This document provides an overview of securing the Internet of Things (IoT). It begins with motivations for securing the IoT due to the rapid growth in the number of connected devices. It then discusses key IoT security requirements like confidentiality, integrity, authentication and availability. The document reviews the common IoT communication stack, including protocols like IEEE 802.15.4, 6LoWPAN, RPL and CoAP. It analyzes security challenges and mechanisms for each protocol, as well as proposals to improve IoT security. The conclusion reiterates that securing communications in the IoT is critical for enabling its benefits, while more research is still needed to address open issues.

1. Securing The IoT
Presented By: Guided By:
Moustafa Najm Dr. RASHMI RANJAN ROUT
NITW – CSE M.Tech
Roll No: 147509

2. Abstract
• The Internet of Things (IoT) is a computing concept that
describes a future internet where everyday physical objects
will be connected to the Internet making daily life easier.
• on the other hand there will be many security challenges
• This seminar gives overview about IoT, analyzes security
challenges and requirements in IoT, introduces IoT
communication stack for IoT and discusses different
mechanisms to secure communications in each protocol, as
well as limitations and some improvements and open
issues for future research.

3. Agenda
Overview of the Internet of Things
IoT security challenges
Securing the Internet of Things
Conclusion and summary

4. Firstly, does it matter?

6. Motivation
In 2011, the number of
“things” connected to
the Internet surpassed
the number of people
this year, there will be
25 billion connected
devices, and by 2020,
50 billion
By 2018, mobile data
traffic will exceed
fifteen Exabyte each
month.
by 2020, 90% of cars
will have an Internet
connection, less than
10% in 2013.
Yet we are still at the beginning

7. Motivation
The web search popularity, as measured by the Google search

8. What is the IoT
Place where machine to machine talk

9. Internet Evolving

10. IoT Applications

11. ‘Botnets are already a major security concern and the emergence of “thingbots”
[things being gadgets] may make the situation much worse.’ David Knight, Proofpoint.

12. http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/07/26/smart-homes-hack/

14. So what is different about IoT?
• The longevity of the device
– Updates are harder (or impossible)
• The size of the device
– Capabilities are limited – especially around crypto
• The fact there is a device
– Usually no UI for entering userids and passwords
• The data
– Often highly personal

15. IoT security requirements
– There can be many ways the system could be attacked:
– Capture data and messages
– Disabling the network availability
– Pushing erroneous data into the network
– Accessing personal information …
– Security is critical to any network and the first line of
defense against data corruption is cryptography.
• insider attacks ?!

16. IoT Security requirements
Security
Requirements
confidentialityprivacy
integrity
authentication
availability
nonrepudiation

18. protocol stack for the IoT
Communication protocols in the IoT

19. IEEE 802.15.4

20. Security in IEEE 802.15.4

21. Security in IEEE 802.15.4
• Efficient symmetric cryptography at hardware

22. Security in IEEE 802.15.4
– security is available only at the MAC layer
– Security as currently defined by IEEE 802.15.4 is optional
• Confidentiality:
– encryption using AES in the Counter (CTR) mode
• Data authenticity and integrity:
– employing AES in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode
• Confidentiality, data authenticity and integrity
– The CTR and CBC modes may be jointly employed using the
combined Counter with CBC-MAC AES/CCM encryption mode

23. Security in IEEE 802.15.4
• protection against message replay attacks
– The sender breaks the original packet into 16-byte blocks,
each block identified by its own block counter.
– each block is encrypted using a different nonce or
Initialization Vector (IV)

24. Security in IEEE 802.15.4
• Access control mechanisms
– the device stores an access control lists (ACL) with
max of 255 entries, each for particular destination
device.
– A default ACL entry may also be employed

25. Limitations of security with IEEE 802.15.4
• No keying model.
• The management of IV values
– if the same key is used in two or more ACL entries. it may
enable an adversary to recover plaintexts from cipher
texts.
• No adequate support for all keying models
– in particular group keying and network-shared keying.
• No protection for acknowledgment messages in
respect to integrity or confidentiality  DOS Attack

26. 6LoWPAN
IPv6 over IEEE 802.15.4

27. 6LowPAN Challenge
• Header Size Calculation. . .
127-25-40-8 = 54 octets left for application data!
– The challenges in 6LoWPAN environments are
related to the resource constraints of typical
wireless sensing platforms
• IPv6 MTU Requirements
– IPv6 requires that links support an MTU of 1280
octets
– Link-layer fragmentation / reassembly is needed

28. Security in 6LoWPAN
• No security mechanisms are currently defined
in 6LoWPAN
• a malicious or misconfigured node sending
forged, duplicate or overlapping fragments
– This is due to the lack of authentication at the
6LoWPAN adaptation layer.

29. Proposals for Security in 6LoWPAN
• Lightweight IPSec
– confidentiality, authentication and non-repudation
– Analysis:
• With compressed IPSec, packet size is similar to
802.15.4 while IPSec provides end-to-end security
• Space analysis show that AH and ESP consumes just
3.9KB and 9kB, respectively, for mandatory IPSec
Algorithms.

30. Proposals for Security in 6LoWPAN
• security against packet fragmentation attacks:
– Addition of a timestamp plus a nonce to the
6LoWPAN fragmentation header to support
security against unidirectional and bidirectional
fragment replays
– per-fragment sender authentication using hash
chains
Example of a content chain for a packet consisting of three fragments

31. RPL
IPv6 Routing Protocol for LLNs

32. Routing in RPL
• RPL builds Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph
(DODAG) for each root. by accounting for link costs, node
attributes, and its respective objective function. The topology
is set up based on a rank metric.

33. RPL Control Messages
• DAG Information Object (DIO)
• DAG Information Solicitation (DIS)
• Destination Advertisement Object (DAO)
• Destination Advertisement Object ACK (DAO-ACK)
• Consistency Check (CC)
– Synchronization of counter values among communicating
nodes
– provide a basis for the protection against packet replay
attacks.

34. Security in RPL
• secure versions of the various routing control messages
• The high order bit of the RPL Code field identifies whether or not
security is applied
• Support of integrity and data authenticity:
– Confidentiality and Integrity: AES/CCM with 128-bit keys for MAC
– integrity and data authenticity : RSA with SHA-256
• LVL :allows varying levels of data authentication and, optionally, of
data confidentiality.

35. Security in RPL
• protection against packet replay attacks :
CC (Consistency Check ) messages are used
for synchronization of counter values among
communicating nodes.

36. Proposal for Security in RPL
• Protection of RPL routing operations against
falsified routing updates :
– a child may have malicious parent !
– Use a version and rank authentication security
scheme based on one-way hash chains providing
security against internal attackers

37. CoAP
Constrained Application Protocol

39. CoAP Security
• Define bindings to DTLS , with four security
modes:
– NoSec:
• no protocol-level security and DTLS is disabled
– PreSharedKey:
• PreShared Key(PSK)-based authentication is used.
• The device store list of keys, each key includes a list of nodes
– RawPublicKey:
• the device has an asymmetric key pair.
– Certificate:
• the device has an asymmetric key pair
• The X.509 certificate binds the public key

40. Evaluation 1
• Large memory footprint in ROM and RAM.
– Complexity of the DTLS handshake, i.e., many messages and states.
– Crypto suites require SHA-2 that is not available on hardware crypto co-
processor.
• Overhead due to lower layer per-packet protocol headers.

41. Evaluation 2

42. DTLS Improvement
• Avoiding Fragmentation Through Compression
• on average 15% less energy is used to transmit (and receive)
compressed packets

43. Conclusion
• With the nature of today’s computing, security is
becoming very critical for wide range of
applications.
• we have seen the requirements, issues, designs
and solutions of secure standard protocol design
to counter the different attacks.
• Several issues, however, still remain open to find
a solution to the problem of IoT security.
• By Complying with the security measures, the IoT
can fully improve daily aspects of our life.

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45. References (2)
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