1. Schmitt Reframed: Can
Schmittian Theory be
used to Analyze
International Relations
Theory Today?
T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f K e n t
B r u s s e l s S c h o o l o f
I n t e r n a t i o n a l S t u d i e s
M a s t e r o f A r t s I n t e r n a t i o n a l
C o n f l i c t A n a l y s i s 2 0 1 4 - 2 0 1 6
1 4 , 0 0 0 w o r d s
8 / 1 6 / 2 0 1 6
James Peters

2. i
Schmitt Reframed: Can Schmittian Theory be used
to Analyze International Relations Theory Today?
By James Peters
MA International Conflict Analysis
University of Kent
2014-2016
14,000 words

3. ii
To Troy,
I wouldn’t have been here without you
And I could not have finished without you

4. iii
Abstract
Schmitt Reframed: Can Schmittian Theory be used to Analyze International Relations
Today is a master dissertation that focuses on deconstructing the arguments proposed by Carl
Schmitt in The Concept of the Political and The Großraum Order of International Law with a
Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in
International Law. The constituent elements are systematically deconstructed and compared
to other international relations theories from a comparable etiology and ontology. It is then
applied in a case study in evaluating the ‘neo-warfare’ methods employed by great powers
today to beg the questions: 1.) how has great power war changed since the end of the Cold
War? and 2.) what is the implication for European security in the 21st
century?

5. iv
Table of Contents
Part I: Introduction............................................................................................................................ 1
1. Historical Relevance............................................................................................................... 1
2. Theoretical Approach............................................................................................................. 3
2.1 Concept of the Political ........................................................................................................ 4
2.2 Schmitt and Huntington, Two Sides of the Same Coin........................................................... 4
3. Methodological Approach...................................................................................................... 5
4. Expected Findings .................................................................................................................. 6
Part II: Theory.................................................................................................................................... 7
1. The Concept of the Political.................................................................................................... 7
1.1. Etiology.......................................................................................................................... 7
1.1.1. Carl Schmitt............................................................................................................ 7
1.1.2. Basis in Realpolitik.................................................................................................. 8
1.2. Definition and Analysis of Schmitt’s Political................................................................... 9
1.2.1. The Political............................................................................................................ 9
(1) Definition ............................................................................................................... 9
(2) The Political Antithesis as an observable Paradigm ............................................... 10
(a) The Paradigm of Friend-Enemy as the basis for Politics..................................... 10
(b) Jus Belli and the Right to Go to War.................................................................. 13
(3) Liberalism and De-Politicalisation ......................................................................... 14
(a) Liberalism and Party Politics.............................................................................. 15
(b) Civil War ........................................................................................................... 16
(c) Universalism, Humanity and De-Politicalisation................................................. 17
1.2.2. Response to Liberalism/Pluralism ......................................................................... 19
1.2.3. National Identity built upon the Idea of “Friend and Enemy”................................ 21
1) Historical Examples................................................................................................... 21
a) The United Kingdom............................................................................................. 21
b) France .................................................................................................................. 23
c) Germany............................................................................................................... 25
d) The United States ................................................................................................. 26
2) Schmitt’s Critique of the League of Nations .............................................................. 27
2. The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign
Powers: A contribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law............................................ 29
2.1. Defining the Concepts of Großraum and Reich as New Units of Political Organization .. 29

6. v
1) Großraum .................................................................................................................... 29
2) Reich............................................................................................................................ 29
2.2. Etiology and a New Order of Imperialism?.................................................................... 30
1) New Order of Empire ................................................................................................... 30
2) Concept compared to Other Contemporary forms of Empire........................................ 30
a) Monroe Doctrine...................................................................................................... 30
b) The Sun Never Sets on the British Empire................................................................. 32
3) Russian Bolshevism ...................................................................................................... 33
2.3. The Historical Development of Großraum/Reich as a counter concept to the Westphalian
Model 33
1) A Global Alternative to the Traditional Western Conception of Imperialism and Empire?
33
a) Spanish and Portuguese Colonialism in the New World ............................................ 33
b) Imperial France: Traditional Westphalian Imperial Power or Reich?.......................... 34
2) European Neighborhood Policy and the Russian Near Abroad...................................... 35
a) The EU as Reich and the ENP as Großraum ............................................................... 35
b) Putin and the Russian Near Abroad........................................................................... 35
c) Is there an Irreconcilable Overlap? ........................................................................... 36
d) Reich, Großraum, and Civilizations: Huntington’s Civilizations as an extension of the
Concept of Großraum....................................................................................................... 36
Part III: Case Studies........................................................................................................................ 39
1. External Neo-Warfare: The Ukraine Crisis and the Russian Connection ................................ 39
2. Internal Neo-Warfare: The Power of Money and the Power of the Vote............................... 42
Part IV: Conclusion.......................................................................................................................... 45
1. How has Great Power Conflict Evolved?............................................................................... 45
2. How Have Identity Politics Threaten to end Europe’s Longest Period of Great Power Peace?46
3. What Are the Implications for Moving Forward in the 21st
Century? .................................... 47
Bibliography.................................................................................................................................... 49
Annex A: Abbreviations................................................................................................................... 56
Annex B: Definitions........................................................................................................................ 58
Annex C: Schmitt: Level Two Realism?............................................................................................ 65

7. Page | 1
Part I: Introduction
1. Historical Relevance
The close of World War II saw a shift in the dynamic of interstate conflict, specifically in
great power conflict. The advent of the nuclear age and the possibility of nuclear holocaust
had all but negated the willingness of the blocs lead by the United State and the Soviet Union
to fight in an all-out total war similar in the destructive style of total war that had decimated
Europe twice in two generations. So, from 1945 onwards, great powers tended to fight their
wars in proxy states: Vietnam,1
Angola,2
Nicaragua,3
Ethiopia,4
Afghanistan5
etc. While this
alleviated pressure between the two superpowers that could have escalated into a hot war, it
proved that interstate rivalry and conflict did not evaporate following the Second World War.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc,
the United States was left as the sole remaining superpower; the European model of gradual
spillover style integration6
prevailed over the communist model that bound the eastern bloc
together under the coercion of Soviet military might. And as there was no more Soviet money
to fund the continued global rivalry, the United States found itself in a position to engage in a
series of campaigns and wars around the world in the name of either humanitarian
intervention –primarily in the 1990s7
– or to spread democracy, neo-liberal values, and fight
terrorism –primarily from 2001 onwards.8
While some of these interventions and displays of
military power helped to stabilize conflict resulting in peace to a relative level, the wars in the
post-communist Balkans and the first gulf war, others failed to build lasting peace despite
enormous investments of time and money in attempting to establish regime change or
1
(Black, 2005, p. 157)
2
(Black, 2005, p. 165)
3
(Peace, 2010, p. 5)
4
(Jackson D., 2010, p.26)
5
(Black, 2005, p. 205)
6
(Rosamond, 2000, p. 58)
7
(Fisher D, 2011, p. 226-8)
8
(Schmidt, 2013, p. 205)

8. 2
stabilizing a failing state, the second gulf war (the Iraq war of 2003)/the failed 2011 Libyan
intervention and Somalia/Afghanistan post-2001 invasion.
The 1990s was a decade of Russian recovery from the collapse of the USSR. Many of
the states of the Eastern Bloc and several Soviet successor states sought to integrate
themselves with the countries of Western Europe and the EU saw two large rounds of
ascension in 20049
and in 200710
; NATO membership grew to include many of the former
communist countries and successor states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia starting with
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999 and with the latest members, Albania and
Croatia joining in 2009.11
The interest in joining the two most prominent international
organizations in Europe (the EU and NATO) was something that a recovering Russia was
unable to counteract states in its former sphere of influence from pursuing.
The tables began to turn in the second half of the 2000s; soaring oil prices pumped
billions into the Russian economy. And, the 2008/9 financial crash in the US, and the
resulting monetary and debt crisis in Europe, served to embolden and enable a much stronger
Russian foreign policy to reassert dominance over the near-abroad. The outcome of Russian
recovery, US war wariness over Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic strain in the
European Union manifested in Russia testing the waters by invading Georgia in 2008. In
2010, Ukraine turned away from the Orange Revolution— that saw it pivot towards the West
in 2004 with the election of Yulia Tymoshenko— by electing the strongly pro-Russian Victor
Yanukovych, and Russia annexed Crimea in 2014.
While the above summary is a very brief and simplified version of post-cold war
Europe and the development of integration on the continent, it’s important because in this
9
Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia
10
Bulgaria and Romania
11
(Member Countries, 2016)

9. 3
master’s dissertation, I will be looking at EU/NATO relations with Russia from 2014
forward. Specifically, I want to look at the ways Russia has used neo-warfare methods to
exert pressure on the European Union to weaken its position on CFSP/CSDP and the EU’s
willingness/ability to sanction Russia in retaliation for actions that Russia has taken in
Ukraine, and how it has used that same pressure to sow internal division and feed fire to far-
right Euroscepticism. Using a Schmittian based framework, I will show that resurgent
Russian expansionism into former Soviet territory is emboldening this idea of “us and them,”
Carl Schmitt’s “friend enemy” thesis, and it has a direct impact on voters which is beginning
to become a driving factor behind European reactions to Russia. Essentially, I want to look at
how great power antagonism, and the resulting conflicts, has adapted to the 21st
century.
It is significant to look at this adaptation and the strongly conservative ideology that
plays a role in driving it because by no measure has the post-Soviet world become Fukyama’s
‘End of History.’ More specifically, there has been a resurgence in the relevance of ‘us and
them’ ideology, of ‘othering.’ Both academics and fringe political movements have
increasingly focused on this question of identity politics, and it’s important to wonder: how
does a resurgence of nationalism drive Western foreign policy?
This then leads me to ask, how has great power conflict adapted to manifest itself in
the 21st
century? Why is this significant? And, what does it potentially mean for the future of
foreign policy convergence between the member states of the European Union, the EU’s
CFSP/CSDP and NATO, and for the transatlantic alliance?
2. Theoretical Approach
Identity politics and the concept of ‘othering’ became strongly relevant in the post-
9/11 world and was infamously used as a justification for the War on Terror in George W

10. 4
Bush’s response to the 9/11 attacks,12
and again then in his State of the Union address in
January, 2010.13
Since 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine, the Syrian crisis has really raised
the question of identity politics at the public discourse level and has manifested in the surging
popularity of both populist parties and policies on both sides of the Atlantic; the Republican
nomination of Donald Trump on a platform marked by xenophobia and the number of British
people who voted for Brexit under the pretense of feeling that Romanians and other
foreigners were overrunning their country suggests that there is a strong undercurrent of
public polarization driven by identity politics. So, it is with this political climate in mind that
I will be evaluating the question of: ‘how has great power conflict evolved, and why are its
implications significant to European security in the 21st
century?’.
2.1 Concept of the Political
I will deconstruct the core concepts in Carl Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political to
form the basis for defining the use of ‘othering’ in identity and populist politics. The Concept
of the Political was a fundamental piece in forming a political theory argument in support of
the Nazi regime and it serves as a fundamental piece of literature when discussing the
question of identity politics. Moreover, the logic of the thinking feeds into the wider
international relation’s theory on spatial territories proposed by Schmitt in his work, The
Großraum Order of International Law.
2.2 Schmitt and Huntington, Two Sides of the Same Coin
The second core feature of my theoretical deconstruction will include an analysis of
The Großraum Order of International Law and how the core concepts relate to Samuel
Huntington’s idea of Civilizations. As will be shown in the deconstruction of the Großraum
12
(Bush 2001)
13
(Bush 2002)

11. 5
theory and its comparison with the Civilizations theory, both the territory encompassed by the
European Neighborhood Policy and the Russian conception of the near abroad encapsulate
this idea of a sphere of influence into which both powers feel they have a right to insert their
values and influence.
Together with the ideas presented in The Concept of the Political, I will construct a
theoretical framework that will be applied to evaluating the case study of how EU/NATO/US
relations with Russia from the invasion of Ukraine onward have demonstrated the new ways
in which great powers can now express antagonism against one another without engaging in a
total or nuclear war.
3. Methodological Approach
My methodological approach in evaluating my case study in regards to my research
question will be a mixed methods approach. I will be conducting mainly a literature and
discourse analysis. I will also include an evaluation of more quantifiable aspects such as
increases in military spending, increased troop deployments, and what NATO has done to
prepare to counter a Crimea/Eastern Ukraine style invasion of the Baltic States.
I will use this methodological approach because I mainly want to focus on identity
politics that play out on both sides. And as I am focusing on my research question within the
context of European security in the 21st
century, I will focus on the way identity politics is
beginning to shape the domestic European view on its security policy. Because security is
both a policy area of mixed competency with most of the responsibility for security policy
falling on the shoulders of the member states of the European and a key function of the
United States role in Europe via NATO, this paper will focus on how statements by populist
parties and leaders in the more influential member states of the EU and NATO play a major
role in affecting policy decisions regarding the future of European security. And as it is

12. 6
impossible to discuss this topic without addressing the reasons why Russia is seeking to
reassert itself into the geopolitics of Eastern Europe, there will be a short evaluation of the
Russian side of the equation as well.
4. Expected Findings
Russian usage of neo-warfare methods in the 21st
century –cyber warfare,14
the support of
anti-establishment/Eurosceptic parties,15
and the use of war abroad in places like Ukraine and
Syria– should weaken European unity and the transatlantic alliance. Because of the
democratic nature of a republic style of government, growing xenophobic, Eurosceptic, and
the nationalistic tendencies sweeping the West right now should reflect a growing
demonization of ‘others,’ both domestic and foreign. This then should be manifested in rising
support for far-right parties and candidates, which then feeds into this cycle of growing
nationalism. The result is an overall weakened European ability to respond with sanctions, in
regards to the Euro/Debt Crisis, Russian aggression or the Migration Crisis, or militarily, to
the threat of domestic terrorism or the possibility of war with a foreign power. These findings
then become very significant because the hallmark success of the post-war order has been
peace in Europe, and if this core aspect of the world economic and political order becomes
destabilized the fallout can be far and damaging.
14
(Sanger and Schmitt, 2016)
15
(Polyakova, 2016)

13. 7
Part II: Theory
1. The Concept of the Political
The Concept of the Political by Carl Schmitt is the basis for the first part of my
theoretical perspective. By deconstructing the arguments he lays to build his ‘friend-enemy’
antithesis to define the ‘political’, I will show that it can be combined with his theoretical
underpinnings behind Großraum and Reich in The Großraum Order of International Law
with a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers to construct a theoretical
international relations framework that can be applied when questioning the necessity for
using identity politics when analyzing the current Western-Russian conflicts over Ukraine
and Syria.
1.1. Etiology
1.1.1. Carl Schmitt
Carl Schmitt was a German legal and political philosopher born in 1888 to a Catholic
family of modest means.16
Similar to how Thomas Hobbes’ ontology was shaped by his life
experience of living through the English civil war,17
in his introduction to The Concept of the
Political, George Schwab argues that WWI had a profound influence on shaping the ontology
of how Schmitt viewed the world philosophically and from his Catholic upbringing, thus
impacting his philosophical writings on constitutional law and politics.18
Throughout his legal
and academic career, he rose to prominence by questioning the weakness of the Weimar state
and the fundamental assumptions of liberalism as it had emerged from the Enlightenment and
had shaped the western European political model.19
His writing and works were then used by
16
(Balakrishnan, 2000, p. 12)
17
(Sorell 2016)
18
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 5)
19
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 13)

14. 8
the National Socialist régime to support a German-centric European order as the natural
historical response to the Franco-Anglo dominance of Europe.20
1.1.2. Basis in Realpolitik
The basis for Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberalism is an ideological cousin of realism in
international relations. In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt makes it clear that politics is
the central duty of the state and can be distinguished from every other people. Moreover, so
long as humanity continues to group itself into political units, liberal ideals, such as economic
convergence and the spread of democracy, will not morph the human condition into a more
peaceful world free of politics.21
When taking his writing and applying it to international relations theory, it’s easy to draw
a link between his concept of states as being the primary actors of international relations and
international relations theories proposed by people like Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth
Waltz.22
Morgenthau and Schmitt both agreed on the principled weakness of international
law as a method to depoliticize the relationship between states and thus reduce the likelihood
for war to break out.23
Schmitt himself in The Concept of the Political links his writings to
the political for-fathers of classical realism (Machiavelli and Hobbes).24
As it can be said that
neo-realism postulated by Waltz is a natural evolutionary step beyond the classical realism
authored by Morgenthau,25
neo-realism’s assumption in the balance of great powers being the
defining feature of the international order is inherently connected to Schmitt’s idea of politics
as being the expression of friendship and enemy hood that can manifest itself in violence in
the worst case scenario.2627
20
(Tralau, 2010, p, 447)
21
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 78)
22
(Balakrishnan, 2000, p. 90)
23
(Koskenniemi, 2001, p. 20)
24
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 59)
25
(Jackson and Sorensen, 2007, p. 86)
26
(Moisio, 2006, p. 455)

15. 9
1.2. Definition and Analysis of Schmitt’s Political
The Concept of the Political is Schmitt’s thesis in which he offers a new lens through
which the art of politics can be observed: the Political antithesis. The following section is
devoted to deconstructing the political, offering historical examples through which
nationhood can be based on the assumptions of the ‘friend-enemy’ grouping, and how it can
be evolved to and amalgamated with the theory of Großraum to create an international
relations theory that can be used to observe the contemporary antagonistic competition
between modern great powers.
1.2.1. The Political
(1) Definition
Schmitt begins The Concept of the Political by stating that, “the concept of the state
presupposes the concept of the political.”28
Meaning, the idea of an organized political unit is
predicated upon the idea of politics existing as a method of grouping that separates humans
into separate labeling and categories. As Schmitt moves on to suggest, this means that politics
is not a product of the Westphalian state, but rather it is something more primal and innate to
the nature of human groupings. This holds to contradict Aristotle in his belief that humans are
political animals by nature that seek to group out of a longing for cooperation and
community,29
and moves rather to support the Hobbesian notion of human groupings being
the response to singular existence in the “nasty [and] brutish” state of nature.30
He moves forward to elaborate on this point by belaboring that his conception of the
political has endured the evolutions of the modern European state from the feudal society, to
the absolutist era, to the revolutions of 1848 to the states of immediate post-World War I
27
See Annex C for more
28
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 19)
29
(Aristotle, 1999, p. 59)
30
(Hobbes, 1999, p. 110)

16. 10
Europe.31
It transcends the form and structure of the state, because every topic can potentially
be politicized. Thus, a total state can embrace every domain, and when these domains
(society, culture, religion, education, etc.) intersect a total state, this becomes a core feature of
a state’s identity.32
Politics is then something that is both deeper than other divisions like
religious, cultural or economic and independent of their existence.
Instead, politics “can only be obtained by discovering and defining the specifically
political categories.”33
Meaning, the existential categorization outside of other forms of
labeling denotes that like aesthetics (beautiful and ugly) or economics (rich or poor), there
should be some method of dichotomy that allows for labeling the political duopoly. And it is
from this train of thought that Schmitt defines a political antithesis as an observable paradigm
that can be used to describe the extremes of political relationships between states, thus
leading Schmitt to define politics as, “the specific political distinction to which political
actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.”34
(2) The Political Antithesis as an observable Paradigm
(a) The Paradigm of Friend-Enemy as the basis for Politics
Defining the distinction between friend and enemy is the central function of politics
according to Schmitt; moreover, it is an antithesis, a dichotomy, that can independently inter-
mix and correspond with more traditional antitheses, for example “good and evil in the moral
sphere, beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere” etc.35
So while there is a distinction of two
extremes, friend and enemy, like with art there can be beautiful and ugly or morally good and
evil, the two categories can intermingle with other paradigms: the villainess can be the fairest
in the land, the ugly hunchback is the protagonist of the story.
31
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 22)
32
ibid
33
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 25)
34
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 26)
35
ibid

17. 11
For Schmitt, the political antithesis, that of the friend-enemy distinction “denotes the
utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation.”36
This
can be distinctly separate of how we understand dichotomies in other fields, ie. just as
economically rich or poor does not have a direct correlation to morally right and wrong or
aesthetically beautiful and ugly. This idea between union and separation is expressed by
describing the utmost degree of separation as “other, the stranger…existentially something
different and alien so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.”37
And for Schmitt, this is not a metaphorical or imaginative distinction. Whilst it is
subjective onto each individual political grouping, it is a concrete and tangible political
grouping of a societal ‘us’ contrasted against a societal ‘them;’38
the enemy or ‘other’ only
exists so long as a political organization of people faces a similar collectivity that can
challenge the core values of that society and its self-determination to project the values it
holds as a society.39
The enemy is a public enemy; the ‘other’ is a term applied to a separate
collection of people whom stand in possible opposition to one’s own personal grouping to
which he belongs. This then lends to the fact that private personal relationships can be held
between people of separate political groupings, but the two societies can stand in political
opposition on separate ends of the friend-enemy grouping. For instance, one can have friends
or family members in North or South Korea, but the two collective political entities stand in
public enmity, each as an existential threat to the other.40
The ‘friend-enemy’ paradigm manifests itself through the states monopoly on politics
and the states sovereignty in determining the friend-enemy distinction.41
This means that
36
ibid
37
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 27)
38
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 28)
39
Ibid
40
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 29)
41
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 30)

18. 12
while other antitheses such as political systems (forms of governance), economics, religion,
etc. each stand as their own independent means of categorization, the end result of how
political each of these categorizations becomes in determining the friend-enemy distinction is
the prerogative of the state. For instance, while ideologically capitalism and soviet style
socialism stand in philosophical opposition to one another, this does not mean that they are
by nature political enemies.
An example of this demonstration would be the political alliance between capitalist
Great Britain and the United States with the Soviet Union during the Second World War.
While Marxism suggests that a global uprising by the proletariat ‘communist’ nations against
the bourgeois ‘capitalist’ nations is historically inevitable42
and interdependence liberals, like
David Mitrany, argue that free market interdependence leads to peace between states (a direct
contradiction to the state run/eventually globally proletariat run society envisioned by
Marx),43
Schmitt would argue that these issues are economic in nature and thus not an
ultimate defining political line thus the alliance between the capitalist west and communist
east against the Nazi’s juggernaut in World War II.
A second example of the distinction of the political ‘friend-enemy’ paradigm from
traditional natural ‘enemies’ would be how the absolutist French monarchy sided with the
Enlightenment inspired American republic in their war of independence against the
constitutional monarchy in Britain. While the forces of revolution and frustration were
already beginning to show in France, the King decided that supporting America in its bid for
independence was not as big of a threat to its existential existence as was its global rivalry
with the British for domination of the New World and beyond. Thus, reaffirming Schmitt’s
claim that “political concepts…have a polemical meaning[;] they are focused on a specific
42
(Marx, 2008, p. 61)
43
(Steffek, 2015, p. 25)

19. 13
conflict and are bound to a concrete situation; the result…is a friend-enemy grouping.”44
Thus, the polar opposite alignments and alliance of the economic spectrum (capitalism and
communism) or of the political spectrum of 18th
century Europe (republic and absolutist
monarchy) against a common enemy that threatened the existential existence of the once
rivals. This also demonstrates the idea that Schmitt put forward that the enemy is a public
enemy, and not a private enemy; despite the fact that America was rebelling against a
monarchy and there were simmering tensions at home, the (French) state decided who its
public enemy was and acted.
While those two examples demonstrate the extremes of the friend-enemy paradigm,
Schmitt writes that, “neither war nor revolution is something social or ideal,” however, “the
friend-enemy [paradigm]…receive[s]…its real meaning because [it] refer[s] to the real
possibility of physical killing.”45
So while it is not the inevitable outcome of the friend-
enemy paradigm, the paradigm itself is defined by the ultimate possibility of physical
violence [war] occurring between political units in the event of enmity reaching the point of
threatening a political unit’s existential existence. For Schmitt, this is the basis of politics.
(b) Jus Belli and the Right to Go to War
The concept of Jus Belli, the right to go to war, lies with the sovereign authority of the
state. After all, according to Schmitt, this is the one defining purpose of politics, to determine
public friend from public foe. Wars that are fought over religious motivations, economic
disparity or inequality, social norms and ideas are nonsensical and unjustifiable if they are
fought without an existential threat to one’s society’s way of life.46
Unlike St. Augustine who argues that jus belli follows a set of criteria for war to be a
‘just war,’ Schmitt argues that, “if there really are enemies in the existential sense…then it is
44
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 30)
45
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 33)
46
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 48-9)

20. 14
justified, but only politically, to repel and fight them physically.”47
This then gives the state
the right to, “demand from its own members the readiness to die and…to kill enemies.”48
There are two key points here that need to be pointed out.
First, while Schmitt says it is unjustifiable to fight a war on the basis or motivation of
ideals, morals, economics or any other antithesis,49
if one of these antitheses becomes
politicalized, then that changes things: “the requirement for internal peace compels [the
state]…to decide also upon the domestic enemy.”50
If a political unit is threatened because of
its Christianity, if it is threatened because it is a Marxist society, or if it is in national need of
natural resources it does not own in order to maintain its position of power and protect itself
from political enemies, then a state is justified in fighting a war in the name of Christianity, in
the name of global communist revolution, or in the name of the emperor of Japan; because,
the war has surpassed a religious, economic, or moral basis to become a matter of survival.
That is the distinction that transforms any other antitheses into the spectrum by which a
degree of friendship or enmity can be measured between states.
Second, and this, for Schmitt is the basis for jus belli: if survival of the state becomes
threatened, then war is justified.51
Again, this is where Schmitt finds ideological kinship with
the whole spectrum of realist writers and philosophers from Thucydides to Hobbes to Waltz
all the way up to Huntington: the idea that the accumulation of power and the usage of that
power by sovereign entities for self-preservation is the central push factor of politics.
(3) Liberalism and De-Politicalisation
Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political was written as a critique of the weaknesses that
Schmitt saw in the political theory that supported the Weimar state and by extension
47
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 49)
48
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 46)
49
ibid
50
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 46)
51
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 49)

21. 15
liberalism. The foundations of liberalism are apolitical in Schmitt’s view. They cannot be
used to effectively describe the mechanisms of politics: the role of determining friend from
enemy. While liberal states definitely engage in determining the friend-enemy distinction,
Schmitt claims that the liberal focus upon economics, religion, and other antitheses as a
means to attempt to replace politics is societal de-politicalisation.
(a) Liberalism and Party Politics
As Tracy B Strong writes his forward to The Concept of the Political,52
it is fairly
evident from his writing that Carl Schmitt found liberal’s political ideals and understanding
of politics to be highly flawed as their focus on the political discourse seemed to aim to use
an almost Orwellian form of doublespeak to transform the word ‘enemy’ into permutations
such as, “economic competitor”53
or “disturber of the peace.”54
The emphasis that
enlightenment-inspired authors placed on international trade and dependence replacing war
for Schmitt was an unacceptable idea. This would essentially remove the idea that politics
happen between states.
Additionally, Schmitt found further cause for frustration with liberals who claimed
that multi-party systems in domestic political systems were ‘political’ in their functioning.
Because again, Schmitt reserves the understanding of the word ‘political’ or ‘politics’ to be
used exclusively to describe the friend-enemy alignment between to similar organized groups
of people. It was Schmitt’s view that a strongly polarized domestic political system would
weaken the fabric of the all-embracing state: “the equation politics=party politics
[means]…weakening the common identity vis-à-vis another state.”55
52
(Strong, 2007, p. XIII)
53
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 28)
54
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 79)
55
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 32)

22. 16
(b) Civil War
If internalized antagonism were polarized enough, then Schmitt said that multi-party
politics could split the fabric of the state. And, in the event of this happening, “if domestic
conflicts…become the sole political difference…the domestic…friend-enemy groupings are
decisive for armed conflict,”56
then a new political division has split the state. From Schmitt,
the use of the word ‘politics’ or ‘political’ is reserved to describe the friend-enemy distinction
and it implies, “the real possibility of physical killing.”57
Therefore the liberal/Enlightenment ideal of economics, plurality and a multi-party
system being called political within a domestic purpose is absurd. But if a group within a
state can effectively politicize one of these categories and stand in opposition to the public
consensus of the state and its collective public will, then the state could declare that faction to
be an enemy that threatens the existential existence of the state. And, if the state does decide
that that outlier group has indeed become a political public enemy, then civil war, “the
dissolution of the state as an organized political entity…impenetrable to aliens,”58
becomes
possible.
Schmitt adds that this notion of civil war being perpetuated by the politicalization of
internal antagonisms between parties or groups within a pluralistic society is especially
applicable to constitutionally based states.59
Because a constitution provides a common set of
principles and values as enshrined and defined by a commonly accepted document, the
existence of that basis for common law then provides a much shaper lens for determining
friend from foe on both a domestic and international level. This notation is important to note
when considering the European Union because several principles are enshrined in the Treaty
of Lisbon refereeing to a defined set of values that all member states should share, and it
56
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 32)
57
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 33)
58
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 47)
59
ibid

23. 17
gives the EU competency to espouse those views beyond the borders of its member states.60
While the European Union is not a state in a recognized sense, this point and the idea of the
European Union functioning like a Schmittian political unit will be revisited after the
discussion of Großraum in relation to the European Neighborhood Policy.
(c) Universalism, Humanity and De-Politicalisation
Since politics is based around the idea of human groups coming together to form
communities on the basis of a friend-enemy distinction, Schmitt dismisses the idea of
universalism as being one of the most misleading de-politicalizing ideas presented by
liberalism. As politics is the division of humans into separate political groups and the
existence of those groups is predicated on each individual political unit being able to decide
friend from enemy, Schmitt dismisses the idea that a state can declare friendship for all states
of the world: “a people which exists in a political sphere cannot…escape from making [the
friend-enemy distinction].”61
Additionally, this also applies to groups within the state that
seek to make peace or chose to ignore the public enemy of the state; Schmitt sees this as
laying down ones arms and adding the enemy.62
This opinion finds parallel in a lot of the rhetoric that is found in the political
discourse today around terrorism and radical Islam; George Bush evoked this mentality in his
address to the American public (and the ‘Free World’) following the attacks on 9/11.63
This is
the big problem that Schmitt finds with declaring causes in the name of humanity or making
universalistic claims. Schmitt defines humanity as, “a universal, i.e. all-embracing, social
ideal, a system of relations between individuals.”64
It overlooks the simple fact that humanity
60
(TEU, Art 3 (5))
61
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 51)
62
ibid
63
(Bush, 2001)
64
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 55)

24. 18
cannot become a political grouping because politics requires a minimum of two actors; as
Schmitt puts it, “the political world is a pluriverse, not a universe.”65
This then means that in the event all the peoples of the world across cultural lines,
religious lines, economic lines etc. were to become so complacent with one another that war
became an obsolete possibility, then politics would cease to exist according to Schmitt.66
However given the vast complexities and rivalries between human political groupings, it
would seem highly unlikely for us ever to truly reach Fukuyama’s postulated ‘end of history.’
Moreover, if a state declares that it is fighting for a war in the name of humanity, this is a
form of political cognitive dissidence.
As Schmitt writes, “the concept of humanity excludes the concept of the
enemy…because wars waged in the name of humanity…[have] an especially intensive
political meaning[;]…it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular
state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent.”67
This then indicates
that a state has removed a particular group of people from being human. By claiming to fight
a war for “peace, justice, or progress” in the name of humanity, a state has effectively denied
humanity to its opponents. However, when humanity as a concept does become a
politicalizing force, it then becomes a most useful tool for imperialistic aims Schmitt writes,
because by declaring ones enemy to be an “outlaw” or a danger to all humanity, war can “be
driven to the most extreme inhumanity.”68
This then lends to the idea of de-politicalisation, that is, the removal of politics from
the public sphere, the end of political grouping into states.69
When this happens on a small
scale, Schmitt describes it as a state forfeiting its will to remain within the sphere of politics,
65
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 53)
66
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 53)
67
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 54)
68
ibid
69
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 55)

25. 19
it will become subject to either relying on a protector state to maintain its existence within the
sphere of politics after having abdicated its sovereign right to jus belli, or it will cease to
exist.70
If it were ever to happen on a global level, if the world were to be “transplanted into a
condition of pure morality, pure justice, or pure economics,”71
then politics and the
possibility of war is precluded, states would become nonexistent.72
1.2.2. Response to Liberalism/Pluralism
Schmitt’s critiques of the concepts of universal values and politics feeds right into the
base assumptions of his critiques of liberalism and pluralism. While scholars such as Doyle73
and Fukuyama74
have postulated that the spread of liberal values and republicanism were the
central tenants in assuring a stable era of global peace and prosperity (the Democratic Peace
Theory),75
Schmitt argues that these are not political solutions to the world’s problems. He
comments that liberalism has “neither advanced a positive theory of state nor…discovered
how to reform the state [and] has attempted only to tie the political to the ethical and
subjugate it to economics.”76
Instead, liberalism only offers a critique of politics with no
liberal definition of politics.77
Because the central tenant of political liberalism that stems from the enlightenment is
centered on freedom of the private individual, Schmitt finds it to be hypocritical for the state
to call upon an individual to sacrifices one’s life on behalf of the state.78
Thus, this creates a
fundamental ideological conflict of forfeiting the central ideological position of liberalism to
ask a private citizen to fight on behalf of the state when political tensions reach their high
points and enmity transforms into open conflict. This then places liberalism at an ideological
70
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 52-3)
71
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 52)
72
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 55)
73
(Doyle 2005)
74
(Fukuyama 1989)
75
(Jackson and Sorensen, 2007, p. 44)
76
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 61)
77
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 70)
78
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 71)

26. 20
bypass that is insurmountable within Schmitt’s definition of what political is, the state’s
ability to distinguish friend from enemy then being able to call upon its populace to fight the
enemy in the most polarizing and separating of situations. For Schmitt, this is as equally true
of the divisions over religion that had plagued Europe through the middle ages (Christianity
versus Islam) and the renaissance/pre-modern era (Catholics versus Protestants), as it was of
the contemporary economic divisions that were coming to a ‘political’ critical mass (and
would eventually result in becoming the political division line for a post-WWII bipolar
world).79
But as Schmitt wrote, even if liberalism free-market economics prevailed in becoming
the ‘universal’ value of the world following the successes of Europe’s industrial revolution
and England’s economic triumph over the military might of Napoleon,80
then politics
wouldn’t disappear; the parameters that formed the basis around what constituted the friend-
enemy axis would simply realign around economic have and have-nots.81
A global order
centered on the gravity of free markets and the institutions that preside over those markets,
and the power that the members of those kinds of institutions82
can still be used to form a
political axis of friend and enemy that can manifest itself violent wars.
Moreover, as Schmitt writes, wars fought in the name of an apolitical free market
economic order are still political in nature, because for Schmitt, the possibility and eruption
of violence is the sole prerogative of politics.83
Punitive sanctions are not a form of an
apolitical economic slapping of the wrists, but instead are telltale signs of the global
alignment of the friend-enemy paradigm. And for Schmitt, this is evidence enough that even
a world, like our 21st
century world governed around the perpetuation of globalization, that
79
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 74)
80
ibid
81
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 77)
82
Institutions like the EU, UN, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund for instance
83
(Schmitt, 2007, p.78

27. 21
governs itself around apolitical ideas like a global religion or economic system “cannot
escape the logic of the political.”84
1.2.3. National Identity built upon the Idea of “Friend and Enemy”
Now that the main tenants of Schmitt’s theory proposed in The Concept of the
Political and his definition of the political has been defined, this next section will offer a
practical deconstruction of statehood based on this theory. The aim of this demonstration is to
show that it can be: 1.) practically applied as an alternative model to other philosophical
approaches to state craft (Hobbes’ or Rousseau’s competing ideas’ of the social contract for
instance), and 2.) show that it can be used as a critique applied towards the effectiveness of
international institutions. Like any model, there are holes that do not apply perfectly in each
direct historical example one could bring to the table, but viewing state/nation formation
through the lens of Schmitt’s political friend-enemy alignment gives us an alternative model
to those normally considered by international relations scholars.
1) Historical Examples
As the focus of this dissertation is on European security in the 21st
century, this
dissertation will use a Schmittian model to shortly trace the historical societal and statehood
development of key states of the transatlantic alliance. As states will be the units for analysis
in the application of a Schmittian/identity politics based foreign policy analysis, it is
important to trace how his domestic theory applies to states and then observe how that theory
connects to his more direct spatial theory of international relations explored in II.2.
a) The United Kingdom
The British historical experience has been dominated by the fact that it is a small
island nation off the shores of Europe. That degree of separation has allowed the British to
both see themselves as an Atlantic/global power and see themselves as a part of Europe at
their own convenience. Recently, this attitude manifested itself in first the British reluctance
84
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 79)

28. 22
to join the European Coal and Steel Community instead opting to form the separate European
Economic Area in 1960,85
and later when they voted to leave the European Union in the
historic Brexit vote on June 23, 2016.86
Historically, this dual identity finds its roots in the development of the modern
English state which merged with Scotland in 1707.87
Up to 1707, England fought a series of
wars that defined the English state starting with the French occupation in 1066, to the
Hundred Years War against the French,88
to the series of religious civil and foreign wars that
defined King Henry VIII’s bid to establish a separate English identity distinct of the religious
rule of Rome. These defensive struggles for the English people to maintain themselves in the
political sphere fits in with Schmitt’s description of what a political people has to do if it
wants to define itself and separate itself as a separate political unit in a world of politics.89
This political means of building statehood took an offensive turn as England (the
United Kingdom after 1707) aimed to contrast itself against the other states of Europe by
expanding a wide colonial empire abroad. This essentially took the issue of trade and
projection of national power and transposed it into a Schmittian political one and showed that
politics and nationhood was measured in how the great powers of Europe were able to
compete in establishing colonies abroad and later exerting imperial influence over Africa.90
And by the advent of the First World War, the UK had found itself in the unique position of
Europe as being the one country that freely moved between alliances and thus was able to
shift the balance of power in the multipolar system.91
This unique position gave the United
Kingdom the freedom to shift between the alliances of the late 19th
century and constantly
85
(European Free Trade Association 2016)
86
(Hunt and Wheeler 2016)
87
(Barrow, 1969, p 534)
88
(Allmand, 1988, p. 138)
89
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 52)
90
(Stokes, 1969, p. 268)
91
(Christensen, 1997, p. 83)

29. 23
change the public enemy and defining a sense of Britishness as being free of the continent.92
The contrast of the friend-enemy consolation resonated with an independent island United
Kingdom having the political freedom to decide the balance of power between alliances in
Europe whilst projecting power overseas.
British dominance of the world in this sense was shattered by the first and second
world wars and with the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the world’s
two leading superpowers. As Britain was no longer the world’s strongest state, it had to seek
refuge in an alliance to preserve its position in the political sphere.93
As I have shown though,
identity politics continued to play a role in its participation in Europe up onto the present day
with the very recent vote by the British people to leave the European Union.
b) France
As was shown in the previous section, France’s political and military history has been
very tied up with that of its neighbor across the English Channel. Schmittian French political
history can trace its roots to the empire of Charlemagne and the subsequent century long
efforts to centralize a French state based in Paris. Unlike England who lost the Hundred
Years War as it failed to hold its claim to feudal lands across France,94
the French polity
came out stronger for the war with a more established sense of national identity built with a
very strong foundation in the enmity felt towards England during the war.95
This pre-modern
and early modern political development of France was further strengthened and reinforced by
the French state fighting wars of religion, expansion and survival from the late 16th
century
up onto the time of the First World War.
92
(Barber, 2013, p. 2)
93
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 46)
94
(Allmand, 1988, p. 164)
95
(Allmand, 1988, p. 166)

30. 24
A further pivot of Schmittian style political definition of France can be read into the
French terms surrounding the end of the First World War and the provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles. Prior to the war France used German Unification and tensions between Germany,
Moscow and the defecting parts of the Austro-Hungarian territory to try create a strong public
series of alliances and defined foes to solidify its position in Europe;96
after the war, the
Treaty of Versailles clearly illustrates the French perception of Germany as a dangerous foe,
the UK as a colonial rival but a political friend as the alliance between France and the UK
was critical for holding ground against a possible German resurgence of power,97
and a key
political friend in the US considering how strongly it advocated for the US to become an
essential member of the League of Nations.98
Again, the UK and US examples are
demonstrations of Schmitt’s declaration that alliances are critical for weaker states when
faced against stronger political foes if they want to hold their own in the political sphere.99
Finally, in the immediate period after WWII, France sought to forge strong political
ties with first the UK in an effort to maintain its primacy as a great power.100
Then after the
balance of power began to shift away from the old imperial powers of Europe towards the
bipolarity of the two nuclear superpowers, France began to forge its political identity around
enmity with Russia, uneasy political friendship but key economic partnership with
Germany,101
and by seeking much closer friendship ties with the US than the UK to enhance
security whilst maintaining jus belli and sovereignty at home.102
96
(Christensen, 1997, p. 71)
97
(Christensen, 1997, p. 90)
98
(Hudson, 1929, p. 19)
99
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 46)
100
(Smith, 1979, p. 71)
101
(Willis, 1978, p. 2)
102
(Hoffman, 1964, p. 3)

31. 25
c) Germany
Though the German nation-state formed rather late compared to its western European
neighbors in 1871,103
it was found under the recourse of the apex of the Schmittian political
paradigm. German was unified through a series of wars that saw Prussia conquer several of
the other key German principalities spread throughout the old Holy Roman Empire including
the Hanseatic League, Bavaria, and it wrestled the Alice-Loraine region away from France as
well. But because Germany, like Italy, was consolidated into a single political unit about 200-
400 years later than its neighbors to the north and west, Germany provides an interesting
example of political consolidation.
The Holy Roman Empire allowed the micro-states and principalities of Germany to
exist in a political pluriverse of similarly structured political units. In The Concept of the
Political, Schmitt describes how, “internal antagonisms [within a nation like the German or
Italian Nation]…weaken the common identity vis-à-vis another state…[and,] if domestic
conflicts…become the sole political difference…the domestic…friend-enemy groupings are
decisive for armed conflict.”104
This then would lead to suggest why Germany took longer to
unify than France. While France had a central consolidating political power in Paris, the
territory that would become Imperial Germany was divided along Protestant and Catholic
lines, lines of political alliance between the Hanseatic League and family ties to the
Hapsburgs, and the material inability of the slightly larger states like Bavaria or Prussia being
able to unify Germany by force until industrialization had become widespread. But as the 19th
century wore on and the political threat of the French state, Russian State and others grew, it
can be argued that in a Schmittian framework you would expect to see political consolidation
103
(Shibata, 2006, p. 80)
104
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 32)

32. 26
occur in the circumstances the German principalities (and Italian Kingdoms) faced by the
latter half of the 19th
century.105
d) The United States
While it may seem obvious how the friend-enemy paradigm would apply to the
founding of the United States as a spatially separate territory from the United Kingdom based
on the discussion in section 1.2.(3).(B). As the US is a vital security partner in maintaining
NATO and Nuclear deterrence in Europe that serves as a cornerstone for Europe’s security
apparatus today, it is prudent to point out a couple of aspects of the historical development of
American public identity and the American notion of the friend-enemy distinction.
One obvious question that the US raises as being a candidate to whom the friend-
enemy paradigm can be applied is, “is it possible for such a largely populated and diverse
country to have a solid enough public identity to determine friend from enemy?” And, the
answer has been yes throughout the 20th
century history of the United States. Starting with
the Spanish American war, the concept of manifest destiny, the red scare, and both world
wars provided the USA with plenty of public enemies around whom political identity could
be formed. However, that began to change in the latter part of the century.
The Vietnam War and the civil rights act exposed deep partisan splits in the country
that challenged the external notion that the public enemy, the USSR, was indeed a unifying
political force that forged a solid American sense of identity. While there have been moments
like the election of Reagan, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the attack on September 11th
since
the fraying of the 60s and 70s, the United States’ body politic, like many of the states in
Europe, has begun to be challenged by serious internal divisions that seem to be re-
electrifying old divisions within many Western societies’ that can become points of
politicalization that could challenge political friendship across the west.
105
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 66)

33. 27
2) Schmitt’s Critique of the League of Nations
A final key aspect to come from The Concept of the Political, would be Schmitt’s view of
global IGOs like the UN and its predecessor contemporary to the time of Schmitt’s writing of
COP, the League of Nations. While it can surely be traced to the fact that Schmitt was a
German academic building his career at a time when France and the UK were pitted against
Germany and had ratified the highly punitive Treaty of Versailles, Schmitt’s skepticism about
the League of Nations can be traced into his skepticism about universalism becoming a
political concept upon which political units can align themselves. Schmitt dismissed the LON
as an alliance whose aim was to diminish the ability of antagonistic actors (like Germany and
the USSR) from being able to make claims against British and French national interests’.106
He considers such an organization to have the sole aim of de-politicalizing political units
(which does indeed bear some semblance to how the global British and French empires failed
to acknowledged any possibility of self-determination in their overseas colonies). He says
that there can be two extremes and defines an antithesis, international organizations up and
onto interstate organizations.107
He is suspicious of what the end results of either of these two
kinds of organizations would be.
He fears that an international organization would transcend both borders and the notion of
territorial integrity.108
Moreover, it would strip political groupings of their jus belli and thus
de-politicalize the globe, leaving in the place of political units, “a world state…[that] would
be no political entity and could only be loosely called a state.”109
Again, he sees such a kind
of uniform de-politicalization of all forms of human antagonism as a grand delusion.
106
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 56)
107
ibid
108
ibid
109
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 57)

34. 28
On the other extreme, Schmitt also describes an intergovernmental organization (like the
LON), as an organization that neither abolishes states nor has the political/legal/moral
authority to abolish war between states.110
Instead, he suggests that the existence of such
organizations is on par with the motivation of why weaker states fall into compliance. By
creating an illusion of international law, Schmitt equates an organization like the LON to
simply be an alliance upon which jus cogens can be established then thereby used as a
justification to sharpen the polarity of enmity between states. Schmitt writes that, “a league of
nations which is not universal can only be politically significant when it represents a potential
or actual alliance. The jus belli would…be...transferred to the alliance.”111
110
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 56)
111
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 56-7)

35. 29
2. The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for
Spatially Foreign Powers: A contribution to the Concept of Reich in
International Law
The deconstruction of Schmitt’s hypothesis on Reich and Großraum will be combined
with the deconstruction of the COP to form a political framework through which the case
studies will be evaluated.
2.1. Defining the Concepts of Großraum and Reich as New Units of Political
Organization
1) Großraum
In The Großraum order of International Law, Schmitt provides a definition of a
Großraum as, “a spatial order in international law [in which]…third party powers [are]
expressly rejected.”112113
He introduces the concept of Großraum as a counter concept to the
previously dominant ideas of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ that had dominated Western political
thought since the Treaty of Westphalia produced the contemporary system of nation-states.
Though the basis for Großraum is ontologically based within the “context of economic-
industrial-organizational development,”114
Schmitt claims the model established by his theory
is the next logical evolution of societal development.
2) Reich
Schmitt defines a Reich as, “the leading and bearing power whose political ideas radiate
into a certain Großraum and which fundamentally exclude the interventions of spatially alien
powers into this Großraum.”115
Schmitt describes the US as being the first true Reich because
of its economic strength and its spatial exclusion of European powers from intervening in
Latin America.116
112
This describes a geographical zone that reserves sovereignty solely for the people therein, and it becomes
their prerogative to develop internal international law between the states within that domain, thus excluding
external actors beyond the Großraum
113
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 100)
114
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 111)
115
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 101)
116
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 100)

36. 30
2.2. Etiology and a New Order of Imperialism?
1) New Order of Empire
Carl Schmitt contests the western-Westphalian notion of “space” as being a,
“mathematical-natural scientific conception...; an empty space, that is, filled with corporeal
objects.”117
Schmitt builds the argument in his essay on the concept of Großraum that the
previous notion of space and defined territory as created by the Treaty of Westphalia has
been obsoleted. When the POTUS James Monroe declared that the Western Hemisphere was
to be free from European meddling, Schmitt believes that Monroe started an ontological
change in the way political units organized themselves as fundamental as the shift from
feudalism to the modern nation state had been.118
While it is plainly clear that the Germans lost WWII and Hitler’s Dritte Reich did not
stand for 100 years, there is still an academic counter argument being made against the
Western Imperial model that had dominated the international political system for the previous
century up to this point. Could it not be described that the United States acted as a Reich and
projected its influence into Western Europe and the same is true of the Soviet Union and the
Eastern bloc during the Cold War? And is it is in this alternative description of how political
units can interact with one another in a perceived territory that one can demonstrate a solid
alternative theory for how both the European Union and the modern Russian state may view
themselves and their right to project their culture and influence into the territories
surrounding them and how this can lead to great power conflict?
2) Concept compared to Other Contemporary forms of Empire
a) Monroe Doctrine
As was shown in the definition section above, a Reich is political unit similar to a
state. But unlike the Westphalian state that has an exclusive right to sovereignty and the
117
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 122)
118
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 83)

37. 31
administration of law within its borders, the Reich can be compared to a regional hegemon or
a regional great power that has an extraterritorial right to project its laws and values into the
weaker states of its corresponding Großraum. To demonstrate this, Schmitt declares the
American state to be the first modern historical comparative of a Reich and the western
hemisphere is its Großraum.119
He draws this declaration from the American Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine
was declared by POTUS James Monroe in 1823 as a part of an effort to keep European
colonial and imperial powers from interfering with US interests in Latin America;120
effectively making America a Reich, a state with the exclusive right to project into a given
spatial territory,121
and the western hemisphere its Großraum, the territory of exclusive
access.122
Schmitt observed that the historical development of this policy lead the US to fight
its war against Spain to remove Spanish influence following Spain’s attempt to yield
influence over Cuba, it led to Teddy Roosevelt’s Big Stick policy,123
and became the
justification for US interventionism throughout the Cold War.124
Schmitt then tries to point to American behavior in the western hemisphere and claim
that the German Reich had a similar right to exclusive access in Central and Eastern
Europe.125
The Monroe Doctrine had established jurisprudence in international law that laid a
new foundation for jus cogens in the same way the Treaty of Westphalia had established the
exclusive scared sovereign right of states to establish and enforce laws within their legal
boundaries.126
Therewith, the German Reich and Großraum that was being claimed by Hitler
was merely the fruition of an evolving global system of Reichs and Großräume that would
119
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 83)
120
(Mariano, 2001, p. 37
121
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 101)
122
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 100)
123
(Schmitt, 2011 p. 89)
124
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 83)
125
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 96)
126
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 85)

38. 32
eventually replace the universal law concepts of the LON with a pluriverse of Großräume
each of which had its own principles of international law and its own enforcing Reich.
Großraum is simply the next evolutionary ordering of the international political system.127
b) The Sun Never Sets on the British Empire
The greatest contemporary contrast available for comparison of the American Monroe
Doctrine and America claiming an exclusive right of intervention over Latin America was
comparing how the American Empire functioned contrasted against the British Empire.128
The Victorian saying of, ‘the sun never sets on the British empire’ referred to the fact that the
British Empire was a global empire that spanned the expanse of the world’s trading
thoroughfares. Schmitt described the British Empire as an empire with “no coherent space but
rather a political union of littered property scattered across the most distant continents.”129
To
Schmitt, these two orders represented a contrast between spatial order and claims of
universalism.
A was noted in the deconstruction of the COP, Schmitt viewed the LON as a possible
alliance that would be used to project Anglo-French national interests abroad. And he
continues that argumentation in his piece The Großraum Order by claiming the British
universalistic claims through the LON like freedom of the seas, is actually a usage of the
international organization to enable free passage of the British wartime fleet around the world
and thus an effort to legally protect the British projection of power.130
He writes, “this
century is…the period of time in which there reigned a wonderful harmony between…the
political and economic interests of the British world empire and…international law.”131
127
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 118)
128
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 90)
129
ibid
130
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 95)
131
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 94)

39. 33
3) Russian Bolshevism
While Schmitt writes about the jurisprudence set by the Monroe Doctrine and that that
gives legal claim to the establishment of a German Reich with domination over a
Großraum,132
there is a third comparative power with a comparative claim to Reich: the
USSR and its claims on the territories once dominated by the Russian Empire before the end
of the first world war.133
The Russian interest over this territory stretches back to Tsar
times134
as both expansion for the mark of prestige and as a buffer-zone to shield the Russian
heartland from an aggressive Germany. Moreover, the friendship treaty signed between the
USSR and Nazi Germany further signified that the two powers shared a common interest in
Eastern Europe, and both wanted the right to engage with the area in the same way that the
US engaged in Latin America. However, for Germany to expand into this Großraum, it
would come at the expense of the Russian claim to Großraum in Eastern Europe.135
2.3. The Historical Development of Großraum/Reich as a counter concept to the
Westphalian Model
1) A Global Alternative to the Traditional Western Conception of Imperialism and Empire?
a) Spanish and Portuguese Colonialism in the New World
The historical tracings of the concept of Großraum can be traced back to the Spanish and
Portuguese empires of the 15th
and 16th
century. The idea of having space for a state to
culturally and economically expand into was inferred in the statement made by Hernán
Cortés that “the German Emperor Charles V that he name himself Emperor of his new Indian
[new world] holdings.”136
This statement by Cortés can also be linked to how the Treaty of
132
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 100)
133
ibid
134
(Budd and Turnock, 2001, p. 47)
135
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 114)
136
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 115)

40. 34
Tordesillas sought to divide the territory of the New World between two Reichs (Spain and
Portugal) and legally sanction them Großräume.137
b) Imperial France: Traditional Westphalian Imperial Power or Reich?
Schmitt writes that there are embryonic connections between the early colonial empires of
Europe and his conception of Großraum,138
but the sparks did not catch flame in public
international law until the United States declared the Monroe Doctrine. But as his description
of a Großraum is basically expansionary space, does the French imperial empire in Africa not
fall more so into that category than the category of ‘universal empire’ of the British? After
all, the French wars in Indochina139
and Algeria140
were largely fought to maintain the French
Empire; France even tried to incorporate Algeria into metropolitan France.141
Since decolonization and the end of the Cold War, France has played an increasingly
major role in acting as the regional policeman across West Africa.142
Moreover, France was
the architect behind the Mediterranean Union.143
And, President Sarkozy was one of the
major advocate’s for a European (French lead) military intervention into Libya.144
Now while
these actions can definitely be compared to America’s self-perceived dominance over Latin
America and wartime Germany’s dominance over Central and Eastern Europe, it can be
argued that France too perceives itself as a Reich by the Schmittian definition with a defined
Großraum.145
137
(Meyer et al, 2012, p. 691)
138
(Schmitt, 2011, p. 114)
139
(Black, 2005, p. 156)
140
(Black, 2005, p. 159)
141
(Black, 2005, p. 161)
142
(Moncrieff, 2012)
143
(Euractiv 2008)
144
(Davidson, 2013, p. 314)
145
The topic of this dissertation is more focused on how this theory can be applied to European and Russian
relations so the analysis of French FP in Africa will stop here, though it would be a topic worth exploring in the
next take on Schmittian politics in the 21st
century.

41. 35
2) European Neighborhood Policy and the Russian Near Abroad
This section will aim to connect a coherent international relations theory framework
based on the Schmittian principles discussed in this dissertation and then apply them to the
current EU perceptions of the European Neighborhood and the Russian near broad.
a) The EU as Reich and the ENP as Großraum
The European Neighborhood Policy is outlined in the Treaty of Lisbon as being “a special
relationship with neighboring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good
neighborliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful
relations based on cooperation.”146
While the European Union may not be a Westphalian-
style state, it is a political organization. Moreover, under Art 18 (1) TEU, 21 (1) TEU, 22 (1)
TEU, and Article 25, the European Union is given competence to conduct a foreign policy.
And given the expanse of the geographic area covered by Art 8 (1) TEU and the mandate to
spread European values and principles abroad under Art 3 (5), this can be compared to a
Schmittian style Reich with a Großraum into which it has an exclusive/mandated right where
it can project its values and shape the regional international law and norms.
b) Putin and the Russian Near Abroad
Similar to the ENP, Putin’s Russia has outlined a FP agenda that seeks to project its
influence abroad, protect Russian nationals living in former Soviet States,147
and restore
Russia as a great power. This has involved interventions in Georgia (in 2008) and in Ukraine
(in 2014) to protect Russian nationals who have been threatened by the state that they are
living in. The establishment of the CIS is further evidence in Russia’s desire to partner and
work with states that were formally territories of the USSR or the former Russian Empire.148
Given the Russian economic, cultural and military interest in maintaining a dominant edge in
146
(TEU, Article 8 (1))
147
(Solechanyk, 1994, p.47)
148
(Commonwealth of Independent States 2016)

42. 36
these former soviet/Russian countries, it can also be argued that Russia can be considered a
Reich with a desire to dominate its corresponding Großraum.
c) Is there an Irreconcilable Overlap?
On paper, there would seemingly be no direct confrontation. Because the European Union
is an economically centered supranational organization and the Russian Federation is a state,
if there were to be a direct battle of the wills, then seemingly Russia would have a stronger
claim. But if we were to put this confrontation of interests into a Schmittian framework, and
note that there is an overlap in several of the signatories of the CIS149
and states designated
by the EEAS under the Eastern Partnership Program,150
then we can conclude that there is a
conflict of interests that can serve to become politicalized and form the basis for a friend-
enemy distinction between the European Union and Russia. Moreover, when you take the
NATO security partnerships with states like Georgia and Ukraine into account,151
it adds fuel
to the fire of possible politicization that builds into the friend-enemy paradigm.
d) Reich, Großraum, and Civilizations: Huntington’s Civilizations as an extension of the
Concept of Großraum
Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations was the controversial answer to Fukuyama’s
End of History. Many scholars rebuked CoC as “racist”152
or an “oversimplification.”153
And
given the deep complexities that separate the way someone in California and someone in
Texas may perceive themselves and view the world differently, it isn’t too hard to imagine or
rebuke Huntington as being a Eurocentric cultural imperialist.
However, Huntington’s argument would be as different as the Californian or Texan sees
himself and the world around him, both would both agree that they are American. He then
says there is then a deeper level that transcends cultural identity to the ‘civilizational’ level. It
149
ibid
150
(European External Action Service 2016a)
151
(North Atlantic Treaty Association 2015)
152
(Tsolakis, 2011, p. 179)
153
(Inglehart and Norris, 2003, p. 63)

43. 37
is from there were the Californian or Texan would find kinship and a similarity of world view
based on similar values and cultural norms that he would share with an Australian, German or
Canadian as a ‘Westerner,’ but theoretically, not with the typical, Arab, Russian or Indian.154
However, there are striking similarities between the frameworks put forward by Schmitt
and Huntington. Huntington’s definition of a civilization describes a cultural area that forms
the most common denominator upon which people can relate and still feel a connection.
Huntington then traces this back to regional religions that then have played a major role in the
cultural evolution, values and norms of states and political organizations within a region.155
He then further identifies stronger states in the region as core states and weaker ones as
periphery states.
This kind of classification closely resembles the argumentation presented by Schmitt in
his evaluation of Großraum and Reich. Both frameworks place a given ‘strongman state’
within a cultural bubble wherein they project values and norms that define the space.
Furthermore, conflicts and tensions arise between certain civilizations much in the same way
that Schmitt writes issues of religion, culture, and economics in their natural state are non-
political factors, however when they become politicalized, they can form the basis of a
friend-enemy relationship that can expand into armed conflict.
Schmitt categorizes Russia into its own category of culture, and Huntington places Russia
as a core state in what he deems Orthodox [Christian] Culture156
that stands in opposition to
Wester [Western Christianity] culture. Schmitt and Huntington both argue that this forms a
154
(Huntington, 1993, p. 24)
155
(Huntington, 1993, p. 27)
156
(Huntington, 1993, p. 25)

44. 38
friend-enemy paradigm/cultural fault line upon which conflict will ensue.157
It is through this
framework the case studies in the following portion will be evaluated.
157
(Huntington, 1993, p. 29)

45. 39
Part III: Case Studies
1. External Neo-Warfare: The Ukraine Crisis and the Russian Connection
As was mentioned above, a Schmittian framework will be used to evaluate how great
power conflict has changed in a post-Hiroshima, post-1991, post-9/11 world. The bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki saw the end of the conventional use of total war as a means for
resolving critical mass enmity between political foes because the inevitable end result would
be the usage of nuclear weapons.158
The collapse of the USSR in 1991 saw another change in
the paradigm of great power struggle: the US stood alone as the sole military and economic
superpower of the world.159
And following 9/11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan
and Iraq coupled with the 2008 financial crash, it becomes increasingly clear that the US is
no longer the sole superpower in a unipolar world, rather it has become a great power+ in a
multipolar+ world.160
This then has allowed for other great powers to begin moving in ways
that can undermine the west’s ability to manage conflict and confrontation around the world.
This section will look at how a resurgent Russia has been able to capitalize on conflict in
its near abroad and the area covered by the ENP (primarily the conflict in Ukraine) to exert
pressure on the European Union through usage of ‘hybrid warfare’ and ‘asymmetrical
warfare’ techniques. Russian FP practice stems from an imperial history that saw rule by both
Tsars and the USSR. After the fall in the Soviet Union in the early to mid-90s, there was an
assumption in the West that Russia would become a positive economic and security partner
and be embraced as a new liberal democracy:161
it even signed the Budapest Memorandum.162
The uneasy Schmittian political friendship that was being forged between the West and
158
(Taylor, 1984, p. 36-7)
159
(Fukuyama, 1989)
160
See ‘Annex B: Definitions’ for my clarifications of great power+ and multipolar+
161
(Asmus, 2002, p. 51)
162
(Orlov, 2014)

46. 40
Russia was metaphorically torn up following Putin’s speech in Munich in 2007 in which he
decried American security leadership of the West.163
Ukraine and NATO’s Response
On November 21, 2013, Ukraine’s President, Viktor Yanukovych, officially withdrawals
from negotiations with the EU after the pro-Russian president is thought to have been acting
under pressure from Moscow.164
This then leads to a series of protests and demonstrations
that result in President Yanukovych being deposed and fleeing to Russia on February 22,
2014 and less than four weeks later following armed protest in Eastern Ukraine and in
Crimea, Crimea votes on March 16, 2014 to join the Russian federation, a move approved by
the Russian Duma and Vladimir Putin just two days later in violation of the Budapest
Memorandum.165
While the stealthy deployment of Russian weapons and special operations troops
disguised as plain clothes fighters to first Crimea then later to Donetsk and Luhansk may
seem like a new ‘asymmetric warfare’ method. However, the practice of Russian leaders like
President Putin working hand in hand with local leaders to rally military and nationalistic
support for Russia at the expense of the local government is a tactic that dates back to Tsarist
times.166
Russian troops had successfully invaded another country in Europe, occupied a
region of its territory and annexed it, as Karagiannis notes, this is the first instance of a newly
emerged great power Europe responding to American meddling within Russian space
[Großraum].167
Nevertheless, the impact has been strong on the nervous Baltic States and on NATO
grand strategy in the Eastern European Region. Even traditionally neutral Sweden and
163
(Karagiannis, 2014, p. 402)
164
(Karagiannis, 2014, p. 407)
165
(BBC 2014)
166
(Galeotti, 2016, p. 297)
167
(Karagiannis, 2014, p. 416)

47. 41
Finland, both of whom waited to join the European Union until after the fall of the Soviet
Union in the 90s,168
have been taking closer steps towards the possibility of deeper
partnership and security policy integration with NATO.169
Given Russia’s invasion of
Georgia in 08 and its invasion of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea under the guise of defending
Russian national’s abroad has reopened the question of a security dilemma between Russia
and its European neighbors.170
NATO has responded to the possibility of an Eastern Ukraine
style invasion into the Baltic States or other Eastern European members by vamping up its
rapid response forces in 2014 by adding the élite “spearhead force,” also known as the Very
High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), and increasing its armored forces stationed on its
eastern periphery.171
The NRF was expanded to consist of 40,000 personnel with 5,000 of
them designated to be a part of the VJTF.172
The CFSP/CSDP response of the European
Union has been to levy economic sanctions against the Russian state, Russian banks, and
elites in Russian society.173
When analyzed with a Schmittian framework, one would start by looking at the ontology
of Schmitt, the basis of politics lies in the friend-enemy paradigm and its possible expression
through the outbreak of physical violence between political units in an international political
system. A Schmittian political system is a pluriverse of Großräume that form exclusive
spatial zones that a powerful Reich has the privilege to project its values into that zone.
Conflict can arise when Großräume intersect or a spatial foreign power projects into another
Reich’s exclusive zone of access.
168
(Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2012, p. 25)
169
(Standish, 2016)
170
(Atland, 2016, p. 164)
171
(NATO 2016)
172
ibid
173
(EEAS, Sanctions in Force, 2016, p. 52)

48. 42
In the case of the Ukraine conflict, it is possible to trace these elements. The end of the
Cold War saw the end of a bitter enmity between the US and the USSR; it can be argued that
Western Europe had come to be included in the spatially exclusive territory into which the
US could project its fundamental values (economic liberalism and republicanism),174
and the
USSR’s claims over the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Republics east of Russia formed a
comparative Großraum.175
After the USSR collapsed in 1991 and many of the states in the
previous Soviet zone of domination sought to move west and join western economic
institutions and security apparatuses. This was a basis for politicalization that could lead to
conflict; the Russian defense minister decried the move of Poland west as exposing the
underbelly of Russia to NATO.176
This then further separates the west and Russia on the friend-enemy paradigm. Thus,
making conflict more likely. Russia see’s interference in Ukraine by the EU during ascension
talks as an existential threat to Russian national interests and moves to put pressure on
Yanukovych to back out of the association agreement talks. Then this sets the stage for the
current crisis, and the fallout with the deployment of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine and
western troops being deployed along the eastern front of NATO and the EU.
2. Internal Neo-Warfare: The Power of Money and the Power of the Vote
As was shown under III.1 there has been a reemergence of conflicting interests between
the West and Russia that has the political potential to manifest in interstate conflict. This
conflict has manifested itself in rearmament along old battle lines, deployment of military
174
(Basevich, 2002, p. 30)
175
(Karagiannis, 2014, p. 415
176
ibid

49. 43
techniques meant to intimidate the smaller members of NATO on the eastern flank and cause
them to wonder if they could become the next Ukraine, and there was been enough rhetoric
on both sides to whip up nationalistic fervor for right wing supporters. And that final aspect is
what will be examined in this section.
One of the key defining features of Russia’s current tango with the West is: how Russia
has used the Greek financial crisis to place pressure on the Euro without dropping bombs on
Athens,177
how Putin can force Merkel’s hand without occupying Berlin by simply attacking
civilian villages in Syria and aggravating the immigration crises,178
or most troubling can
shake up European unity from within without having to have a Prague spring and simply
financially supporting Eurosceptic parties instead.179
And this is the aspect of this kind of
neo-warfare conflict that is the most indirect, but it may be having the largest impact on
maintaining the peace of the post-war order. While total war may still seem an inconceivable
option in the nuclear age and it is obvious at times when a state becomes victim of the cyber-
attack of another, funneling money into elections to undermine republics and nudge them in
the direction of illiberal republicanism can be one of the most dividing aspects that the west
can undergo at the moment.180
Each of the mentioned aspects above plays a role in diving Europe and making it weaker.
Geopolitically, a divided weaker Europe is better for Russia for economic, cultural and
security purposes.181
An example of Russian attempts to undercut Western republics at home
and feed the fires of nationalism and Euroscepticism by funding far right parties. And to fan
the fire, Russian efforts to aggravate the Syrian refugee crisis and politicize it divide
177
(Walker, 2015)
178
(Al Jazeera, Russian Air Strikes, 2015)
179
(Polyakova, 2016)
180
(Herd 2009)
181
(Herd, 2009, p. 94)

50. 44
European parties, European states, and the European public.182
The result is then when
Russian law makers congratulate the UK on voting for Brexit.183
And, this strategy is not just limited to the European side of the Atlantic. There is
evidence that connects Russian money to conservative Christian groups in the US.184
Moreover, the US media recently reported that the current campaign manager, Paul Manafort,
of far-right presidential candidate, Donald Trump, worked for the election campaign of
Viktor Yanukovych during 2009;185
Yanukovych would go on to win the election, lock up the
leader of the opposition party, and set the course of action in motion that would reach a
climax in the Ukraine Revolution mentioned earlier.
And to analyze this in a Schmittian framework it makes sense. Since direct great power
war is out of the question and Russia does not have the global resources to challenge the US
in the same manner the USSR did in a number of proxy wars around the world, it makes
sense for Russia to respond with unconventional and new combative methods; Schmitt noted
that enmity did not have to lead to direct armed conflict. Moreover, breaking up Western
financial, political and security alliances weakens the effect that Western sanctions have on
Russia and enables Putin to freely pursue his foreign policy goals without hindrance.
182
(Kennedy, 2016)
183
(Amos, 2016)
184
(Shekhovtsov, 2014)
185
(Meyers and Kramer 2016)

51. 45
Part IV: Conclusion
1. How has Great Power Conflict Evolved?
Great power conflict has undergone a number of changes from the end of the Second
World War that have redefined how states express conflict. While more conventional warfare
methods are common between regional and mid-level powers, the advent of nuclear weapons
has negated the likelihood of great powers engaging in a total war similar to the world wars.
And as the current structure of the world seems to best resemble a multipolar+ system,186
it
also is materialistically impossible for any two states to engage in a series of proxy wars the
way the United States and Soviet Union did throughout the Cold War.
Instead, great power war manifests itself in more subtle, nevertheless effective ways.
While this dissertation looked at how Russia has used propaganda, supported of fringe
parties,187
and asymmetric warfare to manipulate and distort alliances between countries in
Europe and stoke Eurosceptic flames in many countries home electorates, neo-warfare
between great powers is not limited to that. Great (and mid) level powers can and do several
other forms of neo-warfare to manipulate the world around them: cyberwar fare, trade wars,
and funding non-state combatant groups are three other examples.
In many ways the structure of the current international political system has necessitated
these kinds of warfare techniques as much as globalization and technological innovation has
enabled them. Great powers, mid-level powers and regional powers can use these and other
methods to expand their hard and soft power capabilities without necessarily provoking a
great power into an all-out war.
186
In my glossary, I define a multipolar+ system as being: “a political system that is dominated by a state that
has a defined and clear military dominance and whose economy has an absolute advantage in production over
any other one state, but can be challenged by coalitions of states and international institutions in ways a
superpower in a unipolar system can’t. Example: the global military and economic domination of the US in the
post-2008 recession and post-Iraq invasion epoch 2008-presnt”
187
(Groll et al, 2016)

52. 46
2. How Have Identity Politics Threaten to end Europe’s Longest Period of
Great Power Peace?
The theoretical framework constructed in Part II of this essay aimed at removing politics
from the individual level to the state level for analysis. Carl Schmitt believed that politics
happened at the second level of international relations analysis to put it into an international
relations theory framework. A classical realist like Thomas Hobbes of Hans Morgenthau uses
an ontology that focuses on an analysis that goes from the first level up to the third to say that
states are constantly seeking power to protect their security. A neo-realist like Kenneth Waltz
has a ‘top-down’ approach in which he says the structure of the system (unipolar, bipolar, or
multipolar) dictate not only how stable a system is, but also how states should align
themselves to maintain a balance of power.
By comparison, it can be said that Schmitt was a level two realist who’s ontology started
from the secondary level. Because politics was the public action between political entities
that is used to define friend from enemy, the state is the primary unit of analysis. When that is
combined with his Großraum theory of international law, this second level approach is
further reinforced, because it focuses on how one strong state behaves within a regional
political system of weaker states whilst it maintains relations with other strong powers. But
each power within this political system isn’t necessarily competing for primacy or to
maintain a system wide balance of power. Instead each state is seeking to maintain its
influence over a certain region. 188
These two aspects of Schmitt’s theory can come together and give scholars a framework
for analyzing the current developing security crisis in Europe. The United States represents
the concept of Reich from a security perspective for Europe, and Germany represents the
concept of Reich from an economic perspective. As political friends in Europe, the United
188
See Annex C for more on Level 2 realism

53. 47
States and its strongest European partners are able to project neo-liberal economic values and
republican values throughout its perceived corresponding Reich, Eastern Europe and the
ENP-area.
This then brings it into conflict with Russia, another Reich competing for the privilege of
being the dominant cultural, economic and security actor in the territories of the Russian near
abroad. Using a Schmittian framework, this then demonstrates that we have two state level
actors engaging with one another for the exclusive right to be the dominant power within a
given spatial area. And the tension created between Russia and the Western powers has
become politicalized.
This politicalisation manifests itself in conflict. But as great power conflict has evolved
due to circumstances regarding the balance of power, the ability of technology and necessity
for subtlety, these conflicts do not manifest themselves in grand total wars the way Schmitt
envisioned technology would transform war.189
Then again, we wrote that war was not the
direct aim of politics and only happened under moments of greatest duress.190
3. What Are the Implications for Moving Forward in the 21st Century?
Going forward in the 21st
century, it seems likely that antagonisms will grow. Especially
when considering the current rise of nationalism and Euroscepticism across the west, it seems
likely that more factors and antitheses will continue to reenter the Schmittian political sphere.
The anti-intellectualism purported by the far-right and far-left anti-establishment parties
across the west is a very troubling symptom that something is going deeply wrong that could
see a further degeneration of the long peace that has held Europe together. As James Traub
put it, it seems as if the West is sleep-walking towards illiberal democracy,191
the idea put
189
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 46)
190
(Schmitt, 2007, p. 34)
191
(Traub, 2016)

54. 48
forward by Fareed Zakaria that a country can vote, but the values of the enlightenment such
as freedom of speech and religion are non-existent within the society.192
So this means that the West needs to be vigilant about these new forms of warfare. If it
comes to a point where western alliances and economic union are in tatters, then that opens
the door to a foreign great power, like Russia, to militarily and economically confront smaller
and weaker states unchallenged and unopposed. This framework can help policy makers to
understand that even though hot wars are not being fought between great powers at the
moment, the votes of very conservative constituents matter, and can push an entire foreign
policy apparatus down the road of de-integration and dis-union.
192
(Zakaria, 1997, p. 23)