Seminar ksa edited civilian oversight (1)

Running head: CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT 1
Civilian Oversight: Community Review Board on Police Practices
Jocelyn Ntakirutimana
Point Loma Nazarene University
Jocelyn Ntakirutimana: 688 13th Street, San Diego, CA, 92101
jntakirutimana123@pointloma.edu

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT 2
ABSTRACT
Civilian review of police’s internal disciplinary and procedural mechanisms to address
complaints are examined in this paper. Civilian oversight is a prominent feature of modern police
efforts to improve community relations. The organizational theme of civilian oversight is
characterized by terms used to critique police practices. Board members of the Community
Review Board on Police Practices are appointed to serve by the Mayor of San Diego. Board
members are chosen from a pool of applicants volunteering themselves to review complaints
about police and misconduct allegations. The City of San Diego acts an umbrella organization
that partners together civilians and police officers to address public demands and complaints.
Partnerships are inherent amongst governing agencies to ensure their members act with integrity
and achieve performance standards. Agencies, positioned to oversee workings of other agencies,
rely on collected data gathered from investigators to evaluate misconduct. Police misconduct is
a highly controversial subject to study and filled with multiple interpretations and inflammatory
rhetoric. San Diego’s civilian oversight agency was originally established by an amendment
“Proposition,” G in 1988. A public referendum called for charter amendments to restore
consensus in the wake of alleged misconduct and civilian dissatisfaction. Twenty-three members
of the board convene at regular meetings to hear civilian complaints and forge agreements with
the Police Officers Association upon exonerating police officers of alleged misconduct.
Mediation and dialogue between dissatisfied parties are part of a hermeneutical tradition that
emphasized themes of social justice and nonviolent reform to address people’s complaints.
Competing interpretations of biblical ethics are analogous to board members’ different
assessments of ethical policing in the San Diego Police Department. An ideal system sustains
legitimate complaints about police by encouraging complainants and police officers to make
themselves accountable and transparently reviewing evidence gathered from an Internal Affairs
investigation. Literature indicates police’s traditional roles and retributive strategies are
incongruent with public demands for substantive mediation. Efforts to exonerate police of
allegations are as important as holding both civil servants and civilians mutual accountable for
criminal misconduct to realize community policing initiatives. Animosity towards law
enforcement in respective communities limits the impact of restorative and distributive justice
reform. Accountability reform require further study about effective dialogue with law
enforcement officers and civilians. Ultimately, collaborative efforts should orient resources to
facilitate mediation, public access, and transparency.
Keywords: procedural and retributive justice, v. distributive and restorative justice,
accountability and transparency, stakeholder, participation, case audit, legitimacy, semiotics,
spurious

LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
Throughout the world, police have employed ombudsmen and civilian oversight boards
to address concerns about police misconduct and integrity over complaints. Yet, there are
conflicting attitudes of how civilians, also known as citizens, should be incorporated into
investigations of police misconduct. Recommendations for better policing are often lauded in
literature and media publication across the country. On the face of it, everyone seems to have an
opinion about police. Good or bad, favorable or unfavorable, police are nevertheless responsible
for holding all of us accountable to the law. It is an intriguing dynamic that civilians and non-
police officers both lead city governments and hold police officers accountable for misconduct as
well. Police have such prominent role in criminal justice oftentimes civilians are less inclined to
take responsibility for issues and conflicts. Effective justice reform requires collaborative
efforts amongst civilians to positively impact a local community shared with police.
Concerns of police transparency and internal accountability typically make up complaints
people have. City government enables non-professional civilians with an official capacity to
superficially determine whether aspects from a complainant’s case indicate systemic abuse under
police practices. These civilians are also tasked to dismiss cases and restore police’s standing in
their communities due to spurious evidence used against their practices. (Burns, 2007) In San
Diego, members of the Community Review Board on Police Practices are entrusted to review
complaints and issue findings about systemic recommendations about police’s internal discipline
and management. However, the board’s review powers are curtailed according to their
superficial ability to initiate reform beyond a collaborative effort with police. Agencies designate
public relations personnel such as ombudsmen or volunteers to enhance police-community
relations by acknowledging the public’s complaints. Such personnel are upstanding
community members and work to provide access and clarity about intricate processes used
by police.
Semiotics
Civilian oversight originated through community policing initiatives wrought by city
governments’ drive to incorporate exceedingly marginalized communities. Criminal justice is
oftentimes filled with controversial incidents about marginalization and racial discrimination.
Such incidents compound certain communities’ resentment towards city government and police
and cause civilians to insulate themselves behind barriers instead of working towards
collaborative and positive reform. Complaints occur after incidental encounters with police and
present conflicting interpretations about police misconduct and civilian criminality. There is a
premium for semiotics, whereupon civilian board members review technical report language
from a police management unit, Internal Affairs, that professionally investigate complainants’
allegations against police officers. Reviewof Internal Affairs’ case files into police

misconduct is an invaluable preliminary steptowards cooperation between police and
civilian oversight agencies.
Internal Affairs detail statements and evidence for an impartial account presented to
civilians for oversight review. In this example, semiotics can be described by switching words in
a similar sentence structure: 1. Crime is a plague on society 2. Plague is a crime on society
(Kraska and Neuman, 2012). A simple word switch drastically affects what a phrase means.
Misused words alone can expose police especially because board members voice their opinions
upon reacting to report language and terms used in Internal Affairs’ complaint investigations.
Professor Victor Kappeler writes “Semiotics forces us to question commonsense assumptions
and challenges us not to take for granted that there is an objective reality that stands apart from
human creation and interpretation.” (Kraska and Neuman, 2012) City governments can provide
police with discretionary latitude and reasonable force to proactively reduce crime and enforce
the law. Board members are also entrusted by community leaders and institutions such as the
police to help reduce complaints against police. Unfortunately, a lack of complaint reduction
may wrongfully signal to board members systemic policing failures and deflect from sharing
accountability amongst police and civilians to achieve reform. Prenzler writes “confidence on the
part of citizens may lead to an increase in complaints, especially in the immediate aftermath of
the creation of a new agency.” (Prenzler and Lewis, 2005) It is convenient for institutions to
retreat behind a code of silent non-cooperation rather than expose themselves to dialogue and
constructive criticisms.
Accountability can be a weapon used to harshly apply laws for other people to follow.
Yet, those advocates for accountability may avoid addressing our complicit behavior in
exacerbating criminality and issuing vexatious complaints that sabotage the review process.
Many civilians and police, alike, take drastic measures to avoid accountability, dialogue, or
anything that demands their renewed participation as a fundamental key to criminal justice
reform. The ‘Golden Rule’ coined by ancient prophet, Hillel, calls for social reciprocity and
personal accountability in that “That which is hateful unto you do not do to your neighbor. This
is the whole of the Torah, the rest is commentary. Go forth and study.” (Jacobs, 2017) Civilian
oversight success relies on shared and collaboratively willingness to hold ourselves accountable
for criminality and rising complaints. Criminal motives are centered to reciprocate hatred that
criminals anticipate others have towards them. Just as criminals are responsible for their
motivations, communities should hold each other accountable for constructive behaviors. Shared
accountability will increase mindfulness and social awareness that brings a personal touch
to community-police reform.
Community policing

Amongst laws and governments, specific phrases imply different consequences for
everyday life. Different interpretations of community policing can result in considerable variance
amongst law enforcement’s implementation. In San Diego, civilians are mayoral appointments to
the Community Review Board on Police Practices and need to be well-versed in phrases and
semiotics. Civilians are entrusted to address public demands and community police initiatives by
enhancing accountability and transparency. While community policing can be highly politicized,
it can be understood through identifying stakeholders that are mutual accountable for flaws in
criminal justice. The people that write and follow the law through a democratic process and law
enforcement officials that ensure the law’s supremacy are prominent stakeholders in complaint
review and civilian oversight into police. Thus, everyday people are both emboldened to hold
police accountable and criticized for being complicit in rampant criminality plague their
community. Community relations with police are strained in areas riddled high crime rates.
Whereby poorer socioeconomic conditions that increase crime rates are also a noted indicator
used for marginalization and class discrimination. Inconsistent applications of the law project
illegitimacy to the public and negate stakeholders’ participation in a mutually beneficial
system.
Collaboration is at the root of oversight
The root of criminal justice reform is to establish nonviolent interventions and restore
community relationships before they are adversely fractured. Complaints are fundamentally tied
to dissatisfaction and unfavorable attitudes towards established institutions such as the police.
These complaints are sustained by evidence of inequality and discrimination and inflame
community-police relations. At the core of social justice is developing a healthy community of
laws rather than overwhelming government institutions with lop-sided responsibilities.
Researchers have shown that “police agencies realized that they could not adequately address
public safety issues without the full partnership of citizens, and community policing was, at its
core, aimed at bringing citizens back into the realm of assisting the police in addressing crime
and disorder in their respective communities.” (Burns 2007) Social justice movements progress
because there is a personal willingness to be accountable for sociological conditions. Conditions
that police have to hopelessly reckon with and require a communal effort to compensate for these
issues in criminal justice reform. It is recklessly irresponsible for community members to use
civilian oversight agencies as an excuse that neglects their obligation to proactively deter fellow
civilians from toxic influences that advance criminality. Community members, as stakeholders
and citizens to which police officers also belong, must acknowledge their indirect responsibility
in fractured community-police relations. Researchers conclude “most police oversight agencies
are commonly used by municipalities as a mechanism for responding to legitimacy crises arising
out of highly publicized examples of officer misconduct… which can undermine public trust in
police.” (DeAngelis and Kupchik, 2007 ) Legitimate reform requires for partnerships that
address police officers’ lack of trust in civilian reviewers’ to share responsibility. Oftentimes
resentment of police officers and their internal codes stems from attitudes that institutions protect
themselves while people escape responsibility by blaming them for dysfunction. Reactionary

policies undermine confidence in a healthy dialogue and create barriers for people seeking to
improve procedural ineffectiveness by holding themselves accountable for flaws. Because
institutions are unable to thrive without partnerships, they must be accountable for
distributing equal protection under the law and need actual people willing to protect their
functions.
Is successful reduction of the number of complaints, possible?
Board members are enabled to sustain an allegation during case review. In San Diego,
board members can request for others such as the Mayor or Chief of Police to review into alleged
police misconduct. However, disciplinary recommendations, independent investigations, and
subpoena power are all subject to contentious debate. A sustained allegation against a police
officer requires a complaint has detailed and substantive evidence about misconduct. The board’s
qualitative value as civilian oversight agency is to improve police-community relations despite
procedural violations by police and vexatious complaints by civilians. Thus, board members are
civilians seeking a platform for dialogue upon reviewing police’s procedural violations. Dialogue
primarily centers around holistic reforms that can reduce complaints being levied issued against
police officers, or at the very least, prevent vexatious complaints from harming law enforcement
careers. A vexatious complaint by civilian intending to harm a police officer negates benefits
from legitimate complaints that civilian oversight agency has rightfully sustained for disciplinary
purposes against actual police misconduct. Criminologists Timothy Prenzler and Colleen Lewis
explain (Prenzler and Lewis, 2005):
Stakeholders should include police who are the subjects of complaints. This is necessary
as police work in an environment that sometimes gives rise to vexatious complaints.
Police need to feel confident that they will be given a fair and timely hearing should
citizens or colleagues report against them
The more police officers are worried about malicious attempts by civilians to harm their careers,
they less capable of reforming their own offensive behaviors. Even if police officers have
personal grievances within their command or internal affairs, research shows they reserve their
harshest criticism for city officials positioned to enhance community-police relations through
civilian oversight. Police officers anonymously responded, “The problem isn't with IAB (Internal
Affairs Bureau) itself, instead the commands that review and "makes findings' - they screw us.
The city wants to 'punish' officer for political motives and avoids any positive influence.”
(DeAngeles and Kupchik 2007). Board members’ ability to improve community relations
with police and debunk spurious anti-police myths can overcome police officers’ initial
misgivings about review and oversight.
Restore legitimacy and fair distribution
Accountability and transparency are important themes in restoring or creating new
constructive relations between police and their community. Police officers’ disapproval towards

reporting mechanisms and internal integrity erode confidence essential to collaborative dialogue.
Research finds police officers “tend to report that while they believe the procedures followed by
internal affairs investigators are fair and objective, they do not trust the motives of the command
staff who issued the findings on the case.” (De Angelis and Kupchik, 2007) Police command
staff are under pressure to ensure their officers have access to representation, advocacy, and
other constructive outlets to relieve stresses that negatively affect their performance. Consistent
poor performances by police officers reflects poorly on their command staff and leadership and
ultimately, culminates with more officers being targeted for internal discipline. Police officers
are very concerned their command rather issue punitive discipline than fairly distribute justice
and advocate on their behalf amongst complaints. Police officers anonymously stated, “The
whole process is very weak and stacked for the good old boys who the command favors and
against those who are not known or misunderstood, or simply just line officers.” (DeAngelis and
Kupchik, 2007) In San Diego, civilian oversight agencies lack the ability to make disciplinary
recommendations to police command staff but must identify mistrust is tied to institutional and
systemic dysfunction. These systemic threats undermine community policing initiatives and
should encourage constructive dialogue about avoidable grievances police and community
members share towards each other.
Reform requires an intimate trust whereby people are encouraged to make themselves
accountable for the sake of participating in a collaborative effort. Minor grievances can be
compounded when institutions refuse to acknowledge personnel issues at the local level and
avoid dialogue about reform. Even disciplinary management units such as “Internal Affairs” are
subject flaws without community partnerships and personal integrity. Prenzler writes,
“Unfortunately, internal affairs units on their own were almost always an abject failure — deeply
compromised by internal loyalty and the code of silence and often staffed by officers with
histories of corruption. Their real function was to deflect complainants and hide corruption.”
(Prenzler, 2014) Instead of more disciplinary power for leading bureaucracies in civilian
oversight and policing agencies, reform is achieved by a personal willingness to protect
institutional standards. Further, civilian oversight performs an audit of case files that are
presented from Internal Affairs. Audits provided by civilians are alternative means to resolve
grievances between police and their complainants. Mediation and nonviolent interventions are
valuable cost-effective resources that restore legitimacy and transparency to criminal justice
organizations. Ultimately, civilian oversight is an initiative to restore community relations and
acts an alternative outlet that mediates grievances between police and community members.
Criminal justice agencies are jointly tasked to improve relations and measure success through
“dependent variables” that reduce crime as well as “frivolous complaints.” (De Angelis and
Kupchik 2007) Social justice activists, reformers, and protests from all walks of life should be
seen as allies by police. These community activists emotionally invested in reducing complaints
against institutions and demand for their supporters to take personal responsibility for social
conditions and criminal justice reform. At a local level, police officers individually seek out
personal relationships amongst their community to achieve constructive reform and
dialogue.

Vexatious complaints
The stakes are too high for vexatious complaints to distract criminal justice reform. There
are too many people emotionally invested and others that identified themselves as criminal
justice professionals for reform to go underappreciated. Social justice and nonviolence can be
conflated with active demonstrations against the establishment. However, police incorporate
these themes upon addressing resentments held by marginalized and discriminated people over
inequalities and systemic abuses. Reform is usually conflated with social justice and ignores how
police once pioneered progressive ideas through their professional civil service. Police rectify
past struggles with their noble mission by partnering with civilians to reform criminal justice.
Civilian oversight and community policing initiatives should be joined into a practical solution to
resolve complaints from growing out of hand. Ancient Israel is another time wherein religious
authorities experienced declining approval by the Jewish public due to fears of Roman
militarization occupied their attention. Concerns of Jewish people went unheeded as Jewish
authorities joined with Romans to stamp out criticisms and cover-up inconsistencies. Historical
Jesus scholar, John Dominic Crossan restates distributive and social justice’s effect on reform,
“If they [the Israelite prophets] had been asked whether they considered themselves primarily to
be religious reformers or social reformers, they would probably have protested violently against
the distinction.” (Crossan 2000) Ideally, community policing initiatives effectively distribute
benefits of democratic egalitarianism. Initiatives look for stakeholders to share responsibility
in achieving criminal justice reforms and alleviating overburdened police and citizens of
their unrecognized complaints.
Collaborative agencies
Civil service is an important feature in criminal justice. Criminal justice organizations
consist of civil servants bound to transparently administer justice. Such professionals hold
themselves and citizens equally accountable for their actions under democratic laws. Dynamics
of democratic societies are invariably effect by laws enacted over their citizens. In democracies,
officer-holders have an utmost respect for self-governing citizens and processes because their job
depends on these functions. Police officers are professionally devoted to their daily contacts with
citizens and reinforce societal confidence for citizens’ democratic participation and civil
liberties. (Porter and Prenzler 2012) Collaboration amongst various government agencies is also
contingent upon social perceptions and traditional expectations. (Buren 2007) Adequate
performance of policing roles maintains complex government functions in an interwoven
democratic bureaucracy. Democratic leaders rely on transparency to garner public approval by
providing civilians with access to government work. Oversight agencies must also integrate
marginalized people as participants with unfettered access to review proceedings into police
practices. In San Diego, board members validate their credentials as volunteer civil servants
by conducting sessions open to the public and attending meetings out in town.

Reducing complaints and dissatisfaction
Successful complaint reduction is difficult to measure. The quality of these integrated
efforts is measured along citizens’ complaints about police and expanded to include police’s
responding evaluations. (Prenzler and Lewis 2005, Buren 2007) The perceived acknowledgment
between citizens and police, identifies them as mutual “stakeholders,” with vested community
interests. (Prenzler and Lewis 2005) Police solicit collaboration through partnerships and achieve
crime reduction with community policing initiatives. (Buren 2007) Modern policing emphasizes
improved relations and partnerships because citizens’ perceptions are indirectly effect their
satisfaction with internal investigation in police misconduct. (Prenzler and Lewis 2005) People
want to be acknowledged and dignified and modern interpretations of self-government bound
police to address citizens’ perceptions into policing (De Angelis and Kupchik 2007) Unheard or
disregarded complaints substantiate fears of marginalization and unchecked corruption. Civilian
oversight boards were temporarily introduced throughout the country, however their popularity
finally gained traction in minority communities during the 1970s. (Buren 2007) While civilian
oversight boards were a welcomed innovation for marginalized groups to voice their complaints,
they also overburdened police with impossible responsibilities to implement reform and rectify
social inequalities. A new political reality recently emerged from changing demographics.
Because more women and minorities are actively participating government, police need a more
concise mandate and cohesive exchange with civilian agencies than ever before. Police and
civilians share the burden to resolve increasing amounts of complaints within their
community.
Stakeholders’ participation
It is incumbent upon police to encourage citizen participation for civil service to gauge
their community’s needs. With greater demands for professionalism and integrity, modern police
must restore or build new relationships with communities that were historically disregarded
(Buren 2007). Today, police face contradicting goals in addressing both people’s demands for
strong paramilitary force and complaints indirectly attributed to hostile attitudes and combat
training. In ‘New Colossus,’ Emma Lazarus describes a civic obligation on behalf of teeming
masses seeking justice and equality. Lazarus writes (__):
Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!” cries she
With silent lips. “Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!
Lazarus’ poem shed a light people shrugging off marginalization and political
disenfranchisement to reach for an ideal American community. Hostilities from authoritarian
policing are deeply felt by communities traditionally marginalized throughout history. When

people are discouraged from making complaints, it recalls helplessness and apathy towards
previous peoples escaping oppression in the past. In this 19th century poem, Americans
disavowed themselves from indifference and apathy toward people’s complaints, by
selflessly seeking out marginalized people to help within their communities.
Indifferent attitudes to abuses harm the complaint review process and discourage people
from making themselves accountable for a collaborative partnership. It is important to consider
both civilians and police can be exposed and victimized by institutional abuses. Today, public
apathy may be evident with increasing barriers to communal relationships and less respect for
civil servants’ effectiveness. Theologian John Dominic Crossan writes, “You cannot pro claim
present justice or promise future justice and ignore past injustice. If it is true that justice, that is,
the fair distribution of all the earth for all its people, is not a novelty but a necessity, that
admission changes history—past, present, and future.” (Crossan 2013) Crossan suggests
historical injustice evident in unequal distribution that reinforces people’s continued
marginalization. A disregarded complaint reflects how needs of demonstratively weaker
communities can be inhumanely taken for granted in favor of stronger political groups. Jeremiah
22:3 states “Thus says then Lord: act with justice and righteousness, and deliver from the hand of
the oppressor anyone who has been robbed. And do no wrong or violence to the alien, the
orphan, and the widow, or shed innocent blood in this place” (The Holy Bible) Governments
investigate their vulnerabilities to protect themselves from consequences, and it is the
prerogative for citizens to follow the law. While the law is supreme unless complaints change
them, law enforcement is indelibly human. The law can nevertheless be change but, people will
remain people. Before reform and change, civilian oversight and police need to establish a
personal willingness amongst their members. And ultimately, these members can engage
different people and communities for the sake of partnership building.
Civilian oversight agencies and internal affairs work together to ensure police enforce
laws with respect and equal protection for all people. Unlike a benevolent deity, police are both
unable and unqualified to redistribute wealth and power for the benefits of humankind. But, their
professional integrity makes them invaluable agents for reform. Despite inherent social
inequalities, an adequate police force strives to rectify procedural imbalances within criminal
justice. Some community members are desperate for police reform and should be invited to voice
their concerns with access to open proceedings and transparent investigations. Law enforcement
and other civilian oversight agencies must give people alternative ways to intake their
complaints. Such efforts motivate people to come forward with their complaints. Furthermore,
these efforts allow agencies, accountable to critique and bound to be transparent, to function
properly in assessing their flaws. Researchers posit these developments should be view as a
success for civilian oversight and police reform because of civilians have high expectations for
their complaints to be adjudicated in a timely manner (Prenzler and Lewis 2005). Civilian
oversights boards have a practical need to address “frivolous” complaints because it preserves
their legitimacy in the eyes of police (De Angelis and Kupchik 2007, Prenzler and Lewis 2005).

Yet, review processes are hampered by incompetency when board members become
confused with spurious links into police misconduct.
Police role and competent partnership
Police are present at board meetings for civilian oversight. They provide San Diego’s
board members with a professional assessment of competent police work during board review of
civilians’ complaints about police. This collaborative partnership with civilian oversight board
members prevents unreasonably vexatious complaints from occupying police’s internal
resources. Frivolous complaints intimidate officers from sharing accountability because there is
such an outrageous flow of complaints. Incompetency also deter police from providing board
members with transparent access to their internal affairs’ case files. In San Diego, police
officers’ presence at meetings allows civilians to better comprehend intricacies of police
practices. Most importantly, police ensure board members are barred from interfering with police
internal discipline, potential violations of the Police Bill of Rights (POBR) and other forms of
adversarial retribution against officers. Retributive motivations to misconduct could be self-
defeating to the board’s mission to rectify imbalances and discrimination through dialogue. An
ideal system would rewards people’s willingness to be accountable for community reform and
hold transparent mediation hearings to restore dignity of offended parties. The board’s
collaborative mission activates a platform to realize criminal justice reform in distant
communities and reinforce police’s invaluable role in community-policing.
Civilian oversight relies on fellow stakeholders, such as the police, identifying common
goals for each other’s success. The future of civilian oversight is threatened by police officers
viewing the review process as either illegitimately biased or too incompetent to weed out serious
allegations. Despite mutual interests shared by identifiable stakeholders and participants, there
are competing views being presented to the public. The review of these presentations depends on
how words are structured and semiotics is an essential discipline that evaluate sentence structure
and word placement. When internal affairs present their findings on police misconduct or
activists speak about community discord, civilian board members must be mindful of word
placement to bridge communities together with criminal justice reform. Just as police are driven
to reduce crime in a maligned community from interfering with law and order, civilian oversight
must work to reduce complaints from disorienting their vision for collaboratively effective
policing. (Prenzler and Lewis 2005) Perspectives and committee votes of twenty-three board
members from San Diego’s civilian oversight, provide an insightful qualitative analysis into
complaint review. Acclaimed criminologist, Tim Prenzler, views that analysis of police is
obscured by such a complex work environment (Prenzler and Lewis 2005)
no single measure, or even group of measures, provides an objective demonstration of the
effectiveness of an agency in preventing corruption or effectively adjudicating allegations
of misconduct. Importantly, the more ‘real’ the measure, the less it will count activity and
the more it will demonstrate achievement.

In fact, police and civilian oversight board may find difficulties reducing complaints because
their service has helped citizens, once fearful or disaffected, now feel comfortable shedding light
on their issues with police. (Prenzler and Lewis 2005) Researcher and author, Brenda Buren,
finds “that community policing is in the midst of its third and perhaps final iteration, and will
likely be replaced by another policing paradigm… also found no evidence that broken windows
policing is the best use of law enforcement resources.” (Buren 2007) Future study into effective
policing must address whether quantitative data can contribute to a successful strategy and can
success in police oversight even be quantified. Because success is difficult to measure, there is
premium placed on interpretations of people’s work in crime and complaint. Reviewers of
procedural violations and police misconduct act as researchers carefully navigating through
literature and terms. Sentence structure is an important component to how civilians evaluate
complaint investigations conducted by internal affairs.
Conflict and strain
Hindsight is a rare luxury for police officers constantly reacting to multiple crime scenes.
Just one mistake from either endless calls or fights is enough to end an entire law enforcement
career. Matthew 7:1-3 “Judge not, that you be not judged. 2 For with what judgment you judge,
you will be judged; and with the measure you use, it will be measured back to you.” And popular
slogan for reactionaries back into a corner is to “shoot first, and ask questions later.” Complaints
often emerge from police officers’ reaction to unanticipated circumstances. Non-criminal justice
professionals serving on a civilian oversight board criticize how police should react to other
civilians in circumstances, they would naturally be unfamiliar with. Multiple conflicts arise
amongst divided opinions of how a self-governed society should be policed. Conflict theory is
referred as an explanation for strained relationships amongst various groups and a predictive
indicator for crime used by Marxist criminologists. Marxists perceive that in capitalistic
societies, the law helps wealthy and elite groups dominate poorer majorities. Legal equality and
self-determination, are illusions pieced together to conflate capitalist institutions with democratic
traditions. Marxists imagine the aim of elites’ partnership with law enforcement is to promote
“the appearance of legal equality, the law pacifies the powerless by making them feel good about
the status quo and obscuring the true nature and extent of their oppression.” (Barkan 2014: 183)
However, civilian oversight boards combat Marxist views of systemic oppression by
acknowledging anti-establishment complaints about police. Because most controversies
involving police practices involve people from poorer and marginalized communities it may
confirm Marxist conflict theory. However, demands for police oversight come for across many
social groups and also ensure board members have a highly visible office in their community.
(Prenzler 2014) It stands to reason, board members, like police, would also be critiqued by
other civilians and social perceptions about their adjudication of complaints.
Controversies test partnerships’ ability to gather consensus and tolerable agreements
amongst competing policy views. Civilian oversight agencies and professional investigators at

internal affairs must align their views together when assessing complaints about police officers.
In San Diego, disagreements between civilian and professional review groups result in
complaints being sent to other agencies for further review.” During a public referendum about
civilian oversight into police practice, president of the San Diego Police Officers Association
(POA), Ron Newman, said “History has shown that this topic will be the most hotly debated one
to ever come before the voters and will divide this community.” (Serrano 1988) Newman’s
comment was made in 1988 and for almost thirty years, board members have volunteered to go
over research, training procedures, and finally complaint reports completed by internal affairs. It
only takes an out of place word for civilian board members, pouring over internal affairs’
reports, to either voice their disagreement or sustain original findings. Research into police
satisfaction also provides insight about the processes and effectiveness of civilians involved with
adjudicating complaints from other civilians. Despite overzealous protests and activists yelling
“No justice, no peace,” researchers have concluded there is a perceptible lack of societal demand
for retributive justice against police misconduct. (De Angelis and Kupchik 2007) Instead
researchers found “most complainants' goals are highly congruent with what procedural justice
would predict; complainants and reformers are more interested in having their concerns and
dignity acknowledged through officer apologies and having face-to-face encounters than in
having the officer severely punished.” (De Angelis and Kupchik 2007) There is a greater desire
for peaceful resolutions that improve policing training rather than, reactively punishing
officers for misconduct.
Report language from internal investigations is structured to form agreement with civilian
secondary reviewers. Sentence structure is fundamental to how misconduct is interpreted by
civilians. Whereas community disorder is seen to motivate law enforcement’s crime reducing
and community policing initiatives. According to a 2007 revision from the National Law
Enforcement Policy Center, their “study suggests that some early citizen review boards may have
been inherently biased against law enforcement and thus failed to achieve their goals.” (Building
trust between the police and the citizens they serve an internal affairs promising practices guide
for local law enforcement) Authors in a monthly article titled ‘Broken Windows’ found “disorder
and citizens’ fear of crime plagues communities more than serious crime does. Further, they
argued that it is neighborhood decay that is at the root of disorder and fear of crime.” (Buren
2007) Crime plagues society because of perceptions that crime and complaints are unchecked
and these attitudes are conversely matched by police’s own fear of a unfair and illegitimate
civilian oversight process meant to punish them. (De Angelis and Kupchik 2007) Community
demands for police transparency and accountability stem from negative perceptions about crime,
corruption, and unheard complaints. Disorder is inherently part of a diverse and complex society
and people are unable to align their views with others. Yet, law enforcement relies on
collaborative partnerships to cohesively align civilians with restoring order and dignity for
all community members.

Conflict between policing agencies and civilian oversight is another example of disorder
that plagues communities. All the while, Buren concludes, “community policing has ostensibly
become the panacea for addressing crime and disorder in communities throughout the United
States, there is no broad consensus on how it should be implemented or how successful it has
actually been. (Buren 2007). Because of biases and prejudices civilians may be as unfit to review
police practices and professionally tune out anti-police reactions as a racist is unable to work as a
cop. Civilian oversight is seen by police as an inconvenient aspect of working under community
policing initiatives. “some police professionals in Seattle thought that the full implementation of
community policing would actually negate the need for citizen oversight rather than making it a
component of a larger community policing strategy.” (Serrano, 1988) Conversely a future San
Diego civilian oversight board member, Eileen Luna said in 1988, as member of the Berkeley
Police Review Commission, “end up agreeing in 80% to 90% of the cases, with both groups
sustaining about 30% of all complaints.” (Serrano, 1988) Civilian reviewers and professional
police investigators usually agree with each other’s assessment even when police are accused of
misconduct. Because of their collaborative work, researchers must study how these actors
perceive each other.
Social perceptions
Police are budgeted with more militarization than ever before. Conversely, police are
bound to observe social customs and cultural sensitivities. The multiple and contradictory roles
can overwhelm police officers. Civilian oversight should alleviate burdens to develop
community relations with people historically marginalized by all of society. But, civilian
oversight becomes an obstacle to community policing if board members harbor anti-policing
biases that affect their review of complaints. In San Diego, board members begin working with
city executives as prospective applicants and their impartiality can be professionally assessed
before they begin reviewing complaint report. Reviewers’ impressions of their work reducing
complaints and cooperating with police can be codified into qualitative data for future research.
Thereby, such research can translate response data into thoughtful publicization that targets and
encourages marginalized communities to participate in criminal justice reform. People, from
marginalized communities, willing to voice their complaints and have confidence in adjudication
benefit law enforcement’s community policing effort. Buren refers “that citizen participation in
policing is desirable because it augments organizational legitimacy and provides for better
informed communities, but that taken too far has the potential to threaten the civil liberties of
citizens.” (Buren 2007) The perceptions of twenty-three board members from the Community
Review Board on Police Practices are an opportunity to gauge informed civilians about their
participation in San Diego’s review processes. Police officers must be mindful of potential civil
liberties violations because of their community policing involvement. Police can employ
civilian oversight agencies to gather public opinions about their investigative behaviors and
mitigate abuses.

Civilians are usually inconvenienced when urged to participate in criminal justice reform.
These people hope encounters with police go smoothly while simultaneously avoid being
victimized by criminal deviants. There is an essential trust that calls of injustice will be heard
and communities have resources to protect their loved ones and other members. When civilians
that witness injustice against others should proactively ensure their overall community avoids
being taken for granted. Such proactive participation signals police to reform their training and
preempt systemic abuses from conflicting with community-oriented policing. Crossan finds
“participation is not just a matter of emotional feeling as distinct from rational commitment. It
attracts and it involves the whole person at a level far more profound than any such feeble
distinctions, and if it strikes at any one ‘place’ it is in imagination that its drive tends to
concentrate.” (Crossan 2013) Crossan describes distributive justice by alluding to the biblical
story of Queen Jezebel’s call for the execution of Naboth, a property owner refusing to sell his
property. Naboth was community member that challenged authoritarian practices and
emphasized his stakeholder interest in fairness and distributive law enforcement. Crossan writes,
“What clashes here is not an all-good Naboth and an all-bad Jezebel but two radically opposed
visions of distributive justice.” (Crossan 2000) History argues against retributive penalties and
procedural executions, in favor of reviewing how justice issues are mediated and reforms
distributed. Qualities in justice and law enforcement are refined by efforts to realize a fairer
and more equitable criminal justice system.
Complaints are a lawful vehicle for people to challenge their democratic institutions on
the road to justice. Criminal justice and law enforcement professionals may be endowed with
governing powers to hold civilians accountable but, they hold office in a democracy with the
consent of their citizens. Democratic institutions maintain their legitimacy by enforcing laws to
provide all citizens with equal protection and ways to participate in self-government. Injustice
interferes with citizens’ participation in government and creates marginalization. Marginalized
communities are vulnerable to injustice and poverty without concerted efforts by law
enforcement to build relationships and diffuse tensions. The Bible reiterates in Psalm 82:3, “Give
justice to the weak and the orphan; maintain the right of the lowly and the destitute.” Buren
presents (Buren 2007):
A formidable challenge to the core assumption presented in Wilson and Kelling’s Broken
Windows theory. The authors (Sampson and Raudenbush (1999)) argue that it is poverty
that is the dominant factor in determining the level of community disorder, and that
developing trust among neighbors in urban communities plays a more significant role in
crime control than do attempts by the police to address external signs of neighborhood
decay.
Psalms 82:3 may suggest poor people are responsible for maligning communities. But, the Bible
verse is truly meant to admonish an already divided community for failing to provide equality
and justice to specifically marginalized people. A justice system should proactively incorporate
isolated communities. And failure to address economic and sociological needs of poorer
communities is socially unjust and systemically abusive. Jeremiah 9:24 states, “I am the Lord; I

act with steadfast love, justice, and righteousness in the earth, for in these things I delight, says
the Lord.” Harvard professor and noted activist, Cornel West says, “justice is what love looks
like in public.” (West 2011) Criminality is inexcusable and police are embedded with elite
military tools to combat violence. Yet justice extends beyond retribution and should inspire
communities with love and righteousness. Justice should be measured by what love, compassion,
and social welfare look like in a community rather than, conviction rates and sustained
complaints. Poverty had maligned and disordered society because resources are being
inadequately distributed. This leaves with little help and cooperation for law enforcement
reactively treating the ills of criminality that plague all of us. Community policing fairly
distributes police officers to build partnerships and holistically prevent criminality.
Participatory efforts by civilians and law enforcement to improve social resources can
relieve poorer communities of social marginalization.
Demand for mediation and need for alternatives
Law enforcement agencies have been maligned for lacking alternative ways where people
can lodge a complaint. The civilian oversight board into police practice is considered a
convenient alternative to more substantive efforts of mediation between complainants and police
officers. And public oversight has been incorporated into a larger community policing initiative
by San Diego city officials. In San Diego, the Internal Affairs Bureau (IAB) are a professional
law enforcement investigation team and conducts investigation into police misconduct and other
complaints. However, research shows “internal affairs units on their own were almost always an
abject failure — deeply compromised by internal loyalty and the code of silence and often
staffed by officers with histories of corruption. Their real function was to deflect complainants
and hide corruption.” (Prenzler 2014) There are other concerns a civilian oversight board must
address with their collaborative partnership with police. In a 2015 NPR Broadcast, Jim Pasco,
national executive director of the Fraternal Order of Police, disparagingly opines “civilians are
too prone to play Monday morning quarterback.” (Kaste 2015) Pasco says “civilian review
boards tend to be, by definition, made up of civilians who have no particular experience or
insight into what went through that officer's mind…. You need to have an appropriate mindset
towards policing.” (Kaste 2015). Diverse interests of expanding communities should join
traditional policing and alternative reforms together rather than push them apart.
At the expense of criminal justice reform, mediation practices have been underdeveloped.
Mediation requires a political will to improve institutional practices and cooperative instincts that
pull people away from the margins. In areas where relations between civilians and law
enforcement are fractured, mediation practices could potentially be implemented to resolve
complaints. There is considerable research in favor of efforts that further complaint review and
community-oriented policing. However, police are reluctant to enter mediation over complaints
about them because simply “meeting with the complainant would be interpreted as accepting
fault.” (Porter and Prenzler 2012) Yet according to Prenzler, “surveys also show that

complainants prefer mediation, and that subject officers are willing to participate, but very few
integrity systems offer proper mediation services and prefer the cheaper options of informal
resolution and managerial resolution.” (Prenzler 2014) Maria Volpe writes (Volpe 2013):
The incongruity between police work and general mediation practices is evident.... For
police, it is common for interventions to be undertaken in public areas where there is
virtually no opportunity for them to manage the physical layout of the surroundings or
who else might be present. Moreover, since the number and gravity of the calls for police
services are unpredictable, police are unable to plan how much time they can when
responding to any matter.
It is plainly evident, an external review composed of civilians could make mediation more
convenient and greatly alleviate overburdened police. Nevertheless, both complaints and
criminal justice professionals alike may find mediation to be distasteful. Research determines
whether mediation practices effectively improve the timeliness and outcome satisfactions
from oversight agencies’ complaint review.
Transparency and accountability
There are competing schools of thought for reforming police misconduct. Police’s
command staff are often maligned for their officers’ treatment of minorities. Police misconduct
is a highly contentious subject amongst social activists. Leaders are criticized for institutional
behaviors that failed to prevent abusive police harms against marginalized communities.
Command staff face external criticisms by sensationalized media reports and internal resentment
from their subordinates because junior officers’ fear they may be scapegoated for punishment by
an external review board. Prenzler revealed a popular misconception wherein people “think of
traditional policing as highly authoritarian and militaristic, in fact middle and upper middle
managers frequently fail to closely monitor the behavior of police on the job and set clear
standards, including in their own behavior.” (Prenzler 2014) Increasing levels of cynicism and
discouragement plague both civilian and police communities. According to research, “there are
reasons to be pessimistic that this is pivotal moment in policing. First, it is not known how many
police chiefs are… reviewing their own practices and considering new measures to curb
misconduct and enhance accountability among their officers?” (Weitzer 2015) A qualitative
study into the effectiveness of civilian oversight and external review of policing in San Diego
must analyze perspectives from local police officers about internal accountability. In other
studies, police officers across the country have reasoned their (De Angelis and Kupchik 2007):
City and department administration are uninterested in fair discipline and base decisions
on politics. People in the 'in-crowd' with administration are above discipline while line
officers suffer excessive discipline. Discipline decisions are not based on if the officer did
anything wrong but rather on what will look good in the news.

There are competing interests at stake to realize criminal justice reform. Political dynamics
determine language is used to describe police misconduct and greatly influence civilian
oversight and community-policing partnerships.
Civil liberties violations and burden for community policing
Marxist conflict theory argues integrity from civil service is an unreasonable expectation
because members are biased to favor their group’s prerogative over a community initiative.
However, conflict theory is too simplistic because groups can be internally fractured due their
own complex differences. W.H Auden wrote, “All crimes, of course, are offenses against
oneself,” and complaints refer to personal grievances and isolation from the external group. (__)
Thus, it is narrow-minded to simply classify crime as a struggle between competing groups.
Junior police officers themselves are subject to marginalization by richer and more powerful
members within their own leadership and command staff. While other citizens, particularly black
youths resent police leadership, and have described there is“no point in [making complaints]
because we can’t get justice for real.... so there is really no point in prosecuting them unless you
are rich and can afford a lawyer…. And everybody know the law is to protect the rich.” (Brunson
and Weitzer 2012) Like an embattled police command staff trying to hold together their
community of laws, civilian oversight mediate governing conflicts to maintain collaborative
partnerships with other city agencies. Civilian oversight boards have traditionally varied from
having minimal review as “external agencies are usually restricted to auditing police internal
investigations and recommending modifications” to greater control of “compulsory hearings”
and “covert operations” into policing. (Porter and Prenzler 2012) French philosopher,
Montesquieu remarked, “There is no greater tyranny than that which is perpetrated under the
shield of the law and in the name of justice.” (Montesquieu 1980) The functioning capabilities of
law enforcement and other executive agencies are dependent upon perceptions, opinions, and
traditions from their communities. As a democratic-republic, governments are highly
invested in practices that respect civil liberties and convey legitimacy to the public.
METHODOLOGY
In San Diego, board members review a complaint after Internal Affairs concludes their
case file investigation. A complainant must file an official complaint about their specific
encounter with a police officer for Internal Affairs and civilian oversight agencies to get
involved. At closed sessions, where members deliberate their review opinions amongst each
other, police command staff members are in attendance to referee potential misunderstandings of
police practices amongst the civilian board. The Community Review Board on Police Practices
restore community relationships by identifying key stakeholders within the police leadership and
appointed community members. The police command staff advocates for junior officers’ swift
exoneration in the face of vexatious complaints. A complaint that takes too long for board

members to review and adjudicate adds significant stress to junior officers and prevents
command staff from issuing internal discipline on their subordinate officers. Community
policing initiatives incorporate distributive and restorative justice through fairness principles and
holistic relationships. Conversely, the sociology of procedural and retributive justice is a
prominent research tool into the isolated communities and adversarial relationships that inhibit
community policing. (De Angelis and Kupchik 2007) Board members’ attitudes towards their
case reviews into misconduct reflect competing interests between institutional and adversarial
traditions versus innovative analyses into community policing.
Phrases and sentence structure within Internal Affairs’ cases are an additional challenge
for board members to appreciate semiotics differences. The board is one of several task forces
created to enhance police-community relations and ultimately provide more qualitative analyses
of areas for improvement. Board members can be overwhelmed by nuanced tactics and roles
police apply. And then board members strive to achieve mutual understandings with police
command staff that effectively translate into reducing complaints amongst their communities.
English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes believed that “the source of every crime, is some defect of
the understanding; or some error in reasoning; or some sudden force of the passions. Defect in
the understanding is ignorance; in reasoning, erroneous opinion.” (Hobbes 2008) My research
methodology focused on the inner workings of civilian oversight agency to examine complaints
about police. I informed city executives, managing volunteer reviewers on the board, about
my intent to study their work environment and terms used during complaint review.
The board is highly visible and subject to media criticism and demands for transparency.
Impartiality and continued growth are vital to the board’s interests as prominent agency leading
criminal justice reform and community policing initiatives. The board’s partnerships amongst
police and community members can be undermine if they painted in an unfavorable light by a
publication. It takes one out of place word in a case file presentation about an investigated
complaint for board members to voice their disagreement with police practices. Playwright
Henry Miller said “The study of crime begins with the knowledge of oneself. All that you
despise, all that you loathe, all that you reject, all that you condemn and seek to convert by
punishment springs from you.” (Miller 1970) The board’s inner workings must be examined to
better understand how they will review investigative report into police practices gather by
Internal Affairs. In previous administrations, board members had to be screened for anti-policing
biases for the San Diego Police Chief to permit their access to internal police files. Prior to a
1988 referendum that created Proposition G and shaped civilian oversight in San Diego,
community members opined then Police Chief, Bill Kolender, role in board member selection
threatened their independent review. The aim of my research project is to evaluate how data and
opinions collected from civilian oversight review enhance community policing relations.
Independent investigations against police to attack misconduct, reinforce adversarial themes
prevalent in criminal justice proceedings. While, systems that urge information exchange with

police support collaborative partnerships. Executives from other cities provide response data
for a comparative study between independent retribution and collaborative restoration.
Timeliness is another measurement used to form an impression of the board’s review
process. Complainants and police officers both have a vested interest in timely adjudication of an
Internal Affairs investigation. Civilians can present their audits of investigation reports that
encourages collaboration between complainants and police to resolve their issues. Investigators
are burdened to thoroughly collect competing versions of an incident between complainants and
police officers. Audits are a form of independent review by civilian oversight boards but,
evidence is limited to report language by Internal Affairs. Thus, board members undergo training
to learn about terminology and police practices used in reports. However, civilians’ reasonable
lack of competency is concerning to police officers’ desire for fair and unbiased adjudication.
Most civilian oversight boards are denied from issuing disciplinary recommendations against
police officers because they are either incompetent of police practices or work outside of police
management as non-professionals. Audits reflected civilian oversight’s limited understanding
and reliance on police cooperation to access Internal Affairs report data and evidence. Civilians
audit complaint investigations to assess potential areas for greater transparency. Ultimately,
investigators’ caseloads can be relieved by complainants and police officers working together to
mediate their differences. In San Diego, communities avoid mediations and even minor
complainant issues take considerable amount of time to resolve. Civilian reviews are ideally
positioned to dispel spurious anti-policing myths and prevent biases from distracting mediation
efforts that restore community relations with police. My research examines areas where
complaints can be resolved in timely manner.
Many board members have a background in law and social advocacy prior to
volunteering their services on the board. However, they are either unfamiliar with community
issues or police practices. In some cases, board members may be unfamiliar in both areas.
Ideally, the sample population of interviewees will consist of twenty-three board members. But,
members the Community Review Board on San Diego may feel apprehensive to provide their
views for a research project they are unfamiliar with. Even after a rigorous screening process by
city executives, board members need continuous training on community issues and police
practices to stay update to complainants’ grievances about police. City executives work outside
of the police department but, both agencies ultimately collaborate to realize objectives for the
City of San Diego’s community policing initiatives. Areas wherein board members are
unavailable or provide insufficient details for my interview questions, I can refer to the National
Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (NACOLE). Names and contact
information for comparable civilian oversight boards are available at the NACOLE database.
There is a vast amount of civilian oversight agencies that post their review process and degree of
police presence during deliberations. While organization names and mission statements vary in
terms of their independence, there is a national dialogue about accountability and transparency
for law enforcement professionals. With help of San Diego city executives and their office, I can

contact other cities’ executives that more than willing to discuss social developments that
underlie needs for civilian oversight. Researchers Prenzler and Porter explain (Prenzler and
Porter, 2012):
Historically, internal investigators have been criticized for a real or perceived lack of
independence. Indeed, it is these criticisms that have led to systems of independent
oversight. However, it is often argued that not allowing police to handle conduct matters
themselves removes internal responsibility for the professional standards of the
organization and encroaches on the job of police, as employers, to manage their staff.
Most civilian agencies are barred from interfering with internal discipline and they are
intentionally deprived of resources to launch independent investigations without police
assistance into complaints. However, the Community Review board retains powers to seek
independent legal counsel outside of the City of San Diego’s City Attorney office. Nevertheless,
board members are locked into building partnerships with San Diego police to maintain
their access to complaint data.
Materials and Procedures
My internship at the Community Review Board on Police Practices provide access to
case files and data gathers by Internal Affairs investigations. First, I public forum meetings to
gather perspectives from speakers about their community concerns and thoughts on sharing
accountability for outcomes. While closed sessions contain confidential information I am unable
to use, it is worthwhile to learn what board members look for during their review assessments.
One of my duties as an intern is to transcribe exchange during meetings and I will enlist the
service of “Dedoose” a digital transcription application to aid my efforts. Then, I will look for
phrases that emphasized reforming police practices and enhancing community relationship.
Upon identifying these phrases, I will examine how sentence structure is reveal patterns and
assess board members’ competency of police practices by their ability to dispel spurious links
about systemic police abuse. Many community members that speak at board meetings have
endured personal hardships in their dealings with police but, others deliver their own opinions
about systemic harms with police. However, false these opinions may be, they still reflect a
lingering sense of community dissatisfaction with police and challenge the board to restore
relations between police and dissatisfied community members. Board members must avoid anti-
police arguments from distracting their focus on social justice reform and demands for
nonviolent police tactics. I would use on my questions to reflect board members’ expectations
for accountability in others and organizational transparency. I would criticize how either board
members in San Diego or executives in other cities’ oversight agencies hold themselves
accountable for fractured community policing efforts. J.D Crossan asks (Crossan 2011):
Is there a fair distribution of goods and resources, of duties and obligations? But what if
some of the children were starving and others were over-fed? What if some received food
while others did not? What would you think of that householder — then or now? That is

the mega-model or mega-metaphor underneath the biblical tradition’s understanding of
its God.
The theme of my questions will center on the implementation of fairness and distributive justice
through accountability. Should an entire community decide to share accountability for failed
reforms and poor dialogue, then researchers can determine if complaints are essential to
distributing adequate justice across a community.
An unobtrusive research method allows me to witness board members and city
executives’ relationship with police. At board meetings, police are present to answer questions
but, barred from speaking about complaints to the board. In good faith, board members make
their work transparent to police officers and devote time for training on police practices. The
board is a unique position to identify distributive justice needs in both marginalized communities
and law enforcement agencies. Members can evaluate fairness and distributive justice because
they rely on command staff conditionally agreeing to share information and holding their own
junior officers accountable. Essentially, self-criticism allow members to correct inconsistencies
that offend either complainants or police officers by having a dialogue about shared
accountability. The board willingness to acknowledge their flaws evidenced by increases in the
numbers of complaints sets a positive example for other community stakeholders to follow suit.
The board’s primary reviews Officer Involved Shootings (OIS) and in-custody deaths regardless
if a complaint was filed by the deceased’s representative. But board members should prioritize
secondary complaints where living parties can have a dialogue about ways to avoid further
disputes with law enforcement and eventual killings. Transparency legitimizes police practices
and enables greater understanding. A transparent presentation of a nonviolent process that
facilitates mediation can strengthen relationships in communities. And ultimately, orients
communities towards increasing their competency of police work and away from pursuing
adversarial retribution against police misconduct.
Interview questions provide a context for interviewees’ opinion of an ideal complaint
system. Time in which members devote for collaborative with police will also be measured.
Board members’ work should focus on translating their increased understanding of police
practice into an efficient processing of complaints. Yet, board members vie for votes to advance
an ideological agenda instead of collaborating with police to either address potential
misunderstandings or incompetence. An overflow complaints in need of review negatively
reflects a common dissatisfaction amongst complainants and police officers. Mediation is a
restorative justice tool wherein board members facilitate resolutions between police officers and
their complainants. Board members demonstrate their willingness to hold themselves
accountable by introducing benchmarks for their performance. Such willingness goes a long way
to earn legitimacy in the eyes of police officers and rally support amongst community members.
Successful reduction of complaints can determine the board’s ability to distinguish social issues
from vexatious complaints. A collaborative partnership must have identifiable stakeholders to

achieve criminal justice reform. In a 2007 national publication, the Department of Justice
authored a study about community oriented policing services and found:
Citizen involvement may not be feasible, warranted, or necessary in all communities. It is
important for a chief of police, in collaboration with government and community
representatives, to take a position on citizen review after careful and detailed analysis of
existing problems, costs, and political consequences and weigh alternative methods of
reviewing internal matters in a way the fosters community trust.
While it is ideal to achieve criminal justice reform throughout the country, practical reforms can
only be implemented with a nuanced understanding of local communities. Retributive
punishment defines many aspects of criminal justice, but collaborative relationships develop
restorative justice principles. These principles use mediation as a pretext for eliminating
adversarial retribution that harm community policing initiatives. Organizational relationships
ensure board members and police can apply understanding in an appropriate context.
RESULTS
The Community Review Board on Police Practices publishes quarterly and yearly reports
of their members’ attendance and hours spent reviewing complaints. These results demonstrate
the number of complaints is unrelated to the seriousness of alleged offenses. In fiscal years,
wherein there were more OIS incidents and in-custody deaths, the number of complaints
remained consistent. Trust in internal affairs and civilian administrators are predictors for
satisfaction with review process. Review agencies can only exist and succeed because of
community members’ participation and trust in filing a complaint. Leading up to a 1988
referendum, future San Diego civilian oversight executive, Eileen Luna said, “Our success
depends on what kind of faith the public has in the process, if the public believes the police are
being held accountable by this process, then I think it can go a long way to make people feel the
police are being acceptable and the situation is under control.” (Serrano 1988) Yet, according to
research, favorable outcomes from a complaint are unrelated to satisfaction with the overall
process. Results from Joseph DeAngelis and Aaron Kupchik’s 2007 study was surprised to find:
Contrary to what we predicted, we find that having one's complaint sustained (being
found guilty) has no direct effect on overall satisfaction. This is not to say, however, that
case outcome (distributive justice) is irrelevant. Rather, case outcome operates on overall
satisfaction indirectly by influencing trust in authority (i.e. trust in administration) and by
affecting perceptions of procedural justice (i.e. procedural fairness and quality of
treatment).
It is difficult to enlist board members as participating interview subjects. Other cities’ executives
were more willing to answer my questions. The most intriguing participants during my study
were community members seeking to engage in dialogue with board members at the outset of
meetings. It is important to preface these participants were motivated to file complaints because
of their dissatisfaction with police. Thus, respondents experienced in review work were most

likely to be satisfied with resolutions that encouraged accountability. Other respondents are
satisfied when outcomes validate their agenda and align themselves to deflect criticism and
accountability from their respective group. City executives conceptualize accountability as a
goal opposed to adjudication outcomes that either adversely affect one group or reward
another.
Civilian participation in criminal justice proceedings are often structured for parties
competing towards an outcome. Responsibilities of criminal justice professionals have grown
beyond retributive enforcement of law and order and, now incorporate demands for collaboration
with participating civilians that volunteer themselves to be reviewers. Eran Vigoda’s results from
“Administrative Agents of Democracy?” were cited in Naval Postgraduate research project on
citizen participation, “However, the results were paradoxical, according to Vigoda. Public sector
performance was negatively related to citizen involvement. As citizens became more satisfied
with performance, they were less inclined to actively participate in political and community
affairs.” (Roberts 2004Civilians negatively associate participation with dissatisfaction. Thus,
civilians’ willingness to account for a lack of positive reforms varies according to their proactive
participation. Police misconduct may urge a reactive participation from civilians but, reactive
reforms fail to achieve holistic changes without civilians accounting for vexatious complaints. At
public meetings, civilians voice their complaints and expect other civilians to issue discipline
against police officers. In the past three months, civilian attendees describe to the board incidents
of police misconduct and unprofessionalism at meetings. The board sets aside an opportunity for
people criticism others but, fails to encourage people to criticize themselves. When civilians rely
on others’ performance for their satisfaction and civilians’ participation decreases along with
self-criticism. Civilians, willing to be accountable for their role in reducing vexatious
complaints, must critique their own communities just as thoroughly as law enforcement.
Complaint review is an opportunity to fairly redistribute justice reform amongst civilians
and law enforcement officers.
I conducted interviews with twenty-five city executives across the country about civilian
oversight of law enforcement in their community. I garnered insightful results from interviews
with three city executives. The cities of Seattle and Spokane, WA, and Los Angeles, CA devote a
sizeable amount of resources to civilian oversight. And executives from these cities provided
their professional evaluation of the role of civilian oversight in a community oriented policing
initiative. During these interviews, community policing was considered as a preventative step
and holistic solution to both police misconduct and unfair community resentment towards police.
As employees of city government, civilian oversight executives that manage volunteer and
professional reviewers of police identify themselves as non-police. They are professionals with
an employed role for criminal justice reform but, work to engage civilians with police. Kevin
Rogan, Assistant Director from Los Angeles’ Inspector General Officer, began his career as a
police officer and emphasize the changes in policing from the early 1990s that were the result of
a difficult period in his city’s community policing initiative. Eventually, Rogan earned a law

degree and left police work. Rogan’s background is featured in his primary role to provide a
degree of competency and legitimacy as civilian volunteer themselves to review police work.
Los Angeles has multiple agencies with professionals investigating police misconduct.
In San Diego, civilian oversight is officially managed by an executive director. The
executive directs brings partnering experience with a previous police department in Albany, NY
to San Diego. Nevertheless, the executive director of CRB is employed by the city rather than
directly working under police department and serves as an example for collaboration rather than
subordination to the police command staff. The executive director’s civilian oversight office is
enabled to work alongside San Diego police in a collaborative partnership. While some have
misgivings about civilian oversight independence from police, responses from other city
executives find such attitudes to be destructively incoherent for partnership with police. In San
Diego, the board relies on police to make themselves accountable and present Internal Affairs
cases about complaints, with the condition board members are unable to recommend disciplinary
action against their officers. According to a deputy City Attorney, the board achieves their
collaborative mission as an “agency created by the city’s charter” by respecting the Police Bill of
Rights (POBR) that bars members from disclosing potentially harmful information about
officers. San Diego’s newly elected City Attorney also works closely with the executive
director to provide legal counsel to board members about their resolutions and community
policing initiatives.
At a civilian oversight meeting in February 2017, San Diego’s City Attorney introduced
her entire staff of criminal justice professionals to a public audience. I transcribed the rest of her
speech per my duties as an intern with the Community Review Board on Police Practices. The
City Attorney stresses collaborative work between police command and civilians to reform
police training. The City Attorney’s office deploys deputies to proactively participate in
community oriented policing. My interview with Fe’ Lopez of the Seattle Police Commission
reinforce the City Attorney’s collaborative policies, because she has found civilians are best
suited to simply review misconduct rather than launch independent investigations and issue
disciplinary recommendations. Civilians can lose sight of their obligation to enhance community
relations and reduce complaints through participatory reform in favor of disciplinary
recommendations to address increasing numbers of complaints. Increases have created an
overflow of complaints, wherein board members are too overwhelmed by Category I complaints
reactively launched by (Officer-involved shootings, in-custody deaths) that there is insufficient
time to address lesser Category II complaints. Thereby, such an overflow of unresolved
complaints creates dissatisfaction amongst complainants and police officers. Lopez’s experience
has shown civilian reviewers need a concise mission to address complaints in a timely manner.
Ultimately, civilian oversight depends on police providing their reviewers with enough
competency to perform their mission and legitimacy as a criminal justice reform agency. Without
partnership, solely independent agencies lack access to complaint case files and are often
professionally incompetent to assess police practices without direct training from police
command staff. Luvimae Omana from the Spokane Police Commission also concurs and her

office appoints civilians to foster better relations with police. Omana’s work provides police with
civilians’ opinions and perspectives to preemptively implement appropriate reforms while it is at
their discretion. Other cities such as San Jose, CA and Rochester, NY only have civilians audit
Internal Affairs case files for sentence structure, errors, and thereby ensure police follow up with
complaints. But these police departments and Internal Affairs teams are unrequired to
neither inform a select group of civilians about systemic police practices nor listen to these
groups’ opinions about complaint investigations.
The board routinely sponsors students’ internships and stresses transparency and
accountability. The City of San Diego wants to hear whether civilians can agree with Internal
Affairs investigations and thereby reduce vexatious complaints from gaining traction as indicator
of police misconduct. The City’s civilian oversight agency also invites civilian reviewers to
receive superficial training about police work and eventually mediate misunderstandings from
becoming adversarial lawsuits. Civilian oversight in San Diego carries a sense of intimacy
amongst people working in agencies, reviewers and professionals choose their words carefully
but, trust their best intentions will be included in holistic reforms. Today, the Department of
Justice’s interests have markedly changed with former Senator Jeff Sessions succeeding
Attorney Loretta Lynch and her penchant for launch civil rights investigations into local police
departments. The organizational intentions of criminal justice agencies are both a national and
local debate about law enforcement’s future. Yale historian, Timothy Snyder commented on Real
Time With Bill Maher that now more than ever, “We have to save the institutions. They don’t do
it on their own. This is the moment of ‘ask not what the institutions can do for you. Ask what
you can do for the institutions” (Burris, 2017) Organizational success hinges upon a personal
initiative and willingness for all participants to protect their institutions and invite dialogue.
Winston Churchill famously coined the phrase “History is written by the victors.” Oftentimes,
people endorse narratives and investigations that reinforce their dominance. But, transparency is
meant to reveal vulnerabilities, afford access to marginalized people, and facilitate mediation.
The value of history to a community depends on people’s recall of past lessons used to overcome
their vulnerabilities. Transparency maintains history’s value beyond superficial victory.
Historical traditions can preserve open processes and civil service emboldens people’s
participation in community initiatives. Through openness, people mediate their differences to
restore defeated communities and justify improving community cohesion.
Criticism is essential to healthy dialogue in a community. The board invites board
members to criticize police practices, civilian visitors attend meetings to criticize board
members’ mission in their communities, and police can justify their critical role and practices to
all civilians in attendance. The board is enabled to seek independent legal counsel away from the
City Attorney’s office. Thereby, new counsel develops a legal interpretation of charter policy
that grants members with disciplinary powers over police officers. Although, the City intended
for their original 1988 charter to partner police with civilian oversight, newer amendments and
modern interpretations are based upon word sequence. Semiotics demonstrate drastic shifts from

interpretative collaboration to issuing disciplinary recommendations. Despite recommendations
into internal disciplinary remaining violations of POBR, civilian board members can still use
their highly visible platform to demand for procedural punishments against officers. Without
collaborative agreements that protect officers’ identity from the public and prosecution, civilian
oversight can devolve into a highly contentious struggle with police command. Collaboration
allows for constructive criticism to be implemented. While, prosecutorial attitudes exacerbate
division with people either silencing critics or resentfully mocking the established system
through vexatious complaints.
The City of San Diego can be negatively exposed by their own civilian oversight agency.
The Community Review Board on Police Practice was created to decrease problems and bring
communities together but, damaging revelations of institutional flaws may increase
administrative problems in the short-term. It is difficult for city officials and other law
enforcement agents to tackle social justice issues previous administrations denied exist and
escaped from sharing accountability. A successful civilian oversight agency must encourage
accountability without fear of discipline by partnering together with police to reduce complaints.
Complaint reduction is an overall goal that sustains civilian oversight and keep everyone
accountable as opposed to focusing efforts on either a few bad apples or couple of frivolous
complaints. Personal accountability spurs everyone to participate and holistically negates
malicious effects of few corrupt police and false complaints because so many people are now
positively engaged in their community’s justice programs. Board members should set aside
meetings for community members to exchange their ideas and concerns and encourage attendees
to ask themselves- what they can do better for their community. Theme of civilian oversight’s
mission should move from holding one group accountable to keeping everyone accountable for
marginalized people’s well-being in the justice system. Vexatious and frivolous complaints are
specifically launched by people seeking to deflect behavioral criticisms by blaming another
group for their behavior. It is difficult to address police misconduct and excessive force when
officers view any criticism as a threat to their authority. These officers inflict harsh punishments
upon people to hold their specific groups accountable for community disorder and thereby, avoid
confronting how they can do a better job to address needs of marginalized communities.
Performance benchmarks can incentivize a reduction of complaints through consistent
participation and collaborative dialogue rather than silencing complainants and further
militarizing police practices. The future of civilian oversight depends upon holistic solutions
such as conditional immunity from prosecution, protected speech, and dialogue about
fairly distributing justice for everyone.
CONCLUSION
People are empowered to voice their complaints more than ever before. Companies hand
surveys out for their employees, schools ask for student evaluations, and community members
fill out complaints. However, these complaints are analogous to police officers’ power to use

deadly force. Like a police officer’s lawful shooting. an appropriate complaint can only be
necessitated by legitimate circumstances. Otherwise, it is a vexatious complaint, effectively acts
as an abuse of power. The intake and sentence structure of a complaint report is just as important
as the complaint itself to the review process. Abusive and excessive complaints can be likened to
the shamelessly destructive boy that cried wolf. The intake of false accusations is just as ruinous
to civilian participation as excessive force is to community policing initiatives. People’s
numbness to constant accusations, mask criminal exploitation of privileges. In a 1992 film,
Schindler’s List, the villainous Nazi Commandant Amon Goeth vainly describes his power over
marginalized Jews dreading execution, “We have the f***ing power to kill, that is why they fear
us.” (Zaillian 1992) In another scene, the film’s protagonist, Oskar Schindler is searching for his
business partner and friend, Itzhak Stern, before he is forced onto a train and sent away to die
along with thousands of Jews onboard. Initially, the Nazis refuse to help Schindler find his
partner after they verify Stern is indeed on board but, lost amongst thousands of people huddled
into train cars.
Schindler is tickled, name drops a few of his powerful associations to the two Nazis,
before demanding for their names. Schindler boasts if Stern leaves the station, they will be sent
to fight amongst their Nazis comrades on the bleak Russian front, “by the end of the month.”
(Zaillian 1992) The two Nazis frantically hold up the entire train and run along with Schindler
shouting for Stern until he is found and summarily released from his cramped railway car. The
Nazis deflect blame from their disrespect towards Schindler because of a clerical error that
almost sent Stern to his death amongst thousands of other Jews. They apologize on behalf of
their institution’s flaws, and simply say “It makes no difference to us, you understand -- this one,
that one. It's the inconvenience to the list. It's the paperwork.” (Zaillian 1992) These Nazis’
indifferent attitudes allow them to follow their Nazi institution without question and furthermore,
many Nazis in the film lack the critical thinking skills to question both Goeth’s genocidal rages
and a murderous blunder in Stern’s case. In the film, only a handful of Nazis are depicted
savagely indulging in the murder of defenseless Jews but, numerous scenes capture a
pervasive indifference that bloodies everyone’s hands in a black and white contrast.
Public indifference, towards names on a list, eventually subjects real people, with their
own names, to dehumanization and murder. Without lawful advocates like the heroic Schindler,
examples of social justice and human rights would be missing from our collective memory. In
San Diego, people expect power to equally distribute protections in accordance to preserving
people’s humanity. Freedoms to criticize San Diego’s criminal justice professionals assure
people stay involved in a community because they trust someone in power is willing to hear
them. Professionals should be rewarded for their willingness to personally account for systemic
inequalities just as they are reviled for looking for an excuse to send critics of their institutions
away on trains or silently murder them altogether. Independent legal counsel is a safeguard,
wherein board members can get a legal opinion about recourse from potential violations of their
foundational agreements with police. City Attorney serves at the board’s convenience to warn

members from misinterpreting charter provisions and potentially infringing on POBR. Some
board members consider the City Attorney’s office as being conflicted between serving in the
board’s interests and advising police officers of their rights and protections from an external
disciplinary board. Board members seemingly expect the city attorneys to behave with an
indifference towards their proposals and concede to an anti-police agenda. They expect either for
the police to be rendered defenseless from their proposed disciplinary recommendations or the
City Attorney should be stripped of their role to provide legal counsel in favor of hiring an
independent law firm. Board members must view the City Attorney’s office as an invested
advisor for both police officers and civilians. The professional respect of these attorneys to the
law equally protects the board and police officers as their client. Sub-groups, taking advantage
of indifferent attitudes towards a vast and mystifying legal code to advance their own
political agenda, are opposed to a collaborative systemthat entrusts legal advisors to serve
all groups with integrity.
City attorneys are equipped with critical thinking skills to challenge proposals that
potentially harm community policing initiatives. The sequence of every sentence and phrase
from a complaint case file to the civilian oversight charter are important for a successful City
Attorney’s office. Thus, the board’s power to seek legal counsel should be used to increase
participation and add stakeholders rather than push out the City Attorney’s office and their
resources. Schindler explains to the impetuous blood-thirsty Nazi, Goeth, that appropriate
applications of power are a true marker of civility and order as opposed to exploiting power for
selfish validation. Schindler describes power as the ability to forgive and explain differences
between power and justice (Zaillian 1992):
A man commits a crime, he should know better. We have him killed, we feel pretty good
about it. Or we kill him ourselves and we feel even better. That's not power, though, that's
justice. That's different than power. Power is when we have every justification to kill --
and we don't. That's power.
The City Attorney must continue to be involved with the Community Review Board and ensure
power reinforces civility and order by limiting retributive lawsuits and exploitation of
authoritative office. Through the City Attorney’s office, the Community Review Board
establishes a powerful ally that reinforces their exoneration of either complainant or police
officer. Provided both sides are willing to collaborate and accept constructive criticism from each
other, the city government and Mayor’s executive office are inclined to respect CRB’s
assessment. Community members often resist mediation with a police officer and vice versa,
because it may imply guilt and be used against them in a future lawsuit. Because civilian
agencies and police command staff are jointly advised under city government, city attorneys can
decrease prosecutions of lesser procedural violations in favor of a collaborative partnership.
Paperwork and red-tape are a burden to any government agency. And criminal justice
professionals, city executives, and even board members devote a great deal of resources towards

examining paperwork down to every sentence and each phrase. Tireless professionals must go
beyond paperwork, clerical duties, and strict procedural enforcement to realize a humanitarian
spirit of the law. The examples of government workers and law enforcement agents such as
Oskar Schindler, that have conscientiously affirmed people’s humanity over their own
institutional practices, must be celebrated. Schindler made himself responsible for respecting
others’ humanity and was a proactive advocate against arbitrary procedural justice. Like an
investigator instinctually following the money to uncover an elaborate scheme, Schindler could
bribe Nazis hunting Jews that he was harboring by paying enormous amounts to deceitfully feign
his business was profitable. Nazis were too busy trying to track Schindler’s wealth on paper than
simply consider Schindler bankrupted his entire business to keep Jews at work and away from
Nazi death chambers. At the outset of a Nazi raid on a Polish city, Goeth exhorts his fascist
minions to rewrite history by eradicating Jewish presence in a mass transportation into the
ghettoes: “For six centuries, there has been a Jewish Cracow. By this weekend, those six
centuries, they're a rumor. They never happened. Today is history.” (Zaillian 1992) On the
contrary to Goeth’s monologue, history is immutable. The efforts of history effects remain
particularly visible in marginalized areas underexposed to flattering myths made to appear real
due out of our incompetence. We may change interpretations and narratives at our convenience
but, the stories of history are already complete before they are ever put on paper. Stories wait to
be reawakened, important lessons long to be retold and revised paperwork is unable to
wipe their indelible mark.
A holistic legal culture that unites moral, ritual, religious, and criminal laws can be traced
to Ancient Israel. While in non-Israelite societies, Yale theologian Christine Hayes comments
(Hayes 2006):
the purpose of the law is to secure certain sociopolitical benefits…. It reads almost
exactly like the prologues to these ancient collections. You can pick out words that are
identical. The purpose of the law is to ‘establish justice, insure domestic tranquility,
provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of
liberty.’
Our criminal justice system reflects many Judeo-Christian principles but, there are notable
differences. Hayes compares ancient Middle Eastern codes to Israelite Mosaic law, “Talion only
applies between social equals in the Code of Hammurabi. In the Bible, the extension of talion to
all free persons, regardless of class, expresses the notion that all persons are of equal value.”
(Hayes 2006) People were only held accountable if they committed crimes against a class equal
in non-Israelite society. In case, a complainant or plaintiff was from a lower class, the accused
only made a financial compensation for a crime that would otherwise result in their execution.
Schindler reminds the sadistic authoritarian Goeth, “They don't fear us because we have the
power to kill, they fear us because we have the power to kill arbitrarily.” Hayes declares the
prologue of Lipit-Ishtar’s ancient laws was to “‘establish justice… banish complaints,’ I like that
one, ‘bring wellbeing’ — promote the common weal and welfare.” (Hayes 2006) Fear eventually
contradicts the law’s egalitarian purpose because common welfare is neglected in favor of

Seminar ksa edited civilian oversight (1)

Seminar ksa edited civilian oversight (1)

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (20)

Similar to Seminar ksa edited civilian oversight (1)

Similar to Seminar ksa edited civilian oversight (1) (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Seminar ksa edited civilian oversight (1)