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Prj bul-04-2019 focus areas for in-field inspections
- 1. REFERENCE PRJ-BUL-04-2019 ISSUE DATE 07/03/2019 CONTACT Joseph Le, joseph.le@metrotrains.com.au L4-SQE-FOR-141(1) Focus Areas for In-field Inspections Background The Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR) conducted an inspection between Richmond and South Yarra between 10th and 11th of January 2019. Focus was placed on the role of the Work Group Supervisor (WGS), management of Road Rail Vehicles (RRVs) and Fatigue Risk Management. ONRSR Inspection Findings During the inspection the ONRSR team spoke to WGSs at various locations to verify that they were conducting their roles and accountabilities in accordance with “Planning Work Site Protection in the Rail Corridor” procedure L1-SQE-PRO-054 (Version 6). Whilst WGS roles and accountabilities are clearly defined within MTM’s procedure several areas of non-compliance were found: Person(s) performing the role of WGS in respect of Railway Operations did not have the necessary tools to check and validate rail safety worker competencies Person(s) performing the role of WGS in respect of Railway Operations did not have the necessary tools to validate the network acceptance status of RRVs Person(s) performing the role of WGS in respect of Railway Operations were not trained and inducted, and have an understanding of their work roles and responsibilities in accordance with L1-SQE-PRO-054 Through inspection of the management of RRVs several areas of non-compliance were found: Several operators did not complete a Road Rail Usage Report and Pre-Start Vehicle daily check. Accordingly, there was no evidence to demonstrate that the RRV was in proper working order and therefore safe to use Several RRVs did not contain Safe Work Method Statements (SWMS). Accordingly, there was no evidence to demonstrate that the rail safety workers on site had been inducted into the safe working in and around the RRV Several RRVs did not contain a log book to report defects. Accordingly, there was no evidence to demonstrate that the RRV did not contain defects and therefore safe to use Several RRV did not contain a vehicle operations manual. Accordingly, there was no evidence to demonstrate that a person using the RRV had all the necessary information regarding the proper use of the RRV Through inspection of the fatigue risk management arrangements several areas of non- compliance were found: A number of rail safety workers had worked excessive hours during a two week period, resulting in breaches of fatigue risk management procedure There was no evidence to demonstrate that risk assessments were undertaken to assess variances to the planned hours of work There was no evidence of who had approved such risk assessments on these variances
- 2. REFERENCE PRJ-BUL-04-2019 ISSUE DATE 07/03/2019 CONTACT Joseph Le, joseph.le@metrotrains.com.au L4-SQE-FOR-141(1) Immediate Actions When performing your respective infield inspections, focus on the following areas: WGS roles and accountabilities understanding of L1-SQE-PRO-054 (Version 6) installation of RIW App and understand its use to check rail safety workers competencies installation of PlantGUARD App and understand its use to check plant registration Note: You cannot perform WGS duties if the above areas cannot be satisfied. Management of RRVs operations manual stored on the vehicle as per L4-CHE-FOR-058 plant risk / hazard assessment on the vehicle as per L1-CHE-STD-007 and L4- CHE-FOR-058 log book stored on the vehicle as per L4-CHE-FOR-058 SWMS for specific task(s) associated with RRV as per L1-CHE-STD-007 Daily running sheet / (track vehicle) usage report maintained and kept with RRV as per L1-CHE-STD-007 Daily checks as per L2-CHE-PRO-005 Note: The RRV operation must cease if the above areas cannot be satisfied. Fatigue Risk Management risk assessments of variances to planned hours of work appropriate MTM endorsements for risk assessments in relation to variances to planned hours of work Note: non-compliance with the above will result in related person(s) performing rail safety work to cease their duties immediately. Report any non-conformances via INX. Authorised by Tim Maher Executive Director | Safety, Environment, and Risk
- 3. REFERENCE PRJ-BUL-04-2019 ISSUE DATE 07/03/2019 CONTACT Joseph Le, joseph.le@metrotrains.com.au L4-SQE-FOR-141(1) The Responsible Manager is to determine the following: Which areas in MTM are to be notified of this alert? Check Code Division/Department MTM Entire MTM Network CHE Engineering / Chief Engineer HMR People & Performance INF Infrastructure Delivery ELN Electrical Networks OCS Operational Control Systems SIG Signals & OCS STF Structures & Facilities TRK Track Delivery OPS Operations TSD Train Service Delivery SWS Safeworking / Signalling NOS Network Operations SER Metrol Customer Experience STO Stations Customer Experience AOS Authorised Officers PRJ Projects & Planning ROS Rolling Stock SQE Safety, Environment & Risk Other (e.g. Other Divisions/Departments or people not listed): Which contractors should be notified of this alert? Note: This is undertaken by MetroSafe through the Avetta portal. All contractors/third parties have previously been tagged into their relevant MTM areas. Check Division/Department All MTM Contractors and Third Parties Corporate Infrastructure Projects Rolling Stock Operations How should this alert be distributed and/or acknowledged? Note: This section may be amended by the Division dependent on best method of distribution Check Division/Department Issued via email Placed on Noticeboards Placed in staff pigeon holes / letterboxes Delivered during toolbox discussions Employees to acknowledge receipt L4-SQE-FOR-070 Alert Register Toolbox Attendance Records Weekly Operational Notice (WON) Other (specify):