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Ahmad Shekarchi, Shahid Beheshti University
Pursuit of Authority in Post 19th Century Iraq
The city of Mosul was the conquest scene of the ISIS in mid-June 2014, witnessing 3 troops
and more than 50 commanders of the Iraqi army flee. Today, the city is not yet freed from
the occupation of the ISIS in spite of all the international aid to the Iraqi army, direct and
indirect military aid on the part of the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Republic of Iran
and last but not least, the Al-Hashd Al-Sha’bi (the popular mobilization) that was formed
thanks to the fatwa of “the Righteous Jihad” by Ali Al-Sistani.
Since its formation in 1921, the main body of the Iraqi army has consisted of Sunni forces,
leaving a marginal role for the Shiites. In return, the appearance of the Shiite Militia during
the exile and after the fall of Saddam’s rule is another sign of the Shiites’ interest in military
power. All these Shiite military forces are active in the structure of Iraq’s politics, under the
leadership and supervision of the well-known Shiite Mujtahids. These forces, whose number
is estimated between 100,000 to 120,000, have played a key role in the ongoing wars with
the ISIS forces. Shiites’ participation in the military forces is a significant indicator of their
approach to the concept of power during the history of Iraq. Previously, the Shiite ulamā
used to prevent their Iraqi followers from entering the Ottoman military service, which in
many cases would lead to their having to apply for Iranian identity documents. The
dominant theory in explaining this behaviour is that because of the authority of the Sunni
Ottomans, the Shiites did not tend to participate in the military forces ruled by the Ottoman
caliphate, hence they would refuse registrations to their military service. Although this
theory seems legitimate, it cannot account for the whole reality including the details of the
internal mechanisms.
Several questions could be raised about this reality from different aspects. This article seeks
to study the role of the Shiite ulamā’s ijtihad since the turn of the 19th century, in the
government power, as well as for today, in the military power. The main question is if there
is a relationship among the process of development of ijtihad, the role of the Mujtahids in
the contemporary history of Iraq, and the power of the existing ruling Shiite government. If
such a relationship exists, how has it changed during different periods? What is the role of
ijtihad and its relationship to political power and what hunches seem realistic for the
future?

Theory of the Elite as a Theoretical Model
The studies relating to the religious seminaries and the socio-political role of the Mujtahids
are mainly focused on two current binary tendencies of Usuli/Akhbari and vocal/mute
(sāmita/nātiqa). In the former categorization, ulamā are divided according to their interests
in theology and methodology. The Usuli category accommodates those ulamā who give
precedence to Reason among the four sources of Quran, Sunnah, Reason and
Ijma’(consensus of Islamic scholars). This way, they use the methods of the science of Usul
(principals) to extract laws from the main sources, namely the Quran and the Sunnah. The
latter group, however, suffice to Quran and Hadith (Khabar: report), believing that they
sufficiently lead them to the commands of God. Though this difference has always existed in
the history of Shiism, since the Safavid period the Akhbari ulamā have developed
significantly, finding positions of power among the Shiites with such faqih (jurist) figures as
Amin Astarabadi and Yusof Bahrani. However, when Sheik Mortadha Ansari (1781-1864)
collected and published his Usul Fiqh (The Principals of Jurisprudence), the position of the
Akhbari ulamā was severely weakened, leaving enough space for the Usuli ulamā to gain
power. This power has since been maintained in spite of the ups and downs they have faced
through this time. Without doubt, the two categories cannot accommodate each and every
Mujtahid, hence some characteristics could be left out in the generalizations that assign
them to each category. Moreover, the Mujtahids in each category are not homogenous,
demonstrating highly different characteristics. Even so, this categorization helps define the
differences of jurisprudential methods among them.
The categorization of vocal/mute which is much more recent than the former one, deals
with the extent to which the ulamā interfere with the public issues, especially the politics
and their relations to the institution of power. In one category, there are those ulamā who
not only believe interference or relating to the political issues is not their responsibility, but
in some cases they also announce it as harām (prohibited), believing that it is sort of
interfering in issues that should be exclusively authorized by the Ma’sum (the innocent
Imam). In the other category, the ulamā take responsibility of the social as well as political
affairs, and even in some cases in the history not only have they encouraged their followers,
but they themselves have directly and openly interfered with the political activities in
various levels. The quintessential example for this group in the contemporary history is
Ruhollah Khomeini, who utilized the theory of Velayat Faqih (the Guardianship of the Jurist)

to lead a revolution against the Pahlavi government, accompanied its victory, and politically
led the government that he established afterwards.
Because this binary categorization and the existing cross combinations cannot explain the
complexities of the existing realities in the relationship between the institution of ijtihad
and ulamā and the institution of politics and power, this article seeks to explain this
relationship in the framework of the sociological theory of the elites. Although most of the
literature on the elite and the accordingly obtained models are about the industrial Western
societies and hardly including of others, and though they suffer imperfections and
insufficiencies, they seem to be useful for this research. The sociological theories of the
elite, most of which rooted in the ideas of Pareto, Mosca, Michels and Weber, focus on the
ruling elites and the concept of elite circulation. Among the new generation of the
sociological theories of the elite, two categories of normative and positive can be defined
distinctly. Etzioni-Halévy counts two conditions for “elite pluralism” and “elite autonomy” to
realize the balance among the elites of the opposition party. By elite pluralism, we mean the
existence of a vast number of sections and subsections of elites who share the power. In
contrast, elite autonomy is defined by the extent to which the resources are distributed
among the elites, on the condition that different cliques of elites, for instance political elites,
cannot take control of other cliques of elites.
Among the positive theories, the theory by Higley et al. seems to be the most outstanding.
According to Higley, elites are the ones who, thanks to their positions in the organizations
and determining movements, are able to regularly and fundamentally influence the political
decision makings. Where there are multiple elites, their achieving consensus involves
conditions that are categorized into two concepts of “value consensus” and “structural
integration”. Value consensus means admitting the regulations and norms of political games
by the elites. Structural integration means the existence of overlapping and crossing
relationships and connections that influence and connect all sections and parties of the
elites. Accordingly, elites are categorized into three types of disunited elites, ideologically
united elites, and consensually united elites.
Building on and criticizing these theories, Engelstad believes that the variables of
communication in the public sphere and culture of liberal values are necessary. Moreover, if
elites’ consensus is to contribute to political stability, it needs to be institutionalized.
Institutionalization of consensus among the elites includes the existence of: 1) a legal

system to resolve the conflicts, 2) a set of constitutive rules to determine the priorities of
different sections of the institutions, for example the priority of election institutions over
military, and 3) stable rules for changing procedures, such as the regulations of reform or
modifications of the Constitution.
In the theories relating to network analysis and group dynamics, the condition for avoiding
determinism and conflict is formation and development of the norms within the groups.
Defining the proper or improper feelings, thoughts or actions for certain people in various
situations form the norms, and the norms in turn determine the actions. Coleman counts
four functions for the theory of norms formation: 1) Determining the situations in which a
norm with certain contents is formed. This first function determines who will commit and
whose actions are related to each norm. 2) Defining and determining the extent of power as
well as the prevalence and type of the punishments, like affecting one’s reputation or the
resulting material advantages or disadvantages. 3) Internalizing the norms. For example
dealing with such situations where people who hold a certain norm force others to follow
the rule of the same norm. 4) Explaining and reporting the interrelationships of the existing
norms. The mechanisms of relationships and connections among people are explained
according to a line of the theories of norm formation. Based on these mechanisms, common
norms appear in the primary situation of uncertainty and lack of consensus. The
development of a certain common attitude helps decrease opposition and uncertainty in
the process of interpersonal connections. In this article, the definition of norm basically
considers the idiosyncratic meaning that accord with Homans’ definition of norms.
However, in the situations of lack of consensus among the significant others, it is difficult to
imagine this type of norm to be continually stable. Therefore, norms are always based on
interpersonal agreements. Most of the norms are shared. Obviously, there is a close
relationship between the norms and the attitudes when it comes to connections. If, similar
to social psychologists’ definition, attitude is defined as the positive or negative evaluation
of a person from a subject, then a norm is a special case of attitude. According to Sherif and
Festinger in social psychology, in their group relations, people form their attitudes according
to social comparisons, assuming a right and correct reply to the uncertainties and
oppositions, and evaluate and integrate others’ attitudes. The interpersonal agreements
anchor and validate the attitudes that are formed in this process. In the milieu of
interpersonal disagreement, the attitudes are unstable. The reason lies behind the fact that

when there is no significant other to agree with them, the probability of correctness of their
attitude decreases. Social validation of a positive or negative evaluation of an attitude to a
feeling, thought, or action while the content of this evaluation is transforming into a
normative evaluation, creates a norm. People may have their own norms while anomie
usually accompanies instability in such norms. The reason is that the development of a
normative content is related to identifying or understanding the evaluation of a common
attitude with the significant others.
The theory of Social Influence Network, explains the process of influence in a group whose
attitudes and beliefs about a subject changes when they consider the weighted average
influential situations of other members to revise their own situations:
(1)
i)yia-)+(1(t)
NyiN+…+w(t)
2yi2+w(t)
1yi1(wi= a(t+1)
iY(1)
According to this model, the ideas of the people at the time of (t) equals y1
(t) + y2
(t)+…+ yN
(t)
and in the primary situation it is y1
(1) + y2
(1)+…+ yN
(1). The combination of the influence of the
other members of a group on one member is {wi1 +wi2+…+wiN}. The extent to which one
member is influenced by others equals to the aggregated weight of the interpersonal
influences on him/her (ai=∑j≠iwij). This theory is based on a model which considers people’s
cognitive process of integrating opposite beliefs. The result of this process, however, by and
large depends on the social structure in which this process occurs. This social structure
consists of a combination of primary situations of the people, interpersonal influences and
being influenced.
Shiite Ijtihad and the Process of its Development
The analysis of the relation between Politics and Hawza in general, and specifically in Najaf,
Iraq, has been dominated by the dichotomy of sāmita-nātiqa by most of theorists and even
the clergies themselves. But more historical-sociological investigations suggest that for the
institution of Shi’ite religious seminaries in Najaf as the prominent center, at least four
major stages could be distinguished since 19th century: 1) emergence of marja’ and taqlid 2)
formation of marja’iyya ’āmma 3) elaboration of institutionalized and systematic
management of relation between marja’ and moqallid and 4) promotion of marja’ as
informal supreme leader or valii faqih.

The first stage was evolved in the last Ottoman period when Iraq was not more than a
combination of three vilāyets, and modernization was just rising at the hands of some
reformists. Then the ulamā were concentrated on accumulation and formulation of the
knowledge of Fiqh and promoting it in public against the prominent Sunni shari’ah. In the
second stage, the most important aspect was the raise of some comprehensive scholars
who had the semi-formal authority for legislation and issuing historic fatwā especially in the
Constitutional Reform of Iran. After WWI, the third stage was the time for organization and
connection of the followers within an extensive network, including a financial system of
wojuhāt. The last stage which is marked by the prominence of Al-Sistani is substantially
different from the three previous ones.
After the establishment of the Shi’ite majority state in Iraq, the legitimacy-dependency
relation of the state and Hawza has taken a more complicated pattern than any similar
examples in Iran and Iraq. Although the state officially doesn’t need legitimation from
Ulemā, but there is no important decision in this stage that has not been endorsed by Al-
Sistani.
What could be observed from the time of Sheik Mohammad Hasan Saheb Javaher and Sheik
Mortadha Ansari is a combination of vast variety of several different attitudes, which will be
dealt with as realities to be related to the theoretical framework from the previous sections
of this article. To understand the relationship between this institution and the concept of
power, this study divides this relationship into five levels of the interrelation of the ulamā to
each other, the relation of ulamā with their followers, the relation of ulamā with the
government, the relation of ulamā with the other elites, and the relation of ulamā with the
foreign powers. This article does not aim to deal with all the evidences relating to the
mentioned concepts in all levels, but it will only try to test some of the evidences against
this new theoretical framework, to understand the possibilities of utilizing this framework to
analyze the power of the ulamā in all levels.
Autonomy
Following the rivalries between the Usuli and Akhbari ulamā during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, and with the victory of the Usulis over the Akhbaris, the background
was being prepared for what we know as Marjaiyyah (reference) today. When some highly
qualified Mujtahids gathered in Najaf and when they won the attentions of the public, and

considering the fact that they did not face noticeable rivals, the Marjaiyyah āmmah
(Comprehensive Reference) was formed and later established along the political events of
the Constitutional Revolution in Iran and the Mujtahids’ significant roles there. The
formation of such a concept means in some points of time and regarding different criteria
like knowledge, popularity, financial power, political support and etc. each of which is a
variable that depends on various other factors and criteria, a Mujtahid, depending on the
recommendation of his predecessor or because of the attention of the other ulamā and
Mujtahids as well as the public, finds a central position, and his ideas and fatwas will be
more attended. This phenomenon and this new role that had not been experienced prior to
the nineteenth century and especially among the Shiites, brought about a better
centralization and organization, and more specialized division of labour in the institution of
the seminaries. Moreover, in such a situation, the autonomy of the other mujtahids and
ulamā would be limited, i.e. even in the case of opposition and lack of consensus with the
idea of the Marja’ āam, the ulamā need to avoid oppositions. Regarding the definition
presented for autonomy, in such a situation, the resources held by the Mujtahids such as
the financial resources, the followers, their roles and influence would be limited, and also, in
different situations, this is the Marja’ āam who defines and determines the rules of the
game, limiting the other Marjas even if they are willing to be active.
In fact, this public authority has increased the autonomy of the authority against his
followers, the governments, other elites and foreign powers to a large extent, elevating his
position, power and influence in different dimensions.
Pluralism
The absolute victory of the Usulis over Akhbaris was in a way that there remained only a few
marginal parties like Sheikhiyeh, and the recently grown Hojatiyeh and Maktab Tafkik
(School of Separation) in Mash’had. In the vocal/silent axis, there exists more variety and
plurality, accommodating different trends and attitudes in this background, ranging from
ulamā who extremely oppose any interference in the politics to Mujtahids who rule armed
forces. What provides this pluralism with more meaning is the structure of its followers. In
the authority system, the unit of each matrix is the beyt (house) and office of one Marja’.
Each Marja’ announces his authority by publishing his Risalah Amaliyah Book. Also, by
collecting financial duties [from their followers], not only do they expand their missionary

network with their book, but they also pay scholarships to more students at the seminaries
to create even more channels for their authority through training scholars. Scholars of the
seminaries propagate directly (in their speeches and sermons) and indirectly (by replying
the questions relating to Sharia law and referring them to the risalah of their Marja’). In the
situation of public authority, the attitudes will turn by concentration of propaganda and
reference to the public authority.
The other meaning of pluralism is the presence of other elites. In the post-Ottoman Iraq, in
spite of the presence of the nationalistic movements, the most serious intellectual rival for
the ulamā was Marxism. The rivalry finally reached a climax when Mohsen Al-Hakim
announced a fatwa indicating “Membership in communist party is prohibited because it is
Infidelity and heresy”1 Also the publications of Mohammad Baqer Sadr, such as ‘Our
Economics’ and ‘Our Philosophy’ were basically aimed to refute the ideas and beliefs of the
Marxists. Regardless of all the variety in their attitudes, the Shiite ulamā were able to
reconcile with nationalism, to the extent that even some of them would approve of some
the nationalistic attitudes. None of the Shiite ulamā, however, is recorded to have approved
of Marxism. The ulamā’s primary confirmation of Abdolkarim Qasem’s coup might be
interpreted as their accompanying Marxism, but it is highly notable that their approving was
firstly focused on independence from the superior power of England and the non-Muslim
foreigners; and secondly because of the Shiite agrarians’ benefit from the law Qasem had
introduced about the land reform. However, as soon as the non-religious and in some cases
irreligious attitudes of Qasem and his government were revealed, especially when he
started the registration of equality of men and women in inheritance law, the ulamā
disqualified him. After the occurrence of nine coups in Iraq and the Baath Party’s
establishing its power, now it was this party’s turn to start elimination of the ulamā and
religious scholars. Later on and after the fall of Saddam and Baath Party, this party was
announced illegal, having abrogated the possibilities of recruiting the former members of
this party and cancelled any formal activities of them following the law of ‘De-
Ba’athification’.
1
...‫الحاد‬ ‫و‬ ‫کفر‬ ‫ذلک‬ ‫فإن‬ ‫الشیوعی‬ ‫الحزب‬ ‫الی‬ ‫االنتماء‬ ‫الیجوز‬

Value Consensus
The fourth source for interpreting the Sharia law in Shiite jurisprudence is Ijmā’, meaning
consensus. Here, we need to clarify this concept and its relationship to the background of
the discussion. Firstly, in the principals of jurisprudence, Ijmā has several different meanings
and various types. According to one categorization, Ijmā is of six types and according to
another, of five. The main question is if Ijmā is consensus or not. In the first place, the value
consensus in the theory of elites indicates a “relative” consensus among all the members
and sections, of the norms of political behaviour as well as the value of the political
institutions, while Ijmā means agreement of the ulamā on a certain matter, regarding the
fact that the agreement among the ulamā is an “absolute” consensus on the contents of the
Sharia law not the behavioural norms. The behavioural norms fall outside the borders of
jurisprudence, more relating to the science of ethics, which is a rather marginal discussion
among the intellectual systems of the seminaries. In the second place, the subject of
ulamā’s interfering with the politics and their entering the circle of power as well as the
regulations relating to political behaviour of themselves and their followers, except for the
recent couple of decades and only for some ulamā, has not been among the core or
principle values to be attended as a matter of Ijmā. Moreover, in the cases where ulamā
were related to the politics in different eras, their circle of relationships and the way they
acted could only be defined in the frame of the limited situation or that certain issue and
not with a long term view to politics. In other words, even where their political ideas and
actions share same attributes of their previous ideas and actions, they are not elevated to
the level of policy making, lacking the practical aspects and defined solutions for the
administration of affairs, and sufficing to announcing general fatwas when needed.
A principle evidence for all the above claims is that during the Constitutional Revolution in
Iran, Mohammad Kazem Khorasani was the proponent while Mohammad Kazem Yazdi an
opponent to the Constitutionalists and a proponent to the monarchy. Also in the event of
protectorate of England and during the people and ulamā’s riot, he did not support the
people. The same difference was obviously observable between Ruhollah Khomeini and
Abolqasem Khoii relating to the Shah and Saddam’s rules.

Structural Coherence
This article mentioned some of the characteristics of relationship and influence networks
among the marjas. One of the most important conditions for consensus of the elites is the
presence of structural coherence and pluralism at the same time. This means that several
different elites can form interwoven and overlapping networks of influence. The historical
experience of the ulamā shows that the reinforcement of each variable of pluralism and
structural coherence can weaken the other variable. Moreover, there is no accurate or
reliable information available from the structure of the network of the relationships within
one clique of elites, among the cliques of elites and between the elites and non-elites.
The Case of Najaf Today
Ali Al-Sistani has the highest density of relationships, be it of the within ulamā relationships,
of the type of ulamā with the government, of the type of ulamā with people or of ulamā
with the international environment. Every morning at 9, Al-Sistani’s Beit and office registers
the names of the people who ask for appointment with him, witnessing two long lines of
Iraqis and non-Iraqis in the Share’ Al-Rasul Street. When the main gate opens, people pass
the alley and the corridors of the house to enter the room where he sits; they are permitted
to only kiss his hand, and then they are shown the way out from the other door. In the
private meetings which are usually appointed in the afternoons, his son Seyed Mohammad
Reza manages the time, and arranges the start and the end of each meeting. Meeting Al-
Sistani is a sign of legitimacy for the Iraqi politicians, and regarding Iran, it indicates his good
intentions with the Islamic Republic and especially the Velayat Faqih. The significant change
that has occurred in the internal network of his Beit is the direction of the religious duties:
previously the duties were received by his office in Qom supervised by his son-in-law, Javad
Shahrestani, whereas after the opening of the borders of Iraq to the other countries’ Shiites,
these duties are submitted to his office in Najaf which is managed by his son Mohammad
Reza. This change in the direction of income, along with the relationships and the political
messages from Qom to Najaf have provided a central position for his son Mohammad Reza,
to the extent that he is publically titled Seyed Alrais (meaning the Master President).
Moreover, in another important change, Iranian students of seminaries are refused
permission to study in the seminary of Najaf. Regarding the historical role of Iranian ulamā
during the history of Atabāt, this change might result in serious consequences influencing

the process of development of the future Marjas, the prediction and understanding of
which needs further studies.
Conclusion and Discussion
The necessity of the elite’s consensus is obvious when a society decides to move in the
direction of democratic systems. Today it is known more than ever that democracy will be
achieved later and with more difficulty in the milieu of war be it civil war or war on the
borders. Instead, the path to democracy will be smoother and shorter if the mechanisms of
the elites’ achieving unity according to consensus are discovered and admitted by the elite
themselves. In addition, regarding the uncertainty and the chronic and stable conflicts in the
Middle East, and especially in a country like Iraq, the possibility of elites’ falling in the trap of
conflict is much more probable than their achieving consensus. As a result, the complexity
of the problems will be doubled in such a situation. To avoid such confusions, it is necessary
to find and create norms that pave the way for achieving consensus. Accordingly, the central
core for studying future models will be the process of formation and development of such
norms that provide the elites and non-elites, like religious scholars and their followers, with
unity based on consensus, especially in the environment of political activities and power
relations.
Future Speculations
To understand and predict future changes in the structure of power relations of the
religious elite, this study implicates two approaches in these researches:
A) Regarding the mentioned concepts and variables, it seems that besides the
researches on theology, jurisprudence, humanities and linguistics on the one hand,
and researches on politics and international relations on the other hand; new
methods must be combined with the existing ones. In the agent based modelling,
such attributes and characteristics as heterogeneity, autonomy, explicit space, local
interactions and bounded rationality are modelled independent of the comparative
and inferential models. (Epstein, 1999)
B) In the Network analysis, attributes such as strength, brokerage, centrality, equality,
reciprocity, transitivity and density in people, cliques and the relationships among
them are studied. The literature on this branch has mainly focused on networks of

terrorism up to now (Qin et. al. 2005; Carley 2006; Moon & Carley 2007; Koschade
2006). Using the modelling of this type and generalizing it to other sections of the
society will facilitate understanding the complexities of the existing realities for the
analysts and those interested in the changes in the Islamic societies and the Middle
East.

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