Rizvi-CIVILMILITARYRELATIONSNATIONAL-1989 (2).pdf

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND NATIONAL STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA
Author(s): Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Source: Pakistan Horizon , April 1989, Vol. 42, No. 2 (April 1989), pp. 47-78
Published by: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41393356
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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND NATIONAL
STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA
Hasan-Askari Rizvi*
National stability is one of the major goals of the political systems
S«tith Asia. It requires the establishment of viable political institutions an
processes capable of coping with the participatory and distributive pressur
and facilitating a smooth transition of power. The ways and means ar
be developed to accommodate the linguistic» ethnic and regional identi
in a manner that interdependence is promoted amongst these identi
and they perceive It advantageous to identify themselves with, and w
within, such a national-political framework.
The politicai activities aimed at achieving the goal of nátion
stability fall in what is described as the civilian or political dom
However, these cannot be totally isolated from what is tradition
designated as the military domain. As the distinction between
military and the civil is being gradually eroded due to the multi-face
interaction across the boundaries of the two domains, the dynamics
civil-military relations in a polity have a direct bearing on national st
lity and the related matters. It is not merely the former influencing
latter, the issues and problems relating to national stability also have
impact on the nature and direction of civil-military relations.
* Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Pun
university. He is at present doing research at the Stidaeien Institut, Universi
•f Heidelberg.
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Despite the recognition of the relationship between civil-military
interaction and national stability, it is difficult to establish correlatlonship
in precise terms between a particular pattern of civil-military relationship
and a specific level of national stability. It may not be possible to suggest
that civilian supremacy over the military is a guarantee of arriving at a
consensus on the operational norms of the polity and vice versa. Finer
correlates the level of political culture with the vulnerability of a polity
to military Intervention. The states with the "mature" political culture
can maintain civilian supremacy over the military, i Huntington links
military intervention in politics or the emergence of the military-domin-
ance model of the policy to the lack of political institutionalization^ Ken-
nedy argues that the political systems suffering from a crisis of political
legitimacy are vulnerable to successful or unsuccessful coups. з These views
are shared by a large number of other scholars who recognize the problems
in the political domain as the major causes of the military's ascendancy
in the polity. The issues like a broad-based consensus on the operational
norms of the polity, a general acceptance of a political formula for sharing
and transfer of power, a widespread acceptance of the political institutions
and processes, and public attachment to, and involvement in, the political
institutions are highlighted as the pre-requisites for a stable pattern of
civil-military relations, with emphasis on civilian supremacy. These writers
do explain why the failure to address these issues or a crisis in the civilian
domain produces changes in the pattern of civil-military relations but their
discourses do not provide sufficient guidance as to how far military rule or
dominance facilitates the conditions conducive to national stability.
The initial response to the rash of coups in Asia and Africa in the
late fifties and the early sixties was that the expanded role of the military
elite was conducive to facilitating socio-economic change, national intégra-
tion and political stability, including the promotion of liberal- democratic
norms. However, this optimism proved shortlived and several compara-
I. S.E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (London: Pall Mal!, 1962), pp. 87-89.
2. S.P. Huntington, Politicai Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968), pp. 194-96.
3. G. Kennedy, The Military in the Third World (London: Charlee Scribner, 1974),
p. 25.
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tive studies of the military dominated political systems in the mid-seventies
and the eighties concluded that the military dominated polities did not
necessarily evolve more satisfactory solutions to the problems of stability
and change, although some such regimes registered gains in the initial
stages. The experience suggests that in the long run, the military regimes
art confronted with a host of problems not different from those faced by a
civil regime, i.e. Inability to create self sustaining political institutions,
the crisis of legitimacy, and widespread political alienation.
What matters most is not the character of the regime but its ability
te pursue the goal of national stability. If a government, civil or military,
can address the problems pertaining to consensus building, political
participation, legitimacy and the attachment of the populace with the
polity, it can promote stability and sustain a particular pattern of civil-
military relations. However, the inability of the ruling elite to cope with
these problems will always bring about changes in the pattern of civil-
military relations. If the civil/political regime suffers from such a failure, it
will always find it difficult to sustain the primacy of the civil over the
military. Similarly, a military regime will be confronted with serious
problems if it is unable to find satisfactory solution to these problems.
Either the military regime Is replaced by another set of generals or the
political elite get an opportunity to stage a partial or total comeback or
the regime has to rely more heavily on coercion to sustain Itself.
As a hierarchical and authoritarian institution, the military empha-
sizes internal cohesion, discipline and bureaucratic rigidity and puts a
"premium on authoritarian rather than democratic attitude."4 This
perspective evaluates policy options by invoking what It considers "the
criteria of rationality, efficiency and sound administration."5 Such a
mental framework is not usually accommodative towards cultural and ethnic
diversity found in most Third World states and shows impatience towards
4. Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Politicai Power (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), p. 79.
5. Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Pêlitics: Military Coups and Covernmentt (Englewood
Cliffs: Prçntiçe Hall, 1977), p. 119,
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dissent and political competition. The military elite either endeavours to
by-pass/suppress diversity and dissent or engages in constitutional and
political engineering to create a selective consensus. This provides tem-
porary solutions but, in the long run, these efforts do not produce viable
solutions to the problems of national stability. At times, these problems
are accentuated by extended military dominance of the political system.
South Asia provides a leading example of interaction between differ-
ent patterns of civil-military relations and national stability. India is a
striking case of civilian supremacy over the military in a continent where
the military has either directly assumed power or it has shaped Itself Into
a political force capable of dominating the core political institutions.*
A functional democracy, Institutionalization of the electoral process and
smooth and constitutional transfers of power in India created a delicate
balance among the social, political and economic forces and strengthened
the management capacity of the political system. This made it possible
to sustain the existing pattern of civil-military relations characterized by
the primacy of the civil leadership.
Pakistan and Bangladesh are two examples of the military-dominance
model of civil-military relations. These states adhered to the principle of
civilian supremacy over the military at the time of independence but
their inability to deal effectively with the Issues and problems of national
stability led to the transformation of the pattern of interaction between
the civil and the military. The military has, by now, emerged as the most
powerful political actor in Pakistan and Bangladesh. For most of the years
since independence, the military has alternated between RULE and ROLE.
However, Bangladesh's experience needs to be distinguished from that
of Pakistan. Whereas the military In Pakistan has preserved Internal
6. Sri Lanka is another case where the participator/ system and civilian supremacy
over the military proved effective. However, the political system has been under serious
stresses since the early eighties mainly due to the intensification of internal strife and
violence, partial or total collapse of the civil administration in the troubled areas, heavy
reliance on the control apparatus of the state, postponement of parliamentary elections
in 1983, and India's militar/ involvement in the civil strife in support of $ri Lankan
Government.
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cohesion despite its active Involvement In politics, the Bangladesh militar/
suffers from cleavages and there have been several revolts and counter
coup attempts since it first assumed power in August 1975. It can be
argued that TWO-AND-A HALF MODELS OF civil-military relations
have developed in South Asia: India (civilian supremacy), Pakistan and
Bangladesh (military dominance), and Bangladesh (£: factionalism and dis-
sension).
The Heritage
The military in South Asia was organized on the modern lines by the
British who introduced a theory of civil-military relations that recognized
the separate domains of the civil, and the military, emphasized the over-
all civilian control, and underscored the military's aloofness from active
politics. They viewed the military as an Important Instrument of the state
which served as a shield not only for the British rule in India but also for
the British empire. It performed four major functions: defence of India
on the northwestern frontier; intermittent expeditions against the
Pushtoon tribes; assistance to the civil authorities to deal with law and
order situations caused by communal riots and political agitation as well
as extension of limited support to relief operations; and participation In
military expeditions outside India undertaken by the British government.
A high degree of professional excellence was demonstrated by the military
in performance of their duties and the British-Indian government was
successful In keeping them aloof from active politics. The only exceptions
were the formation of the Indian National Army (INA) and the naval
mut|ny of 1946. These were limited affairs and the overall disposition of
the military - subordination to the civil and non-involvement in active
politics - was not impaired.
THE CHANGING PATTERNS
Though India and Pakistan shared military traditions, t
moved in two different directions so far as civil-military relations
concerned. Bangladesh also emphasized the principle of civilian s
macy over the military In the early years of Independence. Later, it
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only followed the footsteps of Pakistan but also suffered from dissensions
and cleavages In the military which led the commanders to attempt coups
and revolts against one another. This partly distinguished the Bangladesh
model of civil-military relations from that of Pakistan.
India
India's political Institutions and processes, based on the 1950 consti-
tution, have proved durable and functional to different aspects of national
stability. Although 59 amendments have so far been made In the constitu-
tion yet its primary features remain intact. The parliamentary system
based on the Westminster model, designates the Prime Minister as the
chief executive who is responsible to a directly elected lower house of the
parliament. A federal system divides powers between the Union and
the states, although the Union Is quite powerful and it can also Invoke
emergency powers. Periodical elections on the basis of universal adult
franchise, civil and political rights, and an Independent Judiciary have also
been provided In the constitution.
Many Individuals and groups questioned the rationale of liberal-
democratic-parliamentary system when It was Introduced in 1950. Some
continue to be sceptical about the capability of these Institutions to respond
to the problems of the society. While others argue that an authoritarian
system is more In line with India's tradition and heritage. However,
the Institutions and processes established under the 1950 Constitution have
proved to be viable and these have succeeded In cultivating a widespread
support In the polity. The political system provides sufficient opportuni-
ties to Its citizens for political participation by holding elections regularly
at the Union, state and local levels. So far, India has held 8 general elections
(1951-52, 1957, 1962, 1967, 1971, 1977, 1980, 1984) at the Union level, not
to speak of the state level and focal elections. The efficacy of the ballot-box
was demonstrated when the governments changed on the basis of the
election results at the Union as well as the state levels. At one time in
the late sixties, more than half of the states were being governed by the
non-Congress ministries. No doubt, the Congress Party which controlled
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the Union government (except during Áprií Í977-January ¡980), used
the emergency powers or resorted to the device of President's rule time
and again to dislodge the opposition governments in the states,7 the
issue was ultimately resolved by holding elections and the Congress had
to accept the reality that it could not rule all states.
The transfers of power in India were peaceful and constitutional.
On three occasions, power changed hands at the Union level within the
same party. In 1964, Jawaharlal Nehru was succeeded by Lai Bahadur
Shastri. Two years later (1966), Shastrl's death confronted the Congress
with the succession question for the second time. Indira Gandhi was
selected to succeed Shastri. In 1984, when Indira Gandhi was assassinated,
the ruling Congress (1) selected her son, Rajiv Gandhi, to succeed her.
In less than three months after he assumed office, Rajiv Gandhi decided to
hold general elections. The resounding success of the Congress (I) in the
December 1984 poll, conferred legitimacy on his leadership. There were
two instances when power shifted from the ruling party to the opposition
as a consequence of the defeat of the ruling party in the general elections.
In 1977, when the Congress party led by Indira Gandhi was defeated In the
polls, power was handed over to the opposition alliance, Janata, and its
leader, Morarji Desai, assumed the office of Prime Minister. As the Janata
could not hold itself together, mid term polls were called in January 1980.
The Congress (I) won the polls and Indira Gandhi triumphantly returned
to power. * There are numerous examples of constitutional transfers of
power from one party to another at the state level.
India's approach towards linguistic, ethnic and regional identities is
relatively accommodative and pluralistic. It does not endeavour to steam-
7. A stud/ argues that the Union government is using its right to suspend state
governments more often than was the case in the past. During i 950-65, only 9 state govern-
ments were suspended on account of failure of their constitutional machinery. This
number rose to 67 during the next 15 years (1966-81). This trend holds today. Amai
Ray, "From i Constitutional to an Authoritarian System of Government: Interaction
between Politics and the Constitution in India," The Journal of Commonwealth and Com-
parative Politics , XXV, 3 November 1987, pp. 275-291.
8. For a study of selection of Prime Ministers in India, see Subrata К. Mitra, "India:
Dynastic Rule or the Démocratisation of Power," Third World Quarterly , 10, I, January
1988, pp. 129-59.
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roll diversity to create a menolithic Indian identity. Rather, these Identities
are defused by their accommodation and articulation within a loose and
pluralistic national framework. Four principles seem to have governed
the government's attitude towards such demands. These are: the regional
demands should stop short of secession; the demands should be based on
language and culture rather than explicitly on religion; the demand must
enjoy a widespread support in the region; and the demands for division of
multi-lingual states must have the support of different language groups.9
This approach has not completely solved all problems and some of
these continue to haunt India's policy makers. However, the reasonable
opportunities of political participation and an accommodative approach
have either defused the problems or kept these within manageable limits.
The electoral process has been especially useful in extending opportuni-
ties to the citizens and various identities to get Involved in the political
process at the union, state and local levels. It enhances their political
efficacy, promotes interdependence and bargaining among them and
provides the leaders with opportunities for upward mobility in the
political system. This no doubt adds complexity to the political process
and conflictual and harmonious interactions take place simultaneously.
However, when various identities and interests have a hope of advance-
ment within the framework of the political system, they develop stakes in
It which strengthens their identification and attachment with such a
political system. This promotes the efficacy and legitimacy of the political
Institutions and processes which, in turn, facilitates national stability.
As the political elite In India were successful In preserving a reasonable
level of national stability, they kept the military out of active politics and
reinforced the primacy of the civil over the military. The toj> brass of the
military did not have reasons or opportunities to expand their role and
engage in overt political activity.
Pakistan
The pattern of civil-military relations characterized by civilian supre-
macy underwent a complete transformation in Pakistan within a decade or
9. Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and foli tics in North India (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1974), pp. 17-18.
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so. this shift of the military from subordination to the civil and aloofness
from active politics to a commanding role in politics was caused by the
gradual decay and degeneration of the civil institutions and processes.
At first, the top brass of the military emerged as Important actors in the
decision-making process at the national level. Later, in 1958, they dis-
placed the civil elite and assumed power without facing any problem.
Not many tears were shed at the overthrow of the civil/political institu-
tions. Since then, the military either directly ruled the country under
the cover of martial law (1958-62, 1969-71, 1977-85) or enforced a carefully
tailored political system which civilianized military rule, protected the
entrenched interest of the military and ensured the continuation of the
policies and some of the key personnel from martial law to the post martial
law period. The only exception was the Bhutto era (December 1971
to July 1977) when he asserted the primacy of the civil over the military
but he could not sustain this when his regime was completely paralyzed
by the PNA agitation in the Spring and Summer of 1977.
Parliamentary system of government was introduced at the time of
independence under the first interim constitution (1947). This was carried
over to the first permanent constitution (1956) which lasted until October
1958, when the military assumed power. During these 1 1 years, Pakistan
had 7 prime ministers and 8 cabinets. The parliamentary system of govern-
ment was reintroduced in 1973 which lasted until July 1977, when the
military assumed power. Eight years later (1985), the military reverted
Pakistan to parliamentary system but before doing so, the military brought
about several changes in the 1973 Constitution which weakened the posi-
tion of the Prime Minister vis-a-vis the President.
The political elite found it difficult to evolve a broadbased consensus
on the fundamental features of the political system. Serious disagreements
on several constitutional and political issues delayed the formulation of the
first constitution. These issues included, inter alia , federalism and auto-
nomy for provinces, the Islamic state, the national language, and the
electoral system. By the time the political leaders succeeded in framing the
first permanent constitution (1956), a strong pattern of violation of parlia-
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mentary and democratic principles had been established. The constitution
could not restrain the political drift and degeneration which made it
possible for the military to dislodge the fragile political institutions. The
1962 Constitution, handed down to the people by the military government
of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, could not create viable political infra-structur*.
It crumbled in the face of the massive street agitation in 1969 which
reverted the political system to military rule. The 1973 Constitution
defined the role of the military as defence "against external aggression or
threat of war, and subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon
to do so." The oath laid down for the officers and men of the armed
forces proscribed any involvement in active politics.10 The constitution
also described any attempt to abrogate or conspire to abrogate and subvert
the constitution "by the use of force or show of force or by any other
means" as high treason.11 These provisions could not sustain civilian
supremacy over the military. When Bhutto's government was besieged
by a massive popular agitation in 1977, the military found it convenient to
assume power.
The transfers of power in Pakistan in 1958 (assumption of power
by Field Marshal Ayub Khan), 1969 (Ayub Khan to General Yahya Khan),
1971 (Yahya Khan to Z.A. Bhutto), and 1977 (Bhutto to General Zia-ul-Haq)
were not in accordance with any constitutional formula and Involved the
military. The civllianization of military rule in 1962 and 1985 was carried
out under martial law decrees which ensured the continuation of the
coup-making army commanders as the heads of state/government after
the withdrawal of martial law.
The interim and permanent constitutions adhered to the participatory
norms but when it came to their operationalization, the ruling elite did
not create sufficient opportunities for the people for political participation.
Either they avoided general elections or manipulated the electoral laws
and procedures to obtain the desired results which often created doubts
10. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Article 245 and Third
Schedule.
Ii. Ibid., Article 6 (I) and (2).
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»bout the legitimacy of the electoral exercise. During 1947-58, when
the political elite were in command, only one election was held at the
provincial level. Once the Muslim League lost the 1954 provincial elec-
tions In East Pakistan, it did not take the ri$k of holding elections at the
national level. Ayub Khan introduced indirect elections. The first direct
general elections were held in December 1970 by the military regime of
General Yahya Khan but the military regime did not accept the results and
refused to hand over power to the majority party, the Awami League
led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. Second general elections (March 1977)
were organized by the civil government of Z.A. Bhutto but the ruling
People's Party employed such methods to ensure its victory that raised
strong doubts about the credibility of the elections. * 2 The opposition
parties reacted by launching a mass movement against the government.
The ruling party which had won over two-thirds seats in the National
Assembly a few weeks ago could not sustain itself in the wake of the mass
movement. Third general elections (February 1985), organized by the
military government of General Zia-ul-Haq, were designed to exclude
dissident political parties and groups. No political party was allowed to
take part in the polls and the election campaigning was carefully regulated
by the military government.
The national elite was less accommodative towards ethnic, linguistic
and regional identities and attempted to promote national stability by
circumscribing thejr role and coopting those who identified with their
perspectives and were prepared to counterbalance the dissident political
groups. These political arrangements could not create sense of participa-
tion In the smaller ethnic, linguistic and regional identities. Some of these
identities and groups began to view the national political framework and
processes as hostile to their interests which sharpened cleavages in the
polity. This accenuated their alienation and they began to question
the legitimacy of the political system.13
12. See, White Paper on the Conduct of General Elections in March 1977 (Islamabad:
Government of Pakistan, 1978).
13. For a study of interaction between the ethnic-linguistic identities and the
national political system, see Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Develop-
ment (Boulder: Westview, 1980); Khalid Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan : The Nature and
Direction of Chcnge (New York: Praeger, 1980).
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As the political elite were unable to tackle the problems pertaining
to national stability in a satisfactory manner, they could not continue to
assert their primacy over the military. The rampant political alienation and
the accentuation of the crisis of legitimacy for the ruling elite compromised
their political efficacy. Some of them began to look towards the military
to strengthen their position vis-a-vis their political adversaries. This
improved the bargaining power of the top brass of the military who found
it convenient to expand their role in the polity. When the political drift
and degeneration could not be arrested by the civil/political elite, the
military had no problem in displacing them and assumed power.
Bangladesh
The inability of the civil/political elite to promote national stability
in Bangladesh shifted political initiative to the military and led to its
ascendancy to power. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman who returned to Bangla-
desh from detention in Pakistan in January 1972, introduced parliamen-
tary system of government. This was carried over to the constitution
approved by the constituent assembly and enforced on the eve of the
first anniversary of independence on December 16, 1972. Unitary and
Parliamentary system was introduced which incorporated the major
characteristics of liberal, democratic and participatory political system.
The leadership emphasized civilian supremacy over the military, took
steps to disarm the guerrilla groups, and imposed discipline on them.
First general elections were held in March 1973 which were swept by
the Awami League (293 out of 300 general seats).
Within a short period after such an electoral triumph and with the
charismatic personality of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman as the head of govern-
ment, the fortunes of the civilian leaders and institutions began to slide.
The Mujib government was unable to cope with the problems of recons-
truction of the polity ravaged by the civil war (March-December 1971)
and the Indo-Pakistan war of December 1971. It received a large quantity
of foreign aid in the early years of independence but the absence of suffi-
cient infra-structure and technical know-how were the major constraints
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on the ability of the government to make an effective use of it. Moreover,
the acute shortage of food and especially the famine of 1973-74, lack of
imagination in economic planning and management as well as rampant
corruption and smuggling to and from India made the dream of "Sonar
Bangla" unrealizable. The Awami League which led the independence
movement, was unable to transform itself into a coherent national party
capable of serving as the major vehicle of mobilisation and consensus-build-
ing in the polity. It was highly factionalized and its workers were engaged
in making personal power and material gains at the expense of the ordinary
folks. Such a political environment was not conducive to building a broad-
based consensus for parliamentary-participatory system afld it did not help
to create viable political institutions and processes. There was a rapid
degeneration and fragmentation of the political forces. The extremist
groups proliferated who often resorted to violence, including the physical
elimination of their political adversaries.*4
Mujib resorted to authoritarian/dictatorial solutions to these prob-
lems and compromised the democratic principles, including civil and
political rights, which he highlighted during his struggle for independence.
In January 1975, the constitution was amended to replace parliamentary
system with presidential system and he assumed presidency for 5 years.'1 s
Six months later, one party system was introduced. No political party
other than the official party - BKSAL - could engage in political activity.
The Supreme Court was stripped off the power to enforce fundamental
rights and all newspapers were taken over by the government.16 The
elite paramilitary force - Jatio Rakhi Bahini - was expanded and rein-
forced to protect the regime. Mujib also announced plans to divide the
14. For the problems of the Mujib Government, see Razia Akhtar Banu, 'The Fall
of the Sheikh Mujib Regime - An Analysis Indian Political ScieMce Review, XV I, January
1981, pp. 1-19; Taulakder Maniruzzaman, Group Interests and Political Changes : Studies of
Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi: Souht Asian Publishers, 1982).
15. The amended constitution provided that the president would be directly
elected but a special provision in the amendment bestowed presidency on Sheikh Muji-
bur Rebman without having to seek election. Asian Recorder , March 12-18, 1975, p. 12479.
16. March 12*18, 1975, pp. 12479-80; July 23-29, 1975, pp. 12691.
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country in 6 1 district, each headed by a governor appointed by the presi-
dent (i.e. Mujib) and supported by Jatio Rakhi Bahini and the administrative
machinery of the state.
These measures proved counter productive to the goal of checking
the growing alienation in the polity and enhancing the legitimacy of the
political institutions, processes and leadership. As a result, the government
could not create durable political infra-structure to ensure stability by
promoting accommodation and interdependence amongst the conflicting
interests In the polity.
There were three coups during August-November 1975. The first
coup took place in the early hours of August 15th, when a group of Army
Majors killed Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and seized power. Major General
Zlaur Rehman and Khondkar Mushtaq Ahmad were installed as Chief
Martial Law Administrator and President respectively. The second coup on
November 3rd, led by Brigadier Khaled Musharaf, displaced the Mushtaq-
Ziaur government. On November 7th, the supporters of a leftist group,
the JSD, in the army, led the third coup. Brigadier Khaled Musharaf and
some of his associates were killed and Major General Ziaur Rehman was
restored to power.
Fourth coup took place on March 24, 1982, when Lt-General H.M.
Ershad, then Chief of Army Staff, assumed power in a bloodless coup by
replacing the tottering government of president Abdul Sattar (civilian).
In addition to these four coups, there have been numerous insurrections
and counter-coup attempts in Bangladesh. Some of these were quite
widespread and bloody. Several hundred people, including military
personnel, were killed during the course of these uprisings, or they were
executed later by the authorities.
Two generals - Ziaur Rehman and Ershad - have ruled the country
since August 1975, with the exception of the May 1981 - March 1982
period, when after the assassination of Ziaur Rehman, Vice President
Abdul Sattar assumed presidency. He was later elected to the office of
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president but his elected tenure could not last for more than 5 months.
Both the generals first ruled under the cover of martial law and later civi-
lianized their regime and resigned the military rank. This was done by
adopting a step-by-step strategy which had four major aspects: conferrment
of an aura of legitimacy by holding carefully managed referendum, parlia-
mentary and local elections; building of a support system and political
organization for popular mobilisation; cooption of a docile political elite
prepared to share the political perspective of the ruling generals; and
introduction of political arrangements to ensure continuity of policies and
some of the top brass of the military (especially the CMLA) from martial
law to the post martial law period.
WHY DIFFERENT PATTERNS OF CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS
It is not difficult to understand why divergent patterns of civil
relations grew up in South Asia. The major causes have to be i
in the political leadership and the working of the civilian politic
tions, the defence and security imperatives and the position of the
in the polity, the nature of the military organization - internal
professionalism and ideology, and the interaction across the b
of the civil and military domains.
The effective political leadership, especially in the early years of
pendence, set the pace of the political system in India. Jawahar
who could be described as the architect of India's modern politi
tutions, provided a determined leadership and laid the founda
participatory process. He led the country until his death in
did not lose his charismatic appeal which enabled him to employ
isma to legitimize the political system and assert civilian leader
the military. Although Nehru's personal appeal was more powe
the political institutions he established yet the fact that he did
a personalized system and insisted on institutions and processes
a firm foundation to the political system. Three general electio
52, 1957, 1962) were held during his tenure of office which wer
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as fair and free by the political observers. This established the tradition
that the government must renew its popular mandate after regular
intervals and that the electoral process should play a decisive role in
political recruitment and political change.
Pakistan faced the crisis of leadership in a couple of years after inde-
pendence. Mohammad Ali Jinnah who led the independence movement
and had a charismatic personality, died in September 1948. His lieutenant,
Liequat Ali Khan, partially filled the gap but he was assassinated in 1951.
They did not get sufficient time to establish and legitimize participatory
political institutions and processes by the employment of their charisma
as well as by running them in their true spirit. Their successors did not
have national stature and lacked imagination to address the political and
economic problems. They were unable to inspire people, let alone give
them a sense of direction.
In Bangladesh, the crisis of leadership took a different direction.
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the father of the nation, suffered from rapid
decline of his charisma due to his government's inability to cope
with the post-independence problems. He compensated the decline
of charisma by concentrating more and more powers in his hands
and by relying heavily on the regulative and control apparatus of
the state. The introduction of presidential system, the ban on all political
parties except the official one, the take-over of all newspapers and the
withdrawal of Supreme Court's power to enforce fundamental rights,
made him virtually an absolute ruler. Instead of restoring the people's
confidence in the government, these changes evoked resentment and
accentuated the already widespread alienation in the polity.
The differences in the nature and political styles of the leading politi-
cal parties of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh also explain why they treaded
different political paths. India's Congress Party was able to transform
itself from a nationalist movement to a national and majority party with
the support of the people which gave the much needed strength to the
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political institutions.17 The roots of this success go back to the pre-
independence period. It became a mass party by the early 1920s and
developed a widespread organizational network which strengthened its
roots. The long struggle for independence enabled the Congress to
develop ways and means to resolve intra-party conflicts and the leadership
favoured accommodation of divergent points of view in order to promote
consensus on its programmes and strategies. These features were carried
over to the post-independence period which enabled the Congress to
keep itself as a mass oriented, broad based umbrella party that worked
on the consensus principle and tolerated different perspectives within
its fold. The Congress had its share of problems. Some members defected
and the party was split up in 1969 and 1978-79, but it proved an effective
ruling party. It was voted out of office at the Union level for the first
time in 1977. The thirty years of uninterrupted Congress rule within a
participatory framework gave continuity and stability to the political
system. The surrender of power by the Congress to the opposition in
1977 after it lost the polls contributed to the sustenance of the system.
The Muslim League of Pakistan failed to transform itself into a national
party after the attainment of independence. Given the weak and divided
leadership, lack of a clear socio-economic programme, and the absence of
procedures to resolve its internal problems, the Muslim League could not
be instrumental to state building and nation building. It was not merely
the Muslim League which suffered from discord, indiscipline and weak
organization, other political parties were also afflicted with these problems.
They could not evolve consensus on the operational norms of the polity
which delayed the formulation of the first constitution, undermined the
prospects of the participatory framework and led to the fragmentation
and regionalization of political forces.
In Bangladesh, the Awami League which inherited power at the time
of independence, proved a no less failure, although a constitution was
framed and enforced in one year. Its activists had created their factions
17. George R. Haines, "The Military in Indian Politics: A Case Study in Non-inter-
v+ntion Contemporary Politics, 2, Spring 73, pp. 73-51.
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and acquired the habit of pursuing their political goals in a semi-independent
manner during the course of the armed struggle against Pakistan. Most
of them did not change their political styles after independence and thus
the Awami League could neither develop an effective organisational net-
work nor impose discipline on different factions. It was a conglomerate of
several feuding groups who served their own interests rather than working
as a member of a party dedicated to realize the dream of "Sonar Bangla".
India did not suffer from any of the political ills which afflicted the
political processes in Pakistan and Bangladesh in the early period of
independence. The political process gained strength over time which
enabled India's civil leadership to sustain their commanding role and
assert their leadership over the military. They consciously down-graded
the army's position "administratively and socially".18 In 1955, the civil
leadership changed the designation of the C-in-C to the Chief of Staff,
although the top brass of the military were not favourably disposed to-
wards this change. 19 The Warrant of Precedence was changed by the
civil government to lower the ceremonial ranking of the top brass assigned
by the British government and placed them lower to a number of senior
civil servants and the political leaders holding key position at the union
and state levels. 20 The government also established a cumbersome policy
making procedure which restricted the role of the top brass and kept the
initiative with the political leadership. 21 The Thimayya-Menon episode,
arising out of the differences over the promotions in the Army in 1959,
was settled to the satisfaction of the civilian leadership, 22 although the
18. Lloyd i Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, "Generals and Politicians in India,"
Pacific Affairs , XXXVII, I, Spring 1964, pp. 5-19.
19. See, for the opinion of the top brass of the army; General J.N. Chaudhari,
Arms Aims and Aspects (Bombay: Manaktolas, 1966), p. 100.
20. Rudolph and Rudolph. cto. cit.
21 . For details, see Stephen P. Cohen, "The Military and Indian Democracy," in Atul
Kohli (ed.), India's Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 99-143
(see pp. 114-177); and P.R. Chari, "Civil-Military Relations in India." Armed Forces and
Society, 4, I, November 1977, pp. 3-28; A.L. Venkateswaran, "Changes Under the New
Constitution," Sa'sinik Samachar, XXVII, 22, June 8, 1980.
22. Lome J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security; Defence Policies 1947 -65 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1967), pp. 154-168,
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military circles continued to express dissatisfaction with the government's
promotion policy.
The Indian leadership tightened their vigilance of the military after
the 1958 coup in Pakistan so that India's top brass did not get "ideas"
from Ayub Khan's seizure of power. What perturbed them most was that
some public figures occasionally talked against parliamentary system and,
at times, suggested that the military should take over power to cleanse
what was described as the mess created by the politicians. Defence Minister
Krishna Menon's policy of promoting his trusted officers to the senior
posts was partly designed to ward off any challenge from the Army. In
1959, a correspondent suggested to Krishna Menon that the Army should
be associated with the government programme of growing more food.
His response was quite typical of the attitude of the political leadership.
He said: "I fundamentally differ from such proposals because you will
encourage dictatorship to be established in this country straight
away." 23
The Indian government has generally taken a serious view of the state-
ments favouring an expanded role of the military in the polity. Moreso,
then such statements are issued by retired senior army officers. The
first Indian Chief of Staff of the Indian Army, K.M. Cariappa, made several
statements after his retirement favouring "a spell of administration by the
army" 24 in India. Field Marshal Manekshaw made a controversial statement
In Kathmandu in 1977, that the "politicians are not clean and that the
government administration under the top brass of the military Is likely
to be "more punctual, disciplined, dedicated and clean." He landed in
trouble by issuing another statement about India's military operations in
East Pakistan in 1971.25 The government described such remarks as
23. The Hindu, March 8, 1959.
24. See, for example, K.M. Cariappa, Let Us Wake Up (New Delhi: English Book
Store, 1964), pp. Í8-!9; Times of India, March 10, 1970.
25. Far Eastern Economic Review, November 1 1, 1977, p. 32. Wing Commander Mohan
Singh, "Press, Politics and the Armed Forces," ViJcront X, 7 April 1980, pp. 49-53. Some
other retired officers have also made similar comments on the state of politics In India
and favoured an expanded role for the military in the polity.
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irresponsible and uncalled for. The views of the retired officers and a
small section of the civil leaders never caught on in India where military
rule was not viewed as an alternative to the civil/political administration.
The profession of arms and militarism did not enjoy much respect in
traditional Hindu culture. It honoured the Brahmin over the Kashtriya
(I.e. soldier). The role of the Kashtriya was compromised during the
British period because the British recruitment policy favoured the so-
called martial classes, not all of whom were Kashtriya. The soldiers
could not be fitted Into the second category of the caste system
and, therefore, they could not claim whatever little glamour was associted
with the fighting men in the traditional culture. The lack of enthusiasm
for the profession of arms was reinforced by Gandhi's philosophy of non-
violence and Nehru's suspicions of a large and powerful standing army.
Gandhi admired the organization and discipline of the military but he was
averse to the Instrument of violence it controlled, although he endorsed
India's military action in Kashmir in 1947. Defining the role of the mili-
tary, Gandhi advocated that "they must plough the land, dig wells, clean
latrines and do every other constructive work."26
The Congress party and the Indian government did not accept Gandhi's
advice but his views adversely affected the Image of the military and
encouraged a strong anti-military lobby in India. Several of his disciples
advocated reduction in defence expenditure. The leading personalities
like Rajagopalachari, Acharaya Vinoba Bhave and Acharya Kripalani were
of the opinion that India could not claim to follow the Gandhian path if
it spent so much on military. They favoured a gradual reduction in weapons
and troops.
Nehru had strong reservations about the contribution of the military
towards national development.27 The major planks of his policy - non-
alignment, economic development and industrialization - circumscribed
the role of the military in the polity.
2 6. Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army (Berkeley: University), p. 103.
27. For Nehru's views on military, see ibid., pp. 104-7, 199.
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The military had no image problem in Pakistan and Bangladesh. The
military profession enjoyed respect in Pakistan partly due to Islam's stress
on "holy war" and the concepts like "ghazi" and "shaheed". Moreover,
the acute security problems faced by Pakistan made the military relevant
to national survival and policy-making. It enjoyed a widespread support
and all governments, civil as well as military, actively pursued the policy
of allocating the maximum possible resources to defence services. In
Bangladesh, the military's image was enhanced due to its participation in
the war of liberation but this adversely affected its discipline.
The military was assigned a low priority in Nehru's strategic thinking
in the pre-1962 period. The principal threat to India was perceived to
come from Pakistan28- a weaker military power. Although India raised
hue and cry on Pakistan's participation in the West-sponsored pacts and
resumption of the U.S. military assistance to Pakistan yet Pakistan was
never considered a serious military threat. Pakistan was viewed as a major
irritant and an obstacle to the achievement of India's foreign policy goals.
What worried them most was that Pakistan might despatch the tribesmen
or paramilitary personnel to the Indian controlled Kashmir who might
later be joined by the regular Pakistani troops. The Indian military leaders
therefore concentrated their troops in Kashmir to check the potential
threat and maintained a relatively high military profile in the Punjab sector
of India-Pakistan border to apply pressure on Pakistan and divert Its
attention from Kashmir.
India maintained troops in a state of readiness sufficient to meet
the threat from Pakistan. As Pakistan was a smaller military power (des-
pite American military aid), the civil leadership could adopt an attitude
of indifference towards the needs and requirements of the military.2?
This also contributed to reducing the importance of the military In the
28. Raj и G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986), p. 20.
29. The Government adoptee' a policy of effecting savings on defence grants voted
by the parliament. By mid-f»fties, a saving rang ng from 8 to 10 per cent had become a
regular feature. Ttvs policy was reversed after the Sino-lndian conflict of 1962.
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body-politic. The government attitude underwent a drastic change after
India's debacle In the Slno-lndian conflict In 1962. For the first time, India
was face to face with a stronger military power. In a way, this was a
blessing for the military. It found itself showered with attention and
support •- » something it lacked in the past.
The political elite in Pakistan were divided and engaged in free for all
struggle for power. The parliamentary institutions were in shambles, the
political parties were the shifting combinations of self-seeking political
leaders, and the economy was in a big mess. The political elite could neither
assert their leadership over the military nor restrict its role in the polity.
They cultivated the military to strengthen their position, sought their
opinion and association for policy-making, and gave ample freedom to the
top brass to deal with the internal affairs of the military. "It [the military]
was too powerful for civilians to tamper with and virtually ran itself with-
out outside Interference."* о
In the case of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Reh man attempted to
restrict the role of the military in the polity, tamper with its organization,
and counterbalance it by establishing a loyal Jatio Rakhi Bahini. He also
began to put a hold on the allocation of resources to the military. His
efforts did not succeed because his political arrangements lacked wide-
spread support and the political process was in disarray. The Awami League
could hardly work as a coherent national party and political alienation
was rampant in the polity. The Bangladesh experience shows that the
civil leadership can assert its leadership and limit the role of the military
only if it has created viable political institutions that do not suffer from
a serious crisis of legitimacy and demonstrate their efficacy in responding
to the needs and aspiration of the society.
A large number of writers correlate internal cohesion of the military
with its ability to intervene in politics. Cohesion is relevant to planning
and execution of a coup and a low level of military cohesion can result in
30. Stephen P. Cohen, "State Building ;n Pekistrn" in Ali Banuazizi & Myron Weiner
(eds.) The State , Religion and Ethnic Politics (Lahore: Vanguard, 1987), p. 315.
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instability of junta or recurrence of coups. 31 The diversity of the officer
corps of the Indian Army is considered an important factor that militates
against the development of any coherent political ambition. The Indian
government made special effort to encourage recruitment from the
regions which had insignificant representation in the Army. This policy
expanded the recruitment-base of the Army but it multiplied diversity.
The government also avoids concentrating all the senior posts among the
personnel of one community or a region. The preponderant bulk of the
officers still come from the northern states but most of the officers appoint-
ed to the post of COAS came from the states other than these. The Sikhs
have traditionally been the single largest group In the Army but no Sikh
was ever appointed Army Chief. The government did not favour extension
of tenure to the Army Chief; the only exceptions being those of Manekshaw
and Bewoor who were given brief extensions.32 Almost half of them
retired before the completion of their tenure of three years. 33 These
efforts were designed to forestall the rise of a "man on horseback" in India.
The Pakistan Army has developed a strong ethnic and regional
cohesion. The Punjab provides the majority of officers, trailed by NWFP
and the tribal areas. It is essentially the Punjabi-Pathan Army and these
two groups have not only developed strong mutual ties but they have also
cultivated links with the bureaucratic elite, most of whom have a similar
ethnic regional background. The top Jobs are held by them and naturally
all the Army Chiefs have either been Pathans or Punjabis. With the
exception of two, all the Chiefs of Army Staff got extensions. The two
who did not get extensions served during the period of Bhutto's civilian
government.34 General Zia-ul-Haq held on to the post of Chief of Army
Staff from March 1976 till his death in an air crash in August 1988.
31. Claude E. Welch, "Long Term Consequences of Military Rule: Breakdown and
Extrication," The Journal of Strategic Studies. I. 2 September 1978. pp. 139-153.
32. Field Marshal Manekshaw's extended term lasted less than one year. General
Bewoor's tenure was extended by 9J months. However, his total service as COAS,
including the extended period, was about 2 years and 5 months.
33. For a detailed study of the politics of appointment of COAS in India, see Hasan-
Askari Rizvi, "Appointment of Chief of Army Staff," The Muslim (Islamabad), February
10, 1986. See also hy the same author, "Sikhs and the Indian Army," Ibid., April 29, 1984.
34. Lt-General Gul Hasan was retired prematurely in March 1972 along with the
Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Rahim Khan. General Tikka Khan retired after the com-
pletion of his tenure in March 1976.
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Bangladesh Army does not have the problem of ethnic diversity and
regional Imbalance but it is highly politicized and factional ized. The roots
of politicization can be traced back to the civil strife in 1971 when the
leaders of the Bangladesh movement organized Mukti Bahini to fight
against Pakistan. The Mukti Bahini comprised three major elements:
the Bengalis who defected Pakistani military, paramilitary forces and the
Police; the die-hard workers of the Awami League; and the youths recruit-
ed from the refugee camps in India. A large number of them were inducted
in Bangladesh Army after independence. They were highly politicized
and had developed an aura of heroic achievement. Two other categories
of people joined the army: (i) The Bengali military personnel who were
posted In Pakistan (West Pakistan) at the time of outbreak of the civil
war, and returned to Bangladesh after independence. As they were not
directly exposed to the civil strife, they were not so politicized and
maintained a professional disposition, (ii) The youths who joined the
army after independence and were trained in India or Bangladesh. Most
of them had been through the trauma of armed struggle in 1971.
As there were sharp differences in their background, experience and
disposition, they could not develop mutual trust and a shared professional/
service identity. A large number of the former freedom fighters (Mukti
Bahini), especailly at the level of Other Ranks, carried over their group
loyalties, habit of operating in an autonomous manner and political orienta-
tions to the Bangladesh Army. Many political groups, especially those
with the leftist orientations (the JSD) were able to penetrate the ranks
of the military which impaired cohesion and discipline in the Bangladesh
Army. Major General Ziaur Reh man had to use force and shrewd mani-
pulation to keep factionalism in check.35 Lt-General Ershad pursued the
policies initiated by Ziaur Rehman to keep the army under his control.
He has been quite successful, although the threat of countercoup or
insurrection haunts his regime.
35. For a detailed study of the Bangladesh military and its internal problems, see
Hasan-Askarl Rizvi, "Politics of Military Intervention in Bangladesh/' The Muslim. April
4 & 5, 1982; P.B. Sinha, Armed Forces of Bangladesh, Occasional Paper No. I (New Delhi:
Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 1979); Craig Baxter et. al, Government and
Politics in South Asia (Boulder: Westview Press,* 1987), pp. 277-283.
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The absence of a total breakdown of administration has been a strong
point of the political leadership in India. There were serious law and order
situations caused by ethnic, linguistic religious and other cleavages in
several parts of India, insurgencies and agitation some states and separatist
movements in a few other states. Not a month passed without some such
incident somewhere in India. However, these threats were (and still con-
tinue to be) regional and local which the state and union governments can
handle with or without the use of the paramilitary forces or regular troops.
Some of these problems lasted for several years but these did not threaten
the total fabric of the polity. The diversity and vastness of India, a gradual
dispersal of power, and a relatively autonomous functioning of the stata
level administration created many safety valves for the national political
system. These problems did not necessarily constitute a direct threat
to the political institutions and processes at the union level and their
survival was never totally dependent on the support of the army.
The coups in Pakistan were preceded by serious law and order
situations and the national political process suffered from serious crises of
legitimacy. As power was concentrated at the national/federal level and
there were hardly any intermediary safety valves, all alientation, resent-
ment and agitation was targeted at the national level. There were situations
in Pakistan, especially in the period immediately before the coup, when
the civil/political elite was almost totally dependent on the army for the
sustenance of its regime. Such a situation makes the civil institutions
vulnerable to the take-over by the military. The situation in Bangladesh
was not much different. The authoritarian and centralized system created
by Mujibur Rehman lacked popular support and the law and order situation
was getting from bad to worse. Political violence and widespread corrup-
tion and the related ills in the polity accentuated political alienation.
Similarly, the government of President Abdul Sattar which was overthrown
by Lt-General Ershad in March 1982, was besieged by a host of political
problems and it was functioning in a very precarious manner.
The political systems in Pakistan and Bangladesh shaped up in a manner
that power and authority was concentrated in the capital city. This made
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it convenient for the military to stage a coup-control of the capital meant
the control of the country. In India, the democratic and participatory
process made it possible to disperse some power and strengthened the
position of the states in the political process. A coup maker in India will
have to take into account the growing complexity of the political process.
This may not be the most serious obstacle to military's assumption of
power but what needs attention is the fact that, unlike Pakistan and
Bangladesh, the control of New Delhi is not necessarily a guarantee of
a successful coup in India.
IMPACT ON NATIONAL STABILITY
The failure of the political elite to create viable institutional
ments facilitating national stability creates the crisis of legitimacy
variably, they have to rely heavily on the control apparatus of
and seek the blessings of the military to ward off threat to th
If their reliance on the military increases and they often depl
for solving the problems in the political domain, the weakness
civil institutions and the impotence of the political leaders is e
It goads political ambition amongst the top brass who can domi
core political institutions either by directly taking over the gov
or by manipulating the weak and divided political leadership.
The failure of the political process encourages the military to
political role and create a military-hegomonic political system.
this is no guarantee that such a system can evolve the long range
for the socio-economic and political ills of the polity. The exper
. Pakistan and Bangladesh suggests that it may be easy for an army to
power in a polity where the political forces are fragmented
political institutions suffer from the crisis of legitimacy. But, th
ful assumption of power by the military does not necessarily m
it will be equally successful in evolving a viable participatory fra
for ensuring national solidarity and stability. The military com
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often attempt to enforce national "cohesion without consensus",3« which
does not serve as a durable foundation of national stability.
The repeated military intervention or extended military rule creates
additional political problems. When the senior commanders get used to
exercising power, they develop a self-styled missionary zeal or start en-
joying the pleasures of exercising power. Once they become politically
ambitious, they describe their rule as the only alternative to political
disorder and disintegration of the polity. They introduce political arrange-
ments to share power with a section of the civil elite with the objective of
extending their support base as well as protect their corporate or personal
interests. As these political arrangements are based on a narrow or
'selective consensus and exclude a large section of the political elite not
prepared to accept the political terms of the ruling generals, they find it
difficult to acquire sufficient popular support and legitimacy to withstand
political pressures without the backing of the military. This is more so
in the states where the military's ethnic-regional composition is heavily
tilted in favour of some ethnic group'(s) or region(s).
THE FUTURE PROSPECTS
What are the future prospects of the different patterns of
military relations in South Asia? Have the Indian political insti
acquired enough strength to sustain the principle of civilian su
over the military? Will the existing political arrangements in In
tinue to function without facing any serious interruption or br
What are the prospects of the military-dominance models of go
in Pakistan and Bangladesh? Can these states ever revert to dem
system based on the primacy of the civil?
Several political analysts addressed the question of the fu
India's democracy and offered divergent responses. A Pakistani
analyst, D. Shah Khan, appeared quite convinced that coup was
36. Edward Feit, The Armed bureaucrats (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1973),
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bllity in India. 37 Neville Maxwell was more cautious while talking about
the political role of the military, although he entertained doubts about
the durability of India's democratic system.38 Taya Zinkin and P.R. Chari
ruled out the possibility of rise of military dictatorship in India. Chari
concluded that some changes might take place in the pattern of civil-
military relations but "its basic characteristic of civilian control over the
military apparatus [seemed] likely to continue."*9 Bopegamage viewed
the military as an agent of economic and social modernization without hin-
dering political competitiveness.40 Rudolph and Rudolph, and Haines ruled
out a conspiratorial coup but they thought that some sharing of power
by the military could take place under the cover of legality.41 Stephen
Cohen recognized the barriers to military intervention but he argued that
"the circumstances under which they
difficult to imagine."42
The military in India began to acquire greater
1962 Sino-lndian border conflict when India re
frontation with a more powerful adversary. In
not accepting military aid from other countries. Th
experts from the West was sought to meet the
aftermath of the war with China, and to unde
strengthen its defnce needs. The Indian Air Fo
exercises with the Air Forces of the U.K., an
The Indian government not only did away with
37. D. Shah Khan, "Shadow of the Generals," Defenc
December 1982, pp. 21-34.
38. See, Neville Maxwell's two articles "Will India seek an Alternative to Parlia-
mentary Democracy," The Times, February 10, 1967; "Must The Military Intervene In
India," ibid., February 28, 1968.
39. Taya Zinkin, "India and Military Dictatorship," Pacific Af fairs, XXXII, I March
1959; P.R. Chari, op. cit .
40. A. Bopegamage, "The Military as a Modernizing Agent in India," Economic
Development and Cultural Change, 20, I October 1971, pp. 71-79.
41. Rudolph and Rudolph, op. cit. Haines, op. cit .
42. Stephen P. Cohen, "The Military and Indian Democracy," in Atui Kohli,
op. cit., p. 122.
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savings in defence budget It began to divert resources from economic
development to defence needs.
The polic/ of assigning a higher priority to defence needs was rein-
forced by the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971. India's military triumph
over Pakistan in 1971 settled the debate about the relevance of the military
to national goals in favour of the military. These developments reinforced
the view that a strong military was instrumental to achieving national goals.
The crystalization of the hitherto dormant Indian ambition in the
post-1971 period to assume the role of a regional power in South Asia
underscored the importance of a powerful military capable of projecting
India's power in the region and beyond. This assigned a central role to the
military in India's strategic worldview and its relevance to foreign policy
goals was being widely shared by the civil elite. The budgetary allocations
for defence therefore registered a continuous and rapid rise since the
mid-sixties and the Congress as well as the Janata governments gave close
attention to modernization of the armed forces.
The military's role has also expanded in the domestic political system.
The armed forces are being called out to play a progressively large role in
aiding the civil administration for the maintenance of law and order and
counter-insurgency measures. One may argue that this is not entirely
a new development and that the military performed these functions in
the past. However, four aspects of the aid to the civil deserve a close
attention. First, the number of calls to the Army to undertake counter-
insurgency measures, control law and order situations, and the maintenance
of essential services have increased over time. Second, the aid-to-the
civil assignments of the military are no longer restricted to the remote
regions at the periphery of the polity. Such operations are being under-
taken in all parts of India. Third, the calls for police duties in urban areas
have especially increased which make the army quite conscious of the
growing alienation in the polity. Fourth, the frequent use of the military
by the civil authorities has given rise to a debate about the rationale and
implications of such assignments. This is mainly because the military
authorities performing such tasks are given extraordinary powers which
aré generally the prerogatives of the civil authorities.
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The most controversial civic role of the arm/ was its action against
the Golden Temple in Amritsar (Punjab) in June 1984 to dislodge the Sikh
militants from there. This operation might be described as successful
purely on technical grounds but it caused serious emotional and profes-
sional stress for the Sikh servicemen and subjected the military to severe
criticism. Several thousand Sikh servicemen deserted the army in various
parts of India. The subsequent developments, especially the anti-Sikh
riots in Delhi after the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi reinforced
Sikh distrust of the political system. Such developments, if not handled
with prudence, would impair discipline of the Sikhs in the army.
The current trend of reliance on the military to deal with the political
problem is not likely to change in the near future because the Indian
polity continues to be afflicted with a host of problems. The Congress
(I) suffers from organizational weakness and the personalization of power
first by Indira Gandhi and now by Rajiv Gandhi has undermined the
aggregative and accommodative role of the party. The tradition of dia-
logue and consensus-building in the party has been replaced by authori-
tarian management of the party from the top. The cleavages based on
ethnicity, language, caste and religion have sharpened which have made
the task of political management quite difficult. The civil leadership often
finds itself besieged by these problems.
Despite these problems and the changed domestic and external
environment, the chances of military take-over will be slim as long as
India's functional democracy can facilitiate political change through the
ballot box and bring forward a coherent and effective leadership capable
of keeping the problems within manageable limits. If they can maintain
legitimacy, coherence and efficacy of the national political process, the
present pattern of civil-military relations, characterized by the primacy
of the civil, can be kept intact.
However, in view of the escalated domestic pressures on the civif
leadership and the recognition of the military's direct relevance to
India's ambitious foreign policy goals, the military now carries more
76
111.88.76.85 on Sun, 28 Jan 2024 01:35:41 +00:00

political clout in the body-politic than was the case in the pre-1962 period.
It has acquired sufficient leverage to influence decision making pertaining
to defence and security affairs including internal security, although
the final choices are still made by the civil elite.
The armed forces in Bangladesh and Pakistan can be described as
powerful political actors which will continue to dominate the political
process. As these have acquired the qualities of "ruler Praetorian"
military, their disposition will be crucial in shaping the course of polititcal
change in these countries.
Two factors reinforce the military dominance model òf civil-military
relations in Pakistan and Bangladesh. First, the political forces suffer
from ideological incongruity, mutual jealousies and poor organization.
They find it difficult to Join together to offer a credible national alternative
to the military. Second, the military commanders in both the countries
are convinced that the military has a role to play in the domestic context,
although they do pay lip service time and again to the principle of the
military's aloofness from active politics. General Zia-ul-Haq and his
lieutenants used to argue that the military's role cannot be limited to the
defence of geographical boundaries of the state. It must also protect the
"ideological frontiers" (i.e. Islamic character) of the polity.43 Such an
argument provides a convenient excuse to the military to play a political
role. He minced no words to warn the political leaders: "Pakistan Army
will not be a silent and helpless spectator to the political leaders pushing
the country once again to the verge of ruin."44 Both, General Zia-ul-Haq
and Lt-General Ershad favoured a constitutional guarantee for military's
role in the decision making process at the national level.45 In Pakistan,
the constitution was amended under the cover of martial law to enable
43. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86 (Lahore: Pro-
gressive Publishers, 1987), pp. 242, 258.
44. interview with Bhabani Sen Gupta: Daily Jang (Lahore), September 6 and 10,
1987.
45. For Generai Zia-ul-Haq's statements, see Defence Journal , VIII, 12 December
1982, pp. 35-38; Down Oversees Weekly , December 9, 1982. For General Ershaďs state-
•ments, see Asian Recorder, Nov. 5-11, 1981, p. 16299; Dec. 10-16, 1981, p. 16356.
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General Zia-ul-Haq to combine the offices of the head of state and the
COAS after the withdrawal of martial law. Although the two generals
civilianized their military regimes by coopti ng a section of the civil elite
through a carefully regulated electoral exercise, the key to their survival
is the support they enjoy from the military.
The major dilemma of the military dominated political systems
in Pakistan and Bangladesh is that their legitimacy is often disputed, espe-
cially by those political groups and forces which find themselves pushed to
the periphery or are completely excluded from the political process. This
compromises the ability of these political systems to effectively cope
with the participatory and distributive pressures and set up viable politi-
cal institutions and processes enjoying a widespread support and legiti-
macy - the major prerequisites of national stability.*
* This article was written before the restoration of democracy in Pakistan as a result
of the general electron held in the country after the death of General Zia-ul-Hiq and
other top military generals in a plane crash in August 1988.
78
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