1) The document discusses the rise of German imperialism in the late 19th century and how it contributed to rising tensions between the major European powers and ultimately led to World War 1. 2) It analyzes how Germany's increasingly aggressive foreign policy under Kaiser Wilhelm II caused other states like France and Britain to see Germany as a threat, leading them to form the Triple Entente alliance for security. 3) Escalating arms races and military plans by Germany and the other powers exacerbated the security dilemma, increasing the risks of an accidental war as countries tried to balance each other's capabilities.

1. IAFF 1005: INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Chips and Bluffs: An
Assessment of the Prelude
of World War I
Juan Pablo Poch
Professor Alexander Downes
03/03/2015

2. 1
The arena of international relations is governed by the contest between various states and
individuals over the fluctuating substance power. Throughout the course of history, this struggle has
yielded several scenarios of conflict and cooperation that are constantly subject to controversy and debate
over its causes, for the consequences have been carved into humanity’s historical memory. However, the
emerging theories from these affairs attempt to transcend the factual past aiming to make reliable
predictions of the future awaiting mankind. This essay concerns about the following statement: “The rise
of new great powers in the international system inevitably leads to war even though states might prefer
peace”. The case of World War I illustrates a setting in which states’ ambiguous translation of their
intentions into actions provoked a massive global carnage, despite the desire of the majority of the actors
for peace or a minor contention at most. To evaluate this claim – or any – there is no sole theory of
international relations that covers every aspect of the subject matter in its totality. Therefore, a
comprehensive assessment that includes more than a single approach is deemed necessary.
From the idealist corner, social constructivism magnifies the role of states’ identities to prescribe
their interests and means of fulfilling those interests, which later shape states’ behavior and action in the
international arena. Afterwards, structural realism and hegemonic war theory analyze the escalating
security dilemma and the uneven dynamics of the balance of power within the anarchic international
system, while the rationalist explanations for war dig into the states’ calculations to endure the costs of
ineffective war. Finally, neoliberal institutionalism suggests that the absence of vigilant international
institutions implied an unclogged path for states to engage in World War I.
In “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” Alexander
Wendt focuses on the endogenous characteristics or identities of actors in an international system as
prescriptions that shape their interests and fuel their behaviors. This contrasts with Kenneth Waltz’s
realist claim that exogenous factors in the anarchic international system are the sole determinants of a
state’s decision making. According to Wendt, an identity is a “relatively stable, role-specific
understanding and expectation of self,” and is acquired through the interaction with other social actors
and the resulting spontaneous collection of meanings (Wendt 1992, 398). In other words, states interpret
their surroundings on the basis of probabilities, use interaction to alter the odds and, finally, create

3. 2
expectations for the environment and for themselves, from which future interaction is assumed. These
collective expectations and interpretations constitute identities, which are the basis of states’
interpretation (ideas) of and action towards new situations (interests). Thus, the essential mechanism of
Social Constructivism can be established in simpler terms based upon the following formula: a desire or
interest plus a belief or idea (to carry out such interest) yields action and behavior.
Bismarck’s forced resignation from the German Chancellery in 1890 sealed the end of German
Realpolitik and the clockwork system of alliances. With Keiser Wilhelm II as head of state, German
foreign policy turned to Weltpolitik to extend its influence abroad and consolidate – if not impose – the
Reich as a world power. This new imperious identity was nourished by the belief that “Germany had to
either expand or stagnate” (Wawro 2000, 176). Hence, the Kaiser engaged in a series of aggressive
diplomatic moves beginning with the 1989 Fleet Policy, a naval arms race against Britain that intended to
surrender the British sea empire. Later on, during the Moroccan Crises in 1905 and 1911, the Germans
issued threats and deployed troops against France and Britain in an unsuccessful act of provocation that
fell into the Algeciras and Fez negotiations respectively, afflicted German diplomatic relations with the
former, and depraved the bold Kaiser of his craved power demonstration. On the other side of the coin,
France and the United Kingdom started regarding Germany as a future threat – or, in Wendt’s terms, as a
“predator state”— to their own security (interest), and were convinced of superior German military
capacities vis-à-vis their single individual forces (idea). Subsequently, they decided to unite against the
larger threat and form the “Anglo-French-Russian bloc [Triple Entente] in 1907 (…) to thwart what [they]
feared was a German drive to world domination” (Kissinger 1994, 194). Even though Germany
contemplated the possibility of meeting one of the Entente powers on the battlefield, the General Staff
wanted to avoid fighting a two-front war with France and Russia or that Britain intervened in the middle
of a lesser conflict (mainly against France). Yet, the Kaiser’s unyielding aggressive policy reinforced the
Triple Entente’s interpretation to defend its security interests from the German threat, as it had been
tagged as the “predator” of the system by the rest of superpowers. War was inevitable, because German
hostility was prescribed by its acquired aggressive identity, and peace unattainable for “the other states

4. 3
will continue [with the] competitive behavior until the predator is either destroyed or transformed from
within” (Wendt 1992, 409).
In his overview of realism, Charles Glaser breaks down two fundamental concepts of Waltz’s
Structural Realism and of realist theories overall: anarchy and security dilemma. The former concerns the
broad spectrum of the international system; the latter aims to explain states’ behavior to deal with specific
situations pertinent to their security. According to Waltz, anarchy is the “lack of authority that can enforce
agreements and prevent the use of force” – “it does not mean that international relations are chaotic”
(Glaser 2013, 14). In consequence, states must resort to a self-help mechanism through which they
enhance their capabilities – mainly military – and, inevitably, enter in a security dilemma. According to
Glaser, a security dilemma can be exemplified as “when military forces that a state deploys to increase its
security are also useful for attacking a potential adversary, [but] will reduce the adversary’s ability to
defend itself, which can make the adversary less secure” (Glaser 2013, 20). Nevertheless, according to the
defensive realism doctrine, this is partly meaningless without a general categorization of state types:
security-seekers, which intend to counter their adversary’s capabilities by enhancing their own, and
greedy states, of which security-seekers are uncertain about their motives and attacking capabilities.
Afterwards, Glaser dissects three mechanisms through which states assess the security dilemma
along with their adversary’s motives to determine the “risks of competition,” and that trace the escalating
process towards World War I. The first in line is states reaction to an arms build-up. In 1898, the
implementation of the Kaiser’s Flottenpolitik could have served either as a solution to a domestic issue –
the growing proletariat due to industrialization – or a means for expansion. According to Geoffrey
Wawro, “powers like Great Britain took the increase in German naval construction for a strategic threat
rather than a political gambit” (Wawro 2000, 178). Thus, the security dilemma originated, and Britain, a
security-seeker, expanded its own naval power in response. Furthermore, in 1907, Britain gathered France
and Russia to create the Triple Entente, under the pretext that the risk of fighting single-handedly against
or even forming an alliance with Germany (tagged as a greedy state) outweighed that of cooperating
among them (security-seekers). And, “with each German challenge, the bonds of the Entente grew
tighter” (Kissinger 1994, 195).

5. 4
The second mechanism centers in the “[pursuit of] policies that increase the probability of war”
(Glaser 2013, 22). Later in 1912, after the Second Moroccan Crisis, the Germans executed an armaments
reorientation, described by Wawro as a “race with the French and Russians on land” (Wawro 2000, 185).
In line with the security dilemma, the French and the Russians undertook military-enhancing campaigns
by respectively fortifying the frontier with German Alsace-Lorraine – France’s Plan XVI –, and
implementing massive mobilization maneuvers – Russia’s Great Program. In past years, Bismarck’s
worst preoccupation had been to fight an encircling, two-front war against France and Russia, yet not
entirely for the strategic disadvantage. Germany feared Russia over anything else because they were
superior in an aspect they could not compensate for: population size. It was only a matter of time for
Russia to reach the German level of industrialization, but it was an impossible venture for Germany to
match Russian manpower – technology may have eased such pressure in the short run but not for more
distant prospects. Therefore, the Reich developed the Schlieffen Plan as a solution to the time constraint
to win the war before its opponents grew overwhelmingly strong. Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen
relied on the Russian lack of mobility to “invade and crush France in six weeks and then redeploy to
Russia, where, assisted by the Austro-Hungarians, it would smash the slow-moving Russian army”
(Wawro 2000, 190). In line with Glaser’s logic, Germany “would be more willing to pursue these
dangerous, risky policies to regain its security” (Glaser 2013, 22).
Finally, the third mechanism consists in a state’s perception of an adversary as a greedy state
having in mind the previous mechanisms of capacity and policy. German military enhancement and
aggressive diplomacy increased the likelihood of its neighboring rivals to regard the Reich as a greedy
state, which thereby increased their expectation of a German offensive. This would not only rise the
Entente’s perception of insecurity alleging Germany’s willingness to endure the costs of war, but also
mitigate the chances of an accord in fear of being stabbed in the back by the greedy state. In such event,
the security dilemma explains how the window for a peaceful settlement shrunk dramatically regardless
of any state’s intentions to preserve peace, for “while there are risks in cooperating with a greedy state,
there are also costs in competing with a state that is a security-seeker” (Glaser 2013, 24). However, the
theory fails to set a limit to the increase in defensive capabilities – a measurable climax after which war

6. 5
would officially begin. Neither the Entente dared to send costly signals avowing its desire for peace, nor
Germany and the Central Powers one that revealed their acceptance of concessions without the need to
fight a war.
The Hegemonic War Theory parts from the idea of uneven growth among states in the
international system – particularly in an unstable one – to explain the conflict that arises as a result of the
decline of a foregoing hegemon and the intrepid rise of a challenging state. According to Thucydides, an
unstable system is “one in which economic, technological, and other changes are eroding the international
hierarchy and undermining the position of the hegemonic state” (Gilpin 1988, 592). This means the
international system is nonresistant to shifts in power among the secondary states without challenging the
prestige, dominance or policy of the preeminent state. Yet, this friction can yield a contender with the
capacity – or at least the intention – to fracture the current paradigm. Thucydides relies on the underlying
assumption of unchanging human nature “driven by three fundamental passions – interest, pride, and,
above all else, fear”, which compels them to “always seek to increase their wealth and power until other
humans, driven by like passions, try to stop them” (Gilpin 1988, 593). As a result, Robert Gilpin argues
that states endure “profound changes in political relations, economic organization, and military
technology behind hegemonic war and the associated domestic upheavals undermine both the
international and domestic status quo” (Gilpin 1988, 603).
The change in European pre-World War I power politics can be associated with the adamant
nature of statesmen that later fueled destabilizing alterations in the international system. One of the most
evident cases is the German Kaiser Wilhelm II and his cabinet. Driven by the zeal of Weltpolitik, they
were obsessed with the idea of Germany’s international prestige and capacity to overwhelm the declining
hegemon, Britain. Therefore, they adopted a foolhardy diplomacy, and took advantage of the internal
nationalism to spur a military-based economy – not to mention the isolating protectionism to boost
national production and “shut out cheap Russian and American grain” along with other imports (Wawro
2000, 180). In response, Britain looked forward to defend its hegemony and responded to the German
naval race with the full extent of its economic power. In 1906, the United Kingdom was even able to
temporarily outrun its rival with the invention of the Dreadnought, a floating steel fortress. Undeterred by

7. 6
a naval program that “plunged the Germans into obsolescence,” Wilhelm II and Admiral Alfred von
Tirpitz tightened their country’s budget and households to surpass the British giant in the coming years.
Thus, the strength of the German Wehrmacht incremented unprecedentedly vis-à-vis Britain’s,
notwithstanding, as 1914 approached, the German leadership was also enveloped in a growing fear
towards Russia. Even though it lagged in the industrial race with the rest of Europe, the Eastern Empire
had an industrial potential proportional to its considerable population, capable of defying the incoming
German hegemony in the future. Ultimately, the vicious circle of power produced a series of crises and
escalating tensions in the upcoming years that would occasionally lead to war. Nevertheless, the
Hegemonic War Theory fails to “forecast when a hegemonic war will occur and what the consequences
will be,” for “war released forces of which the protagonists had previously been unaware; it took a totally
unanticipated course” (Gilpin 1988, 601). The conflict erupted officially after a “seemingly minor affair”
– the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand –, but “its eventual scale and consequences were beyond the
comprehension of contemporary statesmen” (Gilpin 1988, 609). Hence, the rise of new powers inevitably
abetted the stage for war, even though their objectives might have been to balance and deter each other to
avoid the fracture of peace.
In his “Rationalist Explanations of War,” James Fearon submits the international disputes to Carl
von Clausewitz’s Bargaining Model of War in which a variety of statistical outcomes from the political
tug-of-war – including but not limited to absolute victory or defeat – leads up either to a bellicose conflict
or a diplomatic settlement of the issue. Based on this reference frame, Fearon proposes two major
mechanisms through which states rationally opt to fight wars rather than engage in diplomatic bargains to
international disputes: private information and incentives to misrepresent, and commitment problems. The
former establishes that the lack of private information about a state’s relative power and capabilities,
summed up with incentives to misrepresent the available knowledge about their rival’s intent, means that
states cannot always use subtle conciliation to discover mutually preferable settlements. “Since the
bargaining range is determined not just by relative power but also by states' values for the issues at stake
relative to the costs of fighting,” states would forego the alternative of a diplomatic solution in order to
obtain a stronger leverage in the bargaining table (Fearon 1995, 395).

8. 7
Throughout the prelude of World War I, Anglo-German relations received a significant amount of
pressure product of compromising actions, from questionable threats to suspicious militarization.
However, what kept both powers in check were their interpretations of their rival’s moves, which were
subject to the availability of private information. On one hand, German Chancellor Theobald Bethmann
Hollweg believed “brinkmanship and bluffing [could] be used to demonstrate resolve”, which denoted a
test of the patience of his opponents – especially Britain –, and, more important, a demarcation of their
vital interests and willingness to fight over them (Snyder 1984, 127). Correspondingly, during the July
Crisis of 1914, the Britons leaned on their adversaries’ uncertainty over their possible intervention in the
war. This parameter was pivotal in the outcome of the Belgian affair: the Schlieffen Plan’s success
depended on the tactical advantage of flanking the French army from the Marne, ineluctably rushing
through Belgium and breaching its neutrality. Nonetheless, “the German government received sufficiently
contradictory intelligence about London’s intentions as to be highly uncertain about British intervention”
(Sagan 1986, 167). Constrained by the impending need to expedite the Schlieffen Plan, the General Staff
opted to disregard the British intent (Sagan 1986, 170), and rather “overestimated their chance of a
military victory” (Fearon 1995, 390). At long last, the rise of new superpowers correlates with increased
uncertainty over diplomatic alternatives. Therefore, in the pursuit of their vital interests, states would
rather risk war rather than face a less advantageous outcome in relation to their rivals. Germany would not
risk its security facing a simultaneous French and Russian assault, nor would Britain have tolerated the
German overexpansion that would threaten its global influence, even less its domestic security.
The explanation of commitment problems implies that a state cannot fully compromise to uphold
an agreement in the future under specific circumstances, particularly those that would conflict with its
vital interests. Such situation arises, for example, over a territorial concession that could arrange a short-
term entente, but would provide crucial strategic or economic advantage to the recipient over the grantor
in the occasion of a future bargain. In the scenario of World War I, Fearon proposes the case of Russo-
German relations concerning the Austro-Hungarian Empire:
“Even if the increase in Russian power had not led Russia to attack Austria and Germany at some
point in the future-war still being a costly option-greater Russian power would have allowed St.

9. 8
Petersburg to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy in the Balkans and the Near East, where
Austria and Russia had conflicting interests” (Fearon 1995, 407)
Germany was compromised to help its ally in the event of a Russian menace. Otherwise, it would have
suffered complete isolation, either leaving Austria to perish to the Russians or watching it join the
Entente.
Neoliberal institutionalism postulates the intervention of international institutions as a resource
adept to “surmount this [private] barrier to communication” (Fearon 1995, 400) and solve the deceptive
commitment issue. For the former, Robert Keohane suggests these organizations could hurdle the barrier
of uncertainty “by promoting negotiations in which transparency is encouraged [and] dealing with a series
of issues over many years and under similar rules, thus encouraging honesty in order to preserve future
reputation” (Keohane 1998, 86). Supranational institutions would also possess an enforcing capability “by
systematically monitoring the compliance of governments with their commitment” (Keohane 1998, 86).
This guarantee would have worked as an incentive for Britain and Germany to confess their private
information – the intervention in Belgium and the Schlieffen Plan respectively –, and avoided the
miscalculation of vital interests, capabilities and willingness to fight. Given this hypothetical scenario,
rational states, “with complete information, would avoid the inefficient outcome of war” (Fearon 1995,
394), and probably awarded concessions in place. Whereas to solve the commitment problems, Keohane
advocates that international institutions would oversee and sanction the agreement as the legitimate
authority, so that none of the parties would default on the agreement. In addition, they would “reinforce
practices of reciprocity, which provide incentives for governments to keep their own commitments to
ensure that others do so as well” (Keohane 1998, 86).
Without a doubt, a comprehensive application of theory enables a rigorous assessment of the
dynamics of international affairs and even enables the formulation of new hypotheses about the future.
The initial premise on the rise of new powers covers accurately a diversity of circumstances that preceded
and catalyzed World War I. A plethora of destabilizing intentions and motives, strengths and weaknesses,
converged in the events of July of 1914 that unleashed the machine of war upon the known world.
Nevertheless, Wawro briefly depicts the great power’s final thoughts during ill-fated events of the July

10. 9
Crisis: “Whereas the British and the French governments went to war with extreme reluctance, the
Russians with mixed feelings, and the Italians not at all, the Austrians and the Germans chose the moment
for war and deliberately forced its outbreak” (Wawro 2000, 214). War is a circumstance that is as
necessary to humans as much as humans are accountable for it. Thusly, building on Waltz’s syllogism, we
must not hope for a world without war but with greater chances of peace.
Work Cited:
Fearon, James D., “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (Summer
1995): 381-408.
Gilpin, Robert, “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring
1988): 591-613.
Glaser, Charles. "Realism," Contemporary Security Studies, 3rd ed. (2013): 13-27.
Keohane, Robert O., “International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?” Foreign Policy no. 110
(Spring 1998): 87-89.
Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994): p. 170-204.
Sagan, Scott D. "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability." <i>International Security</i> 11.2
(1986): 151-71.
Snyder, Jack. "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984." International
Security 9.1 (1984): 120-30.
Wawro, Geoffrey, Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914 (London: Routlege, 2000), 176-225
Wendt, Alexander, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,”
International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-410