Funeral of the Patiala Pathan who stopped Indian tank division with two squadrons and the unjust controversy to usurp his role since 1965 war

THE REAL HERO OF 1965 WAR
A H AMIN, Major (Retired)
2001

Thanks to Ex Major
Ikram Sehgal without
whose support this
account would not have
been published in March
2001.In the limited
publishing world of 1999-
2002 Defence Journal was
a great platform.
This was a chapter of my book Pakistan Army since
1965 written in 1999.

Had he been 100 % West Pakistani and not 50 %
Bengali this would not have been published.
A H AMIN, Major (Retired)

In March 2001 my book Pakistan Army till
1965's chapter on Battle of Chawinda was
published in Defence Journal Karachi.This
started a controversy about the real hero of
Battle of Chawinda as far as the most decisive

day 8th September was concerned.Below are the
series of letters then exhanged.The controversy
has raged on from March 2001 till September
2008.
Agha H Amin
EX MAJOR FAROUK ADAMS LETTER TO
DEFENCE JOURNAL AND MY REBUTTAL
OF 2001:---
Farouk Adams Letter to Editor Defence Journal and
A.H Amin's Reply Defence Journal August 2001
The Battle of Chawinda
I refer to Agha Humayun Amin’s article on the
Battle of Chawinda, and also being “direct
participant, would like to share with your readers,
some of my knowledge on the subject. Since I am
writing from memory, I will touch only upon those

incidents and aspects of the battle, of which I am
certain.
About a week before the war started, an A. K officer
from the Gibraltar Force, exfiltrated, and brought to
HQ 24 Brigade, certain Indian Army documents.
These purported to show the presence of the 1st
Indian Armoured Division opposite us. Brig Abdul
Ali Malik accordingly informed the higher HQ, and
GHQ detailed Maj. Mahmud of the Army Aviation
to physically carry these documents to GHQ for
evaluation. GHQ’s assessment was that these
documents were part of an Indian deception plan.
Brig Malik disagreed with this assessment. So it is
incorrect to say that he had no idea what he had
against him, though it is correct that when the attack
came, he had no way of knowing that this was the
main effort of the enemy. But neither did anyone
else.
When the Jassar fiasco took place, Brig Malik
advised 15 Div. not to move him, because he
expected a strong attack against his positions. HQ 15
Div. did not agree.

HQ 15 Div. ordered 24 Brigade to clear the
imaginary enemy bridgehead at Jassar. Brig Malik
tasked 2 Punjab Regiment (my unit) to do the
needful. The Commanding Officer, Lt Col Jamshed
MC Bar, SJ, suggested an attack at first light, instead
of a night attack, because we had no idea about the
enemy location, terrain etc etc. But 15 Div. orders
were clear and inflexible, and so Col Jamshed,
decided to lead the attack in person. But before this
could be done, the actual situation in Jassar became
clear, and the attack was called off.
At about first light on 08 September, an NCO of the
Engineers came into our positions. He told of a
heavy Indian attack that had severely mauled 3 F.F
Regiment which was deployed as screen. He was
immediately taken to the Brigade HQ, where Brig
Malik questioned him in the presence of Col
Jamshed and Major Aslam Shah, who was the B.M.
If Brig Malik had any doubt about a serious enemy
thrust in his sector, that was now removed. It took
him about a minute to take, what many consider, the
most important decision of the war i.e. to advance on
a broad front and engage the attacking enemy forces.

This decision was entirely Brig Malik’s, and it saved
Pakistan. Had it gone wrong, he would have been
court martialled. Since he suspected that HQ 15 Div.
was prone to panic, he ordered Maj. Aslam Shah to
break wireless contact with the Div. HQ (which was
re-established when the enemy had been engaged,
and Tikka Khan had taken over 15 Div). Brig Malik
then gave the operation orders to his unit
commanders, including Lt Col Nisar, CO 25
Cavalry. It is, therefore, absolutely incorrect to say
that Brig Malik “abdicated” his command to a unit
commander. Indeed, after that first day, 25 Cavalry
was not involved in operations as regiment, because
the situation warranted squadron actions in support
of infantry. And this support these squadrons
unstintingly and heroically provided. But this by no
stretch of the imagination can be taken to mean the
de facto command of the Chawinda Battle was at
any time exercised by Co 25 Cavalry. This remained
firmly in Brig Malik’s hands who remained
unswerving and steadfast and central to the battle,
right till the very end.
After the first three days of almost continuous battle
we had suffered serious depletion in numbers, and

had suffered extreme exhaustion both physically and
mentally. And so we were withdrawn from the FDLs
to recover, but that same evening the situation at the
front became so alarming that we were thrust right
back into the battle. It is a fair comment on the
morale of 24 Brigade group that despite our
bedraggled state and the mauling we had received,
there was no hesitation on the part of anyone to
rejoin battle. From then, to the end of the war, 24
Brigade held its position and survived — but barely.
It is difficult to explain what extreme weariness
really is.
There is mention in the article under reference, of
Brig Malik’s request to be moved to the “rear”,
which was refused by Gen Abrar. If a Brigade
Commander is to make such a suggestion, he cannot
just say “rear”. He has to give an alternate plan of
operations which he must work out with his staff.
Gen Aslam Shah (then B.M) denies that any such
suggestion was ever made, and this fits into the
experience of people like me, who were quite clearly
told that for 24 Brigade, this was to be a “last man
last round battle”. Therefore, if such a suggestion is
recorded, either its context is missing, or it is the

result of a misunderstanding. When we were
suddenly pulled out of recuperation and sent back
into battle (refer sub-para above) we were told that
we will be pulled back for refitment at the first
possible opportunity. Perhaps this could be the
context.
2. And now I would like to make few general
comments as under:-
Anyone reading the article under reference is bound
to come away with the impression that the Battle of
Chawinda was fought exclusively by Brig Amjad
Chaudhry, Lt Col Nisar, Maj. Muhammad Ahmed,
and the “direct participant” Maj. Shamshad. The
infantry, it seems was just not there. As authentic
history, therefore, this article will be seen as trifle
lop-sided. The truth is that by sheer coincidence
some very brave and steadfast men got thrown into
what was 24 Brigade. With the courage of these
men, came a good deal of luck by providence — and
the combination made for quite a number of gallant
actions by all arms, and all ranks.

Brig Muhammad Ahmed was heroic, and so was Lt
Col Nisar, but how can the rest of 25 Cavalry be put
into the dustbin of anonymity? Indeed I can’t think
of one officer or tank commander who did not
perform.
Yes, General Abrar was a good commander. He was
calm and poised and did not foist needless
interference on 24 Brigade. Brig Amjad Chaudhry
too had a reputation of a good artillery officer,
though I would have to be a very brave man to
declare him the best gunner officer in the sub-
continent. These officers held their nerve, and did
not panic. And nor did they need to. They were
never within the sights of the enemy. But people like
Lt Col Shinwari, Lt Col Jamshed and Maj. Aslam
Shah constantly were, and yet they kept their calm.
And last but not the least the composure of Brig
Abdul Ali Malik deserves to be saluted. Throughout
the battle his HQ was either in the FDLs or not more
than 400 yds in the rear. He kept his cool in the face
of direct enemy fire for days at end — comparison
between him and the others is like comparing a
fighter in the ring with the audience. When Lt Gen
(Retd) Tariq, S. J came on PTV two years ago on the

occasion of Defence Day, he talked of his
experiences of the Battle of Chawinda. He was
generous in his praise of many gallant actions. But
he singled out Brig Malik beyond all the rest as the
man whose battle it really was, while all the rest of
us revolved around him. Having seen him at close
quarters, I cannot disagree with this assessment.
3. Lastly, to call a respected senior officer “a VCO
type” General, was not in very good taste.
Farouk Adam Khan S. J
27 June 001
REPLY OF A.H AMIN TO EX MAJOUR
FAROUK ADAM PUBLISHED ALONG SIDE
FAROUK ADAMS LETTER IN DEFENCE
JOURNAL :---
I refer to Ex Major Farouk Adam Khan’s S.J letter
on my article “ Battle of Chawinda” .
I have only touched “incidents and aspects” of the
battle about which “I could be certain” based on the
“authority of tangible concrete and precise” records

in the form of “ official sources of the Pakistan
Army” like Major General Shaukat Riza’s “The
Pakistan Army-War 1965” sponsored and published
by the Pakistan Army and printed by the Pakistan
Army Press in 1984 , The Pakistan Army Green
Book-1992 the official yearbook of the Pakistan
Army published by the Pakistan Army’s General
Headquarters and accounts of direct participants like
Major Shamshad. I had the opportunity of meeting
other participants like Brigadier Ahmad in 1982 ,
Lieutenant Colonel Raza in 1993 and Major
Shamshad in 2000. In addition, I met a large number
of participants while serving in 11 Cavalry from
27th March 1983 till 9th April 1985.
l Firstly the assertion by the worthy critic that the
Indian mailbag was captured by an exfiltrating
element of Gibraltar Force. The Gibraltar Force was
a fiasco of magnanimous proportions and very few
exfiltrated in good shape what to talk of capturing a
mail bag. The mail bag was captured by a deliberate
ambush launched under the direction of Headquarter
15 Division under direction of Col S.G Mehdi. The
official account on this episode is clear. Thus
Shaukat Riza states “Lt Col Sher Zaman (MI

Directorate) ordered Col S.G Mehdi (15 Division) to
lay an ambush on the road (Samba-Kathua), and get
some prisoners. At 0100 hours night 3rd/4th
September, Zaman had a call from an excited Mehdi.
An Indian despatch rider had been captured. His
message bag contained mail for HQ Squadron 1
Indian Armoured Division. The bag was
immediately flown to Rawalpindi.” (Refers-Pages-
133 & 134-The Pakistan Army-War 1965-Shaukat
Riza-Army Education Press-1984).
l What happened after this at least on paper was a
mystery till Gen N.U.K Babar cleared this point on
paper in an interview conducted by this scribe and
published in DJ April 2000 issue by stating that the
mail box was dismissed as an Indian deception by
the then DMI Brigadier Irshad.
l In paragraph 1 the worthy critic states about
Brigadier Malik i.e “It took him about a minute to
take the most important decision of the war i.e to
advance on a broad front and engage the attacking
enemy forces”. Now this is a figment of the worthy
critics imagination. In “Summer 1997“ issue of
“Pakistan Army Journal“ Brigadier Nisar the

Commanding Officer of 25 Cavalry gave his version
of the Battle of Gadgor-Chawinda. Nowhere in the
article did Nisar state that Brigadier Malik gave him
any order on the decisive 8th of September “to
advance on a broad front and engage the enemy”. On
the other hand this point has been treated very
clearly by Shaukat Riza in the Pakistani GHQ’s
officially sponsored account. Shaukat describes the
initial situation on the crucial morning of 8th
September 1965 in the following words “At about
0600 hours 24 Brigade received the news that 3 FF
had been overrun. Brigadier Ali Malik got on to Col
Nisar and ordered 25 Cavalry to do something”.
(Refers Page - 148-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit) That was
the only order Malik gave. All the subsequent
deployment was done by Nisar and the brunt of the
Indian attack was borne by “Bravo Squadron” of 25
Cavalry commanded by Major Ahmad. It was Col
Nisar and Nisar alone who did the broad front
deployment without any orders to resort to any
broad front deployment from Brigadier Malik.
l In paragraph 1 the worthy critic states that
Brigadier Malik never made a request for a
withdrawal on 16th September. My source for

stating that Brigadier Malik made a request for
withdrawing from Chawinda position is none other
than a major direct participant staff officer of the
battle i.e Major K.M Arif the then GSO-2
(Operations) 6th Armoured Division at Chawinda. It
was 6th Armoured Division Headquarters which
controlled the battle after 9th September. It is very
strange that the critic finds my narration odd rather
than contesting the authority which I quoted to
support my assertion. In an article published in
Pakistan Army Green Book-1992-Year of the Senior
Field Commanders, General K.M Arif (Retired)
made the following assertion i.e “The battle raged
with considerable intensity on September 16. After
its failure to capture Chawinda the enemy failed to
envelop it by a two pronged attack. In the process
the villages of Sodreke fell and Buttur Dograndi
came under attack. The severe fighting resulted in
many casualties. The situation was confused and the
outcome uncertain .So fluid the situation became
that at 1630 hours 24 Brigade Commander requested
permission to take up a position in the rear.Abrar
told the brigade commander on telephone, “You
know what is there in the kitty. There is no question
of falling back.We shall fight till the bitter end from

our present positions.” His words proved a timely
tonic. 24 Brigade fought gallantly. Soon the danger
subsided.” (Refers -Page -6-” Abrar’s Battlefield
Decisions”-Pakistan Army Green Book-Year of
Senior Commanders-Pakistan Army-General
Headquarters-Rawalpindi-1992). This assertion was
made by one of the principal staff officers of the 6th
Armoured Division who was present on the scene
and not a figment of my imagination.
l Even 6th Armoured Division’s War Diary contains
a record of the above mentioned telephone call.
l As to the worthy critic’s assertion in paragraph 1
about de facto command of Chawinda Battle
remaining in Brigadier Malik till the end. All that I
stated was that during the most decisive encounter of
the whole battle at Gadgor on 8th September it was
Nisar and Nisar alone who exercised coup d oeil
deploying his regiment entirely on his own without
any orders from 24 Brigade about “any broad front
deployment” or any “specific orders to deploy in any
particular disposition”. After this decisive encounter
at Gadgor the Indians did not do anything till 11th
September. From 10th September 6th Armoured

Division entered the scene and controlled the
Chawinda battle, 24 Brigade being one of the many
brigades that it commanded.
l Refers the criticism in paragraph 2 that “the battle
was fought exclusively by Amjad Chaudhry,
Lt Col Nisar, Major Mohammad Ahmad and the
direct participant Major Shamshad” all I can say is
that the critic did not read my article but only
scanned through it.On map opposite Page-40 it is
written that C squadron i.e Shamshad’s squadron
arrived opposite Gadgor area at 1130 hours after the
situation had been stabilised. On various pages I
have stated eg “ 25 Cavalry was to Pakistan Army’s
good luck, a newly raised but extremely fine tank
regiment” (Refers-Page-43). The same point is
repeated on various pages.
l About Abdul Ali Malik’s command qualities Gen
Fazal Muqeem notes in his “Pakistan’s Crisis in
Leadership” “The few counterattacks which 8
Division tried during the war were most noticeable
by their lack of planning.The units were hurled into
battle without having been given enough time for

planning and preparations .The worst example of
this attack was on December 17 when against all
protestations of its very gallant commanding officer ,
35 FF was sent into battle for almost certain
massacre” (Refers-Page-215 and 216-Pakistan’s
Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem
Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Lahore-
1973).
l Chawinda was an armour battle and this is proved
by casualties suffered by tank and infantry units.
How many infantry units except 3 FF could match
the casualties of 11 Cavalry in 1965 i.e 34 killed. As
a matter of fact the direct participant Major
Shamshad has referred to one counter attack in
which an infantry company of 2 Punjab had Nil
killed and two officers got the SJ. Even in Chamb
during Grand Slam 11 Cavalry lost 19 killed on 1st
September 1965 alone while 14 Punjab lost a total of
3 killed in the entire Grand Slam. (Refers-Page-108
1 & 109-Pak Bharat Jang-Colonel Mukhtar Gillani -
Rawalpindi-April -1998). As a matter of fact 11
Cavalry suffered more casualties in Grand Slam than
all ten infantry units except one i.e 13 Punjab which
had lost 24 killed as against 11 Cavalry’s 19

killed.But then the strength of an armoured regiment
is around 400 vis-a-vis 800 of infantry.
l Lastly the reference to VCO. This was purely
symbolic and had nothing to do with rank or status
in the literal sense. Sher Bahadur’s efforts to divide
and distribute the 4 Corps Artillery Headquarter
before the 1965 War have been discussed by an
authority no less eminent than Pakistan Army’s last
C in C, Gul Hassan.This if done would have
seriously compromised chances of Pakistani success
in Grand Slam and Chawinda.Without concentrated
artillery at Grand Slam or in Chawinda none
including Abrar or Malik could have defeated the
Indians.
Kind Regards
A.H Amin (pavocavalry@hotmail.com)
-------------------------------------------------------------
BRIGADIER KAMAL ALAMS AND
COLONEL ANWARS LETTERS TO
DEFENCE JOURNAL AND MY REBUTTAL

AS ASSISTANT EDITOR DEFENCE
JOURNAL OF JANUARY 2002:---
Brig Kamal Alam and Colonel Anwars Criticism of
Chawinda and A.H Amin's Reply Defence Journal
January 2002
Dear Major Sehgal,
In his letter in Defence Journal of Aug 2001, Mr .
Amin says that in the Pak Army Journal (Summer
97) Brig Nisar does not mention any order coming
his way from his Brigade Comd on 8 Sept 1965. I
am no historian but some questions immediately
come to mind viz. Does Col Nisar also mention that
the Brigade Commander told him to “do
something”? If not who is to be believed, Brig Nisar
or Gen Riza. And if he was not told to “do
something“, what major event galvanized him into
taking this unilateral action against the enemy
advance? Did he get information about the enemy
advance himself, or did someone give it to him, and
if so who? When he got his information, was he in
the presence of the Brigade Commander , or was in
wireless contact with him? And when he decided to

strike out on his own, did he at least inform the
Brigade? And if so what transpired; or did the rest of
the Brigade merely follow 25 Cav through guess-
work?
The point I want to make is that in order to be
classified as “history“ we have to first establish
whether 25 Cav was a part of a larger formation, or
was acting in a vacuum. And if it was subordinate to
24 Brigade, did it take itself out of the Brigade
ORBAT on its own, or did if take the Brigade under
its own command. This relationship can only be
settled by the communication between the two. So
far it has been considered a settled fact beyond any
controversy, that this Brigade and all its components
fought an outstanding action. After all there have
been M Ds and presentation on the subject for the
last 36 years and most officers have had a chance to
take part in one or another of these. And no adverse
comment has come to tarnish the reputation of any
officer of the brigade.
It is only recently that through one sentence of Maj
Gen Shaukat Riza ‘s Book almost all infantry

actions of this battle seem to have been nullified, and
the brave conduct of the Bridge Commander has
been found fit to be relegated to those who
functioned below par.
I am afraid that Gen Riza’s Book is primarily the
amalgam of various war diaries, with very little
original research , “officially sponsored” to give the
“official view“. A very good insight into its
historical value and credibility lies in what it has to
say regarding the change of command in Chamb,
which is a scandal that has refused to be hushed up
despite the best official efforts. On page 121 of the
book Gen Riza blatantly states that change of
Command in Chamb was pre-planned. And then he
goes on to brazenly assert that this was confirmed by
most officers in GHQ and 12 Div. He forgot that this
was a deliberate, set-piece attack, the operation
orders for which per force would have to be attended
by GOC 7 Div, if the command was to change, and
all the lower formations would have known about it,
and at least some shred of documentary evidence of
this effect would have survived, at least in GHQ. But
there is not a word extant to corroborate this cover-
up. And what is worst is that immediately after the

war in Staff College under, Gen Riza was serving “a
12 Div officer” who was the GOC of this Division.
He was Gen Akhtar Malik. At a time when even
subalterns like me could question Gen Malik on this
subject and get a candid reply, it is impossible to
believe that Gen Riza did not know all details of this
change from the horse’s mouth. And knowing this
and then wilfully distorting history is deserving of
the strongest opprobrium. And then DJ takes one
line of this “history” and knocks out all infantry
actions, and goes further to malign the commander
of Chawinda Brigade! And now this is to pass for
history?
Brig (Retd) Kamal Alam, TJ
14 Dec 2001
To : The Editor Defence Journal
Karachi
Sir,
I refer to letter by Mr. Farouk Adam and Mr. Amin
on the Battle of Chawinda (Defence Journal Aug
2001). In 1972, in company of some regimental at
officers I met Gen A .A Malik in Mangla. The

question of 3 F F came up. He said the heaviest
attacks seemed to come wherever this unit was
deployed. As such at one point he had to ask the Div
HQ if there was any possibility for this unit to be
relieved and rested. The Div HQ said this was not
possible. War diaries are often not written
immediately . There are often inaccuracies in them.
Is it possible that this event is being referred to by
both writers? At any rate 24 Brigade War Diary
should also be consulted.
Mr. Amin quotes Gen Riza’s Book i.e. Brig Malik
got on to ...............” From this it is obvious that it
means the communication was by wireless or
telephone. But I have attended an M D on this battle
and also heard its narration from Brig Shinwari.
Both were nearer to Farouk Adam’s explanation of
events of
8 Sept. Mr. Amin says he has referred to “official
sources” and “officially sponsored” GHQ account of
this Battle. This is its weak point. Our “officially
sponsored accounts” unfortunately have been cover-
ups. Gen Riza wrote about such an important battle
without interviewing any infantry CO, or any officer

of the Brigade HQ, when they were all alivel! What
sort of history is this?
I heard the talk by Lt Gen Tariq S. J to which Farouk
Adam has referred. I have also heard him on the
subject in person. He said that all units gave their
very best but also that the Brigade Commander’s
conduct, whose HQ was often in line of direct fire,
was most inspiring.
After reading the original article one gets the
impression that the whole battle was fought by Col
Nisar and Maj Ahmed ably supported by Brig
Amjad Chowdhry’s guns. It seems infantry was non-
existant! Granted it was a tank battle and very well
done by 25 Cav. But I can’t recall any DEFENSIVE
tank battle over two weeks duration without an
infantry firm base. And if Chawinda base did not
hold, that would be the end of the tank battle also.
But the infantry did hold, better than any infantry
brigade on either side. And the Brigade Commander
showed more pluck than any officer of his rank, also
on either side. I am willing to stand corrected on
this. And if not corrected, will not this make these
units and Brig Malik deserving of credit?

Lt Col Mohammad Anwar
5 Dec 2001
REPLY TO CRITICISM OF BRIG ALAM AND
COL ANWAR ON ARTICLE “BATTLE OF
CHAWINDA” AND SUBSEQUENT LETTERS
PUBLISHED IN DJ MARCH 2001 ISSUES AND
AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 2001 ISSUES
It is amusing as well as encouraging to note that this
scribe’s article on Chawinda Battle of 1965
published in Defence Journal March 2001 issue
continues to attract flak from critics!
The latest in the series are two letters , both written
by retired officers . First of all I must clarify that my
sole motivation in all writing has been to endeavour
to write “what men did” rather than what “they
ought ideally to have done” or what “someone later
with the benefit of hindsight tried to portray , what
they had done”. Thus the analysis of Chawinda
Battle done with pure loyalty to service without any
inter arm rivalry or nationalistic motivation. Pure

and unadulterated military history filtered
dispassionately separating fact from fiction and myth
from reality. How far I succeeded is for readers to
judge.
History as Frederick the Great once said can be well
written only in a free country and ours has been
continuously under civil or military dictators since
1958. Enters Defence Journal which in its
resurrected form from 1997 picked up the gauntlet of
serving as a medium of intellectual honesty and
forthright criticism and published facts which were
unpalatable for some and welcomed by the vast
multitude. A breath of fresh air in a country reduced
to intellectual stagnation because of years of
censorship and intellectual persecution! I had written
for the Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel but had
left military history writing when in 1998 through a
dear friend I discovered that there is a new Defence
Journal in Karachi which is open to some critical
writing!
I maintain as one great master of English prose said
that “all history so far as it is not supported by
contemporary evidence is romance”! Battle of

Chawinda published in DJ March 2001 was thus not
romance! What many in this country wrote and was
outwardly military history was essentially
“Romance”! Inspiring, superhuman but a myth
promiscuously mixed with reality!
Chance plays a key role in battle and at Chawinda
chance played a very important role! Nisar, when he
deployed 25 Cavalry did not know what was in front
of him ! KK Singh Commander 1st Indian Brigade
also did not know what was in front of him! This
mutual ignorance saved Pakistan on that crucial day
! Later heroes were created! I repeat “Heroes were
created” ! This was what the article was all about !
What were the key facts? Most important tangible
fact was “casualties” ! These were deliberately
hidden since these would have let the cat out of the
bag! Everyone would have discovered who really
fought and who got gallantry awards on
parochial,regimental or old boy links !How many
were killed in the biggest military blunder
“Operation Gibraltar”! This is Top Secret ! How
many infantry men died at Chawinda? Again no
mention of any figures! The real motivation here is

not national interest but to preserve or more
important to “guard reputations”
Brigadier Kamal Alam’s Letter
a. I stick to the assertion that the “broad front
deployment” was done by Nisar and Nisar alone and
Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik had no role in it. It is
another matter that Nisar also did not know what
was in front of him. It was like Jutland when both
contending fleets were running towards each other at
express train speed. Why Nisar behaved as he did
and what actually happened even today is hard to
understand, whatever anyone may claim now with
the benefit of hindsight! Brigadier Alam offers no
tangible proof that the actions of 25 Cavalry had
anything to do with what Brig A.A Malik told Nisar.
Nisar was told to “do something” and Nisar did
something without the least clue of what was in front
of him. The important thing is that Nisar did
something rather than getting paralysed into inertia
and inaction! I may add a personal note here. I
understand that Alam’s elder brother Brig Mujahid
Alam COS 31 Corps while this scribe was

commanding 5 Independent Armoured Squadron
was a fine soldier.
b. Alam raises the question about the controversial
“Do Something” order by Brig A.A Malik to Lt Col
Nisar CO 25 Cavalry. The same words were
repeated by Nisar in his article published in Pakistan
Army Journal in 1997. Then Alam raises the
question about 25 Cavalry functioning in a vacuum.
24 Brigade had two infantry units, one which had
been overrun and dispersed on 8th September i.e 3
FF and 2 Punjab which was at Chawinda. The
crucial action took place at Gadgor few miles north
of Chawinda in which 25 Cavalry faced the entire
Indian 1st Armoured Division. This was an
extraordinary situation and Nisar acted on his own
best judgement since Malik had abdicated to Nisar
by stating that he should do something. It is another
thing that Nisar also did not know what was in front
of him and acted boldly and unconventionally. Had
he known what was in front of him he may have
been paralysed by inertia and inaction! But this is
speculation and some part of history always remains
unfathomed and hidden! Nisar acted through sheer
reflex and deployed his unit in an impromptu

manner. The fire fight which took place at Gadgor
between 0900 hours and 1200 hours was a pure tank
versus tank affair. 25 Cavalry versus two leading
tank regiments of Indian 1st Armoured Division!
Thus the Indian Armoured Corps historian stated
“The Armoured Brigade had been blocked by two
squadrons of Pattons and in the first encounter had
lost more tanks than the enemy had...the worst
consequence of the days battle was its paralysing
effect on the minds of the higher commanders. It
took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next
move. This interval gave Pakistanis time to deploy
their 6th Armoured Division...in fact the golden
opportunity that fate had offered to the 1st Armoured
Division to make worthwhile gains had been
irretrievably lost” (Refers-Pages-393 & 394-History
of Indian Armoured Corps-Gurcharan Singh
Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-1990). Thus the Indians
acknowledged “This regiment’s (25 Cavalry)
performance was certainly creditable because it
alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured
division and its objective, the MRL canal”.
(Refers-Page-395-Ibid).

c. At Gadgor on 8th September it was 25 Cavalry
and 25 Cavalry alone which saved the day. Major
Shamshad a direct participant has already stated on
record that SJs were awarded to some officers for an
attack in which not a single man was killed on both
sides!
d. 25 Cavalry was part of 24 Brigade but all that
Nisar its CO did on the crucial 8th September at
Gadgor was based on his own judgement. On 9th
and 10th September no fighting took place as
Indians had withdrawn their armoured division to
the crossroads. On 10th September, 6 Armoured
Division took over and 24 Brigade was a part of 6
Armoured Division. On 8th September there was a
vacuum and Nisar acted in a sitaution which can be
classified as one characterised by “absence of clear
and precise orders”!
e. Shaukat Riza’s book is basically a compilation of
existing facts. It has historical value since Riza was
allowed access to official records.
f. The change of command aspect about which Alam
asserts is correct and was officially hushed up but

why should Shaukat Riza have any sympathy for the
armoured corps of 1960s which was arrogant and
looked down on artillery as I personally witnessed
right till 1980s as a young officer in Kharian and
Multan? Artillery officers were never welcomed in
armoured corps unit messes unless real exceptions
based on personal ties and armour officers rarely
visited artillery messes.
g. Chawinda was a tank battle, thus armour suffered
more casualties. On the other hand Lahore was an
infantry battle where the indomitable 1st Baluch lost
something like around 30 killed in battle , more
casualties than most infantry units in the much
trumpeted Grand Slam.
h. Now I offer some figures for the readers to form
their own conclusions.
KILLED-CASUALTIES GRAND SLAM
UNIT KILLED CASUALTIES
6 PUNJAB 9
9 PUNJAB 15
13 PUNJAB 24
14 PUNJAB 3

15 PUNJAB 8
8 BALOCH 10
11 CAVALRY 19
13 LANCERS 14
REFERS-PAGE-109-PAKISTAN BHARAT JANG-
1965-COL MUKHTAR GILLANI-RAWALPINDI-
JULY 1998 AND UNIT SOURCES 13 LANCERS
AND 11 CAVALRY
The above casualties prove that Grand Slam was
both an infantry and armour battle yet armour
suffered proportionately more casualties since the
effective battle strength of a tank unit is half that of
an infantry unit. 14 Punjab lost just 3 killed while 10
Guides Cavalry at Chawinda lost 3 killed in officers
alone apart from 12 OR/JCOs killed! 11 Cavalry lost
more in killed casualties in 1965 War than any of the
above units of the Grand Slam i.e 34 killed.
No fault of infantry since Chawinda was an
essentially a tank battle.
i. Brigadier Alam does not give any figures which
prove that infantry suffered more casualties at

Chawinda. I have already admitted in my letter that
the only infantry unit which bore the brunt of Indian
assault was 3 FF on the 8th September. 3 FF aside
the brunt of the attack at Chawinda was borne by
armour units since Chawinda was a tank battle. At
Lahore, the brunt of the attack was faced by infantry
since Lahore i.e 10 Division battle was an essentially
infantry battle.
Thus, there were units like 1st Baloch and 16 Punjab
which suffered tremendous casualties.1st Baloch
suffering casualties of 31 killed in 10 Division Area
(Refers-Page-139-Col Gillani-Op Cit). 16 Punjab
suffering casualties of 106 killed and 70 missing
most of whom were killed (more than total of all
regular infantry units in Grand Slam) (Refers-Page-
138-Col Gillani). On the other hand there were
formations which in words of Colonel Mukhtar
Gillani exaggerated the fighting and suffered
nominal casualties like the 103 Brigade in 10
Division area (Refers Page-143-Col Gillani).
j. Even at formation level Chawinda was not a big
battle in terms of casualties since the Indian 1 Corps

suffered less casualties than 11 Indian Corps in Ravi
Sutlej Corridor.
k. Brigadier Alam has mixed inter arm rivalry with
operational leadership and personalities. Infantry had
a role in Chawinda. Every arm and service had a
role. If I have not discussed infantry actions in detail
it is not because infantry did nothing at Chawinda
but simply because Chawinda was a tank dominated
battle with artillery playing a crucial role. Had I been
biased I would not have stated in various articles that
the greatest tank commander of Pakistan Army at
operational level was Maj Gen Iftikhar who was an
infantry man. Similarly Ibrar whose conduct I
pointed out as most decisive was again an infantry
man .
l. If Brigadier Alam wants to highlight the infantry
side of the battle he is free to write an article on the
“Role of Infantry at Chawinda”.
m. I have also compiled some casualty figures of
armour units in 1965 which will give the reader a
fair idea of who did what and who suffered more or
less:—

UNIT Killed casualties Battle area Remarks
4 CAVALRY 17 KHEM KARAN
5 HORSE 5 KHEM KARAN
6 LANCERS 20 KHEM KARAN
GUIDES 15 CHAWINDA Including 3 Officers
11 CAVALRY 34 CHAMB
CHAWINDA Including 1 Officer
12 CAVALRY 8 KHEM KARAN Did Traffic
Control / Flank Protection etc. being Recce
Regiment
13 LANCERS 14 CHAMB
JAURIAN
AKHNUR Including 3 Officers
15 LANCERS 8 KHEM KARAN
19 LANCERS 18 CHAWINDA Including 2 Officers
20 LANCERS Nil SIALKOT
22 CAVALRY 1 CHAWINDA
23 CAVALRY 18 10 DIVISION Including 2
Officers
24 CAVALRY 14 KHEM KARAN Including 2
Officers
25 CAVALRY 16 CHAWINDA
30 TDU 3 RAVI-SUTLEJ
CORRIDOR

31 TDU 7 SIALKOT
32 TDU 7 RAVI-SUTLEJ
CORRIDOR
33 TDU 9 JASSAR
Note:—These casualties were compiled personally
and may not be wholly or totally accurate.
n. Lastly, Alam’s assertion that DJ is distorting
history. A bit naive since articles published in
journals are opinions of individual writers and not of
the management. This is true for all journals whether
it is Pakistan Army Journal or Command and Staff
College Citadel.
o. Finally, Brigadier Alam’s letter was crude and
lacked common courtesy that one would associate or
expect from one holding the rank of a brigadier.
Lt Col M. Anwar’s Letter:—
a. I was not referring to 3 FF when I discussed Brig
A.A Malik’s withdrawal request of 16 September.
Hence, Col Anwar has misunderstood the point. Brig
A.A Malik had requested permission to withdraw

when Indian tanks had crossed the railway line on
16th September and occupied Buttur Dograndi and
Sodreke. This fact was brought to light not by the
much criticised Shaukat Riza but by the then GSO-2
of 6 Armoured Division Major (later General K.M
Arif), first more bluntly in Pakistan Army Green
Book-1993 and again a little tactfully in his recently
published book Khaki Shadows. Thus no connection
with 3 FF, an infantry unit which as far as I know
suffered more casualties than any other infantry unit
at Chawinda. 3 FF fought admirably but was
launched thoughtlessly as brought out by Major
Shamshad in his letter published in Sept 2001 DJ
and consequently suffered enormous casualties at
Sodreke-Buttur Dograndi area. Shamshad was the
tank troop leader in support of 3 FF when it
disastrously attacked Buttur Dograndi. In opinion of
Shamshad, the attack had failed not due to any fault
of 3 FF but because of poor planning by Commander
24 Brigade.
b. About the assertion of Col Anwar that official
sources are cover ups, all that one can state is that if
these are cover ups why don’t experts like Brigadier
Alam and Farouk Adam or Col Anwar or Lt Gen

Tariq devote some time to writing serious military
history.
c. In my writings I have relied on official, unofficial
and personal as well as Indian accounts. If someone
has better knowledge of facts he is most welcome to
apply his intellect and come out with a better
account.
d. Anwar has a point that infantry was holding a firm
base. I have not denied this anywhere. My emphasis,
however, was on the real battle, the armour battle
which was fought at Chawinda. It is up to a reader to
form subjective conclusions.
e. Anwar states that infantry has been ignored, I
contend that the real fact which has not been
favourably received by some is that Brig A.A Malik
has not been projected as much in my article as he
had been before. Infantry, is an arm and I have great
respect for it , A.A Malik was an individual who did
well and rose to three star rank despite launching
poorly planned counter attacks as brought out by
Gen Fazal i Muqeem in 1971 War as a GOC .

Lastly I want to quote a great captain of war :—
“ I am not publishing my memoirs, not theirs and we
all know that no three honest witnesses of a brawl
can agree on all the details. How much more likely
will be the differences in a great battle covering a
vast space of broken ground, when each division,
brigade, regiment and even company naturally and
honestly believes that it was the focus of the whole
affair! Each of them won the battle. None ever lost.
That was the fate of the old man who unhappily
commanded”.
“Memoirs of General Sherman”
Lastly my humble submission; Chawinda was about
operational leadership, not small unit actions or
projecting individuals or maligning them. If
someone feels otherwise it is his subjective opinion.
Kind regards
A.H Amin

--------------------
MAJOR SHAMSADS SEPTEMBER 2001
LETTER PUBLISHED IN DEFENCE
JOURNAL REBUTTING FAROUK ADAM
AND KAMAL ALAM AND COLONEL
ANWAR:---
Major Shamshads Rebuttal of Farouk Adams
Account of Chawinda-Defence Journal September
2001
The Editor
Defence Journal
Karachi.
Dear Sir,
Brig (Retd) Muhammad Ahmed
The May 2001 edition of your esteemed magazine
carries a letter by Brig (Retd) Mohammed Ahmed
which mentions as under,
“Major Shamshad is right, in a way, when he says
only Charlie Squadron went up to Pasrur. The little
difference being that only Charlie Squadron went up

to Pasrur the others were turned back half way when
the Jassar fiasco was discovered.
I would like to correct the record here.
The entire action of night 7/8 and 08 Sept has been
covered in a single article appeared in Oct 1997
edition of DJ. I have nowhere stated or recorded
what Brig Ahmed has ascribed to me. An editing
error has appeared in the March 2001 edition of DJ
which the Brig should have corrected rather than
confirming it.
The fact is that entire regiment moved to Pasrur on
its way to Jassar. The regiment was detained at
Pasrur while Charlie Squadron was despatched to
Jassar which reached Narowal at 0300 hours and
turned about to reach Pasrur at 0500 hours.
BATTLE OF CHAWINDA
The August issue of DJ carries a letter by Farooq
Adam SJ on the subject and another by Mr A H
Amin who is on the panel of D J. Both the
gentlemen have made reference to me. I, therefore,

feel obliged to put in my word to keep the record
straight.
Farooq Adam, as a direct participant appears to have
reservations about the description of the battle by A
H Amin who was not a participant. He has merely
conducted research and has adequately defended his
point of view by quoting his source of knowledge. A
H Amin has quoted Gen Fazle Moqeem who has
reflected upon command quality of Brig Ali and how
35 FF was massacred in Nawa Pind in 1971. To
support the opinion of Gen Fazle Moqeem I can
quote one out of several ill planned attacks which
fizzled out in initial stages, ordered by Brig Ali in
1965. On the morning of 17 Sept 3rd FF were
ordered to attack Jassora with a company. A detailed
discription has been published in May 1998 issue of
DJ. For those who could not reach that edition and
also to prove inanity of command I shall describe the
attack precisely. The company was commanded by
Capt Raheem Shah and was supported by my troop
of three tanks.
I submitted to CO 3FF that before attacking
Jassoran, which was 2000 yards away from Railway

line, we had to clear Buttardograndi half way
between Railway line and Jassoran. I also informed
him that area Jassoran-Buttardograndi is occupied by
a tank regiment supported by an infantry battalion
which I faced on 16 Sept and eventually my troop
was shot up by that force. It was impossible to
dislodge an armoured brigade by attacking with a
company and three tanks. My plea was brushed
aside with remark that Butterdograndi had been
cleared during the night. As we formed up behind
railway line heavy artillery fire was dropped on us
causing casualties to our infantry. In the FUP we
located a centurian in Battalion one which was
destroyed. Finally we attacked without artillery.
Capt Raheem Shah and his company displayed
tremendous courage.
8 Gharwal was entered in the middle of 5 feet high
maze crop. As our men reached the trenches they
were fired at from point blank range. Many of them
fell other turned and went to ground. They were
surprised: I saw this massacre standing in cupola
from a distance of 50 yards. I moved the tank up and
mounted the trenches. By this time I had reached the
killing range of enemy tanks deployed in Jassoran.

My tank was shot up and went into flames. My
second tank was also hit and damaged. The third
tank turret # 1, tank commanded by LD Kamal
prudently did come up and was saved. In this swift
action two enemy tanks were also destroyed. Here
the attack fizzled out.
It is now for the reader to assess the competence of
higher command. In my opinion it was callous act to
launch a company and three tank against an
armoured brigade. To further illustrate my point of
view, a quotation from a book (Guns of August by
Barbara Tuchman) will be in place.
Quote “When the moment of live ammunition
approaches, the moment to which his professional
training is directed, the issue of the combat, even the
fate of the campaign may depend on his decision.
What is happening in the heart and vitals of a
commander. Some are made bold by the moment,
some irresolute, some carefully judicious, some
paralyzed and powerless to act” Unquote. I place
ours higher in the last category.

After having gone through the letter of Farooq Adam
and his two earlier scripts, on the subject (“Hero of
Chawinda” published in daily The News in April/
May 1992 and “THE ALI OF
CHAWINDA”published in UNIFORM Sept 1994
issue) I can say that his writing is more of fiction
than honest description of the events on the
battlefield. On reading his script of 1992, I expressed
my views which have been published in daily THE
NEWS of May 1992. I reproduce below the opening
paragraph of the article which delivers goods to
those who are interested to know the facts.
Quote”On the outset I shall mention here that I have
never served in the direct command of Brig Ali.
Hence there is no possibility of having ill will or
malice towards him. However, I feel that both the
writers have tried to aggrandize the revered general
out of proportion. I hold this opinion as I have first
hand knowledge about the Battle of Chawinda. I was
a troop leader and squadron commander in 25
cavalry which was a part of Brig Ali’s brigade. Mr
Agha Babar should show Adam’s article to his
literary friends in Newyork to be appreciated as a
good piece of literature. Anyone with little

knowledge about army matters and warfare will
confront him with awkward questions such as, Why
should Brig Ali ask Col Nisar as to how many tanks
did he have? Was he ignorant of the organisation
and deployment of his only tank regiment?. Why did
Farooq Adam leave his defensive position when
enemy tanks were still more than a mile away? Why
did he not wait for the tanks to destroy once they
reached the killing zone of his ante tank weapons?
Why was Chobara captured and abandoned time and
again?. Was a pitched battle fought at Chobara? If so
what was the score of casualties? And many more
such questions.’Unquote.
The knowledge which Farooq Adam wants to share
with the readers is of no consequence unless he first
fixes his position in a fighting unit. Was he a platoon
/company commander or a staff officer. I have gone
through his three scripts mentioned above. Only at
one place (UNIFORM Sept 1994) he said that he
was attached to Major Mohammad Hussain whose
company was to follow 25 cavalry tanks on the
morning of 8 Sept. Was he attached to Major
Mohammad Hussain to advise him.

I will not go in details here, which of course I have,
to prove that whatever Farooq has written is all truth.
Only one example is enough to prove what I state.
On page 59 of the periodical UNIFORM of Sept
1994 he writes while describing the dialogue
between Brig Ali and Col Nisar. “How many tanks
do you have? One squadron of tanks right here,
another dismounting from transporters nearby”. He
claims that these words were exchanged at
Chawinda in the morning at Chawinda on 8 Sept.
This is totally untrue. The whole regiment was
concentrated at Pasrur. Col Nisar was called by Brig
and told “enemy had come think about it”. He must
have also told him that enemy tanks were advancing
on Charwa-Cawinda track. What happened
thereafter has been recorded by me in the form of 8
articles in D J starting from Oct 1997 to May 1998.
9th and concluding article will appear in near future.
My suggestion to Farooq is to write an account of 17
days as he saw the battle moving day by day, mere
eulogy is not welcomed.
Passing orders is a simple affair.The quality of effort
a commander makes to insure the implementation of

the order is what that matters. The extent of personal
involvement, his control and direction of the events,
his presence at the place and time where the fate of
the battle is being decided are the factors which go
in to assess the competence of a commander. In this
light I found our leader wanting.
Maj (Retd) Shamshad Ali Khan
-----------------------
BRIGADIER SIMONS LETTER OF 2008
BASED ON HIS DISCUSSION WITH
VARIOUS DIRECT PARTICIPTANTS:---
AGHA AMIN AND BATTLE OF SIALKOT-1965
JUL 24, 2008 THU 12:07 PM
I KNOW THE URGENCY AGHA AMIN HAD IN
CONTACTING ME REPEATEDLY ABOUT HIS
ILOG ON CHOWINDA, BUT I WANTED
CERTAIN CONFIRMATIONS BEFORE

PUTTING MY VIEWS. IN THE COURSE, I
TRACED AND TALKED TO SOME OF THE
PARTICIPANTS OF THIS BATTLE AND AGREE
THAT AGHA AMIN’S ACCOUNT IS MOST
ACCURATE.
FIRST, HATS OFF AND A TRIBUTE TO THOSE
SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT BRAVELY IN THE
BATTLE OF CHOWINDA DESPITE THE
CONFUSION GENERATED BY THE PAPER
TIGER COMMANDERS LIKE GEN. ISMAIL,
SAHIBZADA YAKOOB ALI KHAN AND MANY
MORE WHO EARNED LAURELS OVER THE
DEAD BODIES OF THEIR SOLDIERS.
1. INDIAN PLANS. YES IT WAS AN FIU
OPERATION SUPPORTED BY AN INFANTRY
AMBUSH PARTY THAT CAPTURED AN
INDIAN DESPATCH RIDER. THOUGH THE
INDIAN OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS
COINCIDED WITH GEN. YAHYA’S LEADING
HYPOTHESES OF AN INDIAN MAIN
OFFENSIVE IN THIS SECTOR, THESE
DESPATCHES WERE RUBBISHED AS
DECEPTION BY THE MASTER PAKISTANI

THINK TANK. THE ORIGINAL HYPOTHESIS
WAS DOWNGRADED BY THE NEW GOC 15
DIVISION MAJOR GENERAL ISMAIL, DEPUTY
DIVISION COMMANDER BRIGADIER RIAZ UL
KARIM, CORPS COMMANDER LT. GEN
BAKHTIAR RANA, AND DEPUTY CORPS
COMMANDER DESIGNATE SAHIBZADA
YAKOOB ALI KHAN ONCE INDIAN’S
ATTACKED JASSAR.
“HOWA KE PEHLEY HE JHONKEY PE HAAR
MAN GAI
WOHI CHIRAGH JO HUM NE JALA KE
RAKHAY THAY”
2. JASSAR ENCLAVE. IT IS AN ENCLAVE
WHERE MAJOR OPERATIONS FROM
NEITHER SIDE WERE POSSIBLE AS THE
TERRAIN IS DIVIDED BY RIVER RAVI. YET
WHEN AN INFANTRY BRIGADE WAS
DESPATCHED IN HASTE TO DEFEND THE
BRIDGE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE RIVER, THE
LEADING UNIT HAD VERY LITTLE
DEFENSIVE POWER IN TERMS OF

PREPARATION AND DEFENCE STORES.
CONSEQUENTLY, SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS
WERE OVER RUN IN DOUBLE QUICK TIME
BY A DIVERSIONARY ATTACK OF AN
INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE PRIOR TO THE
MAIN ATTACK ON LINE CHARWA-
CHOBARA- PHILORA. BRIGADIER
MUZAFFAR MADE A VERY BIG BLUNDER OF
JUDGEMENT IN HIS ASSESSMENT AND
REPORTED IN PANIC THAT AN INDIAN MAIN
HAD BEEN LAUNCHED.. AS A RESULT THE
ENTIRE DEFENCE OF SIALKOT SECTOR WAS
UNHINGED IN PANIC AND 24 BRIGADE
MINUS 3FF IN SCREENS AND 25 CAVALRY
WERE MOVED IN HASTE TOWARDS JASSAR.
THE DEFENCE HAD TAKEN A 90 DEGREE
TURN. IN THIS VACUUM WHAT REMAINED
BETWEEN INDIA AND SIALKOT WERE THE
SCREEN POSITIONS OF 3FF. ON THE
EVENING OF 7TH SEPTEMBER, GOC 15
DIVISION ORDERED 24 BRIGADE AND 25
CAVALRY TO LAUNCH A COUNTER ATTACK
ON JASSAR. THE RESERVES WERE NEAR
NAROWAL AND THE DIVISION
HEADQUARTER PREPARING FOR A WHITE

LINEN DINNER, WHEN INDIAN DIVISIONAL
ARTILLERY BEGAN POUNDING 3FF
POSITIONS. MAJOR MEHMOOD OF AVIATION
THEN TOOK THE RISK OF FLYING OVER
JASSAR ONLY TO REPORT THAT THE
BRIDGE OVER RIVER RAVI WAS IN TACT
AND IN PAKISTANI OCCUPATION. A
SQUADRON OF 25 CAVALRY UNDER MAJOR
SHAMSHAD HAD ALREADY REACHED THE
JASSAR SECTOR WHILE THE TWO
REMAINING WERE ON THE MOVE. 15
DIVISION HAD BEEN CAUGHT WITH ITS
PANTS DOWN.
3. PHILORI-CHARWA-CHOBARA SECTOR.
INDIAN ADVANCING COLUMNS ENGAGED
THE SCREENS OF 3FF ON THE NIGHT OF 7
SEPTEMBER. BY FIRST LIGHT 8 SEPTEMBER
THESE SCREENS AFTER SUFFERING
CASUALTIES AND OVER RUN FELL BACK TO
LINE PHILORI-CHARWA-CHOBARA AND
ALONG WITH A COMPANY OF 2 PUNJAB
TOOK HASTY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. THE
SAME MORNING INDIAN ARMOUR
COLUMNS OVERRAN CHARWA-CHOBARA,

BYPASSED PHILORI AND REACHED 3-4 KMS
FROM CHOWINDA. AT 8:30 AM 18
SQUADRON OF PAF COMMANDED BY
SQUADRON LEADER SALAUDDIN SHAHEED
CAME INTO ACTION WITH THREE F-86
FIGHTERS WHO ENGAGED THE INDIAN
ARMOUR AND IMPOSED A DELAY OF ONE
HOUR ON INDIAN ADVANCE. THIS ONE
HOUR WAS VERY CRUCIAL AS IT PROVIDED
TWO SQUADRONS OF 25 CAVALRY THAT
ARRIVED FROM NAROWAL ENOUGH TIME
TO REGROUP AND MOVE INTO BATTLE
FORMATION FOR ENCOUNTER BATTLE. IT
WAS A VERY BOLD MOVE ON PART OF THE
COMMANDING OFFICER TO TAKE ON THE
INDIAN ADVANCING ARMOUR HEAD ON.
PAF PROVIDED CRUCIAL SUPPORT. THE
NEXT TWO SORTIES WERE LED BY FLIGHT
LIEUTENANT CECIL CHAUDARY WITH
WHOM I TALKED TODAY TO GET THE
RECORDS STRAIGHT.
IN THE COURSE OF WRITING THIS, I TRACED
OUT SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THIS
ACTION AND AM CONVINCED THAT ALL

ACTIONS OF 8 SEPTEMBER WERE TAKEN
SOLELY BY LT. COL NISAR THE
COMMANDING OFFICER OF 25 CAVALRY AT
HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND NO ONE ELSE.
THROUGHOUT THIS BATTLE BRIGADIER A A
MALIK REMAINED IN A SCHOOL AT
PHILORA AND LET NISAR HANDLE THE
SITUATION. AGAIN ON 9/10 SEPTEMBER, IT
WERE 25 CAVALRY AND 3FF THAT
REPULSED INDIAN ATTACKS.
4. RELIEF IN LINE. AS IF THE COMEDY OF
ERRORS WAS NOT ENOUGH, THE PAPER
TIGER THINK TANK NOW LED BY
SAHIBZADA YAKOOB DECIDED TO CARRY
OUT RELIEF OF TROOPS ENGAGED IN
BATTLE FOR THREE DAYS. 25 CAVALRY
AND 3FF WERE REPLACED BY 11 CAVALRY
AND 9 FF (MOTORISED) ON NIGHT 10/11. IN
FACT THERE WAS NO RELIEF AND THE
ENTIRE MOVEMENT WAS A FIASCO.
INDIANS EXPLOITED THE SITUATION AND
LAUNCHED A FIERCE OFFENSIVE ON THE
11TH MORNING. THE ADVANCING INDIANS
WERE FIRST SPOTTED BY MAJOR

MUZZAFAR MALIK OF 11 CAVALRY WHO
THEN ALERTED EVERYONE ELSE. IT WAS A
TOUGH TASK FOR THE NEW UNITS
BECAUSE THEY HAD MOVED AT NIGHT AND
WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE TERRAIN.
BRIGADIER AA MALIK WAS TO REPEAT
HISTORY WHEN AS GOC IN 1971, HE
LAUNCHED A JUST ARRIVE 355FF INTO
ACTION AT BERA PIND AND HAD IT
MASSACRED.
THE BIGGEST LESSON OF THIS BATTLE WAS
THAT BOTH ARMIES WERE IN EFFICIENT IN
HANDLING OPERATIONS AT A LARGE
SCALE. INDIAN CAUTION AND RELUCTANCE
TO PURSUE AND EXPLOIT SITUATIONS
RESULTED IN FAILURE OF THEIR PLAN AND
HEAVY LOSSES. IN TERMS OF CLAUSEWITZ’
FRICTION, IT WAS MOSTLY THE MENTAL
BLOCKAGE ON PART OF COMMANDERS ON
BOTH SIDES THAT RESULTED IN MISTAKES.
YET THE CONDUCT OF SMALL UNITS ON
BOTH SIDES WAS OUTSTANDING.

1965 WAS ALSO TO USHER A SPIRIT OF
CAMARADERIE AMONGST THE PAPER
TIGERS THAT SURVIVES EVEN TODAY.
THEY FORM A MUTUAL PRAISE GROUP
WHILE THE MOST HARDY AND TRUE ONES
LIE AROUND TO ROT IN ANONYMITY
THANKS ARE DUE TO AGHA AMIN,
BRIGADIER MEHMOOD (EX-SERVICEMEN
FAME), GROUP CAPTAIN CECIL AND MAJOR
SHAMSHAD.
---------------------------------------------------------------
--
MAJOR SHAMSHADS SUMMING UP
LETTER OF AUGUST 2008
MEN OF STEEL by Major Shamshad Ali Khan
Kaimkhani (Retired),majshamshad@hotmail.com,25
Cavalry
MEN OF STEEL
By

Major Shamshad Ali Khan Kaimkhani (Retired)
majshamshad@hotmail.com
25 Cavalry
This was first sent to daily DAWN but they did not
have the guts to publish it on grounds that it
involved the president and the army.
The other day I came across a book entitled ,’ MEM
OF STEEL,’. President General Mushrraf has graced
the book with Foreword while the preface has been
written by General Khalid Mahmud Arif (Retired).
The book is based on war diaries supposed to had
been maintained by the units and the staff or the
general (late ) Abrar Hussain who commanded 6
Armoured Division in 1965 on Chawinda sector. I
cannot reason out as to why the book has been
published now when the event is forty years behind
at this point of time. As there is nothing in the book

that would have jeopardized the security of the
country, it should have come out immediately after
the war. That was the time when it could provided
opportunity to higher command( there is nothing for
junior leaders in the book) to learn from the
experience of the one who had fought the greatest
tank battle after world war- II. That would have
saved us of many debacles in 1971 and especially
the ones committed in Sialkot sector on western
front The book has five parts. Part three (25% of the
book) is the description of the events on the
battlefield that is of interest to students of military
history. 75 % of the book comprises of background
and statistics regarding composition of units
/formations, casualties in men and material on both
sides, names of commanders, list of recipients of
gallantry awards, photographs and such like details.
I feel that late general Abrar Hussain has not
authored the book because he was known to be of
the type who would never indulge in such a travesty.
General K.M Arif appears to be the ghost author of
the book.

I was a participant in the events on battlefield
mentioned in part 3 of the book and have a different
version.
To give authenticity to my narration, which will be
diametrically opposed to the one given in the book,
it is necessary to state that I was directly involved in
the events as a troop leader in C squadron of 25
cavalry and squadron commander twice on extreme
critical moments on the battle field. I was face to
face with enemy every day throughout the war. My
location from day one had been at Gadgor, Phillorah,
Chawinda and Butter Dogranmdi where the battle
was fought. It is regretted that I did not have the
good luck to see a red tab or even a staff officer on
front line during entire war.
From the text of part three it is clear that the general
left his Headquarter, at Bhollowal ten miles behind
the front line, for the first and last time in a
helicopter on 11 September in the evening, By that
time our two regiments , Guides and 11 Cavalry, had
been badly mauled.. The right time for the general to
leave his HQ was in the morning when he got the

news that 11 cavalry was under pressure. Had he
been at Chawinda at 1100 hours he could have
directed and controlled the efforts of the three
regiments and saved the day. By the evening, while
sitting in the caravan, he had launched two more
regiments, Guides and 25 cavalry. Guides was
launched at a time( about 1100 hours) when 11
cavalry had retreated and Indians had taken up
defensives position to shoot up Guides who attacked
with high spirits on their first day in action. Some
fine men and officers were lost in this action due to
the apathy of commanding officer who launched the
regiment in haste, without artillery and infantry
support contrary to the dictates of terrain.. Lethargy
and incompetence of HQ 6 armoured division
resulted in our defeat at Phillorah which was the
greatest tragedy on this front.
As if that was not enough, 25 cavalry was launched
at 1600 hours with a mission to occupy Phillorah
track crossing which was reported not occupied by
the enemy. Thanks to our stars and battle experience
of preceding three days that we got away with loss
of only one tank when we hit against enemy

defenses at Phillorah at 1700 hours. This is a classic
example how to destroy one’s forces piecemeal.
Now a word about the title of the book.
General Musharraf in the introduction of the book
has mentioned that he was proud to be apart of the
force called MEN OF STEEL by its commander. It
implies that late general Abrar had ascribed the title
of MEN OF STEEL to his own formation. This
never happens, it amounts to praising oneself. Such

an absurdity was not expected of general Abrar who,
I am told , was a different breed.
Titles or honors are always awarded by higher
authorities .It was 25 cavalry alone which was
referred to as men of steel by General Ayub Khan
during the course of his talk on the eve of his visit to
the regiment immediately after ceasefire, in
acknowledgement of our performance. This had
happened on Pasrur airstrip where we were camping
.Army, Naval and Air Chiefs were also present.
Since the president was not to visit any other unit or
formation head quarter, all officers in the area were
called at the airstrip.
There are tangible, discernable and universally
accepted actions of 25 cavalry on the battlefield that
justify the suffix ‘ men of Steel’ with its’ title. The
actions precisely and in short are;
1-It was 25 cavalry alone which clashed headlong
with an armored division , north of Fhillorah
crossing at 0800 and pushed it back to Gudgor
(2.5miles) by 1200 hours.

2-we attacked, captured Gudgor at 1700 hours and
pushed the enemy further back by three miles to
Chobara.,
3- we kept the enemy at bay for another two day
with no additional force in our support. Air support
was of course there.
4- On night 10/11 September we were sent to Pasrur
for rest and refit On this point of time we were
placed under command 6 armoured division which
had taken over Chawinda sector.
5- At about 1100 hours on 11 September C squadron
25 cavalry found itself deployed behind Chawinda
with a mission to stop the enemy at all cost that was
believed to be advancing behind our force that had
retreated from Gudgor-Phillorah area in the
morning. In fact Div HQ had accepted the loss of
Chawinda and therefore we were deployed behind
that town to stop the enemy advance towards Pasror.
After five hours of my insistence that Chawinda was
vacant, at 1700 hours we were ordered to advance
and occupy Phillorah, which according to high

command was not held by the enemy. What
happened later is along story but it should suffice to
say that we hit enemy defenses in Phillorah where
tank to tank battle ensued. In the process our one
tank with crew was destroyed. The skirmish proved
to be a deterrent and the enemy did not advance any
further that day.
6- On12, 13,14,and 15 September C squadron along
with 3FF was defending area in the north and up to
Jassoran in the west of Chawinda. It was through
this area that the enemy attempted, for four days, to
penetrate but could not succeed.
7- On 16th the enemy launched an armored Brigade
to out flank Chawinda and attacked Butter Dograndi
in the rear of that town. They succeeded because the
task force commander (who later retired as Major
General Wajahat Hussain), failed to coordinate with
24 Bde and left Jassoran unoccupied providing a gap
through which the enemy infiltrated and turned our
flank. We suffered heavy losses. Seven tanks were
destroyed including two of 33 TDU. In the evening
we attacked Butter Dugrandi supported by artillery. .
Destroyed two enemy tanks and some infantry.

Under very critical circumstances we stopped the
enemy at Butter Dograndi that was determined to
reach Pasror that day. Artillery played effective roll
but never fired on enemy tanks with open sights on
that day as mentioned in the book. We never allowed
enemy tanks to reach that close to our gun areas.
8- It was a troop of 25 cavalry and company of 3 FF
who again attacked (without artillery) Butter
Dograndi, midway to our main objective Jassoran,
on the morning of 17th and mounted enemy trenches
north of the village. Although we suffered heavy
losses and could not reach the objective, our
offensive action forced the enemy to vacate Butter
Dograndi and withdraw to Jassonan in the evening
and eventually across the railway line Chawinda –
Sialkot.(quoted from official history of 17 Poona
Horse that was controlling the operation on Indian
side).

9-It was 25 cavalry again, along with 3 Ff who
repulsed an infantry brigade attack on night19/20
September. Although some of their troops had
crossed over the railway line and hit the track behind
Chawinda at milestone 5, our tanks fired from
behind railway line and forced the enemy to
withdraw, leaving behind dead and wounded.
Now where does the 6 armour division appear in this
scenario? It has always been a troop or squadron
action through out war accept 11 September that was
a fiasco .I can confront any one who can prove me
wrong.
Now the story as to how did 6 armored division
became’Men Of Steel’.
I served in 6 armored division, of which 25 cavalry
was a part , till September 1971. No one called the
Division as men of steel it was only 25 cavalry
alone. I was shocked when I visited HQ 6 armoured
Div after Indian captivity in 1974. I saw on the name
boards of staff officers written ‘MEN OF STEEL’

on top. No body could explain how it happened.
Knowing general K.M.Arif I can say that he is
behind this happening supported by general Wjahat
Hossain(retd) who was commanding 6 Armored
Division in 1973-74.
To face the enemy is the professional obligation of a
soldier. To be killed in action, get wounded and fall
prisoner is very much a normal happening in the life
of soldier and there is nothing to be proud or
ashamed about it. This ancient and universal concept
of soldiering does not hold good in Pakistan. Here a
soldier sitting in trench and killed by artillery fire
can be given gallantry award and also proclaimed a
national hero. A gallantry award is justified only for
an act performed beyond call of duty and in the face
of enemy.
Major K.M. Arif never left the Divisional HQ which
was 10 miles away from front line and the Div
Commander left only once in the evening of 11
September, as mentioned an the book, when fighting
had subsided. Obviously both of them do not
deserve the gallantry award.

Major Khalid .Mahmod Arif ( Later general) was
GSO-2 operation of 6 armored division in 1965.
.In 1974 he was a Brigadier and held very powerful
position in GHQ.
To justify undeserved gallantry awards that he and
the Div commander had received and also to cover-
up the blunders committed by Div HQ, he floated
the word that general Mosa Khan had called 6
armored division as men of steel at Pasror airstrip.
Knowing his vindictive nature nobody could dare
oppose him.
On his signal this word was continuously and
systematically given currency for 20 years. It is
possible that he provided documentary support to
this misdeed while he was in power.
It is time that we stopped fabricating and twisting
history to serve the vested interests and record true
fact for our posterity.

---------------------------------------------------------------
------
COLONEL SARDAR YAHYA EFFENDIS
SUMMING UP OF 2008 AFTER READING
BRIGADIER SIMON AND MAJOR
SHAMSHADS LETTERS OF 2008

---------------------------------------------------------------
------------------

THE GENERAL WHO FAILED WHEN
VICTOY WAS AT HIS FEET

ONE OF THE MOST PHENOMENAL FAILURES
OF 1965 WAR--MAJOR GENERAL RAJINDER
SINGH SPARROW COMMANDER FIRST
INDIAN ARMOURED DIVISION WHO
MISERABLY FAILED IN WINNING THE 1965
WAR,WHEN ON 8TH SEPTEMBER 1965
DESPITE A PHENOMENAL SUPERIOROTY OF
5 TO 1 IN TANKS AND 15 TO 1 IN INFANTRY
HE FAILED TO OUTFLANK A LONE TANK
REGIMENT 25 CAVALRY OF PAKISTAN
ARMY

THE TANK REGIMENT COMMANDER WHO
EXHIBITED EXTREME COUP D OEIL AND
DEPLOYED HIS REGIMENT TO STOP A
WHOLE TANK DIVISION,NOT KNOWING
WHT WAS IN FRONT OF HIM

LIEUTENANT COLONEL NISAR AHMAD
COMMANDANT OF 25 CAVALRY WHO
ENTIRELY ON HIS OWN JUDGEMENT
DEPLOYED 25 CAVALRY ON BROAD FRONT
AND BROUGHT THE INDIAN FIRST TANK
DIVISIION TO A HALT

Battle of Chawinda
Comedy of Higher Command Errors
Major Shamshad’s excellent and thought provoking
articles published in the Defence Journal in 1997-
98 on the Battle of Chawinda, inspired this scribe

to redraft parts of his book “The Pakistan Army
till 1965” and present them in form of an article
devoted exclusively to the Chawinda Battles. The
article is a humble attempt to integrate the picture
incorporating viewpoints of both sides and to
analyse the Battle of Chawinda in its larger
perspective.
Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN examines
this crucial battle objectively.
Introduction
The tank battles fought in the area between Charwa
and Chawinda from 8th to 21 September 1965 were
the most decisive battles of the 1965 War . Initially
the Indians were very close to victory while in the
last stages the Pakistan Army was in a relatively
better position to launch a counterstroke which could
have forced the Indians to abandon all gains made
inside the Shakargarh Bulge from 7th September.
The Chawinda Battles also gave birth to many myths
as far as the Pakistan Army was concerned. Many
conflicting claims were made about ‘Military
Effectiveness’ ‘Martial Fervour’ etc citing the
‘Battles of Chawinda’ as an example. The Indian
commanders were also criticised for phenomenal
incompetence, but somehow they rationalised their

failures as a case of normal failure in face of
technically superior tanks.
Pakistani Dispositions
Pakistani dispositions in Ravi-Chenab Corridor
where the battle of Chawinda was fought were as
following:-- (ONE) 8 Division consisting of four
infantry brigades (24,101,104 and 115 Brigades)
four armoured regiments (20 Lancers,25 Cavalry, 31
& 33 TDU 1) defending Sialkot-Pasrur Sector and
Jassar. The total frontage that this division had to
defend was approximately 180,000 yards. 2 But
this was only a theoretically awesome figure,
because till 1965, keeping in view the force to space
ratio in terms of divisions available, the Indians were
not in a position to be effective as a threat all along
this frontage. (TWO) 6 Armoured Division in
Chenab Ravi Corridor3 to defend the area from any
Indian incursion. The 6 Armoured Division was not
a full strength division and consisted of a divisional
headquarter, three armoured regiments (one of
which was in Chamb for Grand Slam) two artillery
regiments, two motorised infantry regiments and had
no brigade headquarter. Initially it was placed at
Gujranwala but later placed at Pasrur4. This
Division according to Musa was placed at Pasrur

with the express intention of dealing with enemy’s
main attack which was expected on the Jassar-
Sialkot approach.5
Indian War Plan
The Main Indian Attack was aimed at decisively
disrupting the Pakistani defensive layout and
resultantly forcing Pakistan to commit its main
armoured reserves for defence was to be launched by
the newly formed Indian 1 Corps comprising the 1st
Armoured Division and three infantry divisions (6
Mountain Division 14 Division and 26 Division) in
the Ravi-Chenab Corridor from Samba area on the
general axis Samba-Chawinda-Phillora-MRL Link
and eventually secure line Daska-Dhallewali-
Mandhali6. In other words the Indian aim as stated
by another Indian military writer was to ‘cut off
Sialkot from Lahore’.7 As per the wording of the
decisions taken at the planning conference of the
Indian Chief of Army Staff held on 9th August the
object of the 1 Corps attack aimed at Daska was
‘with a view to relieving Jammu’.8 This meant that
the Indian Army Chief viewed a Pakistani attack on
Jammu with a view to severe the Indian line of
communication as most likely. This attack was
rightly termed as ‘Riposte’ by some Indian

authors.Riposte has been defined as ‘Striking a
vulnerable point thus forcing the enemy to abandon
his attack’.9
The Battle of Chawinda
The main Indian attack against Pakistan was
launched by the Ist Indian Corps opposite Chawinda
in Sialkot Sector. The Sialkot Sector was defended
by the Pakistani 1 Corps comprising 15 Division and
6 Armoured Division. From 1956 onwards the 1
Corps was the only corps of the Pakistan Army. Till
1965 its area of operational responsibility extended
from river Chenab till Sulaimanke in the north
and it consisted of 1st Armoured Division, 6
Armoured Division,10,11 and 15 Divisions. The 1
Corps since soon after its creation in 1956 was
commanded by Lieutenant General Bakhtiar
Rana10 whose basic qualifications were described
as extreme loyalty and limited intellect by many
contemporaries! In early September the frontage of
the corps was reduced to the area between Ravi and
Chenab rivers or simply the Ravi-Chenab Corridor,
and its under command formations were reduced to
the 6 Armoured Division and 15 Division.
Pakistani Dispositions and Plans:- 15 Division
(four infantry brigades, four tank regiments) was

designated to defend the area of responsibility while
the newly formed 6 Armoured Division (previously
known as 100 Armoured Brigade) was the main
strategic reserve in the area. The total frontage of 15
Division was 180,000 yards and the distribution of
forces/dispositions/tasks were as following11:--
15 Division:- This division was commanded by
Brigadier Sardar Mohammad Ismail Khan from the
ASC. Its defences were organised as following:-
115 Brigade:-- The main task of this brigade was to
defend the area along the river Ravi with special
emphasis on Jassar bridge over river Ravi. The
brigade had two infantry battalions, one tank
regiment (33 TDU), one R & S company and two
artillery batteries (one field and one mortar).
24 Brigade:-- Defend area Chobara-Phillaura and be
prepared to attack an enemy force which seek to
attack the Sialkot Sector (i.e. 15 Division area of
responsibility). It was a sort of a
reserve/counterattack force. The brigade had two
infantry battalions, one tank regiment (25 Cavalry),
one R & S company, and one field artillery regiment
less a battery in direct support.
101 Brigade:-- Defending Sialkot city against
enemy attack along main Jammu-Sialkot road and

also to be prepared to go on the offensive in case of
an enemy concentration in Phillaura area. The
brigade had two infantry battalions,one R & S
company, one tank squadron (ex 31 TDU) and one
field regiment and a mortar battery less troop in
direct support.
104 Brigade:-- This was a reserve brigade but had
just one infantry battalion, one tank regiment (31
TDU) minus one squadron and a field regiment less
battery in direct support.
One infantry battalion in an independent role to
defend the crucial Marala Headworks.
Covering Troops/Advance Positions:--
One tank regiment (20 Lancers) less squadron
deployed in front as covering troops from Chaprar
till main Jammu-Sialkot road. 20 Lancers was the
corps recce regiment.
One tank squadron (20 Lancers) with one infantry
company, one R & S company deployed as advance
position on main Sialkot Jammu road in area
Raspur-Kundanpur.
One R & S company as screen on border to cover
the front from Bajra Garghi to Charwa.
One R & S platoon with R & S Battalion
Headquarter in Shakargarh area.

Rangers (border police) to keep the border between
Chaprar and Marala Headworks under observation.
12 Mujahid Companies (Militia) and rangers all
along the border subdivided into small posts for
observation/local defence.
NOTE:-- There were a total of 24 Rangers/Mujahid
Companies in 15 Division area. These were of
limited military value and could not face regular
Indian Army.
6 Armoured Division:- 6 Armoured Division was
not an armoured division in the full sense but did
have a large number of the organisational
ingredients of an armoured division. It was
commanded by Major General Ibrar Hussain. It was
the 1 Corps reserve and was the main Pakistani
armoured reserve in the Ravi-Chenab Corridor with
the primary role to take on an enemy strike force
attacking 1 Corps area of responsibility. According
to Musa the most expected line of Indian approach
in 1 Corps defended area was the Sialkot Jassar
Corridor12 and the 6th Armoured Division was to
be used in a defensive role against an enemy
offensive in 1 Corps area.According to Gul Hassan it
was also visualised that the 6 Armoured Division
could be used to attack the Jammu sector but later on

this idea was dropped13. The 6 Armoured Division
was a curious division for it had no brigade
headquarters! On 6th September 1965 it was in
dispersal in Gujranwala-Nandipur area. It had the
following units14:-
Guides Cavalry (10th Cavalry)
22 Cavalry
11 Cavalry (On loan to 12 Division/7 Division for
Operation Grand Slam since late August 1965 and in
Chamb area on 6th September 1965.
Two infantry battalions one of which was in Kharian
as defence battalion with the 1 Corps Headquarter.
One self-propelled field artillery regiment and one
medium battery. Later on from 6th September
onwards the formidable and extremely well
organised 4 Corps Artillery Brigade consisting of
one field, one medium, one heavy and one locating
regiment was also affiliated with it.
One engineer and one signal battalion.
Indian Dispositions and Plans:- The Indian 1
Corps was deployed opposite the Pakistani 1 Corps.
The 1 Corps consisted of one armoured division (1st
Armoured Division) and three infantry divisions (6
Mountain Division,14 Infantry Division and 26
Infantry Division). The 1 Corps was the principal

Indian strike force and was tasked to launch the
main Indian attack inside Pakistan.The main task of
this corps in words of K.C Praval was to ‘cut off
Sialkot from Lahore’ and this was to be done
by attacking from general area Samba east of
Jammu and advancing in a southwesternly
direction cutting the Sialkot-Jammu road around
Daska15 as already discussed in the earlier part of
this chapter. Gurcharan Singh described 1 Corps task
as ‘secure a bridgehead extending to line Bhagowal-
Phillora cross roads junction south of Tharoah with a
view to advancing to the eastern bank of the MRL
canal’ with the possibility of advancing further to
line Dhalewali-Wahulai-Daska-Mandhali’16. The
initial objectives of this attack were
capturing Phillora Chawinda and Pagowal
areas.Distribution of forces/dispositions and
formation tasks were as following17:--
1st Armoured Division:-- It was the spearhead of
the Indian offensive. This formation was much
weaker in numerical/organisational terms from the
1st Pakistani Armoured Division i.e. having only
four tank regiments and lorried infantry battalions
and two brigade headquarters. 62 Tank regiment was
therefore taken from 26 Division and assigned to it

as the fifth tank regiment.It was tasked to advance
inside Pakistani territory on general axis Ramgarh-
Phillora-Pagowal-Chawinda-MRL from first light
8th September after the 6 Mountain Division had
secured the bridgehead in Maharajke-Charwa
area.As per the Divisional plan this advance was to
be conducted on two axis with 43 Lorried Brigade
on the right and 1st Armoured Brigade on the left.
The 1st Armoured Division was organised as
following:--
1st Armoured Brigade:- It consisted of two
tank regiments (17 Poona Horse, 16 Light Cavalry)
one tank squadron (from 62 Cavalry), and one and a
quarter infantry battalion (lorry borne) etc which
was tasked to advance in the first phase on axis
Ramgarh-Harbal-Sabzkot-Chobara-Phillora.
Tasks/Groupings for operations till MRL canal after
capture of Phillora were to be given later.
43 Lorried Brigade:- Grouped as one full tank
regiment (2 Lancers), one tank regiment less
squadron (62 Cavalry) and two lorried infantry
battalions tasked to advance on axis Salehriyah-
Saidanwali-Cross roads-Mastpur-Ahmad Pur-
Pagowal.

Divisional Reserve:- One tank regiment (4
Hodson’s Horse) and one lorried infantry company.
6 Mountain Division:- This division was the
principal infantry component of the 1 Corps
offensive battle and was tasked to secure the
bridgehead inside Pakistani territory from where the
1st Armoured Division was to be launched on the
thrust towards MRL canal.Its initial task was to
secure the bridgehead in area Maharajke-Charwa
and exploit till line Ahmadpur-Nauni.It was tasked
to commence the attack at 2300 hours on 7th
September 1965.18 It had the following troops for
the bridgehead operation:-
69 Mountain Brigade:- The right forward
assaulting brigade in the 6 MountainDivision
bridgehead operation. It had three battalions and a
tank squadron from 62 Cavalry and was tasked to
capture Maharajke area in the first phase of the 1
Corps operation.
99 Mountain Brigade:- The left forward assaulting
brigade in the 6 Mountain Division bridgehead
operation.It consisted of three infantry
battalions and was tasked to capture Charwa in the
Corps phase one.

35 Infantry Brigade:- Originally from 14 Division,
this brigade consisted of three infantry battalions and
was placed under command 6 Mountain Division
specifically for the bridgehead operation. It was the
reserve brigade of the 6 Mountain Division and was
earmarked for unforeseen tasks.
14 Infantry Division:- In the initial Indian attack
plan this formation was supposed to take full part in
the I Indian Corps offensive in Sialkot sector.
However the peculiar developments of events in
September 1965 dictated otherwise and this
formation played a limited role in the 1 Corps
operation. These reasons are explained in detail in
note 146.19 The Division played no role in the
initial battles of 8 to 10 September 1965 as its 35
was under 6 Mountain and 1st Armoured Division
but was assigned a limited role from 11/12th
September to attack Zafarwal. Its 116 Brigade
reached Samba area from Pathankot on 10th
September and became the first brigade to function
under command 14 Division opposite general area
Zafarwal.20
26 Infantry Division:- This formation consisted of
three infantry brigades (19,162 & 168) and one tank
regiment (18th Cavalry).19 Brigade had two infantry

battalions while 162 and 168 Brigades had three
infantry battalions each. It was assigned the mission
of containing Pakistani forces at Sialkot so that
these could not create any problem on the northern
flank of the 1st Armoured Division’s line of
advance. To achieve this aim 162 and 168 Brigade
with a tank squadron each,162 Brigade on the right
and 168 Brigade on the left were to carry out a
limited advance into astride Sialkot Jammu road in
the direction of Unche Wains-Niwe Wains-
Bajragrahi areas from 2330 Hours night of 7th
September onwards. The third brigade i.e. 19
Brigade was to be the reserve brigade.21 It appears
that this brigade was brought particularly against the
Pakistani Marala Salient which was called ‘ Dagger
Salient’ by the Indians. All the Pakistanis had in this
dagger salient was one simple infantry battalion!
The main malady with which the Indians suffered
was having too much infantry and not knowing how
to use it while the Pakistani problem seems to have
been having too many tanks and not knowing how to
use them!
Battle of Chawinda-6th to 22nd September 1965
Jassar Bridge Crisis:- At 0315 hours on the night
of 6th/7th September Indian artillery shelled the

Pakistani 115 Brigades positions on both sides of the
Jassar Bridge.It was ironical that both the 115
Pakistani Brigade (two infantry battalions,one R & S
Company and one TDU tank regiment) and the 29
Indian Brigade(three infantry battalions and one tank
squadron) opposing each other in Jassar area were
commanded by two extremely timid and highly
nervous commanders. The task assigned to 29 Indian
Brigade originally from 7 Division but now
operating in an independent role directly under 11
Corps Headquarter was to capture the Pakistani
enclave across river Ravi which was a potential
Pakistani jump off point inside Indian territory. The
Indians launched their attack at 0400 hours 6th
September and by 0415 hours reached the southern
end of the Jassar bridge which was a few hundred
yards from the Indian border. 115 Brigade launched
a counter attack using tanks and dislodged the
Indians from the southern end of the bridge by 0800
hours. The Pakistani GHQ, influenced by
nervousness at Headquarter 1 corps, took the
situation opposite Jassar very seriously and ordered
the 6 Armoured Division in dispersal in Gujranwala-
Nandipur area to move to Pasrur on night 6/7
September.22 The Indian brigade commander sent

exaggerated reports about Pakistani success to 11
Corps Headquarter and requested permission to
withdraw. 11 Corps Headquarter instead sent their
Chief Engineer Officer and another staff officer to
revive the morale of 29 Infantry Brigade
Commander. These two officers on arrival were able
to put some spirit in the 29 Brigade and under their
supervision the 29 Indian Brigade launched another
attack on night 06/07 September 23. This attack was
successful and the Indians recaptured the southern
end of the bridge by 0800 hours 7th September
1965. In response to this development the 115
Brigade blew up a span of the Jassar bridge which
was already prepared for demolition since 6th
September at 0800 hours 07 September 1965. In
reality the situation had stabilised now with river
Ravi in between and both the brigades positioned
north and south of the river. Brigadier Muzaffar was
unfortunately for Pakistan Army of a different stuff.
At 1130 hours on the same day i.e. 7th September
without reconfirming he sent a report to Headquarter
15 Division that an enemy infantry battalion had
crossed the ravi river and established a foothold on
the northern side of the river 24. All this was
happening at a time when Headquarter 11 Indian

Corps had ordered the 29 Brigade on 8th
September to leave a battalion and revert to its
parent formation 7 Infantry Division’s command in
area Bhikiwind on the night of 8/9th September25,
in response to the developments in 4 Mountain
Division sector as a result of the 1st Armoured
division’s offensive in Khem Karan. 115 Brigades
alarming report naturally caused grave
apprehensions in the Pakistani High Command from
15 Division onwards till the GHQ. Headquarter 15
Division despatched 24 Brigade less one battalion
opposite Chobara-Phillora alongwith one tank
regiment (25 Cavalry) to 115 Brigade area (Jassar).
25 Cavalry spearheading the fire brigade sent to
extinguish the exaggerated fire at Jassar reached
Jassar at 2200 hours on 7th September and found out
that the situation was not a fraction as serious as
reported by 115 Brigade and at 0200 hours on night
7/8 September to return to his original location
Pasrur which 25 Cavalry reached at first light 8th
September26. Meanwhile the 6 Armoured Division
which had started moving from Gujranwala to
Pasrur on 6th September evening and whose leading
elements had reached Pasrur by 2345 hours was
ordered to return to Gujranwala by 0500 hours 7th

September!27 Contrary to the porevalent thinking in
Pakistan Jassar was no Indian deception but a sheer
defensive action aimed at eliminating a dangerous
enclave from which the Pakistanis could threaten
Amritsar. It was the fog of war that made the
Pakistani GHQ and 1 Corps imagine the shadow at
Jassar as that of a giant ! Interestingly the Indian
brigade commander at Jassar was as much afraid of
the Pakistani troops opposite him as the Pakistani 1
Corps and GHQ were afraid of the Indian threat
opposite Jassar. If Major Shamshad a direct
participant who went to Narowal (Jassar) is to be
believed then only one squadron of 25 Cavalry was
sent to Jassar.28
The 26 Division Fixing Manoeuvre against
Sialkot from 7th to 8th September:-- The aim of
26 Division attack against Sialkot was not to capture
Sialkot but to contain the Pakistani forces in Sialkot
so that they could not pose a threat to the northern
flank of the main Indian attack force consisting of
the 1st Armoured and 6 Mountain Division.Keeping
in view the Indian superiority in this sector this was
an easy to achieve objective.The Pakistani 15
Division had relatively better mobile forces in the
shape of one tank regiment, one TDU tank regiment

and one R & S Company but just three infantry
battalions (two from 101 Brigade and one being
from the divisional reserve i.e. 104 brigade) against
one Indian tank regiment and eight infantry
battalions. The Indian attack commenced two
brigade up against the border villages of Niwe
Wains, Bajragarhi etc from 2330 hours night 7/8
September. Both the brigades captured their
insignificant objectives.In any case the troops
opposite Sialkot were too weak to interfere with the
advance of the main Indian attack. The Indians
however remained obsessed with defence of Jammu
and later brought a fourth brigade i.e. the
52 Mountain Brigade(three battalions) on 11th
September 1965.29
The Main Indian Attack and 25 Cavalry (24
Brigade) Counter actions 0n 8th September
1965:--We have already discussed that 25 Cavalry
and 24 Brigade minus one unit in defence opposite
Charwa was despatched to Jassar on 7th September
and that 25 Cavalry returned to Pasrur at
approximately 0500 hours on 8th September. While
25 Cavalry and 24 Brigade were moving to Jassar
and moving back to Pasrur the third battalion of 24
Brigade i.e. 3 FF which was holding defences

opposite Maharajke-Chrawa extended as a screen for
over 10,000 yards30 was overrun by the concerted
attack of the 69 and 99 Mountain Brigades on the
night of 7th/8th September. This news about the
overrunning of 3 FF was received at 0600 hours at
Pasrur by the 24 Brigade headquarter which had just
reached Pasrur from Jassar at 0500 hours on 8th
September. The news was shocking! Brigadier
Abdul Ali Malik the 24 Brigade Commander knew
little about tank warfare and had no idea of the
quantum of troops opposite him. However the
Commanding Officer of 25 Cavalry Lieutenant
Colonel Nisar, was a capable armour officer. In
adition 25 Cavalry was,to Pakistan Army’s good
luck, a newly raised but extremely fine tank
regiment, having on its strength some very
outstanding officers, not merely on paper but in
terms of bravery in face of enemy and in
extraordinary situations. Malik who like Nisar had
no clue about the situation in his front and asked
Nisar to do something.31 Thus Malik abdicated the
conduct of battle to the commanding officer of a
tank regiment which was under his command! The
regiment was refuelling at this time having poofed
up all the fuel going to Jassar (Major Shamshad, a

direct participant and later referred to, states that
only Charlie Squadron went to Pasrur) and coming
back. Nisar immediately ordered tank squadron (B
Squadron) commanded by Major Ahmad (originally
from Guides Cavalry and an extremely brave leader
of men) to advance in an extended order towards
Charwa the reported point of enemy
breakthrough!After tasking one of the squadrons to
advance towards Charwa Nisar alerted the remaining
part of the regiment to move towards Chawinda. At
0730 hours Nisar sent another squadron (A
Squadron) towards Tharoah on receiving reports that
Indian armour was seen opposite Tharoh area. At
1130 hours Nisar sent ‘A’ Squadron to area west of
Gadgor.In short by 1200 hours the whole of 25
Cavalry was deployed three squadrons in line
abreast opposite the Indian 1st Armoured Brigade
leading the advance of the Indian 1st Armoured
Division. ‘B’ squadron of 25 Cavalry came in
contact with the advancing tanks of the Indian 1st
Armoured Division near Gadgor.The Indian 1st
Armoured Division which had commenced its
advance from the bridgehead secured by the 6
Mountain Division in Charwa-Maharajke area after
crossing the international border at 0600 hours on

the morning of 8th September.It was advancing two
regiments up;with an inter regiment gap of
approximately 3500 to 4000 metres in between,each
regiment one squadron up, 16 Light Cavalry
supported by a Gurkha infantry battalion on the
right,advancing towards Phillora 17 Poona Horse
on the left advancing towards Tharoah cross
roads.Both the tank regiments had a clean run during
the first 15 kilometres of their advance inside
Pakistan.According to the Indian armoured corps
historian the Pakistan Airforce aircrafts attacked the
leading Indian armour elements at about 8.40 Am.
at Chobara but were unable to hit any tank. The
Indian 16 Light Cavalry advancing two troops up
came in contact with 25 Cavalry’s tanks advancing
in extended order towards Chobara without a clue
that the Indian 1st Armoured Division was just a few
miles away. 25 Cavalry ‘s ‘Bravo Squadron’
commanded by Major Ahmad ,suddenly at
approximately 50 to 200 metres ranges at about
0900 or 0945 hours came into contact with two
leading tank troops of 16 Light Cavalry. Some of
Ahmad’s tanks had taken firepositions while some
were in the open .The Indians were on the move. A
confused firefight followed in which both sides lost

tanks, Pattons burning on being hit while Centurions
getting shot through both sides! Both the Indian
leading tank troop leaders were killed, thus leaving
the leading squadron commander of 16 Light
Cavalry clueless.32 Major Ahmad of 25 Cavalry
carried the day by fighting from the front, thus
inspiring his men to fight till death, rather than
withdraw an inch. It was during this firefight that
Major Ahmad, who had already changed his tank
once was also severely burnt after having personally
destroyed four tanks.33 There is no doubt that it
was Major Ahmad who saved the Pakistani position
at Gadgor by fighting from the front and injecting in
his men real steel. He was the only squadron
commander in 25 Cavalry who led from the front
and was the only major who proved himself equal to
the crisis in 25 Cavalry! Major Shamshad one of the
direct participant in that battle gave the same
verdict.34 16 Light Cavalry CO tried to bring up
another squadron, commanded by an Indian Muslim
officer Major M.A.R Shiekh to outflank the
Pakistani position in front from the the east. The
space for manoeuvre was however extremely limited
Poona Horse the left forward Indian unit being just
4000 metres away from the right forward unit. In the

process of manoeuvring this second squdron
exposed its broadsides to 25 Cavalry tanks of ‘
Alpha Squadron’ losing many tanks including that of
Major Shiekh who received a head injury35 and
died on the spot. Finally this second squadron was
held up having lost its squadron commander and
unable to manoeuvre due to limited visibility and
lack of space to manoeuvre. As per General
Gurcharan Singh once the second squadron was
held up CO 16 Light Cavalry passed ‘exaggerated’
reports to the 1 Armoured Brigade Commander who
in turn ordered 16 Light Cavalry not to advance any
further36. We will not go in the details of what 25
Cavalry or 16 Light Cavalry did since this in itself
would require a whole book.In brief 16 Light
Cavalry’s advance was checked at Gadgor by 1000
hours 8th September. 17 Poona Horse which was
advancing on the left towards Tharoah commenced
its advance two squadrons up but soon changed to
one squadron up because of the limited fields of fire
and observation that made command and control,
extremely difficult.It came in contact with 25
Cavalry at 0945 hours in Tharoh area and was also
checked like 16 Light Cavalry. According to
Gurcharan Singh some firing took place in between

the tanks of 16 Light Cavalry and 17 Poona
Horse37. This happened because the inter regiment
gap between both the regiments was too less. ‘C’
Squadron 62 Cavalry which was tasked to provide
left flank protection to the 1st Armoured Division’s
advance was delayed as its tanks got bogged down
while inside Indian territory .When half of this
squadron did finally got going and crossed the
border at 1000 hours it went south towards Zafarwal
by some misunderstanding after crossing the Degh
Nala instead of advancing parallel and north of the
Degh Nala as originally ordered!This squadron
crossed the Degh Nala and reached Zafarwal in
Pakistani territory absolutely unopposed and later
recrossed the Degh Nala to go north once it probably
realised that it was supposed to stay north of Degh
Nala!Once this squadron was recrossing the Degh
Nala it was engaged by an Indian artillery battery
providing fire support to the 1st Armoured
brigade,which naturally mistook it for Pakistani
tanks seeing it approach from south of Degh Nala.In
turn this squadron also opened fire on the Indian
battery which they thought to be a Pakistani battery
destroying several guns and vehicles!38 By 1300
hours Brigadier K.K Singh Commander 1st

Armoured Brigade was a mentally defeated man.He
reached the conclusion that ‘He was held up by at
least two Patton regiments and that there was no
possibility of advancing direct towards Phillora
without suffering unacceptable losses’.He was
further unnerved by reports of a ‘raid by enemy
tanks on guns and soft vehicles’ (which in reality
was the firing between 62 Cavalry’s tanks coming
recrossing Degh Nadi!)39 Commander 1 Armoured
Brigade concluded that ‘his line of communication
was not secure’40 and ‘decided to adopt a
defensive posture for the security of his command at
1400 hours issued orders withdrawing the brigade
into a ‘box’ around Sabzpir cross roads! The 17
Poona Horse which had encountered opposition but
was taking positive measures to deal with it was also
withdrawn and deployed to cover the eastern flank in
the area,and the 4 Hodson’s Horse was also detailed
to defend the southern flank41. All this was
happening at a time when there was just 25 Cavalry
in front of the whole 1st Indian Armoured Division!
The readers may note that the Indians were not
lacking in valour as cheap propaganda conducted in
Pakistan after 1965 claimed but phenomenally
incompetent at unit and brigade level. Their right

forward unit 17 Poona Horse could have easily
outflanked 25 Cavalry’s ‘Alpha Squadron’. Major
Shamshad a direct participant thus rightly observed
in his article that ‘There is a big gap, about six miles
wide, between Hasri Nala and Degh Nala which
could have provided a safe passage to 17 Poona
Horse up to Pasrur. No troops were deployed to
defend this area. It appears that they did try to
advance but the higher headquarters held them back.
I say so because I saw trackmarks of Centurions in
Seowal on 19th September.’ 42 It may be noted that
the 43 Lorried Brigade advance on the other axis
also went diasastorously, less due to enemy
opposition and more due to poor as well as
inefficient execution.The 43 Lorried Brigade which
was supposed to commence advance at 0600 hours
commenced advance five hours late at 1100 hours
because its leading unit 8 Garhwal reached the start
line much later than planned,and got delayed as soon
as it commenced advance due to poor traffic control
! No men with landmines tied to their chests were
needed in face of such phenomenally incmpetent
staff and battle procedures! 43 Lorried Brigade
led by 2 Lancers finally reached Sabzpir cross roads
at 1530 hours where tanks of the Indian 1st

Armoured Brigade opened fire on Indian Armoured
Corps’s 2 Lancers mistaking them for Pakistani
tanks and in the process destroyed two Indian tanks
including CO 2 Lancers tank!43 Thus 43 Lorried
brigade also harboured at Sabzpir cross
roads.Gurcharan Singh’s verdict on the Indian 1st
Armoured Division’s performance is worth quoting
and is also a tribute to 25 Cavalry, the only unit of
the Pakistan Army that did on 8th September 1965
what no other unit of Pakistan Army ever did and
most probably would ever do again.44 Gurcharan
thus wrote; ‘The first days battle could not have got
off to a worse start. The Armoured Brigade had
been blocked by two squadrons of Pattons and in the
first encounter the brigade had lost more tanks than
the enemy had....whole of 1 Corps had gained a few
kilometres... The worst consequence of the days
battle was its paralysing effect on the minds of the
higher commanders. It took them another 48 hours
to contemplate the next offensive move. This
interval gave the Pakistanis time to move up and
deploy their 6 Armoured Division with five
additional armoured regiments.In fact the golden
opportunity that fate had offered to the 1st Armoured
division to make worthwhile gains had been

Funeral of the Patiala Pathan who stopped Indian tank division with two squadrons and the unjust controversy to usurp his role since 1965 war

Funeral of the Patiala Pathan who stopped Indian tank division with two squadrons and the unjust controversy to usurp his role since 1965 war

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Funeral of the Patiala Pathan who stopped Indian tank division with two squadrons and the unjust controversy to usurp his role since 1965 war