economic reform has warned.
Alexei Kudrin, the former finance minister, was asked by Mr Putin last year to come up with a new strategy for economic policymaking for the next term, following the president’s planned re-election next year.
Outlining his plans on Friday, Mr Kudrin said: “We have come to face the problem that Russia has fallen behind technologically in the world. That, in my view, is the most serious challenge we face in the coming 10 to 15 years.”
Financial Times, Jan 13, 2017
Alexei Kudrin
Kudrin…
“We will struggle with diminishing defense potential and threats to national sovereignty if we don’t become a technological power. Even military experts say that technological challenges facing Russia are bigger than geopolitical and military ones,” Mr Kudrin said.
“Our entire foreign policy should be subordinated to the task of technological development.”
Russia is popularly known as the world’s second largest natural gas producer and the 3rd largest oil producer. The country has a large number of major oil and gas companies. Most of the top oil companies in Russia have continued to maintain significant downstream and upstream gas and oil operations. This includes retail service stations, exploration and production divisions and petroleum refineries.
This is the largest oil company in Russia. Reports show that the company produced around 1.5 billion barrels of oil in the year 2014. Besides, the company is also ranked as the 3rd largest natural gas company in the world with a production of more than 347 million barrels of oil equivalent.
The company’s market capitalization is around $38.7 billion which automatically makes it the highest valued gas and oil company. Rosneft operates 13 refineries in the country and has shown tremendous interest in around seven refineries based in Eastern and Western Europe. The company maintains exploration and production operation in countries such as Canada, Vietnam, USA, Norway and.
NewBase 18 February-2023 Energy News issue - 1594 by Khaled Al Awadi_compres...Khaled Al Awadi
NewBase 18 February-2023 Energy News issue - 1594 by Khaled Al AwadiNewBase 18 February-2023 Energy News issue - 1594 by Khaled Al AwadiNewBase 18 February-2023 Energy News issue - 1594 by Khaled Al AwadiNewBase 18 February-2023 Energy News issue - 1594 by Khaled Al AwadiNewBase 18 February-2023 Energy News issue - 1594 by Khaled Al Awadi
Monthly Economic Monitoring of Ukraine No.223
The IER has released the new issue of the Macroeconomic Monitoring of Ukraine (MEMU), which outlines key figures, trends, and events of July 2023.
According to the IER estimate, real gross value added (GVA) in agriculture increased by almost 5%
yoy primarily due to the lower statistical base of July 2022.
The grain harvest in July was close to last year due to higher yields.
The flooding of territories in June due to the destruction of the Kakhovka dam by russians slowed the pace of crop recovery.
The mining industry grew insignificantly compared to last year.
At the same time, we estimate that the processing industry grew by more than 20% yoy due to the recovery of all sectors from a low base.
The growth rate of real GVA in transport slowed to 9% yoy, while the GVA in trade continued to grow rapidly (about 27% yoy).
However, the real GVA was significantly lower than in 2021 in all sectors.
Russia’s window onto Europe by Olga Gopkalo and Alexander Goloviznin, Mostroy...Olga Gopkalo
The last decade’s affairs of Russian Baltic ports were dramatic, interesting and complex. However, the ports can also prove their track records by success stories. The Big Port of Saint Petersburg is currently the largest container port in the Baltic Sea, the First Container Terminal – a leader in container handlings in the region. The Port of Primorsk is a major oil port and Rosterminalugol has grown into the biggest coal terminal.
Presented by Anastasia Luzgina during the conference "Belarus at the crossroads: The complex role of sanctions in the context of totalitarian backsliding" on April 23, 2024.
Presented by Erlend Bollman Bjørtvedt during the conference "Belarus at the crossroads: The complex role of sanctions in the context of totalitarian backsliding" on April 23, 2024.
More Related Content
Similar to The impact of the war on Russia’s fossil fuel earnings
The IER has released the new issue of the Macroeconomic Monitoring of Ukraine (MEMU), which outlines key figures, trends, and events of July 2023.
According to the IER estimate, real gross value added (GVA) in agriculture increased by almost 5%
yoy primarily due to the lower statistical base of July 2022.
The grain harvest in July was close to last year due to higher yields.
The flooding of territories in June due to the destruction of the Kakhovka dam by russians slowed the pace of crop recovery.
The mining industry grew insignificantly compared to last year.
At the same time, we estimate that the processing industry grew by more than 20% yoy due to the recovery of all sectors from a low base.
The growth rate of real GVA in transport slowed to 9% yoy, while the GVA in trade continued to grow rapidly (about 27% yoy).
However, the real GVA was significantly lower than in 2021 in all sectors.
Global LNG Navigating Risks in a Dynamic MarketCTRM Center
Liquified natural gas (LNG) has been a traded commodity for more than a century. But only in the last couple of decades has the market expanded to meet the ever-increasing demand for energy, through low carbon emissions energy sources. With the development of the massive Qatar LNG facilities in the mid-1990s and the increasing demand for imported gas, global LNG trading has grown from about 50 MTPA in 1990 to more than 350 MTPA in 2020.
Most energy commodities struggled with lower trade and consumption volumes under the pandemic-induced industrial shutdowns in 2020. LNG trade was, however, up slightly at 0.4% during the year, continuing its uninterrupted streak of year-over-year growth since 1996. However, that growth was far below rates in the preceding years which averaged 7% since 2004.
EY Price Point: global oil and gas market outlook, Q2 | April 2022EY
The theme for this quarter is rearrangement. The loss, or potential loss, of Russian oil and gas supplies is forcing producers, refiners and traders to rethink the flow of crude oil and refined products from the wellhead to the gas pump in light of sanctions, potential sanctions and the risk of reputational damage. Countries, companies and consumers will all be searching for ways to adapt, and the outcome of the race to bring alternatives to market could alter the global energy landscape for years to come.
It is likely crude oil and LNG prices will remain elevated for some time. The process of diverting Russian oil through countries unwilling to sanction it will take time and there is little indication OPEC members are willing (or able) to increase production to make up for the loss of Russian crude. Spare capacity sat at 3.7 mbpd at the end of 2021, just above where it was in January 2020. Currently, sanctioned Venezuelan and Iranian production (about 3 mbpd below their peak) could fill the gap, but political and commercial obstacles remain. At today’s prices, US shale production is attractive, but the fastest the industry has been able to grow is between 1mbpd and 2mbpd per year. The LNG infrastructure was already stretched before the war in Ukraine and there is little prosect of finding new supplies soon.
As the largest buyer of Russian energy, Europe will be the epicenter. There is a deeply embedded bias there in favor for renewable energy, and the current crisis is certain to result in an all-out effort to accelerate the build-out of wind and solar power. The capacity to add new green energy is limited though by the project pipeline and supply chains for solar panels and wind turbines, and it is likely that much of the shortfall will be made up with the new LNG infrastructure.
With the beginning of the millennium,
Most of the world countries started to turn
toward the natural gas as an alternative
energy resource instead of crude oil and
harmless resource for the environment.
Global conflict signs started to shape
because of the countries’ interests
encounter - specially, in the near and
middle east regions.
In this presentation, I will try to explain
these signs by dividing the related
countries to three categories:
1- Consuming Countries.
2- Producing Countries.
3- Transit Countries.
The president of Russia is considered the head of th.docxgabrielaj9
The president of Russia is considered the head of the state and the government, while the prime minister serves as his deputy (the equivalent of a Vice President in the United States of America). They are co-heads of the government, and they both belong to the same political party – United Russia (though Putin ran as an independent in 2018).
The president of Russia has a central role in the government’s political system. The president mainly influences the executive branch’s activities. He also appoints the prime minister and other members of the government, chairs the cabinet’s meetings, and gives orders to his deputy and other members regarding governance. He can also revoke any act or law passed by the government.
Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (left) with Russian President Vladimir Putin (right)
“Russia needs to radically overhaul its administrative and judicial systems and embrace new technology otherwise economic stagnation could threaten its security, Vladimir Putin’s chief adviser on economic reform has warned.
Alexei Kudrin, the former finance minister, was asked by Mr Putin last year to come up with a new strategy for economic policymaking for the next term, following the president’s planned re-election next year.
Outlining his plans on Friday, Mr Kudrin said: “We have come to face the problem that Russia has fallen behind technologically in the world. That, in my view, is the most serious challenge we face in the coming 10 to 15 years.”
Financial Times, Jan 13, 2017
Alexei Kudrin
Kudrin…
“We will struggle with diminishing defense potential and threats to national sovereignty if we don’t become a technological power. Even military experts say that technological challenges facing Russia are bigger than geopolitical and military ones,” Mr Kudrin said.
“Our entire foreign policy should be subordinated to the task of technological development.”
Russia is popularly known as the world’s second largest natural gas producer and the 3rd largest oil producer. The country has a large number of major oil and gas companies. Most of the top oil companies in Russia have continued to maintain significant downstream and upstream gas and oil operations. This includes retail service stations, exploration and production divisions and petroleum refineries.
This is the largest oil company in Russia. Reports show that the company produced around 1.5 billion barrels of oil in the year 2014. Besides, the company is also ranked as the 3rd largest natural gas company in the world with a production of more than 347 million barrels of oil equivalent.
The company’s market capitalization is around $38.7 billion which automatically makes it the highest valued gas and oil company. Rosneft operates 13 refineries in the country and has shown tremendous interest in around seven refineries based in Eastern and Western Europe. The company maintains exploration and production operation in countries such as Canada, Vietnam, USA, Norway and.
NewBase 18 February-2023 Energy News issue - 1594 by Khaled Al Awadi_compres...Khaled Al Awadi
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Monthly Economic Monitoring of Ukraine No.223
The IER has released the new issue of the Macroeconomic Monitoring of Ukraine (MEMU), which outlines key figures, trends, and events of July 2023.
According to the IER estimate, real gross value added (GVA) in agriculture increased by almost 5%
yoy primarily due to the lower statistical base of July 2022.
The grain harvest in July was close to last year due to higher yields.
The flooding of territories in June due to the destruction of the Kakhovka dam by russians slowed the pace of crop recovery.
The mining industry grew insignificantly compared to last year.
At the same time, we estimate that the processing industry grew by more than 20% yoy due to the recovery of all sectors from a low base.
The growth rate of real GVA in transport slowed to 9% yoy, while the GVA in trade continued to grow rapidly (about 27% yoy).
However, the real GVA was significantly lower than in 2021 in all sectors.
Russia’s window onto Europe by Olga Gopkalo and Alexander Goloviznin, Mostroy...Olga Gopkalo
The last decade’s affairs of Russian Baltic ports were dramatic, interesting and complex. However, the ports can also prove their track records by success stories. The Big Port of Saint Petersburg is currently the largest container port in the Baltic Sea, the First Container Terminal – a leader in container handlings in the region. The Port of Primorsk is a major oil port and Rosterminalugol has grown into the biggest coal terminal.
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Presented by Anastasia Luzgina during the conference "Belarus at the crossroads: The complex role of sanctions in the context of totalitarian backsliding" on April 23, 2024.
Presented by Erlend Bollman Bjørtvedt during the conference "Belarus at the crossroads: The complex role of sanctions in the context of totalitarian backsliding" on April 23, 2024.
Presented by Dzimtry Kruk during the conference "Belarus at the crossroads: The complex role of sanctions in the context of totalitarian backsliding" on April 23, 2024.
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This year’s SITE Development Day conference will focus on the Russian war on Ukraine. We will discuss the situation in Ukraine and neighbouring countries, how to finance and organize financial support within the EU and within Sweden, and how to deal with the current energy crisis.
This year’s SITE Development Day conference will focus on the Russian war on Ukraine. We will discuss the situation in Ukraine and neighbouring countries, how to finance and organize financial support within the EU and within Sweden, and how to deal with the current energy crisis.
The (Ce)² Workshop is organised as an initiative of the FREE Network by one of its members, the Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA, Poland) together with the Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (CeMMAP, UK). This will be the seventh edition of the workshop which will be held in Warsaw on 27-28 June 2022.
The (Ce)2 workshop is organised as an initiative of the FREE Network by one of its members, the Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA, Poland) together with the Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (CeMMAP, UK). This will be the seventh edition of the workshop which will be held in Warsaw on 27-28 June 2022.
The (Ce)2 workshop is organised as an initiative of the FREE Network by one of its members, the Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA, Poland) together with the Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (CeMMAP, UK). This will be the seventh edition of the workshop which will be held in Warsaw on 27-28 June 2022.
The (Ce)2 workshop is organised as an initiative of the FREE Network by one of its members, the Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA, Poland) together with the Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (CeMMAP, UK). This will be the seventh edition of the workshop which will be held in Warsaw on 27-28 June 2022.
Diabetes is a rapidly and serious health problem in Pakistan. This chronic condition is associated with serious long-term complications, including higher risk of heart disease and stroke. Aggressive treatment of hypertension and hyperlipideamia can result in a substantial reduction in cardiovascular events in patients with diabetes 1. Consequently pharmacist-led diabetes cardiovascular risk (DCVR) clinics have been established in both primary and secondary care sites in NHS Lothian during the past five years. An audit of the pharmaceutical care delivery at the clinics was conducted in order to evaluate practice and to standardize the pharmacists’ documentation of outcomes. Pharmaceutical care issues (PCI) and patient details were collected both prospectively and retrospectively from three DCVR clinics. The PCI`s were categorized according to a triangularised system consisting of multiple categories. These were ‘checks’, ‘changes’ (‘change in drug therapy process’ and ‘change in drug therapy’), ‘drug therapy problems’ and ‘quality assurance descriptors’ (‘timer perspective’ and ‘degree of change’). A verified medication assessment tool (MAT) for patients with chronic cardiovascular disease was applied to the patients from one of the clinics. The tool was used to quantify PCI`s and pharmacist actions that were centered on implementing or enforcing clinical guideline standards. A database was developed to be used as an assessment tool and to standardize the documentation of achievement of outcomes. Feedback on the audit of the pharmaceutical care delivery and the database was received from the DCVR clinic pharmacist at a focus group meeting.
Artificial Reefs by Kuddle Life Foundation - May 2024punit537210
Situated in Pondicherry, India, Kuddle Life Foundation is a charitable, non-profit and non-governmental organization (NGO) dedicated to improving the living standards of coastal communities and simultaneously placing a strong emphasis on the protection of marine ecosystems.
One of the key areas we work in is Artificial Reefs. This presentation captures our journey so far and our learnings. We hope you get as excited about marine conservation and artificial reefs as we are.
Please visit our website: https://kuddlelife.org
Our Instagram channel:
@kuddlelifefoundation
Our Linkedin Page:
https://www.linkedin.com/company/kuddlelifefoundation/
and write to us if you have any questions:
info@kuddlelife.org
Natural farming @ Dr. Siddhartha S. Jena.pptxsidjena70
A brief about organic farming/ Natural farming/ Zero budget natural farming/ Subash Palekar Natural farming which keeps us and environment safe and healthy. Next gen Agricultural practices of chemical free farming.
Willie Nelson Net Worth: A Journey Through Music, Movies, and Business Venturesgreendigital
Willie Nelson is a name that resonates within the world of music and entertainment. Known for his unique voice, and masterful guitar skills. and an extraordinary career spanning several decades. Nelson has become a legend in the country music scene. But, his influence extends far beyond the realm of music. with ventures in acting, writing, activism, and business. This comprehensive article delves into Willie Nelson net worth. exploring the various facets of his career that have contributed to his large fortune.
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Introduction
Willie Nelson net worth is a testament to his enduring influence and success in many fields. Born on April 29, 1933, in Abbott, Texas. Nelson's journey from a humble beginning to becoming one of the most iconic figures in American music is nothing short of inspirational. His net worth, which estimated to be around $25 million as of 2024. reflects a career that is as diverse as it is prolific.
Early Life and Musical Beginnings
Humble Origins
Willie Hugh Nelson was born during the Great Depression. a time of significant economic hardship in the United States. Raised by his grandparents. Nelson found solace and inspiration in music from an early age. His grandmother taught him to play the guitar. setting the stage for what would become an illustrious career.
First Steps in Music
Nelson's initial foray into the music industry was fraught with challenges. He moved to Nashville, Tennessee, to pursue his dreams, but success did not come . Working as a songwriter, Nelson penned hits for other artists. which helped him gain a foothold in the competitive music scene. His songwriting skills contributed to his early earnings. laying the foundation for his net worth.
Rise to Stardom
Breakthrough Albums
The 1970s marked a turning point in Willie Nelson's career. His albums "Shotgun Willie" (1973), "Red Headed Stranger" (1975). and "Stardust" (1978) received critical acclaim and commercial success. These albums not only solidified his position in the country music genre. but also introduced his music to a broader audience. The success of these albums played a crucial role in boosting Willie Nelson net worth.
Iconic Songs
Willie Nelson net worth is also attributed to his extensive catalog of hit songs. Tracks like "Blue Eyes Crying in the Rain," "On the Road Again," and "Always on My Mind" have become timeless classics. These songs have not only earned Nelson large royalties but have also ensured his continued relevance in the music industry.
Acting and Film Career
Hollywood Ventures
In addition to his music career, Willie Nelson has also made a mark in Hollywood. His distinctive personality and on-screen presence have landed him roles in several films and television shows. Notable appearances include roles in "The Electric Horseman" (1979), "Honeysuckle Rose" (1980), and "Barbarosa" (1982). These acting gigs have added a significant amount to Willie Nelson net worth.
Television Appearances
Nelson's char
Characterization and the Kinetics of drying at the drying oven and with micro...Open Access Research Paper
The objective of this work is to contribute to valorization de Nephelium lappaceum by the characterization of kinetics of drying of seeds of Nephelium lappaceum. The seeds were dehydrated until a constant mass respectively in a drying oven and a microwawe oven. The temperatures and the powers of drying are respectively: 50, 60 and 70°C and 140, 280 and 420 W. The results show that the curves of drying of seeds of Nephelium lappaceum do not present a phase of constant kinetics. The coefficients of diffusion vary between 2.09.10-8 to 2.98. 10-8m-2/s in the interval of 50°C at 70°C and between 4.83×10-07 at 9.04×10-07 m-8/s for the powers going of 140 W with 420 W the relation between Arrhenius and a value of energy of activation of 16.49 kJ. mol-1 expressed the effect of the temperature on effective diffusivity.
Micro RNA genes and their likely influence in rice (Oryza sativa L.) dynamic ...Open Access Research Paper
Micro RNAs (miRNAs) are small non-coding RNAs molecules having approximately 18-25 nucleotides, they are present in both plants and animals genomes. MiRNAs have diverse spatial expression patterns and regulate various developmental metabolisms, stress responses and other physiological processes. The dynamic gene expression playing major roles in phenotypic differences in organisms are believed to be controlled by miRNAs. Mutations in regions of regulatory factors, such as miRNA genes or transcription factors (TF) necessitated by dynamic environmental factors or pathogen infections, have tremendous effects on structure and expression of genes. The resultant novel gene products presents potential explanations for constant evolving desirable traits that have long been bred using conventional means, biotechnology or genetic engineering. Rice grain quality, yield, disease tolerance, climate-resilience and palatability properties are not exceptional to miRN Asmutations effects. There are new insights courtesy of high-throughput sequencing and improved proteomic techniques that organisms’ complexity and adaptations are highly contributed by miRNAs containing regulatory networks. This article aims to expound on how rice miRNAs could be driving evolution of traits and highlight the latest miRNA research progress. Moreover, the review accentuates miRNAs grey areas to be addressed and gives recommendations for further studies.
The impact of the war on Russia’s fossil fuel earnings
1. SITE 2023 Development Day
conference | How to
undermine the Russian war
effort and support Ukraine
Petras Katinas – 5th December 2023
2. Who are CREA &
what do we do?
● CREA provide analysis, data &
policy recommendations on fossil
fuel revenues that enable Russia to
wage the war.
● From January 2022 until July 31,
2023, the global bilateral
commitment to Ukraine amounted
to 237 billion euros, as reported by
the Kiel Institute for the World
Economy's sanction tracker.
Payments to Russia for fossil
fuels
since 24 February 2022
3. The impact of the war on Russia’s fossil fuel earnings
Russia is more
dependent than ever on
earnings from oil to fund
the war it helps to
decrease budget deficit.
In 2022, Russia earned
USD 166 bln from the
taxes on oil & gas sales
(40% of federal budget) -
an enabler of their military
aggression.
4. Where is Russia selling its fossil fuels since the EU bans?
● China & India are the
largest buyers of R
● Russia’s crude oil.
● Turkey, China, Brazil &
Saudi Arabia purchased
the most oil products.
● LNG is purchased by EU,
especially Belgium, Spain
as well as China & Japan.
● EU, Turkey & China
bought high values of
pipeline gas
● Russian coal is bought by
China, India, South Korea
& Turkey.
● EU & Turkey were the
largest LPG buyers.
5. Russian gas exports
● 44% drop in pipeline gas exports to the EU in
2022 damaged Russia’s gas sector.
● LNG increased 26% to EU - partially offsetting
decline in pipeline gas.
● Russia more reliant on EU gas market - making
up 47% of sale in 2023 from 37% in 2021.
● Russia’s plans to expand gas production
requires EU reduced reliance - must prevent
investing in RU LNG projects or building
infrastructure.
● LNG shipments are reliant on EU ports for
transshipment, storing & re-export LNG to non-
EU countries.
Banning transshipment could make logistics of
LNG exports difficult, lowering profits & volumes.
6. Russia continues to rely on EU & G7 insurance / vessels to
transport its oil: there are not enough “shadow tankers”
● Sixty-five percent of Russian crude oil
was transported by “shadow” tankers,
while tankers owned or insured in
countries implementing the price cap
accounted for 35%.
● “Shadow” tankers transporting oil
products, chemicals, and LPG handled
38% of the total volume of products. The
remaining volume was shipped by the
tankers subject to the price cap policy.
● Russian oil Greek-owned vessels
transported over 25% of Russian crude
7. The EU imports of refined oil from Russian crude
● The EU imported an estimated EUR 6.5 billion of oil products refined from Russian crude since the beginning of sanctions until the
end of October 2023. This made up 11% of their imports of oil products.
8. How the price cap coalition
whitewashes Russian oil in
third countries?
The price cap coalition
countries are exploiting a
significant loophole by
increasing imports of refined
oil products from nations that
have become the leading
buyers of Russian crude.
The refining loophole
provides an outlet for Russian
crude oil, supporting volumes
and prices through increasing
demand for Russia’s oil
exports.
One year post invasion | Million
tonnes
9. ● Lukoil’s Burgas refinery increased its reliance on Russian crude
to 93% in 2023 up from 70% prior to the invasion.
● Imports of Russian crude accounted for EUR 1.1 bln.
● Burgas exported EUR 984 mln of oil products between Jan -
Oct 2023.
● We track shipments showing the Seaexpress delivered 40,000
tonnes of oil products to Netherlands - Russian oil ends up fueling
vehicles in the EU.
● Since the ban on Russian oil products, tankers departing Burgas
that conducted STS transfers has tripled.
Bulgaria 4th largest importer of
seaborne Russian crude oil (2023)
10. STS transfers of Russian oil
● Ship-to-ship transfers (STS) of crude oil have increased 54% -
influenced by logistics & trade in Russian oil becoming more
complicated, many ships are reluctant to enter Russian ports.
● While some STS transfers could mask the origin of the oil.
● Focal points of transshipments have been observed in Ceuta (Spain),
Constanta (Romania), & Laconian Gulf (Greece).
● STS operations rely on tugboats & shore support, which should be
banned.
● The operations involving “shadow tankers” with no or dubious
insurance & safety oversight, constituting a risk to coastal waters.
● Instances of vessels turning off their location transponders (AIS)
increased 225% globally1 in 2023Q1 on year.
1Platts Maritime Intelligence Risk Suite (MIRS) and
Maritime Portal
11. ● Russian revenues could have
been slashed by EUR 59 bln
(49%) by setting the cap for crude
oil at USD 30 per barrel (still well
above Russia’s production
costs, averaging USD 15).
● Full enforcement at current level
would have cut Russia’s oil
export revenue by ~ EUR 3.75
bln, or 25%, in October.
Price cap level is too high
12. Thank you for
listening, any
questions are
welcomed?
Petras Katinas - Energy Analyst at CREA
December 2023
14. Enforcement of the price cap is failing
● Urals prices have consistently stayed above the cap since July, yet tankers owned or insured by the EU and G7
nations continue to operate. In contrast, prices for the ESPO (Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean) blend have never
approached 60 USD per barrel.
● Enforcement hasn’t
worked in Pacific trade.
India & China customs
data indicates buyers
paying prices above price
cap..
15. ● Monitoring & enforcing the price cap relies on
“attestations”, issued by traders outside of
enforcement agencies’ jurisdiction -> vulnerable to
falsified documents.
● Not enough done within current enforcement powers.
The UK is the largest insurer of Russian oil (33%),
OFSI have previously reported the collection of limited
attestation documents.
Without scrutiny, Western companies aren’t
dissuaded from providing insurance / tankers to
facilitate oil exports above the price cap.
● Penalties are too weak: exclusion from insurance &
financial services for three months.
● Require banks to verify payment of oil adhered to
price cap shift liability to banks for processing
violating payments.
● Tankers passing through coastal states should
provide insurance documents.
Monitoring & enforcement issues
16. Additional - Policy recommendations
Additional measure:
● Invest more in clean energy to
reduce reliance on fossil fuels
● LNG ban
● LPG ban
● Pipeline oil bans
● Pipeline gas bans
Every Euro spent buying Russian fossil fuels
contributes to funding Putin’s warchest used to fight
our allies in Ukraine
17. Policy recommendations to tighten sanctions
Measures to prevent the laundromat
loophole:
● Ban imports from refineries
receiving Russian crude.
● Require refineries receiving
Russian crude to enforce the
crude oil price cap policy to
export to the sanctioning
countries.
● Advocate to dissuade ally
countries purchasing Russian oil.
● Ban investments in refineries
identified as importing Russian
crude oil.
Measures to improve the oil price cap:
● Revise the oil price cap down to USD25–35 per barrel.
● Enhance monitoring & enforcement:
○ Permanently ban tankers.
○ Require underlying sales contracts rather than
attestations.
○ Monitoring & enforcement authority collaboration -
audits on attestations.
● Additional sanctions:
○ Restrictions on the sales of tankers, to prevent Russia
acquiring old tankers to circumvent the cap.
○ Prohibit transhipment of Russian oil in coalition countries
waters.
● Require enhanced P&I insurance disclosure & review for vessels
not insured by the IG when passing through the Danish Straits /
other EU/G7 territorial waters.
18. ● Lukoil has been exploiting the exemption to export oil products “cannot be stored in Bulgaria due to environmental and
safety risks”, i.e. when the refinery produces more than can be stored or consumed domestically.
● The law clarifies that “such sale, supply, transfer or export is not meant to circumvent the prohibitions”. This exception
has allowed Burgas to continue to produce and export the excess products it refines to non-EU countries.
● Our investigation tracks and specific shipment (Seaexpress) that transported refined Russian oil into the Netherlands
unloading the fuel at a marine fueling station.
● After presenting the results of the investigation on the day it was published at a conference in Sofia, attended by the
Bulgarian Prime Minister, European Public Prosecutor and EU Commission officials, the story created huge amounts of
interest. The next evening, we were invited into the Bulgarian Council of Ministers to have an emergency meeting with
Bulgaria's Prime Minister and Cabinet Members to discuss our analysis.
● This is an example of how investigations and transparent data analysis can be used to instigate change. This
investigation, paired with tireless efforts from the CSD team to work with the Bulgarian Government to end Bulgaria's
derogation as soon as possible looks likely and should finally stop Bulgaria's purchases of Russian oil that finances the
Kremlin's war chest.
Impact of the investigation?
Editor's Notes
Thank you for your interest in our work: we produced this briefing to shed light on how the price cap policy that started off well has run into serious problems with effectiveness and integrity both in terms of the enforcement and not having lowered the level of the price caps. We want to encourage the architects of this policy to fix its problems or if that fails, for the EU to draw conclusions and return to a full ban on ancillary services to ships transporting Russian oil.
The price cap coalition needs to re-take the initiative from the Kremlin in the dynamic game of sanctions - otherwise Putin will learn that the coalition will not follow its own policy and he can continue to manipulate markets.
Since the full-scale invasion, the different countries and companies paid to Russia 554 bn euros, while the EU paid 182 bn EUR. Tha majority Russia received for oil, natural gas and coal.
For comparison. From January 2022 until July 31, 2023, the global bilateral commitment to Ukraine amounted to 237 billion euros, as reported by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy's sanction tracker.
Fossil fuel is crucial for balancing Russia federal budget. More that 40% of total annual income comes from fossil fuel.
The primary purchasers of Russian fossil fuels are China and India. Typically, China constitutes 40-45% of the total Russian fossil fuel exports, while India accounts for 21%. These nations predominantly acquire crude oil, with lesser volumes being allocated to oil products, coal, and gas. The European Union (EU) contributes to 14%, primarily importing pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas (LNG), with some countries having exemptions."
44% drop in pipeline gas exports to the EU in 2022 damaged Russia’s gas sector (production cuts & lower tax revenues).
LNG increased 26% to EU since the invasion - partially offsetting decline in pipeline gas.
Russia more reliant on EU gas market - making up 37% of sale in 2021 now 47% in 2023.
Russian LNG shipments are also reliant on EU ports for transshipment, storing & re-export LNG to non-EU countries. Banning transshipment could make logistics of LNG exports difficult, lowering profits & volumes.
Russia’s plans to expand production of gas require EU reduced reliance - must prevent investing in RU LNG projects or building infrastructure.
Russia has made an estimated EUR 58 bln in export revenue on seaborne oil since the EU import bans and the price caps entered into force , with the majority of this oil carried on European-insured or owned tankers.
Sixty-five percent of Russian crude oil was transported by “shadow” tankers, while tankers owned or insured in countries implementing the price cap accounted for 35%.
“Shadow” tankers transporting oil products, chemicals, and LPG handled 38% of the total volume of products. The remaining volume was shipped by the tankers subject to the price cap policy.
Russian oil; Greek-owned vessels transported over 25% of Russian crude
This loophole enables Russian crude oil to be 'whitewashed' and sold to coalition countries, potentially undermining the impact of sanctions on Russia. Key re-export hubs include Jamangar and Vadinar in India, Aliaga in Turkey, and Singapore, along with certain ports in China. Refined products from China are directed to Australia, those from India reach the EU and Australia, and the majority of Turkey's refined product exports go to the EU.
Such cases where the enforcement of the price cap is failing,, the laundromat process circumvents the price cap further creating demand for Russia’s crude oil and funding the Russia’s warchest
The EU, most of G7 and Australia have banned or limited imports of Russian crude oil and oil products, leading to a significant fall in Russia’s oil prices and export revenues. However, these price cap coalition countries have increased imports of refined oil products from countries that have become the largest importers of Russian crude. This is a major loophole by which, Russian crude oil is being ‘whitewashed’ and sold to price cap coalition counties that can undermine the impact of the sanctions on Russia.
Ship-to-ship transfers (STS) of Russian crude oil have increased +54% since the implementation of the oil price cap sanctions until the end of Oct 2023 - mainly because the logistics & trade in Russian oil have gotten more complicated, many ships are reluctant to enter Russian ports.
While some ship-to-ship transfers could be done to mask the origin of the oil, this is not the main reason, let alone the only reason they are undertaken.
Focal points of Russian oil transshipments have been observed in Ceuta (Spain), Constanta (Romania), & Laconian Gulf (Greece).
STS operations in these areas rely on tugboats & shore support, which should be banned.
The operations involving “shadow tankers” with no or dubious insurance & safety oversight, constituting a risk to coastal waters.
STS from price cap-compliant tankers to “shadow” tankers should be banned.
Instances of vessels turning off their location transponders (AIS) increased 225% globally1 in 2023Q1 on year.
Source: https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/PlattsContent/_assets/_images/latest-news/053123-infographic-russia-dark-sts-transfers-ship-to-ship-western-sanctions-oil-crude-tankers-shipping.jpg
As seen by the modelled chart in the right hand side of the slide, Russian revenues could have been slashed by EUR 59 billion euros by setting the price cap for crude oil at USD 30 per barrel and revising the caps for oil products accordingly. USD 30 is a level closer to Russia’s production costs, which average USD 15/barrel, while still comfortably above those costs, incentivising continued production.
lowering the cap would also be deflationary, reducing oil prices Russia can receive for their exports. As oil prices have fluctuated this year, Russian oil export volumes have remained relatively stable.
Strengthened enforcement of the price caps and lower price cap levels are needed if the architects of the oil price cap policy want it to function as a credible policy and to lower Russia’s oil export revenues.
Full enforcement of the price caps would have cut Russia’s oil export revenue by approximately EUR 2 billion, or 12%, in April alone when prices were above the 60 dollars per barrel level in comparison to sales taking place at the market level prices.
The EU, most of G7 and Australia have banned or limited imports of Russian crude oil and oil products, leading to a significant fall in Russia’s oil prices and export revenues. However, these price cap coalition countries have increased imports of refined oil products from countries that have become the largest importers of Russian crude. This is a major loophole by which, Russian crude oil is being ‘whitewashed’ and sold to price cap coalition counties that can undermine the impact of the sanctions on Russia.
Box 1: The key findings of the laundromat report are that, in the year following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine:
Western sanction imposing countries imported EUR 42 billion worth of oil products from countries that have increased imports of Russian crude oil in the 12 month period since Russia’s invasion.
These 5 identified “laundromat countries”
increased imports of Russian crude oil by 140% in volume terms in the year after Russia’s invasion compared to the prior year.
These 5 countries have also made up 70% of Russia’s crude oil exports since the crude oil ban was implemented (5th December) until the year after Russia’s invasion.
These laundromat countries have also increased oil product exports to price cap coalition countries by 26% while exports to other countries were flat - showing that the main increase in laundromat oil product sales were to sanction imposing countries.
Chart: This Sankey diagram to the right shows the flows of Russian crude oil (starting from the left hand side) travelling into laundromat countries represented in the middle of this chart: UAE, Turkey, Singapore, India and China in the first flow of the sankey diagram in the one year period after the invasion of Ukraine. The second flow in the sankey diagram to the right hand side of the chart shows the flow of refined oil products moving to price cap coalition countries.The thickness of the bars represents the volumes of oil that travels to price cap coalition countries.
Box 2: Why is this “laundromat” process a concern?
The refining loophole provides an outlet for Russian crude oil, supporting volumes and prices through increasing demand for Russia’s oil exports.
In cases where the enforcement of the price cap is failing, especially Russia–China trades, the laundromat process circumvents the price cap further creating demand for Russia’s crude oil and funding the Kremlin’s warchest.
Reported prices for Urals crude rose above the price cap in April as seen in the chart on the right hand side of this slide, but EU & G7-owned and insured tankers continued to lift Russian oil during this period, indicating that enforcement is not working.
It has been apparent for months that enforcement of the price cap doesn’t work in the Pacific trade from Russia’s Far Eastern ports to China.
Customs data from India and China indicates that buyers are paying prices well above the Urals benchmark, although still at a discount to Brent crude.
Failure in enforcement was an open invitation for Russia & OPEC+ to continue to manipulate markets with supply cuts.
Monitoring & enforcing the price cap relies on “attestations”, which can be issued by any trader outside of enforcement agencies’ jurisdiction, making the system vulnerable to false documents.
Not enough is being done within current enforcement powers. The UK being the largest insurer of Russian oil (33% of total Russian oil since sanctions implemented), enforcement agency OFSI have previously reported the collection of few attestation documents. Without scrutiny, Western companies aren’t dissuaded from providing insurance or tankers to facilitate Russian oil exports above the price cap.
Penalties for violating the price cap policy are too weak: exclusion from insurance & financial services for three months.
Require banks to verify payment of oil adhered to price cap shift liability to banks for processing violating payments.
Tankers passing through coastal states should provide insurance documents.
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/stop-russian-oil/the-price-aint-right/
The purpose of the price cap policy is to enable Russian oil to find markets at a discounted price. In theory, if the price cap for crude oil was set at a sufficiently low level, and if the coverage and enforcement of the cap was perfect, importing refined Russian oil from third countries would not undermine the policy. However, the price cap is currently set at a level that is far in excess of Russia’s costs of production, allowing the Kremlin to extract most of the export revenue as tax. Furthermore, the cap is not effective on shipments from Russia’s Far Eastern ports due to lackluster enforcement, and obviously cannot cover oil exports through pipelines. Restricting oil product imports from third countries that import Russian crude oil would also create an additional layer of leverage against Russia’s attempts to work around the price caps and import bans.
we recommend to:
Ban imports to the price cap coalition from refineries receiving any Russian crude. Alternatively, develop legislation to require oil product importers into sanctioning countries to provide documentation of the origin of the crude oil used to produce oil products, and deny imports of refined oil products from originally Russian origin.
Ban maritime services in perpetuity to vessels used to transport Russian crude without complying with the price cap.
Reduce reliance on fossil oil through energy saving measures, sustainable transport policies, electric vehicles and clean energy investments. Lower oil demand and prices will reduce Russia’s pricing power and leverage, as well as reduce reliance on other questionable suppliers of oil.
Advocate through political relationships or trade deals to dissuade ally countries from purchasing Russian oil as it is providing finance to Putin’s warchest.
Ban investments in refineries identified as importing Russian crude oil and exporting oil products likely from Russian origin to price cap coalition countries.
Another possible solution could be to require refineries receiving any Russian crude to enforce the crude oil price cap policy as a precondition for exports to the price cap coalition countries. However, the apparent dysfunction of the review mechanism that was supposed to lower the price cap over time has made this approach ineffective as the current price cap level of USD 60 still allows Russia to make a sizable, taxable profit.
The purpose of the price cap policy is to enable Russian oil to find markets at a discounted price. In theory, if the price cap for crude oil was set at a sufficiently low level, and if the coverage and enforcement of the cap was perfect, importing refined Russian oil from third countries would not undermine the policy. However, the price cap is currently set at a level that is far in excess of Russia’s costs of production, allowing the Kremlin to extract most of the export revenue as tax. Furthermore, the cap is not effective on shipments from Russia’s Far Eastern ports due to lackluster enforcement, and obviously cannot cover oil exports through pipelines. Restricting oil product imports from third countries that import Russian crude oil would also create an additional layer of leverage against Russia’s attempts to work around the price caps and import bans.
we recommend to:
Ban imports to the price cap coalition from refineries receiving any Russian crude. Alternatively, develop legislation to require oil product importers into sanctioning countries to provide documentation of the origin of the crude oil used to produce oil products, and deny imports of refined oil products from originally Russian origin.
Ban maritime services in perpetuity to vessels used to transport Russian crude without complying with the price cap.
Reduce reliance on fossil oil through energy saving measures, sustainable transport policies, electric vehicles and clean energy investments. Lower oil demand and prices will reduce Russia’s pricing power and leverage, as well as reduce reliance on other questionable suppliers of oil.
Advocate through political relationships or trade deals to dissuade ally countries from purchasing Russian oil as it is providing finance to Putin’s warchest.
Ban investments in refineries identified as importing Russian crude oil and exporting oil products likely from Russian origin to price cap coalition countries.
Another possible solution could be to require refineries receiving any Russian crude to enforce the crude oil price cap policy as a precondition for exports to the price cap coalition countries. However, the apparent dysfunction of the review mechanism that was supposed to lower the price cap over time has made this approach ineffective as the current price cap level of USD 60 still allows Russia to make a sizable, taxable profit.
The EU, most of G7 and Australia have banned or limited imports of Russian crude oil and oil products, leading to a significant fall in Russia’s oil prices and export revenues. However, these price cap coalition countries have increased imports of refined oil products from countries that have become the largest importers of Russian crude. This is a major loophole by which, Russian crude oil is being ‘whitewashed’ and sold to price cap coalition counties that can undermine the impact of the sanctions on Russia.
Box 1: The key findings of the laundromat report are that, in the year following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine:
Western sanction imposing countries imported EUR 42 billion worth of oil products from countries that have increased imports of Russian crude oil in the 12 month period since Russia’s invasion.
These 5 identified “laundromat countries”
increased imports of Russian crude oil by 140% in volume terms in the year after Russia’s invasion compared to the prior year.
These 5 countries have also made up 70% of Russia’s crude oil exports since the crude oil ban was implemented (5th December) until the year after Russia’s invasion.
These laundromat countries have also increased oil product exports to price cap coalition countries by 26% while exports to other countries were flat - showing that the main increase in laundromat oil product sales were to sanction imposing countries.
Chart: This Sankey diagram to the right shows the flows of Russian crude oil (starting from the left hand side) travelling into laundromat countries represented in the middle of this chart: UAE, Turkey, Singapore, India and China in the first flow of the sankey diagram in the one year period after the invasion of Ukraine. The second flow in the sankey diagram to the right hand side of the chart shows the flow of refined oil products moving to price cap coalition countries.The thickness of the bars represents the volumes of oil that travels to price cap coalition countries.
Box 2: Why is this “laundromat” process a concern?
The refining loophole provides an outlet for Russian crude oil, supporting volumes and prices through increasing demand for Russia’s oil exports.
In cases where the enforcement of the price cap is failing, especially Russia–China trades, the laundromat process circumvents the price cap further creating demand for Russia’s crude oil and funding the Kremlin’s warchest.