5. In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and
applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly
historical practice of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs'
(RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of
how and why strategy 'works’. The author explores
the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and
historically. The book argues that the conduct of an
RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic
behavior, which means that, of necessity, it must
"work" as strategy works. The focus of his analysis is
how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The
conclusions that he draws from these empirical
exercises are then applied to help us understand
what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with
the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA
6. The author presents three
historical RMAs as case studies
for his argument: those arguably
revealed in the wars of the
French Revolution and
Napoleon; in World War I; and in
the nuclear age.
7. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is
reviewed empathetically, though skeptically,
by the author, with every major school of
thought allowed its day in court.
The notion of military revolutions grew from
Soviet writing of the 1970s and 1980s. Early
studies talked of a "Military Technical
Revolution" (MTR), which is the impact of a
new technology on warfare, but this quickly
evolved into the more holistic concept of
“Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)”,
which encompasses the subsequent
8. The genesis of the current thinking
about a revolution in military affairs
began in Russia in the early 1980s,
when Soviet Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov,
the Soviet chief of staff at that time,
wrote about a "military technical
revolution" that would dramatically
improve the lethality and capabilities
of conventional weapons
9. General William Westmoreland
testified before Congress and said: On
the battlefield of the future, enemy forces
will be located, tracked and targeted
almost instantaneously through the use of
data links, computer assisted intelligence
evaluation, and automated fire control. . .
.I am confident the American people
expect this country to take full advantage
of its technology—to welcome and
applaud the developments that will
replace wherever possible the man with
10. RMA- Revolution In Military Affairs
kjTECHNOLOGICAL ORGANIZATIONALInformational Technology,
Telecommunication, and space
technology
11. international terrorism, the new roles of
non-state actors, and the new
emphasis on asymmetric warfare,
however, that are now doing most to
make us rethink almost every form of
cooperation in national security, the
tools we use in meeting these threats,
and the way in which we train and
educate.It forces us to think, educate,
train and act far beyond the limits of
what we once called the “Revolution in
12. RMA “is a major change in the nature of
warfare brought about by the innovative
application of new technologies which,
combined with dramatic changes in
military doctrine, operational and
organizational concepts, fundamentally
alters the character and conduct of military
operations”
13. consists of a combination of two terms;
revolution and military affair
Military affairs is generally understood as
the policies that come under the
responsibility of the ministry of war or
defense
Department of Defense (DoD)
+
Intelligence Agency
+
Technology
14. the fairly obvious observation that progress
in military technologies is usually tied to
progress in the technological and economic
base of countries fielding a military. Large
standing armies depended on agricultural
surpluses, and Napoleon's huge army
depended on the kinds of logistical
complexities that had allowed cities to feed
off of remote farms. The American Civil War,
World War I and World War II were
obviously wars of heavy industry.
15. One example frequently mentioned in the
literature as a landmark was when U.S. bombers
flew 800 bombing sorties over the Thanh Hoa
bridge in North Vietnam, losing ten aircraft
without damaging the bridge, but then the
bridge was destroyed in one pass by four
Phantom F-4 fighter-bombers using laser-
guided Paveway 1 bombs (U.S. News and World
Report 1987).
17. *RMA is never apart from political
context
*RMAs are made by people through
lengthy period of gesture, experiment,
time
*Has to be translated into politically
defined goals
*success in military innovations could
only postpone defeat ,it couldn’t pint to
an alternative, apolitical route to
success
18. Example: Napoleon
If the French had been able to attack
in the early hours they could have
swept the British from the field before
the arrival of their Prussian allies
19. Strategy is a Duel:
* Newton’s 3rd law of motion
*There is no law of Strategic history
requiring a particular foe to be
successfully adaptive at a particular
time
*War is nothing but a duel on a larger
scale
*War is not a lifeless thing
20. *Long as I have not overthrown my
opponent I am bond to fear he may
overthrow me
*war id not a single shot
Example: red army
21. *As strategy is a united behavior thus
RMA must be
*Detail of each RMA is unique but
common in nature
*context for analysis includes
dimensions like alliance ,human, ethical
issue, geopolitical and temporal.
*Theory of strategy is needed to reveal
the secrets & outcome of a RMA
*RMAs are example of strategy in
action
22. Strategy need not to be Chaotic:
*Nature of war is chaotic but nature of
strategy is not
*Chance , friction is not unnecessary
*Mistaken over view: chaos rules in war in
reality over strategy
*If strategy history truly were nonlinear &
chaotic, then chance would rule
*Strategic history humors chaos,but it is not
pervasively chaotic
24. Continuity in strategic history:
*Our theory of strategy includes the
proposition that every dimension always is
in play, though the relative importance of
say, geography, ethics or technology must
vary in historical context
25. déjà vu all over again :
*The action that matters most in strategic
history, to repeat an all too familiar refrain,
is the political and the human.
*armies that do not train hard are not
likely to fight well, almost regardless of the
quality of their weapons or the operational
skills of their generals.
26. *The professionals at the ‘what if...’ game are
those scholars and officials who must look to
the future.
* Historical actors frequently, perhaps usually,
fail to predict at all accurately the consequences
of action and inaction, when indeed they even
attempt so to do, but that fact does not deny
the authority of strategy.
