Strategy and Tactics

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THE ESSENTIAL CLAUSEWITZ
BY
MAJORAGHAHUMAYUN AMIN
December 1992
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THE ESSENTIAL
CLAUSEWITZ
CARL VONCLAUSEWITZSONWAR
SUMMARISEDINFORTYFIVEPAGES
By
AGHAHUMAYUN AMIN

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Preface
I saw On War for the first time in
1975.
The book fascinated me and has always continued
to fascinate me.
This is a summary of the essence of OnWar in45
simple pages that I compiled after an 18 year
effort in 1993.
An attempt has been made to capture its essence.
Clausewitz’s thoughts are immortal.
Agha H Amin
INTRODUCTION
Clausewitz's philosophical cum military work “Vom Kriege" or
“on War”is of immortalvalue as far as its practical merits are
concerned. I am of the firm conviction that it is the basic book for
anyone who wishes to understand the military art.
The aim of this little book is as following:-
a. Present a brief summary of Clausewitz's views which are
of permanent value from the strictly military point of
view.
b. Act as a ready reckoner for anyone who wants to quote
Clausewitz while doing any research on a military topic.
If we want to understand any art we have to start from the

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abstract and only then can we understand the concrete. Every
great endeavor had some philosophical basis, may it be a great
army a great religion or a great political movement. War is
abstract and Clausewitz's philosophy greatly assists and
facilitates the soldier in his more concrete job on the intellectual
plane.
It is felt with considerable conviction that Clausewitz's
profound dictums will not betray any ardent military
commander at any level and in any situation. However this will
happen only if one makes a deliberate and conscious effort to
understand what this military genius wants to say. This work is
a very insignificant attempt to present in a brief form
Clausewitz's military wisdom as enunciated in Vom Kriege.
BOOKS UPON WHICH THE STUDY IS BASED
A. "ON WAR” EditedbyAnatoleRapport - Pelican Edition -
1967 - Reprint National
Book Foundation Government of Pakistan.
B. "ON WAR” Edited by MichaelHoward and Peter Paret -
Princeton University Press - Reprint National Book Foundation -
Government of Pakistan.

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DEDICATION
DEDICATED TO MAJOR GENERALEFTIKHAR JANJUA- VICTOR OF
CHHAMB THE GREAT MILITARY COMMANDER WHO CAME
CLOSEST TO THE CLAUSEWITZIAN FRAME OF THE PERSONALITY
OF THE IDEALMILITARY COMMANDER AS FAR AS PAKISTAN
ARMY IS CONCERNED.
ALAS...... HAD HE LIVED MANY COWARDS MAY NOT HAVE
PROSPERED.
Contents
Chapter 1 Theory of War
Chapter 2 Military Genius and Requirements
of Higher Command
Chapter 3 Information and Making of
Assessments
Chapter 4 Strategy and Tactics
Chapter 5 Suspension of Action
Chapter 6 Friction of War
Chapter 7 Element of Chance/Luck
Chapter 8 Military Training
Chapter 9 Courage
Chapter 10 Boldness
Chapter 11 Surprise and Deception
Chapter 12 Reserves

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CHAPTER 4
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
ESSENCE
1. Strategy is the theory of the use of combats for the
object of the war.
2. Strategy deals with combination of different
actions or combats with a view to the ultimate
object of the war. Strategy deals with battles to
gain end of the war.
3. Strategy and tactics are two different activities
although sometimes mixed w h each other in
terms of time and space.
4. Time and space is much less in tactics as
compared to strategy.
5. Tactics is concerned with formation and conduct
of single combats or actions - thus tactics is the
theory of use or employment of military forces in
single combats or actions.
6. It is much easier to theories in tactics as compared
to strategy.
7. Thus theory in strategy can offer to the
commander in chief very limited guidance at best
- whereas tactical theory can guide a commander
till the very end of any military action.
8. Moral forces play a very important role in
strategy. Strategy borders with political science
here.
9. Very few Generals possess strategic knowledge
sufficient enough to raise a man above

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mediocrity.
10. Factors in strategic theory at first sight
Appear very simple but execution in the realm of
strategy is a very difficult process.
11. Much greater strength of will is required in
Strategy as compared to tactics.
12. Imagination and mental assessment play a
Much greater role in strategy than in tactics.
13. Strategy may easily be divided into various
Elements like the moral, physical, mathematical,
geographical and statistical but all these are so
much interwoven and mixed that any analysis of
these elements singly can only lead to great
confusion and is thereby pointless.
14. The strategic plan settles when where and
With what forces a battle is to be
Delivered. Thus the strategic plan has a very
decisive influence on outcome of
Battle.
15. Only great tactical results can lead to great
Strategic results.
16. Superiority of numbers is in general a
Principle of victory in strategy as in
tactics.
17. Best strategy is always to be very strong at
the decisive point.
18. Strategy forms the plan of the war.
19. Surprise easier to achieve in tactics than in
strategy.

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20. Dispositions in battle is not within the
Sphere of strategy but decision to fight the battle
is a strategic decision.
21. Line of communications.
22. Simplicity in plans lead to shorter execution time.
23. Two main principles of planning a war
are:-
a. Act with the utmost concentration. b. Act
with the utmost speed.
24. Culminating point.
25. Diminishing force of attack.
26. Exact object of strategic attack cannot be
determined in war with certainty.It is a variable
subject.
27. Strategic attack may include defence also.
28. Defence includes attack also.
RELEVANT EXCERPTS
1. DEFINITION. Tactics is the theory of the
use of military forces in combat. Strategy is the
theory of the use of combats for the object of the
war. (Page 173) - A.
Strategy is the employment of the battle to gain the
end of war. (Page 241) - A.
2. Strategy and Tactics Essentially Different
Activities though Sometime Intermixed.
Tactics and strategy are two activities mutually
permeating each other in time and space, at the
same time essentially different activities, the inner
laws and mutual relations of which cannot be
intelligible at all to the mind until a clear

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conception of the nature of each activity is
established. (Page 179) - A.
3. Time and Space In Tactics Much Less
as Compared to Strategy. In tactics time and
space quickly dwindle to their absolute minimum.
If a body of troops is attacked in the flank and
rear by the enemy, it soon gets to a point where
retreat no longer remains ......... (Page 289) - A.
In strategy this is only faintly reflected, on
account of the greater space and time. We do not
fire from one theater of war upon another
andoften weeks and months must pass before a
strategic movement designed to surround the
enemy can be executed. Further, the distances are
so great that the probability of hitting the right
point at last, even with the best arrangements, is
but small. (Page 289) – A
4. Much Easier to Theories in Tactics as
Compared to Strategy. Therefore it is easier to
determine, by theoretical rules, the order and
conduct of a battle, than the use to be made of the
battle itself. Yonder physical weapons clash with
each other, and a; thorough mind is not wanting
there in, matter must have its rights. But in the
effects to be produced by battles when the material
results become motives we have only to do with the
moralnature. In a word, it is easier to make a theory
for tactics than for strategy. (Page 190)- A
5. Theory will stop much sooner in strategy than in
tactics.Theory, therefore, especially where it
comprehends the highest services, will stop much
sooner in strategy than in tactics at simple
consideration of things, and content itself to assist the
commander to that insight into things which, blended
with his whole thought, makes his course easier and
surer, never forces him into opposition with himself
in order to obey an objective truth. (Page 200) – A
6. Moral Forces PlayImportant Part in Strategy.
But let us admit: there is no question here about
scientific formulas and problems; the relations of

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material things are all very simple; the right
comprehension of the moralforces which come into
play is more difficult. Still, even in respect to them. It
is only in the highest branches ofstrategy that moral
complications and a great diversity of quantities and
relations are to be looked for, only at that point
where strategy borders on political science, or rather
where the two become one. (Page 243) – A
7. Real Strategic Insight Possessed by few Generals.
Thus then in strategy everything is very simple, but
not on that account very easy. Once it is determined
from the relations of the state what should and may be
done by war, then the way to it is easy to find; but to
follow that way straight forward, to carry out the plan
without being obliged to deviate from it a thousand
times by a thousand varying influences, requires
besides great strength of character, great clearness
and steadiness of mind, and..... out of a thousand men
who are remarkable, some for mind, others for
penetration, others again for boldness or strength of
will, perhaps not one will combine in himself all
those qualitieswhich are required to raise a man
above mediocrity in the career of a General. (Page
243) A.
8. Much More Strength of will Required In Strategy
than In Tactics. It may sound strange, but for all
who know war in this respect it is a fact beyond
doubt, that much more strength of will is required to
make an important decision in Strategy than in tactics.
In the latter, we are hurried on with the moment; a
Commander feels himself borne along in a strong
current, against which he durst not contend without
the most destructive consequences, he suppresses the
rising fears, and boldly ventures farther. In strategy,
where all goes on at a slower rate, there is more
room allowed for our own apprehensions and
those of others,for objections and remonstrance’s,
consequently also for unreasonable regrets; and as we
do not see things in Strategy as we do at least half of
them in tactics,with the living eye,but everything
must be conjectured and assumed, the convictions
produced are less powerful. The consequence is that

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most Generals when they should act, remain stuck
fast in bewildering doubts. (Page 243) - A.
9. Strategy May Be Divided Into Elements But Their
Separate Analysis will Only Lead to Contusion.
The causes which condition the use of the combat in
strategy may be easily dividedinto elements of
different kinds such as the moral physical,
mathematical, geographical and statistical elements.
(Page 249) - A.
The separation of these things once for all in the
mind does good in giving clearness and helping us
to estimate at once, at a higher or lower value, the
different classes as we pass onwards. (Page 250) -
A.
But to treat upon Strategy according to these
elements would be the most unfortunate idea that
could be conceived, for these elements are generally
manifold, and intimately connected with each other in
every single operation of War. We should lose
ourselves in the most soulless analysis and as if in a
horrid dream we should be for ever trying in vain to
build up anarch to connect this base of abstractions
with facts belonging to the real world. Heaven
preserve every theorist from such an undertaking.
(Page
250)- A.
10. Great Strategic Feats Appear Simple After
theEvent But Are Actually Difficult In Execution.
Another feature relates to the difficulty of execution.
Marches to turn a flank, right or left are easily
combined; the idea of keeping a small force always
well concentrated to be able to meet the enemy on
equal terms at any point, to mu iply a force by rapid
movement, is as easily conceived as expressed; the
mere contrivance in these points, therefore cannot
excite our admiration, and with repeat to such
simple things, there is nothing further than to admit
that they are simple. But let a General try to do these
things likeFrederick the Great. Long after words
authors, who were eye witnesses, have spoken of

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the danger, indeed of the imprudence, of the king's
camps, and doubtless, at the time he pitched them,
the danger appeared three times as great afterwards.
(Page 245) - A.
But it required the King's boldness, determination,
and strength of will to see things in this light and not
to be led astray and intimidated by the danger of
which thirty yearsafter people still wrote and spoke.
Few Generals in this situation would have believed
these simple strategic means to be practicable.
(Page 245) - A.
Is it to be supposed that all this could have been done
without producing great friction in this machine? Can
the mind of a Commander elaborate such movements
with the same ease as the hand of a land surveyor
uses the astrolabe? (Page 245 & 246)-A.
11. Strategic Plan. By the strategic plan is
Settled when, where and with what forces
a battle is to be delivered. (Page 174) -A.
Strategy fixes the point where, the time when, and the
numerical force with which the battle is to be fought.
By this triple determination it has therefore a very
essential influence on the issue of the combat.
{Page 264) - A.
We shall now consider how the whole war should be
planned with a view to the three distinguishable
phases that can go with each particular aim. After
everything we have so far said on the subject, we can
identify two basic principles that underlie all
strategic planning and serve to guide all other
considerations. The first principle is that the ultimate
substance of enemy strength must be traced back
to the fewest possible sources, and ideally to one
alone. The attack on these sources must be
compressed into one. Finally all minor actions must
be subordinated as much as possible. In short the first
principle is: act with the utmost speed. No halt or
detour must be permitted without good cause. (Page

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617) - B.
12. Only Great TacticalResults Can Leak to
Great Strategic Result. Our assertion is that
Only great tacticalresults can lead to great
Strategicalones, or, as we have already once
before more distinctly expressed it , the
tactical successes are of paramount
importance in the conduct of war. (Page
306) - A.
13.Simplicity In Plans Leads to Shorter
Execution Time. The question whether a simple
attack, or one more carefully prepared ie more
artificial, will produce greater effects, may
undoubtedly be decided in favor of the latter as
long as the enemy is assumed to remain quite
passive. But every carefully combined attack requires
time for its preparation, and if a counter stroke by the
enemy intervenes, our whole design may be upset.
How if the enemy should decide upon some simple
attack, which can be executed in a shorter time, then
he gains the initiative, and destroys the effects of the
great plan. (Page 306) - A.
Our opinion is not on that account that the simple
blow is the best, but that we must not lift the arm too
far for the time given to strike, and that this condition
will always lead more to direct conflict the more
warlike our opponent is therefore, far from making it
our aim to gain upon the enemy by complicated
plans, we must father seek to be beforehand with
him by greater simplicity in our designs. (Page 306)
- A.
14.Decision to Fight a Battle a Strategic
Decision. Dispositions in the battler is not an affair
of strategy, but the decision to fight the battle is in
intimate connection with it (Page 312) -A.
15.Line of Communications/Retreat. From this
arises, in the whole conduct of the war,and
especially in great and small
combats, perfectinstinct to secure our own
Line of retreat and to

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seize that of the enemy; thisfollows from the
Conception of victory, which as we have seen,
is something beyond mere slaughter? In this
effort we see, therefore, the first immediate
Purpose in the combat, and one which is quite
Universal. No combat is imaginable in which
this effort, either in its double or single form,
does not go hand in hand with the plain
andsimple stroke of force. Even the smallest
Troop will not throw itself upon its enemy
without thinking of its line of retreat, and, in
most cases, it will have an eye upon that of the
enemy also. (Page 313) - A
16.Superiority of Numbers Is a General
Principle of VlctorvIn Strategy and
We think, therefore ,that under our conditions,
as well as in all similar ones,the superiority at
the decisive point is a matter of
capitalimportance, and that this subject, in the
generalof cases, is decidedly the most
important of all. (Page 2136) - A •
The first rule is therefore to enter the field with
an Army as strong.as possible. (Page 266) - A
This is in tactics,as well as in Strategy,the
mostgeneralprinciple of victory. (Page
`264)- A.
In such an aspect we grant,that the superiority in
numbers is the most importart factor in the result
of a combat, only rt must be sufficiently great to
be a counterpoise to all the other cooperating
circumstances. The direct result of this is, that the
greatest possible number of troops should be
brought into action at the decisive point. (Page •
265)- A.
If we go through the military history of modern
Europe, we find no example of a
Marathon. (Page 265) - A

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It is very difficult in the present state of Europe,
for the most talented General to gain a victory
over an enemy double his strength. (Page 266) -
A
Now if we see double numbers prove such a
weight in the scale against the greatest Generals,
we may be sure, that in ordinary cases,in small as
well as great combats, an important superiority of
numbers,but which need not be over two to
one,will be sufficient to ensure the
victory,however disadvantageous other
circumstances may be. Certainly we may imagine
a defile which even tenfold would not suffice to
force,but in such a case it can be no question of a
battle at all. (Page 266) -A
The best strategy is always to be very strong, first
generally; then at the decisive point. Therefore
apart from the energy which creates the Army, a
work which is not always done by the General,
there is no more imperative and no simpler law
for strategythan to keep the forces concentrate. No
portion is to be separated from the main body
unless called away by some urgent necessity. On
this maxim we stand firm and look uponas a
guide to be depended upon. (Page 276) - A.
17. But Concentration In Practice Requires
Great Militarv Ability and Is Difficult to
Achieve. And in the resolution required to
sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the
important - In this, Frederick the Great and
Bonaparte are particularly characteristic. (Page
268) - A.
It seems incredible, and yethas happened a
hundred times, that troops have been divided and
separated merely through a mysterious feeling of
conventionalmanner, without any clear perception
of reason. (Page 276) - A.
18. Surprise Easter to Achieve In Tactics Than in

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Strategy. In tactics Surprise is much more at
home, for the very natural reason that all times
and spaces are on a smaller scale. It will be
therefore, in strategy be the more feasible in
proportion as the measures lie nearer to the
province of tactics, and more difficult the higher
up they lie towards the province of policy. (Page
270) - A.
The preparations for a war usually occupy several
months; the assembly of an Army at its principle
position requires generally the formation of
depots and magazines, and long marches,
theobject of which can be guessed soon enough. It
therefore rarely happens that one state surprises
another by a war, or by the direction whichgives
to
the mass of forces. (Page 270) - A.
19. Culminating Point of the Attack. Success in
attack results from the availability of superior
strength, including of course both physical and
moral. In the preceding chapter we pointed out
how the force of an attack gradually diminishes; is
possible inthe course of the attack for superiority
to increase, but usually it will be reduced.
Theattacker is purchasing advantages that may
become valuable at the peace table, but he must
pay for them on the spot with his fighting forces.
The superior strength of the attack which
diminishes day by day - leads to peace, the object
will have been attained. There are strategic attacks
that have led directly to peace, but these are the
minor. Most of them only lead up to the point
where their remaining strength is just enough to
maintain defense and watt for peace. Beyond that
point the scale turns and the reaction follows with
a force that is usually much stronger than that of
the original attack. This is what we mean by the
culminating point of the attack. Since the object of
the attack is the possession of the enemy's
territory follows that the advance will continue
until the attacker's superiority is exhausted; it is

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this that drives the offensive on toward its goal
and can easily drive further. If we remember how
many factors contribute to an equation of forces,
we will understand how difficult it is in some
cases to determine which side has the upper
hand.Often it is entirely a matter of the
imagination. (Page 528) - B.
What matters therefore is to detect the
culminating point with discriminative
judgement. We here come up against an apparent
contradiction. If defense is more effective than
attack, one would think that the latter could never
lead too far; rt the less effective form is strong
enough the more effective form should be even
stronger. (Page528)- B.
20. Diminishing Force of the Attack. The diminishing
force of attack is one of the strategist's main
concerns. His awareness ofwill determine the
accuracy of his estimatein each case of the options
open to him.
Overall strength is depleted:--
a. If the object of the attack is to occupy the
enemy's country (Occupation normally
begins only after the first decisive action,
but the attack does not cease with this
action).
b. By the invading armies, need to occupy
the area in their rear so as to secure their
lines of communication and exploits
resources.
c. By lossesincurred in action and through
sickness.
d. By the distance from the source of
replacements.
e. By sieges and the investment of fortresses.
f. By a relaxation of effort.
g. By the defection of allies.

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But these difficulties may be balanced by other
factors that tend to strengthen the
attack. Yet it is clear that the overall result will be
determined only after these various quantities
have been evaluated. For instance. A weakening
of the attack may be partially or completely
cancelled out or outweighed by a weakening of
the defense. This is unusual; in any case one
should never compare all the forces in the field,
but only those facing each other at the front or at
decisive points. Different examples: the French in
Austria and Prussia, and in Russia; the allies in
France; the French in Spain. (Page527)- B.
21. Object of Strategic Attack. The object of
strategic attack, therefore, may be thought of in
numerous gradations, from the conquest of a
whole country to that of an insignificant hamlet.
As soon as the objective has been attained the
attack ends and the defense takes over. One might
therefore think of a strategic attack as an entity
with a well defined limits. But practice - seeing
things, thatis, in the light of actual events - does
not bear things out. In practice the stages of the
offensive - that is, the intentions and the actions
taken - as often tum into defensive action as
defensive plans grow into the offensive. It is rare,
or at any rate uncommon, for a general to set out
with a firm objective in mind;rather,he will
makedependent on the course of events.
Frequently his attack may lead him further than he
expected; after a more or less brief period of rest
he often acquires new strength; but this should not
be considered as a secondwholly separate action.
At other times he may be stopped earlier than he
had anticipated, butwithout abandoning his plan
and moving over; a genuine defensive, So
becomes clear that
a successful defense can imperceptibly tum into
attack, the same can happen in reverse.These
gradations must be kept in mind ijwe wish to
avoid a misapplication of our general statements

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on the subject of attack. (Page 526) - B.
22. The Nature of Strategic Attack. As we have
seen, defense in general (including of course
strategic defense) is not an absolute state of
waiting and repulse; it is not total, but only
relative passive endurance. Consequently, it is
permeated withmore or less pronounced elements
ofthe offensive. In the same way, the attack is not
a homogeneouswhole: it is perpetually combined
with defense. The difference between the two is
that one cannot think of the defense without that
necessary component of the concept, the counter
attack. This does not apply to the attack. The
offensive thrust or action is complete in itself. It
does not have to be complemented by defense; but
dominating considerations of time and space do
introduce defense as a necessary evil. In the first
place, an attack cannot be completed in a single
steady movement: periods of rest are needed,
during which the attack is neutralized, and
defense takes over automatically. Second, the area
left in rear of the advancing forces, an area vital to
their existence, is not necessarily covered by the
attack, and needs special protection.
The act of attack, particularly in strategy, is thus a
constant alteration and combination of attack and
defense. The latter, however, should not be
regarded as a useful preliminary to the attack or
an intensification of it, and so an active principle;
rather it is simply a necessary evil,an impeding
burden created by the sheer weight of the mass. It
is its original sin, its mortal disease. (Page 524)
- B.
23. DE F E N C E - in other words, our offensive
takes place within our own positions or theater of
operations. Thus a defensive campaign canbe
fought with offensive battles, and in a defensive
battle, we can employ our divisions offensively.
Even in a defensive position awaiting the enemy
assault,our bullets take the offensive. So the
defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a

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shield made up of well-directed blows.(Page 357)
- B.