Input Specificity and the Propagation of Idiosyncratic Shocks in Production Networks by Jean-Noel Barrot and Julien Sauvagnat
Presentation by Michael-Paul James
Firm level shocks propagate in production networks
● Customers drop 2-3% in sales growth when suppliers suffer a disaster
○ 25% drop in sales growth with respect to sample average of 10%
○ Temporary effect, without prior trends
○ Losses only affect active customer-supplier relationships
○ Larger effect when supplier produces differentiated goods with
high R&D, more patents, thus difficult to replace
○ Customer suffers 1% drop in market equity value
● Other suppliers experience drop in sales growth after another supplier
is hit, when customers are shared.
● Input disruptions are not compensated, resulting in sector wide losses
● Input specificity is a key determinant of the propagation of
idiosyncratic shocks in the economy
Annie Williams Market Trends Nov-Dec 2013Jon Weaver
Annie Williams is a real estate agent in San Francisco who publishes a monthly real estate report. The October 2013 report showed that median home prices in SF rose 9.2% year-over-year to $911,944, though the rate of price increases has slowed. Condo prices rose 13.2% to a record high. Home sales fell 4% while condo sales rose 19.3%. Mortgage rates are expected to rise in the coming weeks as economic data improves. Foreclosures continue to fall significantly in SF with notices of default down 65.9% and homes owned by banks down 43.4% from a year ago.
Annie Williams Market Trends April-May 2015Jon Weaver
- Home sales in San Francisco jumped 6.5% in March compared to the previous year, while condo sales were down slightly by 1.6%.
- Median home prices rose 25% and average prices increased 22.5% in March compared to the previous year, setting new all-time highs. Condo median prices rose 13.9% year-over-year.
- Mortgage rates are expected to remain low in the coming weeks as recent economic data has been mixed, though rates will likely begin rising later in the year as signaled by the Federal Reserve.
The document provides an overview of the causes and macroeconomic outcomes of the Great Recession that began in December 2007. It discusses several shocks that contributed to the crisis, including the bursting of the housing bubble, a global savings glut, subprime lending, and volatile oil prices. The recession resulted in a 3.6% decline in output, an unemployment rate that peaked at 10%, and over 8 million jobs lost by early 2010. This downturn was more severe than the average postwar recession in terms of its impact on GDP, employment, consumption, and other indicators.
This document provides a summary of real estate market trends in San Francisco for August/September 2014. Key points include:
- The median home price in San Francisco was $988,500 in August, up 1.2% year-over-year but down from July. Condo prices also declined slightly.
- Home and condo sales saw small declines compared to previous months but were up year-over-year. Inventory remains low while demand is high.
- Mortgage rates dipped slightly in recent weeks but are expected to remain stable overall.
- Foreclosure activity continued declining from previous years.
The document discusses the potential for an economic recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic. It notes that early signs suggest social distancing measures are slowing the spread of the virus. While the crisis is not over, governments have implemented massive fiscal and monetary stimulus packages to address liquidity issues and prevent a humanitarian crisis. However, the economic damage has already been done through lost productivity and jobs. A quick, V-shaped recovery is hoped for but not guaranteed, as some sectors may face lasting damage. Overall, optimism for recovery stems from the health rather than economic origins of the crisis, and the scale of coordinated government and central bank responses.
U.S. House Prices Rose 1.9 Percent in First Quarter 2013Wealth Partners
U.S. house prices rose 1.9% in the first quarter of 2013 according to the FHFA House Price Index. This marks the seventh consecutive quarter of house price increases. While the housing market has stabilized in many areas, foreclosures and labor market weakness are still hindering stronger recovery. House prices were up 6.7% from the first quarter of 2012. The Pacific region saw the strongest price increase this quarter at 4.4%, while the Middle Atlantic region saw the smallest rise of 0.3%.
The document examines whether rising household debt or energy costs were more responsible for the 2008 economic crisis. It analyzes three ratios: 1) household financial obligations as a percentage of income, which includes debt payments but not energy costs; 2) household energy expenditures as a percentage of income; and 3) total household obligations, which combines 1) and 2). While the financial obligations ratio rose in recent decades, the total obligations ratio declined from 1980 to 2000 due to falling energy costs. The total ratio surged in 2008, possibly better explaining the recession than the smaller rise in just the financial obligations ratio. The total obligations ratio has since declined substantially, suggesting consumer recovery may be quicker than expected.
Annie Williams Market Trends Nov-Dec 2013Jon Weaver
Annie Williams is a real estate agent in San Francisco who publishes a monthly real estate report. The October 2013 report showed that median home prices in SF rose 9.2% year-over-year to $911,944, though the rate of price increases has slowed. Condo prices rose 13.2% to a record high. Home sales fell 4% while condo sales rose 19.3%. Mortgage rates are expected to rise in the coming weeks as economic data improves. Foreclosures continue to fall significantly in SF with notices of default down 65.9% and homes owned by banks down 43.4% from a year ago.
Annie Williams Market Trends April-May 2015Jon Weaver
- Home sales in San Francisco jumped 6.5% in March compared to the previous year, while condo sales were down slightly by 1.6%.
- Median home prices rose 25% and average prices increased 22.5% in March compared to the previous year, setting new all-time highs. Condo median prices rose 13.9% year-over-year.
- Mortgage rates are expected to remain low in the coming weeks as recent economic data has been mixed, though rates will likely begin rising later in the year as signaled by the Federal Reserve.
The document provides an overview of the causes and macroeconomic outcomes of the Great Recession that began in December 2007. It discusses several shocks that contributed to the crisis, including the bursting of the housing bubble, a global savings glut, subprime lending, and volatile oil prices. The recession resulted in a 3.6% decline in output, an unemployment rate that peaked at 10%, and over 8 million jobs lost by early 2010. This downturn was more severe than the average postwar recession in terms of its impact on GDP, employment, consumption, and other indicators.
This document provides a summary of real estate market trends in San Francisco for August/September 2014. Key points include:
- The median home price in San Francisco was $988,500 in August, up 1.2% year-over-year but down from July. Condo prices also declined slightly.
- Home and condo sales saw small declines compared to previous months but were up year-over-year. Inventory remains low while demand is high.
- Mortgage rates dipped slightly in recent weeks but are expected to remain stable overall.
- Foreclosure activity continued declining from previous years.
The document discusses the potential for an economic recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic. It notes that early signs suggest social distancing measures are slowing the spread of the virus. While the crisis is not over, governments have implemented massive fiscal and monetary stimulus packages to address liquidity issues and prevent a humanitarian crisis. However, the economic damage has already been done through lost productivity and jobs. A quick, V-shaped recovery is hoped for but not guaranteed, as some sectors may face lasting damage. Overall, optimism for recovery stems from the health rather than economic origins of the crisis, and the scale of coordinated government and central bank responses.
U.S. House Prices Rose 1.9 Percent in First Quarter 2013Wealth Partners
U.S. house prices rose 1.9% in the first quarter of 2013 according to the FHFA House Price Index. This marks the seventh consecutive quarter of house price increases. While the housing market has stabilized in many areas, foreclosures and labor market weakness are still hindering stronger recovery. House prices were up 6.7% from the first quarter of 2012. The Pacific region saw the strongest price increase this quarter at 4.4%, while the Middle Atlantic region saw the smallest rise of 0.3%.
The document examines whether rising household debt or energy costs were more responsible for the 2008 economic crisis. It analyzes three ratios: 1) household financial obligations as a percentage of income, which includes debt payments but not energy costs; 2) household energy expenditures as a percentage of income; and 3) total household obligations, which combines 1) and 2). While the financial obligations ratio rose in recent decades, the total obligations ratio declined from 1980 to 2000 due to falling energy costs. The total ratio surged in 2008, possibly better explaining the recession than the smaller rise in just the financial obligations ratio. The total obligations ratio has since declined substantially, suggesting consumer recovery may be quicker than expected.
This document analyzes the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on sales at electronic stores. It first reviews literature discussing the macroeconomic impact of 9/11 and the resilience of the American economy and consumer in response. The document then describes the methodology used to analyze sales data from electronic stores from 2000-2002. The results show that while electronic sales dipped slightly in 2001 compared to 2000 and 2002 according to the means report, this dip was not statistically significant according to the one-way ANOVA. This suggests the American consumer showed resilience following 9/11 in line with President Bush's message, maintaining the overall status quo of the economy.
Blackout: Extreme Weather, Climate Change and Power Outagesclimate central
Climate change is causing an increase in many types of extreme weather. To date, these kinds of severe weather are among the leading causes of large-scale power outages in the United States.
Top 10 Actions a CIO Can Take to Prepare for a HurricaneBillatDell
Plan for the worst, hope for the best
An active hurricane season imposes an unwelcome set of additional challenges for businesses and executives. Immediate concerns include the safety and security of employees, as well as the prevention of damage to physical facilities. However, CIOs must also be prepared to successfully overcome the challenge of maintaining business continuity in the event of a hurricane. Short and long-term impacts on customers, suppliers, partners, and employees can arise if communications and critical IT systems are lost or down for even a short period of time as the result of a storm.
Business continuity and business viability are closely linked. In the days and months following these recent devastating hurricanes, a handful of businesses fared much better than average. These companies had a combination of the right disaster recovery program in place and had technology solutions to maintain contact with their employees, customers, vendors, and ‘the outside world’. They executed strategies with built-in flexibility to swiftly react to situations and ultimately provided excellent resilience for their organizations. While many companies struggled for months to bring their operations and staff back to capacity, these organizations remained open for business, quickly relocated staff, maintained effective internal & external communications and were able to maintain operations without a devastating financial impact.
This document discusses the increasing trend of catastrophic losses from natural disasters in Canada. It notes that the number of catastrophic events and insured losses have increased significantly over the past few decades, with 2013 being particularly costly due to floods in Alberta and Toronto. Climate change and development in at-risk areas are contributing to rising losses. The document advocates for both structural measures like flood protection and non-structural approaches like risk transfer through insurance to address the growing economic impacts of disasters.
How location can mitigate risk exposure to your inaurance portfolioDMTI Spatial
On March 11th, 2015 Canadian Underwriter magazine and DMTI Spatial partnered to broadcast a webinar on how location can provide the pivot-point to reducing risk exposure on your book of business for the Canadian insurance industry
To view the archive - please go to: http://edge.media-server.com/m/p/j8frvavt
The document discusses economic trends in the United States. It notes that the US economy is divided into eight regions, and the finance, insurance and real estate industry and manufacturing industry make up 37% of GDP. Certain regions and states have experienced stronger growth than others in recent years, led by industries like mining, utilities and information. The largest states by GDP are California, Texas, New York, Florida and Illinois.
This report examines issues with FEMA's process for declaring federal disasters. It finds that nearly half of recently declared disasters would not have qualified in the 1980s-1990s due to FEMA failing to adjust its key damage indicator for inflation. This biased process favors less populous states and encourages states to exaggerate damage estimates. The report recommends FEMA update its damage indicator using annual population data and only provide assistance for events truly exceeding state capabilities as intended by Congress.
Hurricane Katrina formed over the Bahamas in August 2005 and eventually decimated the US Gulf Coast when it made landfall, especially in New Orleans where the flood protection system failed in 53 places, flooding 80% of the city. Over 1,800 people died as a result of the hurricane and subsequent floods, making it the deadliest US hurricane since 1928. The storm caused $81.2 billion in damage, making it the costliest natural disaster in US history.
Copyrighted Material 1 Shrink the Targets Disasters .docxvanesaburnand
Copyrighted Material
1 Shrink the Targets
Disasters from natural sources, from industrial and technolog
ical sources, and from deliberate sources such as terrorism have all
increased in the United States in recent decades, and no diminution
is in sight.1 Weather disturbances are predicted to increase; low-
level industrial accidents continue but threaten to intensify and the
threat of cyber attacks on our “critical infrastructure” becomes ever
more credible; foreign terrorists have not relaxed and we anxiously
await another attack. Cataclysmic fantasies proliferate on movie
screens and DVDs, and scholars write books with “collapse,” “ca
tastrophe,” “our final hour,” and “worst cases” in their titles.
But we have neglected a fundamental response to the trio of dis
aster sources. Instead of focusing only on preventing disasters and
coping with their aftermath—which we must continue to do—we
should reduce the size of vulnerable targets. Weapons of mass de
1The evidence for the increase in industrial disasters comes from the Swiss rein
surance firm, the world’s largest, Swiss Re. The worldwide figures can be found in
its Sigma reports. (Swiss Re 2002) “Man-made disasters” include road and ship
ping accidents, major fires, and aerospace incidents, and the threshold for qualify
ing is 20 deaths, or 50 injured, or 2,000 homeless, or $70 billion in losses, or in
surances losses ranging from $143 million for shipping, $28 billion for aerospace
to $35 billion for the rest. Similar criteria are applied to natural disasters. For man-
made disasters in the United States, the period from 1970 to 1992 averaged 7.7;
2
Copyrighted Material
_ C H A P T E R 1
struction (WMDs) already litter our landscape; terrorists need not
sneak them in, and they are more likely to be triggered by natural
and industrial disasters than by terrorists. Ninety-ton tank cars of
chlorine gas are WMDs that travel daily through our cities; dis
persing the deadly gas via a tornado or hurricane, an industrial ac
cident, or a terrorist’s suitcase bomb would endanger up to seven
million people. New Orleans and its surroundings is, or was, our
largest port, but it could have been a target one-third the size of its
pre-Katrina population of some 450,000 souls, and much easier to
defend and evacuate. Because of the increased concentration of the
electric power industry, our vital electric power grid is so poorly
managed that sagging power lines hitting tree branches in Ohio
plunged the Northeast into darkness for hours and even days in
some areas in 2003. The industry has made its grid a better target
for a heat spell, a flood, a hurricane, or a few well-placed small
bombs. Deconcentrating the industry would uncouple the vulner
abilities and barely decrease efficiency, as we shall see.
Not all of the dangers confronting us can be reduced through
downsizing our targets. Some natural hazards we just have to face:
we are unlikely to sto.
EMP Defense Council(sm) - Presentation by Desi IvanovaDavid Palella
The document discusses electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) and their potential catastrophic effects. It notes that EMP events, such as solar flares or nuclear explosions, have occurred throughout history and could disable electronics and critical infrastructure over wide areas. The document advocates for organizations and individuals to prepare for potential EMP "black swan events" by hardening equipment, planning contingencies, and raising awareness of the risks of such disruptive events.
Boston’s New Big Dig: How does U.S. winter storm risk impact your portfolio?RMS
This document discusses the risks of winter storms to U.S. and Canadian portfolios. It notes that recent winters in 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 caused billions in insured losses due to numerous snow and cold temperature records. Freezing temperatures, snow, ice, and wind are the major perils. Climate change may impact winter storm risk by weakening jet streams and increasing volatility in cold air outbreaks. Key questions remain around accurately assessing this risk and potential impacts of a changing climate.
This document discusses developing an emergency response plan for the Atlanta, Georgia community. It identifies three major disasters that occur annually in Atlanta - winter storms, hurricanes, and floods. Winter storms can dump several inches of snow, causing flight cancellations, school closures, and disruptions to power and other services. Hurricanes bring strong winds, storm surge, heavy rain, tornadoes, and have caused deaths in the past. Floods are a common occurrence after heavy rain or snow melt, with one catastrophic flooding in 2009 causing over $500 million in property damage. The response plan will include mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery strategies to address these three disasters.
This document discusses the growing economic costs of natural disasters and the need to close the protection gap to help communities better absorb losses. It provides data showing a rise in uninsured losses from natural catastrophes over time. Various case studies are presented on disaster risk financing programs around the world, including parametric insurance schemes that provide rapid funds for relief efforts. The document advocates for more comprehensive risk transfer solutions and disaster risk planning to help make societies more resilient to climate change impacts.
Presentation- Fourth Roundtable on Financing Water- Roger PulwartyOECD Environment
This document discusses challenges related to water resources management under a changing climate. It notes that water demand is increasing while availability is becoming more unpredictable due to factors like drought and flooding. Infrastructure is at risk from these climate impacts. Additionally, the document discusses how climate change is making water resources management more complex, with uncertainties increasing and compound events becoming more common. It advocates for approaches that can adapt to uncertainty, like prioritizing observation programs, flexibility, and resilience over rigid predictive models.
Originally Aired: July 19 - The Economics of Fracking
The second webinar will discuss the economic realities of fracking including economic costs, long term implications of resource extraction, and a summary of interviews covering economic impacts in the gaslands of Ohio (Carroll County).
Presenters:
Melanie Houston of the Ohio Environmental Council
Amanda Weinstein of the Ohio State University
Amanda Woodrum of Policy Matters Ohio
The document announces a conference focused on outage response and restoration management. Representatives from Alabama Power, Progress Energy, and The Empire District Electric Company will discuss their experiences and lessons learned, including from the 2011 Joplin, Missouri tornadoes. The conference will provide an opportunity for utilities to share best practices in outage communication strategies, strengthening mutual assistance programs, and utilizing social media to update customers.
Mitigating supply chain risk in uncertain times murphy's law--mworld volume 1...Thomas Tanel
The simple fact is that in today’s longer global supply chains, product moves over greater distances and across
more multinational borders than in the more localized
supply chains of the past. This distance-based supply chain, whose links are forged by many supplier tiers in various countries, carries a risk dependent on its length and
diversity. The longer and more diverse it becomes, the
more it is susceptible to unforeseen circumstances.
This document summarizes a presentation on the costs of electricity theft and power disruptions. It finds that:
1) Electricity theft is a significant problem globally and in Jamaica, costing utilities millions and disrupting power.
2) Jamaica ranks 17th out of 100 countries in terms of electricity theft levels, above some Latin American countries but below others.
3) The estimated cost of power disruptions to the Jamaican economy was over $22 million in 2013 based on analyzing costs by sector.
The document provides an update on the impact of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the Scottish economy. It finds that while the global economy was already slowing prior to the attacks, the attacks deepened the slowdown. Nearly every economy has been affected and growth forecasts have been revised downwards. The US and Japanese economies are reported to be in recession already. Scotland and the UK have also been impacted by international events, though recent UK forecasts still expect growth in 2001. Monitoring the post-September 11th response in specific Scottish sectors remains difficult due to a lack of available economic data.
Energy Resilience Solutions for the Puerto Rico Grid TanaMaeskm
Energy Resilience
Solution
s for the
Puerto Rico Grid
Final Report
June 2018
United States Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
https://powerpedia.energy.gov/wiki/File:DOE_Logo_Color.png
2
List of Acronyms
Act 57
ADMS
AIS
AMI
ANL
Act for the Transformation and Energy Relief of Puerto Rico, 2014
Advanced Distribution Management Systems
Automated Information Sharing
Advanced Metering Infrastructure
Argonne National Laboratory
ARRA
BFE
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Base Flood Elevation
CAIDI Customer Average Interruption Duration Index
CHP Combined Heat and Power
CILT Contributions in Lieu of Taxes
CIP
CRS
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Congressional Research Service
DER
DERMS
Distributed Energy Resources
Distributed Energy Resource Management System
DHS United States Department of Homeland Security
DOD United States Department of Defense
DOE United States Department of Energy
DSCR
EMAC
Debt Service Coverage Ratio
Emergency Management Assistance Compact
ESF#12 Emergency Support Function 12 – Energy
FEMA
FEMP
FIRM
FOMB
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Energy Management Program
Flood Insurance Rate Map
Financial Oversight and Management Board
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GMLC Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium
GSA General Services Administration
ICS Incident Command System
INESI
IMT
Institute for Island Energy Sustainability
Incident Management Team
IRP Integrated Resource Plan
ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center
IT Information Technology
LBNL
LCOE
LIPA
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Levelized Cost of Electricity
Long Island Power Authority
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
MATS Mercury and Air Toxins Standard
MSW
NARUC
NASEO
NEMA
Municipal Solid Waste
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
National Association of State Energy Officials
National Electrical Manufacturers Association
NERC
NESC
North American Electric Reliability Corporation
National Electrical Safety Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
3
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NREL
NYPA
ORNL
National Renewable Energy Laboratory
New York Power Authority
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
OT Operational Technology
PMA Power Marketing Administration
PREC Puerto Rico Energy Commission
PREPA Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
PROMESA
PUC
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act
Public Utility Commission
PV
RMI
RPS
Photovoltaic
Rocky Mountain Institute
Renewable Portfolio Standard
RSF Recovery Support Function
RUS
SAIDI
Rural Utilities Service
System Average Interruption Duration Index
SAIFI
SNL
T&D
System Average Interruption Frequency Index
Sandia National Laboratory
Transmission and Distribution
UPR University of Puerto Rico
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers
USDA
USGS
USVI
United States De ...
Reusing Natural Experiments; Presentation by Michael-Paul JamesMichael-Paul James
Reusing Natural Experiments
Paper by Davidson Heath, Matthew C. Ringgenberg, Mehrdad Samadi, and Ingrid M. Werner
Presentation by Michael-Paul James
Multiple Testing Corrections
Family-Wise Error Rate
FDR and FDP
Bootstrap
Simulations
Empirical Settings
Randomized Control Trial
Staggered Introductions
IV Regression
Regression Discontinuity Design
Compustate and CRSP Outcomes
Simulated True Treatment Effects
Comparing Multiple Testing Frameworks
Adjusted t-statistic Critical Values
Evaluating Existing Evidence
Business Combination Laws
Regulation SHO
Sequencing Tests
Results
Discussion
Caveats
p-Values are Only One Input for Inference
What is the Right Burden of Proof?
Improving Inference when Reusing a Natural Experiment
Corroborating Evidence
State and Test Causal Channels
Compound Exclusion Restrictions
Presentation on Institutional Shareholders And Corporate Social ResponsibilityMichael-Paul James
Institutional Shareholders And Corporate Social Responsibility
Paper by Tao Chen, Hui Dong, Chen Lin
Presentation by Michael-Paul James
Institutional shareholders induce corporate managers to invest more in social goodness (increase CSR rating)
Two quasi-natural experiments
Random assignment in May demonstrates that higher institutional ownership motivates higher CSR ratings
Exogenous shocks in other industries demonstrate distracted investors lead to lower CSR ratings reducing social responsibility
Three additional measure reinforce distraction results
Voice is an important method to motivate CSR investments
More Related Content
Similar to Presentation of Input Specificity and the Propagation of Idiosyncratic Shocks in Production Networks
This document analyzes the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on sales at electronic stores. It first reviews literature discussing the macroeconomic impact of 9/11 and the resilience of the American economy and consumer in response. The document then describes the methodology used to analyze sales data from electronic stores from 2000-2002. The results show that while electronic sales dipped slightly in 2001 compared to 2000 and 2002 according to the means report, this dip was not statistically significant according to the one-way ANOVA. This suggests the American consumer showed resilience following 9/11 in line with President Bush's message, maintaining the overall status quo of the economy.
Blackout: Extreme Weather, Climate Change and Power Outagesclimate central
Climate change is causing an increase in many types of extreme weather. To date, these kinds of severe weather are among the leading causes of large-scale power outages in the United States.
Top 10 Actions a CIO Can Take to Prepare for a HurricaneBillatDell
Plan for the worst, hope for the best
An active hurricane season imposes an unwelcome set of additional challenges for businesses and executives. Immediate concerns include the safety and security of employees, as well as the prevention of damage to physical facilities. However, CIOs must also be prepared to successfully overcome the challenge of maintaining business continuity in the event of a hurricane. Short and long-term impacts on customers, suppliers, partners, and employees can arise if communications and critical IT systems are lost or down for even a short period of time as the result of a storm.
Business continuity and business viability are closely linked. In the days and months following these recent devastating hurricanes, a handful of businesses fared much better than average. These companies had a combination of the right disaster recovery program in place and had technology solutions to maintain contact with their employees, customers, vendors, and ‘the outside world’. They executed strategies with built-in flexibility to swiftly react to situations and ultimately provided excellent resilience for their organizations. While many companies struggled for months to bring their operations and staff back to capacity, these organizations remained open for business, quickly relocated staff, maintained effective internal & external communications and were able to maintain operations without a devastating financial impact.
This document discusses the increasing trend of catastrophic losses from natural disasters in Canada. It notes that the number of catastrophic events and insured losses have increased significantly over the past few decades, with 2013 being particularly costly due to floods in Alberta and Toronto. Climate change and development in at-risk areas are contributing to rising losses. The document advocates for both structural measures like flood protection and non-structural approaches like risk transfer through insurance to address the growing economic impacts of disasters.
How location can mitigate risk exposure to your inaurance portfolioDMTI Spatial
On March 11th, 2015 Canadian Underwriter magazine and DMTI Spatial partnered to broadcast a webinar on how location can provide the pivot-point to reducing risk exposure on your book of business for the Canadian insurance industry
To view the archive - please go to: http://edge.media-server.com/m/p/j8frvavt
The document discusses economic trends in the United States. It notes that the US economy is divided into eight regions, and the finance, insurance and real estate industry and manufacturing industry make up 37% of GDP. Certain regions and states have experienced stronger growth than others in recent years, led by industries like mining, utilities and information. The largest states by GDP are California, Texas, New York, Florida and Illinois.
This report examines issues with FEMA's process for declaring federal disasters. It finds that nearly half of recently declared disasters would not have qualified in the 1980s-1990s due to FEMA failing to adjust its key damage indicator for inflation. This biased process favors less populous states and encourages states to exaggerate damage estimates. The report recommends FEMA update its damage indicator using annual population data and only provide assistance for events truly exceeding state capabilities as intended by Congress.
Hurricane Katrina formed over the Bahamas in August 2005 and eventually decimated the US Gulf Coast when it made landfall, especially in New Orleans where the flood protection system failed in 53 places, flooding 80% of the city. Over 1,800 people died as a result of the hurricane and subsequent floods, making it the deadliest US hurricane since 1928. The storm caused $81.2 billion in damage, making it the costliest natural disaster in US history.
Copyrighted Material 1 Shrink the Targets Disasters .docxvanesaburnand
Copyrighted Material
1 Shrink the Targets
Disasters from natural sources, from industrial and technolog
ical sources, and from deliberate sources such as terrorism have all
increased in the United States in recent decades, and no diminution
is in sight.1 Weather disturbances are predicted to increase; low-
level industrial accidents continue but threaten to intensify and the
threat of cyber attacks on our “critical infrastructure” becomes ever
more credible; foreign terrorists have not relaxed and we anxiously
await another attack. Cataclysmic fantasies proliferate on movie
screens and DVDs, and scholars write books with “collapse,” “ca
tastrophe,” “our final hour,” and “worst cases” in their titles.
But we have neglected a fundamental response to the trio of dis
aster sources. Instead of focusing only on preventing disasters and
coping with their aftermath—which we must continue to do—we
should reduce the size of vulnerable targets. Weapons of mass de
1The evidence for the increase in industrial disasters comes from the Swiss rein
surance firm, the world’s largest, Swiss Re. The worldwide figures can be found in
its Sigma reports. (Swiss Re 2002) “Man-made disasters” include road and ship
ping accidents, major fires, and aerospace incidents, and the threshold for qualify
ing is 20 deaths, or 50 injured, or 2,000 homeless, or $70 billion in losses, or in
surances losses ranging from $143 million for shipping, $28 billion for aerospace
to $35 billion for the rest. Similar criteria are applied to natural disasters. For man-
made disasters in the United States, the period from 1970 to 1992 averaged 7.7;
2
Copyrighted Material
_ C H A P T E R 1
struction (WMDs) already litter our landscape; terrorists need not
sneak them in, and they are more likely to be triggered by natural
and industrial disasters than by terrorists. Ninety-ton tank cars of
chlorine gas are WMDs that travel daily through our cities; dis
persing the deadly gas via a tornado or hurricane, an industrial ac
cident, or a terrorist’s suitcase bomb would endanger up to seven
million people. New Orleans and its surroundings is, or was, our
largest port, but it could have been a target one-third the size of its
pre-Katrina population of some 450,000 souls, and much easier to
defend and evacuate. Because of the increased concentration of the
electric power industry, our vital electric power grid is so poorly
managed that sagging power lines hitting tree branches in Ohio
plunged the Northeast into darkness for hours and even days in
some areas in 2003. The industry has made its grid a better target
for a heat spell, a flood, a hurricane, or a few well-placed small
bombs. Deconcentrating the industry would uncouple the vulner
abilities and barely decrease efficiency, as we shall see.
Not all of the dangers confronting us can be reduced through
downsizing our targets. Some natural hazards we just have to face:
we are unlikely to sto.
EMP Defense Council(sm) - Presentation by Desi IvanovaDavid Palella
The document discusses electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) and their potential catastrophic effects. It notes that EMP events, such as solar flares or nuclear explosions, have occurred throughout history and could disable electronics and critical infrastructure over wide areas. The document advocates for organizations and individuals to prepare for potential EMP "black swan events" by hardening equipment, planning contingencies, and raising awareness of the risks of such disruptive events.
Boston’s New Big Dig: How does U.S. winter storm risk impact your portfolio?RMS
This document discusses the risks of winter storms to U.S. and Canadian portfolios. It notes that recent winters in 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 caused billions in insured losses due to numerous snow and cold temperature records. Freezing temperatures, snow, ice, and wind are the major perils. Climate change may impact winter storm risk by weakening jet streams and increasing volatility in cold air outbreaks. Key questions remain around accurately assessing this risk and potential impacts of a changing climate.
This document discusses developing an emergency response plan for the Atlanta, Georgia community. It identifies three major disasters that occur annually in Atlanta - winter storms, hurricanes, and floods. Winter storms can dump several inches of snow, causing flight cancellations, school closures, and disruptions to power and other services. Hurricanes bring strong winds, storm surge, heavy rain, tornadoes, and have caused deaths in the past. Floods are a common occurrence after heavy rain or snow melt, with one catastrophic flooding in 2009 causing over $500 million in property damage. The response plan will include mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery strategies to address these three disasters.
This document discusses the growing economic costs of natural disasters and the need to close the protection gap to help communities better absorb losses. It provides data showing a rise in uninsured losses from natural catastrophes over time. Various case studies are presented on disaster risk financing programs around the world, including parametric insurance schemes that provide rapid funds for relief efforts. The document advocates for more comprehensive risk transfer solutions and disaster risk planning to help make societies more resilient to climate change impacts.
Presentation- Fourth Roundtable on Financing Water- Roger PulwartyOECD Environment
This document discusses challenges related to water resources management under a changing climate. It notes that water demand is increasing while availability is becoming more unpredictable due to factors like drought and flooding. Infrastructure is at risk from these climate impacts. Additionally, the document discusses how climate change is making water resources management more complex, with uncertainties increasing and compound events becoming more common. It advocates for approaches that can adapt to uncertainty, like prioritizing observation programs, flexibility, and resilience over rigid predictive models.
Originally Aired: July 19 - The Economics of Fracking
The second webinar will discuss the economic realities of fracking including economic costs, long term implications of resource extraction, and a summary of interviews covering economic impacts in the gaslands of Ohio (Carroll County).
Presenters:
Melanie Houston of the Ohio Environmental Council
Amanda Weinstein of the Ohio State University
Amanda Woodrum of Policy Matters Ohio
The document announces a conference focused on outage response and restoration management. Representatives from Alabama Power, Progress Energy, and The Empire District Electric Company will discuss their experiences and lessons learned, including from the 2011 Joplin, Missouri tornadoes. The conference will provide an opportunity for utilities to share best practices in outage communication strategies, strengthening mutual assistance programs, and utilizing social media to update customers.
Mitigating supply chain risk in uncertain times murphy's law--mworld volume 1...Thomas Tanel
The simple fact is that in today’s longer global supply chains, product moves over greater distances and across
more multinational borders than in the more localized
supply chains of the past. This distance-based supply chain, whose links are forged by many supplier tiers in various countries, carries a risk dependent on its length and
diversity. The longer and more diverse it becomes, the
more it is susceptible to unforeseen circumstances.
This document summarizes a presentation on the costs of electricity theft and power disruptions. It finds that:
1) Electricity theft is a significant problem globally and in Jamaica, costing utilities millions and disrupting power.
2) Jamaica ranks 17th out of 100 countries in terms of electricity theft levels, above some Latin American countries but below others.
3) The estimated cost of power disruptions to the Jamaican economy was over $22 million in 2013 based on analyzing costs by sector.
The document provides an update on the impact of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the Scottish economy. It finds that while the global economy was already slowing prior to the attacks, the attacks deepened the slowdown. Nearly every economy has been affected and growth forecasts have been revised downwards. The US and Japanese economies are reported to be in recession already. Scotland and the UK have also been impacted by international events, though recent UK forecasts still expect growth in 2001. Monitoring the post-September 11th response in specific Scottish sectors remains difficult due to a lack of available economic data.
Energy Resilience Solutions for the Puerto Rico Grid TanaMaeskm
Energy Resilience
Solution
s for the
Puerto Rico Grid
Final Report
June 2018
United States Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585
https://powerpedia.energy.gov/wiki/File:DOE_Logo_Color.png
2
List of Acronyms
Act 57
ADMS
AIS
AMI
ANL
Act for the Transformation and Energy Relief of Puerto Rico, 2014
Advanced Distribution Management Systems
Automated Information Sharing
Advanced Metering Infrastructure
Argonne National Laboratory
ARRA
BFE
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Base Flood Elevation
CAIDI Customer Average Interruption Duration Index
CHP Combined Heat and Power
CILT Contributions in Lieu of Taxes
CIP
CRS
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Congressional Research Service
DER
DERMS
Distributed Energy Resources
Distributed Energy Resource Management System
DHS United States Department of Homeland Security
DOD United States Department of Defense
DOE United States Department of Energy
DSCR
EMAC
Debt Service Coverage Ratio
Emergency Management Assistance Compact
ESF#12 Emergency Support Function 12 – Energy
FEMA
FEMP
FIRM
FOMB
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Energy Management Program
Flood Insurance Rate Map
Financial Oversight and Management Board
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GMLC Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium
GSA General Services Administration
ICS Incident Command System
INESI
IMT
Institute for Island Energy Sustainability
Incident Management Team
IRP Integrated Resource Plan
ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center
IT Information Technology
LBNL
LCOE
LIPA
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Levelized Cost of Electricity
Long Island Power Authority
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
MATS Mercury and Air Toxins Standard
MSW
NARUC
NASEO
NEMA
Municipal Solid Waste
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
National Association of State Energy Officials
National Electrical Manufacturers Association
NERC
NESC
North American Electric Reliability Corporation
National Electrical Safety Code
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
3
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NREL
NYPA
ORNL
National Renewable Energy Laboratory
New York Power Authority
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
OT Operational Technology
PMA Power Marketing Administration
PREC Puerto Rico Energy Commission
PREPA Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
PROMESA
PUC
Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act
Public Utility Commission
PV
RMI
RPS
Photovoltaic
Rocky Mountain Institute
Renewable Portfolio Standard
RSF Recovery Support Function
RUS
SAIDI
Rural Utilities Service
System Average Interruption Duration Index
SAIFI
SNL
T&D
System Average Interruption Frequency Index
Sandia National Laboratory
Transmission and Distribution
UPR University of Puerto Rico
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers
USDA
USGS
USVI
United States De ...
Similar to Presentation of Input Specificity and the Propagation of Idiosyncratic Shocks in Production Networks (20)
Reusing Natural Experiments; Presentation by Michael-Paul JamesMichael-Paul James
Reusing Natural Experiments
Paper by Davidson Heath, Matthew C. Ringgenberg, Mehrdad Samadi, and Ingrid M. Werner
Presentation by Michael-Paul James
Multiple Testing Corrections
Family-Wise Error Rate
FDR and FDP
Bootstrap
Simulations
Empirical Settings
Randomized Control Trial
Staggered Introductions
IV Regression
Regression Discontinuity Design
Compustate and CRSP Outcomes
Simulated True Treatment Effects
Comparing Multiple Testing Frameworks
Adjusted t-statistic Critical Values
Evaluating Existing Evidence
Business Combination Laws
Regulation SHO
Sequencing Tests
Results
Discussion
Caveats
p-Values are Only One Input for Inference
What is the Right Burden of Proof?
Improving Inference when Reusing a Natural Experiment
Corroborating Evidence
State and Test Causal Channels
Compound Exclusion Restrictions
Presentation on Institutional Shareholders And Corporate Social ResponsibilityMichael-Paul James
Institutional Shareholders And Corporate Social Responsibility
Paper by Tao Chen, Hui Dong, Chen Lin
Presentation by Michael-Paul James
Institutional shareholders induce corporate managers to invest more in social goodness (increase CSR rating)
Two quasi-natural experiments
Random assignment in May demonstrates that higher institutional ownership motivates higher CSR ratings
Exogenous shocks in other industries demonstrate distracted investors lead to lower CSR ratings reducing social responsibility
Three additional measure reinforce distraction results
Voice is an important method to motivate CSR investments
Return Decomposition
By Long Chen and Xinlei Zhao
Presentation by Michael-Paul James
Directly modeling discount rate news and backing out cash flow news
adds residual news to the latter
○ The method has led to erroneous conclusions:
■ Larger relative DR variance
■ Value stocks earn higher returns due to higher βCF
■ βCF is more important than total βtotal
○ DR news cannot be accurately estimated (low predictive power)
and backed out CF news inherits large misspecification error of DR
○ Modeled Treasury bonds reveals higher CF variance with no real CF
risk
○ Minor changes in predictive variables produce opposite results
Directly modeling cash flow news, discount rate news, and residual
○ Value firms have both lower modeled CF betas and DR betas, but
higher residual betas, indicating that the results in the current
literature are driven by the residual news.
Presentation on Predicting Excess Stock Returns Out of Sample: Can Anything B...Michael-Paul James
Predicting Excess Stock Returns
Out of Sample: Can Anything Beat
the Historical Average?
Paper by John Y. Campbell & Samuel B. Thompson
Presentation by Michael-Paul James
● Many variables are correlated with subsequent stock returns
● In the previous research, historical average stock returns have
outperformed most contenders
● Predictor variables in this paper outperformed out-of-sample once
restrictions were imposed on coefficient signs and return forecast
○ Small explanatory power, meaningful economic significance
● Although not fully described asset prices, out-of-sample performance
improves.
● Models generate meaningful utility gains for mean-variance investors
● Data accessibility and improvement may prove more valuable than
theoretical restrictions
Bad Beta, Good Beta
By John Y. Campbell And Tuomo Vuolteenaho
Presentation by Michael-Paul James
Cash flow and discount rate betas estimates stock market risk factors
more efficiently than CAPM over time.
○ Cash flow news
■ Stock returns covariance with cash flows news
○ Discount rate news
■ Stock returns covariance with discount rate news
● “Bad” cash flow beta (risk) demands higher premiums than “good”
discount rate beta (risk).
● Value and small stocks have higher cash flow betas than growth and
large stocks on average.
● High average returns on value and small stocks are appropriate
compensation for risk, not an unrealized benefit to ownership.
● Overweighting small and value stocks benefit low risk aversion equity
investors
● Underweighting small and value stocks benefit high risk aversion
equity investors
● Model offers strong explanatory power in the cross section of asset
returns with theoretical values
● ICAPM outperforms the CAPM in empirical research
Presentation by Michael-Paul James on Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners by Ian R. Appel, Todd A. Gormley, Donald B. Keim.
Summary:
Study exploits exogenous variation in passive institutional ownership around the cutoff of Russell 1000 & 2000 inclusion. They find that passively managed mutual funds play important role in stock ownership, corporate behavior, and corporate policy.
The Log-Linear Return Approximation, Bubbles, and PredictabilityMichael-Paul James
Presentation by Michael-Paul James on The Log-Linear Return Approximation, Bubbles, and Predictability by Tom Engsted, Thomas Q. Pedersen, and Carsten Tanggaard
Competition and Bias by Harrison Hong and Marcin KacperczykMichael-Paul James
Competition and Bias
Paper by Harrison Hong and Marcin Kacperczyk
Presentation by Michael-Paul James
Treatment effect: a decrease in analyst covering increases optimism bias one year after the merger relative to control.
-Evidence for competition reduction bias
-Larger bias impact for stocks with less coverage
Presentation on Social Collateral
Paper by Ha Diep-Nguyen and Huong Dang
Presented by Michael-Paul James
Paper uses an experimental design to test the impact of social image on repayment behavior
Presentation on Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency, and Loan Repayment Delays ...Michael-Paul James
Presentation on Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency,
and Loan Repayment Delays in Italy. Paper by Fabio Schiantarelli, Massimiliano Stacchini, and Philip E. Strahan. Presentation by Michael-Paul James
Presentation on Rhetoric, Reality, and Reputation: Do CSR and Political Lobby...Michael-Paul James
Presentation by Michael-Paul James on "Rhetoric, Reality, and Reputation: Do CSR and Political Lobbying Protect Shareholder Wealth against Environmental Lawsuits?" Paper by Chelsea Liu , Chee Seng Cheong, and Ralf Zurbruegg
Research Paper Presentation on Asset Redeployability, Liquidation Value, and ...Michael-Paul James
"Asset Redeployability, Liquidation Value, and Endogenous Capital Structure Heterogeneity"
Paper by Antonio E. Bernardo, Alex Fabisiak, and Ivo Welch
Presentation by Michael-Paul James
Research Presentation on Reserve Management and Audit Committee Characteristi...Michael-Paul James
"Reserve Management and Audit Committee Characteristics: Evidence From U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Companies"
Paper by Wen-Yen Hsu, Yenyu (Rebecca) Huang, Gene Lai
Presentation by Michael-Paul James
Presentation on Property–Liability Insurer Reserve Error: Motive, Manipulatio...Michael-Paul James
The document summarizes a research paper that examines hypotheses for property-liability insurer reserve errors. It analyzes two measurements of reserve error and tests four main hypotheses from the literature - taxes, income smoothing, rate regulation incentives, and financial weakness. The results found that the choice of reserve error measurement impacted the findings. There was little evidence for income smoothing. Evidence supported overreserving for tax purposes under one measurement but not the other. Rate regulation incentives were supported. Financial weakness was linked to underreserving rather than deception.
What Is a Patent Worth? Evidence from the U.S. Patent “Lottery”Michael-Paul James
Presentation by Michael-Paul James on What Is a Patent Worth? Evidence from the U.S. Patent “Lottery” by Joan Farre-Mensa, Deepak Hegde, Alexander Ljungqvist.
Monthly Market Risk Update: June 2024 [SlideShare]Commonwealth
Markets rallied in May, with all three major U.S. equity indices up for the month, said Sam Millette, director of fixed income, in his latest Market Risk Update.
For more market updates, subscribe to The Independent Market Observer at https://blog.commonwealth.com/independent-market-observer.
In World Expo 2010 Shanghai – the most visited Expo in the World History
https://www.britannica.com/event/Expo-Shanghai-2010
China’s official organizer of the Expo, CCPIT (China Council for the Promotion of International Trade https://en.ccpit.org/) has chosen Dr. Alyce Su as the Cover Person with Cover Story, in the Expo’s official magazine distributed throughout the Expo, showcasing China’s New Generation of Leaders to the World.
Fabular Frames and the Four Ratio ProblemMajid Iqbal
Digital, interactive art showing the struggle of a society in providing for its present population while also saving planetary resources for future generations. Spread across several frames, the art is actually the rendering of real and speculative data. The stereographic projections change shape in response to prompts and provocations. Visitors interact with the model through speculative statements about how to increase savings across communities, regions, ecosystems and environments. Their fabulations combined with random noise, i.e. factors beyond control, have a dramatic effect on the societal transition. Things get better. Things get worse. The aim is to give visitors a new grasp and feel of the ongoing struggles in democracies around the world.
Stunning art in the small multiples format brings out the spatiotemporal nature of societal transitions, against backdrop issues such as energy, housing, waste, farmland and forest. In each frame we see hopeful and frightful interplays between spending and saving. Problems emerge when one of the two parts of the existential anaglyph rapidly shrinks like Arctic ice, as factors cross thresholds. Ecological wealth and intergenerational equity areFour at stake. Not enough spending could mean economic stress, social unrest and political conflict. Not enough saving and there will be climate breakdown and ‘bankruptcy’. So where does speculative design start and the gambling and betting end? Behind each fabular frame is a four ratio problem. Each ratio reflects the level of sacrifice and self-restraint a society is willing to accept, against promises of prosperity and freedom. Some values seem to stabilise a frame while others cause collapse. Get the ratios right and we can have it all. Get them wrong and things get more desperate.
“Amidst Tempered Optimism” Main economic trends in May 2024 based on the results of the New Monthly Enterprises Survey, #NRES
On 12 June 2024 the Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting (IER) held an online event “Economic Trends from a Business Perspective (May 2024)”.
During the event, the results of the 25-th monthly survey of business executives “Ukrainian Business during the war”, which was conducted in May 2024, were presented.
The field stage of the 25-th wave lasted from May 20 to May 31, 2024. In May, 532 companies were surveyed.
The enterprise managers compared the work results in May 2024 with April, assessed the indicators at the time of the survey (May 2024), and gave forecasts for the next two, three, or six months, depending on the question. In certain issues (where indicated), the work results were compared with the pre-war period (before February 24, 2022).
✅ More survey results in the presentation.
✅ Video presentation: https://youtu.be/4ZvsSKd1MzE
Discovering Delhi - India's Cultural Capital.pptxcosmo-soil
Delhi, the heartbeat of India, offers a rich blend of history, culture, and modernity. From iconic landmarks like the Red Fort to bustling commercial hubs and vibrant culinary scenes, Delhi's real estate landscape is dynamic and diverse. Discover the essence of India's capital, where tradition meets innovation.
A toxic combination of 15 years of low growth, and four decades of high inequality, has left Britain poorer and falling behind its peers. Productivity growth is weak and public investment is low, while wages today are no higher than they were before the financial crisis. Britain needs a new economic strategy to lift itself out of stagnation.
Scotland is in many ways a microcosm of this challenge. It has become a hub for creative industries, is home to several world-class universities and a thriving community of businesses – strengths that need to be harness and leveraged. But it also has high levels of deprivation, with homelessness reaching a record high and nearly half a million people living in very deep poverty last year. Scotland won’t be truly thriving unless it finds ways to ensure that all its inhabitants benefit from growth and investment. This is the central challenge facing policy makers both in Holyrood and Westminster.
What should a new national economic strategy for Scotland include? What would the pursuit of stronger economic growth mean for local, national and UK-wide policy makers? How will economic change affect the jobs we do, the places we live and the businesses we work for? And what are the prospects for cities like Glasgow, and nations like Scotland, in rising to these challenges?
Navigating Your Financial Future: Comprehensive Planning with Mike Baumannmikebaumannfinancial
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Budgeting as a Control Tool in Government Accounting in Nigeria
Being a Paper Presented at the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) Budget Office Staff at Sojourner Hotel, GRA, Ikeja Lagos on Saturday 8th June, 2024.
Budgeting as a Control Tool in Govt Accounting in Nigeria Prof Oyedokun.pptx
Presentation of Input Specificity and the Propagation of Idiosyncratic Shocks in Production Networks
1. Input Specificity and the
Propagation of
Idiosyncratic Shocks in Production
Networks
Paper by Jean-Noel Barrot and Julien Sauvagnat
Presentation by Michael-Paul James
1
2. Table of contents
2
Michael-Paul James
Introduction
story, questions, context, issues,
literature
01
Identification
Identification Strategy
02
Data
Firm-Level Information
Supplier-Customer Links
Natural Disasters
Input Specificity
Summary Statistics
03
Results
Effect on Affected Suppliers
Effect on Customers’ Sales
Effect on Customers’ Value
Effect on Related Suppliers
Discussion
04
Conclusion
05
4. Inquiry & Natural Experiment
4
Michael-Paul James
● Do linkages explain sector specific shocks?
○ Can firms avoid production disruptions through organizational
practices? Production mix? Supplier switch?
● Natural disasters provide exogenous event to test supply chain
disruption.
○ Large short term effects on sales growth of affected firms.
■ 2-3% average drop in sales growth after event
■ Suppliers represent a small share of firm inputs
■ No impact from non-active suppliers
○ 1% average drop in firm equity value
5. Input Specificity
5
Michael-Paul James
● Key driver of propagation of firm level shocks
● Input specificity identification strategy
○ Rauch classification of goods traded on international markets
○ Suppliers R&D expenses to reveal relationship specific investments
○ Number of patents issued by suppliers to capture restrictions on
alternative sources of substitutable inputs.
● Large negative spillover of initial shocks to other suppliers, possibly
due to the provision of complementary goods.
○ Two ideas:
■ Complementary goods suffer if another supplier is disrupted
■ Substitutes benefit if another supplier is disrupted
6. Customer Identification and Supplier Impact
6
Michael-Paul James
● Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 131
○ Reports identity of any customer representing more than 10% of
total reported sales
○ Dataset only includes major customers and publicly traded firms
● Supplier losses of $1 lead to $2.40 of lost sales to customer.
● Specificity of intermediate inputs allows idiosyncratic shocks to
propagate in production networks.
7. Contribution
7
Michael-Paul James
● Documents significant aggregate fluctuations originating from
macroeconomic shocks
● Provides evidence that shocks are transmitted in the economy
through industry linkages, specifically networks of firms
● Natural experiment disentangles input disruptions from demand
shocks to identify the importance of input specificity.
● Identifies the importance of switching costs of the propagation of firm
level shocks, which are large in the short run
● Possible explains aggregate drop in investment and employment
during a crisis
● Important of input complementarity and switching cost: comovement
8. Key results
8
Michael-Paul James
● Firms whose suppliers need to make relationship specific investments
hold little leverage to avoid high liquidation costs
● Firms linked to specific suppliers hold less leverage to avoid financial
distress risk due to input disruptions
10. Identification
10
Michael-Paul James
● Natural disasters provide exogenous input disruption
○ Disruption channels
■ Power outages
■ Asset damage: buildings, machines, or inventory loss
■ Employment disruption: limited access to facilities
○ Identify headquarter location and match with natural disasters
■ Possible measurement error when headquarters is not located
in the same county as production facilities
11. Identification
11
Michael-Paul James
● OLS regression
● ΔSalesi,t-4,t
Sales growth between current quarter a year earlier
● HitsOneSupplieri,t-4
Dummy if one supplier is located in disaster county
● DisasterHitsFirmi,t-4
Dummy if customer is located in disaster county
● ηi
Year quarter
● πt
Firm fixed effects
● Interactive terms: controls for state, industry size, age, profitability with year fixed effects
12. Identification
12
Michael-Paul James
● Parallel trends assumption
○ Firm sames growth would have been flat minus treatment
● Exclusion restriction
○ Natural disaster only affects firm through the disruption effect on
the supplier
○ Excluded sample when firm and supplier headquarters are less
than 300 miles apart.
13. Figure
1:
Network
Evolution
from
1995
to
2000
13
This figure illustrates the evolution of the
supplier-customer network from 1995 to 2000.
Relationships that were active in 1995 but not
in 2000 are depicted in red. Relationships that
are active in both years are depicted in green.
Relationships that were not active in 1995 but
were active in 2000 are depicted in blue.
Red: Active 1995
Blue: Active 2000
Green: Active 1995 & 2000
Substantial share of relationships start
or end within this five-year window
If firms endogenously select location
to account for disasters, it would bias
against finding effects
DisasterHitsOneSpecificSupplier
DisasterHitsOneNonspecificSupplier
DissaterHitsFirm
DisasterHitsOneCustomer
DisasterHitsOneCustomersSupplier
15. Firm Level Information
15
Michael-Paul James
● Compustat North America Fundamentals Quarterly database from
1978-2013
○ Variables winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles
○ GDP deflator of the Bureau of Economic Analysis to adjust for
inflation
● Infogroup (1997 to present)
○ Documents changes in headquarter locations
○ Used to determine when >10% of employees affected by disaster
● Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
○ Stock prices
16. Supplier Customer Links
16
Michael-Paul James
● Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
○ Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 131
■ Supplier-customer link: Identifies customers representing
more than 10% of reported sales
○ Customers in data compose of 75% of total sales in Compustat
17. Natural Disasters
17
Michael-Paul James
● Spatial Hazard and Loss Database for the United States database
(SHELDUS)
○ Event data provides start/end dates, and Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) code of all counties
○ Excludes any event lasting more than 30 days and less than 1
billion 2013 dollars
○ 41 disasters included in final dataset
18. Table 1:
List of Major Disasters
Table 1: List of Major Disasters
Disaster Date # Counties
U.S. Employment
Affected (%) Location
Mount St. Helens eruption May 1980 2 0.03 WA
Hurricane Alicia August 1983 139 4.72 TX
Hurricane Elena August 1985 32 0.54 AL FL LA MS
Hurricane Juan October 1985 66 3.58 AL FL LA MS TX
Hurricane Hugo September 1989 71 1.43 NC SC VA
Loma earthquake October 1989 8 2.56 CA
Hurricane Bob August 1991 54 7.06 MA ME NC NH NY RI
Oakland Hills firestorm October 1991 1 0.54 CA
Hurricane Andrew August 1992 51 2.67 AL FL LA MS
Hurricane Iniki September 1992 1 0.02 HI
Blizzard March 1993 221 11.15 AL CT FL GA MA MD NJ OH SC VA VT
Northridge earthquake January 1994 1 3.69 CA
Hurricane Alberto July 1994 41 0.66 AL FL GA
Hurricane Opal October 1995 186 6.43 AL FL GA LA MS NC SC
Blizzard January 1996 319 14.57 CT DE IN KY MA MD NC NJ NY PA VA WV
Hurricane Fran September 1996 100 2.02 NC SC VA WV
Ice storm January 1998 43 1.09 ME NH NY VT
Hurricane Bonnie August 1998 43 1.26 NC VA
Hurricane Georges September 1998 78 3.68 AL FL LA MS
Hurricane Floyd September 1999 226 15.68 CT DC DE FL MD ME NC NH NJ NY PA SC VA VT
Hurricane Allison June 2001 77 4.56 AL FL GA LA MS PA TX
Hurricane Isabel September 2003 89 4.99 DE MD NC NJ NY PA RI VA VT WV
Southern California wildfires October 2003 3 1.78 CA 18
41 major natural
disasters of all
types
19. Table 1:
List of Major Disasters
19
Table 1: List of Major Disasters
Disaster Date # Counties
U.S. Employment
Affected (%) Location
Hurricane Charley August 2004 67 3.94 FL GA NC SC
Hurricane Frances September 2004 311 12.47 AL FL GA KY MD NC NY OH PA SC VA WV
Hurricane Ivan September 2004 284 7.31 AL FL GA KY LA MA MD MS NC NH NJ NY PA SC TN WV
Hurricane Jeanne September 2004 160 8.8 DE FL GA MD NC NJ PA SC VA
Hurricane Dennis July 2005 200 5.38 AL FL GA MS NC
Hurricane Katrina August 2005 288 9.21 AL AR FL GA IN KY LA MI MS OH TN
Hurricane Rita September 2005 123 3.75 AL AR FL LA MS
Hurricane Wilma October 2005 24 3.55 FL
Midwest floods June 2008 216 5.25 IA IL IN MN MO NE WI
Hurricane Gustav September 2008 98 1.79 AR LA MS
Hurricane Ike September 2008 163 4.11 AR LA MO TN TX
Blizzard Groundhog Day February 2011 210 14.63 CT IA IL IN KS MA MO NJ NM NY OH OK PA TX WI
Hurricane Irene August 2011 40 3.19 CT MA MD NC NJ NY VA VT
Tropical Storm Lee September 2011 110 5.23 AL CT GA LA MD MS NJ NY PA TN VA
Isaac August 2012 77 3.36 FL LA MS
Hurricane Sandy October 2012 274 22.08 CT DE MA MD NC NH NJ NY OH PA RI VA WV
Flood/severe weather Illinois April 2013 29 3.11 IL IN MO
Flooding Colorado September 2013 8 0.92 CO
Notes. This table describes the 41 natural disasters included in the sample. Names, dates, number of affected counties, and the location of each natural disaster are
obtained from the SHELDUS database at the University of South Carolina. The list is restricted to events classified as Major Disasters in SHELDUS, with total direct
estimated damages above $1 billion 2013 constant dollars and lasting less than 30 days. The share of total U.S. employment affected by each natural disaster is computed
from County Business Pattern data publicly provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. The sample period is from January 1978 to December 2013.
20. Figure 2:
Major Natural Disaster Frequency by U.S. Counties
20
This map presents the number of major natural disaster strikes for each county in the U.S. mainland over the sample period. The list of counties affected
by each major natural disaster is obtained from the SHELDUS database at the University of South Carolina. Table I describes the major natural disasters
included in the sample.
Southeast coast
more frequently
hit, comparatively
21. Figure 3:
Location of Sample Suppliers’ Headquarters
21
This map presents for our sample the number of suppliers’ headquarters located in each U.S. county. Data on the location of headquarters are obtained
from Compustat and Infogroup databases.
Broad range of
headquarter
locations
22. Patent Specificity
22
Michael-Paul James
● Rauch classification of goods traded on international markets (1999)
○ Classifies inputs into differentiated or homogeneous
○ Groups inputs into 1189 industries according to four-digit Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 2
● Google patents assembled b Kogan et al. (2012)
○ Suppliers holding patents are more likely to provide inputs difficult
for other suppliers to replace.
23. Table
2:
Descriptive
Statistics
23
Notes. This table presents the summary statistics for our sample. Panel A presents the customer sample, which consists of 80,574 firm-quarters between 1978 and 2013. There are 2,051 firms in this sample. A firm is included in the customer sample for each quarter between three years before the first year and three yearsafter
the last year it appears as a customer in the Compustat Segment files. The main variables of interest are the growth in sales and cost of goods sold relative to the same quarter in the previous year. Panel A also reports for customer firms the average duration of relationships with their suppliers (computed as the number of
years between the first and last year the supplier reports the firm as a customer in the Compustat Segment files), the average distance in miles (computed using the Haversine formula) between the headquarters (HQs) county of the firm and the headquarters county of its suppliers, and the average suppliers’ input share
(measured as the ratio of the suppliers’ sales of the supplier to the firm over the firm’s cost of goods sold) separately for relationships with specific (S) and nonspecific (NS) suppliers. In columns (1) and (2), a supplier is considered as specific if its industry lies above the median of the share of differentiated goods according to
the classification provided by Rauch (1999). In columns (3) and (4), a firm is considered specific if its ratio of R&D expenses over sales is above the median in the two years prior to any given quarter. In columns (5) and (6), a firm is considered as specific if the number of patents it issued in the past three years is above the
median. The last part of Panel A compares the size, age, and return on assets (ROA) of eventually treated firms, namely, those with suppliers that are hit by a major natural disaster at least once over the sample period, and never treated firms. Panel B presents the supplier sample, which consists of 139,976 firm-quarters
between 1978 and 2013. There are 4,686 firms in this sample. A firm is included in the supplier sample for each quarter between three years before the first year and three years after the last year it reports another firm as a customer in the Compustat Segment files. The main variable of interest is the growth in sales relativeto
the same quarter in the previous year.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p1 p50 p99
Panel A: Customer sample
Sales growth (t - 4,t) 80,574 0.102 0.375 -0.606 0.040 1.927
Cogs growth (t - 4,t) 79358 0.106 0.411 -0.651 0.038 2.193
Disaster hits firm (t) 80,574 0.016 0.126 0.000 0.000 1
Disaster hits one supplier (t) 80,574 0.014 0.118 0.000 0.000 1
Number of suppliers 80,574 1.383 4.162 0.000 0.000 19
Diff. R&D Patent Patent
S NS S NS S NS
Av. duration of relationships 7.125 6.692 6.373 8.335 7.821 6.618
Av. supplier-customer HQ distance 1,332 1,210 1,502 1,214 1,388 1,219
Av. suppliers’ input share 0.022 0.025 0.017 0.023 0.025 0.022
Eventually treated Never treated
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Assets 32,061 12,656 20,013 48,513 3,254 7,099
Age 32,061 27.822 16.623 48,513 19.233 15.68
ROA 32,061 0.145 0.091 48,513 0.118 0.128
Panel B: Supplier sample
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. p1 p50 p99
Sales growth (t-4,t) 139,976 0.188 0.814 -0.876 0.045 4.568
Disaster hits firm (t) 139,976 0.017 0.127 0.000 0.000 1
Disaster hits a customer (t) 139,976 0.008 0.088 0.000 0.000 0
Disaster hits customers supplier (t) 139,976 0.042 0.200 0.000 0.000 1
Number of customers 139,976 0.711 0.964 0.000 0.000 4
% Employees at HQs county 102,279 0.597 0.365 0.000 0.667 1
Over 4 quarters
Sales Growth 10.2%
COGS 10.6%
Firm reported by
1.38 suppliers
1.6% chance of
disaster hitting firm
1.4% chance
disaster hits supplier
S- Specific
NS- Nonspecific
~7 year relationship
~2.5% supplier sales
of firm COGS
1.7% firm hit
0.8% customer hit
4.2% supplier hit
0.7 customers
18.8% sales growth
24. Results
04
Effect on Affected Suppliers
Downstream Propagation: Effect on Customers’ Sales
Downstream Propagation: Effect on Customers’ Value
Horizontal Propagation: Effect on Related Suppliers
Discussion
24
Michael-Paul James
25. Table
3:
Natural
Disaster
Disruptions—Supplier
Sales
Growth
25
Notes. This table presents estimates from
panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative
to the same quarter in the previous year on a
dummy indicated whether the firm is hit by a
major disaster in the current and each of the
previous five quarters. All regressions include
fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed
effects. In the second and fourth columns, we
also control for firm-level characteristics
(dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and
ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter
dummies. In the third and fourth columns, we
include state dummies interacted with year
dummies. In the fourth column, we include 48
Fama-French industry dummies interacted
with year dummies. Standard errors presented
in parentheses are clustered at the firm level.
Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our
supplier sample (described in Table II, Panel B)
between 1978 and 2013. *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Table 3: Natural Disaster Disruptions—Supplier Sales Growth
Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Disaster hits firm (t) -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 -0.011
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Disaster hits firm (t-1) -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.032* -0.039**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
Disaster hits firm (t-2) -0.033* -0.032* -0.024 -0.026
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
Disaster hits firm (t-3) -0.042** -0.040** -0.032 -0.029
(0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023)
Disaster hits firm (t-4) -0.031 -0.028 -0.029 -0.024
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023)
Disaster hits firm (t-5) -0.007 -0.005 -0.022 -0.019
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.177 0.192 0.212 0.233
Sales growth drops by 3.3%
to 4.5% in 3 consecutive
quarters after disaster
First with HQ located in
county of disaster do worse
26. Table
4:
Natural
Disasters
Disruptions—Specific
Versus
Nonspecific
Suppliers
26
Notes. This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same quarter in the previous year on a dummy
indicated whether the firm is hit by a major disaster in one of the previous four quarters. In the first and second columns, a firms is considered
as specific if its industry lies above the median of the share of differentiated goods according to the classification provided by Rauch (1999). In
the third and fourth columns, a firm is considered specific if the ratio of its R&D expenses over sales is above the median in the two years prior to
any given quarter. In the fifth and sixth columns, a firm is considered as specific if the number of patents it issued in the previous three years is
above the median. All regressions include fiscal-quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed effects. In the second, fourth, and sixth columns we also
control for firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies.
Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our supplier sample (described
in Table II, Panel B) between 1978 and 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
TABLE 4: Natural Disasters Disruptions—Specific Versus Nonspecific Suppliers
Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Supplier specificity: Diff. R&D Patent
Disaster hits firm (t - 4,t - 1) -0.050*** -0.044*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.041***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
Disaster hits specific firm (t - 4,t - 1) 0.023 0.013 0.038 0.044 0.020 0.011
(0.026) (0.026) (0.040) (0.039) (0.028) (0.028)
Specific firm 0.099*** 0.090*** -0.060*** -0.030**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.014) (0.013)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.177 0.192 0.177 0.192 0.177 0.192
Disasters are similar in
impact on specific and
nonspecific firms
Specific interaction term is
positive but not significant:
maybe smaller magnitude
27. Figure 4:
Natural Disaster Strikes and Sales Growth
27
This figure presents difference-in-differences estimates
of quarterly sales growth in the year before and the two
years after a major natural disaster for both directly
affected suppliers and their customers. Sales growth is
the growth in sales relative to the same quarter in the
previous year. The dashed line connects estimated
coefficients, βτ, of the following regression performed in
the supplier sample:
The solid line connects estimated coefficients, g , of the
following regression performed in the customer sample:
where πt and ηi are year-quarter and firm fixed effects,
respectively; Hits Firmi,t-τ
is a dummy equal to 1 if a
natural disaster hits firm i in year-quarter t-τ; and
HitsSupplieri,t-τ
is a dummy equal to 1 if a natural disaster
hits at least one supplier of firm i in year-quarter t-τ .
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level in both
regressions. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample period spans
1978 to 2013.
Input disruptions result in lost
sales for the firm after supplier is
hit by a disaster
28. Table
5:
Downstream
Propagation—Baseline
28
Notes. This table presents estimates from panel regressions of
firms’ sales growth (Panel A) or cost of goods sold growth
(Panel B) relative to the same quarter in the previous year on a
dummy indicating whether (at least) one of their suppliers is
hit by a major disaster in the same quarter of the previous
year. All regressions include a dummy indicating whether the
firm itself is hit by a major disaster in the same quarter of the
previous year as well as fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and firm
fixed effects. All regressions also control for the number of
suppliers (dummies indicating terciles of the number of
suppliers). In the second, third, and fourth columns, we control
for firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of
size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter
dummies. In the third and fourth columns, we include state
dummies interacted with year dummies. In the fourth column,
we include 48 Fama-French industry dummies interacted with
year dummies. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our
customer sample (described in Table II, Panel A) between 1978
and 2013. Standard errors presented in parentheses are
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
TABLE 5: Downstream Propagation—Baseline
Panel A Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Disaster hits one supplier (t - 4) -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.019**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Disaster hits firm (t - 4) -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.005 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Number of suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574
R2 0.234 0.262 0.300 0.342
Panel B Cost of Goods Sold Growth (t – 4,t)
Disaster hits one supplier (t - 4) -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.020**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Disaster hits firm (t - 4) -0.014 -0.013 0.001 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Number of suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 79,358 79,358 79,358 79,358
R2 0.188 0.215 0.253 0.290
Sales growth drops by 3.1%:
Sample mean is 10%:
Economically large impact
Input disruption not related to
temporary shocks at state
level or close to disaster
Input disruption not related to
industry wide shocks
~25% sales growth drop from
2.5% of COGS: strikingly
large disaster impact
29. Notes. This table presents estimated coefficients from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same quarter in the previous year on dummies
indicating whether (at least) one of their suppliers is hit by a major disaster in the current and each of the previous five quarters. All regressions include dummies
indicating whether the firm itself is hit by a major disaster in the current and each of the previous five quarters, as well as fiscal-quarter, year-quarter and firm
fixed effects. All regressions also control for the number of suppliers (dummies indicating terciles of the number of suppliers). In the second, third, and fourth
columns, we control for firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. In the
third and fourth columns, we include state dummies interacted with year dummies. In the fourth column, we include 48 Fama-French industry dummies
interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our customer sample (described in Table II, Panel A) between 1978 and 2013. Standard
errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table
6:
Downstream
Propagation—Sales
Growth
Dynamics
29
Table 6: Downstream Propagation—Sales Growth Dynamics
Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Disaster hits one supplier (t) -0.012 -0.010 -0.007 -0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Disaster hits one supplier (t - 1) -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.004
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Disaster hits one supplier (t - 2) -0.013 -0.009 -0.010 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Disaster hits one supplier (t - 3) -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.013
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Disaster hits one supplier (t - 4) -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.020**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Disaster hits one supplier (t - 5) -0.016* -0.013 -0.014 -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574
R2 0.234 0.262 0.300 0.342
Sales growth drops by
2.0-3.1%: Not driven by prior
trends; caused by disaster
30. Table
6:
Downstream
Propagation—Sales
Growth
Dynamics
30
Notes. This table presents estimated coefficients from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same quarter in the previous year on dummies
indicating whether (at least) one of their suppliers is hit by a major disaster in the current and each of the previous five quarters. All regressions include dummies
indicating whether the firm itself is hit by a major disaster in the current and each of the previous five quarters, as well as fiscal-quarter, year-quarter and firm
fixed effects. All regressions also control for the number of suppliers (dummies indicating terciles of the number of suppliers). In the second, third, and fourth
columns, we control for firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. In the
third and fourth columns, we include state dummies interacted with year dummies. In the fourth column, we include 48 Fama-French industry dummies
interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our customer sample (described in Table II, Panel A) between 1978 and 2013. Standard
errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 6: Downstream Propagation—Sales Growth Dynamics
Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Disaster hits firm (t) 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.011
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Disaster hits firm Disaster hits firm (t - 1) -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Disaster hits firm Disaster hits firm (t - 2) -0.023** -0.022** -0.002 0.002
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits firm Disaster hits firm (t - 3) -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.022* -0.016
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits firm Disaster hits firm (t - 4) -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.010 -0.006
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits firm Disaster hits firm (t - 5) -0.026** -0.027** -0.010 -0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Number of suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574
R2 0.234 0.262 0.300 0.342
Sales growth drops by
2.0-3.1%: Not driven by prior
trends; caused by disaster
31. Table
7:
Downstream
Propagation—Robustness
31
TABLE 7: Downstream Propagation—Robustness
Sales Growth (t - 4,t)
Panel A: Controlling for share of the workforce hit
Disaster hits more than 10% of -0.006 -0.005 0.002 0.009
firm’s workforce (t - 4) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Disaster hits one supplier (t - 4) -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.030*** -0.020**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Disaster hits firm (t - 4) -0.027** -0.026** -0.006 -0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Number of suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574
R2 0.234 0.262 0.300 0.342
Notes. This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same quarter in the previous year on a dummy indicating
whether (at least) one supplier is hit by a major disaster in the same quarter of the previous year. All regressions include a dummy indicating whether the firm
itself is hit by a major disaster in the same quarter in the previous year as well as fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed effects. Panel A also includes a dummy
indicating whether 10% or more of the firm’s workforce is hit. Panel B includes a dummy indicating whether (at least) one location of any supplier once in a
relationship with the firm is hit. In the second through fourth columns, we control for firm level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA,
respectively) interacted with year quarter dummies. In the third and fourth columns, we include state dummies interacted with year dummies. In the fourth
column, we include 48 Fama-French industry dummies interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our customer sample (described
in Table II, Panel A) between 1978 and 2013. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.
10% of workforce is hit by
disaster to control for firm
plants near supplier HQ:
regression result is stable
32. Table
7:
Downstream
Propagation—Robustness
32
Notes. This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same quarter in the previous year on a dummy indicating
whether (at least) one supplier is hit by a major disaster in the same quarter of the previous year. All regressions include a dummy indicating whether the firm
itself is hit by a major disaster in the same quarter in the previous year as well as fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed effects. Panel A also includes a dummy
indicating whether 10% or more of the firm’s workforce is hit. Panel B includes a dummy indicating whether (at least) one location of any supplier once in a
relationship with the firm is hit. In the second through fourth columns, we control for firm level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA,
respectively) interacted with year quarter dummies. In the third and fourth columns, we include state dummies interacted with year dummies. In the fourth
column, we include 48 Fama-French industry dummies interacted with year dummies. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our customer sample (described
in Table II, Panel A) between 1978 and 2013. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the firm-level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.
TABLE 7: Downstream Propagation—Robustness
Sales Growth (t - 4,t)
Panel B: Controlling for whether any ‘‘eventually linked’’ supplier is hit
Disaster hits any eventually 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005
linked suppliers’ location (t - 4) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Disaster hits one supplier (t - 4) -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.023**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Disaster hits firm (t - 4) -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.005 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Number of suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE No Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No Yes Yes
Industry-year FE No No No Yes
Observations 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574
R2 0.234 0.262 0.300 0.342
If disaster hits any previous
supplier to control for
demand shocks:
regression result is stable
Input disruptions on matter in
an active relationship
between supplier and firm
33. Table
8:
Downstream
Propagation—Input
Specificity
33
Notes. This table presents estimates from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same quarter in the previous year on two dummies indicating
whether (at least) one specific supplier and whether (at least) one nonspecific supplier is hit by a major disaster in the same quarter of the previous year. In the
first and second columns, a supplier is considered as specific if its industry lies above the median of the share of differentiated goods according to the
classification provided by Rauch (1999). In the third and fourth columns, a supplier is considered specific if its ratio of R&D expenses over sales is above the median
in the two years prior to any given quarter. In the fifth and sixth columns, a supplier is considered as specific if the number of patents it issued in the previous
three years is above the median. All regressions include a dummy indicating whether the firm itself is hit by a major disaster in the same quarter in the previous
year as well as fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed effects. All regressions also control for the number of suppliers (dummies indicating terciles of the
number of suppliers). In the second, fourth, and sixth columns, we control for firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA,
respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. Regressions contain all firm quarters of our customer sample (described in Table II, Panel A) between 1978
and 2013. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
TABLE 8: Downstream Propagation—Input Specificity
Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Supplier Specificity Diff. R&D Patent
Disaster hits one nonspecific -0.002 -0.002 -0.018 -0.011 -0.020* -0.016
supplier (t - 4) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Disaster hits one specific -0.050*** -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.032** -0.039*** -0.034***
supplier (t - 4) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
Disaster hits firm (t - 4) -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.029***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Number of suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574 80,574
R2 0.234 0.262 0.234 0.261 0.234 0.262
Effect is stronger when disaster hits specific supplier rather than nonspecific
34. Table
9:
Downstream
Propagation—Effect
on
Firm
Value
34
Notes. This table presents CAAR of customer firms around the first day of a natural disaster affecting (at least) one of its suppliers. When more than one supplier is
affected by the same natural disaster, the event day is the earliest date across affected suppliers reported in SHELDUS database. Abnormal returns are computed
after estimating, for each firm-disaster pair, a three-factor Fama-French model over the interval from 260 to 11 trading days before the event date. We exclude
firm-disaster observations with missing returns in the estimation or event windows, when the firm itself is hit by the disaster, or when the firm or one of its
suppliers are hit by another major disaster in the 30 trading days around the event. ADJ-BMP t-statistics, presented in parentheses, are computed with the
standardized cross-sectional method of Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) and adjusted for cross-sectional correlation as in Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). The
second column reports CAAR of directly hit supplier firms. The third column reports CAAR of unaffected customer firms, namely, firm-disaster pairs for which no
suppliers reporting the firm as a customer have been hit by the disaster. Computations of abnormal returns follow the same procedure as above. The sample
period is from 1978 to 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 9: Downstream Propagation—Effect on Firm Value
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR)
Customers Suppliers Customers
(Direct Effect) (Control Group)
(N=1,082) (N=2,004) (N=6,379)
[-10,-1] -0.487 -0.195 -0.176**
(-1.283) (-0.819) (-2.310)
[0,10] -0.361* -0.548** -0.124
(-1.911) (-2.215) (-0.302)
[11,20] -0.177 -1.452*** -0.029
(-0.269) (-3.340) (-0.205)
[21,30] -0.121 -0.385 -0.006
(-0.583) (-1.088) (0.392)
[31,40] 0.014 0.120 -0.042
(-0.215) (1.123) (-1.208)
[-10,40] -1.132** -2.459*** -0.379
(-1.982) (-3.029) (-1.563)
~1% drop in customer stock price
when supplier is hit by disaster
Investors immediately react
~2.5% drop in supplier stock price
when hit by disaster
Control group nominally impacted
35. Table
10:
Downstream
Propagation—Input
Specificity
and
Effect
on
Firm
Value
35
Notes. This table presents CAAR of customer firms around the first day of a natural disaster affecting (at least) one of its suppliers. When more than one supplier is
affected by the same natural disaster, the event day is the earliest date across affected suppliers reported in SHELDUS database. Abnormal returns are computed
after estimating, for each firm-disaster pair, a three-factor Fama-French model over the interval from 260 to 11 trading days before the event date. We exclude
firm-disaster observations with missing returns in the estimation or event windows, when the firm itself is hit by the disaster, or when the firm or one of its
suppliers are hit by another major disaster in the 30 trading days around the event. ADJ-BMP t-statistics, presented in parentheses, are computed with the
standardized cross-sectional method of Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) and adjusted for cross-sectional correlation as in Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). The
second column reports CAAR of directly hit supplier firms. The third column reports CAAR of unaffected customer firms, namely, firm-disaster pairs for which no
suppliers reporting the firm as a customer have been hit by the disaster. Computations of abnormal returns follow the same procedure as above. The sample
period is from 1978 to 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 10: Downstream Propagation—Input Specificity and Effect on Firm Value
Customers’ CAAR When Disaster Hits at Least One Supplier
Supplier Specificity Diff. R&D Patent
N=628 N=454 N=318 N=764 N=375 N=707
At least one specific supplier Yes No Yes No Yes No
[-10,-1] -0.885 0.064 -0.321 -0.556 -0.096 -0.694*
(-1.567) (-0.288) (-0.568) (-1.243) (0.164) (-1.731)
[0,10] -0.636*** 0.018 -0.621 -0.253 -0.651*** -0.208
(-2.757) (-0.022) (-1.395) (-1.542) (-2.585) (-0.742)
[11,20] -0.168 -0.189 0.181 -0.326 0.177 -0.365
(-0.608) (0.250) (1.482) (-1.021) (0.479) (-0.674)
[21,30] -0.460 0.348 -1.351** 0.391 -0.560 0.112
(-1.017) (0.192) (-2.349) (0.564) (-0.502) (-0.421)
[31,40] -0.219 0.337 -0.340 0.162 -0.391 0.229
(-0.331) (0.006) (-0.896) (0.213) (-0.381) (-0.038)
[-10,40] -2.368*** 0.578 -2.452* -0.582 -1.519 -0.926*
(-2.939) (0.080) (-1.769) (-1.412) (-1.285) (-1.690)
Larger price
drop when
specific supplier
is hit
36. Figure 5:
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
36
This figure presents cumulative average
abnormal returns (CAAR) of customer firms
around the first day of a natural disaster
affecting (at least) one of its suppliers. When
more than one supplier is affected by the same
natural disaster, the event day is the earliest
date across affected suppliers reported in
SHELDUS database. Abnormal returns are
computed after estimating, for each
firm-disaster pair, a three-factor Fama-French
model over the interval from 260 to 11 trading
days before the event date. Firm-disaster
observations with missing returns in the
estimation or event windows, for which the
firm itself is hit by the disaster or for which the
firm or one of its suppliers are hit by another
major disaster in the previous or following 30
trading days on either side of the event date
are excluded. We find 1,082 customer
firm-disaster pairs satisfying these
requirements.
Larger price drop when
specific supplier is hit
37. Table
11:
Horizontal
Propagation—Related
Suppliers’
Sales
Growth
37
Notes. This table presents estimated coefficients from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same quarter in the previous year on one dummy
indicating whether one of the firm’s customers’ other suppliers is hit by a major disaster in the previous four quarters. The second and fourth columns split
customers’ other suppliers into specific and nonspecific suppliers. All regressions include two dummies indicating whether the firm itself is hit in the previous four
quarters and whether one of the firm’s customer is hit in the previous four quarters. All regressions also control for the number of customers’ suppliers (dummies
indicating terciles of the number of customers’ suppliers). All regressions include fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed effects as well as firm-level
characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. Standard errors presented in parentheses
are clustered at the firm level. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our supplier sample (described in Table II, Panel B) between 1978 and 2013. *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 11: Horizontal Propagation—Related Suppliers’ Sales Growth
Sales Growth (t - 4,t)
Supplier Specificity Diff. R&D Patent
Disaster hits firm (t - 4, t - 1) -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.040***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(t - 4, t - 1) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Disaster hits one customer’s -0.038***
supplier (t - 4, t - 1) (0.010)
Disaster hits one customer’s -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.040***
specific supplier (t - 4, t - 1) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer’s -0.011 -0.013 -0.015
non-specific supplier (t - 4, t - 1) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Number of customers’ Suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
3.8% drop in sales growth
if supplier is hit
Specific supplier is
significant, nonspecific is
not.
38. Table
12:
Horizontal
Propagation—Robustness
38
Notes. This table presents estimated coefficients from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same quarter in the previous year on one dummy indicating whether one of the firm’s customers’ other
suppliers is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters, as well as in Panel A a dummy indicating whether 10% or more of the firm’s workforce is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters, in Panel B a
dummy indicating whether (at least) one location of any other suppliers once in a relationship with a customer of the firm is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters, in Panel C a dummy indicating
whether (at least) one other supplier of any customer once in a relationship with the firm is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters. The second through fourth columns split customers’ other suppliers
into specific and nonspecific suppliers. All regressions include two dummies indicating whether the firm itself is hit in the previous four quarters and whether one of the firm’s customer is hit in the previous four
quarters. All regressions also control for the number of customers’ suppliers (dummies indicating terciles of the number of customers’ suppliers). All regressions include fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed
effects as well as firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the firm
level. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our supplier sample (described in Table II, Panel B) between 1978 and 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 12: Horizontal Propagation—Robustness
Supplier’s Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Diff. R&D Patent
Panel A: Controlling for share of the workforce hit
Disaster hits at least 10% of firm’s -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007
workforce (t - 4,t - 1) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Disaster hits firm (t - 4,t - 1) -0.035* -0.035** -0.035* -0.035**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Disaster hits one customer 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
(t - 4,t - 1) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Disaster hits one customer’s -0.038***
supplier (t - 4,t - 1) (0.010)
Disaster hits one customer’s -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.040***
specific supplier (t - 4,t - 1) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer’s -0.011 -0.013 -0.015
nonspecific supplier (t - 4,t - 1) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
Number of customers’ suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
Tests whether suppliers are
located in same area,
result not significant
39. Table
12:
Horizontal
Propagation—Robustness
39
Table 12: Horizontal Propagation—Robustness
Supplier’s Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Diff. R&D Patent
Panel B: Controlling for whether any customers’ "eventually linked supplier" is hit
Disaster hits any customers’ eventually -0.022* -0.022* -0.022 -0.022*
linked suppliers’ location (t - 4,t - 1) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits firm (t - 4,t - 1) -0.040*** -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.041***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
(t - 4,t - 1) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Disaster hits one customer’s -0.038***
supplier (t - 4,t - 1) (0.010)
Disaster hits one customer’s -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.039***
specific supplier (t - 4,t - 1) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer’s -0.011 -0.013 -0.015
nonspecific supplier (t - 4,t - 1) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
Number of customers’ suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
Notes. This table presents estimated coefficients from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same quarter in the previous year on one dummy indicating whether one of the firm’s customers’ other
suppliers is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters, as well as in Panel A a dummy indicating whether 10% or more of the firm’s workforce is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters, in Panel B a
dummy indicating whether (at least) one location of any other suppliers once in a relationship with a customer of the firm is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters, in Panel C a dummy indicating
whether (at least) one other supplier of any customer once in a relationship with the firm is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters. The second through fourth columns split customers’ other suppliers
into specific and nonspecific suppliers. All regressions include two dummies indicating whether the firm itself is hit in the previous four quarters and whether one of the firm’s customer is hit in the previous four
quarters. All regressions also control for the number of customers’ suppliers (dummies indicating terciles of the number of customers’ suppliers). All regressions include fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed
effects as well as firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the firm
level. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our supplier sample (described in Table II, Panel B) between 1978 and 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Tests whether suppliers suffer
common industry shocks
Shocks do not spill over to
related suppliers unless they
have an active economic link
through customers
40. Table
12:
Horizontal
Propagation—Robustness
40
Table 12: Horizontal Propagation—Robustness
Supplier’s Sales Growth (t – 4,t)
Diff. R&D Patent
Panel C: Controlling for whether any "eventually linked customers" supplier is hit
Disaster hits any eventually linked -0.008 -0.005 -0.019 -0.012
customer’s supplier (t - 4,t - 1) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
Disaster hits firm (t - 4,t - 1) -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.039***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004
(t - 4,t - 1) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Disaster hits one customer’s -0.032*
supplier (t - 4,t - 1) (0.016)
Disaster hits one customer’s -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.036***
specific supplier (t - 4,t - 1) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Disaster hits one customer’s -0.008 -0.003 -0.008
nonspecific supplier (t - 4,t - 1) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
Number of customers’ suppliers Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size, age, ROA x year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976 139,976
R2 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
Notes. This table presents estimated coefficients from panel regressions of firms’ sales growth relative to the same quarter in the previous year on one dummy indicating whether one of the firm’s customers’ other
suppliers is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters, as well as in Panel A a dummy indicating whether 10% or more of the firm’s workforce is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters, in Panel B a
dummy indicating whether (at least) one location of any other suppliers once in a relationship with a customer of the firm is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters, in Panel C a dummy indicating
whether (at least) one other supplier of any customer once in a relationship with the firm is hit by a major disaster in the four previous quarters. The second through fourth columns split customers’ other suppliers
into specific and nonspecific suppliers. All regressions include two dummies indicating whether the firm itself is hit in the previous four quarters and whether one of the firm’s customer is hit in the previous four
quarters. All regressions also control for the number of customers’ suppliers (dummies indicating terciles of the number of customers’ suppliers). All regressions include fiscal quarter, year-quarter, and firm fixed
effects as well as firm-level characteristics (dummies indicating terciles of size, age, and ROA, respectively) interacted with year-quarter dummies. Standard errors presented in parentheses are clustered at the firm
level. Regressions contain all firm-quarters of our supplier sample (described in Table II, Panel B) between 1978 and 2013. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Tests whether suppliers have
unobserved economic links
41. Figure 6:
Aggregate Input Specificity in the United States
41
This figure is based on the computation of
Nunn (2007). The author uses the U.S.
Input-Output Use Table to identify which
intermediate inputs are used and in what
proportions, in the production of each final
good. Then, using data from Rauch (1999),
inputs are sorted into those sold on an
organized exchange, those that are reference
priced in a trade publication, and those that
are differentiated.
Share of differentiated goods is
large and growing, suggesting
examined propagation channels
will continue to impact aggregation
idiosyncratic shocks in production
networks
43. Summary
43
Michael-Paul James
● Firm level shocks propagate in production networks
● Customers drop 2-3% in sales growth when suppliers suffer a disaster
○ 25% drop in sales growth with respect to sample average of 10%
○ Temporary effect, without prior trends
○ Losses only affect active customer-supplier relationships
○ Larger effect when supplier produces differentiated goods with
high R&D, more patents, thus difficult to replace
○ Customer suffers 1% drop in market equity value
44. Summary
44
Michael-Paul James
● Other suppliers experience drop in sales growth after another supplier
is hit, when customers are shared.
● Input disruptions are not compensated, resulting in sector wide losses
● Input specificity is a key determinant of the propagation of
idiosyncratic shocks in the economy
45. You are Amazing
Ask me all the questions you desire. I will do my best to answer honestly
and strive to grasp your intent and creativity.
45
Michael-Paul James