Running head CHILD CARE PROBLEMS AND EMPLOYMENT1CHILD CARE PRO.docx

Running head: CHILD CARE PROBLEMS AND
EMPLOYMENT 1
CHILD CARE PROBLEMS AND EMPLOYMENT 2Child Care
Problems and Employment
Child Care Problems and Employment
The issues that will be addressed are that all parents struggle
with daycare and employment, however a single parent in
particular single mothers can and do have more problems
juggling daycare and their employment. This needs to be
addressed because the single mother is more likely to make
changes to their employment status because of the daycare
problems.
If single mothers do not have close friends and relatives to help
with daycare, the mothers end up missing work because of
problems with daycare. The child or children could be sick and
not be able to attend daycare, they may be having behavioral
problems that lead to the mother having to leave or miss work
and stay at home with the child. Daycare may cost more than
the mother can afford to pay.

Forry and Hofferth (2011) discusses the “association between
child care subsidies and parents’ experience of child care
related work disruptions while controlling for individual,
family, child care and community characteristics” (Forry &
Hofferth, 2011). During this study there were two questions
asked, the first question posed was asking “is receipt of a child
care subsidy a negative predictor of experiencing a child care–
related work disruption?” the second question posed to the same
parents over a period of time, “do parents experience fewer
child care–related work disruptions while receiving a child care
subsidy as compared with while not receiving a subsidy?”
(Forry & Hofferth, 2011).
The first study used longitudinal survey and “verified
administrative data collected in Montgomery County, Maryland,
using quasi-experimental design” (Forry & Hofferth, 2011). The
second study was a subsample of families that was taken from
the Fragile and Child Wellbeing study that were either receiving
child care subsidy or were financially eligible to receive child
care subsidy. “The use of multivariate change analyses applied
to quasi-experimental data also sets this study apart from
current literature in the field. (Forry & Hofferth, 2011).
One thing that was surprising in this article was it was found
that even when there was more than one adult in the home there
was still disruption in child care and work related disruptions.
This was found to be because even though there was more
adults in the home, usually the multiple adults in the home was
for financial reasons so the adults were working and not
available to help with daycare.
Hofferth and Collins (2000), discusses the ways that
childbearing and child rearing affect a mother’s ability to
maintain stable employment. The article shows that mother who
have recently given birth, have a large number of children and
young children are more likely to quit their job at any given

time. The article shows that mothers who have lower paying
jobs and have young children and do not have the convenient
access to center based child care programs are more likely to
leave their jobs.
The research method that was used for this study was a discrete
time logit models, this was used to examine the relationship
between employed mothers of preschool children who leave
their jobs and the constraints of child care, the model estimates
the log odds of leaving “work in any given month as a function
of number and ages of children, the expected birth of a child,
job-related characteristics, given that she was employed in the
prior month” (Hofferth & Collins, 2000).
Gordon, Kaestner and Korenman (2008) discuss how the type of
child care a mother uses is connected to employment absences
but in different ways. An example is when a mother uses a
larger day care center there is less likely to be employment
absences because of provider unavailability, but rather more
absences due to child illnesses. When using a smaller day care
center there it is more likely the mother will miss work because
of provider unavailability and this is the reason more mothers
quit their jobs, however the mothers who quit work because of
provider unavailability are in the lower wage bracket.
This study was conducted by building on the prior study
discussed by the authors in 2005 regarding the offsetting
consequences of the type of child care on employment absences
and the parents leaving their employment. The questions asked
in this study was “(a) Are parents who use larger and more
formal care settings more likely to stay home from work when
their child is sick but less likely to miss work because of
provider unavailability than parents who use smaller and less
formal child-care settings? (b) Do work absences because of
child illness and provider unavailability have negative
consequences for maternal employment?” (Gordon, Kaestner &
Korenman, 2008).
The longitudinal method was used for this study, there were
1,364 children and families who were participants. The first part

of the study was between birth and three years of age of the
child, phone interviews were conducted every three months.
Child care was divided into four groups to look at, dedicate
child care facility, private home based child care with five or
more children, home based child care with three or four
children, and home based with only one or two children.
Mothers were asked if their child had been sick in the last
month and if they had to miss work because of the illness. The
study was limited because of the modest response rate by the
parents and that the sample was not nationwide, rather only nine
state were used.
Meyers, Heintze and Wolf (2002) discuss the growing demand
for substitute child care because of more mothers working and
returning to work after giving birth to their child. The article
reports that there is a gap between mothers and non-mothers in
regards to employment because the mother has to pay child care
rates. This article shows that low income mothers are able to
utilize day care for children when the day care is subsidized by
the federal Welfare programs. The article does suggest that
although there are programs for subsidized child care there are
few mothers utilizing the programs.
This study used data collected from low-income single mothers,
who were either currently receiving welfare or had recently
received welfare, the mothers were welfare recipients in
California. There were two questions that were asked, “What
are the chances that these mothers would receive child care
subsidies if they were to use child care, and how would
variations in the likelihood of being subsidized affect these
mothers’ labor market activities?” (Meyers, Heintze & Wolf,
2002).
The study used a two stage model to analyze the effect of child
care subsidies on labor market activity. When looking at the
stages it was found that there was a probability that each mother
who was a participant would have been subsidized if she had
used child care. The study found that 69% of mothers who could

have used subsidized child care were not using it, and they were
either using a family member or paying out of pocket for child
care (Meyers, Heintze & Wolf, 2002).
Montes and Halterman, (2011) discuss how the impact of child
care problems can and do affect a parents’ employment. What
was found from this study is that all families with children
young and older face employment challenges, it was discussed
that because many jobs and the school hours do not coincide
there is a problem there, do the parents take the job that starts
before school, or starts after school. It was found that a parent’s
education level does not make any difference in the issues of
employment and child care, and the study showed that lower-
income families only have a slightly higher chance of having to
modify their work than higher-income families.
A national representative random digit dial survey Gallup panel
was used to gather the answers for this study. The household
criterial for the study was that families had a child or children
ages 0 – 13 years of age. The phone survey lasted for
approximately 15 – 20 minutes and the participants consented to
respond to the questions. The study found that among some of
the issues facing single parents was having a child with
behavioral issues increased the odd of having child care related
employment changes and well as having children was also a
significant increase in the parents job performance.
The questions that will be asked are “in the last six months, did
you have to make a change to your employment status because
of problems with child care? Are you a single parent household
or two parents household?”
The hypothesis is more single parent households will make a
change to their employment status because of child care
problems.

Methodology
Purpose statement.
More single parent households will make a change to their
employment status because of child care problems.
Participant
The participants for the study were the households with single
parents whose income ranged from $10,000 to $50,000 yearly
and the number of children they have child care for and
households with two parents in the same income range and the
number of children they have child care for. The study will
cover all areas of the United States and will have parents who
are single and married.
Materials and Procedures.
The materials there were used was both closed and open
questionnaires that were distributed to the participants in only
five regions. The procedure was to visit this regions and give
the questionnaires to the families and wait for an instant
answers in an attempt to avoid time consumption. The questions
asked were; the most influential experiences someone had in the
work with young children and families, among this experience
which ones were the most important to them and why, in the last
six months, did they have to make a change to their employment
status because of problems with child care, are they a single
parent household or a two parents household. Some of these
questions were open to the participant and others were closed.
Variables.
REGIONS
Bad experiences from families. (both single and two parents
result)
Good experiences from the families. (both single and two
parents result)

WALLET REGION
110
40
KAMAT REGION
95
55
SARIT REGION
85
65
WARENG REGION
114
36
HUNGS REGION
145
100
REGIONS
Child care experience being not important (both single and two
parents result)
Child care experience being important. (both single and two
parents result)
WALLET
4
20
KAMAT REGION
5
19
SARIT
6
18
WARENG
7
17
HUNGS
12
12

REGIONS
Number of two parent households who made a change in
employment status because of child care.
Number of single parent households who made a change in
employment status because of child care.
WALLET
30
120
KAMAT REGION
39
111
SARIT
36
114
WARENG
48
102
HUNGS
90
60
Data analysis plan.
Part 1.
Null hypothesis: families have bad experience with young
children when employed.
Alternative hypothesis: families have good experience with
young children when employed.
Paired t test
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
Variable | Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95%
Conf. Interval]
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------

----
secondary | 5 109.8 10.22448 22.86263
81.41229 138.1877
university| 5 59.2 11.45164 25.60664
27.40516 90.99484
---------+----------------------------------------------------------------
----
diff | 5 50.6 10.50524 23.49042
21.43279 79.76721
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
mean(diff) = mean(sec - uni) t =
4.8166
Ho: mean(diff) = 0 degrees of freedom =
4
Ha: mean(diff) < 0 Ha: mean(diff) != 0 Ha:
mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9957 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0085 Pr(T > t) =
0.0043
Interpretation
From the analysis above t-test results is given as 4.8166 and the
critical value is given as 0.0085. Because the test statistics is
more than the critical value there is enough evidence to accept
the null hypothesis and conclude that the families had bad
experience with children when they are at work.
Part 2.
Null hypothesis: bad experiences with parents because of child
care while at work.
Alternative hypothesis: good experiences with parent because of
child care while at work.
One-Sample Statistics
N

Mean
Std. Deviation
Std. Error Mean
Not important
5
6.80
3.114
1.393
Important.
5
17.20
3.114
1.393
One-Sample Test
Test Value = 0
t
df
Sig. (2-tailed)
Mean Difference
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Lower
Upper
Child experience not being important.

4.882
4
.008
6.800
2.93
10.67
Child experience taken as important.
12.349
4
.000
17.200
13.33
21.07
From the analysis using SPSS program, the null hypothesis can
be accepted since there is a significant difference between Child
care experiences being important for both single and two
parents household. This shows that both single and two parent
household find it important to have their experience to their
children. This is shown by the mean time given as 17.2
compared to that of 6.8.
Part 3.
Null hypothesis: more single household parent changed their
employment status due to child care.
Alternative: more two household parents changed their
employment status due to child care.
From the SPSS program, the average mean of number of single
household parent who made change to their employment status
is more than the average mean of two household parents who

made change in their employment status. Since the standard
deviation is the same, it can be concluded that there is no wide
variation is this change for both single household and two
household parents.
Statistics
welltreat
unwelltreat
N
Valid
5
5
Missing
0
0
Mean
48.60
101.40
Std. Deviation
24.037
24.037
Conclusion.
From the analysis above it can conclude that more single parent
households will make a change to their employment status
because of child care problems.

References
Forry, N. D., & Hofferth, S. L. (2011). Maintaining work: The
influence of child care subsidies on child care—related work
disruptions. Journal of Family Issues, 32(3), 346-368. doi:
10.1177/0192513X10384467
Hofferth, S., & Collins, N. (2000). Child care and employment
turnover. Population Research and Policy Review, 19(4), 357-
395. Retrieved from
http://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/do
cview/206262167?accountid=3783
Gordon, R. A., Kaestner, R., & Korenman, S. (2008). Child care
and work absences: Trade-offs by type of care. Journal of
Marriage and Family, 70(1), 239-254. Retrieved from
http://ezproxy.snhu.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/do
cview/219767893?accountid=3783
Meyers, M. K., Heintze, T., & Wolf, D. A. (2002). Child care
subsidies and the
employment of welfare recipients. Demography, 39(1), 165-179.
Montes, G., & Halterman, J. (2011). The impact of child care
problems on employment: Findings from a national survey of us
parents. Academic Pediatrics, 11(1), 80-87.
doi:10.1016/j.acap.2010.11.005
The Qualitative Report Volume 16 Number 6 November 2011

1599-1615
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR16-6/age.pdf
Grounded Theory Methodology: Positivism, Hermeneutics,
and Pragmatism
Lars-Johan Åge
Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden
Glaserian grounded theory methodology, which has been widely
adopted
as a scientific methodology in recent decades, has been
variously
characterised as “hermeneutic” and “positivist.” This
commentary
therefore takes a different approach to characterising grounded
theory by
undertaking a comprehensive analysis of: (a) the philosophical
paradigms
of positivism, hermeneutics, and pragmatism; and (b) the
general
philosophical questions of the aims of science and the issue of
choosing a
scientific methodology. The commentary then seeks to position
grounded
theory methodology in terms of these philosophical
perspectives. The
study concludes that grounded theory methodology contains
elements of
positivism, hermeneutics, and pragmatism. In coming to this
conclusion,
the study clarifies the degree to which these three perspectives

are found
within Glaserian grounded theory methodology. Key Words:
Grounded
Theory, Positivism, Hermeneutics, Pragmatism.
Although grounded theory methodology (Glaser, 1978, 1998,
2003; Glaser &
Strauss, 1967) has been widely adopted in scientific research in
recent decades, this
qualitative methodology has been the subject of various
interpretations and criticisms
from a variety of perspectives. Some authors have classified
grounded theory
methodology as a positivist methodology (Charmaz, 2006),
whereas others have
considered it to be an interpretive methodology (Brown, 1995;
Goulding, 1998). Barney
Glaser is one of the two originators of grounded theory
methodology in 1967 and Glaser
(1998) himself claimed that the methodology occupied a
pragmatic position that went
beyond other philosophical schools of thought. Regarding the
difficulty to classify this
particular methodology, Gustavsson (1998) mentioned that it
has been subjected to
criticism from both subjectivists and objectivists.
The present study aims at analysing grounded theory in terms of
various
philosophical schools of thought. It is hoped that such an
analysis will provide insights
regarding the different philosophical perspectives inherent
within this particular
methodology. In other words, the purpose of this commentary is

to position Glaserian
grounded theory methodology in terms of the philosophical
paradigms of positivism,
philosophical hermeneutics, and pragmatism. Also, practical
implications of this analysis
are also discussed.
The report of this study begins with a brief description of
grounded theory
methodology. Secondly, I present researchers perspective in
order to describe my own
relations to this topic. Thirdly, I use two general question of
science in order to position
the Glaserian grounded theory methodology in terms of the
philosophical paradigms of
positivism, hermeneutics, and pragmatism. Based on this
analysis, a picture of Glaserian
grounded theory methodology is emerging that implies that
influences from all these
1600 The Qualitative Report November 2011
different philosophical traditions are found within this
particular methodology, an insight
that has practical implication in terms of opening up this
methodology to a broader use.
Grounded Theory Methodology

According to Glaser (1978), data collection in grounded theory
methodology
begins with a “sociological perspective [of a] general problem
area [rather than a]
preconceived conceptual framework” (p. 44). The researcher
thus begins with an attitude
of openness, which seeks to ensure that the “the emerging of
concepts never fails”
(Glaser, 1978, p. 44).
The next step involves the generation of various categories by
“constant
comparison” of data through a procedure known as “open
coding” (Glaser, 1978; Glaser
& Strauss, 1967). According to this procedure, which permeates
the whole research
process, “incidents are compared to incidents [and then]
concepts to more incidents”
(Glaser, 1978, p. 62), in
By continuing this procedure of constant comparison, the
researcher then
establishes a “core category” (Glaser, 1978, p. 95), which is a
category that holds all
other categories together. When the core category has emerged,
the researcher undertakes
the process of selective coding (Glaser, 1978), whereby
incoming data are compared to
the core category in a more precise manner than when the
categories were first
established. In this process of “selective coding,” only variables
related to the core
category are considered.
order to generate more conceptual properties. Finally, concepts

are compared to concepts in order to integrate the theory.
The way in which the various categories are related is
considered under a process
of theoretical coding (Glaser, 1978). This process is facilitated
by the writing down of so-
called “theoretical memos” (Glaser, 1978, p. 83) that elaborate
on the theoretical codes.
These “theoretical memos” represent immediate notations of
emerging ideas about
categories and how they inter-relate. These memos are then
sorted into a theoretical
outline. Finally, a process described as “theoretical writing” (p.
128) is undertaken,
whereby all the details of the substantive theory are brought
together in an overall
conceptual description that is then integrated with or “weaved
into” (Glaser, 1998, p.
207) the extant literature on the subject.
It is noteworthy that these various steps are, to a greater or
lesser extent,
conducted concurrently during the overall research process. In
doing so, all the steps,
from data collection to analysis, are guided by the emerging
theory (Glaser, 1978). This
means that the each session in the continuous process of data
collection is determined by
the previous sessions in which the data have been closely
examined. This process is
known as “theoretical sampling” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p.
45). This data-collection
process continues until theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss,
1967, p. 61) is reached,
which indicates that the substantive theory has been
satisfactorily developed.

However, the grounded theory methodology has been subjected
to changes and
variations since it was presented by Glaser and Strauss (1967).
One of the first signs of
the methodology being interpreted differently from the original
authors was the work of
Strauss & Corbin (1990). In practical terms, for example, while
Glaser emphasized the
emergence of concepts, Strauss & Corbin (1990), in a more
systematic version of the
methodology, provided several analytical tools that the
researcher could choose from in
Lars-Johan Åge 1601
order to “create” and “construct” a theory from the stories told
by the participants. This
difference was later discussed by Glaser (1992) as the polarities
of emergence versus
forcing (Glaser, 1992).
Interestingly, what in Strauss & Corbin’s (1990) version of the
grounded theory
methodology has been looked upon as systematic tools that have
procedural affinity to
positivism (Locke, 2001) others find characteristics of post-
positivism in Strauss and
Corbin’s emphasis on context and complexity. Inspired by this
emphasis on context and
complexity, Clarke (2005) argues that she has moved the
grounded theory around the

postmodern turn by developing something called situational
analysis, which focuses on
discourses, narratives, and historical analyses.
Other researchers (e.g., Charmaz, 2006), emphasize that the
connection to the
researcher is to be made visible as the theory is a construction
and results from the
interplay between the researcher and the respondents.
Researcher’s Perspective
The motivation for this commentary arises from a combination
of my academic
and practical experience with this interesting subject matter. As
a doctoral student in
2002, I soon became interested in grounded-theory
methodology, which I pursued with
enthusiasm in my subsequent postgraduate studies. Given my
practical experience as a
practitioner in selling and sales management, it therefore
seemed appropriate to combine
my theoretical and practical areas of expertise and interest by
conducting a grounded-
theory study within the field of business-to-business selling
processes. The result of this
project was a successful postgraduate dissertation entitled:
“Business Manoeuvring: A
Grounded Theory of Complex Selling Processes.”
While conducting this grounded-theory research, I became
increasingly interested
in the philosophical underpinnings of this particular

methodology. However, when
discussing my research project with academic colleagues, I
received conflicting opinions
regarding the essential nature of grounded-theory methodology.
Some colleagues insisted
that it was a “positivist” methodology, whereas others felt that
it was more closely related
to a “subjectivist perspective.” Intrigued by these conflicting
opinions and curious to
learn more about the philosophical antecedents of this particular
methodology, I
proceeded to study the philosophy of science in general terms
with a view to obtaining a
broader philosophical understanding of the Glaserian nature of
grounded theory
methodology.
I was interested to discover that the founders of particular
scientific
methodologies, including grounded theory, often fail to explore
and explain the
fundamental philosophical basis of their particular
methodologies—even when the
theoretical and conceptual principles of a given methodology
are ostensibly being
presented. However, in the writings of Laudan (1977, 1984,
1996) and Popper (1963,
1972), I found some answers to such fundamental questions as:
“What are the aims of
science?” and “How should a scientific methodology be
chosen?” By addressing these
sorts of fundamental questions to Glaserian grounded theory
methodology, I discovered
new and insightful perspectives on the issue of the basic nature
of Glaserian grounded
theory.

Approach
This brief introduction reflects how my insights and
understanding of grounded-
theory methodology began to form in the initial stages of my
research journey, and how
my perspectives subsequently became enriched by deliberately
placing the methodology
under the spotlight of a rigorous examination of its fundamental
philosophical nature.
The present commentary gathers these ideas and insights
together—with a view to
providing readers interested in grounded theory methodology
with a new (and perhaps
enlightening) perspective on the fundamental philosophical and
scientific basis of this
increasingly popular methodology.
The purpose of this commentary is to position Glaserian
grounded theory
methodology in terms of the philosophical paradigms of
positivism, hermeneutics, and
pragmatism. Thus, the present commentary seeks to discuss the
extent to which the
original Glaserian grounded theory methodology (as described

by Glaser) can be argued
to have positivist, relativist, and pragmatic characteristics. In
undertaking this task, the
commentary addresses two broader philosophical questions,
both of which have been
previously raised by prominent authors in other contexts—
Popper (1963, 1972) in
discussing the nature of science in general, and Laudan (1977,
1984, 1996) in discussing
differences between positivism and relativism. These two
questions are:
• What is the aim of science?
• How should a scientific methodology be chosen?
By using these two general and broad philosophical questions
the philosophical
underpinnings of the grounded theory methodology will be
clarified. In this analysis, the
focus is on the original version of grounded theory (Glaserian
grounded theory) as
described by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Glaser (1978, 1998,
2001, 2007).
Aims of Science
Dimensions of a Scientific Theory
According to Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994), a scientific theory
has three distinct
properties: (1) correspondence; (2) understanding; and (3)

usefulness. Alvesson and
Sköldberg further suggest that a theory: should have elements of
all three dimensions
(even if some dimensions are emphasised more than others in a
particular theory); and
might be more or less valid, with respect to certain dimensions
(but not others). In this
commentary, these three dimensions can be considered as
desiderata for scientific
theories—that is, these dimensions not only represent properties
of a theory, but also
more general aims of science, all of which have significant
methodological and
theoretical implications. Each of these dimensions, and their
applicability to a substantive
theory produced by grounded theory methodology, is discussed
in more detail below.
Dimension of correspondence. Popper (1963) was as a positivist
interested in the
“the idea of objective and absolute truth” (p. 224) which he
articulated as correspondence
to the facts (Popper, 1963, p. 223). However, while emphasising
correspondence to the
facts, Popper (1972) nonetheless argues that “… satisfactory
theories must, as a matter of
principle, transcend empirical instances which gave rise to

them” (p. 355).
The basis for Popper’s (1963) argument was Tarski’s (1933,
1944) theory of truth,
which, according to Popper, “… rehabilitated the
correspondence theory of absolute or
objective truth” (p. 223). According to Popper, the implication
of this theory for scientific
truth was that any criterion of scientific truth would be valid
only if subjective criteria for
truth (such as “belief”) were replaced with the notion of
correspondence to the facts (p.
223). To illustrate this idea of objective truth, Popper makes a
trivial example, “the
statement, or the assertion, Snow is white corresponds to the
facts only, and only if, snow
is, indeed, white” (p. 224, emphasis in the original).
In other words, according to Popper (1963, p 223), a scientific
procedure must
lead to the establishment of objective and true knowledge.
However, to understand what
he meant by the terms “objective” and “true,” it is necessary to
undertake a brief
exploration of Popper’s (1972) understanding of the role and
properties of scientific
theory.
According to Popper (1972), the aims of scientific theory are
twofold: (1)
theoretical understanding (which can also be termed
explanation); and (2) practical
understanding (which incorporates prediction and technical
explanation). Popper
emphasised that the aim of science is to provide “satisfactory
explanations” (p. 191) of

things that are “in need of explanation” (p. 191). To do so,
scientific enquiry requires
testable hypotheses. As Popper (1972) observed:
An analysis and comparison of the degrees of testability of
different
theories shows that the testability of a theory grows with its
degree of
universality as well as with its degree of definiteness, or
precision.
[emphasis in original] (p. 356)
According to the positivist perspective of Popper (1972),
scientists propose
conjectures that are then subjected to attempts to refute them.
Popper argue that scientific
progress occurs by a process of empirical falsification or
“refutation” (p. 13) as theories
are tested and discarded, to be replaced with new theories that
have greater universality,
precision, and explanatory power than the preceding
formulations. As Popper noted:
“From the point of view of objective knowledge, all theories
therefore remain
conjectural” [emphasis in original] (p. 80). According to Popper
(1972), objective and
true knowledge is thus derived from a process of empirical
falsification that determines
which statements correspond to the facts (p. 46) and can
therefore be regarded as
scientific “truth” (p. 46).
In terms of Glaserian grounded theory methodology, certain
aspects of the

correspondence dimension seem relevant. For example,
referring to grounded theory,
Glaser and Strauss (1967) note that “… the theory must closely
fit the substantive area in
which it will be used” (p. 237). Similarly, Glaser (1998)
contends that the notion of
fitness can be equated with validity in that it describes the
extent to which concepts and
theory reflect the data from which they are generated.
Further evidence of the relevance of the dimension of
correspondence to
grounded theory has been provided by Glaser (1978), who notes
that a grounded theory
should work—by which he meant that it should be able to
explain, predict, and interpret
what is happening in a specific area of interest. Taken together,
the requirements that a
grounded theory should both “fit” and “work” constitute the
notion of relevance, which
can be defined as a theory’s ability to grasp the core problems
and processes of the
subject under investigation. Such a basic social process is
denoted in Glaserian grounded
theory as a core category.
According to Glaser (1978), such a basic social process consists
of two or more

stages, and can therefore be characterised as “processural” (p.
101). In addition, a basic
social process has several other properties, including: (1) being
pervasive (by which is
meant a fundamental process that continues over time
“irrespective of the conditional
variation of place”); and (2) having full variability (by which is
meant a process that can
be found in different places in different forms).
In most grounded theory studies, such a core category or basic
social process is
the cornerstone of the study. To exemplify, in Lowe’s (1997)
study of mergers, the core
category/basic social process was default remodelling, in
Christiansen (2005) study of
business management, it was opportunizing, and in Bigus (1972)
study of milkmen, the
basic social process was depicted as cultivating. These core
categories or basic social
processes are thus the centrepieces of a grounded theory study,
and bind the other
categories together. For example, in Lowe’s study of bank
mergers, the core category of
default remodelling describes the way that relationships were
redesigned in three main
ways by supporting, terminating, and neglecting.
This search for a core category or basic social process within
the grounded theory
methodology resonates with Popper’s (1963) contention that
“[a] new theory should
proceed from some simple, new, and powerful unifying idea”
[emphasis in original] (p.
241) that connects previously unconnected things.

On the basis of the above discussion, it can be argued that
Glaserian grounded
theory methodology incorporates certain presumptions that have
similarities to the
scientific canons proposed by Popper (1963, 1972). In
particular, the insistence that
grounded theory categories should fit the empirical data and the
emphasis on a core
category grasping the basic social process that (presumably)
exists in the empirical field
are both notions clearly related to the positivist scientific
dimension of correspondence.
These aspects of Glaserian grounded theory are in accordance
with Popper’s insistence
on the existence of objective facts that are independent of the
researcher, and the need to
determine the extent to which theoretical statements correspond
to these facts.
Another similarity between Glaserian grounded theory
methodology and Popper’s
(1972) position is the latter’s criterion of transcendence—
whereby “satisfactory theories
must … transcend empirical instances which gave rise to them”
(p. 355). In a similar
vein, Glaser (1978) argued that a grounded theory repeatedly
places a researcher beyond
the data to new research problems and ideas; that is, the theory
“transcends” (p. 110) the
substantive field of interest by being more general and abstract
than the data from which
it is derived.
Nevertheless, despite these similarities, it is acknowledged that
there are also
salient differences between the so-called “positivist” tradition

(commonly associated with
Popper) and Glaserian grounded theory. In particular, Glaser
(1978) insists that grounded
theory should also be “modifiable” (p. 5) during and after the
data-collection process
when he observes that “… nothing is sacred if the analyst is
dedicated to giving priority
attention to data” (p. 5). This property of modifiability is not
consistent with the
falsification criterion of science as proposed by Popper (1963,
1972) since the notion of
modifiability is based on the perspective that a theory is never
finished but subjected to
continuously modifications.
Dimension of understanding. As previously noted, the second
dimension of a
scientific theory proposed by Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994)
was the dimension of
understanding. According to Ödman (1979), the hermeneutic
tradition in natural science
focuses on understanding the world—that is, it focuses on
establishing meaning and
interpretation. In Ödman’s view, this understanding can be
characterised as “inter-
subjective”—in that it is established through a “dialogue” (p.
49). Ödman (p. 56))

identified three forms of interpretation within the hermeneutic
tradition: (1) elementary
interpretation (which refers to everyday interpretations during
daily activities); (2)
narrative interpretation (which involves a higher level of
abstraction in the process of
interpretation); and (3) scientific interpretation (which is a more
abstract interpretation
made by a researcher). According to Ödman, the last of these,
scientific interpretations
(or theories), are more formal than the other two types of
interpretation, and usually
incorporates a broader span of incidents.
Giddens (1984) acknowledged that scientific theories are more
formal than other
types of interpretations, but noted that it is more difficult to
establish definitive categories
of interpretation in the social sciences than it is in the natural
sciences. For example,
Giddens described what he termed double hermeneutics, which
occurs when second-
order concepts created by sociologists become first-order
concepts by mediating so-
called frames of meaning. In practical terms this can mean that
a second order concept
invented by social scientists, such as the term social class, is
transferred and used by the
social actors in order to orient themselves in their everyday
activities.
Giddens (1984) and Ödman (1979) thus focused on what might
be termed the
dialogical nature of understanding. This means that the process
of understanding is to be
looked upon as a dialogical process between the researcher and

the subject of the
research. In other words, social science can be looked upon as
an interaction process of a
dialogical nature between the scientists and the involved actors,
which in practical terms
can lead to construction of concepts which have the inherent
ability to change both the
perspectives and the activities performed by the actors.
Other hermeneutic philosophers have focused on the context of
the research and
the researcher. For example, Gadamer (1975) contends that an
understanding of a
phenomenon requires researchers to recognise their own
prejudices and notes that “… to
be situated within a tradition does not limit the freedom of
knowledge but makes it
possible” (p. 361). Thus, “a person who thinks he [sic] is free of
prejudices will be
unconsciously dominated by them” (p. 360). However, Gadamer
acknowledged that
scientists must examine the legitimacy of the “fore-meanings
dwelling within [them]” (p.
267), and must adapt these beliefs according to the phenomena
being studied if they are
to arrive at the “truth” (p. 268).
In terms of Glaserian grounded theory methodology, the
dimension of
understanding is clearly relevant, as it is also described as a
dialogical process, even
though a somewhat different vocabulary is used compared with
the hermeneutic tradition.
According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), a grounded theory in
any given area must be
“understandable by laymen concerned with this area” [emphasis

in original] (p. 237).
Such understanding is essential to the usefulness of the theory,
because it “sharpens
[laypersons’] sensitivity” (p. 240) with regard to present
problems and potential
solutions. To accomplish such understanding, Glaser and
Strauss argue that the crucial
concepts need to be both “analytical” (p. 38) and “sensitizing”
(p. 38). Such a sensitizing
concept is, according to Glaser (2001), a concept that has an
instant grab, which enables
people to see an underlying pattern in the things that are going
on in the area of interest.
When a theory consists of such concepts, actors can understand
the theory in the light of
their own personal experiences.
In summary, Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) insistence that concepts
should be
abstract corresponds to Ödman’s (1979) categorisation of a
hermeneutic scientific theory
as a third order of interpretation. Furthermore, Glaserian
grounded theory’s focus on
producing so-called sensitizing concepts can be related to
Giddens’ (1984) contention
that a hermeneutic theory merges with the existing conceptual
framework of the actors
involved in the phenomenon under study. Finally, Gadamer’s

(1975) views on prejudices
are also relevant to Glaserian grounded theory methodology, in
which the vexing
question of the researcher’s presumptions is a recurring issue
for discussion (Glaser,
1998). Indeed, it can be argued that, just as Gadamer was
reluctant to abandon the notion
of one true interpretation, Glaserian grounded theory also
searches for the core process
which can only be discovered if the researcher is able to avoid
pre-existing prejudices
affecting the research process. As expressed by Glaser (1998)
“The grounded theorist has
no preconceived view of what problems they may encounter in
the research or how the
participants resolve their problem or main concern” (p. 118).
Finally, although Glaser (1978) did note that there should be a
separation of data
from theory in grounded theory methodology, the methodology
does allow for a dialogic
research process. This resonates with Giddens’ (1984)
description of a merger between
the framework of the researcher and that of the involved actors,
which implies a
diminishing linguistic and conceptual distance between the
object of the study and the
researcher. Thus, the hermeneutic perspective of establishing
meaning through an inter-
subjective and dialogical process between the social scientists
and the involved actors is
to a great extent present within Glaserian grounded theory
methodology.
Dimension of usefulness. As previously noted, the third

dimension of a scientific
theory proposed by Alvesson and Sköldberg (1994) was the
dimension of usefulness. In
this regard, Laudan (1977) contends that “the central cognitive
test of any theory … [is]
its adequacy as a solution of certain empirical and conceptual
problems” (p. 70). Laudan
defined such an “empirical problem” as “… anything about the
world which strikes us as
odd or otherwise in need of explanation” (p. 15).
According to Laudan (1977), empirical problems can be divided
into three
categories: (1) unsolved problems (which are empirical
problems that have not yet been
solved by any theory); (2) solved problems (which have been
solved by an existing
theory); and (3) anomalous problems (which are not solved by a
particular theory, but
which are solved by a competing theory). According to Laudan,
“… one of the hallmarks
of scientific progress is the transformation of anomalous and
unsolved problems into
solved ones” (p. 18).
Whereas Laudan (1977) referred to empirical problems as
phenomena that have
not yet been satisfactorily explained, Jensen (1995) referred to
practical problems, for

which it is possible to imagine situation that is more desirable”
(p. 16).
In addition to treating empirical (or practical) problems, both
Laudan (1977) and
Jensen (1995) also discussed conceptual problems. According to
Laudan (1977), a
conceptual problem is a problem that is “… exhibited by some
theory or another” (p. 48).
This implies that conceptual problems cannot be viewed in
isolation from theories, which
sometimes is the case with empirical problems. The relationship
between theory and
conceptual problems was explained by Laudan (1996) in the
following terms: “… a
theory solves or eliminates a conceptual problem when [the
theory] fails to exhibit a
conceptual difficulty of its predecessor” (p. 81). In a similar
vein, Jensen argued that a
theoretical problem occurs when there is something wrong with
existing theory, which
can be manifested as contradictions that are puzzling. Jensen
also commented upon the
relationship between theoretical problems and practical
problems, and concluded that the
solution of a practical problem sometimes requires more
knowledge in a specific area of
interest, which, in itself, can constitute a conceptual problem.
In terms of grounded theory methodology, the dimension of
usefulness is clearly
relevant. Indeed, Glaser (1998) stated that a grounded theory
can provide two useful
contributions to conceptual problems. First, in practical terms,
grounded theory can open
up a particular area by providing concepts that are appropriate

to the real contemporary
activities and challenges of that area of interest. Secondly, in a
more theoretical sense, a
grounded theory can synthesise and integrate existing concepts
into a broader view. In
both cases, a grounded theory clearly fulfils the criterion of
usefulness.
Moreover, the focus of grounded theory methodology is often
on how actors
control their daily endeavours. In the words of Glaser and
Strauss (1967), a grounded
theory provides the user with “… partial control over the
structure and process of daily
situations as they change through time” [emphasis in original]
(p. 237). This useful
function is accomplished by the application of a grounded
theory that consists of both
“controllable variables” (p. 245), (which give the user a feeling
of control in situations of
change), and “access variables” (p. 248), (which provide access
to existing controllable
variables).
However, although Glaserian grounded theory methodology
certainly has the
property of usefulness; the effectiveness of this dimension is
dependent on the dimension
of understanding. According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), it is
important that the
concepts generated by grounded theory are not so abstract that
the sensitizing effect is
lost. As Glaser (2007) observed, the properties of understanding
and usefulness are both
natural consequences of a theory that is well grounded in the
empirical field. It is thus

apparent that the actual groundedness, that is, the extent to
which the theory is grounded
in empirical data determines its ability to facilitate both
understanding and usefulness for
the involved actors.
Summary of Applicability of Dimensions to Glaserian Grounded
Theory
These three dimensions of correspondence, understanding, and
usefulness, which
in this discussion represent the perspectives of positivism,
philosophical hermeneutics,
and pragmatism each have a place within a substantive theory
produced by Glaserian
grounded theory methodology. For example, it is clear that there
are similarities between
Glaserian grounded theory methodology and the so-called
positivist paradigm, as
formulated by Popper (1963, 1972). In particular, both
approaches aim to identify
something that lies in the empirical field waiting to be
discovered. Moreover, both
approaches aim to generate transcending theories, and both seek
to unify previously

disconnected phenomena.
It can also be argued that there are similarities between
Glaserian grounded theory
methodology and the hermeneutic tradition. For example, both
approaches focus on the
establishment of meaning and interpretation through inter-
subjectivity and dialogue.
Moreover, with regard to the vexing issue of researcher
prejudices, there are
resemblances between Glaserian grounded theory and
Gadamers’ (1975) emphasis on the
role of “fore-meanings” (p. 267) in arriving at the truth. As
explained by Gadamer, “the
important thing is to be aware of one’s own bias, so that the text
can present itself in all
its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own
fore-meanings.” (p. 269)
With regard to the three specific dimensions, it can be argued
that usefulness and
understanding are especially applicable to Glaserian grounded
theory. Glaser probably
emphasizes the dimension of usefulness more than other
properties within his grounded
theory methodology, and the preceding discussion has
demonstrated that this property is
strongly linked with the dimension of understanding. However,
despite the influence of
the positivist tradition on grounded theory methodology, it is
acknowledged that the
dimension of correspondence has a slightly different meaning
within Glaserian grounded
theory from that ascribed to it in the positivist research
tradition. More precisely,
correspondence in Glaserian grounded theory methodology

refers to the production of a
substantive theory that is useful for the actors in the area of
interest, whereas
correspondence in the positivist tradition has always referred to
a true theory that
corresponds to the facts. This difference of emphasis with
respect to the dimension of
correspondence obviously has implications for the notion of
accuracy. In this regard,
Glaser (2003) downplayed the importance of accuracy in
grounded theory when he
argued that this is not a first priority for grounded theory,
because the methodology
expressly envisages that theory will be continuously modified in
accordance with new
data; as a consequence, a grounded theory is always in progress
and never finalised.
Indeed, Glaser contends that “worrisome accuracy” (p. 130) is
not the issue for grounded
theory, because the principal focus for grounded theory is
whether it explains “how a
main concern is continually resolved in a substantive area and
its general conceptual
applicability” (p. 130). This pragmatic position can be
contrasted with the emphasis on
the notion of objective truth in the positivist tradition, which
was expressed by Popper
(1963) in the following terms: “… the very idea of error, or of
doubt, (in its
straightforward sense) implies the idea of an objective truth
which we may fail to reach”
(p. 226).
It is apparent from this discussion that Glaserian grounded
theory methodology
has significant affinity with philosophical positions that

emphasise the dimensions of
understanding and usefulness, but a somewhat different
interpretation of the dimension of
correspondence. In terms of the model of Alvesson and
Sköldberg (1994), the grounded
theory methodology can thus be positioned as shown in Figure
1.
Correspondence
Figure 1. Positioning Grounded Theory Methodology within the
Model of Alvesson and
Sköldberg (1994)
As seen above, within Glaserian grounded theory methodology
the most
emphasized desiderata or aims of science are that a scientific
theory should be useful and
providing understanding (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The
dimension of correspondence is
there, but in a different meaning than in the perspective of
Popper (1963), since it is not
about what is true in the sense that it is corresponding to the
facts (p. 223), but about
what can bring the involved actors conceptual understanding

and be useful for them.
Accuracy and Credibility
The above discussion raises the issue of what is meant by the
notions of accuracy
and credibility. By adopting a more instrumental and pragmatic
view of “truth” (and the
cognitive goals of science in general), Glaserian grounded
theory methodology ostensibly
leaves itself open to criticism with regard to the notions of
accuracy and credibility.
Aside from the positivist canons of validity and reliability,
there are other criteria
for the quality of qualitative research, for example,
trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba,
1985); trustworthiness, rigor, and quality (Golafshani, 2003); or
the act of putting data
into a broader context by historical and structural analysis
(Wainwright, 1997). Glaser
(1998) has a different perspective on quality based on the view
that a grounded theory is
modifiable. More specifically, Glaser (2003), contends that the
issues of “worrisome
accuracy” (p. 130) and whether a theory is true or false are not
relevant when pursuing
theory that is, by its very nature, subject to continuous
modification, as it aims to solve
empirical and conceptual problems. However, if accuracy is not
to be regarded as the
primary criterion for judging the credibility of a theory
generated by grounded theory
methodology, Glaser suggests other criteria of credibility will

be required. Glaser (1998)
offers the following criteria for credibility of a grounded
theory:
• Fit: According to Glaser (1998) is another word for “validity”
(p. 18).
The term fit refers to whether the concepts generated in a
grounded
theory adequately describe patterns in the data. In Glaserian
grounded
theory methodology, fit is continuously sharpened during the
research
process by ongoing comparison of incoming data with existing
categories.
Understanding
Usefulness
• Grounded Theory
• Workability: According to Glaser (1998) refers to whether the
concepts account for the main concern of the participants and
how it is
“continually resolved” (p.18).

• Relevance: Refers to whether the theory is important to the
practitioners and whether it evokes instant “grab” (Glaser,
1998, p.
18).
• Modifiability: Implies that the theory is never “wrong;” rather
it is
continuously modified because, as argued by Glaser (1998),
“new data
never provides disproof, just an analytical challenge” (p. 19).
Having discussed the general question of the aims of science
(including the
concept of a scientific theory, and the related issues of accuracy
and credibility), it is now
appropriate to turn to the second question posed in the
Introduction: “How should a
scientific methodology be chosen?”
Choosing a Scientific Methodology
With regard to the means that are adopted to achieve a certain
end in scientific
enquiry, there is a dispute about processual credibility between
what might be termed the
positivist perspective and the relativist perspective. From the
positivist perspective, there
is a belief that strict adherence to certain methodological rules
will invariably result in the
objective truth. Popper (1963) thus argues that methodological
choice is based on

axiomatic conventions (such as correspondence to the facts),
and that there is therefore no
room for discussion about how different methodological
alternatives might fulfil different
objectives. In essence, this positivist position is based on the
traditional scientific model
of rationality, which consists of three levels of agreement (or
disagreement): (1) matters
of fact or theory; (2) matters of methodology; and (3) cognitive
goals or aims of science.
According to this schema, disagreements on the first (fact or
theory) level are settled at
the second (methodological) level, disputes at the second
(methodological) level are
settled at the third (cognitive or axiological) level, and
disagreements about the third level
(such as the cognitive goals of science) are irresolvable.
In contrast, from the relativist perspective, Feyerabend (1975)
suggests that
adherence to prescriptive methodological principles can
represent a hindrance to the
attainment of scientific knowledge. According to this view,
history shows that scientific
progress has, more often than not, resulted from the
abandonment of strict
methodological principles, because all methodologies, no matter
how well conducted,
have their limitations. Feyerabend therefore advocates the use
of so-called counter-
induction, which involves the utilisation of a combination of
various methodological
perspectives, including non-scientific methods, in order to
develop knowledge of reality.
In effect, Feyerabend’s position is that “anything goes”—a
position that is not amenable

to arguments about the justification of a chosen methodology.
Indeed, Feyerabend
questions whether there is any connection between idea and
action in arguing that
scientific progress often results from the actual dismissal of
reason. For example,
Feyerabend argues that the idea of starting with a problem that
needs to be solved should
be abandoned because, in his view, most human achievement
begins with extraneous
(and non-argumentative) activities, such as play.
It is thus apparent that the logical conclusion reached by
extrapolation of both the
extreme positivist perspective and the extreme relativist
perspective is that the ultimate
cognitive aims of science (and hence the choice of
methodology) are not amenable to
rational debate. Glaser (1998) argues a different position,
emphasising that grounded
theory methodology fulfils certain aims and that other
methodologies fulfil other aims.
Glaser thus took a more pragmatic view of the question of
methodological choice. Glaser
describes his view on methodological choice as, “it is merely
another methodology, not a
best methodology that replaces and supplements other
methodologies. The researcher
should always (at least try) to choose the method best for him
[sic] and for the problem at

hand” (p. 11).
This reflects the fact that neither the extreme relativist
perspective, nor the
extreme positivist perspective represents the essentially
pragmatic view of
methodological justification adopted by Glaserian grounded
theory methodology. But this
does not mean that this position lacks scholarly support within
the scientific community.
Indeed, a well-documented view that closely resembles the
approach that is apparent
within Glaserian grounded theory methodology is that of
Laudan (1984, 1996).
According to Laudan (1984, 1996), the cognitive aims of
science are not immune to
debate, even among different paradigms. In support of this
view, Laudan (1984)
presented a reticulated model of scientific rationality (as
illustrated in Figure 2).
Figure 2. A Simplified Version of Laudan’s (1984) Triadic
Network of Justification
As can be seen in the diagram, this model consists of the three
elements of the traditional
scientific model of rationality noted above—(1) theories; (2)
methods; and (3) aims.

However, in contrast to the traditional model, the three elements
are connected in a
“triadic network of justification” (p. 63). This means that the
three elements are posited
as being inter-related in that sense that they can justify each
other in a non-hierarchical
fashion (rather than being posited as separate hierarchical
levels). As a result, a decision
with respect to one element can be motivated from a position
with respect to another
element. For example, just as issues of facts (or theories) can
constrain methods, so
methods can justify theories; similarly, aims can justify
methods, but methods must
exhibit ”realisability” (p. 62) with respect to selected aims, that
is, make it probable that a
certain method will obtain a particular goal. According to
Laudan (1984) the elements of
this model “imply that our factual beliefs drastically shape our
views of which sorts of
methods are viable, and about which sorts of methods do in fact
promote which sorts of
aims.” (p. 62). In other words:
Aims Theories
Methods

• A scientific aim is justified by being methodologically
realisable
• Matters of fact (or theory) must harmonise with aims
This model differs from the position adopted by both the
extreme positivist
perspective and the extreme relativist perspective by enabling
different aims in science to
be subjected to a justification process that goes beyond
conventions and paradigms. By
adopting a pragmatic criterion of realisability, that is expressing
an aim of probability to
be realised, the model thus transcends both the positivist search
for true theories (which is
difficult to maintain, because it is, as argued by Laudan (1996),
impossible to ascertain
the extent to which a nebulous criterion such as truth has been
realised), and the relativist
position that the different aims of science (and hence
methodologies) are
incommensurable. In other words, if decisions about scientific
aims and methods are
based on the triadic network of justification, such decisions
become an exercise in
empirical comparison, rather than a matter of adherence to
conventions.
Conclusions
The major conclusion of this analysis is that a Glaserian
grounded theory can be
understood as a conceptual theory that primarily aims to

enhance understanding and be
useful in the substantive field of interest. It thus fulfils the first
two dimensions of any
scientific theory, as enunciated by Alvesson and Sköldberg
(1994). However, the third
dimension of correspondence is interpreted within Glaserian
grounded theory as the
ability to depict reality in terms of relevance and usefulness,
rather than as a theoretical
property of objective “truth.”
There is affinity between Glaserian grounded theory and the
perspective of
Popper (1963, 1972) in terms of: (1) grasping something that
lies out there waiting for
discovery (correspondence); (2) finding a core category, which
is similar to Popper’s
(1963,) search for a “simple, new, and powerful unifying idea”
[emphasis in original] (p.
241) that connects previously unconnected things; and (3) an
emphasis on transcending
theories.
Similarly, there is relatedness between Glaserian grounded
theory and
hermeneutics in terms of: (a) the notion that concepts should be
abstract; and (b) a
dialogical research process, which relates to the hermeneutic
emphasis on the diminishing
linguistic and conceptual distance between the object of the
study and the researcher.
Glaserian grounded theory also has affinity with the more
pragmatic “problem-
solving” stance, as expressed by Laudan (1977) and Jensen
(1995) in terms of focusing

on solving empirical and theoretical problems. This was
expressed by Glaser (1998) as
either “opening up” (p. 78) a new area by providing appropriate
concepts or, in a more
theoretical sense, synthesising and integrating existing concepts
into a broader view.
It is also evident that the Glaserian grounded theory
methodology is pragmatic
with regard to the question of means and ends in science. The
methodology upholds a
position outside those of the positivists and relativists in the
sense that it contends that
methodological issues are not given by the conventions that
underpin both the positivist
perspective and the relativist perspective. Rather, Glaserian
grounded theory
methodology holds that methodological choice is, in itself, an
empirical question in
which the aims, method, and theory can justify each other in a
non-hierarchical fashion.
Practical implications
Investigating the extent to which the different philosophical
schools are present

within Glaserian grounded theory methodology has practical
implications. First, this
discussion hopefully opens up the methodology for a broader
use in the sense that it can
be used by researchers independent of research tradition and
philosophical standpoint.
The methodology can be used by positivists to discover what
actually lies undiscovered
in the empirical field of interest or to connect and unify before
unconnected categories or
constructs. It can be used by researchers inspired by
hermeneutics as a tool for creating
dialogical understanding and inter-subjective interpretations. Or
it can be used by
researcher with a more pragmatic standpoint to create something
conceptually that will be
useful for the practitioners by solving empirical and conceptual
problems.
Second, this discussion clarifies the philosophical ingredients in
Glaserian
grounded theory methodology. By this clarification, instead of
viewing this methodology
as either objectivistic or subjectivistic, a more nuanced picture
of the epistemological and
ontological underpinnings of a grounded theory can be depicted.
Third, in the descriptions by Glaser (for example, Glaser 1992,
2001, 2003), the
grounded theory methodology is described as having certain
specific characteristics and
specific procedures that separate this methodology from other
methodologies, and Glaser
strongly emphasizes that they should not be mixed. This
discussion places the Glaserian
grounded theory methodology in context and shows that the

methodology is not that
orthodox in the first place. Instead, its procedures are actually
compromises between
different perspectives to begin with. This conclusion should not
be looked upon as a
problem, but rather as a possibility for broader, and perhaps a
more conscious, use by
researchers from different research traditions.
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Author Note
Lars-Johan Åge, Ph.D, is a researcher at Stockholm School of
Economics. Having
practical experiences of sales management, his areas of interests
are sales and sales
management. His dissertation thesis was a Grounded Theory
study of complex selling
processes in contemporary industrial markets. Correspondence
regarding this article can
be addressed to his E-mail: [email protected]
Copyright 2011: Lars-Johan Åge and Nova Southeastern

University
Article Citation
Åge, L.-J. (2011). Grounded theory methodology: Positivism,
hermeneutics, and
pragmatism. The Qualitative Report, 16(6), 1599-1615.
Retrieved from
http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR16-6/age.pdf
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further
reproduction prohibited without permission.
ADM_113910_20111101_00008.pdfGrounded Theory
Methodology: Positivism, Hermeneutics, and
PragmatismStockholm School of Economics, Stockholm,
SwedenAuthor NoteCopyright 2011: Lars-Johan Åge and Nova
Southeastern University
Milestone 4 feed back
Great job addressing the comments I made on your Milestone
Two assignment. For the final project, you will need to add
some more information to your Participants section. You
should describe the participants in more detail. How were they
recruited? What were their ages/ethnicities? Did they have
children with special needs?
You could also describe your methods in more detail. Who
conducted the interviews? How long were the inerviews? Were
they over the phone? In person? Online?
Your data analysis plan should be described in more detail as

well, in paragraph format. You should write something like:
"The hypothesis will be examined using a one-way ANOVA
with the following variables as the IV and DV....." It should be
about one paragraph total.
You should report the results in APA style, as you did in your
problem sets. For example, the APA style format for reporting
a t test is: "There were significantly more single parent
households reporting a change in employment status due to
childcare (M=45.6) as compared to two parents households
(M=23.4), t(134)=4.6, p<.05."
It's fine to include your SPSS output in the paper, but please
have a separate Results section describing all of your results
together, rather than having each described after the SPSS
output.

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