The text presents an analysis of the Polish energy policy, which takes into account its both aspects: the institutional and normative aspect (policy), and the context of political activities involved (politics). As the text analyses the planning documents prepared by the Minister of Economy (the so - called “State’s energy policy”), the starting point for this analysis are the legal issues ensuing from the Energy Law Act. The text outlines the major assumptions of the Energy Policy till 2030
as well as the general provisions of the incomplete, as of the year 2015, Project of the Energy Policy
till 2050. The institutional and normative context has been supplemented with an analysis of selected issues significant for the directions in the development of the energy policy and the energy security in Poland. Moreover, the text addresses the following questions: (1) to what extent does the legal status of
the document “the State’s energy policy” contribute to the poor achievement of the strategic goals in the energy sector?, (2) to what extent does the lack of actual responsibility of the political subjects
contribute to the lack of the realisation of strategic goals put forward in the “State’s energy policy”?, (3) what actions should be undertaken in order to administer a cohesive and effective energy policy in
Poland?
While an agreement reached between Ukraine and Russia on gas supplies this winter was hailed by the European Commission, the deal may not solve all issues. Key elements include Ukraine repaying $3.1 billion of its gas debt to Russia in installments by end of year, and Russia providing gas at a reduced price until March. However, not all details are public and sources of payments are unclear. The EU says it will not pay Ukraine's debt, but the Ukrainian central bank and national gas company will pay initially, with EU taxpayers potentially having to pay the bill in the long run. The negotiated price is significantly lower than Russia's initial request, but sustainability of the deal is uncertain beyond this winter.
The document discusses the recent gas crisis in Europe and what it reveals about the EU's energy security and dependence on Russian gas imports. It argues that while decreasing reliance on Russian gas may improve energy security, it is not feasible in the short-to-medium term due to the EU's green transition goals and increased gas demand. The EU has made some progress in diversifying suppliers and infrastructure but risks remain from high gas prices, competition for LNG, and Gazprom's market power. The best solution is for the EU to implement a coordinated energy policy to strengthen its bargaining position with Russia as a large buyer of gas.
The European Union’s (EU) consumption of natural gas has been growing rapidly over the last two decades. Gas has become an increasingly important component of the EU’s energy mix, with gas-fired power plants gradually replacing less environmentally friendly coal plants. Domestic gas production covered close to 60 percent of the EU’s consumption needs during the 1990s, but by 2007 it declined substantially around 40 percent (see Figure 1). The rest is imported from three main sources: Russia (around 40 percent of total gas imports), Norway (around 25 percent) and various African countries among them Algeria, Nigeria, Libya and Egypt which account for around 25 percent. The last few years have also heightened public worries in Europe over the security of its gas supplies, primarily those imports coming from Russia. These fears were partly confirmed in January 2009 when several EU and non- EU countries faced a sudden cut in their gas supplies. The Russian- Ukrainian stand-off only reinforced the argument that more needs to be done to strengthen the reliability of access to vital energy resources.
Authored by: Wojciech Paczynski
Published in 2009
The need for urgent climate action and energy transformation away from fossil fuels is widely acknowledged. Yet, current country plans for emission reductions do not reach the requirements to contain global warming under 2°C. What is worse, there is even reasonable doubt about the commitment to said plans given recent history and existing future investment plans into fossil fuel extraction and infrastructure development. This policy brief shortly summarizes the presentations and discussions at the SITE Development Day Conference, held on December 8, 2021, focusing on climate change policies and the challenge of a green energy transition in Eastern Europe.
The document provides an overview of the complex security environment in the South Caucasus region and EU security policy challenges there. It describes the region as a security complex with two main axes - a horizontal axis linking Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the EU, and a vertical axis linking Armenia, Iran and Russia. Conflict dominates across the axes, while cooperation occurs along them. Key security issues include the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and separatist conflicts involving Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU has strategic interests in the region related to conflict resolution and energy security, but its security policies have been tangled and ineffective. The document concludes with recommendations for how the EU could take a
This paper proposes a Transit Risk Index (TRI) designed to assess the riskiness of pipeline gas imports and to study the effect of introducing new gas routes. TRI controls for gas dependency, transit route diversification, political risks of transit, pipeline rupture probability, and the balance of power between supplying and consuming countries along the transit route. Evaluating TRI for the EU-Russia gas trade, we show that the introduction of the Nord Stream pipeline would further widen already large disparities in gas risk exposure across the EU Member States. The gas risk exposure of the Member States served by Nord Stream would decline. In contrast, EU countries not connected to Nord Stream, but sharing other Russian gas transit routes with the Nord Stream countries, would face greater gas risk exposure. We discuss the implications of our analysis for the design of the common energy policy in the EU.
Find more research papers at: https://www.hhs.se/site
Opal Of Discord. Why the EU supports Gazprom's anti-Ukrainian plans?Mariia Melnyk
1) The EU's recent decision to allow Gazprom to increase capacity on the German OPAL pipeline will allow Russia to supply more gas through Nord Stream and less through Ukraine, hurting Ukraine.
2) While the EU has investigated Gazprom for antitrust violations regarding market dominance and unfair pricing, decisions like OPAL signal the EU's ambiguity in balancing business and political interests.
3) Ukraine risks losing billions annually from less Russian gas transit and should strengthen its energy diplomacy and reforms to defend its interests and lobby the EU to block projects like Nord Stream 2 that undermine Ukraine.
Essay based on the crisis in Ukraine and the role of the access to energy resources (oil and natural gas) in developing/resolving the conflict, with the focus on relations between two super powers EU and Russia.
While an agreement reached between Ukraine and Russia on gas supplies this winter was hailed by the European Commission, the deal may not solve all issues. Key elements include Ukraine repaying $3.1 billion of its gas debt to Russia in installments by end of year, and Russia providing gas at a reduced price until March. However, not all details are public and sources of payments are unclear. The EU says it will not pay Ukraine's debt, but the Ukrainian central bank and national gas company will pay initially, with EU taxpayers potentially having to pay the bill in the long run. The negotiated price is significantly lower than Russia's initial request, but sustainability of the deal is uncertain beyond this winter.
The document discusses the recent gas crisis in Europe and what it reveals about the EU's energy security and dependence on Russian gas imports. It argues that while decreasing reliance on Russian gas may improve energy security, it is not feasible in the short-to-medium term due to the EU's green transition goals and increased gas demand. The EU has made some progress in diversifying suppliers and infrastructure but risks remain from high gas prices, competition for LNG, and Gazprom's market power. The best solution is for the EU to implement a coordinated energy policy to strengthen its bargaining position with Russia as a large buyer of gas.
The European Union’s (EU) consumption of natural gas has been growing rapidly over the last two decades. Gas has become an increasingly important component of the EU’s energy mix, with gas-fired power plants gradually replacing less environmentally friendly coal plants. Domestic gas production covered close to 60 percent of the EU’s consumption needs during the 1990s, but by 2007 it declined substantially around 40 percent (see Figure 1). The rest is imported from three main sources: Russia (around 40 percent of total gas imports), Norway (around 25 percent) and various African countries among them Algeria, Nigeria, Libya and Egypt which account for around 25 percent. The last few years have also heightened public worries in Europe over the security of its gas supplies, primarily those imports coming from Russia. These fears were partly confirmed in January 2009 when several EU and non- EU countries faced a sudden cut in their gas supplies. The Russian- Ukrainian stand-off only reinforced the argument that more needs to be done to strengthen the reliability of access to vital energy resources.
Authored by: Wojciech Paczynski
Published in 2009
The need for urgent climate action and energy transformation away from fossil fuels is widely acknowledged. Yet, current country plans for emission reductions do not reach the requirements to contain global warming under 2°C. What is worse, there is even reasonable doubt about the commitment to said plans given recent history and existing future investment plans into fossil fuel extraction and infrastructure development. This policy brief shortly summarizes the presentations and discussions at the SITE Development Day Conference, held on December 8, 2021, focusing on climate change policies and the challenge of a green energy transition in Eastern Europe.
The document provides an overview of the complex security environment in the South Caucasus region and EU security policy challenges there. It describes the region as a security complex with two main axes - a horizontal axis linking Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the EU, and a vertical axis linking Armenia, Iran and Russia. Conflict dominates across the axes, while cooperation occurs along them. Key security issues include the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and separatist conflicts involving Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU has strategic interests in the region related to conflict resolution and energy security, but its security policies have been tangled and ineffective. The document concludes with recommendations for how the EU could take a
This paper proposes a Transit Risk Index (TRI) designed to assess the riskiness of pipeline gas imports and to study the effect of introducing new gas routes. TRI controls for gas dependency, transit route diversification, political risks of transit, pipeline rupture probability, and the balance of power between supplying and consuming countries along the transit route. Evaluating TRI for the EU-Russia gas trade, we show that the introduction of the Nord Stream pipeline would further widen already large disparities in gas risk exposure across the EU Member States. The gas risk exposure of the Member States served by Nord Stream would decline. In contrast, EU countries not connected to Nord Stream, but sharing other Russian gas transit routes with the Nord Stream countries, would face greater gas risk exposure. We discuss the implications of our analysis for the design of the common energy policy in the EU.
Find more research papers at: https://www.hhs.se/site
Opal Of Discord. Why the EU supports Gazprom's anti-Ukrainian plans?Mariia Melnyk
1) The EU's recent decision to allow Gazprom to increase capacity on the German OPAL pipeline will allow Russia to supply more gas through Nord Stream and less through Ukraine, hurting Ukraine.
2) While the EU has investigated Gazprom for antitrust violations regarding market dominance and unfair pricing, decisions like OPAL signal the EU's ambiguity in balancing business and political interests.
3) Ukraine risks losing billions annually from less Russian gas transit and should strengthen its energy diplomacy and reforms to defend its interests and lobby the EU to block projects like Nord Stream 2 that undermine Ukraine.
Essay based on the crisis in Ukraine and the role of the access to energy resources (oil and natural gas) in developing/resolving the conflict, with the focus on relations between two super powers EU and Russia.
European Union VS Germany : Nord Stream 2iakovosal
The document discusses the Nord Stream 2 pipeline agreement between Russia's Gazprom and several European energy companies to transport natural gas from Russia to Europe. This agreement bypasses existing pipeline infrastructure in Ukraine and could violate the European Union's Third Energy Package. While Germany supports the project, many other EU members and countries like Ukraine oppose it as it could increase Europe's dependence on Russia and reduce energy revenues for Ukraine. There are concerns the project ignores European unity and that Germany and Russia's economic cooperation could escalate tensions, especially with Poland and Baltic states.
- Russia is a major global energy producer and exporter, holding the largest natural gas reserves and being the largest gas exporter in the world. It relies heavily on gas exports to Europe.
- Russia has taken steps to solidify its position as a key European energy supplier through pipelines like Nord Stream and planned South Stream, aiming to reduce reliance on Ukraine for gas transit. However, Western powers seek to decrease European dependence on Russian gas.
- Geopolitical conflicts between Russia and the West, like those in Ukraine and Syria, have an energy dimension as they involve control over gas infrastructure and pipelines transporting gas out of the region.
The document summarizes the ongoing dispute between Gazprom of Russia and Naftogaz of Ukraine over natural gas supply contracts. It discusses how the dissolution of the Soviet Union impacted gas reserves and supply routes between the two countries. The dispute involves pricing disagreements as well as political tensions. A temporary settlement was reached in 2006 involving a five-year contract and price concessions, but long term solutions proving difficult due to political differences between Russia and Ukraine remain elusive.
Are Russia and the EU planning a zombie pipeline network?Nicholas Newman
The question being raised in Europe is many of the new gas pipelines being planned by both Moscow and Brussels may not be required. Since 2008, overall demand for power has contracted by 1.2 % per year, reports European Commission's “Quarterly Report on European Electricity Markets."
Demand for gas is likely to fall further due to increased usage of coal and renewables for power generation. Europe has still not recovered from its economic crisis. The arrival of LNG from the United States and domestic production of shale gas.
Tensions in eastern Ukraine eased somewhat in May 2014, as Ukrainian military forces and pro-federalization armed groups maintained a fragile balance of power. Russia signaled willingness to engage with newly elected Ukrainian President Poroshenko but still faces the risk of economic sanctions if it intervenes militarily. A serious dispute also continues over gas prices and debts between Russia and Ukraine. Russia also signed a treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Community with Belarus and Kazakhstan, making minor concessions while maintaining export duties on hydrocarbons.
There are major shifts in the EU energy space including pending lessons from Russian sanctions, France's commitments to renewables,and the politics of pipelines.
Natural gas, a clean fuel against the constraints to its growth in europe sa ...Sid Ahmed Hamdani
here attached is a paper published at the 5th gas symposium held in february, algiers. The paper deals with the main constraints and challenges of natural gas in Europe
Natural Gas Consumption Overview In BrazilQUESTJOURNAL
This document summarizes a research paper on natural gas consumption trends in Brazil over the last 10 years. It finds that while natural gas supply and its share of Brazil's energy matrix have grown, some states still do not consume natural gas due to limitations in simultaneously supplying industrial and power generation consumers. The paper analyzes domestic energy supply and natural gas supply data, finding that natural gas use has increased for electricity generation and is expected to further meet power demands. It concludes there may be limits to concurrent industrial and power sector supply and recommends evaluating this with mathematical models.
The document discusses maps and data showing the major importers and exporters of natural gas and LNG globally. Russia is the largest exporter of natural gas via pipelines while Qatar is the largest exporter of LNG. Japan became the top importer of expensive LNG after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident. The US both imports and exports natural gas depending on geographic convenience. Russia and the Netherlands also appear as importers and exporters on different lists and years.
The document discusses the issue of energy security within the European Union. It notes that the EU imports around half of its total energy needs and will become more dependent on foreign energy imports over time. This dependence creates challenges for ensuring stable, affordable, and reliable energy supplies. The document examines some of the EU's key energy relationships and policies around securing supplies, including its dependence on Russia as a major energy exporter, efforts to diversify energy imports from other countries and routes, and the need for a coherent EU energy policy to strengthen its position internationally.
A new research paper recently published by researchers at the University of Wyoming takes a close look at the economic benefits and potential pitfalls of shale drilling. The paper, titled "The Economics of Shale Gas Development" was accepted last November for publication later this year in the Annual Review of Resources Economics. The upshot of the paper is this: there are ENORMOUS economic benefits from shale drilling--and we'll realize those benefits as long as we don't screw it up. That is, we need to be mindful of, and careful to manage, the environmental impacts from drilling.
The Bord Gáis Energy Index fell 5% in April due to lower wholesale gas and electricity prices. Gas prices declined with healthy supply and lower demand, though tensions over Ukraine caused occasional price increases. Falling gas and carbon prices contributed to lower wholesale electricity prices in Ireland. Oil prices saw minor changes and remained in a narrow range.
The document provides a statistical review and overview of Greece's mining and minerals industry for the years 2011-2012. It details production levels for various mineral commodities, noting declines in some domestic markets like construction materials due to economic crisis, but growth in export sectors. It also discusses specific companies and commodities. For example, nickel production by LARKO GMM SA increased 30% from 2010 levels despite overall losses, while aluminum production by Aluminium SA remained steady.
Güneydoğu Avrupada bir Doğal Gaz Merkezi Omer Senkardes_engÖmer Şenkardeş
This document discusses the possibility of establishing a natural gas trading hub in Turkey. It notes that Turkey's large gas market size, diverse supply options, and planned interconnectors make it well positioned to serve as a hub. However, its low current gas turnover ("churn rate") is a challenge. The document recommends liberalizing Turkey's gas market and integrating it into the European market to increase liquidity and the churn rate. It also identifies Greece, Italy, and Austria as potential competitors for establishing a hub to serve Southeast Europe and notes steps each has taken.
Russia's gas pivot to Asia: a short-sighted policy or a long-term strategy?Olga Gerasimchuk
This presentation aims to examine the reasons which have prompted Russia to seek closer gas cooperation with Asia Pacific countries (mainly China), as well as hightlight its current gas pipeline and LNG projects in the East.
Russia: Energy Policies and Carbon MarketsOpen Knowledge
The WWF'S Russia study concludes that the Kyoto protocol could help Russia move forward. It calls for a long-term energy strategy and a faster Kyoto process in Russia.
A study released in December 2016 by the London School of Economics, titled "On the Comparative Advantage of U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Shale Gas Revolution." While America has enough shale gas to export plenty of it, exporting it is not as economic as exporting oil due to the elaborate processes to liquefy and regassify natural gas--therefore a lot of the gas stays right here at home, making the U.S. one of (if not the) cheapest places on the planet to establish manufacturing plants, especially for manufacturers that use natural gas and NGLs (natural gas liquids). Therefore, manufacturing, especially in the petrochemical sector, is ramping back up in the U.S. For every two jobs created by fracking, another one job is created in the manufacturing sector.
A report issued by the Natural Gas Supply Association that projects a marked increase in demand for natural gas during summer 2016, but "downward pressure" on natgas prices nonetheless--because of incredible production from shale.
Southeastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons - A new energy corridor for the EU?Harris Samaras
The (a) confirmation of significant quantities of hydrocarbons in Cyprus, (b) the scientific estimates of equally significant quantities in the south and southwest of the Greek island of Crete and (c) the officially declared increased cooperation between Cyprus, Israel and Greece to jointly exploit their hydrocarbon deposits may prove to be a tremendous opportunity not only for Cyprus, Greece and Israel but for the EU as a whole.
World renowned scientists claim that the hydrocarbon deposits that lie south and southwest of the island of Crete are huge; and maybe bigger than those in the Levantine Basin; they dare to state that within the EEZ of Greece there may be as much as 51 tcm of natural gas! Could this lead into the making of a new energy corridor for the EU? Shouldn’t the EU be more actively involved in the efforts of its member countries, Greece and Cyprus? Isn’t this for the EU a project of Pan-European interest thus include it in its energy policy, coordinate and assist with technical knowhow but also with political leverage and other? As critical year 2020 is around the corner, aren’t the already scientific interpretations important enough to accelerate the EU think tanks and policy institutes view on the whole issue?
Analiza interesów w polityce bezpieczeństwa energetycznego w UERemigiuszRosicki
Energy safety constitutes an important issue in UE documents and strategies. Its main interests are liberalizing the energy market, interdependence (through the expansion of connections) and energy solidarity. The liberalizing of the energy market aims to introduce free market mechanisms and competition. The main mechanisms are TPA principle and unbundling. The interdependence is to consist in the expansion of gas and electroenergetic connections among UE members. However, there is much controversy connected with the idea of energy solidarity. It results from different stand among old and new UE members. Energy safety, in general, should be connected with the predictability of energy market which can be achieved by means of a transparent market and cooperation, Such energy security is to be achieved by (1) decreasing energy dependency, (2) decreasing domestic demand for energy and resources, (3) diversification of energy resources, (4) counteracting homogenous energy infrastructure, (5) expansion of connections between countries and regions. The main hypothesis of this thesis is the statement the multidimensional interests and different interest groups influence the shape of energy security policy in UE. The main fields of the analysis of the interests in UE energy policy adopted in this thesis include: global interests, geopolitical interests, the interests of individual member countries and interest of energy markets. However, the interest groups include all of those who influence the shape of UE energy policy. The objective of this thesis is to present the main directions of UE energy security policy development. The analysis in historical, institutional and normative scope has been made. The main trends in the development of the energy security policy have been defined. It concerns normative and technological solutions in UE member counties. A flagging UE energy potential in a global perspective has been pointed out, yet the issue of the dynamics of those processes is still open to dispute.
Transmission corridors are the subject of the bill prepared in 2012. The bill on transmission corridors 1 determine the rules of (1) establishing a corridor for new transmission facilities, (2) granting permission for the construction of transmission facilities, (3) determining a transmission corridor for existing transmission facilities, (4) locating further transmission equipment and other transmission facilities in the corridor, (5) establishing transmission easement and land management in the area of the transmission corridor, (6) determining and awarding compensation for the transmission easement encumbrance of real estate. In 2012 the bill was one of the priorities in the energy sector – not including the amendment of the Energy Law, the work on the bill on renewable energy sources and work on the project of the gas law. The intention of the Act on transmission corridors is to organize the legal system in order to ensure effective development of transmission infrastructure in Poland. The problem with the electricity infrastructure should be considered in a broader context, which means with its poor condition, increasing demand for energy, the need to diversify the energy structure in Poland. The problem with infrastructure will continue to grow due to the need to develop renewable energy sources and the planned construction of a nuclear power plant. Current state of transmission lines threatens the development of renewable energy to the level required by the European Union. However, in the case of the plan to build a nuclear power plant, it will be necessary to condense the grid in areas of poor infrastructure and ensure proper grid balancing.
European Union VS Germany : Nord Stream 2iakovosal
The document discusses the Nord Stream 2 pipeline agreement between Russia's Gazprom and several European energy companies to transport natural gas from Russia to Europe. This agreement bypasses existing pipeline infrastructure in Ukraine and could violate the European Union's Third Energy Package. While Germany supports the project, many other EU members and countries like Ukraine oppose it as it could increase Europe's dependence on Russia and reduce energy revenues for Ukraine. There are concerns the project ignores European unity and that Germany and Russia's economic cooperation could escalate tensions, especially with Poland and Baltic states.
- Russia is a major global energy producer and exporter, holding the largest natural gas reserves and being the largest gas exporter in the world. It relies heavily on gas exports to Europe.
- Russia has taken steps to solidify its position as a key European energy supplier through pipelines like Nord Stream and planned South Stream, aiming to reduce reliance on Ukraine for gas transit. However, Western powers seek to decrease European dependence on Russian gas.
- Geopolitical conflicts between Russia and the West, like those in Ukraine and Syria, have an energy dimension as they involve control over gas infrastructure and pipelines transporting gas out of the region.
The document summarizes the ongoing dispute between Gazprom of Russia and Naftogaz of Ukraine over natural gas supply contracts. It discusses how the dissolution of the Soviet Union impacted gas reserves and supply routes between the two countries. The dispute involves pricing disagreements as well as political tensions. A temporary settlement was reached in 2006 involving a five-year contract and price concessions, but long term solutions proving difficult due to political differences between Russia and Ukraine remain elusive.
Are Russia and the EU planning a zombie pipeline network?Nicholas Newman
The question being raised in Europe is many of the new gas pipelines being planned by both Moscow and Brussels may not be required. Since 2008, overall demand for power has contracted by 1.2 % per year, reports European Commission's “Quarterly Report on European Electricity Markets."
Demand for gas is likely to fall further due to increased usage of coal and renewables for power generation. Europe has still not recovered from its economic crisis. The arrival of LNG from the United States and domestic production of shale gas.
Tensions in eastern Ukraine eased somewhat in May 2014, as Ukrainian military forces and pro-federalization armed groups maintained a fragile balance of power. Russia signaled willingness to engage with newly elected Ukrainian President Poroshenko but still faces the risk of economic sanctions if it intervenes militarily. A serious dispute also continues over gas prices and debts between Russia and Ukraine. Russia also signed a treaty establishing the Eurasian Economic Community with Belarus and Kazakhstan, making minor concessions while maintaining export duties on hydrocarbons.
There are major shifts in the EU energy space including pending lessons from Russian sanctions, France's commitments to renewables,and the politics of pipelines.
Natural gas, a clean fuel against the constraints to its growth in europe sa ...Sid Ahmed Hamdani
here attached is a paper published at the 5th gas symposium held in february, algiers. The paper deals with the main constraints and challenges of natural gas in Europe
Natural Gas Consumption Overview In BrazilQUESTJOURNAL
This document summarizes a research paper on natural gas consumption trends in Brazil over the last 10 years. It finds that while natural gas supply and its share of Brazil's energy matrix have grown, some states still do not consume natural gas due to limitations in simultaneously supplying industrial and power generation consumers. The paper analyzes domestic energy supply and natural gas supply data, finding that natural gas use has increased for electricity generation and is expected to further meet power demands. It concludes there may be limits to concurrent industrial and power sector supply and recommends evaluating this with mathematical models.
The document discusses maps and data showing the major importers and exporters of natural gas and LNG globally. Russia is the largest exporter of natural gas via pipelines while Qatar is the largest exporter of LNG. Japan became the top importer of expensive LNG after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident. The US both imports and exports natural gas depending on geographic convenience. Russia and the Netherlands also appear as importers and exporters on different lists and years.
The document discusses the issue of energy security within the European Union. It notes that the EU imports around half of its total energy needs and will become more dependent on foreign energy imports over time. This dependence creates challenges for ensuring stable, affordable, and reliable energy supplies. The document examines some of the EU's key energy relationships and policies around securing supplies, including its dependence on Russia as a major energy exporter, efforts to diversify energy imports from other countries and routes, and the need for a coherent EU energy policy to strengthen its position internationally.
A new research paper recently published by researchers at the University of Wyoming takes a close look at the economic benefits and potential pitfalls of shale drilling. The paper, titled "The Economics of Shale Gas Development" was accepted last November for publication later this year in the Annual Review of Resources Economics. The upshot of the paper is this: there are ENORMOUS economic benefits from shale drilling--and we'll realize those benefits as long as we don't screw it up. That is, we need to be mindful of, and careful to manage, the environmental impacts from drilling.
The Bord Gáis Energy Index fell 5% in April due to lower wholesale gas and electricity prices. Gas prices declined with healthy supply and lower demand, though tensions over Ukraine caused occasional price increases. Falling gas and carbon prices contributed to lower wholesale electricity prices in Ireland. Oil prices saw minor changes and remained in a narrow range.
The document provides a statistical review and overview of Greece's mining and minerals industry for the years 2011-2012. It details production levels for various mineral commodities, noting declines in some domestic markets like construction materials due to economic crisis, but growth in export sectors. It also discusses specific companies and commodities. For example, nickel production by LARKO GMM SA increased 30% from 2010 levels despite overall losses, while aluminum production by Aluminium SA remained steady.
Güneydoğu Avrupada bir Doğal Gaz Merkezi Omer Senkardes_engÖmer Şenkardeş
This document discusses the possibility of establishing a natural gas trading hub in Turkey. It notes that Turkey's large gas market size, diverse supply options, and planned interconnectors make it well positioned to serve as a hub. However, its low current gas turnover ("churn rate") is a challenge. The document recommends liberalizing Turkey's gas market and integrating it into the European market to increase liquidity and the churn rate. It also identifies Greece, Italy, and Austria as potential competitors for establishing a hub to serve Southeast Europe and notes steps each has taken.
Russia's gas pivot to Asia: a short-sighted policy or a long-term strategy?Olga Gerasimchuk
This presentation aims to examine the reasons which have prompted Russia to seek closer gas cooperation with Asia Pacific countries (mainly China), as well as hightlight its current gas pipeline and LNG projects in the East.
Russia: Energy Policies and Carbon MarketsOpen Knowledge
The WWF'S Russia study concludes that the Kyoto protocol could help Russia move forward. It calls for a long-term energy strategy and a faster Kyoto process in Russia.
A study released in December 2016 by the London School of Economics, titled "On the Comparative Advantage of U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Shale Gas Revolution." While America has enough shale gas to export plenty of it, exporting it is not as economic as exporting oil due to the elaborate processes to liquefy and regassify natural gas--therefore a lot of the gas stays right here at home, making the U.S. one of (if not the) cheapest places on the planet to establish manufacturing plants, especially for manufacturers that use natural gas and NGLs (natural gas liquids). Therefore, manufacturing, especially in the petrochemical sector, is ramping back up in the U.S. For every two jobs created by fracking, another one job is created in the manufacturing sector.
A report issued by the Natural Gas Supply Association that projects a marked increase in demand for natural gas during summer 2016, but "downward pressure" on natgas prices nonetheless--because of incredible production from shale.
Southeastern Mediterranean hydrocarbons - A new energy corridor for the EU?Harris Samaras
The (a) confirmation of significant quantities of hydrocarbons in Cyprus, (b) the scientific estimates of equally significant quantities in the south and southwest of the Greek island of Crete and (c) the officially declared increased cooperation between Cyprus, Israel and Greece to jointly exploit their hydrocarbon deposits may prove to be a tremendous opportunity not only for Cyprus, Greece and Israel but for the EU as a whole.
World renowned scientists claim that the hydrocarbon deposits that lie south and southwest of the island of Crete are huge; and maybe bigger than those in the Levantine Basin; they dare to state that within the EEZ of Greece there may be as much as 51 tcm of natural gas! Could this lead into the making of a new energy corridor for the EU? Shouldn’t the EU be more actively involved in the efforts of its member countries, Greece and Cyprus? Isn’t this for the EU a project of Pan-European interest thus include it in its energy policy, coordinate and assist with technical knowhow but also with political leverage and other? As critical year 2020 is around the corner, aren’t the already scientific interpretations important enough to accelerate the EU think tanks and policy institutes view on the whole issue?
Analiza interesów w polityce bezpieczeństwa energetycznego w UERemigiuszRosicki
Energy safety constitutes an important issue in UE documents and strategies. Its main interests are liberalizing the energy market, interdependence (through the expansion of connections) and energy solidarity. The liberalizing of the energy market aims to introduce free market mechanisms and competition. The main mechanisms are TPA principle and unbundling. The interdependence is to consist in the expansion of gas and electroenergetic connections among UE members. However, there is much controversy connected with the idea of energy solidarity. It results from different stand among old and new UE members. Energy safety, in general, should be connected with the predictability of energy market which can be achieved by means of a transparent market and cooperation, Such energy security is to be achieved by (1) decreasing energy dependency, (2) decreasing domestic demand for energy and resources, (3) diversification of energy resources, (4) counteracting homogenous energy infrastructure, (5) expansion of connections between countries and regions. The main hypothesis of this thesis is the statement the multidimensional interests and different interest groups influence the shape of energy security policy in UE. The main fields of the analysis of the interests in UE energy policy adopted in this thesis include: global interests, geopolitical interests, the interests of individual member countries and interest of energy markets. However, the interest groups include all of those who influence the shape of UE energy policy. The objective of this thesis is to present the main directions of UE energy security policy development. The analysis in historical, institutional and normative scope has been made. The main trends in the development of the energy security policy have been defined. It concerns normative and technological solutions in UE member counties. A flagging UE energy potential in a global perspective has been pointed out, yet the issue of the dynamics of those processes is still open to dispute.
Transmission corridors are the subject of the bill prepared in 2012. The bill on transmission corridors 1 determine the rules of (1) establishing a corridor for new transmission facilities, (2) granting permission for the construction of transmission facilities, (3) determining a transmission corridor for existing transmission facilities, (4) locating further transmission equipment and other transmission facilities in the corridor, (5) establishing transmission easement and land management in the area of the transmission corridor, (6) determining and awarding compensation for the transmission easement encumbrance of real estate. In 2012 the bill was one of the priorities in the energy sector – not including the amendment of the Energy Law, the work on the bill on renewable energy sources and work on the project of the gas law. The intention of the Act on transmission corridors is to organize the legal system in order to ensure effective development of transmission infrastructure in Poland. The problem with the electricity infrastructure should be considered in a broader context, which means with its poor condition, increasing demand for energy, the need to diversify the energy structure in Poland. The problem with infrastructure will continue to grow due to the need to develop renewable energy sources and the planned construction of a nuclear power plant. Current state of transmission lines threatens the development of renewable energy to the level required by the European Union. However, in the case of the plan to build a nuclear power plant, it will be necessary to condense the grid in areas of poor infrastructure and ensure proper grid balancing.
The protection of internal security and constitutional order as exemplified b...RemigiuszRosicki
The main objective of the paper is to present the issues of the protection of internal security and constitutional order in view of the tasks and activities of the Internal Security Agency in Poland. The
author of the text seeks answers to the following questions. (1) To what extent does the lack of clear-cut frames for the ISA’s activity influence the instrumental use of this agency? (2) Do over-generalised legal
regulations on the ISA’s activities lead to poorer efficiency of this agency’s operations? (3) Does faulty regulation related to the ISA’s range of activities result from inadequacies in Polish legislation, or maybe from the intention to endow the special services with greater freedom of action? In reference to the above questions, the author puts forward the following theses: (1) the selected and analysed legal instruments exert an infinitesimal influence on the scope of the application of “special
measures”, such as the operational control or access to telecommunications data. Art. 3 of the Bill of 2014 contains too many vague terms or expressions whose legal definitions are missing from Polish leg-
islation; (2) it seems reasonable that the range of the ISA’s activities has been restricted, e.g. as regards drug-related crime. However, other areas of the ISA’s interest have witnessed few changes, and its impromptu involvement with specific threats and offences is left to the ‘political decision’ of the Head of the ISA and the Minister of the Interior; (3) the impractical solutions are partly a result of an inadequate
‘legislative culture’, in this case, at the level of the Ministry of the Interior. This shortcoming might be the result of excessive haste during work on the Bill; nevertheless, such works always carry a political load, which means that the interests of the services themselves, as well as of the state, played an enormous role in this project.
R. Rosicki, The Crisis of the Formula of Liberal Democracy, w: Ł. Jureńczyk, N. Shukuralieva, W. Trempała (red.), Kryzys w stosunkach międzynarodowych, KPSW, Bydgoszcz 2012, pp. 19 - 37.
The Institution of Transmission Easement in PolandRemigiuszRosicki
This paper analyzes the transmission easement institution based both on Polish civil law and legal solutions prepared on the basis of Polish administrative law. In the first case the analyzed solutions contained in the Civil Code (together with the prepared amendments to the regulations on transmission easement). In the second case there was discussed the analysis of selected transmission easement regulations, which are contained in the bill on transmission corridors. The paper presents an analysis of the following issues: (1) the institution of transmission easement, (2) the constraints on transmission easement, (3) the term "transmission facilities" – both on the Civil Code and the bill on transmission corridors, (5) transmission corridors and effects of setting in their area transmission easement. However, the issue of compensation related to the establishment of easements on the basis of civil law and administrative law has not been further discussed here.
The Energy Policy of Poland till 2050 - a critical analysisRemigiuszRosicki
This document provides a critical analysis of Poland's energy policy up to 2050. It summarizes the key assumptions of Poland's Energy Policy until 2030 and reviews an incomplete draft of the Energy Policy until 2050. It analyzes how the legal status of Poland's energy policies has contributed to poor achievement of strategic goals in the energy sector. It also discusses the lack of responsibility from political entities in realizing the strategic goals outlined in these policies. The document concludes by identifying the major problems Poland will face in its energy sector, including grid capacity development, infrastructure development, coal mining transformation, and establishing an effective renewable energy strategy.
O przedmiocie badan politologii. Czy mozliwa jest ogolna teoria polityki?RemigiuszRosicki
W artykule analizie poddane zostało zagadnienie tożsamości przedmiotowej nauki o polityce. Punktem wyjścia jest stwierdzenie o niemożności jednoznacznego i nie wzbudzającego większych kontrowersji zakreślenia granic polityki i polityczności, a w konsekwencji – stworzenia jednolitej ogólnej teorii polityki. Autorzy rozpatrują wpływ tego faktu na samookreślenie politologii, próby wyznaczenia zakresu przedmiotowego analiz politologicznych, a także strategie budowania teorii w nauce o polityce. Problem przedmiotowego zakreślenia pola analiz politologicznych zostaje również zestawiony z analogicznymi kwestiami w innych naukach społecznych (ekonomii, socjologii i psychologii) oraz sposobami w jakie owe nauki sobie z nim radzą.
W dalszej części artykułu rozważane są problemy tworzenia generalizacji teoretycznych w politologii i przechodzenia na kolejne poziomy ogólności teorii. Krytyce poddana zostaje dedukcyjna strategia budowania teorii ogólnej, Autorzy zauważają jednak, że również strategia indukcyjna nie spełnia pokładanych w niej nadziei. Ponadto analizie poddane zostały relacje teorii politologicznej z praktyką polityczną, a także cele jakie stawia sobie w tym zakresie nauka o polityce.
W konkluzji artykułu Autorzy formułują zestaw dyrektyw metodologicznych, jakie ich zdaniem dają szansę na przełamanie dotychczasowego impasu w określaniu przedmiotu badań politologii oraz budowaniu ogólnej teorii polityki.""
The article is a synthetic analysis of the categories of universalism and particularism, which feature in a variety of academic fields, e.g. theology, religious studies, philosophy and his-tory. The four main directions of analysis for the above-mentioned categories are: 1) Christian religion, 2) philosophy, 3) social sciences, and 4) politics. The article addresses the issues of the divine universe; St Paul's universalist strategy; sym-bolic universe by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann; Immanuel Wallerstein's European universalism; the fluidity of the identity in Ernesto Laclau's conception; Chantal Mouffe's politicality and politics; politics of emancipation and life by Anthony Giddens; Chantal Mouffe's and Ernesto Laclau's conception of political identity; agonic and radical democracies in the conception by Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau.
Monitoring report on Ukraine's progress in the implementation of the associat...DonbassFullAccess
Monitoring report on Ukraine's progress in the implementation of the association agreement with the European Union in the areas of energy and environment, June 2017
Swedbank was founded in 1820, as Sweden’s first savings bank was established. Today, our heritage is visible in that we truly are a bank for each and every one and in that we still strive to contribute to a sustainable development of society and our environment. We are strongly committed to society as a whole and keen to help bring about a sustainable form of societal development. Our Swedish operations hold an ISO 14001 environmental certification, and environmental work is an integral part of our business activities.
Current debate on the energy security in the EU often stresses the EU dependency on gas imports from Russia. However, Russia is no less dependent on the EU – more than half of its gas exports goes to Europe. The purpose of this paper is to characterize this mutual dependency through an index-based approach, and to discuss how the development of gas markets may affect such dependency. We suggest a unified framework to assess the security of gas supply for the EU and the security of gas demand for Russia, and construct dependency indexes for both parties. Our approach accounts not only for the traditional import/export dependency measures but also for the balance of power between Russia and the EU. The proposed methodology is then used to address the evolution of the EU-Russia gas relationship in the view of gas market's developments. New gas pipelines projects (e.g., South Stream, Nabucco) and increasing use of liquefied natural gas are all likely to impact both the demand side and the supply side of the EU-Russia gas trade, and affect mutual gas dependency between the EU and Russia.
Russia and Europe: in Useless Search of Diversificationenergystate
The document discusses issues surrounding Europe's energy security and dependence on fossil fuels. It notes that easily accessible oil and gas reserves have been depleted, leaving more difficult reserves that have higher political risks. Economic crisis may temporarily lower oil prices but could exacerbate long-term energy shortages by reducing investment in new projects. Alternative energy sources still have significant limitations, and diversifying gas suppliers away from Russia poses major challenges. The document argues that fully replacing fossil fuels is not possible and Europe will continue to rely heavily on gas imports, including from Russia.
The project "Enhancing impact of civil society in monitoring and policy dialogue on energy and related sectors’ reforms in line with the Association Agreement implementation" presents the monitoring report on Ukraine’s progress in the implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU in the areas of energy and environment for October 2016.
Monitoring report on Ukraine's progress in the implementation of the associat...DonbassFullAccess
Monitoring report on Ukraine's progress in the implementation of the association agreement with the European Union in the areas of energy and environment, October 2016
Running Head Russian Economy Past, Present & Future Russian Ec.docxtodd521
Running Head: Russian Economy: Past, Present & Future
Russian Economy: Past, Present & Future 11
Russian Economy: Past, Present & Future
By [Name of Student]
Course
Professor
[Name of Institution]
November 04, 2018
Russian Economy: Past, Present & Future
Question 1:
INTERMEDIATE INPUTS
1. -----------SOURCES-------- ------REQUIRED BY-------- -----FINAL USE------------------
Output
Stocks
Imports
Coal
Steel
Machinery
Consumption
Exports
Imports
Coal (tons)
975
10
0
10
500
50
50
100
210
Steel (tons)
2,000
0
20
200
400
1,000
300
100
20
Machinery
100
5
5
20
40
10
20
10
10
Consumer goods
340
10
20
0
0
0
100
100
230
The table shows the 4-sector input-out table of the Soviet economy in 1951.
Does a balance exist? Discuss which sector/s you believe may not be in balance and why (50-75 words)
The given input-output model depicts an imbalance. The output of coal, steel and machinery, as well as the consumer goods were in sufficient, but their final consumption was at the lowest level. The reason behind this maladministration, is the fickle economic policy of the government, which forced the agricultural farmers to work into the industries, and maximize the output, while the available resources were minimum. The concentration towards industrialization by ignoring the agricultural field ruined the whole mechanism.
What options does Gosplan have to bring the system into balance? Which options would be appropriate for each sector that might not currently be balanced? How will this bring about balance? Justify your choice of action. (100-150 words)
Soviet economy was managed by Gosplan, the State Planning Commission, responsible for drawing economic policy based on the input of the market and its advisors
1950s is considered to be a most successful period after NEP, when national income grew as much as 9 percent annually. Prices generally went down.
The major fault came through, was the falsification of presented data to the actual planners and policy makers.
There was a drastic expansion in the output of the consumer goods associated with agricultural in the past (Denton, 1968), but the post war period and the destruction of the cities, debris everywhere urged the Gosplan to forcefully minimize the agricultural farming and maximize the reconstruction and the industrialization of the country, which ultimately became the major mistake. The Gosplan should have focused on the agricultural, while tried its utmost effort on the exports of coal, steel and the machinery. And should have stabilized the production of the consumer goods, as per requirements.
Discuss five of the chief drawbacks to the system of central planning that was in place in the Soviet Union from 1935 - 1965. (250 words)
The central planning system of Soviet Union, usually called "material balance planning" which was to balance the total output with the total input, and by this way, there was an equitable.
This presentation was presented by Chloé Le Coq during the annual SITE Development Day 2021 conference at Stockholm School of Economics via Zoom.
Disclaimer: SITE has the permission from Chloé Le Coq to upload this presentation slide.
Russian LNG exports face both opportunities and challenges geopolitically. On one hand, LNG exports could open new markets and add flexibility to Russian gas supplies. However, it also faces competition from other LNG exporters and could undermine Russia's existing long-term gas supply contracts in Europe. Looking ahead, Russia will need to balance using LNG to enter new Asian markets while defending its dominant position in the European gas market through pipeline exports. The growth of shale gas and a potential second economic crisis also pose threats to Russian LNG ambitions.
This document summarizes the challenges Poland faces in ensuring its energy security within the context of the European Union's common energy policy, particularly in the gas sector. It notes that while EU member states share the goal of diversifying energy sources and supply continuity, they differ in factors like historical supplier relationships, energy mixes, resource access, and import dependence. This hampers coordination of a joint energy policy. The lack of cooperation has a more negative impact on Poland and other new EU members that rely heavily on Russian gas imports compared to older members with more diversified supplies. Proper infrastructure and cross-border connections are also still lacking. A truly common EU energy policy is difficult while differences between members persist.
Poland’s Energy Security in the Context of the EU’s Common Energy Policy. The...Michal
This document summarizes the challenges Poland faces in ensuring its energy security within the context of the European Union's common energy policy, particularly in the gas sector. It notes that while EU member states share the goal of diversifying energy sources and supply continuity, they differ in factors like historical supplier relationships, energy mixes, resource access, and import dependence. This hampers coordination of a joint energy policy. The lack of cooperation has a more negative impact on Poland and other new EU members that rely heavily on Russian gas imports compared to older members with more diversified supplies. Proper infrastructure and cross-border connections are also lacking. A truly common EU energy policy is difficult while differences between members persist.
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is rapidly changing the structure of the global gas industry.
Flexible in transportation, safe in use, and competitive in supply, LNG today has already won more than 40% of the physical volume of world gas exports and is expected to reach 60% by 2040. In 2020, the development of the LNG market underwent significant transformations, as the COVID-19 pandemic posed a challenge to the global economy.
This document summarizes information about shale gas resources and exploration in Poland. It discusses Poland's energy problems and potential for shale gas, outlines exploration strategies and licensing requirements, and summarizes initial studies of hydraulic fracturing operations in Poland which found no impact on water or soil quality from fracturing activities. The document advocates for reducing environmental impacts through measures like public information sharing, research into fracturing techniques and chemicals, and use of multi-well pads.
Моніторинговий звіт про просування України у виконанні Угоди про Асоціацію з ...DonbassFullAccess
This document summarizes developments in Ukraine's energy sector in December, focusing on natural gas reforms. Key points include: the government approved a new system for distributing natural gas rent between budgets but did not reduce rent rates; draft laws on rent reductions were not passed; Ukraine and Poland agreed to accelerate construction of a gas interconnector; Ukraine significantly increased gas transit to Europe; and Naftogaz's debt and prices were also addressed. Progress was mixed, with some reforms advancing but important draft laws still pending approval.
Monitoring report on Ukraine's progress in the implementation of the associat...DonbassFullAccess
Monitoring report on Ukraine's progress in the implementation of the association agreement with the European Union in the areas of energy and environment, December 2016
Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Impact on Global LNG PricesEce Dincaslan
The Fukushima nuclear disaster led to a reduction in nuclear power generation globally. This has increased demand for liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a replacement, putting upward pressure on LNG prices. Germany decided to phase out all nuclear power by 2022, which will significantly increase its demand for natural gas. Other European countries are also reviewing their reliance on nuclear power. Higher LNG prices are benefiting exporters like Russia but increasing costs for importers such as Japan, China, and other Asian nations. The long-term impact on global energy markets and prices remains uncertain.
Chapter 4: Renewable Generation and Security of SupplyElectricidad Verde
The document discusses two main issues regarding renewable generation and security of supply in the EU: dependence on imported fuels and intermittency concerns. Regarding import dependence, the EU relies heavily on imported fossil fuels for power generation and natural gas imports are a major concern due to reliance on Russia. Recent winter gas supply interruptions from Russia via Ukraine highlighted this risk. However, renewable generation could help reduce this dependence. Regarding intermittency, renewables' variable output is a concern but may not significantly undermine security if markets are designed properly with backup capacity. The chapter examines these issues and debates surrounding EU renewable energy policy.
The objective scope of this analysis is focused on selected problems of the
Polish energy policy. The text addresses three groups of issues connected with Polish
energy policy: (1) institutional and legal matters, (2) forecasting, and (3) problems.
In the first case, attention is given to the statutory solutions with regard to the goals,
tasks, the model and the elements of the energy policy, as well as to the responsibility of different entities for its implementation. In the second case, scenarios for the
development of the energy policy are presented; they are also subjected to a brief
comparative analysis. In the third case, attention is given to the presentation of the
following issues: (1) energy dependence, (2) energy monoculture, (3) the level of
development of renewable energy sources, (4) emissions performance, and (5) energy
efficiency. In order for the research problem to be elaborated, the text features the
following research questions: (1) to what extent do institutional and legal solutions
affect the effectiveness of the energy policy pursued in Poland?; (2) which scenario
for the development of Polish energy policy should be deemed most likely?; (3) which
problem issues singled out in the analysis should be regarded as the greatest challenge
to the Polish energy policy?
The document discusses natural gas supplies and infrastructure in Europe. It notes that while Europe has significant regasification capacity for liquefied natural gas (LNG), much of this capacity remains unused. It also notes that Russia currently supplies a large amount of the gas used in Europe. There is potential to diversify supplies through increased use of LNG terminals and infrastructure investments, but this would require large capital expenditures. The document also discusses Poland's shale gas resources and efforts to develop regulations to increase hydrocarbon extraction.
The object of analysis in the present text is the issue of surveillance and data retention in Poland. The analysis of this issue follows from a critical stance taken by NGOs and state institutions on the scope of operational control wielded by the Polish police and special services – it concerns, in particular, the employment of " itemised phone bills and phone tapping. " Besides the quantitative analysis of surveillance and the scope of data retention, the text features the conclusions of the Human Rights Defender referred to the Constitutional Tri-bunal in 2011. It must be noted that the main problems concerned with the employment of surveillance and data retention are caused by: (1) a lack of specification of technical means which can be used by individual services; (2) a lack of specification of what kind of information and evidence is in question; (3) an open catalogue of information and evi-dence which can be clandestinely acquired in an operational mode. Furthermore, with re-gard to the access granted to teleinformation data by the Telecommunications Act, attention should be drawn to the wide array of data submitted to particular services. Also, the text draws on open interviews conducted mainly with former police officers with a view to highlighting some non-formal reasons for " phone tapping " in Poland. This comes in the form of a summary.
Public sphere and private sphere - masculinity and femininityRemigiuszRosicki
The sphere is a natural detenninant ofsocial ręiations, and thus shoulc1be an impor-tant category in the social scjences-Moreoveą a broader analysis should be conducted ovęr it. Discussions on sphere in the social sciences (in the narow meaning: sociology and politics) includę both the issue ofphysical sphere as wellas the concept ofsphere as an idea. In the political context it is attempted to connecl spherę with a descdption of politicalphenomena, power, violence, force, the sphere offreedom' ętc. It should be ob_ served that sphere as a public sphere is treatęd as a mętaphoI forpolitical participation, particulally in thę context of civil dghts. WŁat should be distinguished &om the ordi-nary sense ofpubiic sphęIe, the means sphere ofpublic access or spherc with specific fęatures usęful to society. In the |ust meaning ofthe public nature, which for oul con_ sidęrations is more impofiant' spherę would be recognized as a sphere ofparticipation, which means as a specialkind ofinteraction, plesęntations' and the legitimacy ofcol-lęctive oI indivicluai idełtity (of vadous typęs of particularities). It should bę noted that the specific undelstanding of politics and power should bę connected with the traditional recognition ofsphere, social spatial behavior, a deter_ mina[t of aggression or demographic description of society. It seems that you can draw a h1.pothesis that a spęcific type of description based among othęrs on the above-mentioned perspęctives strengthened specific Ępe of discourse in politics and power, whiclr has become one of thę factols lacilitating the ideological exclusion of certain social groups from public life, e'g' womęn. Depreciation ofwomen in social life by dehning the physical force and violence as an impońant lactol of tęrritofialism and tribalism, was thę basis for determining the practices and the mamęr ofthe discourse on the public Spttere as an area ofpolitical in-tęIaction' obviously' it was not the only factor limitirrg womęn's palticipation in the
Processes of change in academia – the impact of government and marketRemigiuszRosicki
The paper describes the problems associated with the development of universities and higher education on a global scale and based on the example of Poland. To illustrate the subject, the research fo-cuses on: (1) the idea of university autonomy and elitism from a historical and contemporary perspec-tive, (2) the delusion of elitism and social advancement of education which is attributed to it, (3) the myth of flexibility of education generated among others by politicians. The text indicates the main processes in academia: (1) centuries long removal of the autonomy of uni-versities, (2) the 'humanistic ethos' of universities is also removed, (3) universities are transformed into 'vocational colleges', (4) higher education is developed as one of the service sectors, (5) universities are transformed into institutions responsible for the labour market, (6) universities are entered in the 'logic of the free market', (7), the number of the educated is increasing, (8) the fetishisation of education, (9) the myth of flexibility of education and the its multifunctionality in the context of limited absorption capacity of the labour.
"Pornographic content related to presentation of violence" - art. 202 § 3 of ...RemigiuszRosicki
The legal issue related to the so-called hard-core pornography (pornography using and presenting violence) has been generally presented on the example of the Polish Criminal Code. Of particular importance is art. 202, § 3, which defines criminal penalties for distribution, production, recording, importing, storage and possession of "hard pornography" (the text is limited to the analysis of pornography using and presenting violence).
Suwerenność można rozpatrywać różnorodnie, tzn. jako zwierzchność władzy, także jako cechę jednostki, społeczeństwa, narodu itd. Artykuł odnosi się do początków rozważań o suwerenności, do suwerenności jako kategorii teoretycznej i prawnej. Ponadto w artykule zawarto analizę pojęcia suwerennej równości, co ma szczególne znaczenie w dobie dynamicznych zmian w środowisku
międzynarodowym. W tym też kontekście artykuł odnosi się do dorobku m.in. U. Becka, I. Wallersteina.
Sovereignty can be viewed from various perspectives: as superiority of power, as
an individual char acteristic, but also as a feature of a society or a nation, and many
others. This article deals with the beginnings of study on sovereignty, as well as with sovereignty as a theoretical and legislative category. Moreover, the text includes analysis of the
term of sovereign equality. The latter is of particular importance in the times of dynamic changes in international perspective. In this scope, the article deals with the heritage of U. Beck and I. Wallerstein.
Kryzys demokracji liberalnej - wybrane problemy rządzenia, legitymizacji i re...RemigiuszRosicki
R. Rosicki, Kryzys demokracji liberalnej - wybrane problemy rządzenia, legitymizacji i reprezentacji, w: M. Kołodziejczak, R. Rosicki (red.), Od teorii do praktyki politycznej, WNPiD UAM, Poznań 2012, pp. 241 – 258.
Instrumentalisation and Objectification of Human SexualityRemigiuszRosicki
The article discusses the issue of instrumentalisation and objectification of corporeality and sexuality. The issue was considered in the context of forms possible to distribute by the media. The starting point is general tabloidisation in the contemporary culture, which changes due to new technologies of production, recording and distribution. The body, nudity and violence are becoming a tool of inducing shock, dazzling with vulgarity and breaking taboos in order to satisfy sexual needs and curiosity. The ability to access previously restricted content or content which was previously not feasible due to the lack of universality of the media, causes that these forms find their customers. This problem has been reduced to the so called “hard pornography” (pornography using and presenting violence); however, attention should be paid to a broader range of issues which included 1) the actual sexual violence, 2) real sexual relations
of BDSM partners and (3) sexual violence in pornographic films. In fact, in each of
these situations we will talk about different forms of instrumentalisation and objectification of human corporeality.
The text presents the thesis that the legal sphere related toius publicum, which is shaped by participation in the public sphere, has a significant impact on private life. Hence the dominance of particular social narratives (ideology, ethics, etc.) affects the legal sphere, which interferes to a great extent with the private sphere of people. We should also stress the change in the meaning of what was called pornography – from tools to express political ideas to contents aiming at providing amusement
and satisfaction on different levels.
The legal issue related to the so-called hard-core pornography (pornography using and presenting violence) has been generally presented on the example of the Polish Criminal Code. Of particular importance is art. 202 § 3, which defines criminal penalties for distribution, production, recording, importing, storage and possession of “hard pornography” (the text is limited to the analysis of pornography using and presenting violence).
Information Security as Exemplified by Clandestine Collaboration and Influen...RemigiuszRosicki
The text addresses the issue of information security as exemplified by clandestine collaboration and the influence exerted by the Internal Security Agency officers upon journalists. The texts analyzes the de lege lata
regulations as well as the de lege ferenda ones. As for the former, the penal provisions of the Act, that is Articles 153b–153d (Chapter 10a) are applicable, whereas as for the latter, the applicable regulations are the 2013 Bill Articles numbered 197–199 (Chapter 10). In both the 2002 Act on the Internal Security Agency and Foreign Intelligence Agency as well as in the 2013 draft Bill of the Internal Security Agency, the legislator penalizes the employment by the officers of the information acquired while fulfilling or in connection with official duties for the purpose of affecting the operation of public authority bodies, entrepreneurs or
broadcasters, editors-in-chief, journalists and persons conducting publishing activity. Also, the
text analyzes regulations concerned with the penalization of clandestine collaboration engaged
in by ABW officers with a broadcaster, editor-in-chief, a journalist and a person conducting publishing activity.
Biogas, agricultural biogas and biogas plants in Poland - selected statistica...RemigiuszRosicki
Poland’s situation in the years 2012/2013 was far from stable and predictable in terms of legal regulations regarding the energy sector. Negative assessment of the works on necessary changes to the energy law does not refer to the scope of the subject. The scope of the subject of such works was forced by the need to adjust the requirements of the European Union in regards to the functioning of RES market. The prolongation of the works on regulations regarding the energy industry was also due to measures taken by various interest groups who, using this opportunity, attempted to guarantee their privileged "legal position” (RES sector, various types of RES, conventional energy sector). All these elements contributed to lack of the sense of legal stability. The object of analysis in the text is one of the RES sectors, namely the sector of biogas and agricultural biogas. Biogas, agricultural biogas and energy and/or heat obtained from them are not a significant element in the aspect of volume (power installed within RES is 136.3 MW, which constitutes 2.9%). However, attention must be drawn to major development potential of e.g. installations related to agricultural biogas production. The text presents the analysis of: (1) biogas potential in Poland, (2)definition of biogas and agricultural biogas, (3) development opportunities for biogas and agricultural biogas, (4) selected legal problems. The last case focuses on de lege ferenda regulations in the aspect of: (1) business activities involving generation of “energy” and agricultural biogas, (2) connection of RES/biogas installation to the transmission infrastructure. Due to specific dynamics of changes to the works on draft statutes, this part of the text focuses exclusively on signaling the selected legal institutions.
Development of Social Sciences in Dissertations of Immanuel Wallerstein - Imp...RemigiuszRosicki
This paper presents an analysis of the social science development concept of Immanuel Wallerstein. In general terms we can say that the development of social sciences was based on a process of emancipation of individual subjects of research and validation of research methods.
I. Wallerstein drew attention to the process of emancipation of individual disciplines, therefore
we can talk about the separation of philosophy, followed by social sciences and, negatively evaluated by I. Wallerstein, applied social sciences. With the constitution of individual disciplines
we dealt with the process of polarising methodological positions, which can be roughly described as the concept of two cultures. The text describes the following issues: (1) the directions
of emancipation of scientific disciplines, (2) the processes of emancipation of scientific disciplines, (3) the dynamics of changes in social sciences, (4) the effects of changes occurring in sciences. In addition to the main assumptions of I. Wallerstein on science, the text attempts to confront these assumptions with the achievements of T. S. Kuhn, R. K. Merton and C. W. Mills. The aim of the article is to point out the implications for the “theory of international relations” deriving from the general trends in the development of social sciences. This issue has come down to only selected issues of: microscopisation, idealisation, metaphorical use, deformation, transcendentalisation, fictionalisation and fetishisation of notions in the “theory of international relations”.
Bezpieczenstwo energetyczne i ekologiczne na przykladzie wegla brunatnego w P...RemigiuszRosicki
The analysis in the text involves selected aspects of brown coal sector functioning in Poland. The analysis has been made in the context of Poland’s energy security and ecological safety, which seems important due to the need to implement low-emission energy policy. In relation to the sole fact that electricity production relies on coal, Poland will face the need to undertake major sector transformations in the coming 20-30 years.
Two main parts of the text focus on the problem of energy security and ecological safety. In the earlier case, brief characteristic of the coal energy
sector in Poland has been presented, namely the potential of brown coal, selected economic problems related to functioning of the sector, and orientation of Polish energy policy in this respect. In turn, the problem of ecological safety has been brought down to the impact of mines on the natural environment.
Hence, the paper presents selected problems of threats to the natural and anthropogenic environment, as well as threats related to particular phases of energy production from brown coal. Furthermore, the text considers possible measures in the area of reclamation of areas where brown coal sector has been located.
Professional air quality monitoring systems provide immediate, on-site data for analysis, compliance, and decision-making.
Monitor common gases, weather parameters, particulates.
DERIVATION OF MODIFIED BERNOULLI EQUATION WITH VISCOUS EFFECTS AND TERMINAL V...Wasswaderrick3
In this book, we use conservation of energy techniques on a fluid element to derive the Modified Bernoulli equation of flow with viscous or friction effects. We derive the general equation of flow/ velocity and then from this we derive the Pouiselle flow equation, the transition flow equation and the turbulent flow equation. In the situations where there are no viscous effects , the equation reduces to the Bernoulli equation. From experimental results, we are able to include other terms in the Bernoulli equation. We also look at cases where pressure gradients exist. We use the Modified Bernoulli equation to derive equations of flow rate for pipes of different cross sectional areas connected together. We also extend our techniques of energy conservation to a sphere falling in a viscous medium under the effect of gravity. We demonstrate Stokes equation of terminal velocity and turbulent flow equation. We look at a way of calculating the time taken for a body to fall in a viscous medium. We also look at the general equation of terminal velocity.
Comparing Evolved Extractive Text Summary Scores of Bidirectional Encoder Rep...University of Maribor
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1. Remigiusz ROSICKI
Poznañ
Poland’s Gas Security
Abstract: The subject matter analyzed in the text is Poland’s energy security as illustrated with the secu-
rity of gas supply (gas supply security). The text analyzes a selection of problems concerned with gas se-
curity and so the focus is on: (1) a description of gas supply contracts, and (2) an assessment of gas
supply security with regard to the technical import capabilities of the transmission infrastructure. In both
cases two time-frames were applied: (1) 2006–2010, (2) the period after 2010 with a prospect for 2022.
The text goes on to verify the following questions: (1) In what scope was real action undertaken in order
to strengthen the security of gas supply to Poland in the years 2006–2010?, (2) How have the technical
and real capabilities to diversify the gas supply to Poland changed after 2010?
Key words: gas security, energy security, energy policy, Poland’s energy security
Introduction
The problem addressed in the text is concerned with the energy security of Po-
land, as exemplified by gas supply security. The gas problem has been the most
heavily discussed issue within the discourse on the state’s energy security. This is-
sue has also been exploited instrumentally during election campaigns – in elections
to the Sejm and Senat as well as in presidential elections (in many terms of office).
A threat to gas supply has always been related to the criticism of Poland’s depend-
ence on the supplies from the “eastern direction” (i.e. the Russian Federation). The
criticism has applied to both the conduct of particular governments responsible for
concluding the “Yamal Contract” itself (a Polish-Russian long-term natural gas
agreement, PGNiG-GAZPROM), as well as to particular annexes to the main con-
tract. Another issue that came under criticism in the discourse on energy security
was the lack of infrastructure that would facilitate a real and technical ability to im-
plement the gas supply diversification called for by politicians and specialists.
Energy security can be considered from various perspectives and in the scheme of di-
verse disciplines (Cherp, Jewell, 2011, p. 202–212). Still, it is hard to single out autono-
mous problems with surgical precision, and instead it should be stated that the burden of
energy security, the burden of analyses, etc. follows from the provenance of the scholarly
discipline represented by a given researcher. The problem of gas supply security can also
be examined against the backdrop of various perspectives, ranging from a political one,
through a technical one, an environmental one, to an economic one. The activity related to
the transmission, distribution and storage of gas requires technical capabilities. Hence,
the very discourse on the necessity to reduce the import dependence is of no use whatso-
ever if we do not possess technical capabilities that would allow a diversification of di-
rections and sources of energy supply. The same problem concerns the creation of
DOI : 10.14746/pp.2015.20.1.11
2. a competitive market. It is impossible to increase competitiveness if transmission infra-
structure is lacking, and the nature of the sector entails a gamut of “barriers to entry”
(Rosicki, 2012, p. 1–3).
With a view to the analysis of gas security, the text addresses the following questions:
(1) In what scope was real action undertaken in order to strengthen the security of gas sup-
ply to Poland in the years 2006–2010?, (2) How have the technical and real capabilities to
diversify the gas supply to Poland changed after 2010? In order to obtain answers to the
questions posed, a comparative analysis of two energy security prospects has been con-
ducted – the “old” one (spanning the years 2006–2010) and the “new” one (after 2010,
with a perspective of 2022). The analysis comprised two issues, to wit (1) an outline presen-
tation of the annexes to the “Yamal contract” (a natural gas supply agreement between Po-
land and Russia), and (2) an assessment of the action aimed at gas supply diversification.
Poland’s problem with gas supply emerged after the demise of the economic-military
system bonding the states of the Eastern Bloc. In the early 1990s (when the USSR was
formally still in operation) the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers pointed
to the necessity to promptly sign gas contracts with the USSR, as well as to the necessity
to find new export partners. Back then the transmission infrastructure on the eastern bor-
der enabled the import of 8 bn m3
of gas annually. The import accounted for only 65% of
Poland’s demand for gas. As regards the supply of gas, the transitional period consisted in
the transition from intergovernmental arrangements and transfer ruble-based settlements
to purchases based on market rules and payments made in convertible currencies. The
prices of gas imported from the “eastern direction” increased fourfold and remained
steady in 1992–1994. Towards the end of 1992 a Program of Poland’s Demand for Gas
until 2010 was announced; it addressed the courses of action to be taken with a view to in-
creasing the level of energy security as far as diversification of gas supplies was con-
cerned (Zawisza, 2011, p. 13–76; Program, 1992). In 1993 under the economic and
political circumstances, an arrangement was made between the governments of Poland
and Russia, whereby a transit gas pipeline was to run across the territory of Poland to
Western Europe; it was supposed to consist of two lines with the target transfer capacity
of up to 65 bn m3
of natural gas per annum. Additionally, by 2010 the gas pipeline was to
provide Poland with the supplies of 13 bn m3
annually (M.P. 2011, No. 46, item 512). The
Polish-Belorussian leg was completed in 1999, and the projected transfer capacity was at-
tained in 2005. Among the factors affecting the conclusion of the arrangement one can
reckon: (1) a reduction in the gas supplies by Russia at the beginning of 1993, (2) fore-
casts estimating Poland’s demand for gas at 25–35 bn m3
in 2010, (3) increased costs of
other gas-related projects presented in the Program of 1992.
1. The old prospect of gas security
1.1. Gas contracts
For a long time now an issue of Poland’s reliance on the gas supplies from the “eastern
direction”, that is from the Russian Federation, has been running throughout the dis-
course on Poland’s energy security. The analyses have more often than not emphasized
160 Remigiusz ROSICKI PP 1 ’15
3. the threat resulting from the development of the transmission infrastructure by Gazprom,
which was supposed to cut off such countries as Ukraine, Belarus and Poland from gas
supply (Ostant, 2012, p. 154–173; Donaj, Kucenko, 2011, p. 335–350). In this context
there was some talk of the so-called “gas loop” that was supposed to be made up of the
transmission infrastructure of Nord Stream AG, South Stream Transport AG, OPAL NEL
TRANSPORT GmbH and NEL Gastransport GmbH (Ka³¹¿na, Rosicki, 2010, p. 177–182).
An example of the sense of threat concerned with Gazprom’s agreement with German
companies was the statement made in 2006 by R. Sikorski (Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Poland), who compared this agreement to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.
The official commissioning of the first line of Nord Stream in 2011 did not get a good
press either; the inauguration of the gas pipeline was attended by German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, French Prime Minister Francois
Fillon, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the European Commissioner for Energy
Günther Oettinger (PAP, 2011). Poland and the post-Soviet States (new members states
of the EU) were amazed to witness the shortsightedness of the politicians from the “old
EU member states”. The amazement was all the greater as there had been a number of gas
crises between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, that is in 2006, 2007, 2008 and par-
ticularly in 2009 (Szeptycki, 2008, p. 99–135). The doubts voiced by the European Com-
mission in 2010, concerned with the gas agreement between Germany and Russia were
regarded as an etiquette formula legitimizing the long-term contract for the supply of gas
by Nord Stream (PAP, 2010).
Attention should be drawn to the prospect of gas supply security, which was in force
in the aforesaid period. The structure of the gas supply to Poland was dominated by the
“eastern direction”; the supplies from GAZPROM accounted for more than 90%. More-
over, Poland was obliged to receive the Russian gas from 1996 to 2022. The year 2019
will also be crucial, for if neither party expresses a wish to terminate the contract, it will
be automatically renewed for another 5 years. Political and economic analyses do not find
the contract terms too favourable for Poland; the same applies to the effects of individual
renegotiations of the so-called “Yamal Contract”. The renegotiation agreement of Octo-
ber 2010 (the negotiations themselves lasted 2009–2010) may serve here as an example.
The negotiations took place in the context of another Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, and
during another round of talks on the energy issues between the European Union and Rus-
sia. The effect of the contract was an annual increase in the gas supply of almost 2 bn m3
up to 2022. In 2006 Poland accepted unfavourable pricing terms, whereby the gas price
was to increase by 10% (Wyst¹pienie, 2012). These terms could not be changed in 2010.
It is estimated that Poland overpays for the gas supplies by 30%. For instance, at the be-
ginning of 2012 for a supply of 1000 m3
of gas Austria paid GAZPROM 397 USD,
France – 394 USD, Germany – 379 USD, Great Britain – 313 USD. It is remarkable that
the mean payment for 1000 m3
of gas among the EU member states was 430 USD,
whereas Poland paid 526 USD (that is 147 USD more than Germany, and 96 USD more
in relation to the mean price). Given the sum of 10 bn m3
of gas imported by agency,
a simple calculation shows that with the aforesaid cost Poland lost about 4 bn PLN an-
nually. It is to be noted that the cost of the Œwinoujœcie LNG terminal finalized at the
turn of 2014 and 2015 was to amount to 2.93 bn PLN, 32% of which was EU-funded
(Finansowanie, 2014).
PP 1 ’15 Poland’s Gas Security 161
4. As a result of the renegotiations completed in 2010 an annexe to the 1996 Contract
was signed by PGNiG and Gazprom Export. The effect of the contract was an increase in
the annual volume of gas supply that now reached 10.24 bn m3
(by the Polish standard)
and was supposed to be continued until 2022. The annexe provided for a direct purchase
of gas in the following years, that is in 2010 up to 9.03 bn m3
, in 2011 up to 9.77 m3
, and in
the years 2012–2022 up to 10.24 bn m3
. It should be noted that the annexe includes some
provisions allowing for gas re-export and price discounts, however these are trade secrets.
It was only estimated that the fixed preferential prices were to yield savings of 200–250
million USD in the years 2010–2014 (Aneks, 2010). The Supreme Audit Office has found
that PGNiG did not fully use its negotiating position in the arrangement-making process
with Gazprom Export in 2009–2010, which concerned the increase in the gas supply to
Poland as part of the Yamal Contract (Wyst¹pienie, 2012).
1.2. Evaluation of gas security
In the years 2006–2010 the index of energy dependence of Poland regarding all the
products rose by nearly 12%. The rising overall index is related to the decreasing coal
production (in that period the index of the dependence on imported solid fuels rose from
–21.7% to –5.2%), a steady and high level of crude oil import in relation to the domestic
production (in that period the dependence index for imported oil was more than 95%) and
the dependence index for imported gas, which by and large never went down [see Dia-
gram 1]. Given the plans to put some mines into liquidation on account of their
unprofitability, a rise in Poland’s import dependence is to be expected in the future. The
162 Remigiusz ROSICKI PP 1 ’15
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
ALL PRODUCTS GAS
Diagram 1. Index of import dependence for all products and for gas
in the years 2006–2010 (in percentage terms)
Source: Own study based on Eurostat data.
5. same problem will apply to the import of gas, which is linked with the predicted rise in the
demand for that fuel within 20 years.
The most widely discussed issue and fact are a high dependence on the gas imported
from the “eastern direction” [See Diagram 2]. Due to the series of successive annexes to
the “Yamal Contract”, the imported volume of this fuel has increased, while in the years
2006–2010 there were no real possibilities for supply diversification. The reasons for the
lack of real diversification in those years are: (1) a lack of proper infrastructure, (2) the
long-term contract with GAZPROM binding until 2022.
The negative assessment of the successive annexes to the “Yamal Contract” seems to
have little relevance to reality, that is to Poland’s actual bargaining power. Of crucial im-
portance are here two facts: (1) Polish-Russian relations that are anything but normal
(“political factors”), (2) a lack of infrastructure that would in technical and real terms se-
cure gas supply from other directions (“infrastructure factors”). In the latter case, the
years 1996–2009 should be assessed negatively as far as the activities of the Polish state
are concerned; Poland did not develop conditions favourably influencing the situation. It
is worth drawing attention to the technical capabilities to import gas to Poland in 2010
(though they are conditioned by the gas volume provided for in the “Yamal Contract”). In
that period the technical capabilities to import gas from the “eastern direction” accounted
for 91% (Drozdowicze + Vysokoye: 7.1 bn m3
, SGT [Transit Gas Pipeline System]/Point
of Interconnection: 3.1 bn m3
), whereas the remainder accounted for the western direction
(Lasów) [See Diagram 3].
PP 1 ’15 Poland’s Gas Security 163
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
RUSSIA CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES
16,4 16,8
47,8 45,8
49,2
57,0 63,1
16,5
4,9
0
Diagram 2. Share of gas imported from Russia and Central Asian countries
in gas consumption in Poland in 2006–2010 (in percentage terms)
Source: own study and calculations based on the data obtained from the Ministry of Economy.
6. The “eastern direction” of gas supply was determined by the existing infrastructure;
even the negotiations conducted with Gazprom in 2010 could not be supported by the
possibilities for the import of a substantial volume of gas from other directions. This must
be viewed as Poland’s weakness during the gas negotiations with Russia. This state of af-
fairs results from the shortsightedness of the Polish authorities, as well as from a lack of
strategic reasoning in the previous years. From the 1990s onwards the problem was not
the lack of potential diversification routes, but the actual implementation of the principles
laying out their realization (Cf. Kwiatkiewicz, 2006, pp. 265–275). It must be noted that
the potential diversification routes were already pointed to in the Program of Poland’s
Demand for Gas until 2010 (Program, 1992). The price terms of the contract, in fact im-
posed by Gazprom, may of course be originally caused by the political sphere, however
the situation would be different if in the public interest a transmission infrastructure so
much needed on account of the gas supply diversification had been developed from the
1990s. A lack of action in this respect was in fact instrumental in supporting Gazprom’s
position of a gas supply monopolist. In the case of a monopoly, conditions set for con-
sumers (in this case Poland) are frequently unfavourable. In the period in question in the
political discourse more importance was attached to the unfavourable activities on the
part of the Russians rather than to the incompetence of the Polish entities responsible for
energy policy and security. Some were of the opinion that diversification is impossible,
and that we are doomed to the gas supply from the “eastern direction” (Kwiatkiewicz,
2008). However, such a mode of thinking about diversification appears to have been
caused by an erroneous economic analysis that made a fetish of the costs of expensive in-
frastructure projects, disregarding the perspective of the public interest and long-term
strategic planning. The “eastern direction” gas prices that were several dozen percent
higher might be converted into potential infrastructure investments made with the saved
money if effective diversification and gas market competition were introduced.
The development of energy policy and security has always been greatly impacted by
the planning and programming formula of these two aspects. The planning formula for
164 Remigiusz ROSICKI PP 1 ’15
RASTERN DIRECTION
WESTERN DIRECTION
Diagram 3. Poland’s technical import capabilities in 2010 (in percentage terms)
Source: Own study based on PGNiG and GAZ-SYSTEM data.
7. the energy policy was laid down in Chapter III of the Energy Law Act of 1997 (“Journal
of Laws” 1997, no. 54, item 348, as amended). There still remains the issue of the respon-
sibility of the Minister of Economy for the directions and the actual implementation of the
policy. The state’s energy policy is adopted by way of resolution by the Council of Minis-
ters every four years for the planning/prediction period of at least 20 years. Regarding its
legal status, the planning document is of low standing in comparison to other legal acts.
Hence, the capacity of the Minister of Economy with respect to the coordination of the
state’s energy policy is hindered because of the nature of the energy policy as a source of
law, as well as the lack of authoritative instruments influencing both consumers and en-
ergy companies (Cf. Czarnecka, Og³ódek, 2007, p. 325–363; Pawe³czyk, Pikiewicz,
2012, p. 430–482; Waligórski, 2008, p. 69–74). The development of planning and pro-
gramming capabilities entails a number of amendments to the Energy Law Act, e.g. con-
cerning successive responsibilities imposed upon energy companies.
2. A new prospect of gas security
2.1. Gas contracts
On 5 November 2012 PGNiG and GAZPROM concluded another annexe to the
“Yamal Contract”, thereby changing the price terms of the gas supply. The new price for-
mula was to bring about a price reduction of more than 10% with the “retroactive effect.”
The gas arrangement with GAZPROM provides for the “retroactive clause”, which
means that in the event of the parties agreeing on the new price formula or the proceed-
ings being concluded in favour of PGNiG, the new price shall be applicable the moment
the formal claim was submitted for the price to be changed. The adopted settlement
method substantially affected the EBITDA results of PGNiG – it was supposed to amount
to about 2.53 bn PLN. This in turn determined the level of the Polish company’s capital-
ization (Aneks, 2012; PAP, 2012). The annexe was to come into force provided that the
Polish party withdrew the plaint submitted to the Arbitration Tribunal in Stockholm.
PGNiG fulfilled this condition on the next day, 6 November 2012. The company received
a confirmation of the plaint withdrawal acknowledgment (Raport, 2012).
At the beginning of 2015 a problem concerning the settlements between PGNiG and
GAZPROM emerged. The arrangements provided for a price reduction, but in January
2015 the negotiations with GAZPROM were still in progress (it’s a general rule that the
negotiations may last for as long as 6 months). The Polish party pointed to the possibility
of handing the matter over to the Arbitration Tribunal. A probable cause of GAZPROM’s
delay in the resolution of this issue was an intention to demonstrate revenues, as in 2014
the company’s income dropped by around 35% (i.e. from approx. 24 bn USD down to
16 bn USD) in comparison to the previous year (Zysk, 2015).
2.2. Gas security assessment
The Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine in fact facilitated the acceptance of the
previously ignored Polish arguments concerning a threat to the gas supply security from
PP 1 ’15 Poland’s Gas Security 165
8. the “eastern direction” in the European Union; even the most devoted EU allies of the
Russian Federation lost their arguments. It became apparent that for political reasons
Russia is not a stable partner, and as a result viewpoints on necessary and additional in-
vestments in Central and Eastern Europe were redefined. It should be stressed that irre-
spective of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, in the European Union the year 2014 was
marked by the finalization of the market construction. Back then the EU member states
were to finalize the construction of the internal energy market, which was to be connected
with an electricity and gas transmission infrastructure linking all the member states
within one EU system. Towards the end of the year the European Commission deter-
mined to earmark 647 m EUR for the crucial infrastructure (PCIs – projects of common
interest) within the CEF (Connecting Europe Facility) financial instrument. It should be
noted that the CEF has secured 5.85 bn EUR for investments in the infrastructure of
trans-European energy networks until 2020 (COM/2011/665; Projects, 2015). The devel-
opment of a transmission infrastructure in Poland will completely change the situation
concerned with the gas supply security and diversification in the forthcoming years. In
the year of the “Yamal Contract” termination Poland will surely have a different negotiat-
ing position against GAZPROM, even if Russia continues to keep high gas prices due to
some “political factors”. With regard to the prediction of Poland’s increased demand for
gas, the volume of 10.2 bn m3
will still have to be secured by import. However, in the year
in question there will be a different proportion of technical capabilities to import gas – i.e.
from the “eastern direction” the volume will still be 10.2 bn m3
, whereas all the other di-
rections will account for the total volume of 28 bn m3
.
It is worth comparing the situation of 2016 with the situation of 2022 as far as the tech-
nical capabilities to import gas are concerned. Thus, we will get the big picture of the
166 Remigiusz ROSICKI PP 1 ’15
EASTERN DIRECTION
MALANOW
LNG TERMINAL
LASÓW
POLAND-CZECH
REPUBLIC (Cieszyn)
Diagram 4. Poland’s technical capabilities to import gas in 2016 (in percentage terms)
Source: Own study based on PGNiG and GAZ-SYSTEM data.
9. situation and of the scope of changes entailing due to the development of the gas infra-
structure in Poland. The choice of these time-frames is not fortuitous; in 2016 the LNG
Terminal will already be in operation, whereas 2022 will mark the operation of new in-
terconnections, inter alia Poland-Slovakia, Poland-Czech Republic (Hat) and Po-
land-Lithuania. When compared to 2010, the technical capabilities in 2016 will rise by
11.4 bn m3
, and in 2022 they will in turn rise by 15.7 bn m3
, attaining the total of
38.3 bn m3
[See Diagram 4 and 5] (Plan, 2014).
In 2016 the structure of the technical import capabilities will still be dominated by
the “eastern direction,” accounting for 45%, whereas the “western direction” (Lasów,
Malanów) will amount to 31% share [See Diagram 4]. From the perspective of an actual
increase in gas supply security in the event of a gas supply cut-off from the “eastern direc-
tion” (due to any factors whatsoever – “infrastructure-related” or “political” ones), of
great significance was the attainment of the technical capability of a physical reverse
flow, inter alia at the Poland-Germany point (SGT Malanów).
In 2022 the “eastern direction”, as part of the structure of technical import capabilities,
will account for 27%. The expansion of the transmission infrastructure in the “southern
direction” will be crucial; this direction will account for 33% share in the structure of the
technical import capabilities. With regard to the “southern direction” the following inter-
connections should be enumerated: Poland-Czech Republic (Hat) – 17%, Poland-Czech
Republic (Cieszyn) – 1%, Poland-Slovakia – 15% [See Diagram 5]. The infrastructural
development of this direction is connected with the project of the so-called “the
North-South Corridor,” which is intended to improve Poland’s gas supply security, but
PP 1 ’15 Poland’s Gas Security 167
EASTERN DIRECTION
MALANOW
LASÓW
LNG TERMINAL
POLAND-CZECH
REPUBLIC (Hat)
POLAND-SLOVAKIA
POLAND-LITHUANIA
POLAND-CZECH
REPUBLIC (Cieszyn)
Diagram 5. Poland’s technical capabilities to import gas in 2022 (in percentage terms)
Source: Own study based on PGNiG and GAZ-SYSTEM data.
10. also to enable a construction of a more effective and competitive Poland-EU energy mar-
ket. This means that the Polish infrastructure will be prepared for a potential reception of
gas from the directions currently unavailable, i.e. from the LNG terminals located in the
Mediterranean Sea. As part of the plan to develop the GAZ-SYSTEM S.A. Transmission
System Operator, a construction of 2000-kilometre gas pipelines has been projected to be
completed by 2023 (Plan, 2014; Lista, 2015).
In 2014 Gaz-System S.A. presented predictions concerned with the development of
the domestic gas demand; three scenarios were considered. The first one was optimal – it
was developed taking into account the possibility and probability of the demand on the
part of specific clients/end users actually reaching the declared amount. The second sce-
nario – the moderate one – was delineated on the basis of the nominations for transmis-
sion contracts, additionally taking into account the gas volume following from the
contracts for a connection to the already-begun investments with a view to the construc-
tion of combined cycle units. The third scenario was based on the guidelines included in
the planning document The Energy Policy of Poland until 2030 (The Energy, 2009; Plan,
2014) [See Diagram 6].
It is interesting to note that the indicated predictions are concerned with the demand
for a transmission service within the context of the domestic gas demand. This means that
for the projection of the demand for transmission services provided with the aid of the do-
mestic system one still needs to take into account a transit transmission and the fuel ex-
port. There is no doubt that each of the scenarios demonstrates a year-over-year increase
in the domestic demand for gas. In the first prediction the demand increases up to
168 Remigiusz ROSICKI PP 1 ’15
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2015 2018 2000 2023
PREDCTION 1 PREDCTION 2 PREDCTION 3
16.7
16.1
15.4
16.4
18.2
17.1
18.5
25.1
23.7
25.5
18.9
18.2
Diagram 6. Predicted demand for gas transmission services in bn m3
(following from domestic demand)
Source: Own study based on GAZ-SYSTEM data.
11. 25.5 bn m3
, the second one – up to 18.9 bn m3
, while the third one – up to 18.2 bn m3
. The
first scenario shows the greatest increase, which means that it will be necessary to secure
the physical supply of gas to Poland [See Diagram 6] (Plan, 2014). Should this scenario
be fulfilled, new directions of gas supply would be needed, for the LNG Terminal will
cover more than 19.5% of the domestic demand and the supplies from the “eastern direc-
tion” will account for 40% (allowing for the maintenance of the technical capabilities to
import gas form the Russian Federation). As for the development of gas demand, the de-
termination of the Polish authorities regarding the introduction of low emission energy
generation (gas-fired power plants should be included) will be of great significance for
Poland. The analysis of the investment outlays on new generating capacities in the period
of 2014–2028, which were declared by energy companies, shows that nearly 40% of new
generating capacities will be related to gas (The Investment, 2014, p. 3 and the following
pages). Furthermore, the development of the chemical industry in Poland should be taken
into account, as it is the single greatest end user of gas.
Conclusion
It should be emphasized that the decade from 2010 will witness a process of strength-
ening Poland’s energy security concerned with the minimization of the risk of the gas
supply being discontinued. The main indicator here is the development of the transmis-
sion infrastructure in the domestic system as well as the construction of the internal en-
ergy market in the European Union. The text analyzes only a selection of problems
concerned with gas security, that is a study of gas contracts and an assessment of gas sup-
ply security with regard to the technical import capabilities of the transmission infrastruc-
ture. With a view to the analysis of the indicated issues, the text undertakes to verify the
following questions: (1) In what scope was real action undertaken in order to strengthen
the security of gas supply to Poland in the years 2006–2010?, (2) How have the technical
and real capabilities to diversify the gas supply to Poland changed after 2010?
1) It is hard to point to real action aimed at the diversification of gas supply to Po-
land in the years 2006–2009, which resulted in a weak negotiating position of Po-
land against GAZPROM in 2010. A negative assessment of the annexes to the
“Yamal Contract”, presented by politicians and some energy policy analysts, se-
ems to have no relevance to the actual negotiating possibilities of Poland. This
state of affairs was greatly shaped by factors of political and infrastructural nature.
It must also be stressed that if technical capabilities to diversify the supply had
been in place, little would have changed in the negotiations with GAZPROM over
lower prices of the supplied volume of gas. Still, the technical import capabilities
would have enabled the negotiation of the choice of extra volume of 2 bn m3
from another direction in 2010. It is worth stressing that in the years 2009–2014
investments were made with a view to the expansion of the gas pipelines by more
than 800 kilometres, and the construction of the LNG Terminal continued.
2) According to the Development Plan for the Current and Future Supply of Gase-
ous Fuels in 2014–2023 the technical import capabilities will be rising. It is esti-
mated that in 2022 the domestic transmission system will attain the transfer
PP 1 ’15 Poland’s Gas Security 169
12. capacity (throughput) of 38.3 bn m3, the “eastern direction” accounting for 27%,
the “southern direction” – 33%, and the “western direction” – 18%. This means
that without the technical capabilities of the “eastern direction”, the domestic sys-
tem will still have the transfer capacity of 28.1 bn m3
. Juxtaposing such a dimi-
nished transfer capacity with the optimal prediction outlined in the text [See
Diagram 6], it follows that Poland will eliminate the threat concerned with the
“energy blackmail” from the “eastern direction”. Also, the negotiating position of
Poland against Russia will change at the turn of 2022–2023. This will however
not eliminate the threat of an “energy blackmail” from the “eastern direction” tar-
geted at the whole of the European Union. Nevertheless, it must be noted that
physical reverse flows in the “western direction” have a substantially consolida-
ting effect on Poland’s gas security. Moreover, a number of other investments are
worth pointing out; among the ones that were not mentioned in the analysis are
the Baltic Pipe Project and a third storage tank of the LNG Terminal, which both
are relevant for the increase in the transfer capacity of the domestic gas system.
Poland’s energy security should also be considered within the context of the internal
energy market of the European Union. The context of the EU policy will significantly in-
fluence the gas security and individual member states in Central and Eastern Europe. The
termination of the “Yamal Contract” (2022) marks a new prospect for the climate and en-
ergy policy of the EU (2nd
Climate and Energy Package), new goals as for the reduction in
GHG emissions, an increase in the share of RES in energy generation, increased energy
efficiency as well as a number of infrastructure-related investments (trans-European en-
ergy connections and crucial infrastructure). Infrastructure investments are particularly
bound to increase the possibilities for supply diversification, while they will introduce
greater competition in the EU gas market. Apparently, greater energy independence re-
quires the development of RES, not because RES are “green energy”, but because they do
not entail import dependence.
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Bezpieczeñstwo gazowe Polski
Summary
Przedmiotem analizy w tekœcie jest bezpieczeñstwo energetyczne Polski na przyk³adzie bez-
pieczeñstwa dostaw gazu (bezpieczeñstwo gazowe). W pracy podjêta zosta³a analiza jedynie wybranych
problemów bezpieczeñstwa gazowego, uwaga skupiona zosta³a na: 1) charakterystyce kontraktów
gazowych i 2) ocenie bezpieczeñstwa dostaw gazu ze wzglêdu na techniczne mo¿liwoœci importowe
infrastruktury przesy³owej. W obu przypadkach przyjêto dwie perspektywy czasowe: 1) 2006–2010,
2) okres po 2010 z prognoz¹ na rok 2022. W tekœcie podjêto siê zweryfikowania nastêpuj¹cych pytañ:
1) W jakim zakresie mieliœmy do czynienia z realnymi dzia³aniami wzmacniaj¹cymi bezpieczeñstwo
dostaw gazu do Polski w okresie 2006–2010? 2) Jak zmieniaj¹ siê techniczne i faktyczne mo¿liwoœci
dywersyfikacji dostaw gazu do Polski po roku 2010?
S³owa kluczowe: bezpieczeñstwo gazowe, bezpieczeñstwo energetyczne, polityka energetyczna, bez-
pieczeñstwo energetyczne Polski
172 Remigiusz ROSICKI PP 1 ’15