1. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
Testing Offensive Realism
on NATO expansion in
Europe
A case study in three parts
Masters thesis in Political Science and International Relations
Department of Government - Uppsala University, spring 2011
Author: Oscar Sundevall
Supervisor: Aaron Maltais
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2. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
Abstract:
This masters thesis is a qualitative case study, testing the explanatory power of John J.
Mearsheimers “Offensive Realism” as expressed in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
(2001) on NATO’s continued existence and expansion in Europe post-Cold War.
Mearsheimer assumes that states are rational power maximizes, always looking out for
themselves in an anarchical world, always trying to gain more power at the expense of others.
From this line of reasoning, NATO’s continued existence and expansion seems to be the
opposite of rational state behavior as NATO has expanded with countries that require more
protection than they contribute in collective security. I pose three questions; first I test the
construct validity of Offensive Realism on NATO’s continued existence. My findings point
towards it being an anomaly of the theory. Second, since Mearsheimer assumes that
anomalies have negative consequences (states gaining less power and security than if they
would have followed Offensive Realisms maxims), by use of counterfactuals I test if U.S.
membership of NATO did or did not have negative consequences for the country. My
findings points towards no causal connection between U.S. security concerns and NATO’s
existence and expansion. This shows that states can have goals and behaviors that are
anomalies, but not suffer the negative consequences Offensive Realism presupposes they will.
Third, I test my alternate theory of explanation, Neoclassical Realism, by uncovering if unit-
level variables had any explanatory power in the process of NATO finding new rationales for
existence and expansion post-Cold War. My findings points towards unit-level variables with
explanatory power especially in the process leading up to the expansion of NATO.
Keywords:
international relations, realism, offensive realism, structural realism, neoclassical realism,
mearsheimer, waltz, nato, cold war, united states, foreign policy
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3. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
Table of contents
Chapter 1 – Introduction, purpose and outline ........................................................................... 5
1.1 Power as the driving force of conflict .............................................................................. 5
1.2 Scope, purpose and research question .............................................................................. 7
1.3 General outline ................................................................................................................. 7
Chapter 2 – Theories of Foreign Policy ..................................................................................... 8
2.1 Offensive Realism ............................................................................................................ 8
2.2 Differences and likeness with Defensive Realism ........................................................... 8
2.3 Premises of Offensive Realism ........................................................................................ 9
2.4 Assumptions of Offensive Realism ................................................................................ 10
2.4.1 Anarchy ................................................................................................................... 10
2.4.2 Offensive military capability ................................................................................... 11
2.4.3 Uncertainty .............................................................................................................. 11
2.4.4 The goal is survival ................................................................................................. 11
2.4.5 Great powers are rational actors .............................................................................. 11
2.5 Central strategies of Offensive Realism ......................................................................... 12
2.6 Neoclassical Realism...................................................................................................... 14
2.6.1 Figure 1 – variables in Neoclassical Realism.......................................................... 14
2.7 Key players within the state ........................................................................................... 15
2.7.1 Foreign Policy Executive (FPE) .............................................................................. 15
2.7.2 Societal Elites .......................................................................................................... 15
2.8 Neoclassical Realism as an extension of Structural Realism? ....................................... 16
2.8.1 Figure 2 – specificity and generalizability .............................................................. 17
2.9 Assumptions of Neoclassical Realism ........................................................................... 18
2.9.1 Primacy of conflict groups ...................................................................................... 19
2.9.2 Primacy of power .................................................................................................... 19
2.9.3 Anarchy of the international system........................................................................ 19
2.9.4 Confined rationality................................................................................................. 20
2.9.5 Figure 3 – feedback in Neoclassical Realism.......................................................... 22
2.10 Concepts of Offensive and Neoclassical Realism ........................................................ 22
Chapter 3 – Research questions, design and case .................................................................... 23
3.1 Methods of research ....................................................................................................... 23
3.2 Research questions ......................................................................................................... 23
3.2.1 Figure 4 – research design ....................................................................................... 24
3.3 The second best design ................................................................................................... 25
3.4 Methodological standards .............................................................................................. 26
3.5 Limitations of Neoclassical Realism .............................................................................. 27
3.6 Material .......................................................................................................................... 27
3.7 Methods .......................................................................................................................... 28
3.8 The Case: NATO cold-War War existence and expansion in Europe ........................... 29
Chapter 4 – Analysis ................................................................................................................ 30
4.1 Analysis: NATO post-Cold War existence and expansion in Europe (question 1) ....... 30
4.2 Analysis: NATO post-Cold War existence and expansion in Europe (question 2) ....... 35
4.3 Analysis: NATO post-Cold War existence and expansion in Europe (question 3) ....... 40
4.3.1 A new raison d’état ................................................................................................. 41
4.3.2 New purpose - new expansion ................................................................................ 45
Chapter 5 – Conclusions and final thoughts............................................................................. 50
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4. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
5.1 Conclusions in summary ................................................................................................ 50
5.2 What then of Europe? ..................................................................................................... 51
5.3 Offensive Realism might be right, if Mearsheimer is wrong ......................................... 52
6. References ............................................................................................................................ 55
6.1 Books & articles ............................................................................................................. 55
6.2 Internet sources .............................................................................................................. 57
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5. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
Chapter 1 – Introduction, purpose and outline
1.1 Power
as
the
driving
force
of
conflict
Political scientists have since the dawn of the first Greek city-states theorized and tried to
explain causes of inter-state conflicts and behaviour. The Greek historian Thucydides (460-
395 BC) is by historical accounts the first person who sowed the seed of realist thought. In his
record of the Peloponnesian War he touches upon a number of core assumptions of
international relations theory, later developed during the centuries, for example when Athens
builds city walls in fear of Spartas might, it might provoke a first strike response.1 Central
concepts later developed into scientific building blocks, such as anarchy, relative power and
balancing are persistent as the backdrop of Thucydides historical narrative, in his attempt to
gauge why Athens and Sparta behaved like they did.
Thucydides lasting legacy to the world was that he recognized power as a fundamental
driving force of political relationships and conflicts. In his own words: “The strong do what
they can and the weak suffer what they must”.2 This assumption is echoed in some of the
most seminal works of political theory that followed. Thomas Hobbes who translated
Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War wrote Leviathan in the 17th century. Hobbes
touches upon an insight and fact that is a cornerstone of international relations theory, namely
that beyond commonwealths there is no Leviathan, or in his words “no court of natural
justice”.3 Therefore anarchy is a state of nature in international relations, and consequently
actors need to provide their own security by gaining and maintaining power. This posits the
security dilemma. As power is in Hobbes view a relative concept, ones security is the
insecurity of another. This bleak fact of life in international relations makes it in his view, and
in modern realist thought, necessary to gain more power than competing nations, i.e. to
balance power.
One might of course ask why the study of a certain theory of International Relations has any
real world relevance outside academia. It all boils down to the fact that armed conflicts seem
1
Clifford W. Brown, “Thucydides, Hobbes and the derivation of anarchy” in History of Political
Thought Volume VIII, spring 1978
2
Thucydides. 1934 reissue. The Peloponnesian War (book V)
3
Hobbes, Thomas. 2009 reissue. Leviathan
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6. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
to be an ever persistent and ever returning activity of human civilization. Professor of
archeology, Lawrance H. Kelly claims that some 95 percent of all known societies have
engaged in warfare.4 Advancing knowledge of states decisions in foreign policy in large - and
pertaining to warfare and organizations conductive to warfare and conflict management in
particular – thus has an undeniable scientific and societal relevance.
Realism strength as theory rests on the fact that it draws from a rich history of political
thought, from previously mentioned Thucydides and Hobbes, through Machiavelli and
Kjellén. These thinkers and political scientists could all be called purveyors of raison d’état,
or reason of state - a doctrine of different maxims that are said to increase security of the
state, when followed in foreign affairs.5 By stripping away idealism, realism claims to show
the naked power structure of the world, i.e. the world as it ‘is’.
Since Realism in large presents itself as an objective and amoral theoretical framework of
statecraft, with very few independent and dependent variables, it should also be highly
testable by scientific method. What I found especially interesting is the recent sub-theory of
Offensive Realism, developed by John J. Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics (2001). My interest in testing his theory stems in part from the fact that he explicitly
denies that domestic politics has any real influence on foreign policy – I find it instinctually
unlikely that ‘all’ is determined by a states relative power. The theory is simply a bit too
reductionist for my liking. A basic premise of his theory is also that states are assumed to be,
what cannot be called anything else than selfish. States look out for themselves first and
always.
From this line of reasoning should follow that states do not enter and maintain, and especially
expand alliances when they are not threatened. But this seems to be the case, as the defensive
alliance of NATO has more than doubled its membership base after the end of the Cold War.
Why do mighty states like the U.S. agree to expand an alliance with new members that
require more protection than they contribute in collective security? It seems contradictory to
Mearsheimers theory. Can this possible contradiction be traced to a variable he explicitly
4
Keeley, H. Lawrance. 1996. War Before Civilization: the Myth of the Peaceful Savage
5
Dunne, Tim & Schmidt, C. Brian. 2008. ”The timeless wisdom of Realism”, in The Globalization of
World Politics: 162
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7. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
denies to provide any explanatory power: For example domestic politics, a certain politician,
or an ‘x-factor’ uncovered by his theory? To answer these questions is the aim of this thesis.
1.2
Scope,
purpose
and
research
question
This master’s thesis is a qualitative case study. The purpose is as argued above to test the
explanatory power of the ‘Realistic’ theory called Offensive Realism as it is presented by its
originator, Mearsheimer in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001). I will do this by
pitting it against a competing theory called Neoclassical Realism. The purpose of this thesis is
to test Offensive Realism on the following questions:
• Why does NATO continue to exist and expand post-Cold War with countries that
require more protection than they contribute in collective security?
• Is the continued existence, and post-Cold War expansion of NATO in Europe an
anomaly of Mearsheimers Offensive Realism?
If it indeed is to be regarded as an anomaly of the theory, I will move on to test if it did or did
not have negative consequences for the U.S. as Mearsheimer would assume (“negative
consequences” being equal to not gaining as much power as they would have if they had
followed Offensive Realisms maxims). Finally, I will look for unit-level variables with
explanatory power, which is what Neoclassical Realism, as the alternate explanatory theory
would presuppose exist.6 In the section “method of research”, I will outline in detail the
research design, discuss problems and strengths, and narrow down the questions to three
testable hypotheses.
1.3
General
outline
6
A unit-level variable is a domestic or sub-domestic variable: It could be anything from an interest
group, economic interests, foreign policy planners and their agendas, to domestic “events” such as
presidential elections. It is not a variable that necessarily is relative to another states, and assumed to
influence foreign policy by its relative distribution between states. Gideon Rose for example identifies
two typical unit-level variables in ”decision makers perspectives” and ”domestic decision making
processes”. Se
Rose, Gideon. 1998. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, in World
Politics Vol. 51 no. 1
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8. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
This master’s thesis is structured into five main chapters. The sections above seeks to give the
reader a very basic understanding of some of the salient characteristics of International
Relations theory, a brief overview it’s history, and introduce some core concepts of Realism,
namely that of power and anarchy. I have also presented the purpose of this master’s thesis.
In chapter two, on theory, I will familiarize the reader with Offensive Realism, Defensive
Realism and Neoclassical Realist thought, showing both it’s similarities and differences, to
give the reader a theoretical understanding of the conflicting views on relevant explanatory
variables and contested concepts.
In chapter three, I will describe and discuss my method of research, the case, associated
material and the demarcations of this thesis, given the case I have chosen. As described in
“scope, purpose and research question” above I will argue as to why the case of NATO’s
post-Cold War existence and expansion is suitable in testing Offensive Realism.
In chapter four I will present my analysis, and it’s results. And finally in chapter five, I will
discuss my conclusions, and final thoughts.
Chapter 2 – Theories of Foreign Policy
2.1
Offensive
Realism
The most hard-boiled power-centered theory of all within Realism is Offensive Realism. It is
a beautifully simplistic theory, almost to a fault. Offensive Realism posits that the overriding
goal of each Great Power state is to maximize its share of world power, which will be at the
expense of other states power.7 Offensive Realism thus recognizes that power is a relative
concept. Although all Great Powers, would like to be strongest of all, the ultimate goal is to
be the hegemon, the only Great Power in the system.8
2.2
Differences
and
likeness
with
Defensive
Realism
To narrow down the conceptual scope of the theory, we need to first look at its close relative,
called Defensive Realism (or Neorealism). The basic assumption of Defensive Realism as
7
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 2
8
ibid
8

9. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
Kenneth Waltz originally stated it, is that all states aim to survive. Therefore they seek
security, which usually equates with their current position. As he puts it: “The first concern of
states is to maintain their position in the system”.9 Great Powers are inclined to gain power at
the expense of others, but Waltz emphasizes balance as a core concept. If states aggressively
seek power, then other states will balance against them. Also, if they overstretch their
ambition, gaining “to much” power, the balancing effect will leave them worse off than if
they simply acted defensively.10 At Defensive Realisms core is thus the notion that the
international system favors status quo, and consequently a defensive posture.
Moving back to Offensive Realism and Mearsheimer, we begin to see what are the contested
concepts between the two theories. Unlike Defensive Realism, Offensive Realism argues that
status quo is rare, because the international system creates incentives for states to try to gain
more power at the expense of others.11 The underlying conflict essentially boils down to that
Defensive Realism sees balancing as likely and successful, and Offensive Realism does not.
They do however share one important feature: The structure (incentives) of the system is the
independent variable, i.e. the main explanatory variable as to why states compete for power.
Both are essentially system-level theories, although Waltz’s theory recognizes that unit-level
variables can have explanatory power.12 Mearsheimer on other hand rejects the notion that
domestic politics matters, and that certain domestic political coalitions will be more
aggressive than others.13 Offensive Realism is fundamentally amoral, since it does not
distinguish between “good” and “bad” states, for example that a state that acts “nice” will
gain good-will and be treated “nice” by others. States are instead analytically treated like
billiard balls of varying size, their movement being determined by outside pressure.14 In
Mearsheimers own words: “A purely realist interpretation of the Cold War, for example,
allows for no meaningful difference in the motives behind American and Soviet behavior
during the conflict”.15
2.3
Premises
of
Offensive
Realism
9
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics: 126
10
ibid: chapter 8
11
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 21
12
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics: 91
13
Rosecrance, Richard N. 2002. ”War and Peace”, review article in World Politics Vol. 55 No. 1: 141
14
Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. ”The False Promise of International Institutions”, in International
Security Vol. 19 No. 3: 48
15
ibid: 48
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10. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
Since no great state is likely to achieve global hegemony, the world is, in the words of
Mearsheimer “condemned to perpetual great-power competition”. From this follows that
Great Powers are primed to exploit opportunities to alter the distribution of power in their
favor, if they possess necessary capabilities.16 I.e. Great Powers are inclined to be offensive.17
The underlying factual premise of these assumptions are threefold 1) the persistent fact that
the world lacks a Leviathan, 2) the fact that states always possess some offensive military
capabilities, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain of other states intentions.18
While these three points are essentially uncontested, the interpretations of how this translates
into state behavior is debated within IR theory and Realism in large, as shown briefly above,
and as I will reveal in greater detail in following sections. Mearsheimer himself recognizes
this as he writes that Offensive Realism is both a descriptive and prescriptive (normative)
theory: States should behave according to the maxims of Offensive Realism. But if the theory
describes how states act, is there a need to prescribe how they should act? Mearsheimer
confesses that states sometimes act in contradiction to the theory (they are in his words
“anomalies”), but this behavior “invariably has negative consequences”.19 I will return to this
statement in the chapter three, as it is a theoretical weak point of the theory, and a point of
critique.
2.4
Assumptions
of
Offensive
Realism
To flesh out the central assumptions of Offensive Realism, we need to recapitulate and
expand the three previously mentioned points, and add two more.
2.4.1
Anarchy
Common to all Realist theories is the assumption that the international system is anarchic.
This is not a statement as to how rife the world is with conflict. Rather it is an “ordering
16
A great power is defined by Mearsheimer ”largely” on basis of relative military capability. To
qualify as a great power, a state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious fight in an all-
out conventional war against the worlds most powerful state. Se Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The
Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 5
17
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 3
18
ibid: 3
19
ibid: 12
10

11. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
principle” stating that the international system is made up of sovereign states that have no
central authority with monopoly of force or judiciary above them.20
2.4.2
Offensive
military
capability
All Great Powers possess some offensive military capability, giving them power to hurt one
another. From this follows that states are potentially dangerous to each other. Counting
nuclear arms as offensive weapons, then not only Great Powers - i.e. the U.S., Great Britain,
France, Russia and China - possess offensive military capabilities, but also regional powers
such as India, Pakistan, Israel and North-Korea.
2.4.3
Uncertainty
Remembering the theoretical divide of Defensive and Offensive Realism on the explanatory
power of balancing, Offensive Realism posits that status quo and equilibrium is an illusion.
While this assumption is contested, the factual premise it is based on holds true - history
shows us that all ‘empires’ one time or another have declined and fallen, either from internal
strife or external pressure. Add to this the assumption that any state lives in uncertainty as to
other states intentions and capabilities.21 This is underlined not in the least by, also the factual
premise that it’s next to impossible to separate offensive military capability from defensive.
This is increasingly the case as military tactics and military forces of both Great Powers and
lesser powers become more mobile.
2.4.4
The
goal
is
survival
Offensive Realism assumes that states primary goal is survival. That is to maintain its
sovereignty, territorial integrity and autonomy of its domestic political order (laws, political
system, order of society).22 At glance this seems to echo Defensive Realism assumption,
which is also that states overarching goal is survival. To a point this is true, the difference
between the two comes to how a state should act to survive. Offensive Realisms assumption is
well known: By offensively seeking more power at the expense of others.
2.4.5
Great
powers
are
rational
actors
Offensive Realism assumes that states are not only aware of the ‘fact’ that the driving force of
state behavior is the quest for power, to secure ones survival. It also assumes that states have
the ability to strategically weigh options and possible actions, pertaining to how other states
20
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 30
21
Hall, John A. 2003. ”A Perpetual and Restless Desire of Power after Power”, review essay in The
Canadian Journal of Sociology Vol. 28 No. 4: 565
22
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 31
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12. Oscar
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Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
will react given their own preferences, and how the actions of those states will affect their
own strategy for survival.23
In summary, according to Mearsheimer these five assumptions, anarchy, offensive military
capability, uncertainty, survival, and rationality, result in certain patterns of behavior: 1) fear,
2) self-help and 3) power maximization.24
2.5
Central
strategies
of
Offensive
Realism
I have displayed the central and underlying assumptions of Offensive Realism, as to how the
international system is assumed to be ordered. To further understand how states are assumed
to behave towards one another in the Offensive Realist framework, we need to also look at
strategies and options. They are as follows:
2.5.1
War – The name of the strategy says it all: the use of military force to further ones goal
of gaining more power, to gain more security. There is a scholarly debate as to if and to what
degree war is a successful way of furthering the state agenda of gaining power. Offensive
Realism, in the vein of Mearsheimer, does not claim that war is always the best option, rather
he makes the case that those claiming war almost always bankrupts the aggressor and leads to
no concrete benefits are wrong. War has been, is, and is assumed to continue to be an option
pursued by Great Powers in some situations.25
2.5.2
Blackmail
– The strategy of threatening with the use of force. It is ceteris paribus
preferable to war, since it entails achieving ones goal without the material costs associated
with war. However, it is unlikely to shift a power balance in any real terms, since Great
Powers also have great military strength. Therefore they are unlikely to cave in to threats
without a fight. Mearsheimer claims that blackmail is more likely to work against minor
powers that have no Great Power ally.26
2.5.3
Bait
and
bleed – This strategy is employed to cause a conflict with two rival powers,
while the ‘baiter’ remains unscathed with its military power intact. Mearsheimer makes the
23
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 31
24
ibid: 32
25
ibid: 148
26
ibid: 152
12

13. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
claim that this strategy is rarely used; since the states being baited are likely to recognize the
danger of letting the baiter remain on the sidelines. There is also the danger of one of the
states actually win a quick victory, with the end result of them gaining rather than losing
power.27 One of the few concrete examples of this strategy being employed is the Al-Qaeda
attack on the U.S. in 2001, where some sources claim that the implicit goal of the attack was
to tie up the U.S. military in a costly campaign in Afghanistan.28
2.5.4
Bloodletting – This is a refined variant of the ‘bait and bleed’ strategy. By making sure
two rivals are engaged in a long and costly conflict they drain each other’s resources, and in
doing so involuntarily increase the relative power of the state that is on the sideline. There is
no actual ‘baiting’ involved in this version, rather the two fighting states went to war for other
reasons, but the on-going conflict is fueled by a third party. Unlike the bait and bleed strategy,
historical records show this strategy being explicitly deployed on numerous occasions.29
2.5.5
Balancing – This strategy entails a Great Power taking responsibility for preventing an
aggressor from shifting the balance of power. The goal is to deter the aggressor, either with
the threat of force, or in worst case, the use of force. In Mearsheimers analytical framework,
this strategy entails three sub-strategies: 1) Drawing the proverbial line in the sand by
diplomatic channels, 2) Creating a defensive alliance, so called “external balancing”, and 3)
Pooling additional resources of their own, for example increasing military spending or
implementing conscription, so called “internal balancing”.30
2.5.6
Buck-­‐passing – Mearsheimer argues that this strategy is the preferred option to
balancing. A buck-passer attempts to shift the burden of deterring or possibly fighting the
aggressor, while it remains unscathed. Ideally it looks for some other state that is also
threatened by the aggressor to bear the burden of deterrence or possibly war. Like most other
strategies displayed in this section, buck-passing has been used on several occasions during
the 19th and 20th century.31
27
ibid: 154
28
Atwan, Bari Abdel. 2006. The Secret History of Al Qaeda: 221
29
During both World War I & II, for detailed examples, see: Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy
of Great Power Politics: 154
30
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 157
31
ibid: 158
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Spring
2011
2.6
Neoclassical
Realism
The latest branch on the tree of realist theory of international relations is the so-called school
of Neoclassical Realism. It developed as a new school of thought in the early nineties, related
to other forms of realist thought, but with its own defining characteristics. Although still
embryonic in some aspects, mostly in the sense that it is not as singular and simplistic in its
assumptions as Mearsheimers Offensive Realism, it has arguably proven to be a useful
analytical framework in explaining certain state behavior and foreign policy outcomes.32
Neoclassical Realism (henceforth “NCR”) shares the same bleak outlook on international
relations as Realism as a whole: The world is Hobbesian, lacks a leviathan and therefore is
characterized by anarchy. From this follows that the most important determinant of state
behavior is the relative power relative to other states. From these two basic conceptions of the
makeup of the international system flows all other analysis of state behavior. NCR opens up
domestic variables that act as filters and feedback mechanisms between the primary
independent variable, relative power, and the dependent variable of foreign policy:
2.6.1
Figure
1
–
variables
in
Neoclassical
Realism
Relative
Power
Domestic
Foreign
Policy
(independent)
variables
(dependent)
A way of highlighting the different relevant variables in state action is the three “images”, or
theories, of Waltz. He differs between the first image of individual decision-makers, the
second image of domestic politics, and the third image of international politics.33 There is no
consensus among defensive realist/neorealist scholars on precise mechanisms of third-image
32
See for example Fareed Zakaria. 1998. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's
World Role
33
Waltz, Kenneth. 1959. Man, the State, and War: 159, 188
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15. Oscar
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Spring
2011
factors in explaining foreign policy, and especially war. But the common view is that
international factors are the best starting points of analysis.
In the view of NCR states are not unitary actors, but composed of networks of differing
interests. While this is factually self-evident, a defining characteristic of NCR is that it
emphasizes and employs it in research. Sometimes in conflict and sometimes in alliance
different interests within the state shape foreign policy in the “wiggle room” that exists under
the systemic pressure of the international system and the premises of anarchy and relative
power.
2.7
Key
players
within
the
state
A central assumption of NCR is thus the primacy of groups (unit-level variables) within the
nation. S.E. Lobell has developed a framework of classification of influential groups within a
given state:
2.7.1
Foreign
Policy
Executive
(FPE)
Composed of the state leaders that sit at the intersection of domestic and international politics.
This group is the “sole authoritative foreign policy maker”, responsible for, and presumed to
be interested in preserving national security.34 They have a monopoly on intelligence on
foreign countries, and have in their hand the reins of the states foreign policy. Thus, any
policy shift must come from, be pushed through, or be convincing enough for the FPE to
change policy.
2.7.2
Societal
Elites
Composed of socioeconomic leaders within the state, interested in maximizing their sectors
economic welfare. Lobell differs between two broad societal coalitions, internationalists and
nationalists. The coalitions form around shared (economic) interests. From these interests
their outlook on foreign policy is shaped, Lobell quotes approvingly Peter Gourevich: “What
people want depends on where they sit”.35
These two ideal types do not presuppose that neither the FPE nor the Societal Elite groups are
internally coherent on preferred policy at all times. Worth noting is also the difference
34
Lobell, S.E. 2009. ”Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy”, in Neoclassical Realism, The
State, And Foreign Policy: 57
35
Quoted in Lobell, S.E. 2009. ”Threat assessment, the state, and foreign policy”, in Neoclassical
Realism, The State, And Foreign Policy: 58
15

16. Oscar
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Spring
2011
between the variables state power (tools of the government) and national power (public
support, shared beliefs and culture, etc). A government can in the views of NCR use state
power in foreign policy to influence a domestic goal concerning national power, for example
“rallying at the flag”-type outcomes.
There is no conflict between NCR and realism in large that in the long term, a state’s behavior
will likely converge with predictions of its actions, following the given structural factors of its
existence, i.e. it’s relative power.36 However, as shown above, NCR argues that to truly
understand foreign policy choices of a given state, not in the least in the short run, we need to
take into account intra-state politics, and its relevant unit-level variables – vocal interest
groups, economic interests, foreign policy makers. In essence, pressure from the international
system is filtered and mediated through unit-level variables that affect policy choices within
the given room of action available to the state.37
2.8
Neoclassical
Realism
as
an
extension
of
Structural
Realism?
The question begs to be answered if NCR should be viewed, as Randall Schweller suggests,
as a ‘theory of mistakes’. Schweller argues that “states rarely conform to realism’s
assumptions of units as coherent actors. The closer the policymaking process and actual state-
societal relations approximate a unitary actor, the more accurate realism’s predictions”.38 This
constitutes a “weak” form of NCR. As Waltz posits, states can do “any fool thing they want”,
but they are likely to be rewarded for behavior that is in line with the structural pressure, and
consequently punished for behavior that isn’t.39 From this line of reasoning, one might like
Brian Rathbun argue that NCR is indeed an extension of structural realism.40 In essence, when
state behavior conforms to structural pressure structural realism provides “enough” of an
explanation. When it does not, NCR comes into play.
I would however argue that this line of reasoning sells out NCR cheap, given the fact that
NCR scholars like Zakaria are not occupied with explaining “mistakes”, but actually
36
Juneau, Thomas. 2010. Neoclassical Realist Strategic Analysis: 2
37
Loebell et al. 2009. Neoclassical Realism, The State, And Foreign Policy: 141
38
Schweller, Randall. 2006. Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power.
39
Waltz, Kenneth. 2003. ”Evaluating Theories” in John A. Vasquez et al, eds, Realism and the
Balance of Power: 49
40
Rathbun, Brian. 1998. “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as the Logical and
Necessary Extension of Structural Realism”, in Security Studies 17: 294-321
16

17. Oscar
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thesis
Spring
2011
anomalies that cannot be explained by other theories. Neither Zakaria nor Rose who coined
‘Neoclassical Realism’ would agree with Rathbun, as their kind of NCR incorporates unit-
level variables from the get go, not only when other realist theories fails in giving satisfactory
answers.41 But as Juneau argues there is no real conflict between these at glance opposing
views of NCR, if we look at them simply as tools available for a given research problem:
Which one we pick is but a question of the problem. The spectrums of research can be shown
visually:
2.8.1
Figure
2
–
specificity
and
generalizability42
SpeciIicity
Rathbunian
Rosian
Generalizability
Rathbunian – ‘theory of mistakes’, Rosian – ‘foreign policy analysis’
Any given NCR research program can move along these two spectrums. The more one moves
towards specificity one, usually, loses in generalizability. Without positing a “straw man”,
realism in its defensive and offensive forms, are theories of foreign policy occupied with
foremost meta-factors: systemic explanations. NCR on the other hand leans towards
specificity, thus losing some generalizability. While this can be a point of critique that NCR
does not posits any “catch-all” theories, what you gain in specificity you lose in
41
Rose, Gideon. 1998. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, in World Politics Vol.
51 No. 1: 146
42
Juneau, Thomas. 2010. Neoclassical Realist Strategic Analysis: 3
17

18. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
generalizability in all social science. If not “grander” realist theories of IR can explain a given
outcome of interest; it is moot point of critique of NCR.
As B.O. Fordham argues, the loss of generalizability of NCR could actually be called a strong
point of the theory. Structural realism (offensive and defensive) posits what is merely
different assumptions as to what behavior is rewarded by the power structure of the
international system. They do not explain “why state X did Y on Thursday”. Given that there
have been cases of overly aggressive regimes, to “sucidally passive” ones, and everything in
between, it seems reasonable to assume that a theory that claiming that all states share the
same priorities (be it security or relative power) is flawed.43 Fordham agues that the problem
gets worse for theories that assume fixed preferences. As we try to explain narrower policy
choices, where policy will vary to a larger degree than on broader questions, greater
explanatory demands are made on theories that assume fixed preferences. Simultaneously the
likelihood of explanatory power lies in unit-level variables increases. As explained above
however, this is an ever-existent problem in social sciences, what you gain in specificity you
loose in generalizability, and vice versa. But it does show the strength of NCR given the right
scope and research question.
This is also a case against additive models that posit that domestic and international variables
are distinct and act as separate influences on policy, I.e. if system-level pressures cannot
explain a given outcome, then we simply add domestic and/or unit-level variables to explain
“mistakes”. This points towards the theoretical weakness of system-level theories when it
comes to narrow policy choices.44 If we assume that state motives are not fixed and universal
in the vein of either security of power maximization, but there is in fact “wiggle room”, it
follows that international considerations interact with domestic political processes, and we
must look at both.
2.9
Assumptions
of
Neoclassical
Realism
43
Fordham, B.O. 2009. ”The limits of neoclassical realism”, in Neoclassical Realism, The State and
Foreign Policy: 255
44
Waltz for example excludes unit-level variables, but does not actually claim that system-level
variables hold all explanatory power. Rather he argues his theory explains the constraints that confine
states. Also, Waltz argues that Defensive Realism is a theory of international politics, not foreign
policy, since he argues that it is impossible to construct a viable theory of foreign policy. Se Waltz,
Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics: 91 & Waltz, Kenneth. 1996. ”International Politics is
Not Foreign Policy”, in Security Studies, 6: 54–57
18

19. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
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Spring
2011
A predominant feature of NCR is its lack of ‘grand’ theorizing. Unlike other forms of realism,
NCR does not approach a given research problem with the notion that regularities of foreign
policy can be deduced from system level variables. While NCR is still an emerging school of
thought, with a wide variety of different methods of research, and indeed also a wide variety
of sub-theories of foreign policy, there still are a number of common features of NCR as a
whole, beyond the notion of the importance of domestic variables in foreign policy
outcomes.45
2.9.1
Primacy
of
conflict
groups
Politics is a collective game of several actors, who have changing alliances, enemies and
goals. The fundamental unit of politics is the group, simply by the fact that politics is shaped
in a setting, be it in a democracy or a dictatorship, where there by definition are several
parties of interest involved.46 The group can take on many forms, from the city-state, to
empires, to the modern state. Within each political unit there are sub-groups, both within the
state, and on the international level where states form larger groups of interest. This
assumption however, says nothing on the extent of the group at hand (be it a several states
with a common agenda, or interests within the state) is and acts as a unitary actor.47
2.9.2
Primacy
of
power
As touched upon above, NCR, as all schools of realism, assumes that a states power – in
essence its “place” (hierarchy) in the international system – is the primary determinant of state
behavior. This fundamental assumption is at realisms very core.48 Even though NCR places
“power” at the start of the casual chain, NCR does not acknowledge that it in itself holds all
explanatory power of foreign policy. Also, unlike structural realism (Offensive and
Defensive) NCR does not hold the view that states only and exclusively try to maximize
power and/or security.49
2.9.3
Anarchy
of
the
international
system
As all theories of international relations acknowledge, the international system differs from
states in the sense that there is no overarching rule-of-law, and no leviathan. Liberalism in its
45
Se for example Loebell et al, 2009, Neoclassical Realism, The State, And Foreign Policy for an
overview of different sub-theories and methods of research within the paradigm of NCR.
46
Gilpin, Robert G. 1996. ”No One Loves a Political Realist, in Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements
and Renewal: 3-26. London: Frank Cass
47
Juneau, Thomas, 2010, Neoclassical Realist Strategic Analysis: 5
48
Rose, Gideon. 1998. ”Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy, in World Politics 51:
144-172
49
Juneau, Thomas, 2010, Neoclassical Realist Strategic Analysis: 6
19

20. Oscar
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Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
different forms emphasizes that the prisoners dilemma can be overbridged by schemes that
are mutually beneficial for the parties involved. Realisms well-known outlook is more bleak:
since there is no central authority, states operates in a structurally insecure environment,
where in the end the only real guarantee of survival is the power of ones own state. The state
of perpetual anarchy promotes suspicion and uncertainty. International politics is in short
conflictual by nature, and as Waltz put it, “self-help is necessarily the principle of action”.50
As a consequence, in realisms view, states are primarily interested in gaining, maintaining,
and expanding security or power. NCR accepts that self-help is a default position of state
behavior – given the anarchy of the international system - and something states revert to when
needed. But NCR introduces the notion that it is not a permanent and ever persistent goal.
2.9.4
Confined
rationality
Accepting anarchy as a fact of life, states seek to maximize power in order to maximize
security, in a fundamentally insecure system. Since any other behavior will be punished in the
sense that other states will gain power that will be, or can be, potentially detrimental to the
state that does not maximize power. NCR accepts this basic notion with some reservations.
Given that much of state behavior is assumed to be “determined” by system level constraints,
the room for rationality is limited. But as Zakaria argues, within the space of action that does
not “force” states to maximize power there is room for choice and rational thought on
weighing “risks, opportunities, costs and benefits”, where states can try to maximize other
goods, such as economically valuable goods.51 However, even though there exists room for
rational contemplation by state leaders on other goals than strictly power maximization, NCR
does not presuppose that states by definition act rationally within these confines.52
A useful tool of understanding why states do not necessarily act rationally is the
methodological tool of path dependency and the theory of historical institutionalism. It is a
framework of high descriptive power. It is based on the notion of increasing returns, which
breaks the “law” of diminishing returns in economics. Politics is a collective action game;
therefore political decisions are dependent on expectations of other people’s political actions
and choices. Increased participation and investment of political capital can create increasing-
return processes, making a movement path dependent. I.e. where outcomes are related
stochastically to initial conditions. The given outcome in any given ‘run’ depends on, as
50
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics: 111
51
Zakaria, Fareed. 1998. From Wealth to Power: 20
52
Juneau, Thomas. 2010. Neoclassical Realist Strategic Analysis: 6
20

21. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
Goldstone puts it “on the choices or outcomes of intermediate events between the initial
conditions and the outcome”.53
While this might seem self-evident at glance, coupled with the fact that politics unlike
economics lacks transparent signal systems when to “invest”, increase production or pull back
products (i.e. revert or changes policies), it makes errors (non-rational behavior) hard to both
observe and correct. Add to the mix that actors operating in such an environment tend to filter
information into mental maps, guided by social interpretations of popular opinion, customs,
norms and cultures, we begin to understand why politics is highly susceptible to path
dependent behavior.54 This highlights how fluent, imprecise and potentially hard “rational”
state behavior can be. It also underscores the relevance of studying domestic variables when
researching foreign policy decisions. NCR incorporates both path dependency and dynamics
in its analysis of domestic variables. Unlike structural realism, which posits that the
independent variable is the structure of the international system, where the main force of
pressure on states is the polarity of the world, NCR recognizes that there is a dynamic
between structure and unit/state.55 To illustrate this concept, we need to modify Figure 1 as
follows:
53
Goldstone, quoted in Ma, Shun-Yun. 2007. “Political Science at the Edge of Chaos”, in
International Political Science Review: 64
54
Ma, Shun-Yun. 2007. “Political Science at the Edge of Chaos”, in International Political Science
Review: 65
55
The biggest proponent of “Balance of Power” is Waltz’s strain of realist thought, where two central
concepts are balancing, where one state seeks more power to counteract another, and bandwagoning,
where one state tries to appease the threat. For further details on these concepts see Waltz, Kenneth
N.1979. Theory of International Politics
21

22. Oscar
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Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
2.9.5
Figure
3
–
feedback
in
Neoclassical
Realism56
Usable
Intervening
Foreign
power
variable(s)
Policy
2.10
Concepts
of
Offensive
and
Neoclassical
Realism
To further understand both the similarities and differences of Offensive Realism and
Neoclassical Realism, I will conclude chapter two with a table that in summary shows
conflicting and shared concepts of the two theories:
Defining features Offensive Realism Neoclassical Realism
Neo-positivist, post-
Epistemology: Positivist behaviouralist
process-tracing, qualitative text
Methodology: analysis Path depencency, process-tracing
High: Varying with the research
Theoretical flexibility: Low: OR is a "complete" theory program
Scope of theory
Catch-all ambitions: Yes: "mistakes" are anomalies No: occupied with specificty
Variables
Independent variable: Relative position/power Relative position/power
Intermediate variables: No: lack explanatory power Yes: unit-level/domestic
56
Juneau, Thomas. 2010. Neoclassical Realist Strategic Analysis: 11
22

23. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
Assumptions
Anarchy: Yes Yes
Uncertainty: Yes Yes
States are rational: Yes Confined rationality
Offensive military Accepted, but not explicitly
capability: Yes covered by theory
Always security through power- Security when needed, not
Goal of the state: seeking necessarily by power
Chapter 3 – Research questions, design and case
3.1
Methods
of
research
By his own standard, the test of Offensive Realism in Mearsheimers view boils down to the
following criteria57:
1) The evidence must show that great powers (or a great power) look for opportunities to
gain power and take advantage of them when they arise.
2) The evidence must show that great powers do not practice “self-denial” when they had
the necessary means to shift the balance of power in their favor, and that the thirst for
more power does not decline when the state has a lot of it.
3) Powerful states should seek regional hegemony whenever the possibility arises.
3.2
Research
questions
Briefly recapitulating on Mearsheimers claims, he confesses that states sometimes act in
contradiction to his theory – they are in his words anomalies. But he claims this kind of
behavior invariably has negative consequences.58 From this it is possible to devise a step-by-
step test of Offensive Realism. To this end, I will look at the period just after the end of the
Cold War, and the process that led up to the decision to both let NATO continue to exist and
expand (ca 1992 – 1999). The salient characteristics of this will be revealed in great detail in
the case section. The first research question I will try to answer is:
57
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 168
58
ibid: 12
23

24. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
1. Is NATO’s continued existence and expansion to be considered an anomaly by the
Offensive Realist standard of Mearsheimer?
If so, I will try to answer the second research question:
2. Counterfactually test if the anomaly unexplained by Mearsheimers Offensive Realism
had negative consequences in the given case.
Finally, with Mearsheimers rebuttal of the explanatory power of intermediate variables in
mind:
3. Try to determine if the anomaly can be traced to unit-level/domestic variables that act
as intermediate variables between the independent variable, relative power, and the
dependent variable of foreign policy.
To highlight the logic behind this step-by-step approach, the research design can be shown
visually.
3.2.1
Figure
4
–
research
design
NATO’s
post-­‐Cold
War
existence
and
expansion
Consistent
with
country
–
two
cases
with
One
Consistent
being
an
anomaly?
Offensive
Realism?
Did
it
have
negative
Offensive
Realism
consequences?
strengthened
24

25. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
Can
the
outcomes
be
traced
to
unit-­‐level
variables?
Mearsheimer is the first in line to confess that his theory does not explain all, and that there
indeed are anomalies. Even if I am able to determine if this is the case, it will not falsify
Offensive Realism. But coupled with questions 2 and 3, I will be able to cast doubts on
Offensive Realism on at least two accounts.
First, I would be able to refute that an anomaly did in fact have negative consequences as
Mearsheimer claims it would have. Essentially showing that the U.S., even though they did
not behave as Offensive Realism predicts, their behavior was in line with their goals. If this is
the case it challenges the basic logic of Offensive Realism: States can in fact have goals, and
strategies to attain them, which are in contradiction to the ‘logic’ and pressures of the system
and still not suffer. In essence, this test challenges Mearsheimer structuralism.
Second, if an anomaly can be traced to unit-level variables in line with the NCR theory it will
cast a shadow on Offensive Realisms explanatory variables in the short run.
3.3
The
second
best
design
A more robust research design, which I originally planned to employ, entailed testing my
three hypothesis on two cases - one most likely and one least likely. Ideally it would consist
of one case during the Cold War and another post-Cold War. If I were to find that the most
likely case of Offensive Realism was an anomaly, it would constitute a serious critique of the
theory, and also strengthen my least likely study. Due to constraints in time and the space
available in a master’s thesis, but mostly my inability to find a suitable Cold War case close in
time to my post-Cold War case, I chose to concentrate on one case. This is a weakness of my
research design, but one I am aware of.
25

26. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
3.4
Methodological
standards
Realism as a whole has a positivist view on ontology. In short, there is an objective world,
and there are objective factors that influence state behavior, factors that can be objects of
research. Also, to a varying degree, depending on which branch of the realist tree we look at,
regularities of state behavior can be deduced from variables previously mentioned in the
theory section. Since Offensive Realism puts so much weight on system level explanations,
foreign policy is assumed to be rational responses to external factors. As previously
mentioned, unit-level variables does not come into play in the Offensive Realist framework.59
Posit that NCR is ‘right’ in its emphasis on unit-level (intermediate) variables, if we are to
truly understand the foreign policy choices of the U.S. – would this falsify Offensive
Realism? Not necessarily. The test of a given theory, in a positivist methodology, is not if the
theory is descriptive. It is rather if it gives good approximations. Mearsheimers own analogy,
where states are ‘billiard balls’ moved by outside pressure, can be used as an illustrative
example of positivist methodology60: A skilled billiard player can be described as just that,
skilled. But if we want to explain his skill, we explain it by geometry, even though the billiard
player is not, and cannot be described as a mathematician with a pen and paper at the table.
Put differently, Offensive Realism might be off in its descriptions and assumptions of reality.
But by the positivist standard, it is not a problem if competing theories (other realist theories,
liberalism, constructivism, etc.) are more “realistic” in their descriptions of reality. The ‘real’
test of a theory is if it provides good predictions.61
Before delving into the case, and finally the analysis, results and conclusions in chapter 4, it
needs to be stated that it is possible that the case is not an anomaly by this methodological
standard – the state acted in fact in accordance to Offensive Realisms maxims. But if this is so
it will not necessarily falsify the competing theory of NCR. Partly because a single case
arguably does not constitute enough empirical support to falsify a theory, and also since it is
possible that the U.S. behaved in accordance to Offensive Realism’s maxims due to unit-level
59
see Chapter 2: 2.2 “Differences and likeness with Defensive Realism”
60
Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. ”The False Promise of International Institutions”, in International
Security Vol. 19 No. 3: 48
61
Friedman, Milton. 1966. Essays in Positive Economics: 15
26

27. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
variables. Which theory is ‘right’ might in part boil down to level of abstraction and
methodological standards, in the sense that Offensive Realism description of relevant
variables might be wrong, but it still provides good approximations of foreign policy.
Essentially, states might follow a whole different rationale than Offensive Realism, but it
‘looks’ like they adhere to Offensive Realisms maxims.
3.5
Limitations
of
Neoclassical
Realism
As noted previously, NCR is not a system-level theory. It does not explicitly challenge or tries
to falsify Offensive Realisms core assumptions, as it acknowledges the primacy of relative
power in the system as the primary independent variable.62 Rather it challenges Offensive
Realism on one simple point: What are the relevant intermediate variables? If the scope of
NCR is not more ambitious than this, one might argue that it is more a methodological tool
than a competing explanatory theory, since it does not challenge Offensive Realism on it’s
own level. I would agree with this to a point. However, criticizing the theory for not trying to
explain “all” is essentially a normative statement of how ambitious a theory ‘should’ be. It is
not a critique of the theory for failing empirical tests.
Unlike Mearsheimer, NCR:s proponents are not trying to predict the future and give
normative recommendations on policy. Mearsheimer has ‘predicted’ a number of things not
yet passed: The U.S. leaving Europe, the rise of China as a regional hegemon, a new power
struggle between Germany/Russia, and The U.S./China, and the nuclear rearmament of
Germany.63 All of this might happen sometime in the future. But as Keynes put it: “the long
run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead”. Thus, even if
NCR only modifies or deepens our knowledge of Offensive Realism by focusing on
intermediate variables that are relevant in the short run, it has real world relevance. Even
though it does not challenge Offensive Realism on the systemic level.
3.6
Material
This case study will be based on historical first and second hand sources. Using historical
material necessitates a certain caution. First, the source material must be authentic. Second,
sources must be neutral. This criterion entails the necessity of confirmation; we preferably
62
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 3
63
See for example Mearsheimer, John J. 1990. “Back to the Future”, in International Security Vol.
15, No. 1 & Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 392
27

28. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
need more than one source. We need to take into account the ‘distance’ between the historian
and the case; first hand sources are naturally preferable to second hand sources. The last
aspect of neutrality entails the storytellers or historians level of independence from the case.
Third, simultaneity in all material – especially first hand sources - is preferable to later-day
accounts. Last but not least, we must account for, and balance any tendency in source material
to distort actual sequence of events.64
While all these factors are highly relevant to keep in mind. I will primarily use historical
second hand sources that are peer reviewed and published. The study is also helped by the
fact that the cases is still very recent in history, and that some of the points I try to underpin,
that are not analytical, are of a very factual nature: “X did Y on Z”, not requiring academic
support per se. Part of my study’s source material is official statements, communiqués and
speeches delivered on the topic at hand. From a methodological perspective, the challenge is
to put those kinds of sources in their correct context: why they were said, and how they
influenced events.
3.7
Methods
The nature of my three research questions necessitates different methods for each. Question 1
is theoretical in nature: My analysis is based on trying to determine the construct validity of
Mearsheimers theory when it comes to NATO’s existence and expansion. It is essentially a
comparison of how consistently the case adheres to theory.
Question 2 is a counterfactual test. This entails trying to identify the dependent variable,
counterfactually remove it, and by deductive reasoning try to determine if the sequence of
events would have played out the same way. In a stringent methodological language is it a test
of the value of the dependent variable if the explanatory variable would have assumed another
value. This test raises what is called “the fundamental problem of causal interference”.65
Since we cannot replay history with all other variables “frozen” at their current value, we can
in fact never know for sure. This is a problem of all social sciences occupied with
64
Esaiasson et al. 2005. Metodpraktikan: chapter 15 (swedish)
65
King, Keohane & Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative
Research: 79
28

29. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
counterfactuals, but carefully choosing and arguing for why ‘this’ explanatory variable is
relevant to the outcome can to a degree mitigate it.66
For question 3, I will use path dependency as my primary methodological tool. It is a separate
framework from “synchronic causality”, where one tries to determine if variations in current
variables effect current outcomes.67 Rather, path dependency traces the historical path of the
outcome in question. Two key points in this framework are sequence and timing. As the
casual chain is assumed to have several interconnected variables, where each step of the line
influences the variables ‘downstream’, “the same event may have different effects when in the
sequence it occurs”.68 Another feature of path dependency are critical junctures, points in time
where previous events allow for contingent choices that may set sequence of events on a path
dependent trajectory, subject to an increasing returns process.
3.8
The
Case:
NATO
cold-­‐War
War
existence
and
expansion
in
Europe
NATO is short for (The) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an intergovernmental military
alliance formed in 1949 by twelve western nations in Europe and North America. The
organization rests on the North Atlantic Treaty, a document of fourteen articles codifying
rules of military cooperation and mutual defense. The most defining article is number five,
which stipulates that “..the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all[..]”.69 The first
NATO secretary general, Lord Ismay, famously stated that the purpose of the organization
was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”.70 Put less bluntly,
the overarching goal of NATO was the defense of Western Europe from the Soviet Union
(USSR) and the communist equivalent of NATO, The Warsaw Pact (The “Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance”). In Mearsheimers terminology, NATO is
defensive alliance, and as such an example of external balancing. During the Cold War, the
twelve founding member states were joined by four more European states in the fifties and
eighties.
66
Esaiasson et al. 2005. Metodpraktikan: 100
67
Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependency and the Study of Politics”, in The
American Political Science Review Vol. 94 no. 2: 263
68
ibid:
264
69
NATO – Official texts: The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949
70
Reynolds, David. 1994. The origins of the Cold War in Europe: International perspectives: 13
29

30. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
The Warsaw Pact effectively ceased to exist in 1991 when then Czechoslovakia left the
organization after thirty-six years. The Soviet Union itself was declared officially dissolved
on December 25, 1991, ending the fifty-four year long Cold War. The dissolution of the
Soviet Union removed the de facto opponent of NATO and its raison d'etre.
Contrary to what was predicted, NATO was not dissolved soon thereafter.71 Rather the
opposite, as the organization has expanded substantially post-Cold War. Three former Soviet
block countries joined in 1999, another seven in 2004, and two in 2009.72 The organization
has more than doubled its membership base, from twelve to twenty-eight states - the majority
of which joined after the end of the Cold War. Another four former Soviet block countries are
affiliated with NATO, and are in various stages of attaining memberships.73 The de-facto
“border” of NATO is now shared with Russia proper, Belarus and The Ukraine.
Lord Ismay would have been proud of his organization in hindsight. It not only succeeded in
keeping “the Russians out”, it expanded on its territory. But like many others he would also
probably be perplexed by its continued existence and the expansion eastward after the
organization lost its raison d'etre – to balance the Warsaw Pact. The question that begs to be
answered is if this expansion is an anomaly of Offensive Realism.
Chapter 4 – Analysis
4.1
Analysis:
NATO
post-­‐Cold
War
existence
and
expansion
in
Europe
(question
1)
1. Is NATO’s continued existence and expansion to be considered an anomaly by the
Offensive Realist standard of Mearsheimer?
The short answer is a ‘yes’. To reveal why this is the case, we first need to keep in mind two
things: First, Offensive Realism assumes that the primary goal of all action is to further ones
own security. Second, the fact that the United States possesses without a par the world’s most
71
See for example Mearsheimer. 1990. “Back to the Future”, in International Security vol. 15 No. 1: 5
72
1999: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland. 2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia. 2009: Albania, Croatia
73
Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina all have a Membership Action Plan (MAP),
the pre-stage of membership, and Georgia is a part of the so called ”Intensified Dialogue”
30

31. Oscar
Sundevall
Masters
thesis
Spring
2011
powerful military force.74 We also need to look at some of the different strategies of Great
Powers mentioned in chapter 2, section 2.5: “central strategies of Offensive Realism”, and the
one I left out since it is in Mearsheimers view not used by Great Powers: bandwagoning, the
case where weaker states ally with stronger ones, either because they recognize the futility of
resisting a greater power, or from expected profits of an alliance with a Great Power.
Mearsheimer explicitly argues that Great Powers do not bandwagon, since it goes against a
basic assumption of his theory.75 When a state bandwagon, it gives up – be it only temporary
– its ambitions of gaining more power by ceding power, influence and forgoing a range of
foreign policy options to the more powerful state it lines itself with. In Mearsheimers own
words: “The evidence must show that Great Powers (or a Great Power) look for opportunities
to gain power and take advantage of them when they arise”.76 Bandwagoning should
therefore be a non-option for the Great Powers of Europe (Great Britain and France in
particular).
There is an ambiguity in Mearsheimers definition of Great Powers, and he operationalizes it
somewhat arbitrary. He first defines Great Powers as “being able to put up a serious fight”,
and that they must possess nuclear arms capable of second-strike capability.77 This would
qualify the UK and France as Great Powers. However, in the footnotes he argues that the UK,
Germany and France were Great Powers up until WW II.78 But he concludes his book by
positing that the UK, France, Germany and Italy all have sufficient resources to be Great
Powers (i.e. post-Cold War).79 I will here follow his original definition, by which I argue that
the UK and France are Great Powers, as they possess the strongest military forces in Western
Europe with nuclear second-strike capabilities (in fact, the only ones who do). A commonly
used ordering system of states in terms power is to divide them into three categories:
superpowers, great powers and regional powers. To qualify as a Great Power rather than just a
regional one, a state must possess the ability to project power beyond its own region. Both the
74
US military spending as of 2011 makes up 40% of total world military spending. In nominal figures
The U.S. spends six times as much on arms as China, which places second in the global ranking. Se
Global Security for figures
75
Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: 162
76
ibid: 168
77
ibid: 5
78
ibid: no. 7, page 404
79
ibid: 392
31