Limited War in South Asia From Decolonization to Recent Times Scott Gates and Kaushik Roy (April 2018) (Volume 99) Book Review

9. In 2018 when I saw this book by
Kaushik Roy I was surprised

10. since to my mind Kaushik Roy
does very well with archives and
records but is not a real military
historian who understands hard
core military matters.
I therefore decided to procure
this book and read it , and find
out what Mr Kaushik Roy has
found out.
Below is my review of Kaushik
Roy and Scott Gates book.
The maps which are published at
the start of the book are poorly
drawn,inaccurate and impossible
to understand as the scale is too
small.A serious failing for a book
published by a publisher as
eminent as Routledge as late as
2017 !

11. For example all Pakistani
formations are marked
incorrectly although the
Pakistani order of battle is known
worldwide.This is a simply
inexcusable failure.
Like Pakistans 1 Corps is marked
as 2 Corps while Pakistans 2
Corps is marked as 1 Corps and
even its dispositions are not
marked accurately.
Further the map invents a new
corps which has never existed in
the Pakistan Army, ie 3
Corps.Thus Lahores 4 Corps is
shown as 3 Corps.
The writer magnifies the role of
Indian Army in North Africa and
Italy while in reality in both
theatres Indian Army was part of

12. a much larger British Australian
New Zealand South African
American force and enjoyed
massive numerical superiority in
both theatres.
Thus Indian Army casualties in
North Africa were very low and
the same was the case in Italy.In
most ways Indian Army learnt
little about higer command as
British Indian Army was never
trusted with major offensive
operations.The brigade and
divisional commanders were
always british and each Indian
brigade had one British infantry
unit.

13. On page-8 it is stated that PAVO
Cavalry (my regiment) had Stuart
tanks at Secunderabad , whereas
as per my research and 11
Cavalry regimental history PAVO
Cavalry had shifted from Stuart
to Sherman V tanks.

14. On page-9 the authors claim that
experience of 4th
Armoured
Division in Africa helped Indian
and Pakistan Army in armour
operations in 1965 war , but this
sweeping assertion is not
supported by hard facts of 1965
war where performance of both
Indian and Pakistan Army tanks
was pathetic in offensive
operations.
Like both armies armour
leadership was so poor that both
armies failed to achieve a break
through despite 5 to 1 superiority
in tanks in case of Indian Army
and 7 to 1 superiority in tanks in
case of Pakistan Army.
The book makes inexcusable
factual errors that are simply

15. unforgivable.Like on page-10
General Cariappa is stated to be
Indian Army COAS from 1962 to
1966 whereas he was Indian
Army COAS from 1949 to 1953.
On page-34 the writers failed to
note that Indian 163 Brigade
Commander ordered a two day
rest during the march to Tithwal
as a result of which as per
Pakistani official history of
Kashmir War the Indians lost a
golden chance to capture
Muzaffarabad as Pakistanis in
these two days reinforced the
single infantry company at
Tithwal with an infantry brigade.

16. The Pakistani official history of
Kashmir war titled the Kashmir
Campaign described the impact
of Brigadier Harbaksh Singhs
two day halt as below :--
Brigadier Harbux Singh
Commander of the 163 Brigade
waited at Tithwal for two
days………..He lingered a little

17. longer to prepare for his next move
and to perhaps also coordinate his
moves with that of Indian offensive
in Jhelum Valley for a two pronged
push towards Muzaffarabad.The
delay changed the subsequent
course of history in the
Kishanganga Valley…..” (Refers
page-144-The Kashmir
Campaign-1947-48-Historical
Branch-General Headquarters-
Pakistan Army-December 1970).
The authors fallaciously claim on
page-34 that there were two
battalions of Pathans defending
Zojila Pass.In reality Zojila was
defended by a ragged mix of
Gilgit Scouts,Baltistan
volunteers and there were
absolutely no Pathans at

18. Zojila.Their strength did not
exceed 500 to 600 men , what to
talk of two battalions.
On page-35 our eminent writers
exhibit their absolute ignorance
of basic geography when they
make statements which are
geographically absolutely
fallacious and incorrect.
Like they claimed that there was
a Pakistani para brigade
threatening communications
between Amritsar and Jammu
and Pathankot and Poonch.
Both these assertions are
absolutely false.
The Pakistani 14 Para Brigade
was threatening Indian
communications between

19. Akhnoor and Punch and not
Patahnkot and Poonch or
Amritsar and Jammu as
fallaciously claimed in this work
which makes a highly inflated
claim to be a work of Military Art
and Operational Strategy.
Our operational strategists
cannot produce one decent
legible and factually correct map
and their narrative does not
relate with geography !
Below is a simple map to
understand this scribes
assertion:--

20. The authors description of
Operation Grand Slam is

21. absolutely inaccurate and
confused, although they quote
from 11 Cavalrys history of
Colonel Effendi , it seems that
they did not completely read the
book !
Our operational strategy
historians thus only describe
conduct of 11 Cavalrys C
Squadron and totally foget that
11 Cavalry had three squadrons
and its B Squadron reached Tawi
river near Chhamb 0830 Hour
morning of first day of the attack.

22. The account totally omits all
operations of Operation Grand
Slam from Tawi River till Akhnur
which had strategic significance.
On page 74 the writers cannot
even accurately describe the

23. order of battle of Pakistans 6
Armoured Division and state that
it consisted of 11 Cavalry and 22
Cavalry whereas in reality the
division had Guides Cavalry,11
Cavalry and 22 Cavalry.
The account of the most crucial
battle of Indo Pak war is
pathetically short,incomplete and
absolutely vague on page-75.

24. In this battle THREE Indian tank
regiments confronted two tank
squadrons of Pakistans 25
Cavalry.They suffered serious
tank losses and Indian 1st
Armoured Brigade commander
losing resolution and magnifying
dangers in frint of him ordered

25. withdrawal to Tharoah cross
roads.
But our brilliant strategists
describe this massive affair as
below :--
“after the initial melee on 8
september the Indian 1st
Armoured Division established a
laager behind Phillora Division” .
This is an absolute apology of
how military history is written.
Map below illustrates the
massive action of 8th
September
and the subsequent Indian
actions:--

27. On page 75 the authors
incorrectly claim that Indian 1st
Armoured Division withdrew
behind Phillora since Indian 1st
Armoured Division far ahead of
Phillora towards Sabzpir .

28. Thereafter no other action of
Indian 1st
Armoured Division is
discussed although this division
as well as its supporting infantry
divisions fought some very major
battles from 8th
to 22 September
1965.
On page 78 the authors claim
that Major General Attiq ur
Rahman was sent as Deputy
Corps Commander 1 Corps.
This matter is nowhere
mentioned in two books that
Musa Khan wrote. Only the book
of Lt Gen Mahmud states that
Attiq visited 1 Corps HQ as
Adjutant General.
Pakistan Armys official account
by Major General Shaukat Riza
states that Major General

29. Sahibzada Yaqub was posted as
Deputy Corps commander 1
Corps.
The authors treatment of
Pakistans 1st
Armoured Divisions
operations on page 78 etc is
extremely sketchy.They fail to
note that 1st
Armoured failed to
concentrate into Indian territory
on 7th
and 8th
September 1965
because of failures linked to
Pakistani inefficiency rather than
any Indian actions.
Rifles and 13 Dogra) and
requesting replacement of 4
Mountain Division with another
division since in his opinion the
morale of the 4 Mountain
Division was so low that it could

30. not withstand even slight enemy
pressure !
No map illustrates the Khem
Karan battles which is a major
failure of this book.
The treatment of 1971 war is
again full of mistakes.
Like on page 107 some real
assorted nonsense claims are
made regarding Pakistan Army
orbat in Kashmir like stating that
23 Division was responsible for
Kotli Poonch area whereas 23
Division had absolutely nothing
to do with Poonch which was in
area of responsibility of 12
Division.
Further it is fallaciously claimed
on the same page that 8

31. Independent Armoured Brigade
was part of 4 Corps Lahore
although this brigade had
nothing to do with 4 Corps.
Page-108 lead me to the
conclusion that this book was an
absolute diasaster and the
editors need to be hanged upside
down.
I had a very high opinion about
Routledge till I read this absolute
diasaster, if one can call it a book
!
The authors on this page made
some very fallacious and totally
non factual claims.
They term attack by Pakistans 23
Division as attack by Pakistans 2
Corps , which one can term as

32. absolute nonsense .I could not
imagine that so called
researchers could be so ill
informed .Anyhow the whole
attack by Pakistans 23 Division is
described as an attack by
Pakistans 2 Corps under Tikka
Khan which is ludicrous and an
absolute travesty of facts.
I am surprised how this book
was written and who edited it at
Routledge and failed to check
and correct these major factual
errors.
On page 109 the authors make
another absolutely fallacious and
unacceptable claim when they
state that the Indians withdrew
east of Tawi and concentrated
their defences around Chhamb

33. sector whereas Indians had
abandoned Chhamb and
withdrawn east of Tawi.
The authors claim that 90,000
Pakistani military and para
military became prisoners in East
Pakistan is also incorrect.
Indian military writer KC Praval
gave a figure of 56,000 military
and para military in his book .The
remaining 34,000 were civilians.
The worst part of the book is
totally ignoring major tank
battles that Indian army fought
like Bara Pind , which are a must
study case for any serious
military historian dealing with
operational strategy.

34. The only reasonable part of the
book is its conclusion where the
authors agree that it was not
within Indias capability to
overrun West Pakistan in 1971
and that the Americans would
never have allowed it.
Kargil chapter is also not
supported by any worthwile
map.Further the authors
assertion that Kargil attackers
were so called Mujahideen or
Lashkar I Tayabba is also false
as this was a 100 % regular force.
The book was a great
disappointment although I spent
a considerable fortune in buying
it.