Dr Thomas Jeffrey Miley is a lecturer in political sociology at the University of Cambridge. His research interests include comparative nationalisms, language politics, the politics of migration, religion and politics, regime types, and democratic theory. He reported on a recent visit to the Kurdish region of Syria and gave valuable insights on the politics of the Rojava 'revolution' and and its relationship with Kurdish national struggles in the wider area claimed as Kurdistan.

1. The Revolution in Rojava:
Strengths and Challenges
Dr. Thomas Jeffrey Miley
Lecturer of Political Sociology
The University of Cambridge

3. International Borders in 1914

4. A Region of Contested Borders

5. A Syrian “Political Map”

6. A Linguistic Map of Kurdistan

7. Kurdistan According to Google Maps

8. The Region of Rojava

9. The Situation in Rojava
Sept. 2014

13. Press Coverage of the Fight for Kobani

14. Basic Chronology of Events in Rojava
• 11 March 2004 – Qamishlo massacre
• 19 July 2012 – “Beginning of Rojava Revolution.”
Assad regime forces withdraw from Rojava and
Kurdish forces seize control over the areas, city by
city. The first city to declare freedom was Kobani.
• November 2013 – Rojava announces autonomy.
• January 2014 – Geneva II conference for the
resolution of the Syrian conflict. The Kurdish
Democratic Union Party requested a delegation to
the conference, but was excluded. Declare three
autonomous cantons the same day: Cizire (east),
Kobane (center), Afrin (west).
http://links.org.au/node/4129
http://mylittletripod.deviantart.com/art/Rojava-The-Unsung-Social-Revolution-488875745

15. A Revolution in Rojava
• “We have created, in the middle of the civil war in Syria,
three independent cantons in the Rojava region that
function by democratic, autonomous rule.
• “Together with the ethnic and religious minorities of the
region – Arabs, Turkmen, Assyrians, Armenians, Christians,
Kurds – we have written a collective political structure for
these autonomous cantons: our social contract.
• “We have established a people’s council including 101
representatives from all cooperatives, committees and
assembly’s running each of our cantons.
• “And we established a model of co-presidency – each
political entity always has both a female and a male
president – and a quota of 40% gender representation in
order to enforce gender equality throughout all forms of
public life and political representation.

16. Strengths of the Revolution
• Discipline, revolutionary commitment, collective mobilisation and
politicization
• Admirable ideological programme and genuine steps towards
collective emancipation through education
• Gender emancipation
• Attempts to accommodate ethnic and religious diversity

17. Challenges and Vulnerabilities of the Revolution
• Integration of the local Arab population
• Coordination and alliances with groups outside of the three cantons
• Avoiding nationalist excesses and exclusion of minorities in the educational system
• Overcoming nationalist imaginaries among revolutionary cadres
• Navigating tensions between charismatic leadership and the will of the people
• Avoiding playing into the divide and conquer tactics of the imperialist powers

18. Strengths of the Revolution:
Revolutionary Discipline, Politicization, and Collective Mobilization
• “Everyone knows how capitalist democracy plays for the
votes; it is a play of elections. In many places parliamentary
elections are just about propaganda, only addressing the
direct self-interest of a voter.
• “Democratic autonomy is about the long term. It is about
people understanding and exercising their rights. To get
society to become politicized: that is the core of building
democratic autonomy.
• “In Europe you will find a society that is not politicized.
Political parties are only about persuasion and individual
benefits, not about actual emancipation and politicization.
• “Real democracy is based on a politicized society. If you now
go to Kobanê and you meet the fighters of the YPG and the
YPJ you will find that they know exactly why they are
fighting and what they are fighting for. They are not there
for money or interests. They are there for elementary
values, which they practice at the same time. There is no
difference between what they do and what they
represent.”

19. “Radical Democracy” and
Revolutionary Self-Defense in Rojava
• “[We are engaged in the construction of]
radical democracy: to mobilize people to
organize themselves and to defend
themselves by means of peoples armies like
the Peoples Defense Unit (YPG) and Women’s
Defense Unit (YPJ). We are practicing this
model of self-rule and self-organization
without the state as we speak.
• Other people will speak of self-rule in theory,
but for us, this search for self-rule is our daily
revolution. Women, man, all strands of our
society are now organized. The reason why
Kobanê still stands is because we have built
these structures” – Saleh Muslim.

55. “Democratic Confederalism” and the “Democratic Nation”
• “We demand a democratic nation. We are not opposed to the unitary state and
republic. We accept the republic, its unitary structure and laicism.
• However, we believe that it must be redefined as a democratic state respecting peoples,
cultures and rights.
• On this basis, the Kurds must be free to organize in a way that they can live their culture
and language and can develop economically and ecologically.
• This would allow Kurds, Turks and other cultures to come together under the roof of a
democratic nation in Turkey.
• This is only possible, though, with a democratic constitution and an advanced legal
framework warranting respect for different cultures.
• Our idea of a democratic nation is not defined by flags and borders. Our idea of a
democratic nation embraces a model based on democracy instead of a model based on
state structures and ethnic origins.
• Turkey needs to define itself as a country which includes all ethnic groups. This would
be a model based on human rights instead of religion or race. Our idea of a democratic
nation embraces all ethnic groups and cultures (War and Peace in Kurdistan, pp. 39-40).

56. “Democratic Confederalism” for the Middle East
• “[T]his model is suitable for the building of federal administrative
structures in all Kurdish settlement areas in Syria, Turkey, Iraq,
and Iran. Thus, it is possible to build confederate structures
across all parts of Kurdistan without the need to question
existing orders” (War and Peace in Kurdistan, p. 33).
• “The citizens must be invited to actively commit themselves for
democracy. For the Kurds, this means building democratic
structures in all parts of Kurdistan and wherever there are
Kurdish communities, which advance the active participation in
the political life of the community. The minorities living in
Kurdistan must be invited to participate as well” (p. 34).
• “The right to native language education must be warranted” (p.
34).
• “The solution of the Kurdish question will be realized within the
framework of the democratization of the countries exercising
hegemonic power over the different parts of Kurdistan. This
process is not limited to these countries, though, but rather
extends across the entire Middle East. The freedom of Kurdistan
is tied to the democratization of the Middle East (p. 35).

77. Summary
Strengths
•Discipline, revolutionary commitment, collective mobilisation and politicization
•Admirable ideological programme and genuine steps towards collective emancipation through education
•Gender emancipation
•Attempts to accommodate ethnic and religious diversity
Challenges
•Integration of the local Arab population
•Coordination and alliances with groups outside of the three cantons
•Avoiding nationalist excesses and exclusion of minorities in the educational system
•Overcoming nationalist imaginaries among revolutionary cadres
•Navigating tensions between the cult of the leader and the will of the people
•Avoiding playing into the divide and conquer tactics of the imperialist powers
Recommendations
•More inclusive non-Kurdish revolutionary symbols and imagery
•Engage in dialogue with groups in Syria and more globally who are sympathetic to anti-imperialist ideology
•Denounce in international forums Saudi funding of IS, CIA training of IS operatives, and NATO complicity
with IS attacks (the Turkish state in particular)
•Engage with the Turkish left to fight the embargo
•Focus on preventative public health campaigns
•Set up systems to monitor and evaluate the health needs of the population
•Seek assistance of international institutes focusing on models of sustainable development