In today's turbulent macroeconomic environment, trying to forecast the top line of a business that is driven by large capital investment decisions can be especially frustrating and cruel. Here is how FP&A can help with (1) a structured approach to the different parts of the sales process, (2) the use of common analytical tools and (3) a rigorous and systematic utilization of quality metrics to help the business drive for success.
1. “ Streamlining the Sales Process and
Using Analytics in a Complex
Top Line Forecasting Environment”
Xavier Sansó /*IE. Barcelona/Oct 18-19, 2012
1
2. your speaker…
Xavier Sansó has 17 years of experience in
international finance/operations across
different industries
He is currently responsible for FP&A EMEA at
ABSCIEX, a subsidiary of the Danaher
Corporation in the life sciences industry
2
3. our story today…
• The year is 2009
• The industry is life sciences
• In the next-generation sequencing market,
there is fierce competition:
454
Genome Analyzer
$ 375,000
$ 425,000
SOLiD
$ 475,000
3
Note: all data in the presentation will be dummy
4. …a challenging sales process…
Few transactions of a high individual value
Customer needs to take a complex technical
decision
Funding comes from often unpredictable capital
expenditure decisions…
(and by the way, Europe is in crisis since 2008)…
4
6. how to fix this?
• Understand each phase in your sales process
• Each phase needs a key metric
• Each metric needs consistent and robust
tracking
• Business discussions and decision-making
should be data-driven and systematic
6
7. breaking down the complexity
What is your
What is “home run”
your rate out of How well do
market the deals you you cover
compete in?
size? your
market?
Out of your
Out of that addressable
market, market, what
which is your
portion do market
you share?
address?
7
8. market size
• Do not try to compete in a market whose size
you do not know
• You will sometimes have good market reports
• If not, you will need to trust the judgement of
the field
• Is the market growing? According to
expectations?
8
9. market size: metrics
1600
1400
1200
Market size $MM
1000
800
600
400
200
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
Last Year This Year (Actual) This Year (Plan)
9
10. addressable market
• Addressable market (AM): a subset of the
market size i.e. how big is your opportunity.
• To manage your AM: salesforce.com, SAP, MS
CRM, Oracle, etc.
• Difference between AM and total market:
disruptive market conditions, product
specifications, regulations… or simply competitive
strength
• Technology shifts, new products… can
dramatically change our AM
• “Are we walking away from deals?”
10
11. addressable market: metrics
1400
1200
1000
Opportunity $MM
800
Not Addressed
600
Addressed
400
200
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
11
12. market share
• Market share= deals won as a % of total
market size
• You cannot talk about market share if you
have not tried to size your market
• Market share contextualizes absolute
performance
• By slicing and dicing our data we can gain a
wealth of insight into our competitive position
12
13. market share: metrics
45%
40%
Deals won/Total deals
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
Prior Year This Year (Actual) This Year (Plan)
13
14. “home run” rate
• “Home run” rate measures how successful
you are in the part of the market you compete
in
• It is effectively a submetric of your market
share
• The metric is a function of: your core sales
execution + your short-term market position
• Any outliers? Key lessons can be learnt from
individual deals
14
15. “home run” rate: metrics
70%
% of deals won/deals competed, $
60%
50%
40%
This year
30%
Prior Year
20%
10%
0%
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
15
16. market coverage
• Coverage : total deals we compete for (not
only the ones we win) divided by the total
market size.
• Getting to know your lost deals in detail is
essential
• With analytical help you need to slice and dice
your data meaningfully
• “Are we always fishing in the same pond, and
it is getting smaller and more crowded?”
16
17. coverage: metrics
2000
1800
1600
1400
Revenue, $MM
1200
Addressed-won
1000
Addressed-lost
800
Not addressed
600
400
200
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun
17
19. a systematic, data-driven approach
Market size Market share
Mkt coverage
Addressable Mkt “Home run” rate
• Your
conclusions?
• What are
you going to
do about it?
19
20. key takeaways
• Products and technology are commoditized -- analytics
become a source of competitive advantage
• … But not everything in this world can be summarized
in a 2x2 matrix. Life is not a management school
• Establish your framework and foster data-driven
discussions in the company
• Learn from your lost deals
• Quality-dive into the data, the trends, the ultimate
causes… use problem solving methodologies once the
data has been sliced and diced
• Make sure decisions are taken, deployed and followed
up
20
>>We are in 2009. In the molecular biologymarket, a new technologyisquicklybecomingmainstream: thenext-generationsequencers. Thisisbasically a more highthroughputtype of DNA sequencing, essentiallyprocessingmillions of samples at thesame time and likethisbeingabletoincrease performance thousands of timesfold.>>Thefirst box youseehereisthe 454 from Roche whichistheincumbenttechnology, thefirstoneto be launched, and theonewiththelowestprice.>>Thesecond box isthe Solid fromLife Technologies. Secondtoappear in themarket, more expensiveonthebasisthat LT invented DNA sequencing and istechnologically superior>>More orless at thesame time as Solid, a third box islaunchedbyIllumina, theGenomeAnalyzer, at anintermediatepricerange.
In thisindustry, youtypicallyhavelessthan 2,000 transactionsannually (worldwide, in Europe youhavelessthan 500) and eachone has a highunitvalue as well as specificcharacteristicsifyouwanttowinthedealEspecially Europe has been in a deep crisis withlots of difficultiestomakesuchimportant capital expenditures, bothforprivatecompanies and forthepublic sectorSometimesyou compete technologically, sometimesthecustomerisnot so educatedortheneedisnot so high and technologyisnotthemain factorIn thecontext I describedbefore, As an FP&A professional, youusedto do yourforecastwiththefieldtothebestyoucould, calibrateitwiththerest of themanagementteam in sales and operations and be readyto compare forecastwithrealityWhathappened?
Once youhave a forecast and youstartmonitoringwhathappens in reality, results are prettymuchalloverthe placeItislike a TetrisgamewhereyoustartseeingtheblocksfallingfromtheskyAnd they are nottheblocksyouhadoriginallyforecastedSo you try to do yourbestwithpiling up the new blocks in a meaningfulwayIn theendyouend up prettybadlybruised and thinkinghow can theforecastingprocessgone so wrong, and whethernext time youshouldtreatthis as a scienceor as an art and justletthingshappenifthereis so muchvolatility and so littlestructureButguesswhat – theprocess can be improvedbig time and you can regain control onhowyour sales processplugsintoyourforecastprocess. Hereishow.
The sales process has differentphasesthatyouneedtoidentifyunderstand and trackHowmany times haveyouseen sales addressed as a one-phaseprocessthateitherhappensordoesnothappen?The concept I am goingto show todayisnotgoingto be dramatically new butmaybethe rigor isgoingto be newA gooddescriptionis “commonsenserigorouslyapplied”
>> Partone of the sales processisyour total marketsize>> Parttwoisdefiningyouropportunity in thatmarket, eitheryouseethemarketoryoudon’t. Wemovefromthenotion of total markettothenotion of addressablemarket. I’llspeakfurtheraboutthislateron>> Partthreeistheportion of the total marketthatyou control>> Partfourisyourwinrate in thepart of themarketyouaddress>> Partfiveishowyoucoveryourmarket, meaningtherelationshipbetweenthe total market, thepartyouaddress, and insidethatpart, thepartthatyouwin and thepart and you lose, and whyyou lose. We’llseelateronhowcriticalistostayon top of yourlostdeals.
>> Whatwewereseeing in ourbusiness case, wasthatthemarketwaseffectivelygrowing versus lastyear, although at a lowerratethanwehadforeseen.>> Thisis a firstimportantstick in theground and thefirstcleartrendwesawfromthe data
>> Again back toourexamplefromthenextgenerationsequencingmarket, wesattheopportunitywewerenotaddressingwasbecominglarger and larger.>> Itisnotthatsomeonewaseatingour lunch, itwasthatthemarket place had moved and wehadnotfollowedthrough>> Whatwerethosedealsthatwewerenotaddressing and whatcouldwe do toenterthatcompetition?
Market share contextualizesabsolute performance (how are wedoing vs themarket)?Byslicing and dicingour data (bymarket vertical, bygeography, time wise,…) we can gain a wealth of insightintoourcompetitive position
>> Theproblem as wehaveseenwasthatwewerenotonlyseeing a market share belowour plan whichwastogain share versus lastyear, butwewereevenerodingour position monthaftermonth
Successrate
>> Whenyou look at theproblemfrom a home runperspective, youdon’tappreciatethereisanissuebecause in themarketyoustill compete in, youhave a similar winrate as lastyear. >> Withtheexception of themonth of Aprilherewhichis a clearoutlier and wherewedidmuchworsethanlastyear and muchworsethanaverage. Whichspecificdealordealscausedthis? Whydidwe lose? Whatwereourlearnings? How are wegoingtoavoidthatthisdoesnothappenagain?
>> Youneedtoknowwhich 3-4 keymetricscharacterizethepurchasingbehaviour of yourcustomers>> Forinstance: Maturity of thedecisionfrom a timingperspective? Sanctioned and availablefunding? Strongcompetitivesituation?>> Once thisisdecided, eachitem in youraddressablemarket has to be measuredagainstthesethreemetrics, thiswillgiveyou a calibrated (weighted) view of your real opportunityover a given time period, whichis as independent as possiblefrom a purelyqualitativeappreciationfromthefield, whichisusuallywherethe error resides.>> Thetypicalinconsistencyhereisthatyoustatethatyourmarketis 100 units per quarterbut in a givenquarteryoureport 20 deals as won and 60 as lost. Thisis 80 deals. Where are theother 20 deals? Are wenotseeingthe total market?
Themarketcoverage chart illustrateswelltheproblem, we are stillfishing in ourtraditionalpond, and we are noterodingourcompetitive position ordoingworsethere.Theproblemisthatthepondisbecomingsmaller and themarket has moved somewhereelse, somewherethatweeven do notaddressIn this case, whatthe data miningdiscoveredwasthatthecritical factor waspricing and not so much performance. Themarketwasmovingto a lowerendpricebracket, and alsotodealswherethevendor (ourselves) isexpectedtocontributetothefinancing of thedeal, whichhadbecomeincreasinglyimportantafterthefinancial crisis.Thecustomerwasexpectingthevendortohelporchestrate leasing deals, sometimestorenttheinstrument, and alwaysto compete in pricingveryaggressively so thattheinitialinvestmentwasnot so highThe total cost of ownership of theinstrument, as well as thepurelytechnicalcharacteristics, whichhadbeenour bread and butterbusinessuntilthen, hadsuddenlybecomelessimportantWehad no presencewhatsoever in this new market and wedidnotknowhowtoreactinitially
>> Hereis a dashboardwiththeresults of yourmetricsbeingtrackedconsistently>> Ifproperly done, thisisnothinglikeyourclassical KPI chart>> Theresult of ourdiscussionwasthatwedecidedtosegmentthemarket and addresseachsegmentwith a differentproduct: a lowendproductwherewe competed in price, a midendproduct and a highendproductforourtraditional “elite” of customers