SlideShare a Scribd company logo
SACON
SACON International 2020
India | Bangalore | February 21 - 22 | Taj Yeshwantpur
On the Wings of Time:
Past, Present and Future of Radio Communication Hacking
Harshit Agrawal
@harshitnic
SACON 2020
● IoT: Transformational Impact across Verticals
● RF Fundamentals
● Joys of the Past
● Current status of Industry & Sutra for Mitigation
● A glimpse of the Future
● Case Study and Demos
● Reference and Learning
Agenda
SACON 2020
● This is for people who are:
○ Just starting out
○ Thought WIFI hacking was cool
○ Saw a few HAK5 videos and wants to get started
○ Saw a DEFCON Video on Wireless Stuff
● You need to know, how a thing works to defeat a thing.
○ It’s not just about the hack
○ If you don't know what its is doing and why it's doing it you won’t know
why your attack did not work
○ Fundamentals but for the purpose of pulling it apart
● Pay attention to dates and specifics
○ There is so much white noise and outdated info on the internet
○ Then there is stuff that is older and still good information
Intro
SACON 2020
IoT: Transformational Impact across Vertical Sectors
SACON 2020
Internet of Things Model
1
Controlling Device
Smartphone, tablets and other smart devices
can control all types of “things”
3
Global Network
Most “things” connected to the Internet,
except for power grids or classified
government systems
5
Things
“Things” can be remotely controlled or
viewed, and they can send telemetry for
analysis.
2
Cloud Service
Cloud services provide the repository and
access control between the “things” and its
controller.
4
Local Network
This may be a controller area network (CAN)
in connected cars, a local network in homes,
etc
SACON 2020
IoT Security Challenges - A perspective
Security
Challenges?!
● Long IoT Device Lifetime
○ High effort to update devices in
the field
○ Outdated security mechanisms
needed or legacy devices.
● Badly maintained IoT devices
○ How many users really care as long
as it works?
● Signaling Storms
○ Normal IoT device signaling
footprint will often be low.
SACON 2020
Why Focus on RF Security?
SACON 2020
History
1984: “Software Radio” Coined by
E-Systems
1995: “The Software Radio Architecture”
Article published in IEEE Communications
Magazine Earned Mitola the nickname “The
Godfather of Software Radio”
2001: GNU Radio Project is Founded
2006: First USRP Released First programmable
& general purpose SDR available publicly.
2011: RTL-SDR Explosion
SACON 2020
Processing is defined by programmed algorithms, not HW.
(‘Software-Defined Radio’ [SDR] is the same thing)
History
SACON 2020
● Using SDR to replace most of Hardware for implementation of Radio
Networking
● SDR can act as VSAs when connected to a computer
● Implementation as SoC (System on a Chip)
● Higher end SDRs have FPGAs for on-board DSP
● Most signal processing and all display functions take place in
external computer, e.g., using GNU Radio
● Shuttles RF I/Q Samples to DSP or host
SDR as Spectrum Analyser
SACON 2020
SACON 2020
What are the Trade-off?
Your budget may allow you to buy one
of these (Vector Signal Analyzer)
Using a single well-equipped device
measuring one location at a time
20 of these (SDR + single board
computer)
A network of configurable low-cost
sensors spread over a wide
geographical area.
Versus
SACON 2020
Inside the Radio Wave Spectrum
3 KHz
1 GHz 3 GHz
4 GHz
5 GHz
2 GHz
AM Radio
2.4 GHz band
Used by more than 300 consumer devices, including
microwave ovens, cordless phones and wireless
networks (WiFi and Bluetooth)
Broadcast TV
Garage Door
Openers
Door Openers
Auctioned
Spectrum
Cell Phones
Global
Positioning
System
Wireless
Medical
Telemetry
GSM Network
Satellite
Radio
Weather Radar
Cable TV
Satellite
Transmissions
Highway Toll
Tags
5 GHz
WiFi Network
Security
Alarms
Most of the white
area of this band is
reserved for
military, federal
government and
industry use
SACON 2020
Importance of Frequency selection
SACON 2020
● Depending on their size, the radio wave loses energy every time it
passes through a medium
● Subject to Electromagnetic Interference (EMI)
● The higher the frequency, they more likely there will be
interference and distortion
● Ground Waves vs Skywaves vs Line of Sight (LOS)
○ Atmospheric Conditions, Reflection (Scatter), Refraction,
Absorption
● Line of Sight & Path Loss
○ (signal strength)20log(4[pi][r]/lambda) == Ptx/Prx (Ptx > Prx) Ptx
is sometimes called budget
RF Propagation & Interference
SACON 2020
PHY Layer
● Lowest layer in communication
stack
● In wired protocols: voltage, timing,
and wiring defining 1s and 0s
● In wireless: patterns of energy
being sent over RF medium
SACON 2020
● Humans analyze complex signals (audio, images) in terms of their
sinusoidal components
● we can build instruments that “resonate” at one or multiple
frequencies (tuning fork vs piano)
● the “frequency domain” seems to be as important as the time
domain
Python code
The intuition
SACON 2020
can we decompose any signal into sinusoidal elements?
yes, and Fourier showed us how to do it exactly!
Fundamental question
Analysis
● from time domain to
frequency domain
● find the contribution of
different frequencies
● discover “hidden” signal
properties
Synthesis
● from frequency domain to
time domain
● create signal with known
frequency content
● fit signals to specific
frequency regions
SACON 2020
● we can use complex numbers in digital systems, so why not?
● it makes sense: every sinusoid can always be written as a sum of sine and
cosine
● math is simpler: trigonometry becomes algebra
Example: change the phase of a pure cosine with complex exponentials
● sine and cosine “live” together
● phase shift is simple multiplication
● notation is simpler
The advantages of complex exponentials
SACON 2020
Initial Profiling of our Device
● What does our device do in
normal operation?
● How do they connect?
● Determining the frequency?
SACON 2020
Phases of RF Attacks
Frequency Transmission
Information
Gathering
Modulation
SACON 2020
Information Gathering
● A good starting point – if you have
some luck –search for the FCC ID:
● https://www.fcc.gov/general/fcc-id-
search-page
● Demo: https://fccid.io/Y8PFJ17-1
SACON 2020
Information extracted from FCC
● FCC also publishes internal images,
external images, user manuals, and
test results for wireless devices.
SACON 2020
Frequency
Use a Spectrum Analyzer (GQRX)
● FFT plot and waterfall
● Record and Playback
● Special FM mode for NOAA APT
● Basic Remote Control through TCP
SACON 2020
Modulation
● Modulation is like hiding a code inside a
carrier wave
● Representing digital data as variations in
the carrier wave.
Source:Attify Inc
SACON 2020
Modulation
● Carrier Wave
○ Amplitude Modulation (AM)
■ On/Off Keying (OOK)
● Angle Modulation
○ Frequency Modulation (FM)
■ Frequency Shift Keying (FSK)
■ Multiple FSK (MFSK)
■ Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) ]
■ Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)
○ Phase Shift Modulation (PSM)
■ Phase Shift Keying (PSK)
■ Bi-Phase Shift Keying (BPSK)
■ Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK)
■ Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM)
● Pulse Modulation
○ Analog
■ Pulse Analog Modulation (PAM)
■ Pulse Time Modulation (PTM)
● Pulse Duration Modulation (PDM)
○ Pulse Width Modulation (PWM)
● Pulse Position Modulation (PPM)
● Digital - Pulse Code Modulation (PCM)
SACON 2020
Modulation: pick your parameters
Make data appear random
(increase entropy of structured data)
Support multiple data
streams, drop-and-insert
Encode changes in data
(receiver can be
non-coherent)
Create signal
suitable for
uplink
Protect integrity of data
(corruption from noise on
channel)
Turn binary into symbols for
baseband RF
(0/1 → combinations of
waves)
SACON 2020
Demodulation: easy when you know
Possible to determine if it is
scrambled (calculate stats), but what
is scrambler?
Is it additive or multiplicative?
How is it synchronised?
Are there multiple streams?
How are they multiplexed?
Is it differential, or
what defines a 0/1?
What is the modulation?
Symbol rate? Require coherence?
What is the phase difference?
Need to conjugate complex plane?
Which FEC(s) is used?
Is it a concentrated code?
What is the code rate?
What is the block size?
How is it synchronised?
SACON 2020
Transmission
● Generate the message from above extracted details (Frequency, Modulation,
Bitrate, Sync word, Preamble...)
Option 1:- Use a flow graph Option 2: Command Line RF tool
SACON 2020
How Transmitting Works
HW Address Sequence Number (other stuff) Layer 3 Frame
MAC Frame
PHY Frame
Preamble Start of Frame Delim. PHY Header CRCMAC Frame
API
Call
Modulation (Maps 1s and 0s to
electrical phenomena)
(to antenna/RF
frontend)
Layer 2 (MAC)
Layer 1 (PHY)
- Matt knight, Marc Newlin
SACON 2020
How Receiving Works
HW Address Sequence Number (other stuff) Layer 3 Frame
MAC Frame
PHY State Machine
API
Call
(from antenna)
Layer 2 (MAC)
Layer 1 (PHY)
- Matt knight, Marc Newlin
Present to Layer
2
Check CRC
Extract N bits
(optional) Inspect
PHY Header
Wait for Preamble Look for SFD
SACON 2020
GNUradio
● GNU Radio is a framework that enables users to design, simulate, and deploy highly
capable real-world radio systems.
SACON 2020
SDR#
SACON 2020
Types of RF Attacks
Wardriving
Wardriving is type of sniffing that refers to
discovering of non-802.11 RF networks.
Example: killerbee 802.15.4 framework
Replay
Attacks
Involve retransmitting a previously captured
raw PHY-layer payload or the synthesis of a
new frame based on decoded data
Sniffing
The passive observation of wireless network
traffic, noteworthy as wireless domain enables
truly promiscuous sniffing with no direct
physical access.
Jamming
Can be conducted by transmitting noise within
the target network’s RF channel with sufficient
bandwidth and power.
Evil-twins Attack
Standing up a decoy device or rogue access
point that mimics trusted infrastructure, such
that it tricks victims into connecting into it.
SACON 2020
Replay Attack
Replay Attack against PKE system of Cars
● RECORD
hackrf_transfer -r 43378000.raw -f 43378000
● TRANSMIT
hackrf_transmit -t 43378000.raw -f 43378000
SACON 2020
Smart Light Demo
SACON 2020
Car Demo
SACON 2020
Safety Features
Description Issues prevented LimitationSafety Feature
Knowledge of the pairing code allows complete
impersonation of a legitimate transmitter.
Transmitter and receiver are
paired with a (fixed) pairing code,
which is used to recognize and
accept commands only from
known transmitters.
Interferences: Multiple transmitters
(e.g. of the same model and brand)
can work together in the same RF
band.
1 Pairing
Mechanism
Knowledge of the passcode allows anyone to use a
transmitter.
The operator needs to enter a
sequence (passcode) to operate
the transmitter. The sequence
enables the transmitter and starts
the receiver.
Unwanted commands and
unauthorized operations: Machinery
can be controlled only upon entering
the correct passcode.
2 Passcode
protection
RFID and equivalent factors can be stolen or
cloned.
The transmitter implements an access
control model that selectively enables or
disables advanced features according to
the level of the operator, who is
identified using radio frequency
identification (RFID) or an equivalent
factor.
Inexperienced operators who might
issue complex commands that could
cause injuries.
3 Authorization
Knowledge of the out-of-band virtual fencing
protocol allows mimicry of it.
Transmitter and receiver
communicate via an out-of-band
channel (e.g., infrared) in addition
to RF. When the transmitter is out
of range, the receiver does not
accept any commands.
Machines cannot be operated outside
the “virtual fence” created by the
out-of-band channel (e.g., the
infrared range).
4 Virtual fencing
Overview of the safety features implemented in radio
remote controllers for industrial applications.
SACON 2020
ADS-B data is not encrypted (broadcast location and altitude
information)
Recommended Windows Setup: DUMP1090 + Virtual Radar
Server
● A vertically polarized antenna tuned to 1090 MHz.
● Software for receiving and decoding ADS-B.
● Software for displaying ADS-B location data.
● (optionally) An LNA and filter for optimizing reception.
ADS-B Receiving Guide (Tracking Aircraft)
SACON 2020
SACON 2020
IMSI Catcher
In 1996, German company Rohde & Schwarz
launched the first IMSI catcher GA090 in Munich.
Initial design of IMSI Catcher is to identify the
cellphone’s geographic location by instructing the
cellphone to transmit IMSI
● IMSI: International Mobile Subscriber Identity
● MCC: Mobile Country Code
● MNC: Mobile Network Code
● MSIN: Mobile Subscriber Identity
● LAC: Location Area Code
● CellId: Unique number to Identity (BTS) within
LAC
SACON 2020
Prepare the Test Environment:
Install the compilation dependencies:
Compile “gr-gsm”:
Compile “kalibrate” (choose the version based on your hardware)
Scan for Base Station with kal
git clone https://github.com/ptrkrysik/gr-gsm.git
cd gr-gsm
mkdir build
cd build
cmake ..
make
sudo make install
sudo ldconfig
git clone https://github.com/scateu/kalibrate-hackrf.git (for HackRF version)
git clone https://github.com/steve-m/kalibrate-rtl.git (for RTL version)
cd kalibrate-hackrf
./bootstrap
./configure
make
sudo make install
sudo apt-get install git cmake libboost-all-dev libcppunit-dev swig doxygen liblog4cpp5-dev python-scipy
kal -s GSM900 -g 40 //Scan GSM900 band
grgsm_livemon -f 945.4e6
GSM Sniffing with “gr-gsm”
SACON 2020
IMSI Catcher
SACON 2020
Live FM Broadcast
rec -c 2 -t wav -r 44000 no.wav
SACON 2020
● Two types of signal leakage
○ Associate signal quality - short
○ Sniff signal quality - long
● Design to limit leakage is often futile
○ Constantly changing office environment
● Modern APs boast increased power
○ Typical 32mW - 200mW
Wireless Signal Leakage
SACON 2020
● Wireless LAN = Shared Segments
○ Think ‘hub’ architecture
● Passive listening on the network
○ Does not require network access
○ Only physical proximity
Assume an attacker can capture your network traffic
Information Disclosure Threats
SACON 2020
● WiFi and Bluetooth networks broadcast preferred networks
● Anyone can capture these network names or MAC addresses
● Used to compromise privacy
Anonymity Attacks
SACON 2020
Case study: EM-Sense
SACON 2020
Case study: EM-Sense
EM-SENSE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
● Does every object have an electromagnetic signature... even if it's not electric? Is this because it
picks up on our own human electricity or what?
● Do similar objects (e.g., similar cameras, but different model) have similar EM signatures?
SACON 2020
● Don’t just follow hackers
○ Vendors
■ Security Teams
■ Software Engineers
■ Products
■ Security Tools
■ Hardware Engineers
● Pentester Academy, CWNPs and Offensive Security (OSWP)
Certifications
● Lots of noise when you search WIFI Hacking or Wireless Hacking
○ be specific (MITM, Packet Parsing, handshakes, hacking)
WiFi Knowledge
SACON 2020
● Just get a freaking HAM License
○ please
○ it will help trying to “work around” transmissions
● RTL-SDR Blog
○ lots of great articles
● HackRF Michael Ossmann Class
● FCC and AARL site
SDR Knowledge
SACON 2020
● The reasons that BT hack is not working for you
○ It was made for that exact chipset
○ It was for that exact keyboard/speaker/mouse
○ It was written for that exact OS with those driver and software versions
○ It was made for a different version of BT.
● The BT 1.0 that that tool or hack was written for is not the same
● BT that's in the BT4.3 LE padlock you are trying to hack today
● I don’t claim to know all the BlueTooth it is still hard for me to do
● You gotta do some reading
○ https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/bluetooth-core-specification
Bluetooth Knowledge
SACON 2020
● Design and implement proper security mechanisms and provide
secure firmware upgrades to existing devices.
● Continue to build on open, well-known, standard protocols such as
Bluetooth Low Energy which offers security by design as part of the
protocol.
● Consider future evolutions or iterations when designing
next-generation systems.
Vendor Should:
SACON 2020
● Be aware of the basics of the technology.
● Keep computers properly secured and up to date.
● Consider next-generation products
System Integrators and client should:
SACON 2020
● Wasabi (Bsides DC)
● Trend Micro
● Michael Ossmann
● SANS Institute
● Matt Ettus
● Ben Hilburn
● EM-Sense (Disney Research)
● Carnegie Mellon University
References
SACON 2020
Thanks Slide
Harshit Agrawal (@harshitnic)
harshit.nic@gmail.com

More Related Content

What's hot

(SACON) Satish Sreenivasaiah - DevSecOps Tools and Beyond
(SACON) Satish Sreenivasaiah - DevSecOps Tools and Beyond(SACON) Satish Sreenivasaiah - DevSecOps Tools and Beyond
(SACON) Satish Sreenivasaiah - DevSecOps Tools and Beyond
Priyanka Aash
 
Meraki powered services bell
Meraki powered services   bellMeraki powered services   bell
Meraki powered services bell
Cisco Canada
 
The New Landscape of Airborne Cyberattacks
The New Landscape of Airborne CyberattacksThe New Landscape of Airborne Cyberattacks
The New Landscape of Airborne Cyberattacks
Priyanka Aash
 
(SACON) Apoorv Raj Saxena - Hacking and Securing Kubernetes and Dockers in Cl...
(SACON) Apoorv Raj Saxena - Hacking and Securing Kubernetes and Dockers in Cl...(SACON) Apoorv Raj Saxena - Hacking and Securing Kubernetes and Dockers in Cl...
(SACON) Apoorv Raj Saxena - Hacking and Securing Kubernetes and Dockers in Cl...
Priyanka Aash
 
Palo Alto Networks Portfolio & Strategy Overview 2019
Palo Alto Networks Portfolio & Strategy Overview 2019Palo Alto Networks Portfolio & Strategy Overview 2019
Palo Alto Networks Portfolio & Strategy Overview 2019
Sean Xie
 
Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Palo Alto Networks Config Guide
Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Palo Alto Networks Config GuideCisco Wireless LAN Controller Palo Alto Networks Config Guide
Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Palo Alto Networks Config Guide
Alberto Rivai
 
Cisco Connect Toronto 2017 - Security Through The Eyes of a Hacker
Cisco Connect Toronto 2017 -  Security Through The Eyes of a HackerCisco Connect Toronto 2017 -  Security Through The Eyes of a Hacker
Cisco Connect Toronto 2017 - Security Through The Eyes of a Hacker
Cisco Canada
 
Meraki Virtual Hackathon: app for Splunk Phantom
Meraki Virtual Hackathon: app for Splunk PhantomMeraki Virtual Hackathon: app for Splunk Phantom
Meraki Virtual Hackathon: app for Splunk Phantom
Joel W. King
 
The 5 elements of IoT security
The 5 elements of IoT securityThe 5 elements of IoT security
The 5 elements of IoT security
Julien Vermillard
 
Deploying Secure Converged Wired, Wireless Campus
Deploying Secure Converged Wired, Wireless CampusDeploying Secure Converged Wired, Wireless Campus
Deploying Secure Converged Wired, Wireless Campus
Rassul Ismailov
 
Too soft[ware defined] networks SD-Wan vulnerability assessment
Too soft[ware defined] networks SD-Wan vulnerability assessmentToo soft[ware defined] networks SD-Wan vulnerability assessment
Too soft[ware defined] networks SD-Wan vulnerability assessment
Sergey Gordeychik
 
WebGoat.SDWAN.Net in Depth: SD-WAN Security Assessment
WebGoat.SDWAN.Net in Depth: SD-WAN Security Assessment WebGoat.SDWAN.Net in Depth: SD-WAN Security Assessment
WebGoat.SDWAN.Net in Depth: SD-WAN Security Assessment
Sergey Gordeychik
 
Cisco Connect Vancouver 2017 - Anatomy of Attack
Cisco Connect Vancouver 2017 - Anatomy of AttackCisco Connect Vancouver 2017 - Anatomy of Attack
Cisco Connect Vancouver 2017 - Anatomy of Attack
Cisco Canada
 
Moby SIG Orchestration Security Summit Presentation
Moby SIG Orchestration Security Summit PresentationMoby SIG Orchestration Security Summit Presentation
Moby SIG Orchestration Security Summit Presentation
Diogo Mónica
 
VPN
VPNVPN
Solving the Visibility Gap for Effective Security
Solving the Visibility Gap for Effective SecuritySolving the Visibility Gap for Effective Security
Solving the Visibility Gap for Effective Security
Lancope, Inc.
 
So You Want a Threat Intelligence Function (But Were Afraid to Ask)
So You Want a Threat Intelligence Function (But Were Afraid to Ask)So You Want a Threat Intelligence Function (But Were Afraid to Ask)
So You Want a Threat Intelligence Function (But Were Afraid to Ask)
Lancope, Inc.
 
Enhancing traffic analysis with elk and snort
Enhancing traffic analysis with elk and snortEnhancing traffic analysis with elk and snort
Enhancing traffic analysis with elk and snort
Yaashan Raj
 
Application layer Security in IoT: A Survey
Application layer Security in IoT: A SurveyApplication layer Security in IoT: A Survey
Application layer Security in IoT: A Survey
Adeel Ahmed
 
GATTacking Bluetooth Smart
GATTacking Bluetooth SmartGATTacking Bluetooth Smart
GATTacking Bluetooth Smart
OWASP
 

What's hot (20)

(SACON) Satish Sreenivasaiah - DevSecOps Tools and Beyond
(SACON) Satish Sreenivasaiah - DevSecOps Tools and Beyond(SACON) Satish Sreenivasaiah - DevSecOps Tools and Beyond
(SACON) Satish Sreenivasaiah - DevSecOps Tools and Beyond
 
Meraki powered services bell
Meraki powered services   bellMeraki powered services   bell
Meraki powered services bell
 
The New Landscape of Airborne Cyberattacks
The New Landscape of Airborne CyberattacksThe New Landscape of Airborne Cyberattacks
The New Landscape of Airborne Cyberattacks
 
(SACON) Apoorv Raj Saxena - Hacking and Securing Kubernetes and Dockers in Cl...
(SACON) Apoorv Raj Saxena - Hacking and Securing Kubernetes and Dockers in Cl...(SACON) Apoorv Raj Saxena - Hacking and Securing Kubernetes and Dockers in Cl...
(SACON) Apoorv Raj Saxena - Hacking and Securing Kubernetes and Dockers in Cl...
 
Palo Alto Networks Portfolio & Strategy Overview 2019
Palo Alto Networks Portfolio & Strategy Overview 2019Palo Alto Networks Portfolio & Strategy Overview 2019
Palo Alto Networks Portfolio & Strategy Overview 2019
 
Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Palo Alto Networks Config Guide
Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Palo Alto Networks Config GuideCisco Wireless LAN Controller Palo Alto Networks Config Guide
Cisco Wireless LAN Controller Palo Alto Networks Config Guide
 
Cisco Connect Toronto 2017 - Security Through The Eyes of a Hacker
Cisco Connect Toronto 2017 -  Security Through The Eyes of a HackerCisco Connect Toronto 2017 -  Security Through The Eyes of a Hacker
Cisco Connect Toronto 2017 - Security Through The Eyes of a Hacker
 
Meraki Virtual Hackathon: app for Splunk Phantom
Meraki Virtual Hackathon: app for Splunk PhantomMeraki Virtual Hackathon: app for Splunk Phantom
Meraki Virtual Hackathon: app for Splunk Phantom
 
The 5 elements of IoT security
The 5 elements of IoT securityThe 5 elements of IoT security
The 5 elements of IoT security
 
Deploying Secure Converged Wired, Wireless Campus
Deploying Secure Converged Wired, Wireless CampusDeploying Secure Converged Wired, Wireless Campus
Deploying Secure Converged Wired, Wireless Campus
 
Too soft[ware defined] networks SD-Wan vulnerability assessment
Too soft[ware defined] networks SD-Wan vulnerability assessmentToo soft[ware defined] networks SD-Wan vulnerability assessment
Too soft[ware defined] networks SD-Wan vulnerability assessment
 
WebGoat.SDWAN.Net in Depth: SD-WAN Security Assessment
WebGoat.SDWAN.Net in Depth: SD-WAN Security Assessment WebGoat.SDWAN.Net in Depth: SD-WAN Security Assessment
WebGoat.SDWAN.Net in Depth: SD-WAN Security Assessment
 
Cisco Connect Vancouver 2017 - Anatomy of Attack
Cisco Connect Vancouver 2017 - Anatomy of AttackCisco Connect Vancouver 2017 - Anatomy of Attack
Cisco Connect Vancouver 2017 - Anatomy of Attack
 
Moby SIG Orchestration Security Summit Presentation
Moby SIG Orchestration Security Summit PresentationMoby SIG Orchestration Security Summit Presentation
Moby SIG Orchestration Security Summit Presentation
 
VPN
VPNVPN
VPN
 
Solving the Visibility Gap for Effective Security
Solving the Visibility Gap for Effective SecuritySolving the Visibility Gap for Effective Security
Solving the Visibility Gap for Effective Security
 
So You Want a Threat Intelligence Function (But Were Afraid to Ask)
So You Want a Threat Intelligence Function (But Were Afraid to Ask)So You Want a Threat Intelligence Function (But Were Afraid to Ask)
So You Want a Threat Intelligence Function (But Were Afraid to Ask)
 
Enhancing traffic analysis with elk and snort
Enhancing traffic analysis with elk and snortEnhancing traffic analysis with elk and snort
Enhancing traffic analysis with elk and snort
 
Application layer Security in IoT: A Survey
Application layer Security in IoT: A SurveyApplication layer Security in IoT: A Survey
Application layer Security in IoT: A Survey
 
GATTacking Bluetooth Smart
GATTacking Bluetooth SmartGATTacking Bluetooth Smart
GATTacking Bluetooth Smart
 

Similar to (SACON) Harshit Agrawal - On The Wings of Time: Past, Present and Future of Radio Communication

Telecommunications Concentration
Telecommunications ConcentrationTelecommunications Concentration
IRJET- Power Line Carrier Communication
IRJET- Power Line Carrier CommunicationIRJET- Power Line Carrier Communication
IRJET- Power Line Carrier Communication
IRJET Journal
 
Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015
Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015
Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015
CODE BLUE
 
PON testing.pdf
PON testing.pdfPON testing.pdf
PON testing.pdf
taha karram
 
IRJET - Software-Defined Radio using ‘Redpitaya’
IRJET - Software-Defined Radio using ‘Redpitaya’IRJET - Software-Defined Radio using ‘Redpitaya’
IRJET - Software-Defined Radio using ‘Redpitaya’
IRJET Journal
 
ATEI PII SBIR Proj Description 5 Feb 2013
ATEI PII SBIR Proj Description 5 Feb 2013ATEI PII SBIR Proj Description 5 Feb 2013
ATEI PII SBIR Proj Description 5 Feb 2013
Frank Lucchesi
 
Low power wireless technologies for connecting embedded sensors in the IoT: A...
Low power wireless technologies for connecting embedded sensors in the IoT: A...Low power wireless technologies for connecting embedded sensors in the IoT: A...
Low power wireless technologies for connecting embedded sensors in the IoT: A...
Gilles Callebaut
 
LORA BASED DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM
LORA BASED DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEMLORA BASED DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM
LORA BASED DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM
IRJET Journal
 
cognitive radio network and software defined radio
cognitive radio network and software defined radiocognitive radio network and software defined radio
cognitive radio network and software defined radio
Madhumitha J
 
Nb iot presentation
Nb iot presentationNb iot presentation
Nb iot presentation
manoj pradhan
 
nbiot introduction based on 3gpp standard.pptx
nbiot introduction based  on 3gpp  standard.pptxnbiot introduction based  on 3gpp  standard.pptx
nbiot introduction based on 3gpp standard.pptx
AnbazhaganSelvanatha
 
CDMA 2000 Principle Issue4.0
CDMA 2000 Principle Issue4.0CDMA 2000 Principle Issue4.0
CDMA 2000 Principle Issue4.0
Tempus Telcosys
 
digitalmicrowavecommunicationprinciples-131014163928-phpapp02 (1).pdf
digitalmicrowavecommunicationprinciples-131014163928-phpapp02 (1).pdfdigitalmicrowavecommunicationprinciples-131014163928-phpapp02 (1).pdf
digitalmicrowavecommunicationprinciples-131014163928-phpapp02 (1).pdf
SaraSwas
 
LoRa vs NB-IoT
LoRa vs NB-IoT LoRa vs NB-IoT
LoRa vs NB-IoT
Antenna Manufacturer Coco
 
Mobile CDS LTE Simulation Demo
Mobile CDS LTE Simulation Demo Mobile CDS LTE Simulation Demo
Mobile CDS LTE Simulation Demo
Dr. Edwin Hernandez
 
LTE-Network-Planning-Huawei-Technologies EMERSON EDUARDO RODRIGUES
LTE-Network-Planning-Huawei-Technologies EMERSON EDUARDO RODRIGUESLTE-Network-Planning-Huawei-Technologies EMERSON EDUARDO RODRIGUES
LTE-Network-Planning-Huawei-Technologies EMERSON EDUARDO RODRIGUES
EMERSON EDUARDO RODRIGUES
 
Computer Interface for Electroluminescence (EL)
Computer Interface for Electroluminescence (EL)Computer Interface for Electroluminescence (EL)
Computer Interface for Electroluminescence (EL)
Editor IJCATR
 
Multiband Transceivers - [Chapter 5] Software-Defined Radios
Multiband Transceivers - [Chapter 5]  Software-Defined RadiosMultiband Transceivers - [Chapter 5]  Software-Defined Radios
Multiband Transceivers - [Chapter 5] Software-Defined Radios
Simen Li
 
Implementation of Algorithms For Multi-Channel Digital Monitoring Receiver
Implementation of Algorithms For Multi-Channel Digital Monitoring ReceiverImplementation of Algorithms For Multi-Channel Digital Monitoring Receiver
Implementation of Algorithms For Multi-Channel Digital Monitoring Receiver
IOSR Journals
 
IRJET - Robovac(Cleaning Robot)
IRJET - Robovac(Cleaning Robot)IRJET - Robovac(Cleaning Robot)
IRJET - Robovac(Cleaning Robot)
IRJET Journal
 

Similar to (SACON) Harshit Agrawal - On The Wings of Time: Past, Present and Future of Radio Communication (20)

Telecommunications Concentration
Telecommunications ConcentrationTelecommunications Concentration
Telecommunications Concentration
 
IRJET- Power Line Carrier Communication
IRJET- Power Line Carrier CommunicationIRJET- Power Line Carrier Communication
IRJET- Power Line Carrier Communication
 
Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015
Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015
Wireless security testing with attack by Keiichi Horiai - CODE BLUE 2015
 
PON testing.pdf
PON testing.pdfPON testing.pdf
PON testing.pdf
 
IRJET - Software-Defined Radio using ‘Redpitaya’
IRJET - Software-Defined Radio using ‘Redpitaya’IRJET - Software-Defined Radio using ‘Redpitaya’
IRJET - Software-Defined Radio using ‘Redpitaya’
 
ATEI PII SBIR Proj Description 5 Feb 2013
ATEI PII SBIR Proj Description 5 Feb 2013ATEI PII SBIR Proj Description 5 Feb 2013
ATEI PII SBIR Proj Description 5 Feb 2013
 
Low power wireless technologies for connecting embedded sensors in the IoT: A...
Low power wireless technologies for connecting embedded sensors in the IoT: A...Low power wireless technologies for connecting embedded sensors in the IoT: A...
Low power wireless technologies for connecting embedded sensors in the IoT: A...
 
LORA BASED DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM
LORA BASED DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEMLORA BASED DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM
LORA BASED DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM
 
cognitive radio network and software defined radio
cognitive radio network and software defined radiocognitive radio network and software defined radio
cognitive radio network and software defined radio
 
Nb iot presentation
Nb iot presentationNb iot presentation
Nb iot presentation
 
nbiot introduction based on 3gpp standard.pptx
nbiot introduction based  on 3gpp  standard.pptxnbiot introduction based  on 3gpp  standard.pptx
nbiot introduction based on 3gpp standard.pptx
 
CDMA 2000 Principle Issue4.0
CDMA 2000 Principle Issue4.0CDMA 2000 Principle Issue4.0
CDMA 2000 Principle Issue4.0
 
digitalmicrowavecommunicationprinciples-131014163928-phpapp02 (1).pdf
digitalmicrowavecommunicationprinciples-131014163928-phpapp02 (1).pdfdigitalmicrowavecommunicationprinciples-131014163928-phpapp02 (1).pdf
digitalmicrowavecommunicationprinciples-131014163928-phpapp02 (1).pdf
 
LoRa vs NB-IoT
LoRa vs NB-IoT LoRa vs NB-IoT
LoRa vs NB-IoT
 
Mobile CDS LTE Simulation Demo
Mobile CDS LTE Simulation Demo Mobile CDS LTE Simulation Demo
Mobile CDS LTE Simulation Demo
 
LTE-Network-Planning-Huawei-Technologies EMERSON EDUARDO RODRIGUES
LTE-Network-Planning-Huawei-Technologies EMERSON EDUARDO RODRIGUESLTE-Network-Planning-Huawei-Technologies EMERSON EDUARDO RODRIGUES
LTE-Network-Planning-Huawei-Technologies EMERSON EDUARDO RODRIGUES
 
Computer Interface for Electroluminescence (EL)
Computer Interface for Electroluminescence (EL)Computer Interface for Electroluminescence (EL)
Computer Interface for Electroluminescence (EL)
 
Multiband Transceivers - [Chapter 5] Software-Defined Radios
Multiband Transceivers - [Chapter 5]  Software-Defined RadiosMultiband Transceivers - [Chapter 5]  Software-Defined Radios
Multiband Transceivers - [Chapter 5] Software-Defined Radios
 
Implementation of Algorithms For Multi-Channel Digital Monitoring Receiver
Implementation of Algorithms For Multi-Channel Digital Monitoring ReceiverImplementation of Algorithms For Multi-Channel Digital Monitoring Receiver
Implementation of Algorithms For Multi-Channel Digital Monitoring Receiver
 
IRJET - Robovac(Cleaning Robot)
IRJET - Robovac(Cleaning Robot)IRJET - Robovac(Cleaning Robot)
IRJET - Robovac(Cleaning Robot)
 

More from Priyanka Aash

Keynote : Presentation on SASE Technology
Keynote : Presentation on SASE TechnologyKeynote : Presentation on SASE Technology
Keynote : Presentation on SASE Technology
Priyanka Aash
 
Keynote : AI & Future Of Offensive Security
Keynote : AI & Future Of Offensive SecurityKeynote : AI & Future Of Offensive Security
Keynote : AI & Future Of Offensive Security
Priyanka Aash
 
Redefining Cybersecurity with AI Capabilities
Redefining Cybersecurity with AI CapabilitiesRedefining Cybersecurity with AI Capabilities
Redefining Cybersecurity with AI Capabilities
Priyanka Aash
 
Demystifying Neural Networks And Building Cybersecurity Applications
Demystifying Neural Networks And Building Cybersecurity ApplicationsDemystifying Neural Networks And Building Cybersecurity Applications
Demystifying Neural Networks And Building Cybersecurity Applications
Priyanka Aash
 
Finetuning GenAI For Hacking and Defending
Finetuning GenAI For Hacking and DefendingFinetuning GenAI For Hacking and Defending
Finetuning GenAI For Hacking and Defending
Priyanka Aash
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Kids Cyber Security .pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Kids Cyber Security .pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Kids Cyber Security .pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Kids Cyber Security .pdf
Priyanka Aash
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Regulation & Response In Banks.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Regulation & Response In Banks.pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Regulation & Response In Banks.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Regulation & Response In Banks.pdf
Priyanka Aash
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Cyber Insurance & Risk Quantification.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Cyber Insurance & Risk Quantification.pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Cyber Insurance & Risk Quantification.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Cyber Insurance & Risk Quantification.pdf
Priyanka Aash
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Workshop _ Most Dangerous Attack Technique...
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Workshop _ Most Dangerous Attack Technique...(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Workshop _ Most Dangerous Attack Technique...
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Workshop _ Most Dangerous Attack Technique...
Priyanka Aash
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Keynote _ Power Digital Identities With AI...
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Keynote _ Power Digital Identities With AI...(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Keynote _ Power Digital Identities With AI...
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Keynote _ Power Digital Identities With AI...
Priyanka Aash
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Digital Personal Data Protection Act.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Digital Personal Data Protection Act.pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Digital Personal Data Protection Act.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Digital Personal Data Protection Act.pdf
Priyanka Aash
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Gen AI & Deepfake In Overall Security.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Gen AI & Deepfake In Overall Security.pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Gen AI & Deepfake In Overall Security.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Gen AI & Deepfake In Overall Security.pdf
Priyanka Aash
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Incident Response .pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Incident Response .pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Incident Response .pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Incident Response .pdf
Priyanka Aash
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) GRC.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) GRC.pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) GRC.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) GRC.pdf
Priyanka Aash
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Orientation by CISO Platform_ Using CISO P...
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Orientation by CISO Platform_ Using CISO P...(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Orientation by CISO Platform_ Using CISO P...
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Orientation by CISO Platform_ Using CISO P...
Priyanka Aash
 
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOs
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOsDigital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOs
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOs
Priyanka Aash
 
Verizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdf
Verizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdfVerizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdf
Verizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdf
Priyanka Aash
 
Top 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdf
Top 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdfTop 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdf
Top 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdf
Priyanka Aash
 
Simplifying data privacy and protection.pdf
Simplifying data privacy and protection.pdfSimplifying data privacy and protection.pdf
Simplifying data privacy and protection.pdf
Priyanka Aash
 
Generative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdf
Generative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdfGenerative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdf
Generative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdf
Priyanka Aash
 

More from Priyanka Aash (20)

Keynote : Presentation on SASE Technology
Keynote : Presentation on SASE TechnologyKeynote : Presentation on SASE Technology
Keynote : Presentation on SASE Technology
 
Keynote : AI & Future Of Offensive Security
Keynote : AI & Future Of Offensive SecurityKeynote : AI & Future Of Offensive Security
Keynote : AI & Future Of Offensive Security
 
Redefining Cybersecurity with AI Capabilities
Redefining Cybersecurity with AI CapabilitiesRedefining Cybersecurity with AI Capabilities
Redefining Cybersecurity with AI Capabilities
 
Demystifying Neural Networks And Building Cybersecurity Applications
Demystifying Neural Networks And Building Cybersecurity ApplicationsDemystifying Neural Networks And Building Cybersecurity Applications
Demystifying Neural Networks And Building Cybersecurity Applications
 
Finetuning GenAI For Hacking and Defending
Finetuning GenAI For Hacking and DefendingFinetuning GenAI For Hacking and Defending
Finetuning GenAI For Hacking and Defending
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Kids Cyber Security .pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Kids Cyber Security .pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Kids Cyber Security .pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Kids Cyber Security .pdf
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Regulation & Response In Banks.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Regulation & Response In Banks.pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Regulation & Response In Banks.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Regulation & Response In Banks.pdf
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Cyber Insurance & Risk Quantification.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Cyber Insurance & Risk Quantification.pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Cyber Insurance & Risk Quantification.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Cyber Insurance & Risk Quantification.pdf
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Workshop _ Most Dangerous Attack Technique...
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Workshop _ Most Dangerous Attack Technique...(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Workshop _ Most Dangerous Attack Technique...
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Workshop _ Most Dangerous Attack Technique...
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Keynote _ Power Digital Identities With AI...
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Keynote _ Power Digital Identities With AI...(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Keynote _ Power Digital Identities With AI...
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Keynote _ Power Digital Identities With AI...
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Digital Personal Data Protection Act.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Digital Personal Data Protection Act.pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Digital Personal Data Protection Act.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Digital Personal Data Protection Act.pdf
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Gen AI & Deepfake In Overall Security.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Gen AI & Deepfake In Overall Security.pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Gen AI & Deepfake In Overall Security.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Gen AI & Deepfake In Overall Security.pdf
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Incident Response .pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Incident Response .pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Incident Response .pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Incident Response .pdf
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) GRC.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) GRC.pdf(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) GRC.pdf
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) GRC.pdf
 
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Orientation by CISO Platform_ Using CISO P...
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Orientation by CISO Platform_ Using CISO P...(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Orientation by CISO Platform_ Using CISO P...
(CISOPlatform Summit & SACON 2024) Orientation by CISO Platform_ Using CISO P...
 
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOs
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOsDigital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOs
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Practical Approach For CISOs
 
Verizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdf
Verizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdfVerizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdf
Verizon Breach Investigation Report (VBIR).pdf
 
Top 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdf
Top 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdfTop 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdf
Top 10 Security Risks .pptx.pdf
 
Simplifying data privacy and protection.pdf
Simplifying data privacy and protection.pdfSimplifying data privacy and protection.pdf
Simplifying data privacy and protection.pdf
 
Generative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdf
Generative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdfGenerative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdf
Generative AI and Security (1).pptx.pdf
 

Recently uploaded

Types of Weaving loom machine & it's technology
Types of Weaving loom machine & it's technologyTypes of Weaving loom machine & it's technology
Types of Weaving loom machine & it's technology
ldtexsolbl
 
EuroPython 2024 - Streamlining Testing in a Large Python Codebase
EuroPython 2024 - Streamlining Testing in a Large Python CodebaseEuroPython 2024 - Streamlining Testing in a Large Python Codebase
EuroPython 2024 - Streamlining Testing in a Large Python Codebase
Jimmy Lai
 
Mastering OnlyFans Clone App Development: Key Strategies for Success
Mastering OnlyFans Clone App Development: Key Strategies for SuccessMastering OnlyFans Clone App Development: Key Strategies for Success
Mastering OnlyFans Clone App Development: Key Strategies for Success
David Wilson
 
Opencast Summit 2024 — Opencast @ University of Münster
Opencast Summit 2024 — Opencast @ University of MünsterOpencast Summit 2024 — Opencast @ University of Münster
Opencast Summit 2024 — Opencast @ University of Münster
Matthias Neugebauer
 
Data Integration Basics: Merging & Joining Data
Data Integration Basics: Merging & Joining DataData Integration Basics: Merging & Joining Data
Data Integration Basics: Merging & Joining Data
Safe Software
 
Feature sql server terbaru performance.pptx
Feature sql server terbaru performance.pptxFeature sql server terbaru performance.pptx
Feature sql server terbaru performance.pptx
ssuser1915fe1
 
Girls call Kolkata 👀 XXXXXXXXXXX 👀 Rs.9.5 K Cash Payment With Room Delivery
Girls call Kolkata 👀 XXXXXXXXXXX 👀 Rs.9.5 K Cash Payment With Room Delivery Girls call Kolkata 👀 XXXXXXXXXXX 👀 Rs.9.5 K Cash Payment With Room Delivery
Girls call Kolkata 👀 XXXXXXXXXXX 👀 Rs.9.5 K Cash Payment With Room Delivery
sunilverma7884
 
Litestack talk at Brighton 2024 (Unleashing the power of SQLite for Ruby apps)
Litestack talk at Brighton 2024 (Unleashing the power of SQLite for Ruby apps)Litestack talk at Brighton 2024 (Unleashing the power of SQLite for Ruby apps)
Litestack talk at Brighton 2024 (Unleashing the power of SQLite for Ruby apps)
Muhammad Ali
 
Sonkoloniya documentation - ONEprojukti.pdf
Sonkoloniya documentation - ONEprojukti.pdfSonkoloniya documentation - ONEprojukti.pdf
Sonkoloniya documentation - ONEprojukti.pdf
SubhamMandal40
 
Acumatica vs. Sage Intacct _Construction_July (1).pptx
Acumatica vs. Sage Intacct _Construction_July (1).pptxAcumatica vs. Sage Intacct _Construction_July (1).pptx
Acumatica vs. Sage Intacct _Construction_July (1).pptx
BrainSell Technologies
 
Computer HARDWARE presenattion by CWD students class 10
Computer HARDWARE presenattion by CWD students class 10Computer HARDWARE presenattion by CWD students class 10
Computer HARDWARE presenattion by CWD students class 10
ankush9927
 
Three New Criminal Laws in India 1 July 2024
Three New Criminal Laws in India 1 July 2024Three New Criminal Laws in India 1 July 2024
Three New Criminal Laws in India 1 July 2024
aakash malhotra
 
Girls Call Churchgate 9910780858 Provide Best And Top Girl Service And No1 in...
Girls Call Churchgate 9910780858 Provide Best And Top Girl Service And No1 in...Girls Call Churchgate 9910780858 Provide Best And Top Girl Service And No1 in...
Girls Call Churchgate 9910780858 Provide Best And Top Girl Service And No1 in...
maigasapphire
 
Connector Corner: Leveraging Snowflake Integration for Smarter Decision Making
Connector Corner: Leveraging Snowflake Integration for Smarter Decision MakingConnector Corner: Leveraging Snowflake Integration for Smarter Decision Making
Connector Corner: Leveraging Snowflake Integration for Smarter Decision Making
DianaGray10
 
How to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptx
How to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptxHow to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptx
How to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptx
Adam Dunkels
 
TrustArc Webinar - 2024 Data Privacy Trends: A Mid-Year Check-In
TrustArc Webinar - 2024 Data Privacy Trends: A Mid-Year Check-InTrustArc Webinar - 2024 Data Privacy Trends: A Mid-Year Check-In
TrustArc Webinar - 2024 Data Privacy Trends: A Mid-Year Check-In
TrustArc
 
Dublin_mulesoft_meetup_Mulesoft_Salesforce_Integration (1).pptx
Dublin_mulesoft_meetup_Mulesoft_Salesforce_Integration (1).pptxDublin_mulesoft_meetup_Mulesoft_Salesforce_Integration (1).pptx
Dublin_mulesoft_meetup_Mulesoft_Salesforce_Integration (1).pptx
Kunal Gupta
 
Russian Girls Call Navi Mumbai 🎈🔥9920725232 🔥💋🎈 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...
Russian Girls Call Navi Mumbai 🎈🔥9920725232 🔥💋🎈 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...Russian Girls Call Navi Mumbai 🎈🔥9920725232 🔥💋🎈 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...
Russian Girls Call Navi Mumbai 🎈🔥9920725232 🔥💋🎈 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...
bellared2
 
High Profile Girls call Service Pune 000XX00000 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...
High Profile Girls call Service Pune 000XX00000 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...High Profile Girls call Service Pune 000XX00000 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...
High Profile Girls call Service Pune 000XX00000 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...
bhumivarma35300
 
July Patch Tuesday
July Patch TuesdayJuly Patch Tuesday
July Patch Tuesday
Ivanti
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Types of Weaving loom machine & it's technology
Types of Weaving loom machine & it's technologyTypes of Weaving loom machine & it's technology
Types of Weaving loom machine & it's technology
 
EuroPython 2024 - Streamlining Testing in a Large Python Codebase
EuroPython 2024 - Streamlining Testing in a Large Python CodebaseEuroPython 2024 - Streamlining Testing in a Large Python Codebase
EuroPython 2024 - Streamlining Testing in a Large Python Codebase
 
Mastering OnlyFans Clone App Development: Key Strategies for Success
Mastering OnlyFans Clone App Development: Key Strategies for SuccessMastering OnlyFans Clone App Development: Key Strategies for Success
Mastering OnlyFans Clone App Development: Key Strategies for Success
 
Opencast Summit 2024 — Opencast @ University of Münster
Opencast Summit 2024 — Opencast @ University of MünsterOpencast Summit 2024 — Opencast @ University of Münster
Opencast Summit 2024 — Opencast @ University of Münster
 
Data Integration Basics: Merging & Joining Data
Data Integration Basics: Merging & Joining DataData Integration Basics: Merging & Joining Data
Data Integration Basics: Merging & Joining Data
 
Feature sql server terbaru performance.pptx
Feature sql server terbaru performance.pptxFeature sql server terbaru performance.pptx
Feature sql server terbaru performance.pptx
 
Girls call Kolkata 👀 XXXXXXXXXXX 👀 Rs.9.5 K Cash Payment With Room Delivery
Girls call Kolkata 👀 XXXXXXXXXXX 👀 Rs.9.5 K Cash Payment With Room Delivery Girls call Kolkata 👀 XXXXXXXXXXX 👀 Rs.9.5 K Cash Payment With Room Delivery
Girls call Kolkata 👀 XXXXXXXXXXX 👀 Rs.9.5 K Cash Payment With Room Delivery
 
Litestack talk at Brighton 2024 (Unleashing the power of SQLite for Ruby apps)
Litestack talk at Brighton 2024 (Unleashing the power of SQLite for Ruby apps)Litestack talk at Brighton 2024 (Unleashing the power of SQLite for Ruby apps)
Litestack talk at Brighton 2024 (Unleashing the power of SQLite for Ruby apps)
 
Sonkoloniya documentation - ONEprojukti.pdf
Sonkoloniya documentation - ONEprojukti.pdfSonkoloniya documentation - ONEprojukti.pdf
Sonkoloniya documentation - ONEprojukti.pdf
 
Acumatica vs. Sage Intacct _Construction_July (1).pptx
Acumatica vs. Sage Intacct _Construction_July (1).pptxAcumatica vs. Sage Intacct _Construction_July (1).pptx
Acumatica vs. Sage Intacct _Construction_July (1).pptx
 
Computer HARDWARE presenattion by CWD students class 10
Computer HARDWARE presenattion by CWD students class 10Computer HARDWARE presenattion by CWD students class 10
Computer HARDWARE presenattion by CWD students class 10
 
Three New Criminal Laws in India 1 July 2024
Three New Criminal Laws in India 1 July 2024Three New Criminal Laws in India 1 July 2024
Three New Criminal Laws in India 1 July 2024
 
Girls Call Churchgate 9910780858 Provide Best And Top Girl Service And No1 in...
Girls Call Churchgate 9910780858 Provide Best And Top Girl Service And No1 in...Girls Call Churchgate 9910780858 Provide Best And Top Girl Service And No1 in...
Girls Call Churchgate 9910780858 Provide Best And Top Girl Service And No1 in...
 
Connector Corner: Leveraging Snowflake Integration for Smarter Decision Making
Connector Corner: Leveraging Snowflake Integration for Smarter Decision MakingConnector Corner: Leveraging Snowflake Integration for Smarter Decision Making
Connector Corner: Leveraging Snowflake Integration for Smarter Decision Making
 
How to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptx
How to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptxHow to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptx
How to Build a Profitable IoT Product.pptx
 
TrustArc Webinar - 2024 Data Privacy Trends: A Mid-Year Check-In
TrustArc Webinar - 2024 Data Privacy Trends: A Mid-Year Check-InTrustArc Webinar - 2024 Data Privacy Trends: A Mid-Year Check-In
TrustArc Webinar - 2024 Data Privacy Trends: A Mid-Year Check-In
 
Dublin_mulesoft_meetup_Mulesoft_Salesforce_Integration (1).pptx
Dublin_mulesoft_meetup_Mulesoft_Salesforce_Integration (1).pptxDublin_mulesoft_meetup_Mulesoft_Salesforce_Integration (1).pptx
Dublin_mulesoft_meetup_Mulesoft_Salesforce_Integration (1).pptx
 
Russian Girls Call Navi Mumbai 🎈🔥9920725232 🔥💋🎈 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...
Russian Girls Call Navi Mumbai 🎈🔥9920725232 🔥💋🎈 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...Russian Girls Call Navi Mumbai 🎈🔥9920725232 🔥💋🎈 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...
Russian Girls Call Navi Mumbai 🎈🔥9920725232 🔥💋🎈 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...
 
High Profile Girls call Service Pune 000XX00000 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...
High Profile Girls call Service Pune 000XX00000 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...High Profile Girls call Service Pune 000XX00000 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...
High Profile Girls call Service Pune 000XX00000 Provide Best And Top Girl Ser...
 
July Patch Tuesday
July Patch TuesdayJuly Patch Tuesday
July Patch Tuesday
 

(SACON) Harshit Agrawal - On The Wings of Time: Past, Present and Future of Radio Communication

  • 1. SACON SACON International 2020 India | Bangalore | February 21 - 22 | Taj Yeshwantpur On the Wings of Time: Past, Present and Future of Radio Communication Hacking Harshit Agrawal @harshitnic
  • 2. SACON 2020 ● IoT: Transformational Impact across Verticals ● RF Fundamentals ● Joys of the Past ● Current status of Industry & Sutra for Mitigation ● A glimpse of the Future ● Case Study and Demos ● Reference and Learning Agenda
  • 3. SACON 2020 ● This is for people who are: ○ Just starting out ○ Thought WIFI hacking was cool ○ Saw a few HAK5 videos and wants to get started ○ Saw a DEFCON Video on Wireless Stuff ● You need to know, how a thing works to defeat a thing. ○ It’s not just about the hack ○ If you don't know what its is doing and why it's doing it you won’t know why your attack did not work ○ Fundamentals but for the purpose of pulling it apart ● Pay attention to dates and specifics ○ There is so much white noise and outdated info on the internet ○ Then there is stuff that is older and still good information Intro
  • 4. SACON 2020 IoT: Transformational Impact across Vertical Sectors
  • 5. SACON 2020 Internet of Things Model 1 Controlling Device Smartphone, tablets and other smart devices can control all types of “things” 3 Global Network Most “things” connected to the Internet, except for power grids or classified government systems 5 Things “Things” can be remotely controlled or viewed, and they can send telemetry for analysis. 2 Cloud Service Cloud services provide the repository and access control between the “things” and its controller. 4 Local Network This may be a controller area network (CAN) in connected cars, a local network in homes, etc
  • 6. SACON 2020 IoT Security Challenges - A perspective Security Challenges?! ● Long IoT Device Lifetime ○ High effort to update devices in the field ○ Outdated security mechanisms needed or legacy devices. ● Badly maintained IoT devices ○ How many users really care as long as it works? ● Signaling Storms ○ Normal IoT device signaling footprint will often be low.
  • 7. SACON 2020 Why Focus on RF Security?
  • 8. SACON 2020 History 1984: “Software Radio” Coined by E-Systems 1995: “The Software Radio Architecture” Article published in IEEE Communications Magazine Earned Mitola the nickname “The Godfather of Software Radio” 2001: GNU Radio Project is Founded 2006: First USRP Released First programmable & general purpose SDR available publicly. 2011: RTL-SDR Explosion
  • 9. SACON 2020 Processing is defined by programmed algorithms, not HW. (‘Software-Defined Radio’ [SDR] is the same thing) History
  • 10. SACON 2020 ● Using SDR to replace most of Hardware for implementation of Radio Networking ● SDR can act as VSAs when connected to a computer ● Implementation as SoC (System on a Chip) ● Higher end SDRs have FPGAs for on-board DSP ● Most signal processing and all display functions take place in external computer, e.g., using GNU Radio ● Shuttles RF I/Q Samples to DSP or host SDR as Spectrum Analyser
  • 12. SACON 2020 What are the Trade-off? Your budget may allow you to buy one of these (Vector Signal Analyzer) Using a single well-equipped device measuring one location at a time 20 of these (SDR + single board computer) A network of configurable low-cost sensors spread over a wide geographical area. Versus
  • 13. SACON 2020 Inside the Radio Wave Spectrum 3 KHz 1 GHz 3 GHz 4 GHz 5 GHz 2 GHz AM Radio 2.4 GHz band Used by more than 300 consumer devices, including microwave ovens, cordless phones and wireless networks (WiFi and Bluetooth) Broadcast TV Garage Door Openers Door Openers Auctioned Spectrum Cell Phones Global Positioning System Wireless Medical Telemetry GSM Network Satellite Radio Weather Radar Cable TV Satellite Transmissions Highway Toll Tags 5 GHz WiFi Network Security Alarms Most of the white area of this band is reserved for military, federal government and industry use
  • 14. SACON 2020 Importance of Frequency selection
  • 15. SACON 2020 ● Depending on their size, the radio wave loses energy every time it passes through a medium ● Subject to Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) ● The higher the frequency, they more likely there will be interference and distortion ● Ground Waves vs Skywaves vs Line of Sight (LOS) ○ Atmospheric Conditions, Reflection (Scatter), Refraction, Absorption ● Line of Sight & Path Loss ○ (signal strength)20log(4[pi][r]/lambda) == Ptx/Prx (Ptx > Prx) Ptx is sometimes called budget RF Propagation & Interference
  • 16. SACON 2020 PHY Layer ● Lowest layer in communication stack ● In wired protocols: voltage, timing, and wiring defining 1s and 0s ● In wireless: patterns of energy being sent over RF medium
  • 17. SACON 2020 ● Humans analyze complex signals (audio, images) in terms of their sinusoidal components ● we can build instruments that “resonate” at one or multiple frequencies (tuning fork vs piano) ● the “frequency domain” seems to be as important as the time domain Python code The intuition
  • 18. SACON 2020 can we decompose any signal into sinusoidal elements? yes, and Fourier showed us how to do it exactly! Fundamental question Analysis ● from time domain to frequency domain ● find the contribution of different frequencies ● discover “hidden” signal properties Synthesis ● from frequency domain to time domain ● create signal with known frequency content ● fit signals to specific frequency regions
  • 19. SACON 2020 ● we can use complex numbers in digital systems, so why not? ● it makes sense: every sinusoid can always be written as a sum of sine and cosine ● math is simpler: trigonometry becomes algebra Example: change the phase of a pure cosine with complex exponentials ● sine and cosine “live” together ● phase shift is simple multiplication ● notation is simpler The advantages of complex exponentials
  • 20. SACON 2020 Initial Profiling of our Device ● What does our device do in normal operation? ● How do they connect? ● Determining the frequency?
  • 21. SACON 2020 Phases of RF Attacks Frequency Transmission Information Gathering Modulation
  • 22. SACON 2020 Information Gathering ● A good starting point – if you have some luck –search for the FCC ID: ● https://www.fcc.gov/general/fcc-id- search-page ● Demo: https://fccid.io/Y8PFJ17-1
  • 23. SACON 2020 Information extracted from FCC ● FCC also publishes internal images, external images, user manuals, and test results for wireless devices.
  • 24. SACON 2020 Frequency Use a Spectrum Analyzer (GQRX) ● FFT plot and waterfall ● Record and Playback ● Special FM mode for NOAA APT ● Basic Remote Control through TCP
  • 25. SACON 2020 Modulation ● Modulation is like hiding a code inside a carrier wave ● Representing digital data as variations in the carrier wave. Source:Attify Inc
  • 26. SACON 2020 Modulation ● Carrier Wave ○ Amplitude Modulation (AM) ■ On/Off Keying (OOK) ● Angle Modulation ○ Frequency Modulation (FM) ■ Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) ■ Multiple FSK (MFSK) ■ Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) ] ■ Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) ○ Phase Shift Modulation (PSM) ■ Phase Shift Keying (PSK) ■ Bi-Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) ■ Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) ■ Quadrature Amplitude Modulation (QAM) ● Pulse Modulation ○ Analog ■ Pulse Analog Modulation (PAM) ■ Pulse Time Modulation (PTM) ● Pulse Duration Modulation (PDM) ○ Pulse Width Modulation (PWM) ● Pulse Position Modulation (PPM) ● Digital - Pulse Code Modulation (PCM)
  • 27. SACON 2020 Modulation: pick your parameters Make data appear random (increase entropy of structured data) Support multiple data streams, drop-and-insert Encode changes in data (receiver can be non-coherent) Create signal suitable for uplink Protect integrity of data (corruption from noise on channel) Turn binary into symbols for baseband RF (0/1 → combinations of waves)
  • 28. SACON 2020 Demodulation: easy when you know Possible to determine if it is scrambled (calculate stats), but what is scrambler? Is it additive or multiplicative? How is it synchronised? Are there multiple streams? How are they multiplexed? Is it differential, or what defines a 0/1? What is the modulation? Symbol rate? Require coherence? What is the phase difference? Need to conjugate complex plane? Which FEC(s) is used? Is it a concentrated code? What is the code rate? What is the block size? How is it synchronised?
  • 29. SACON 2020 Transmission ● Generate the message from above extracted details (Frequency, Modulation, Bitrate, Sync word, Preamble...) Option 1:- Use a flow graph Option 2: Command Line RF tool
  • 30. SACON 2020 How Transmitting Works HW Address Sequence Number (other stuff) Layer 3 Frame MAC Frame PHY Frame Preamble Start of Frame Delim. PHY Header CRCMAC Frame API Call Modulation (Maps 1s and 0s to electrical phenomena) (to antenna/RF frontend) Layer 2 (MAC) Layer 1 (PHY) - Matt knight, Marc Newlin
  • 31. SACON 2020 How Receiving Works HW Address Sequence Number (other stuff) Layer 3 Frame MAC Frame PHY State Machine API Call (from antenna) Layer 2 (MAC) Layer 1 (PHY) - Matt knight, Marc Newlin Present to Layer 2 Check CRC Extract N bits (optional) Inspect PHY Header Wait for Preamble Look for SFD
  • 32. SACON 2020 GNUradio ● GNU Radio is a framework that enables users to design, simulate, and deploy highly capable real-world radio systems.
  • 34. SACON 2020 Types of RF Attacks Wardriving Wardriving is type of sniffing that refers to discovering of non-802.11 RF networks. Example: killerbee 802.15.4 framework Replay Attacks Involve retransmitting a previously captured raw PHY-layer payload or the synthesis of a new frame based on decoded data Sniffing The passive observation of wireless network traffic, noteworthy as wireless domain enables truly promiscuous sniffing with no direct physical access. Jamming Can be conducted by transmitting noise within the target network’s RF channel with sufficient bandwidth and power. Evil-twins Attack Standing up a decoy device or rogue access point that mimics trusted infrastructure, such that it tricks victims into connecting into it.
  • 35. SACON 2020 Replay Attack Replay Attack against PKE system of Cars ● RECORD hackrf_transfer -r 43378000.raw -f 43378000 ● TRANSMIT hackrf_transmit -t 43378000.raw -f 43378000
  • 38. SACON 2020 Safety Features Description Issues prevented LimitationSafety Feature Knowledge of the pairing code allows complete impersonation of a legitimate transmitter. Transmitter and receiver are paired with a (fixed) pairing code, which is used to recognize and accept commands only from known transmitters. Interferences: Multiple transmitters (e.g. of the same model and brand) can work together in the same RF band. 1 Pairing Mechanism Knowledge of the passcode allows anyone to use a transmitter. The operator needs to enter a sequence (passcode) to operate the transmitter. The sequence enables the transmitter and starts the receiver. Unwanted commands and unauthorized operations: Machinery can be controlled only upon entering the correct passcode. 2 Passcode protection RFID and equivalent factors can be stolen or cloned. The transmitter implements an access control model that selectively enables or disables advanced features according to the level of the operator, who is identified using radio frequency identification (RFID) or an equivalent factor. Inexperienced operators who might issue complex commands that could cause injuries. 3 Authorization Knowledge of the out-of-band virtual fencing protocol allows mimicry of it. Transmitter and receiver communicate via an out-of-band channel (e.g., infrared) in addition to RF. When the transmitter is out of range, the receiver does not accept any commands. Machines cannot be operated outside the “virtual fence” created by the out-of-band channel (e.g., the infrared range). 4 Virtual fencing Overview of the safety features implemented in radio remote controllers for industrial applications.
  • 39. SACON 2020 ADS-B data is not encrypted (broadcast location and altitude information) Recommended Windows Setup: DUMP1090 + Virtual Radar Server ● A vertically polarized antenna tuned to 1090 MHz. ● Software for receiving and decoding ADS-B. ● Software for displaying ADS-B location data. ● (optionally) An LNA and filter for optimizing reception. ADS-B Receiving Guide (Tracking Aircraft)
  • 41. SACON 2020 IMSI Catcher In 1996, German company Rohde & Schwarz launched the first IMSI catcher GA090 in Munich. Initial design of IMSI Catcher is to identify the cellphone’s geographic location by instructing the cellphone to transmit IMSI ● IMSI: International Mobile Subscriber Identity ● MCC: Mobile Country Code ● MNC: Mobile Network Code ● MSIN: Mobile Subscriber Identity ● LAC: Location Area Code ● CellId: Unique number to Identity (BTS) within LAC
  • 42. SACON 2020 Prepare the Test Environment: Install the compilation dependencies: Compile “gr-gsm”: Compile “kalibrate” (choose the version based on your hardware) Scan for Base Station with kal git clone https://github.com/ptrkrysik/gr-gsm.git cd gr-gsm mkdir build cd build cmake .. make sudo make install sudo ldconfig git clone https://github.com/scateu/kalibrate-hackrf.git (for HackRF version) git clone https://github.com/steve-m/kalibrate-rtl.git (for RTL version) cd kalibrate-hackrf ./bootstrap ./configure make sudo make install sudo apt-get install git cmake libboost-all-dev libcppunit-dev swig doxygen liblog4cpp5-dev python-scipy kal -s GSM900 -g 40 //Scan GSM900 band grgsm_livemon -f 945.4e6 GSM Sniffing with “gr-gsm”
  • 44. SACON 2020 Live FM Broadcast rec -c 2 -t wav -r 44000 no.wav
  • 45. SACON 2020 ● Two types of signal leakage ○ Associate signal quality - short ○ Sniff signal quality - long ● Design to limit leakage is often futile ○ Constantly changing office environment ● Modern APs boast increased power ○ Typical 32mW - 200mW Wireless Signal Leakage
  • 46. SACON 2020 ● Wireless LAN = Shared Segments ○ Think ‘hub’ architecture ● Passive listening on the network ○ Does not require network access ○ Only physical proximity Assume an attacker can capture your network traffic Information Disclosure Threats
  • 47. SACON 2020 ● WiFi and Bluetooth networks broadcast preferred networks ● Anyone can capture these network names or MAC addresses ● Used to compromise privacy Anonymity Attacks
  • 49. SACON 2020 Case study: EM-Sense EM-SENSE: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ● Does every object have an electromagnetic signature... even if it's not electric? Is this because it picks up on our own human electricity or what? ● Do similar objects (e.g., similar cameras, but different model) have similar EM signatures?
  • 50. SACON 2020 ● Don’t just follow hackers ○ Vendors ■ Security Teams ■ Software Engineers ■ Products ■ Security Tools ■ Hardware Engineers ● Pentester Academy, CWNPs and Offensive Security (OSWP) Certifications ● Lots of noise when you search WIFI Hacking or Wireless Hacking ○ be specific (MITM, Packet Parsing, handshakes, hacking) WiFi Knowledge
  • 51. SACON 2020 ● Just get a freaking HAM License ○ please ○ it will help trying to “work around” transmissions ● RTL-SDR Blog ○ lots of great articles ● HackRF Michael Ossmann Class ● FCC and AARL site SDR Knowledge
  • 52. SACON 2020 ● The reasons that BT hack is not working for you ○ It was made for that exact chipset ○ It was for that exact keyboard/speaker/mouse ○ It was written for that exact OS with those driver and software versions ○ It was made for a different version of BT. ● The BT 1.0 that that tool or hack was written for is not the same ● BT that's in the BT4.3 LE padlock you are trying to hack today ● I don’t claim to know all the BlueTooth it is still hard for me to do ● You gotta do some reading ○ https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/bluetooth-core-specification Bluetooth Knowledge
  • 53. SACON 2020 ● Design and implement proper security mechanisms and provide secure firmware upgrades to existing devices. ● Continue to build on open, well-known, standard protocols such as Bluetooth Low Energy which offers security by design as part of the protocol. ● Consider future evolutions or iterations when designing next-generation systems. Vendor Should:
  • 54. SACON 2020 ● Be aware of the basics of the technology. ● Keep computers properly secured and up to date. ● Consider next-generation products System Integrators and client should:
  • 55. SACON 2020 ● Wasabi (Bsides DC) ● Trend Micro ● Michael Ossmann ● SANS Institute ● Matt Ettus ● Ben Hilburn ● EM-Sense (Disney Research) ● Carnegie Mellon University References
  • 56. SACON 2020 Thanks Slide Harshit Agrawal (@harshitnic) harshit.nic@gmail.com