1. The document discusses the origins and historical development of the concept of strategy from ancient Greece to modern times.
2. Strategy originally referred to military leadership but has expanded to include political, economic, and other fields. Various thinkers and leaders contributed new dimensions and definitions to the concept over time.
3. Modern conceptions of strategy encompass comprehensive national strategies that utilize all aspects of a state's power to achieve objectives in a changing global environment.
This document summarizes a strategy research project paper on operational art and operational shock. The paper argues that operational art is a connecting function between strategy and tactics, rather than a discrete level of war. At the core of operational art is the concept of operational shock - using tactical actions to undermine an enemy's will through disruption of their operational system, rather than needing to destroy all their forces. The paper discusses sources of operational art theory and limitations when forces grew too large in World War I. It proposes operational design can enhance operational shock by depriving the enemy of their ability to achieve objectives.
This document discusses discrepancies between the Carter Administration's defense budget and statements from military leaders regarding actual US military capabilities and the growing Soviet threat. It notes that senior military officials have contradicted the premises of the defense budget. While the budget calls for real growth, cuts in previous years have led to shortfalls. The document argues that additional funding is needed to begin addressing imbalances with the Soviet Union. It analyzes votes in the House and Senate budget committees that rejected proposals to increase defense spending for fiscal year 1981.
The document proposes examining the US military's decision-making process, organizations, and culture. It traces the history of Army staff doctrine from ancient times to the modern era. The military decision-making process has evolved over time to balance analysis with intuition, plans with operations, and the present with the future.
This document provides summaries of various strategic theories and concepts related to warfare and national security. It lists over 50 concepts, briefly explaining each one and attributing it to an author or source. Some of the major concepts covered include centers of gravity, attrition, annihilation, coercion, sea control, deception, maneuver warfare, insurgency, and counterinsurgency strategies.
NATION BUIDLING - A BAD IDEA WHO'S TIME HAS COME?Burt Thompson
This document is a student research paper analyzing challenges associated with post-conflict nation building operations. It provides a brief historical overview of US nation building efforts since the 19th century, noting common themes and lessons around establishing temporary governance, population control, and infrastructure reconstruction. The paper then examines more recent nation building operations in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and Afghanistan/Iraq. It argues that planning for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction has often been inadequate. The purpose is to better understand challenges facing the US Army and evaluate options to enhance success in future nation building missions.
The Allied victory in World War 2 was due to several key factors working together. The Allies gained control of the air and sea, allowing them to bomb German cities and industries while transporting troops and supplies. On the Eastern Front, the Soviets were able to mobilize their vast resources and grind down German forces. The entry of the U.S. into the war provided enormous human, economic, and military resources that exceeded Germany's capacity. Internally, the Nazi regime suffered from a lack of centralized control and efficiency that hampered its war effort.
The document discusses Professor Colin Gray's theory on revolutions in military affairs (RMAs). Some key points:
1) Gray explores RMAs both theoretically and through historical case studies of the French Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars, WWI, and the nuclear age.
2) He analyzes how RMAs functioned strategically and applies the conclusions to understand the current information-technology led RMA.
3) Gray reviews the great RMA debate of the 1990s skeptically while allowing all perspectives. He argues that RMAs must be examined as forms of strategic behavior.
This document summarizes a strategy research project paper on operational art and operational shock. The paper argues that operational art is a connecting function between strategy and tactics, rather than a discrete level of war. At the core of operational art is the concept of operational shock - using tactical actions to undermine an enemy's will through disruption of their operational system, rather than needing to destroy all their forces. The paper discusses sources of operational art theory and limitations when forces grew too large in World War I. It proposes operational design can enhance operational shock by depriving the enemy of their ability to achieve objectives.
This document discusses discrepancies between the Carter Administration's defense budget and statements from military leaders regarding actual US military capabilities and the growing Soviet threat. It notes that senior military officials have contradicted the premises of the defense budget. While the budget calls for real growth, cuts in previous years have led to shortfalls. The document argues that additional funding is needed to begin addressing imbalances with the Soviet Union. It analyzes votes in the House and Senate budget committees that rejected proposals to increase defense spending for fiscal year 1981.
The document proposes examining the US military's decision-making process, organizations, and culture. It traces the history of Army staff doctrine from ancient times to the modern era. The military decision-making process has evolved over time to balance analysis with intuition, plans with operations, and the present with the future.
This document provides summaries of various strategic theories and concepts related to warfare and national security. It lists over 50 concepts, briefly explaining each one and attributing it to an author or source. Some of the major concepts covered include centers of gravity, attrition, annihilation, coercion, sea control, deception, maneuver warfare, insurgency, and counterinsurgency strategies.
NATION BUIDLING - A BAD IDEA WHO'S TIME HAS COME?Burt Thompson
This document is a student research paper analyzing challenges associated with post-conflict nation building operations. It provides a brief historical overview of US nation building efforts since the 19th century, noting common themes and lessons around establishing temporary governance, population control, and infrastructure reconstruction. The paper then examines more recent nation building operations in Somalia, Haiti, the Balkans, and Afghanistan/Iraq. It argues that planning for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction has often been inadequate. The purpose is to better understand challenges facing the US Army and evaluate options to enhance success in future nation building missions.
The Allied victory in World War 2 was due to several key factors working together. The Allies gained control of the air and sea, allowing them to bomb German cities and industries while transporting troops and supplies. On the Eastern Front, the Soviets were able to mobilize their vast resources and grind down German forces. The entry of the U.S. into the war provided enormous human, economic, and military resources that exceeded Germany's capacity. Internally, the Nazi regime suffered from a lack of centralized control and efficiency that hampered its war effort.
The document discusses Professor Colin Gray's theory on revolutions in military affairs (RMAs). Some key points:
1) Gray explores RMAs both theoretically and through historical case studies of the French Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars, WWI, and the nuclear age.
2) He analyzes how RMAs functioned strategically and applies the conclusions to understand the current information-technology led RMA.
3) Gray reviews the great RMA debate of the 1990s skeptically while allowing all perspectives. He argues that RMAs must be examined as forms of strategic behavior.
This document summarizes a report titled "The Strategic Defense: America's Next National Security Concept" authored by Major Mark W. Elfers of the U.S. Marine Corps. The report argues that due to economic challenges, the U.S. needs to adopt a new national security concept called the "Strategic Defense." This concept would involve maintaining a credible military force but only using it defensively to defeat attacking enemies, rather than offensively attacking others. The report outlines this concept and addresses counterarguments, concluding that a Strategic Defense aligns with America's founding principles and would help ensure long-term national security.
The document summarizes the context and organization surrounding the 101st Airborne Division's defense of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. It describes how Bastogne was strategically important due to its network of roads. The German plan called for capturing Bastogne to maintain their rear area communications, though different German units had varying interpretations of this objective. It also outlines the depleted state of the German units involved in the initial attack, including the XLVII Panzer Corps which lacked troops, tanks, weapons and was overall unprepared to take Bastogne as planned.
The document provides revision guidance for a GCSE Modern World History exam covering three sections:
Section A involves analyzing primary sources from either the pre-1939 or post-1945 periods. Section B involves choosing one essay question from topics in international relations or the Cold War. Section C covers the German depth study with sources and essays on Weimar or Nazi Germany. Time recommendations are given for each section.
AY15 FS 6401 - Strategy, What is it, Why is it DifficultBob Poling
1. The document discusses the challenges of developing and implementing sound strategy. It defines strategy as connecting military means and tactics to the political objectives of a conflict.
2. Several experts are cited who note that strategy is more difficult than tactics or acquiring new weapons. Strategy requires understanding an enemy's capabilities as well as one's own national interests and capabilities.
3. The document aims to provide conceptual tools for strategic thinking rather than set rules. It will analyze historical case studies and cultivate critical thinking skills over prescriptive lessons.
Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damag...Professor Joel Hayward
Even before Operation Barbarossa petered out in December 1941, Germany's oil reserves were severely depleted. Adolf Hitler worried that his armed forces would soon grind to a halt for want of petroleum products. During the last months of 1941 and the first of 1942, economic considerations played as much of a role in the formulation of a new strategy as did the run-down state of the eastern armies and air fleets. Hitler feared heavy Soviet bombing attacks on Rumanian oilfields, his main source of oil, and knew that the Reich's reserves were almost exhausted. Consequently, he considered the protection of the Rumanian oilfields and the acquisition of new sources of oil crucial if he were to wage a prolonged war against the growing list of nations he opposed.1 He therefore formulated Fall Blau (Case Blue), a major campaign for summer 1942. This aimed first, through preliminary offensives in the Crimea, to protect Rumanian oil centres from Soviet air attacks, and second, through a powerful thrust to the Don River and then into the Caucasus, to deliver that oil-rich region into German hands. The capture of the Caucasus oilfields, he believed, would relieve Germany's critical oil shortages and deliver a massive, and hopefully mortal, blow to the Soviet economy and war effort. The consequences of that ill-fated campaign are well known, and need little discussion here. Hitler became distracted by Stalingrad (which was not even a main campaign objective) and lost an entire army trying to take it. Soviet forces also drove his armies from the Caucasus and pushed them back to the line they had held before Blau started nine months earlier. This study analyses a little-known and poorly documented aspect of the 1942 campaign: Hitler's employment of airpower in the Caucasus region. It focuses on his reluctant admission in October that his ground forces would probably not reach the main oilfields before adverse weather conditions forced them to take up winter positions, and on his subsequent decision to have the Luftwaffe attempt the oilfields' destruction. He believed that if he could not have the oilfields (at present, anyway), he should at least deny Josef Stalin's agriculture, industry, and armed forces their vast output. The essay argues for the first time that the Luftwaffe could have dealt the Soviet economy a major blow, from which it would have taken at least several months to recover, if Hitler had not been so obsessed with Stalingrad and wasted his airpower assets on its destruction. During August and early September 1942, the Luftwaffe possessed the means to inflict heavy damage on Baku, the Caucasus oil metropolis that alone accounted for 80 percent of all Soviet production. The Luftwaffe still possessed a strong bomber force and airfields within striking range and the Soviet Air Force's presence in the Caucasus was still weak. By October, however, when Hitler finally ordered attacks on oilfields, the Luftwaffe's eastern bomber fleet was ...
1) The document discusses the rise of German imperialism in the late 19th century and how it contributed to rising tensions between the major European powers and ultimately led to World War 1.
2) It analyzes how Germany's increasingly aggressive foreign policy under Kaiser Wilhelm II caused other states like France and Britain to see Germany as a threat, leading them to form the Triple Entente alliance for security.
3) Escalating arms races and military plans by Germany and the other powers exacerbated the security dilemma, increasing the risks of an accidental war as countries tried to balance each other's capabilities.
Real-time threat evaluation in a ground based air defence environmentAshwin Samales
By JN Roux and JH van Vuuren
In a military environment a ground based air defence operator is required to evaluate the tactical situation in real-time and protect Defended Assets (DAs) on the ground against aerial threats by assigning available Weapon Systems (WSs) to engage enemy aircraft. Since this aerial environment requires rapid operational planning and decision making in stress situations, the associated responsibilities are typically divided between a number of operators and computerized systems that aid these operators during the decision making processes. One such a Decision Support System (DSS), a threat evaluation and weapon assignment system, assigns threat values to aircraft (with respect to DAs) in real-time and uses these values to propose possible engagements of observed enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft WSs. In this paper a design of the threat evaluation part of such a DSS is put forward. The design follows the structured approach suggested in [Roux JN & van Vuuren JH, 2007, Threat evaluation and weapon assignment decision support: A review of the state of the art, ORiON, 23(2), pp.151–187], phasing in a suite of increasingly complex qualitative and quantitative model components as more (reliable) data become available.
- The document discusses tailoring arms control and assurance in the current strategic environment, which is characterized as more complex and less stable due to new technologies, revisionist states, and nuclear threats.
- It outlines both the NATO and Russian perspectives on how the current environment developed, noting that strategic stability is a continuum influenced by technologies, states seeking to change borders, and perceptions of threats.
- Moving forward, it argues arms control still has an important role to play through transparency, predictability, and reciprocity. Near-term progress may be limited but arms control benefits Russia long-term, and maintaining existing agreements should be a priority while exploring more creative approaches. Assurance measures are also important to address allies
An archetype for european security 27 april 1993 - ramon martinezRamon Martinez
An Archetype for European Security examines the causes and solutions to the problem of military security in Europe. Specifically, the thesis is that a Federation for European Military Security is a desirable, feasible, and long-term scheme for resolving the problems of uncertainty and a just peace in Europe.
Presenting empirical data compiled by noted warfare research analysts, this paper discusses general trends associated with war. Next presented and discussed are the following proposed military schemes: (1) end all alliances while nation-states maintain military forces only at the necessary level for defending its political sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) using a “Resilient Defense” strategy to manage the NATO irony; (3) the Western European Union; and (4) the Pan-European Army. Although not an exhaustive list, these four schemes are paradigmatic of a multitude of proposed schemes.
Proposing a thought experiment a la John Rawls, derived is a method evaluating any proposed military scheme. Imagining an original position while imposed restrictions under a veil of ignorance, the principles of liberty, truth, and equality are selected in devising a desirable and feasible scheme. Lastly, a Federation for European Military Security is selected as the scheme promoting development within the context of an uncertain European future while maintaining a free, secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe.
Although Lieutenant Colonel Ramon Martinez (USAF, Retired) authored this study in 1993 as a National Defense Fellow, the study and its solution remains relevant today given the immediate and emerging conditions in the Ukraine, Crimea, and Russia, and NATO.
This document provides a summary of the forthcoming book "Call to Glory" which analyzes the strategic and economic value of the Convair B-58 Hustler supersonic bomber during the Cold War. The B-58 packed more nuclear firepower than the entire Soviet bomber force, carried 5 nuclear weapons per aircraft rather than the commonly reported one, and set numerous aviation records. Though more expensive than other bombers, its capabilities increased the effectiveness of Strategic Air Command and deterred the Soviet Union during critical events like the Cuban Missile Crisis. The book argues the B-58's value was greater than perceived based on traditional accounting and that it helped preserve US freedom during a dangerous era, though its service was cut short by new
The document discusses security literacy and evidentiality in discourses. It summarizes a study on the construction and deconstruction of the Iraq war in media before the war. Key findings show politicians' framings dominated without challenging qualitative evidence. Media served as animators of politicians' soundbites rather than advocates seeking good reasons. Reasons for lack of evidence-based reporting included commercial pressures and making information easily accessible. Tools for security literacy include analyzing situations, actors' framings, practices, effects and creating interpretive explanations. The CIA's new rules aim to guarantee high quality information through processes ensuring diversity and scrutiny of experts' views and sources.
ORIGIN OF STATEGY AND THREE LEVELS OF STRATEGY..pptx09MahfujChowdhury
The document discusses the origin and history of strategy across three phases:
1) The military phase from ancient times to the early 20th century where strategy focused on planning military campaigns. Famous strategists included Sun Tzu and examples involved the Trojan Horse and Battle of Cannae tactics.
2) The business phase beginning in the early 20th century where military strategy principles were applied to business, including approaches like cost leadership.
3) The general phase from the late 20th century where strategy was applied broadly across fields like politics, sports and personal life using approaches such as game theory.
1st Lecture.pptx first presentation 123anabila72165
This document provides an introduction to defense and strategic studies. It defines key terms like strategy, military strategy, and grand strategy. Strategy involves coordinating efforts to achieve objectives and is the art of developing and using national powers. Military strategy uses military forces to achieve political objectives. Grand strategy coordinates all national resources towards political goals. Famous strategists from history are also mentioned. The document then discusses the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare.
This document is a 14,983 word dissertation submitted by David John Fowler to the University of Aberdeen for the degree of M.Sc. in Strategic Studies. The dissertation argues that a failure to recognize the ubiquitous political nature of war and strategy can lead to strategic failure.
Chapter 1 discusses debates around whether war is a political or cultural phenomenon. It argues that while culture influences war, the underlying motivation is usually political - to gain or retain power. Chapter 2 examines differing views of "victory" between military and political actors. Chapter 3 shows how divergent views can damage civil-military relations and strategy.
The dissertation concludes that strategic failure results when either policymakers fail to understand strategy requires allocating resources,
1. Military strategy has over 2,500 years of experience to learn from, while business strategy is only around 50-60 years old. Drawing parallels between the two can provide valuable lessons for business leaders and strategists.
2. While the objectives of war and business differ, both involve opponents/competitors and understanding how to "dislocate" them can help gain advantages. Military strategy focuses on physically and psychologically altering an enemy's will to combat through tactics like cutting supply lines.
3. Key lessons that can be applied to business include focusing on speed and initiative to expand strategic options rather than just execution; learning from strategic planning processes developed by militaries; and understanding how personnel deployment impacts outcomes.
Strategic Illiteracy - Inaugural Lecture Professor DuyvesteynUniversiteitLeiden
This document is the transcript of a lecture given by Prof.dr. I.G.B.M. Duyvesteyn on the acceptance of her position as Special Chair in Strategic Studies at Leiden University. In the lecture, she argues that there is a widespread problem of "strategic illiteracy" among political, military, and scholarly thinkers. She outlines Carl von Clausewitz's ideas on strategy, including that one must understand the nature of the war being fought, that strategy translates political objectives into military plans, that war is versatile, and results are rarely final. She asserts that strategic thinking is more of an art than a science. The lack of clear political objectives and realistic military plans to achieve them demonstrates
1. The document summarizes Carl von Clausewitz's seminal book "On War" in 45 pages. It covers Clausewitz's views on key military concepts like strategy, tactics, the role of chance and friction in war.
2. Some of the key points summarized include that strategy deals with combining battles to achieve the overall war aim, while tactics concerns the conduct of individual battles. Strategy involves more complex moral factors compared to tactics. Surprise is also easier to achieve in tactics than in strategy.
3. The summary examines Clausewitz's distinction between strategy and tactics, and emphasizes that great tactical results are needed to achieve great strategic outcomes. It also discusses the importance Clausewitz placed on principles like concentration of force,
This document summarizes the traditional focus in airpower theory on strategic offensive interdiction, which aims to deliver quick military victories through decisive strikes that disable an adversary's military capabilities without prolonged fighting. It discusses how this strategy seeks to avoid attritional warfare by destroying logistics, infrastructure, and high-value targets behind enemy lines. The document then questions if this approach is still appropriate given today's more complex geopolitical environment involving peer competitors like China that have both conflicting and interconnected interests with the US. It explores alternative perspectives from Clausewitz on limiting the aims and intensity of warfare between great powers based on the specific political context.
The document discusses the challenges involved in writing an essay about the Battle of the Bulge. It notes that the Battle of the Bulge was a complex World War II engagement that requires an in-depth exploration of military strategies, geopolitical context, and impact on the war. Researching the topic demands sifting through numerous sources to build an unbiased overview of the events. Analyzing military strategies and decisions requires understanding military history and connecting disparate pieces of information. Additionally, the essay must place the battle in the broader geopolitical context of World War II by integrating micro details with macro forces shaping the conflict. Effectively communicating these complex historical events in a clear and engaging narrative is paramount. Writing about the Battle of
This document provides an overview of tactical fundamentals for Marine officers. It discusses achieving decisions through analytical and intuitive decision making based on understanding the situation using METT-TC. Tactical tenets like achieving a decision guide making sound tactical decisions. The principles of war and tactical tenets form the framework for decision making and evaluating tactics to achieve victory.
This document provides an overview of offense and defense tactics at the tactical level of war. It discusses engagements and battles, and how tactical operations fit within the context of strategic and operational levels. Tactics requires both an art and a science, with the art including flexible application of means to accomplish missions, decision-making under uncertainty, and understanding effects on soldiers. Tactical operations can be either hasty or deliberate based on time available for planning and preparation.
This document summarizes a report titled "The Strategic Defense: America's Next National Security Concept" authored by Major Mark W. Elfers of the U.S. Marine Corps. The report argues that due to economic challenges, the U.S. needs to adopt a new national security concept called the "Strategic Defense." This concept would involve maintaining a credible military force but only using it defensively to defeat attacking enemies, rather than offensively attacking others. The report outlines this concept and addresses counterarguments, concluding that a Strategic Defense aligns with America's founding principles and would help ensure long-term national security.
The document summarizes the context and organization surrounding the 101st Airborne Division's defense of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. It describes how Bastogne was strategically important due to its network of roads. The German plan called for capturing Bastogne to maintain their rear area communications, though different German units had varying interpretations of this objective. It also outlines the depleted state of the German units involved in the initial attack, including the XLVII Panzer Corps which lacked troops, tanks, weapons and was overall unprepared to take Bastogne as planned.
The document provides revision guidance for a GCSE Modern World History exam covering three sections:
Section A involves analyzing primary sources from either the pre-1939 or post-1945 periods. Section B involves choosing one essay question from topics in international relations or the Cold War. Section C covers the German depth study with sources and essays on Weimar or Nazi Germany. Time recommendations are given for each section.
AY15 FS 6401 - Strategy, What is it, Why is it DifficultBob Poling
1. The document discusses the challenges of developing and implementing sound strategy. It defines strategy as connecting military means and tactics to the political objectives of a conflict.
2. Several experts are cited who note that strategy is more difficult than tactics or acquiring new weapons. Strategy requires understanding an enemy's capabilities as well as one's own national interests and capabilities.
3. The document aims to provide conceptual tools for strategic thinking rather than set rules. It will analyze historical case studies and cultivate critical thinking skills over prescriptive lessons.
Too Little, Too Late: An Analysis of Hitler's Failure in August 1942 to Damag...Professor Joel Hayward
Even before Operation Barbarossa petered out in December 1941, Germany's oil reserves were severely depleted. Adolf Hitler worried that his armed forces would soon grind to a halt for want of petroleum products. During the last months of 1941 and the first of 1942, economic considerations played as much of a role in the formulation of a new strategy as did the run-down state of the eastern armies and air fleets. Hitler feared heavy Soviet bombing attacks on Rumanian oilfields, his main source of oil, and knew that the Reich's reserves were almost exhausted. Consequently, he considered the protection of the Rumanian oilfields and the acquisition of new sources of oil crucial if he were to wage a prolonged war against the growing list of nations he opposed.1 He therefore formulated Fall Blau (Case Blue), a major campaign for summer 1942. This aimed first, through preliminary offensives in the Crimea, to protect Rumanian oil centres from Soviet air attacks, and second, through a powerful thrust to the Don River and then into the Caucasus, to deliver that oil-rich region into German hands. The capture of the Caucasus oilfields, he believed, would relieve Germany's critical oil shortages and deliver a massive, and hopefully mortal, blow to the Soviet economy and war effort. The consequences of that ill-fated campaign are well known, and need little discussion here. Hitler became distracted by Stalingrad (which was not even a main campaign objective) and lost an entire army trying to take it. Soviet forces also drove his armies from the Caucasus and pushed them back to the line they had held before Blau started nine months earlier. This study analyses a little-known and poorly documented aspect of the 1942 campaign: Hitler's employment of airpower in the Caucasus region. It focuses on his reluctant admission in October that his ground forces would probably not reach the main oilfields before adverse weather conditions forced them to take up winter positions, and on his subsequent decision to have the Luftwaffe attempt the oilfields' destruction. He believed that if he could not have the oilfields (at present, anyway), he should at least deny Josef Stalin's agriculture, industry, and armed forces their vast output. The essay argues for the first time that the Luftwaffe could have dealt the Soviet economy a major blow, from which it would have taken at least several months to recover, if Hitler had not been so obsessed with Stalingrad and wasted his airpower assets on its destruction. During August and early September 1942, the Luftwaffe possessed the means to inflict heavy damage on Baku, the Caucasus oil metropolis that alone accounted for 80 percent of all Soviet production. The Luftwaffe still possessed a strong bomber force and airfields within striking range and the Soviet Air Force's presence in the Caucasus was still weak. By October, however, when Hitler finally ordered attacks on oilfields, the Luftwaffe's eastern bomber fleet was ...
1) The document discusses the rise of German imperialism in the late 19th century and how it contributed to rising tensions between the major European powers and ultimately led to World War 1.
2) It analyzes how Germany's increasingly aggressive foreign policy under Kaiser Wilhelm II caused other states like France and Britain to see Germany as a threat, leading them to form the Triple Entente alliance for security.
3) Escalating arms races and military plans by Germany and the other powers exacerbated the security dilemma, increasing the risks of an accidental war as countries tried to balance each other's capabilities.
Real-time threat evaluation in a ground based air defence environmentAshwin Samales
By JN Roux and JH van Vuuren
In a military environment a ground based air defence operator is required to evaluate the tactical situation in real-time and protect Defended Assets (DAs) on the ground against aerial threats by assigning available Weapon Systems (WSs) to engage enemy aircraft. Since this aerial environment requires rapid operational planning and decision making in stress situations, the associated responsibilities are typically divided between a number of operators and computerized systems that aid these operators during the decision making processes. One such a Decision Support System (DSS), a threat evaluation and weapon assignment system, assigns threat values to aircraft (with respect to DAs) in real-time and uses these values to propose possible engagements of observed enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft WSs. In this paper a design of the threat evaluation part of such a DSS is put forward. The design follows the structured approach suggested in [Roux JN & van Vuuren JH, 2007, Threat evaluation and weapon assignment decision support: A review of the state of the art, ORiON, 23(2), pp.151–187], phasing in a suite of increasingly complex qualitative and quantitative model components as more (reliable) data become available.
- The document discusses tailoring arms control and assurance in the current strategic environment, which is characterized as more complex and less stable due to new technologies, revisionist states, and nuclear threats.
- It outlines both the NATO and Russian perspectives on how the current environment developed, noting that strategic stability is a continuum influenced by technologies, states seeking to change borders, and perceptions of threats.
- Moving forward, it argues arms control still has an important role to play through transparency, predictability, and reciprocity. Near-term progress may be limited but arms control benefits Russia long-term, and maintaining existing agreements should be a priority while exploring more creative approaches. Assurance measures are also important to address allies
An archetype for european security 27 april 1993 - ramon martinezRamon Martinez
An Archetype for European Security examines the causes and solutions to the problem of military security in Europe. Specifically, the thesis is that a Federation for European Military Security is a desirable, feasible, and long-term scheme for resolving the problems of uncertainty and a just peace in Europe.
Presenting empirical data compiled by noted warfare research analysts, this paper discusses general trends associated with war. Next presented and discussed are the following proposed military schemes: (1) end all alliances while nation-states maintain military forces only at the necessary level for defending its political sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) using a “Resilient Defense” strategy to manage the NATO irony; (3) the Western European Union; and (4) the Pan-European Army. Although not an exhaustive list, these four schemes are paradigmatic of a multitude of proposed schemes.
Proposing a thought experiment a la John Rawls, derived is a method evaluating any proposed military scheme. Imagining an original position while imposed restrictions under a veil of ignorance, the principles of liberty, truth, and equality are selected in devising a desirable and feasible scheme. Lastly, a Federation for European Military Security is selected as the scheme promoting development within the context of an uncertain European future while maintaining a free, secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe.
Although Lieutenant Colonel Ramon Martinez (USAF, Retired) authored this study in 1993 as a National Defense Fellow, the study and its solution remains relevant today given the immediate and emerging conditions in the Ukraine, Crimea, and Russia, and NATO.
This document provides a summary of the forthcoming book "Call to Glory" which analyzes the strategic and economic value of the Convair B-58 Hustler supersonic bomber during the Cold War. The B-58 packed more nuclear firepower than the entire Soviet bomber force, carried 5 nuclear weapons per aircraft rather than the commonly reported one, and set numerous aviation records. Though more expensive than other bombers, its capabilities increased the effectiveness of Strategic Air Command and deterred the Soviet Union during critical events like the Cuban Missile Crisis. The book argues the B-58's value was greater than perceived based on traditional accounting and that it helped preserve US freedom during a dangerous era, though its service was cut short by new
The document discusses security literacy and evidentiality in discourses. It summarizes a study on the construction and deconstruction of the Iraq war in media before the war. Key findings show politicians' framings dominated without challenging qualitative evidence. Media served as animators of politicians' soundbites rather than advocates seeking good reasons. Reasons for lack of evidence-based reporting included commercial pressures and making information easily accessible. Tools for security literacy include analyzing situations, actors' framings, practices, effects and creating interpretive explanations. The CIA's new rules aim to guarantee high quality information through processes ensuring diversity and scrutiny of experts' views and sources.
ORIGIN OF STATEGY AND THREE LEVELS OF STRATEGY..pptx09MahfujChowdhury
The document discusses the origin and history of strategy across three phases:
1) The military phase from ancient times to the early 20th century where strategy focused on planning military campaigns. Famous strategists included Sun Tzu and examples involved the Trojan Horse and Battle of Cannae tactics.
2) The business phase beginning in the early 20th century where military strategy principles were applied to business, including approaches like cost leadership.
3) The general phase from the late 20th century where strategy was applied broadly across fields like politics, sports and personal life using approaches such as game theory.
1st Lecture.pptx first presentation 123anabila72165
This document provides an introduction to defense and strategic studies. It defines key terms like strategy, military strategy, and grand strategy. Strategy involves coordinating efforts to achieve objectives and is the art of developing and using national powers. Military strategy uses military forces to achieve political objectives. Grand strategy coordinates all national resources towards political goals. Famous strategists from history are also mentioned. The document then discusses the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare.
This document is a 14,983 word dissertation submitted by David John Fowler to the University of Aberdeen for the degree of M.Sc. in Strategic Studies. The dissertation argues that a failure to recognize the ubiquitous political nature of war and strategy can lead to strategic failure.
Chapter 1 discusses debates around whether war is a political or cultural phenomenon. It argues that while culture influences war, the underlying motivation is usually political - to gain or retain power. Chapter 2 examines differing views of "victory" between military and political actors. Chapter 3 shows how divergent views can damage civil-military relations and strategy.
The dissertation concludes that strategic failure results when either policymakers fail to understand strategy requires allocating resources,
1. Military strategy has over 2,500 years of experience to learn from, while business strategy is only around 50-60 years old. Drawing parallels between the two can provide valuable lessons for business leaders and strategists.
2. While the objectives of war and business differ, both involve opponents/competitors and understanding how to "dislocate" them can help gain advantages. Military strategy focuses on physically and psychologically altering an enemy's will to combat through tactics like cutting supply lines.
3. Key lessons that can be applied to business include focusing on speed and initiative to expand strategic options rather than just execution; learning from strategic planning processes developed by militaries; and understanding how personnel deployment impacts outcomes.
Strategic Illiteracy - Inaugural Lecture Professor DuyvesteynUniversiteitLeiden
This document is the transcript of a lecture given by Prof.dr. I.G.B.M. Duyvesteyn on the acceptance of her position as Special Chair in Strategic Studies at Leiden University. In the lecture, she argues that there is a widespread problem of "strategic illiteracy" among political, military, and scholarly thinkers. She outlines Carl von Clausewitz's ideas on strategy, including that one must understand the nature of the war being fought, that strategy translates political objectives into military plans, that war is versatile, and results are rarely final. She asserts that strategic thinking is more of an art than a science. The lack of clear political objectives and realistic military plans to achieve them demonstrates
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4. 2. The word strategy and strategic ( adjective ),
they are used widely by the researchers and
thinkers in variety of sciences without clear
specification to its meaning, or a definition of
dimensions and limitations of the concept, which
cause sometimes obscurity and confusion
intellectual wise .
3. It might be described a site or a part of a
state is strategic (Hurmoz straits) also a political
or economic decision might be described as
strategic …….etc.
1. Strategy is considered as a concept that passes
around in different fields of sciences ( politics,
economic, military, social ….. etc. )
4 4
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5. 5
1. The origin of strategic concept .
2. The military concept of strategic
terminology.
3. The historical development of strategic
concept.
4. Schools of strategic thought .
5. Strategic concept in business field .
Lecture’s contents.
5
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1. Strategy concept was derived from Greek lexical
(strategos), which was derived from two compound
words (stratos) and it means (army) , and (agein)
it means (leadership) .
2. The use of the compound in ancient Greek
language (strategos) was meant a military
commander .
3. From the lexical (strategos) was derived from the
word (strategee) which means “ the General
science “.
4. the word “General” at that historical era , was
described as a character of three dimensions .
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The dimensions of the “ General’s” charter :
1. The first dimension.
a. The General is a person who behaves steadfast because
one of his tasks to select the appropriate way to achieve
competitive advantage of some type .
b. The meaning of victory and loss in a battle is related to
the General who conducts the battle , takes right or
wrong decisions, through operating the suitable quantity
and quality of materials and resources in the battle .
c. Therefore, to link between the objective and the General
strategic capability in decision making process .
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a. The general is a person who acts and
know there is another power in
warfare theatre , that effects and be
effected in the way in dealing with
things and decisions making, therefore,
that power makes pressures upon
results which the general are looking to
achievement .
2. The second dimension
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(2) How to address the upper echelons to provide
hem with troops and materials.
(3) How to deal with subordinates to accomplish
the mission.
(4) How to do military maneuvers according to the
theater environment.
(5) How to maneuver to attract others to join in
alliance to affect the battle course for his
benefits.
(6) How to negotiate to accomplish the most suitable
conditions to achieve peace.
b. the General should perform a certain roles to achieve
his Objectives, and these roles exemplify in the following:
(1) How to exercise his role to motivate his troops in
battle field to form a harmonized men (team
work)
fighting fiercely ( insistence ) .
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3 . The third dimension.
The General is a person who is
highly sensitive towards time,
studies his plans and strategic
movements deeply; in order to
be carried out (executed) in a
suitable time .
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The conclusion of strategic origin concept :
1. The ancient Greeks had understood the strategy
as thinking broadly and acting insightly .
2. The ancient Greeks had defined the strategy as
“ a set of important decisions , derived from
administrative process that top-level organized
, for making decisions at administrative
upper echelons (Top Management Level) in the
organization ”
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1. It is noticeable that the variety of the contemporary usage
of the word strategy to include many fields.
2. As it mentioned before: it might be described a site or
apart of a country is strategic.
3. Also a political or economic decisions might be described as
strategic, if it is affect politics or economy in the country.
4. The description strategy may use to call some weapons of
decisive impact in a battle, such as Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty (SALT).
5. Moreover, a way of thinking or professional studies may
described as strategic.05/23/15
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* Due to what is formerly said, it is (clear that)
strategy is used in variety of fields.
* Thus , an importance of accurate
limitation to this concept is needed.
* The essential of limitation to this concept
comes from the (increasing sense) for the
importance of the strategy and its role to
reach the (charted objectives) .
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* The strategy concept is of military origins,
and from (historical perspective) it is linked
to the conduct of war (War Administration)
. when the science of warfare appeared, war
strategy become as branch of it.
* The earnest efforts to register the Science of
War started with Nigola Mikavilly who
wrote a book under title of “ Art of War ” .
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* The study of strategy dated back to the
18th century ,when the British Henery Loid
wrote - in the introduction of his book about
the history of seven wars - a number of
military theories , in addition to that he
established war strategy, and pointed out
that strategy in the military field means (the
use of armed power by the state to achieve
it’s objectives)
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18. * General Gominy: the strategy is to map out war, and
know operations theaters and mark out (determine)
activities.
* General Karl von klawzevids: 18th century the use of
engagement as a means to reach the war aim .
* General Moltika: 19th century conduct the
adequateness process (at the disposal of) the commander , to
a achieve objectives .
* The British Military Theorist Liddle Hart: at the
beginning of the 20th century it is an art of distribution
and utilization of military instruments (means ) to achieve
the political objectives .
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* To conclude with the following :
2. Strategic concept is limited to the
military field .
3. Strategy moved outside from military
field to other fields . Thus , the military
strategy related with politics .
1. Strategy is become of a multiple
definitions in different fields.
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* After we know the variety in strategy
definitions and concepts in the past and the
present , and we observed that strategy was
limited in its beginnings in the military
field, then it moved gradually to cover the
other fields.
* This is to confirm the meaning of strategic
concept pass over developmentary levels
through historical extent.
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To define strategic concept (Before Christ ) , it is important to
divide that period into tow parts :
a . primitive societies .They lacked of strategies .
Their objectives never gone beyond the personal
needs, fighting and primitive weapons, even the
fighting manners were very limited to individual.
b. Ancient eras . At that period of time appeared
empires that had the political and military
leadership, in addition, they had their own
objectives and distinguished manners in fighting
which the military history is no longer preserve
their thoughts and sciences .
1. Strategy in slavery era.
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a. It was distinguished of its clearness and
accuracy, this was because of the unity
of aims, objectives, principles and
beliefs which depended on planning and
execution of different levels .
b. Strategic instruments, manners and
thoughts at that period were varies, that
confirmed by the Islamic conquests.
2. Strategy in Islamic era .
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24. 3. Strategy in the medieval eras .
a. At the beginning , the level of the strategic
thought was decreased in contrast with the
former ones .
b. Complete absence of clear objectives and
strategies
c.Objectives were limited to the individual,
religious exercises , and to preserve/ protect
the feudalities security .
d. Activities and fighting styles concentrated
on the complete dependence on knights and
their sons .
24
2405/23/15
25. 4. Strategy from 15th
century to 18th
century .
* Strategic science and intellectual at that period ,
undergone many changes and decisive development in the
history of strategy .They can be shown on the following :
a. The warfare objectives should be national and
political , not a personal or feudality .
* 15th
century – Mikavilly . Italian philosopher . His
strategic intellectuals were considered as a turning
point in strategic concept . His important views as
following : ( P. 5 )
b. He set the concept of preparing the state for war
to achieve national objectives .
c. Link the state strategy with military strategy to
achieve national strategy .
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* 16th
century – Gostaf Adolf king of
Swede, he improved the strategic
military science and thought; one of
his important views are follows:
a. Formed the regular army .
b. Improved tactics and
fighting manners .
c. Improved training and
educational systems.
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* 17th
century – Fredrik the Great
The king of Prussia, he had a big
role in the improvement of
fighting and strategic systems in
the battle field, moreover army
organization .
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* 18th
century – Napoleon
* Emperor of France . He had a big role in improvement of
strategic science and thought .
* His important views as follow :
a. Specify the national objectives .
b. Prepare the state for war .
c. Set up the recruitment system .
d. Set up the divisions formation .
e. Implementation (Apply) operational maneuvers to achieve
a strategic objectives .
f. Improve the fighting system in the battle fields .
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5. Strategy in 19th
century
a. Impacts of the industrial
revaluation upon strategic thought
b. Development of weapons which were
varied and increased their effects,
range and heaviness .
c. Armies gain high capacity in maneuver
d. Improvement of the fighting manners
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6. Strategy in the world war I
a. Strategy at that time was very clear,
whereas appeared the prominent /clearance
strategic objectives , such as colonialism and
ethnicity purposes, and expansionist policy.
b. Improvement and variety of armies
form and size, specially land (army) , navy and
air forces .
c. Emergence of alliance phenomenon .
d. Applied all fighting techniques in different
levels .
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7. Strategy in the world war II.
a. Advance extension to the former idea .
(Last period) .
b. Emergence of mass warfare idea .
c. Emergence of national objectives .
d. Apply all level and types of strategy .
e. Advancement of military organization ,
capacity (capability), tools and profession .
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8.` strategy in nuclear era.
a. The use of atomic bomb at the end of
world war II had an impact in changing
the balance of science and thought of
strategy .
b. Emergence of the new strategic concepts
(nuclear deterrence and arms race
) .
c. Nuclear power – India, Pakistan, Iran
….. etc.
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. the outer space added another
strategic dimension, because the
utilization of space is an important
factor in the present (current) time
strategies .
9. Strategy in space era
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Western school
* It has not a single concept – but, it might be
collected some of concepts that came out
from this school; the context includes the
most essential and inclusive ones .
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Western school
1. Klawzevids . It is the use of engagement for the
sake of warfare objectives.
2. Moltika . A group of instruments use to a
accomplish a certain aim .
3. British joint training manual 1902. It is a planning
art and direction for a campaign . And it is the
style which the commander running after to bring
about his enemy to the battle .
4. Liddle Hart . Is the art , distribution and usage of
different military instruments for political goals .
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Western school
5. Andaria Bover . It is the art of utilizing power
to reach the political objectives.
6. American concept 1959. It is the art and science
to employ the armed forces for the goals of
public polices of the state through putting into
action power or threat .
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1. Lenin. An ideal strategy which guarantees
operation delay that allow the moral break down of
enemy for an easiest deathblow .
Eastern school
2. Mau Tis Tung . It is the study of law of the whole
warfare situation
3. kozolv. It is certain of military instruments of
making policy to gain it’s objectives.
4. General concept. It is the scientific knowledge
system about warfare rules as an armed conflict
for the sake of specific class interests. 3805/23/15
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* As general, strategy view researches on the following :
Eastern school
1. Study warfare experiments .
2. Both situations; policy and military .
3. Economic and moral capability of the state .
4. Types of up-to-date instruments conflict .
5. Future perspective of the enemy .
6. Conditions and nature of the prospective warfare;
and the ways of preparation and engagement .
7. Build the armed forces and establish a strategic
usage in addition to its fundamentals of security,
finance and techniques, then the leadership of the
armed forces and warfare .05/23/15
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Results
3. It is no longer that the strategy concept is limited to
the military field, but it is expanded to include the
other fields such as: politics, economics and social
affairs .
1. It is to be noticed that all schools of concepts are
related strategy to war and battles, therefore, it
seems to be war is the only way that attained the
strategic aim .
2. All these concepts regard military strategy, as the
first concept of strategy .
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* Today is appeared what is known by
the contemporary concept of strategy
i.e. the comprehensive national strategy
(( it is the science and art of
improvement and optimum utilization
of political, economic , military, social ,
technological and administrational
power for the state , to attain national
aims & objectives of the state ))
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* The essence of contemporary
strategy is an art of selection from
different theories and available
methods , that convenient
(suitable) to situations face the
responsible authorities, thus, to
reach the programmed and desired
objectives to become true .
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* Contemporary strategy ranking
in belief, politics and doctrine a
position of a appendix, i.e. the
doctrine which specify the general
and fundamental situation
whereas the items related to
strategy that work nature is
derived from.
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Elements of the comprehensive national
strategy concept :
1. Connection of strategy with the community
and state security .
2. Mobilization of the community resources and
its arrangement / organization and direction .
3. Avoid inactivity i.e. expressing and
advancement by changing circumstances,
resources, and available options.
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* Tregoe and Zimmerman 1980 the
strategy is an ideation of the Org. for
what to be in future, but not how the Org.
comes to this situation . The strategy is
the guide frame for the choices that
determine nature of the Org. and its
direction, and relation of these choices by
field of the productions or services, the
markets, the capabilities , the growth ,
the revenues , allocate the Org. resources
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* Tommas-1988 : the strategy is plans and activities of the
Org. , set by guarantees a degree of coincide between the
Org. mission and its objectives. Between that mission and
the environment that work in active way higher equality .
* Mendez Berg 1989 : the strategy is the middle power
between the Org. and the environment and compatible
manners in collection from the Org. decisions that related
by environment, so it uses the Org. to adapt with its
environment through collection of decisions that the
management adopt them .
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48. * Gluik and Jawesh-1988 The strategy is a unified,
inclusive/comprehensive and completed plan , that links
the strategic benefits for the Org. by the environmental
challenges, and that build to confirm achieve the basic
objectives of the Org. during the suitable execution by the
Org.
* Bossman and Vatak 1989 the strategy is an
instruments to realize (achieve) goals, it's descript of the
organizational manners to realize the strategic objectives,
and it’s by that include to determine the strategic
alternatives, and evaluate that alternatives to realize
major objectives of the Org.
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* BorterBorter
1. one of the competitive strategy pioneers .
2. ((the strategy is a building and establishment
defenses against the competitive power, or
found a position in industry whereas the power
in its weakest form)).
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BorterBorter
3. Any Org. has its comprehensive competitive strategy it’s
mixing of the workable objectives by the Org. so as to be
implemented to realize these objectives .
4. factors of wording competitive strategy : .
a. the strength and weakness points of the
organization .
b. the opportunities and threats.
c. the personal values of the organization’s
managers (the managers major needs) .
d. the social expectations (what the society requires
from the Org. and impacts by the state policy
and the social sensibility).
53
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52. 52
* Borter
* the main factors the organization’s strategy
affected by :
1. external environment .
2. internal environment ( resources).
3. specific objectives of organization .
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*Conclusions of strategic concept .
1. strategy is just a mean to realize specific aim , also
it's the Org. mission in the society .
2. At the same time strategy is considered as an aim
uses to measure the performance of the
subordinate management level in the Org. , so any
Org. can't use strategy concept unless it's mission
is clear and accurately specified.
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3. Strategy aims to create high coincidence efficiency
between tow basic elements they as follow:
a. create a coincidence between the objectives
and aims of the Org. . because it is
unreasonable for any Org. to work to achieve
these aims when there is a contradiction
between them.
b. create a coincidence degree between
organization's mission and the environment
where it work .
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4. There are three main elements effect the strategy :
a. external environment and it’s political ,
economic , social change ….. etc .
b. Internal environment from sources and
potentials (probabilities) , the organizational
structure, leadership, strength and weakness
points and values.
c. The objectives that laid down by the Org. to
be achieved within specific period of time.
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5. the strategy clarified the mode through which
the Org. competed in business field, when it
lacks of comparative constancy of environment,
thus it must make the strategy changes to
continue the frequent coincidence process
between the organization’s mission and
environment, that required understanding,
studying and continual analysis for working
environment of the Org .
6. focus on the alternatives / choices / options
strategic.
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7. The strategy is arrangement of ideas for facing
the risks cases and unconfirmed , and determine
available opportunities for the Org. in the
environment, therefore using the special quality
to benefit from the Org. available sources .
8. The basic direction of the Org. considers to study
and analyze the relationship between the Org.
and the environment that working in. Therefore,
to face the threats that Org. exposed to, and
investment opportunities that support competitive
situation for it, in order to realize existence,
continuity, growth, and increase the Org. capacity
in managing it relationship with the environment .
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1. Strategy terminology is derived from the Greek
lexical ( stratêgos ) which means any military
leader .
2. the word “ General “ at that time was described
a character of three dimensions which
represented in characteristics, environment,
roles he does and time management .
3. Strategy development , passing over eras, and
different schools; its limitation on strategic
military concept .
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60. 60
4. Development of the strategy concept , till it
reaches the comprehensive national strategy .
5. The concept transfer to business field , in
which the strategy concepts are differ between
different school .
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