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Preparing for a Black Swan: Planning and Programming for Risk Mitigation in Extreme Events
- 1. 1 June 2018 Preparingfor a Black Swan: Planning and Programming for Risk Mitigation in Extreme Events Scott Tucker, RA & Verrick Walker, PhD, LEED AP, CDT
- 2. Contents/ i. How tothink about resilient design ii. Method for organizing and prioritizing iii. Illustrations
- 3. conceptual framework how tothink bout resilient design
- 4.
- 5. Deliver Us FromFailure: How the Astros Endured Futility to Become World Series Champions LeBron James’ Cavaliers face elimination once again
- 6. A/E Industry andGovernmental Perspectives What is resilience? Inherent durability or flexibility. When working within the built environment, it’s important to have foresight: incorporating changing environmental, social, and economic conditions into projects. This requires designs that are tough as well as flexible; providing the ability to not only bounce back, but forward. Ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.
- 7. Disaster Mitigation andRisk Reduction Perspectives What is resilience? Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
- 8. Disaster Mitigation andRisk Reduction Perspectives Resistance • Create the safest possible community that we have the knowledge to design and build in a natural hazard context Sustainability • Tolerate and overcome damage, diminished productivity, and reduced quality of life from an extreme event without significant outside assistance. Resilience • Recover or bounce back to normalcy after a disaster occurs What is resilience?
- 9. Mamoudou Gassama “MaliSpiderman”
- 10. Disaster Mitigation andRisk Reduction Perspectives What is resilience? Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters Shift focus from Post-Disaster Improvisation towards Pre-Disaster Preparedness
- 11. “Bomber Crash intoEmpire State Building” Case Study – UAB Engineering Archive (1997) A bomber crashing into a building is an extremely unlikely occurrence. However, the consequences of the collapse of a large building are very grave. How should the profession guard against rare, but severe events? In a large and complicated project, is there an obligation to go beyond building code requirements? For example, for nuclear reactor containment vessels, what extreme events should engineers consider? What about buildings subject to terrorist attacks?
- 12. Buildings and infrastructure are partof a system/ network Resilient Design • Avoid system-wide failure • Allocate resources to implement preventative/protective/preservative measures What is resilience?
- 13. The ones weknow • Those that are predicable, recurring • Those addressed by building codes, standards, best practices Those we don’t • Lies outside realm of expectation • Carries extreme impact • Causes are often determined after the fact; but never before A Black Swan What threats are we concerned about?
- 14. What is aBlack Swan? An event that appears random, is extremely difficult to predict, and usually occurs unexpectedly— with a huge impact Sometimes referred to as a “HILF” – High Impact, Low Frequency Event Definition
- 15. Black Swans are: •Not addressed by building codes • Not included in actuarial tables • Not accounted for in construction contingencies • And.. • Typically not provided for in facility designs How does it relate to facility planning?
- 16. HIGH NATURAL MAN-MADE RISK MATRIX FOR INFRASTRUCTURE EXISTENTIAL THREAT LOW HIGHLOW FREQUENCY/LIKELIHOOD SEVERE HURRICANE WIND/FLOOD NATIONWIDE DISASTER LOCALIZED DISASTER ORDINARY HAZARDS LIGHTNINGSTRIKE POTENTIALIMPACT BLACK SWAN EARTHQUAKE VOLCANO ISOLATED TERRORISM CYBER ATTACK PROPERTY CRIMES PROLONGED NUCLEAR CONFLICT ASTEROID STRIKE CARRINGTON SCALE SOLAR STORM COORDINATED TERRORIST ATTACK YELLOWSTONE SUPERVOLCANO ERUPTION ROGUE STATE EMP ATTACK BUILDING FIRES FOREST/REGIONAL FIRES AIRLINER CRASH METEOR STRIKE MAJOR STRUCTURAL FAILURE Black Swans tend to occupy the upper-left of the diagram
- 17. Why isn’t ourdesign more resilient? • We are trained to think about causes; then generate a solution based on our conception of the problem • We get busy thinking about why and how an event happened, and spend our time and resources addressing the purported cause, rather than the next (unpredictable) event Applying to Facilities
- 18. The Solution: GeneralRobustness
- 19. How to broadenour thinking: • Built-in resilience: Address a broad range of threats using general responses, as a result of analysis that focuses on overall value • Value engineering vs. cost-cutting • Considering all conceivable threats, create system-wide robustness Applying to Facilities
- 20. approach method for organizingand prioritizing
- 21. how do wedefine the problem?
- 22. Assessment and Mitigationbased on a Hierarchical Survey of System Components Characterization • Establish Model facility • Identify scope and scale of potential hazards Assessment • Identify vulnerabilities for each system component contained within the Model Facility Mitigation • Define general corrective actions to address vulnerabilities How do we define the problem?
- 23. Facility Component ProtectionConcept Matrix Threat1 Location3 Vulnerability4 Priority5 Countermeasures6 Asset2
- 24. Facility Component ProtectionConcept Matrix Frequent appearance of the same response should reduce the chance of a Black Swan taking down the facility/system
- 25. what do weprotect?
- 26. 16 Critical InfrastructureSectors (PPD-21, 2013) Chemical Commercial Facilities Communications Critical Manufacturing Dams Defense Industrial Base Emergency Services Energy Financial Services Food and Agriculture Government Facilities Healthcare and Public Health Information Technology Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Transportation Systems Water and Wastewater Systems What do we protect?
- 27. 16 Critical InfrastructureSectors (PPD-21, 2013) Chemical Commercial Facilities Communications Critical Manufacturing Dams Defense Industrial Base Emergency Services Energy Financial Services Food and Agriculture Government Facilities Healthcare and Public Health Information Technology Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Transportation Systems Water and Wastewater Systems What do we protect?
- 28. Unique Critical Facilities(1-2) Hospitals (5-10) Water Treatment (10-15) Office Buildings, Recreational (>20) Grocery Stores (>30) Fuel Stations Number of Facilities ImportanceofFacilities Protect Redundancy Protect Facility System Vulnerability as a Function of Collective Exposure of Elements
- 29. Unique Critical Facilities(1-2) Hospitals (5-10) Water Treatment (10-15) Office Buildings, Recreational (>20) Grocery Stores (>30) Fuel Stations Number of Facilities ImportanceofFacilities Preserve the minimum number of important facilities that are necessary to meet expected demand during a crisis Protect Redundancy Protect Facility System Vulnerability as a Function of Collective Exposure of Elements
- 30. Learn from Nature: Redundancy= Insurance Big is Ugly, and Fragile The other Redundancy: Functional Redundancy; Multiple-Use Applying to Facilities
- 31. How to helpFacilities be more Resistant to Black Swans Why we should overbuild: There are benefits from overbuilding that can ultimately increase resiliency Cumulative effect of many small improvements Scale matters Applying to Facilities – Lessons Learned
- 32. Consider the System Focuson general vulnerabilities (system resilience) rather than specific causes & effects Provide redundancy in components, especially dependent components (redundancy) “Harden” individual components for many kinds of threats (functional redundancy) Find common solutions for various threats (resilience) Applying to Facilities HARDEN VULNERABLE SUBSYSTEM COMPONENTS MITIGATION PLAN SEMICONDUCTOR ELECTRONICS IDENTIFY VULNERABLE COMPONENTS HF ANTENNAE GROUNDING DEFICIENCIES WAVEGUIDE APERTURES INPUT THREAT CRITERIA
- 33. Generic Facility Component ProtectionConcept Matrix System Component Vulnerability Solution Vulnerability Solution Vulnerability Solution Item 1 Damage Harden Damage Make Redundant Damage Sacrifice Item 2 Failure Sacrifice Upset Harden Failure Stock & Replace Item 3 Failure Stock & Replace Failure Sacrifice Failure Repair Item 4 Damage Repair Damage Harden Damage Make Redundant Item 5 Upset Make Redundant None Sacrifice Failure Harden Item 6 Failure Harden Failure Stock & Replace None Sacrifice Item 7 None Sacrifice Failure Repair Upset Harden Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 3
- 34. Building Facility Component ProtectionConcept Matrix System Component Vulnerability Solution Vulnerability Solution Vulnerability Solution Building Damage Raise 1st Floor Wet/Dry Floodproof Damage Structural & Infiltration Design Loss of Envir Control, Communication Hardened MEP Standby Power Exterior Walls Leak Move Openings Above BFE, Seal All Others Damage Structural Design None N/A Doors/Glazing Damage/Leak Structural & Infiltration Resistant Damage/Leak Structural & Infiltration Resistant Secure Access Failure Standby Power Electrical System Damage Standby Power Raise/Harden Components Damage Harden Elect Components Redundancy Failure Standby Power System Fuel Stockpile Mechanical System Dependent on Electrical Standby Power Raise/Harden Redundancy None Harden Elect Components Redundancy Failure Standby Power Interior Finishes Damage Flood Resistant Materials None N/A Mold, Corrosion Standby Power Flood Resistant Materials Roof None N/A Damage Structural Design Wind-Rated Sys None N/A Flood Hurricane-Wind Extended Power Loss
- 35. Data Center Facility ComponentProtection Concept Matrix System Component Vulnerability Solution Vulnerability Solution Vulnerability Solution Bldg Enclosure Physical Damage Fire Resistance Compartmen- talization Damage to Electronics EMI Shield, Hardened Electronics Physical Damage Concrete or Ballistic Materials Standby Generators Physical Damage Redundancy Fire-Rated Enclosures & Fuel Tanks Damage to Electronics Shielded Ctrl Enclosures, Connections Physical Damage Hardened Enclosures Transformers Physical Damage Redundancy Fire-Rated Enclosures Long-Wire Currents Neutral Blocking Device Hardened Design Physical Damage Hardened Barrier or Enclosure, Coolant Tank Main Switchgear Physical Damage Redundancy Fire-Rated Enclosures Minimal Shield or Harden Electronic Control Devices Physical Damage Hardened Barrier HVAC Physical Damage, Smoke Transfer Redundancy Fire-Rated Enclosures, Dampers & Controls Upset, Loss of Control Shield or Harden Electronic Control Devices Physical Damage Hardened Barriers, Redundant Components Fire Sprinkler-Life Safety Physical Damage Cross-zoning; Redundancy Upset, Damage to Electronics Replacement after Event Mimimal Repair after Event Data Processing & Storage Systems Damage, Upset, Data Loss Clean Agent VESDA or Pre- Action System Damage, Upset, Data Loss Room or Rack Shielding, Hardened Equipment Physical Damage Hardened Barriers, Redundant Components Fire HEMP-GIC Firearm Attack
- 36.
- 37. Achieving General Robustness: Examples display: Cross-disciplinarysolutions Multiple-Hazard Criteria Redundancy Flexibility (Functional Redundancy) Fault-Tolerant Design Applying to Facilities – Lessons Learned
- 38. World Trade Center Lackof compartmentalization Specialized Structural Systems Designed for Efficiency, Economy Fireproofing did not address large physical impact Insufficient redundancy (elevators, egress) Examples of General Robustness
- 39. Empire State Building Lotsof compartmentalization Structural Systems “Hell for Stout” Fireproofing Integral with Structure (functional redundancy: concrete encased steel) Redundancy (elevators, egress) laid out away from vulnerable points (traditional elevator core, but innovative for its day) Examples of General Robustness
- 40. Meyerland Office Building Examples ofGeneral Robustness
- 41. Baylor College of Medicine PrimaryFlood Barriers Examples of General Robustness
- 42. Baylor College of Medicine PrimaryFlood Barriers Elevated Infrastructure Examples of General Robustness
- 43. Baylor College of Medicine PrimaryFlood Barriers Elevated Infrastructure Backup Sump Pumps Examples of General Robustness
- 44. Operational steps thatreinforce facility design solutions to provide resilience Flexible Operations Transferable, Distributed Training Awareness, Simulation, Practice Stockpiling Materials and Supplies Pre-Arrangements Goods and Services