MAJOR SHAMSHADS REBUTTS Pakistan Army SPONSORED BOOK MEN OF STEEL

1. • MAJOR SHAMSHADS REBUTTS Pakistan Army SPONSORED
BOOK MEN OF STEEL
• July 2021
• DOI:
• 10.13140/RG.2.2.24210.17603
• Project:
• Military History
• Agha H Amin
• Major Shamshad Ali Khan

2. MAJOR SHAMSHADS REBUTTS Pakistan Army SPONSORED BOOK MEN OF
STEEL
• July 2021
• DOI:
• 10.13140/RG.2.2.24210.17603
• Project:
• Military History
• Agha H Amin
• Major Shamshad Ali Khan

3. MAJOR SHAMSHAD ALI KHAN (RETIRED) ON
PAKISTAN ARMY SPONSORED BOOK MEN OF STEEL
MEN OF STEEL by Major Shamshad Ali Khan
Kaimkhani (Retired),majshamshad@hotmail.com,25
Cavalry
MEN OF STEEL
By
Major Shamshad Ali Khan Kaimkhani (Retired)
25 Cavalry
This was first sent to daily DAWN but they did not
have the guts to publish it on grounds that it
involved the president and the army.
The other day I came across a book entitled ,’ MEN
OF STEEL,’. President General Mushrraf has graced
the book with Foreword while the preface has been

4. written by General Khalid Mahmud Arif (Retired).
The book is based on war diaries supposed to had
been maintained by the units and the staff or the
general (late ) Abrar Hussain who commanded 6
Armoured Division in 1965 on Chawinda sector. I
cannot reason out as to why the book has been
published now when the event is forty years behind
at this point of time. As there is nothing in the book
that would have jeopardized the security of the
country, it should have come out immediately after
the war. That was the time when it could provided
opportunity to higher command( there is nothing
for junior leaders in the book) to learn from the
experience of the one who had fought the greatest
tank battle after world war- II. That would have
saved us of many debacles in 1971 and especially
the ones committed in Sialkot sector on western
front The book has five parts. Part three (25% of the
book) is the description of the events on the
battlefield that is of interest to students of military
history. 75 % of the book comprises of background
and statistics regarding composition of units
/formations, casualties in men and material on both

5. sides, names of commanders, list of recipients of
gallantry awards, photographs and such like details.
I feel that late general Abrar Hussain has not
authored the book because he was known to be of
the type who would never indulge in such a
travesty. General K.M Arif appears to be the ghost
author of the book.
I was a participant in the events on battlefield
mentioned in part 3 of the book and have a
different version.
To give authenticity to my narration, which will be
diametrically opposed to the one given in the book,
it is necessary to state that I was directly involved in
the events as a troop leader in C squadron of 25
cavalry and squadron commander twice on extreme
critical moments on the battle field. I was face to
face with enemy every day throughout the war. My
location from day one had been at Gadgor,
Phillorah, Chawinda and Butter Dogranmdi where

6. the battle was fought. It is regretted that I did not
have the good luck to see a red tab or even a staff
officer on front line during entire war.
From the text of part three it is clear that the
general left his Headquarter, at Bhollowal ten miles
behind the front line, for the first and last time in a
helicopter on 11 September in the evening, By that
time our two regiments , Guides and 11 Cavalry,
had been badly mauled.. The right time for the
general to leave his HQ was in the morning when he
got the news that 11 cavalry was under pressure.
Had he been at Chawinda at 1100 hours he could
have directed and controlled the efforts of the
three regiments and saved the day. By the evening,
while sitting in the caravan, he had launched two
more regiments, Guides and 25 cavalry. Guides was
launched at a time( about 1100 hours) when 11
cavalry had retreated and Indians had taken up
defensives position to shoot up Guides who
attacked with high spirits on their first day in action.
Some fine men and officers were lost in this action
due to the apathy of commanding officer who
launched the regiment in haste, without artillery

7. and infantry support contrary to the dictates of
terrain.. Lethargy and incompetence of HQ 6
armoured division resulted in our defeat at
Phillorah which was the greatest tragedy on this
front.
As if that was not enough, 25 cavalry was launched
at 1600 hours with a mission to occupy Phillorah
track crossing which was reported not occupied by
the enemy. Thanks to our stars and battle
experience of preceding three days that we got
away with loss of only one tank when we hit against
enemy defenses at Phillorah at 1700 hours. This is a
classic example how to destroy one’s forces
piecemeal.
Now a word about the title of the book.
General Musharraf in the introduction of the book
has mentioned that he was proud to be apart of the
force called MEN OF STEEL by its commander. It

8. implies that late general Abrar had ascribed the title
of MEN OF STEEL to his own formation. This never
happens, it amounts to praising oneself. Such an
absurdity was not expected of general Abrar who, I
am told , was a different breed.
Titles or honors are always awarded by higher
authorities .It was 25 cavalry alone which was
referred to as men of steel by General Ayub Khan
during the course of his talk on the eve of his visit to
the regiment immediately after ceasefire, in
acknowledgement of our performance. This had
happened on Pasrur airstrip where we were
camping .Army, Naval and Air Chiefs were also
present. Since the president was not to visit any
other unit or formation head quarter, all officers in
the area were called at the airstrip.
There are tangible, discernable and universally
accepted actions of 25 cavalry on the battlefield
that justify the suffix ‘ men of Steel’ with its’ title.
The actions precisely and in short are;

9. 1-It was 25 cavalry alone which clashed headlong
with an armored division , north of Fhillorah
crossing at 0800 and pushed it back to Gudgor
(2.5miles) by 1200 hours.
2-we attacked, captured Gudgor at 1700 hours and
pushed the enemy further back by three miles to
Chobara.,
3- we kept the enemy at bay for another two day
with no additional force in our support. Air support
was of course there.
4- On night 10/11 September we were sent to
Pasrur for rest and refit On this point of time we
were placed under command 6 armoured division
which had taken over Chawinda sector.
5- At about 1100 hours on 11 September C
squadron 25 cavalry found itself deployed behind
Chawinda with a mission to stop the enemy at all
cost that was believed to be advancing behind our
force that had retreated from Gudgor-Phillorah area
in the morning. In fact Div HQ had accepted the loss

10. of Chawinda and therefore we were deployed
behind that town to stop the enemy advance
towards Pasror.
After five hours of my insistence that Chawinda was
vacant, at 1700 hours we were ordered to advance
and occupy Phillorah, which according to high
command was not held by the enemy. What
happened later is along story but it should suffice to
say that we hit enemy defenses in Phillorah where
tank to tank battle ensued. In the process our one
tank with crew was destroyed. The skirmish proved
to be a deterrent and the enemy did not advance
any further that day.
6- On12, 13,14,and 15 September C squadron along
with 3FF was defending area in the north and up to
Jassoran in the west of Chawinda. It was through
this area that the enemy attempted, for four days,
to penetrate but could not succeed.
7- On 16th the enemy launched an armored Brigade
to out flank Chawinda and attacked Butter Dograndi
in the rear of that town. They succeeded because

11. the task force commander (who later retired as
Major General Wajahat Hussain), failed to
coordinate with 24 Bde and left Jassoran
unoccupied providing a gap through which the
enemy infiltrated and turned our flank. We suffered
heavy losses. Seven tanks were destroyed including
two of 33 TDU. In the evening we attacked Butter
Dugrandi supported by artillery. . Destroyed two
enemy tanks and some infantry. Under very critical
circumstances we stopped the enemy at Butter
Dograndi that was determined to reach Pasror that
day. Artillery played effective roll but never fired on
enemy tanks with open sights on that day as
mentioned in the book. We never allowed enemy
tanks to reach that close to our gun areas.
8- It was a troop of 25 cavalry and company of 3 FF
who again attacked (without artillery) Butter
Dograndi, midway to our main objective Jassoran,
on the morning of 17th and mounted enemy

12. trenches north of the village. Although we suffered
heavy losses and could not reach the objective, our
offensive action forced the enemy to vacate Butter
Dograndi and withdraw to Jassonan in the evening
and eventually across the railway line Chawinda –
Sialkot.(quoted from official history of 17 Poona
Horse that was controlling the operation on Indian
side).
9-It was 25 cavalry again, along with 3 Ff who
repulsed an infantry brigade attack on night19/20
September. Although some of their troops had
crossed over the railway line and hit the track
behind Chawinda at milestone 5, our tanks fired
from behind railway line and forced the enemy to
withdraw, leaving behind dead and wounded.
Now where does the 6 armour division appear in
this scenario? It has always been a troop or
squadron action through out war accept 11
September that was a fiasco .I can confront any one
who can prove me wrong.

13. Now the story as to how did 6 armored division
became’Men Of Steel’.
I served in 6 armored division, of which 25 cavalry
was a part , till September 1971. No one called the
Division as men of steel it was only 25 cavalry alone.
I was shocked when I visited HQ 6 armoured Div
after Indian captivity in 1974. I saw on the name
boards of staff officers written ‘MEN OF STEEL’ on
top. No body could explain how it happened.
Knowing general K.M.Arif I can say that he is behind
this happening supported by general Wjahat
Hossain(retd) who was commanding 6 Armored
Division in 1973-74.
To face the enemy is the professional obligation of a
soldier. To be killed in action, get wounded and fall
prisoner is very much a normal happening in the life
of soldier and there is nothing to be proud or
ashamed about it. This ancient and universal
concept of soldiering does not hold good in
Pakistan. Here a soldier sitting in trench and killed
by artillery fire can be given gallantry award and

14. also proclaimed a national hero. A gallantry award
is justified only for an act performed beyond call of
duty and in the face of enemy.
Major K.M. Arif never left the Divisional HQ which
was 10 miles away from front line and the Div
Commander left only once in the evening of 11
September, as mentioned an the book, when
fighting had subsided. Obviously both of them do
not deserve the gallantry award.
Major Khalid .Mahmod Arif ( Later general) was
GSO-2 operation of 6 armored division in 1965.
.In 1974 he was a Brigadier and held very powerful
position in GHQ.
To justify undeserved gallantry awards that he and
the Div commander had received and also to cover-
up the blunders committed by Div HQ, he floated
the word that general Mosa Khan had called 6
armored division as men of steel at Pasror airstrip.
Knowing his vindictive nature nobody could dare
oppose him.

15. On his signal this word was continuously and
systematically given currency for 20 years. It is
possible that he provided documentary support to
this misdeed while he was in power.
It is time that we stopped fabricating and twisting
history to serve the vested interests and record true
fact for our posterity.
MAJOR SHAMSHAD ALI KHAN (RETIRED) 25
CAVALRY
DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN 25 CAVALRY BATTLES OF
1965

17. THE REAL HERO OF BATTLE OF CHAWINDA
CONTROVERSY
In March 2001 my book Pakistan Army till 1965's
chapter on Battle of Chawinda was published in
Defence Journal Karachi.This started a controversy
about the eal hero of Battle of Chawinda as far as
the most decisive day 8th September was
concerned.Below are the series of letters then
exhanged.The controversy has raged on from
March 2001 till September 2008.
Agha H Amin

19. Major Agha Humayun Amin (Retired) –The Author
EX MAJOR FAROUK ADAMS LETTER TO DEFENCE
JOURNAL AND MY REBUTTAL OF 2001:---

20. Farouk Adams Letter to Editor Defence Journal and
A.H Amin's Reply Defence Journal August 2001
The Battle of Chawinda
I refer to Agha Humayun Amin’s article on the
Battle of Chawinda, and also being “direct
participant, would like to share with your readers,
some of my knowledge on the subject. Since I am
writing from memory, I will touch only upon those
incidents and aspects of the battle, of which I am
certain.
About a week before the war started, an A. K officer
from the Gibraltar Force, exfiltrated, and brought to
HQ 24 Brigade, certain Indian Army documents.
These purported to show the presence of the 1st
Indian Armoured Division opposite us. Brig Abdul Ali
Malik accordingly informed the higher HQ, and GHQ
detailed Maj. Mahmud of the Army Aviation to
physically carry these documents to GHQ for
evaluation. GHQ’s assessment was that these
documents were part of an Indian deception plan.
Brig Malik disagreed with this assessment. So it is
incorrect to say that he had no idea what he had

21. against him, though it is correct that when the
attack came, he had no way of knowing that this
was the main effort of the enemy. But neither did
anyone else.
When the Jassar fiasco took place, Brig Malik
advised 15 Div. not to move him, because he
expected a strong attack against his positions. HQ
15 Div. did not agree.
HQ 15 Div. ordered 24 Brigade to clear the
imaginary enemy bridgehead at Jassar. Brig Malik
tasked 2 Punjab Regiment (my unit) to do the
needful. The Commanding Officer, Lt Col Jamshed
MC Bar, SJ, suggested an attack at first light, instead
of a night attack, because we had no idea about the
enemy location, terrain etc etc. But 15 Div. orders
were clear and inflexible, and so Col Jamshed,
decided to lead the attack in person. But before this
could be done, the actual situation in Jassar became
clear, and the attack was called off.
At about first light on 08 September, an NCO of the
Engineers came into our positions. He told of a

22. heavy Indian attack that had severely mauled 3 F.F
Regiment which was deployed as screen. He was
immediately taken to the Brigade HQ, where Brig
Malik questioned him in the presence of Col
Jamshed and Major Aslam Shah, who was the B.M.
If Brig Malik had any doubt about a serious enemy
thrust in his sector, that was now removed. It took
him about a minute to take, what many consider,
the most important decision of the war i.e. to
advance on a broad front and engage the attacking
enemy forces. This decision was entirely Brig
Malik’s, and it saved Pakistan. Had it gone wrong,
he would have been court martialled. Since he
suspected that HQ 15 Div. was prone to panic, he
ordered Maj. Aslam Shah to break wireless contact
with the Div. HQ (which was re-established when
the enemy had been engaged, and Tikka Khan had
taken over 15 Div). Brig Malik then gave the
operation orders to his unit commanders, including
Lt Col Nisar, CO 25 Cavalry. It is, therefore,
absolutely incorrect to say that Brig Malik
“abdicated” his command to a unit commander.
Indeed, after that first day, 25 Cavalry was not

23. involved in operations as regiment, because the
situation warranted squadron actions in support of
infantry. And this support these squadrons
unstintingly and heroically provided. But this by no
stretch of the imagination can be taken to mean the
de facto command of the Chawinda Battle was at
any time exercised by Co 25 Cavalry. This remained
firmly in Brig Malik’s hands who remained
unswerving and steadfast and central to the battle,
right till the very end.
After the first three days of almost continuous
battle we had suffered serious depletion in
numbers, and had suffered extreme exhaustion
both physically and mentally. And so we were
withdrawn from the FDLs to recover, but that same
evening the situation at the front became so
alarming that we were thrust right back into the
battle. It is a fair comment on the morale of 24
Brigade group that despite our bedraggled state
and the mauling we had received, there was no
hesitation on the part of anyone to rejoin battle.
From then, to the end of the war, 24 Brigade held

24. its position and survived — but barely. It is difficult
to explain what extreme weariness really is.
There is mention in the article under reference, of
Brig Malik’s request to be moved to the “rear”,
which was refused by Gen Abrar. If a Brigade
Commander is to make such a suggestion, he
cannot just say “rear”. He has to give an alternate
plan of operations which he must work out with his
staff. Gen Aslam Shah (then B.M) denies that any
such suggestion was ever made, and this fits into
the experience of people like me, who were quite
clearly told that for 24 Brigade, this was to be a “last
man last round battle”. Therefore, if such a
suggestion is recorded, either its context is missing,
or it is the result of a misunderstanding. When we
were suddenly pulled out of recuperation and sent
back into battle (refer sub-para above) we were told
that we will be pulled back for refitment at the first
possible opportunity. Perhaps this could be the
context.
2. And now I would like to make few general
comments as under:-

25. Anyone reading the article under reference is
bound to come away with the impression that the
Battle of Chawinda was fought exclusively by Brig
Amjad Chaudhry, Lt Col Nisar, Maj. Muhammad
Ahmed, and the “direct participant” Maj.
Shamshad. The infantry, it seems was just not there.
As authentic history, therefore, this article will be
seen as trifle lop-sided. The truth is that by sheer
coincidence some very brave and steadfast men got
thrown into what was 24 Brigade. With the courage
of these men, came a good deal of luck by
providence — and the combination made for quite
a number of gallant actions by all arms, and all
ranks.
Brig Muhammad Ahmed was heroic, and so was Lt
Col Nisar, but how can the rest of 25 Cavalry be put
into the dustbin of anonymity? Indeed I can’t think
of one officer or tank commander who did not
perform.
Yes, General Abrar was a good commander. He was
calm and poised and did not foist needless

26. interference on 24 Brigade. Brig Amjad Chaudhry
too had a reputation of a good artillery officer,
though I would have to be a very brave man to
declare him the best gunner officer in the sub-
continent. These officers held their nerve, and did
not panic. And nor did they need to. They were
never within the sights of the enemy. But people
like Lt Col Shinwari, Lt Col Jamshed and Maj. Aslam
Shah constantly were, and yet they kept their calm.
And last but not the least the composure of Brig
Abdul Ali Malik deserves to be saluted. Throughout
the battle his HQ was either in the FDLs or not more
than 400 yds in the rear. He kept his cool in the face
of direct enemy fire for days at end — comparison
between him and the others is like comparing a
fighter in the ring with the audience. When Lt Gen
(Retd) Tariq, S. J came on PTV two years ago on the
occasion of Defence Day, he talked of his
experiences of the Battle of Chawinda. He was
generous in his praise of many gallant actions. But
he singled out Brig Malik beyond all the rest as the
man whose battle it really was, while all the rest of
us revolved around him. Having seen him at close
quarters, I cannot disagree with this assessment.

27. 3. Lastly, to call a respected senior officer “a VCO
type” General, was not in very good taste.
Farouk Adam Khan S. J
27 June 001
REPLY OF A.H AMIN TO EX MAJOUR FAROUK
ADAM PUBLISHED ALONG SIDE FAROUK ADAMS
LETTER IN DEFENCE JOURNAL :---
I refer to Ex Major Farouk Adam Khan’s S.J letter on
my article “ Battle of Chawinda” .
I have only touched “incidents and aspects” of the
battle about which “I could be certain” based on the
“authority of tangible concrete and precise” records
in the form of “ official sources of the Pakistan
Army” like Major General Shaukat Riza’s “The
Pakistan Army-War 1965” sponsored and published
by the Pakistan Army and printed by the Pakistan
Army Press in 1984 , The Pakistan Army Green
Book-1992 the official yearbook of the Pakistan
Army published by the Pakistan Army’s General
Headquarters and accounts of direct participants

28. like Major Shamshad. I had the opportunity of
meeting other participants like Brigadier Ahmad in
1982 , Lieutenant Colonel Raza in 1993 and Major
Shamshad in 2000. In addition, I met a large number
of participants while serving in 11 Cavalry from 27th
March 1983 till 9th April 1985.
l Firstly the assertion by the worthy critic that the
Indian mailbag was captured by an exfiltrating
element of Gibraltar Force. The Gibraltar Force was
a fiasco of magnanimous proportions and very few
exfiltrated in good shape what to talk of capturing a
mail bag. The mail bag was captured by a deliberate
ambush launched under the direction of
Headquarter 15 Division under direction of Col S.G
Mehdi. The official account on this episode is clear.
Thus Shaukat Riza states “Lt Col Sher Zaman (MI
Directorate) ordered Col S.G Mehdi (15 Division) to
lay an ambush on the road (Samba-Kathua), and get
some prisoners. At 0100 hours night 3rd/4th
September, Zaman had a call from an excited
Mehdi. An Indian despatch rider had been captured.
His message bag contained mail for HQ Squadron 1
Indian Armoured Division. The bag was immediately

29. flown to Rawalpindi.” (Refers-Pages-133 &
134-The Pakistan Army-War 1965-Shaukat Riza-
Army Education Press-1984).
l What happened after this at least on paper was a
mystery till Gen N.U.K Babar cleared this point on
paper in an interview conducted by this scribe and
published in DJ April 2000 issue by stating that the
mail box was dismissed as an Indian deception by
the then DMI Brigadier Irshad.
l In paragraph 1 the worthy critic states about
Brigadier Malik i.e “It took him about a minute to
take the most important decision of the war i.e to
advance on a broad front and engage the attacking
enemy forces”. Now this is a figment of the worthy
critics imagination. In “Summer 1997“ issue of
“Pakistan Army Journal“ Brigadier Nisar the
Commanding Officer of 25 Cavalry gave his version
of the Battle of Gadgor-Chawinda. Nowhere in the
article did Nisar state that Brigadier Malik gave him
any order on the decisive 8th of September “to
advance on a broad front and engage the enemy”.
On the other hand this point has been treated very

30. clearly by Shaukat Riza in the Pakistani GHQ’s
officially sponsored account. Shaukat describes the
initial situation on the crucial morning of 8th
September 1965 in the following words “At about
0600 hours 24 Brigade received the news that 3 FF
had been overrun. Brigadier Ali Malik got on to Col
Nisar and ordered 25 Cavalry to do something”.
(Refers Page - 148-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit) That was
the only order Malik gave. All the subsequent
deployment was done by Nisar and the brunt of the
Indian attack was borne by “Bravo Squadron” of 25
Cavalry commanded by Major Ahmad. It was Col
Nisar and Nisar alone who did the broad front
deployment without any orders to resort to any
broad front deployment from Brigadier Malik.
l In paragraph 1 the worthy critic states that
Brigadier Malik never made a request for a
withdrawal on 16th September. My source for
stating that Brigadier Malik made a request for
withdrawing from Chawinda position is none other
than a major direct participant staff officer of the
battle i.e Major K.M Arif the then GSO-2
(Operations) 6th Armoured Division at Chawinda. It

31. was 6th Armoured Division Headquarters which
controlled the battle after 9th September. It is very
strange that the critic finds my narration odd rather
than contesting the authority which I quoted to
support my assertion. In an article published in
Pakistan Army Green Book-1992-Year of the Senior
Field Commanders, General K.M Arif (Retired) made
the following assertion i.e “The battle raged with
considerable intensity on September 16. After its
failure to capture Chawinda the enemy failed to
envelop it by a two pronged attack. In the process
the villages of Sodreke fell and Buttur Dograndi
came under attack. The severe fighting resulted in
many casualties. The situation was confused and
the outcome uncertain .So fluid the situation
became that at 1630 hours 24 Brigade Commander
requested permission to take up a position in the
rear.Abrar told the brigade commander on
telephone, “You know what is there in the kitty.
There is no question of falling back.We shall fight till
the bitter end from our present positions.” His
words proved a timely tonic. 24 Brigade fought
gallantly. Soon the danger subsided.” (Refers -Page -
6-” Abrar’s Battlefield Decisions”-Pakistan Army

32. Green Book-Year of Senior Commanders-Pakistan
Army-General Headquarters-Rawalpindi-1992). This
assertion was made by one of the principal staff
officers of the 6th Armoured Division who was
present on the scene and not a figment of my
imagination.
l Even 6th Armoured Division’s War Diary contains a
record of the above mentioned telephone call.
l As to the worthy critic’s assertion in paragraph 1
about de facto command of Chawinda Battle
remaining in Brigadier Malik till the end. All that I
stated was that during the most decisive encounter
of the whole battle at Gadgor on 8th September it
was Nisar and Nisar alone who exercised coup d oeil
deploying his regiment entirely on his own without
any orders from 24 Brigade about “any broad front
deployment” or any “specific orders to deploy in
any particular disposition”. After this decisive
encounter at Gadgor the Indians did not do
anything till 11th September. From 10th September
6th Armoured Division entered the scene and

33. controlled the Chawinda battle, 24 Brigade being
one of the many brigades that it commanded.
l Refers the criticism in paragraph 2 that “the battle
was fought exclusively by Amjad Chaudhry,
Lt Col Nisar, Major Mohammad Ahmad and the
direct participant Major Shamshad” all I can say is
that the critic did not read my article but only
scanned through it.On map opposite Page-40 it is
written that C squadron i.e Shamshad’s squadron
arrived opposite Gadgor area at 1130 hours after
the situation had been stabilised. On various pages I
have stated eg “ 25 Cavalry was to Pakistan Army’s
good luck, a newly raised but extremely fine tank
regiment” (Refers-Page-43). The same point is
repeated on various pages.
l About Abdul Ali Malik’s command qualities Gen
Fazal Muqeem notes in his “Pakistan’s Crisis in
Leadership” “The few counterattacks which 8
Division tried during the war were most noticeable
by their lack of planning.The units were hurled into
battle without having been given enough time for

34. planning and preparations .The worst example of
this attack was on December 17 when against all
protestations of its very gallant commanding officer
, 35 FF was sent into battle for almost certain
massacre” (Refers-Page-215 and 216-Pakistan’s
Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem
Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Lahore-
1973).
l Chawinda was an armour battle and this is proved
by casualties suffered by tank and infantry units.
How many infantry units except 3 FF could match
the casualties of 11 Cavalry in 1965 i.e 34 killed. As
a matter of fact the direct participant Major
Shamshad has referred to one counter attack in
which an infantry company of 2 Punjab had Nil
killed and two officers got the SJ. Even in Chamb
during Grand Slam 11 Cavalry lost 19 killed on 1st
September 1965 alone while 14 Punjab lost a total
of 3 killed in the entire Grand Slam. (Refers-Page-
108 1 & 109-Pak Bharat Jang-Colonel Mukhtar
Gillani -Rawalpindi-April -1998). As a matter of fact
11 Cavalry suffered more casualties in Grand Slam
than all ten infantry units except one i.e 13 Punjab

35. which had lost 24 killed as against 11 Cavalry’s 19
killed.But then the strength of an armoured
regiment is around 400 vis-a-vis 800 of infantry.
l Lastly the reference to VCO. This was purely
symbolic and had nothing to do with rank or status
in the literal sense. Sher Bahadur’s efforts to divide
and distribute the 4 Corps Artillery Headquarter
before the 1965 War have been discussed by an
authority no less eminent than Pakistan Army’s last
C in C, Gul Hassan.This if done would have seriously
compromised chances of Pakistani success in Grand
Slam and Chawinda.Without concentrated artillery
at Grand Slam or in Chawinda none including Abrar
or Malik could have defeated the Indians.
Kind Regards
A.H Amin (pavocavalry@hotmail.com)
-------------------------------------------------------------
BRIGADIER KAMAL ALAMS AND COLONEL
ANWARS LETTERS TO DEFENCE JOURNAL AND MY

36. REBUTTAL AS ASSISTANT EDITOR DEFENCE
JOURNAL OF JANUARY 2002:---
Brig Kamal Alam and Colonel Anwars Criticism of
Chawinda and A.H Amin's Reply Defence Journal
January 2002
Dear Major Sehgal,
In his letter in Defence Journal of Aug 2001, Mr .
Amin says that in the Pak Army Journal (Summer
97) Brig Nisar does not mention any order coming
his way from his Brigade Comd on 8 Sept 1965. I am
no historian but some questions immediately come
to mind viz. Does Col Nisar also mention that the
Brigade Commander told him to “do something”? If
not who is to be believed, Brig Nisar or Gen Riza.
And if he was not told to “do something“, what
major event galvanized him into taking this
unilateral action against the enemy advance? Did he
get information about the enemy advance himself,
or did someone give it to him, and if so who? When
he got his information, was he in the presence of
the Brigade Commander , or was in wireless contact

37. with him? And when he decided to strike out on his
own, did he at least inform the Brigade? And if so
what transpired; or did the rest of the Brigade
merely follow 25 Cav through guess-work?
The point I want to make is that in order to be
classified as “history“ we have to first establish
whether 25 Cav was a part of a larger formation, or
was acting in a vacuum. And if it was subordinate to
24 Brigade, did it take itself out of the Brigade
ORBAT on its own, or did if take the Brigade under
its own command. This relationship can only be
settled by the communication between the two. So
far it has been considered a settled fact beyond any
controversy, that this Brigade and all its
components fought an outstanding action. After all
there have been M Ds and presentation on the
subject for the last 36 years and most officers have
had a chance to take part in one or another of
these. And no adverse comment has come to
tarnish the reputation of any officer of the brigade.

38. It is only recently that through one sentence of Maj
Gen Shaukat Riza ‘s Book almost all infantry actions
of this battle seem to have been nullified, and the
brave conduct of the Bridge Commander has been
found fit to be relegated to those who functioned
below par.
I am afraid that Gen Riza’s Book is primarily the
amalgam of various war diaries, with very little
original research , “officially sponsored” to give the
“official view“. A very good insight into its historical
value and credibility lies in what it has to say
regarding the change of command in Chamb, which
is a scandal that has refused to be hushed up
despite the best official efforts. On page 121 of the
book Gen Riza blatantly states that change of
Command in Chamb was pre-planned. And then he
goes on to brazenly assert that this was confirmed
by most officers in GHQ and 12 Div. He forgot that
this was a deliberate, set-piece attack, the
operation orders for which per force would have to
be attended by GOC 7 Div, if the command was to
change, and all the lower formations would have
known about it, and at least some shred of

39. documentary evidence of this effect would have
survived, at least in GHQ. But there is not a word
extant to corroborate this cover-up. And what is
worst is that immediately after the war in Staff
College under, Gen Riza was serving “a 12 Div
officer” who was the GOC of this Division. He was
Gen Akhtar Malik. At a time when even subalterns
like me could question Gen Malik on this subject
and get a candid reply, it is impossible to believe
that Gen Riza did not know all details of this change
from the horse’s mouth. And knowing this and then
wilfully distorting history is deserving of the
strongest opprobrium. And then DJ takes one line of
this “history” and knocks out all infantry actions,
and goes further to malign the commander of
Chawinda Brigade! And now this is to pass for
history?
Brig (Retd) Kamal Alam, TJ
14 Dec 2001
To : The Editor Defence Journal
Karachi
Sir,

40. I refer to letter by Mr. Farouk Adam and Mr. Amin
on the Battle of Chawinda (Defence Journal Aug
2001). In 1972, in company of some regimental at
officers I met Gen A .A Malik in Mangla. The
question of 3 F F came up. He said the heaviest
attacks seemed to come wherever this unit was
deployed. As such at one point he had to ask the Div
HQ if there was any possibility for this unit to be
relieved and rested. The Div HQ said this was not
possible. War diaries are often not written
immediately . There are often inaccuracies in them.
Is it possible that this event is being referred to by
both writers? At any rate 24 Brigade War Diary
should also be consulted.
Mr. Amin quotes Gen Riza’s Book i.e. Brig Malik got
on to ...............” From this it is obvious that it
means the communication was by wireless or
telephone. But I have attended an M D on this
battle and also heard its narration from Brig
Shinwari. Both were nearer to Farouk Adam’s
explanation of events of

41. 8 Sept. Mr. Amin says he has referred to “official
sources” and “officially sponsored” GHQ account of
this Battle. This is its weak point. Our “officially
sponsored accounts” unfortunately have been
cover-ups. Gen Riza wrote about such an important
battle without interviewing any infantry CO, or any
officer of the Brigade HQ, when they were all alivel!
What sort of history is this?
I heard the talk by Lt Gen Tariq S. J to which Farouk
Adam has referred. I have also heard him on the
subject in person. He said that all units gave their
very best but also that the Brigade Commander’s
conduct, whose HQ was often in line of direct fire,
was most inspiring.
After reading the original article one gets the
impression that the whole battle was fought by Col
Nisar and Maj Ahmed ably supported by Brig Amjad
Chowdhry’s guns. It seems infantry was non-
existant! Granted it was a tank battle and very well
done by 25 Cav. But I can’t recall any DEFENSIVE
tank battle over two weeks duration without an
infantry firm base. And if Chawinda base did not

42. hold, that would be the end of the tank battle also.
But the infantry did hold, better than any infantry
brigade on either side. And the Brigade Commander
showed more pluck than any officer of his rank, also
on either side. I am willing to stand corrected on
this. And if not corrected, will not this make these
units and Brig Malik deserving of credit?
Lt Col Mohammad Anwar
5 Dec 2001
REPLY TO CRITICISM OF BRIG ALAM AND COL
ANWAR ON ARTICLE “BATTLE OF CHAWINDA” AND
SUBSEQUENT LETTERS PUBLISHED IN DJ MARCH
2001 ISSUES AND AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 2001
ISSUES
It is amusing as well as encouraging to note that this
scribe’s article on Chawinda Battle of 1965
published in Defence Journal March 2001 issue
continues to attract flak from critics!

43. The latest in the series are two letters , both written
by retired officers . First of all I must clarify that my
sole motivation in all writing has been to endeavour
to write “what men did” rather than what “they
ought ideally to have done” or what “someone later
with the benefit of hindsight tried to portray , what
they had done”. Thus the analysis of Chawinda
Battle done with pure loyalty to service without any
inter arm rivalry or nationalistic motivation. Pure
and unadulterated military history filtered
dispassionately separating fact from fiction and
myth from reality. How far I succeeded is for
readers to judge.
History as Frederick the Great once said can be well
written only in a free country and ours has been
continuously under civil or military dictators since
1958. Enters Defence Journal which in its
resurrected form from 1997 picked up the gauntlet
of serving as a medium of intellectual honesty and
forthright criticism and published facts which were
unpalatable for some and welcomed by the vast
multitude. A breath of fresh air in a country reduced
to intellectual stagnation because of years of

44. censorship and intellectual persecution! I had
written for the Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel
but had left military history writing when in 1998
through a dear friend I discovered that there is a
new Defence Journal in Karachi which is open to
some critical writing!
I maintain as one great master of English prose said
that “all history so far as it is not supported by
contemporary evidence is romance”! Battle of
Chawinda published in DJ March 2001 was thus not
romance! What many in this country wrote and was
outwardly military history was essentially
“Romance”! Inspiring, superhuman but a myth
promiscuously mixed with reality!
Chance plays a key role in battle and at Chawinda
chance played a very important role! Nisar, when
he deployed 25 Cavalry did not know what was in
front of him ! KK Singh Commander 1st Indian
Brigade also did not know what was in front of him!
This mutual ignorance saved Pakistan on that
crucial day ! Later heroes were created! I repeat

45. “Heroes were created” ! This was what the article
was all about !
What were the key facts? Most important tangible
fact was “casualties” ! These were deliberately
hidden since these would have let the cat out of the
bag! Everyone would have discovered who really
fought and who got gallantry awards on
parochial,regimental or old boy links !How many

46. were killed in the biggest military blunder
“Operation Gibraltar”! This is Top Secret ! How
many infantry men died at Chawinda? Again no
mention of any figures! The real motivation here is
not national interest but to preserve or more
important to “guard reputations”
INDIAN CENTURION TANK OF INDIAN FIRST TANK
DIVISION CAPTURED BY 25 CAVALRY
Brigadier Kamal Alam’s Letter

47. a. I stick to the assertion that the “broad front
deployment” was done by Nisar and Nisar alone
and Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik had no role in it. It is
another matter that Nisar also did not know what
was in front of him. It was like Jutland when both
contending fleets were running towards each other
at express train speed. Why Nisar behaved as he did
and what actually happened even today is hard to
understand, whatever anyone may claim now with
the benefit of hindsight! Brigadier Alam offers no
tangible proof that the actions of 25 Cavalry had
anything to do with what Brig A.A Malik told Nisar.
Nisar was told to “do something” and Nisar did
something without the least clue of what was in
front of him. The important thing is that Nisar did
something rather than getting paralysed into inertia
and inaction! I may add a personal note here. I
understand that Alam’s elder brother Brig Mujahid
Alam COS 31 Corps while this scribe was
commanding 5 Independent Armoured Squadron
was a fine soldier.
b. Alam raises the question about the controversial
“Do Something” order by Brig A.A Malik to Lt Col

48. Nisar CO 25 Cavalry. The same words were
repeated by Nisar in his article published in Pakistan
Army Journal in 1997. Then Alam raises the
question about 25 Cavalry functioning in a vacuum.
24 Brigade had two infantry units, one which had
been overrun and dispersed on 8th September i.e 3
FF and 2 Punjab which was at Chawinda. The crucial
action took place at Gadgor few miles north of
Chawinda in which 25 Cavalry faced the entire
Indian 1st Armoured Division. This was an
extraordinary situation and Nisar acted on his own
best judgement since Malik had abdicated to Nisar
by stating that he should do something. It is another
thing that Nisar also did not know what was in front
of him and acted boldly and unconventionally. Had
he known what was in front of him he may have
been paralysed by inertia and inaction! But this is
speculation and some part of history always
remains unfathomed and hidden! Nisar acted
through sheer reflex and deployed his unit in an
impromptu manner. The fire fight which took place
at Gadgor between 0900 hours and 1200 hours was
a pure tank versus tank affair. 25 Cavalry versus two
leading tank regiments of Indian 1st Armoured

49. Division! Thus the Indian Armoured Corps historian
stated “The Armoured Brigade had been blocked by
two squadrons of Pattons and in the first encounter
had lost more tanks than the enemy had...the worst
consequence of the days battle was its paralysing
effect on the minds of the higher commanders. It
took them another 48 hours to contemplate the
next move. This interval gave Pakistanis time to
deploy their 6th Armoured Division...in fact the
golden opportunity that fate had offered to the 1st
Armoured Division to make worthwhile gains had
been irretrievably lost” (Refers-Pages-393 &
394-History of Indian Armoured Corps-Gurcharan
Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-1990). Thus the
Indians acknowledged “This regiment’s (25 Cavalry)
performance was certainly creditable because it
alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured
division and its objective, the MRL canal”.
(Refers-Page-395-Ibid).
c. At Gadgor on 8th September it was 25 Cavalry
and 25 Cavalry alone which saved the day. Major
Shamshad a direct participant has already stated on

50. record that SJs were awarded to some officers for
an attack in which not a single man was killed on
both sides!
d. 25 Cavalry was part of 24 Brigade but all that
Nisar its CO did on the crucial 8th September at
Gadgor was based on his own judgement. On 9th
and 10th September no fighting took place as
Indians had withdrawn their armoured division to
the crossroads. On 10th September, 6 Armoured
Division took over and 24 Brigade was a part of 6
Armoured Division. On 8th September there was a
vacuum and Nisar acted in a sitaution which can be
classified as one characterised by “absence of clear
and precise orders”!

51. INDIAN CENTURION CAPTURED BY 25 CAVALRY AT
ITS QUARTER GUARD
e. Shaukat Riza’s book is basically a compilation of
existing facts. It has historical value since Riza was
allowed access to official records.
f. The change of command aspect about which Alam
asserts is correct and was officially hushed up but
why should Shaukat Riza have any sympathy for the
armoured corps of 1960s which was arrogant and
looked down on artillery as I personally witnessed
right till 1980s as a young officer in Kharian and
Multan? Artillery officers were never welcomed in

52. armoured corps unit messes unless real exceptions
based on personal ties and armour officers rarely
visited artillery messes.
g. Chawinda was a tank battle, thus armour suffered
more casualties. On the other hand Lahore was an
infantry battle where the indomitable 1st Baluch
lost something like around 30 killed in battle , more
casualties than most infantry units in the much
trumpeted Grand Slam.
h. Now I offer some figures for the readers to form
their own conclusions:--
UNIT KILLED
CASUALTIES IN
OPERATION
GRAND SLAM
REMARKS
6 PUNJAB 9
9 PUNJAB 15
13 PUNJAB 24
14 PUNJAB 3 WHAT KIND OF
FIGHTING THIS
UNIT DID IF IT

53. SUFFERED 3
KILLED ?
15 PUNJAB 8
8 BALOCH 10
11
CAVALRY
19
13
LANCERS
14
REFERS-PAGE-109-PAKISTAN BHARAT JANG-1965-
COL MUKHTAR GILLANI-RAWALPINDI-JULY 1998
AND UNIT SOURCES 13 LANCERS AND 11 CAVALRY
The above casualties prove that Grand Slam was
both an infantry and armour battle yet armour
suffered proportionately more casualties since the
effective battle strength of a tank unit is half that of
an infantry unit. 14 Punjab lost just 3 killed while 10
Guides Cavalry at Chawinda lost 3 killed in officers
alone apart from 12 OR/JCOs killed! 11 Cavalry lost
more in killed casualties in 1965 War than any of
the above units of the Grand Slam i.e 34 killed. No
fault of infantry since Chawinda was an essentially a
tank battle.

54. i. Brigadier Alam does not give any figures which
prove that infantry suffered more casualties at
Chawinda. I have already admitted in my letter that
the only infantry unit which bore the brunt of Indian
assault was 3 FF on the 8th September. 3 FF aside
the brunt of the attack at Chawinda was borne by
armour units since Chawinda was a tank battle. At
Lahore, the brunt of the attack was faced by
infantry since Lahore i.e 10 Division battle was an
essentially infantry battle. Thus, there were units
like 1st Baloch and 16 Punjab which suffered
tremendous casualties.1st Baloch suffering
casualties of 31 killed in 10 Division Area (Refers-
Page-139-Col Gillani-Op Cit). 16 Punjab suffering
casualties of 106 killed and 70 missing most of
whom were killed (more than total of all regular
infantry units in Grand Slam) (Refers-Page-138-Col
Gillani). On the other hand there were formations
which in words of Colonel Mukhtar Gillani
exaggerated the fighting and suffered nominal
casualties like the 103 Brigade in 10 Division area
(Refers Page-143-Col Gillani).

55. j. Even at formation level Chawinda was not a big
battle in terms of casualties since the Indian 1 Corps
suffered less casualties than 11 Indian Corps in Ravi
Sutlej Corridor.
k. Brigadier Alam has mixed inter arm rivalry with
operational leadership and personalities. Infantry
had a role in Chawinda. Every arm and service had a
role. If I have not discussed infantry actions in detail
it is not because infantry did nothing at Chawinda
but simply because Chawinda was a tank dominated
battle with artillery playing a crucial role. Had I been
biased I would not have stated in various articles
that the greatest tank commander of Pakistan Army
at operational level was Maj Gen Iftikhar who was
an infantry man. Similarly Ibrar whose conduct I
pointed out as most decisive was again an infantry
man .
l. If Brigadier Alam wants to highlight the infantry
side of the battle he is free to write an article on the
“Role of Infantry at Chawinda”.

56. m. I have also compiled some casualty figures of
armour units in 1965 which will give the reader a
fair idea of who did what and who suffered more or
less:—
UNIT KILLED CASUALTIES
4 CAVALRY 17
5 HORSE 5
6 LANCERS 20
GUIDES 15
11 CAVALRY 34
12 CAVALRY 8
13 LANCERS 14
15 LANCERS 8
19 LANCERS 18
20 LANCERS NIL
22 CAVALRY 1
23 CAVALRY 18
24 CAVALRY 14

57. 25 CAVALRY 16
30 TDU 3
31 TDU 7
32 TDU 7
33 TDU 9 JASSAR 9
Note:—These casualties were compiled personally
and may not be wholly or totally accurate.
n. Lastly, Alam’s assertion that DJ is distorting
history. A bit naive since articles published in
journals are opinions of individual writers and not
of the management. This is true for all journals
whether it is Pakistan Army Journal or Command
and Staff College Citadel.
o. Finally, Brigadier Alam’s letter was crude and
lacked common courtesy that one would associate
or expect from one holding the rank of a brigadier.
Lt Col M. Anwar’s Letter:—
a. I was not referring to 3 FF when I discussed Brig
A.A Malik’s withdrawal request of 16 September.

58. Hence, Col Anwar has misunderstood the point. Brig
A.A Malik had requested permission to withdraw
when Indian tanks had crossed the railway line on
16th September and occupied Buttur Dograndi and
Sodreke. This fact was brought to light not by the
much criticised Shaukat Riza but by the then GSO-2
of 6 Armoured Division Major (later General K.M
Arif), first more bluntly in Pakistan Army Green
Book-1993 and again a little tactfully in his recently
published book Khaki Shadows. Thus no connection
with 3 FF, an infantry unit which as far as I know
suffered more casualties than any other infantry
unit at Chawinda. 3 FF fought admirably but was
launched thoughtlessly as brought out by Major
Shamshad in his letter published in Sept 2001 DJ
and consequently suffered enormous casualties at
Sodreke-Buttur Dograndi area. Shamshad was the
tank troop leader in support of 3 FF when it
disastrously attacked Buttur Dograndi. In opinion of
Shamshad, the attack had failed not due to any fault
of 3 FF but because of poor planning by
Commander 24 Brigade.

59. b. About the assertion of Col Anwar that official
sources are cover ups, all that one can state is that
if these are cover ups why don’t experts like
Brigadier Alam and Farouk Adam or Col Anwar or Lt
Gen Tariq devote some time to writing serious
military history.
c. In my writings I have relied on official, unofficial
and personal as well as Indian accounts. If someone
has better knowledge of facts he is most welcome
to apply his intellect and come out with a better
account.
d. Anwar has a point that infantry was holding a
firm base. I have not denied this anywhere. My
emphasis, however, was on the real battle, the
armour battle which was fought at Chawinda. It is
up to a reader to form subjective conclusions.
e. Anwar states that infantry has been ignored, I
contend that the real fact which has not been
favourably received by some is that Brig A.A Malik
has not been projected as much in my article as he
had been before. Infantry, is an arm and I have

60. great respect for it , A.A Malik was an individual
who did well and rose to three star rank despite
launching poorly planned counter attacks as
brought out by
Gen Fazal i Muqeem in 1971 War as a GOC .
Lastly I want to quote a great captain of war :—
“ I am not publishing my memoirs, not theirs and
we all know that no three honest witnesses of a
brawl can agree on all the details. How much more
likely will be the differences in a great battle
covering a vast space of broken ground, when each
division, brigade, regiment and even company
naturally and honestly believes that it was the focus
of the whole affair! Each of them won the battle.
None ever lost. That was the fate of the old man
who unhappily commanded”.
“Memoirs of General Sherman”
Lastly my humble submission; Chawinda was about
operational leadership, not small unit actions or

61. projecting individuals or maligning them. If
someone feels otherwise it is his subjective opinion.
Kind regards
A.H Amin
--------------------
-----------------------
BRIGADIER SIMONS LETTER OF 2008 BASED ON HIS
DISCUSSION WITH VARIOUS DIRECT
PARTICIPTANTS:---
AGHA AMIN AND BATTLE OF SIALKOT-1965
JUL 24, 2008 THU 12:07 PM
I KNOW THE URGENCY AGHA AMIN HAD IN
CONTACTING ME REPEATEDLY ABOUT HIS ILOG ON

62. CHOWINDA, BUT I WANTED CERTAIN
CONFIRMATIONS BEFORE PUTTING MY VIEWS. IN
THE COURSE, I TRACED AND TALKED TO SOME OF
THE PARTICIPANTS OF THIS BATTLE AND AGREE
THAT AGHA AMIN’S ACCOUNT IS MOST ACCURATE.
FIRST, HATS OFF AND A TRIBUTE TO THOSE
SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT BRAVELY IN THE BATTLE
OF CHOWINDA DESPITE THE CONFUSION
GENERATED BY THE PAPER TIGER COMMANDERS
LIKE GEN. ISMAIL, SAHIBZADA YAKOOB ALI KHAN
AND MANY MORE WHO EARNED LAURELS OVER
THE DEAD BODIES OF THEIR SOLDIERS.
1. INDIAN PLANS. YES IT WAS AN FIU OPERATION
SUPPORTED BY AN INFANTRY AMBUSH PARTY THAT
CAPTURED AN INDIAN DESPATCH RIDER. THOUGH
THE INDIAN OPERATIONAL INSTRUCTIONS
COINCIDED WITH GEN. YAHYA’S LEADING
HYPOTHESES OF AN INDIAN MAIN OFFENSIVE IN
THIS SECTOR, THESE DESPATCHES WERE
RUBBISHED AS DECEPTION BY THE MASTER
PAKISTANI THINK TANK. THE ORIGINAL HYPOTHESIS
WAS DOWNGRADED BY THE NEW GOC 15 DIVISION

63. MAJOR GENERAL ISMAIL, DEPUTY DIVISION
COMMANDER BRIGADIER RIAZ UL KARIM, CORPS
COMMANDER LT. GEN BAKHTIAR RANA, AND
DEPUTY CORPS COMMANDER DESIGNATE
SAHIBZADA YAKOOB ALI KHAN ONCE INDIAN’S
ATTACKED JASSAR.
“HOWA KE PEHLEY HE JHONKEY PE HAAR MAN GAI
WOHI CHIRAGH JO HUM NE JALA KE RAKHAY THAY”
2. JASSAR ENCLAVE. IT IS AN ENCLAVE WHERE
MAJOR OPERATIONS FROM NEITHER SIDE WERE
POSSIBLE AS THE TERRAIN IS DIVIDED BY RIVER
RAVI. YET WHEN AN INFANTRY BRIGADE WAS
DESPATCHED IN HASTE TO DEFEND THE BRIDGE ON
BOTH SIDES OF THE RIVER, THE LEADING UNIT HAD
VERY LITTLE DEFENSIVE POWER IN TERMS OF
PREPARATION AND DEFENCE STORES.
CONSEQUENTLY, SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS WERE
OVER RUN IN DOUBLE QUICK TIME BY A
DIVERSIONARY ATTACK OF AN INDIAN INFANTRY
BRIGADE PRIOR TO THE MAIN ATTACK ON LINE
CHARWA- CHOBARA- PHILORA. BRIGADIER

64. MUZAFFAR MADE A VERY BIG BLUNDER OF
JUDGEMENT IN HIS ASSESSMENT AND REPORTED IN
PANIC THAT AN INDIAN MAIN HAD BEEN
LAUNCHED.. AS A RESULT THE ENTIRE DEFENCE OF
SIALKOT SECTOR WAS UNHINGED IN PANIC AND 24
BRIGADE MINUS 3FF IN SCREENS AND 25 CAVALRY
WERE MOVED IN HASTE TOWARDS JASSAR. THE
DEFENCE HAD TAKEN A 90 DEGREE TURN. IN THIS
VACUUM WHAT REMAINED BETWEEN INDIA AND
SIALKOT WERE THE SCREEN POSITIONS OF 3FF. ON
THE EVENING OF 7TH SEPTEMBER, GOC 15
DIVISION ORDERED 24 BRIGADE AND 25 CAVALRY
TO LAUNCH A COUNTER ATTACK ON JASSAR. THE
RESERVES WERE NEAR NAROWAL AND THE
DIVISION HEADQUARTER PREPARING FOR A WHITE
LINEN DINNER, WHEN INDIAN DIVISIONAL
ARTILLERY BEGAN POUNDING 3FF POSITIONS.
MAJOR MEHMOOD OF AVIATION THEN TOOK THE
RISK OF FLYING OVER JASSAR ONLY TO REPORT
THAT THE BRIDGE OVER RIVER RAVI WAS IN TACT
AND IN PAKISTANI OCCUPATION. A SQUADRON OF
25 CAVALRY UNDER MAJOR SHAMSHAD HAD
ALREADY REACHED THE JASSAR SECTOR WHILE THE
TWO REMAINING WERE ON THE MOVE. 15

65. DIVISION HAD BEEN CAUGHT WITH ITS PANTS
DOWN.
3. PHILORI-CHARWA-CHOBARA SECTOR. INDIAN
ADVANCING COLUMNS ENGAGED THE SCREENS OF
3FF ON THE NIGHT OF 7 SEPTEMBER. BY FIRST
LIGHT 8 SEPTEMBER THESE SCREENS AFTER
SUFFERING CASUALTIES AND OVER RUN FELL BACK
TO LINE PHILORI-CHARWA-CHOBARA AND ALONG
WITH A COMPANY OF 2 PUNJAB TOOK HASTY
DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. THE SAME MORNING
INDIAN ARMOUR COLUMNS OVERRAN CHARWA-
CHOBARA, BYPASSED PHILORI AND REACHED 3-4
KMS FROM CHOWINDA. AT 8:30 AM 18 SQUADRON
OF PAF COMMANDED BY SQUADRON LEADER
SALAUDDIN SHAHEED CAME INTO ACTION WITH
THREE F-86 FIGHTERS WHO ENGAGED THE INDIAN
ARMOUR AND IMPOSED A DELAY OF ONE HOUR ON
INDIAN ADVANCE. THIS ONE HOUR WAS VERY
CRUCIAL AS IT PROVIDED TWO SQUADRONS OF 25
CAVALRY THAT ARRIVED FROM NAROWAL ENOUGH
TIME TO REGROUP AND MOVE INTO BATTLE
FORMATION FOR ENCOUNTER BATTLE. IT WAS A
VERY BOLD MOVE ON PART OF THE COMMANDING

66. OFFICER TO TAKE ON THE INDIAN ADVANCING
ARMOUR HEAD ON. PAF PROVIDED CRUCIAL
SUPPORT. THE NEXT TWO SORTIES WERE LED BY
FLIGHT LIEUTENANT CECIL CHAUDARY WITH WHOM
I TALKED TODAY TO GET THE RECORDS STRAIGHT.
IN THE COURSE OF WRITING THIS, I TRACED OUT
SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THIS ACTION AND
AM CONVINCED THAT ALL ACTIONS OF 8
SEPTEMBER WERE TAKEN SOLELY BY LT. COL NISAR
THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF 25 CAVALRY AT HIS
OWN INITIATIVE AND NO ONE ELSE. THROUGHOUT
THIS BATTLE BRIGADIER A A MALIK REMAINED IN A
SCHOOL AT PHILORA AND LET NISAR HANDLE THE
SITUATION. AGAIN ON 9/10 SEPTEMBER, IT WERE
25 CAVALRY AND 3FF THAT REPULSED INDIAN
ATTACKS.
4. RELIEF IN LINE. AS IF THE COMEDY OF ERRORS
WAS NOT ENOUGH, THE PAPER TIGER THINK TANK
NOW LED BY SAHIBZADA YAKOOB DECIDED TO
CARRY OUT RELIEF OF TROOPS ENGAGED IN BATTLE
FOR THREE DAYS. 25 CAVALRY AND 3FF WERE
REPLACED BY 11 CAVALRY AND 9 FF (MOTORISED)

67. ON NIGHT 10/11. IN FACT THERE WAS NO RELIEF
AND THE ENTIRE MOVEMENT WAS A FIASCO.
INDIANS EXPLOITED THE SITUATION AND
LAUNCHED A FIERCE OFFENSIVE ON THE 11TH
MORNING. THE ADVANCING INDIANS WERE FIRST
SPOTTED BY MAJOR MUZZAFAR MALIK OF 11
CAVALRY WHO THEN ALERTED EVERYONE ELSE. IT
WAS A TOUGH TASK FOR THE NEW UNITS BECAUSE
THEY HAD MOVED AT NIGHT AND WERE NOT
FAMILIAR WITH THE TERRAIN. BRIGADIER AA MALIK
WAS TO REPEAT HISTORY WHEN AS GOC IN 1971,
HE LAUNCHED A JUST ARRIVE 355FF INTO ACTION
AT BERA PIND AND HAD IT MASSACRED.
THE BIGGEST LESSON OF THIS BATTLE WAS THAT
BOTH ARMIES WERE IN EFFICIENT IN HANDLING
OPERATIONS AT A LARGE SCALE. INDIAN CAUTION
AND RELUCTANCE TO PURSUE AND EXPLOIT
SITUATIONS RESULTED IN FAILURE OF THEIR PLAN
AND HEAVY LOSSES. IN TERMS OF CLAUSEWITZ’
FRICTION, IT WAS MOSTLY THE MENTAL BLOCKAGE
ON PART OF COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES THAT
RESULTED IN MISTAKES. YET THE CONDUCT OF
SMALL UNITS ON BOTH SIDES WAS OUTSTANDING.

68. 1965 WAS ALSO TO USHER A SPIRIT OF
CAMARADERIE AMONGST THE PAPER TIGERS THAT
SURVIVES EVEN TODAY. THEY FORM A MUTUAL
PRAISE GROUP WHILE THE MOST HARDY AND TRUE
ONES LIE AROUND TO ROT IN ANONYMITY
THANKS ARE DUE TO AGHA AMIN, BRIGADIER
MEHMOOD (EX-SERVICEMEN FAME), GROUP
CAPTAIN CECIL AND MAJOR SHAMSHAD.
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COLONEL SARDAR YAHYA EFFENDIS SUMMING UP
OF 2008 AFTER READING BRIGADIER SIMON AND
MAJOR SHAMSHADS LETTERS OF 2008

71. THE GENERAL WHO FAILED WHEN VICTORY WAS
AT HIS FEET

72. ONE OF THE MOST PHENOMENAL FAILURES OF
1965 WAR--MAJOR GENERAL RAJINDER SINGH
SPARROW COMMANDER FIRST INDIAN ARMOURED
DIVISION WHO MISERABLY FAILED IN WINNING THE
1965 WAR,WHEN ON 8TH SEPTEMBER 1965
DESPITE A PHENOMENAL SUPERIOROTY OF 5 TO 1
IN TANKS AND 15 TO 1 IN INFANTRY HE FAILED TO
OUTFLANK A LONE TANK REGIMENT 25 CAVALRY OF
PAKISTAN ARMY

74. THE TANK REGIMENT COMMANDER WHO
EXHIBITED EXTREME COUP D OEIL AND DEPLOYED
HIS REGIMENT TO STOP A WHOLE TANK
DIVISION,NOT KNOWING WHT WAS IN FRONT OF
HIM
LIEUTENANT COLONEL NISAR AHMAD
COMMANDANT OF 25 CAVALRY WHO ENTIRELY ON
HIS OWN JUDGEMENT DEPLOYED 25 CAVALRY ON
BROAD FRONT AND BROUGHT THE INDIAN FIRST
TANK DIVISIION TO A HALT