Bovill briefing: FCA Senior Persons Regime - December 2014 & March 2015
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Bovill - the UK financial services regulatory consultancy - runs regular briefings. These are the slides from the December 2014 London and March 2015 Leeds briefing on the new Senior Persons Regime. For more information visit www.bovill.com. Further information on the event is below: On the hook and nowhere to hide The regulators’ focus on senior individuals is greater than ever before and the personal cost of failing in your duties can be massive. The new Senior Managers Regime will soon replace the Significant Influence Function (SIF) component of the Approved Persons regime for UK deposit takers and systemically important investment firms. The regime aims to increase accountability – and personal liability – for individuals who are Senior Managers in these organisations, and also sets the tone for those in other types of firms. In this briefing, we: • Give a brief refresher on upcoming changes to the SIF and Approved Persons world • Look at the proposed Senior Managers Regime • Reflect on the regulators’ increased scrutiny of individuals • Offer some practical tips on how to keep out of the regulators’ ‘firing line’
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Bovill briefing: FCA Senior Persons Regime - December 2014 & March 2015
- 1. On the hook and nowhere to hide The regulators’ increasing scrutiny of senior individuals Briefing Tuesday 3rd March 2015 – Leeds Thursday 11th December 2014 – London Prem Griffith
- 2. 2 Agenda • The evolving focus on Approved Persons • The proposed Senior Persons Regime • Possible read-across to Approved Persons • How to keep out of the firing line
- 3. 3 Focus on Approved Persons
- 4. 4 Approved Persons Regime – the Gateway • Existed for years under a variety guises • Demonstrate candidate is Fit and Proper When assessing fitness and propriety… The most important considerations will be the person's: 1. honesty, integrity and reputation; 2. competence and capability; and 3. financial soundness. FIT 1.3.1G
- 5. 5 Evolution from registration to authorisation • Pre-2009, FSA focussed on probity (not competence) • Turner Review recommended scrutiny of technical ability • Since 2009, SIF interview process – Tends to focus on the larger firms, but not always…
- 6. 6 Action against individuals • Was focussed on dishonest behaviour • Failure to take action against boards of failed institutions • Collective responsibility = difficult to take individual action SIFs need to have: – Clarity of responsibilities and accountabilities – Awareness of potential liability “…fining of individuals more of a deterrent” Martin Wheatley “…FCA clearly committed to achieving a credible deterrent and using enforcement to demonstrate societal disapproval” Tracey McDermott
- 7. 7 Supervisory / enforcement tools • Use of attestations – Increased accountability • Enforcement powers – Private Warning – Restrictions on Business – Withdraw (firm) authorisation – Fine – Public censure – Suspension (individual) – Prohibition (individual) – Prosecute (individual)
- 8. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 £- £2,000,000 £4,000,000 £6,000,000 £8,000,000 £10,000,000 £12,000,000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Monetary Amount Number of fines 8 FSA/FCA fines – individuals
- 9. 9 FSA/FCA fines – firms 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 £- £200,000,000 £400,000,000 £600,000,000 £800,000,000 £1,000,000,000 £1,200,000,000 £1,400,000,000 £1,600,000,000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Monetary Amount Number of fines
- 10. 10 Recent examples Individual Role Firm Fine Other action Peter Cummings CEO HBOS £500k SIF ban Peter Halpin CEO Swinton £413k CEO ban Anthony Clare FD / Compliance Oversight Swinton £209k SIF ban Nicholas Boyer Marketing Director Swinton £307k SIF ban John Pottage CEO UBS Subsidiaries N/A Overruled at Upper Tribunal*
- 11. 11 Senior Persons Regime … a quick canter through
- 12. 12 The problem… • insufficient or meaningless personal responsibility • illusion of regulatory controls • claiming ignorance or hiding behind collective decision- making • little realistic prospect of financial penalties or sanctions • individual incentives not consistent with high standards.
- 13. 13 PCBS Recommendations (June 2013) Recommendation Key points New regime for individuals • Senior persons regime • Individual statements of responsibilities • Responsibilities map • Code of practice (conduct rules) Incentives for better behaviour • Incentives / disincentives to reflect long- term risk and reward New enforcement approach • Reverse burden of proof • Potential for criminal prosecution
- 14. 14 Birth of the Senior Persons Regime • Individuals to have a “statement of responsibilities” • Firms to have clear map of responsibilities • New set of conduct rules • Reverse burden of proof • Criminal offence (for actions resulting in failure of an institution) For banks, building societies and PRA-designated investment firms Certification Regime Senior Management Regime
- 15. 15 Tier one – Senior Management Regime • PRA Senior Management Functions (SMFs) – Prescribed list of responsibilities that equate to SMF • FCA Senior Management Functions (SMFs) – Prescribed list of functions that equate to SMF • Combined list of SMFs broader than the corresponding SIF functions • PRA and FCA SMF regime to work jointly as a single cohesive regime • Existing SIFs grandfathered
- 16. 16 Senior Management Functions Description SMF FCA/PRA CoSignificant Influence Function Chief Executive function (CEO) SMF1 PRA CF3 Chief Finance function (CFO) SMF2 PRA CF28 (may be CF1) Executive Director SMF3 FCA CF1 Chief Risk function (CRO) SMF4 PRA CF28 (may be CF1) Head of Internal Audit SMF5 PRA CF28 Head of key business area SMF6 PRA CF29? Group Entity Senior Manager SMF7 PRA CF1 (“CF00”) Credit union SMF (small credit unions only) SMF8 PRA CF29? Chairman SMF9 PRA CF2 Chair of the Risk Committee SMF10 PRA CF2 Chair of the Audit Committee SMF11 PRA CF2 Chair of the Remuneration Committee SMF12 PRA CF2 Chair of the Nominations Committee SMF13 FCA CF2 Senior Independent Director SMF14 PRA CF2 Compliance Oversight SMF16 FCA CF10 Money Laundering Reporting SMF17 FCA CF11 Significant Responsibility SMF SMF18 FCA CF29?
- 17. 17 Tier two – Certification Regime • PRA – functions that might involve a risk to the ‘safety and soundness of the relevant firm’ • FCA – SIF functions who are not an SMF – Individuals in customer-facing roles that are subject to qualification requirements – Anyone who supervises or manages a certified person. • No regulatory approval – onus on firms to police and certify that individuals are ‘fit and proper’ • Regulators to assess effectiveness of Certification Regime.
- 18. 18 Section 36 – Criminal Offence! 36 Offence relating to a decision causing a financial institution to fail (1) A person (‘S’) commits an offence if: (a) at a time when S is a senior manager in relation to a financial institution (‘F’), S: (i) takes, or agrees to the taking of, a decision by or on behalf of F as to the way in which the business of a group institution is to be carried on, or (ii) fails to take steps that S could take to prevent such a decision being taken, (b) at the time of the decision, S is aware of a risk that the implementation of the decision may cause the failure of the group institution, (c) in all the circumstances, S's conduct in relation to the taking of the decision falls far below what could reasonably be expected of a person in S's position, and (d) the implementation of the decision causes the failure of the group institution. …
- 19. 19 Outstanding questions • Regulators still considering branches of ‘Third Country’ banks • Competence for branches of EEA banks • How will it all work in practice? • Practical implications of greater personal liability • Further consultations in coming months • Final policy statements later in the spring
- 20. 20 The read-across What effect will the Senior Persons Regime have on Approved Persons?
- 21. 21 The broader impact isn’t yet clear • Application to non-banks / insurers? • Expectation of clearly documented / mapped responsibilities • Greater individual accountability / liability • Increased use of attestations • Regulatory action against individuals • Certification regime for all staff at all firms? THOUGHTS?
- 22. 22 Keeping out of the firing line…
- 23. 23 Apportionment of responsibilities • Who is responsible for what? • Not just approved persons • How are risks / issues reported upwards? • Is this mapping / reporting clearly documented? • Would you be able to explain to the regulator? • Review arrangements periodically? – Evidence? • Culture / customer focus?
- 24. 24 Responsibility Maps • Potentially very complex (large organisations / groups) • How do you document this? • Clear and concise MI crucial – Is the MI used? • What about unregulated / overseas holding companies? • Legal entity / business line focus • Conduct risk – what does this mean for your firm? • What does comprehensive management responsibilities map look like?
- 26. 26 Individual responsibility / accountability • Clear job descriptions / role profiles • Care with wording of attestations to the regulator(s) – s166 to test compliance with attestations • Awareness of potential liability • Not a blame culture but…if something goes wrong… – Does this create a personal conflict (pressure to cover-up)?
- 27. 27 Controls / checks • Annual fitness and propriety certifications? • Training for all new staff: 1-2-1 with Compliance Officer • Annual reminder of obligations and liabilities • Background checks on existing staff • Re-credit referencing? • Evidence is key
- 29. 29 Summary • Ensure individual responsibilities / accountabilities are: – Documented – Mapped – Reviewed • Ensure decisions you take are: – Reasoned – Reasonable – Challenged – Documented
Editor's Notes
- My name is Prem Griffith. I recently joined Bovill from the FCA, where I spent about 10 years in a variety of roles. Most notably, I spent 3 years running the SIF interview process… A lot of this may be known / obvious to many of you, but there will undoubtedly be some useful pointers you can take back to your firms.
- Regulators have had a registration / approval process for senior individuals for years. The FSA established the ‘Approved Persons Regime’. Origins possibly out of Barings bank failure, and need to police key individuals. To be approved to perform a controlled function, the individual / firm had to satisfy the regulator the individual was “Fit and Proper”. FIT sets out the criteria that the “appropriate regulator” will consider when assessing the fitness and propriety of a candidate to perform a controlled function, in particular: Honesty, integrity and reputation Competence and capability Financial soundness Two broad categories of approved person – significant influence functions (broadly board and senior management) and customer function (individuals who advise customers – investment business only). Approved Persons Regime was a clear attempt to map individual accountability. A particular stroke of genius was the CF8 (apportionment and oversight) function. MiFID destroyed this by making it a collective responsibility.
- Prior to 2009, when the regulator (the FSA) considered applications to perform a controlled function, its focus was solely on background checks relating to the candidate’s probity (honesty & integrity and financial soundness). No real focus on technical ability In 2009, the Turner Review looked at causes for the “global banking crisis”, and made recommendations that the FSA should focus on individuals’ technical ability. SIF interview process is born. Regulator’s risk appetite for SIF interviews fluctuates – but largely focussed on large firms. Still minimal / no focus on approved persons applications at smaller firms, except the probity checks.
- FSA concentrated its disciplinary action at the firm level, and only rarely took action against individuals (mainly for fraudulent / dishonest behaviour) In the fall-out from financial crisis, the regulator’s seeming inability to take action against individuals responsible for the large-scale failures in some of our largest institutions has been greeted with wide-spread incredulity and ridicule. In reality, action against individuals for negligence / incompetence proved to be almost impossible to take, as boards and senior management successfully hid behind ‘collective responsibility’. Unlike the authorisations gateway, the burden of proof is on the regulator to demonstrate an individual is not fit and proper. Now, the FCA is far more likely in any action against a firm, to consider whether any individuals should be disciplined. “Painful discipline” is far more likely in the FCA’s view, much more likely to change behaviours, than actions taken against firms. Vitally important that individuals in senior management positions understand and are clear of their responsibilities, and aware of the potential for personal liability in the form of regulatory action against them individually. Likely to name and shame
- Supervisory Tools FCA is making increased use of attestations – a written statement from a senior person within a firm, confirming (attesting) that a particular set of actions have been (or will be) undertaken. Attestations can be used as evidence against individuals in enforcement cases. Possibility of skilled person reviews to check whether terms of attestation met. The FCA has a wide range of enforcement powers: Private Warning Withdraw a firm’s authorisation Impose penalties (fines) Public censure Suspend a firm or individual Prohibit an individual from working in financial services Prosecute individuals …and now potentially criminal prosecution (for individuals caught by the Senior Persons Regime, whose actions causes an institution to fail) – we talk more about this later
- Clear that regulatory action against individuals has increased since 2010. Drop-off in the past few years sends some interesting mixed messages: Might suggest regulator doesn’t have appetite for individuals Is action against individuals “too difficult” Increased use of attestations likely to give regulator more evidence in future Does the room think that action against individuals is becoming more or less likely? Drop off in 2013/2014 likely to be due to: Up until the last few weeks, the PRA had not yet fined anyone. Both regulator’s enforcement divisions have been heavily focussed on a couple of major ‘market-wide’ investigations (LIBOR and FX). Ex-colleagues at the FCA have anecdotally told me that over past 18 months, been virtually impossible to get cases into Enforcement due to “lack of resources” The LIBOR and FX (13 months and 70 staff) investigations are largely completed, so the enforcement teams will be looking for new targets…
- FCA fined 5 banks (Citibank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, RBS and UBS) £1.1bn for failing to take reasonable care to organise and control their affairs responsibly and effectively with adequate risk management systems in relation to G10 spot FX voice trading in London. In essence, rate-rigging. It was individual ‘rogue’ traders who were acting dishonestly, but the banks failed to control their staff. Fine is for poor governance and controls. Hot on the heels of the Libor manipulation saga. £530m in fines. Will be interesting to see whether further action is taken against SIF individuals for poor oversight and control.
- Peter Cummings For failing to exercise due skill, care and diligence by pursuing an aggressive expansion strategy within the Corporate Division of HBOS, without suitable controls in place to manage the associated risks. Pretty much the only senior executive at a (near) failed bank against whom FSA took action The FSA found that: Cummings was aware that there were significant issues with the Corporate Division’s controls, including: weaknesses in management information; staff being incentivised to focus on revenue rather than risk; and a culture which saw risk management as a constraint on the business rather than an integral part of it. Under Cummings’ direction, the division pursued an aggressive growth strategy, despite these known weaknesses in the control framework. Cummings led a culture of optimism which also affected the division’s judgement about bad debts. The division did not adequately monitor the deterioration of high value transactions and was slow to pass them to the dedicated ‘High Risk and Impaired Assets’ team for more detailed assessment of the likelihood of default and the corresponding level of provision that should be raised. The assessment of individual provisions was consistently optimistic rather than prudent and Cummings chose not follow the approach to levels of provisioning which had been suggested by HBOS’s auditors and the division’s own Risk function. The FSA accepted that Some of the problems existed before Cummings was appointed, He did make efforts to introduce some improvements and that critical business decisions were made collectively. Cummings did not act deliberately or recklessly in breaching FSA regulations, and that the full severity of the global financial crisis, and its effects, were not reasonably foreseeable during the early part of the time period reviewed. Peter Halpin (CEO) failed to ensure that Swinton’s management information was adequate for the firm to identify compliance issues with the sales of the monthly add-ons and to ensure its customers were being treated fairly. failed to respond to warning signals about those sales and, when he did act, his actions did not go far enough. He should have stepped back and considered whether, when taken together, those warnings pointed to fundamental problems with Swinton’s sales of the monthly add-ons. failed to recognise the risk that the potentially lucrative incentive scheme for Swinton's executive directors could give rise to a culture within Swinton that increased the risk of mis-selling. Observations Held responsible for firm’s failings Failed to take sufficient steps to address potential compliance risks Element of hindsight: “reasonableness” of conduct judged objectively after the event Level of monitoring was disproportionately low Call monitoring “scorecards” developed by Compliance Department inadequately assessed TCF Failed to appreciate that nature of complaints (as opposed to quantity) indicated a compliance risk. Anthony Clare Lack of competence Oversight for compliance and TCF Involved in specific decisions concerning development of firm’s breakdown and home emergency insurance policies Nicholas Boyer Lack of competence Played central role in development of monthly add-on policies, responsible for design, development and marketing Involved in a number of decisions that were not fair to consumers Did not understand that, whilst not part of compliance framework, still had personal responsibility for consideration of TCF Firm Firm were also fined £7.4m for mis-selling monthly add-on insurance policies John Pottage Was found by the FSA to have failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the business of UBS complied with the requirements and standards of the regulatory system. The FSA contended that Mr Pottage Failed to undertake an adequate risk assessment of the business when he entered the role Failed to question assurances he received that there were no deficiencies to the business Failed to carry out “continuous monitoring” Commence early enough a systematic overhaul of systems and controls The Upper Tribunal overturned the FSA’s enforcement finding against Pottage. It found that there were Flaws in the risk management system Flaws and inadequate resourcing in the compliance monitoring Weaknesses in MI However there was insufficient evidence that Mr Pottage conduct fell significantly below what could reasonably be expected in the circumstances
- Hands up who works in a “dual-regulated” firm? Any employees of Insurers? The rest should also pay attention, as the SPR has implications for all firms.
- In 2012, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (the ‘PCBS’) was established to consider the professional standards and culture of the UK banking industry. The problem Too many bankers, especially at the most senior levels, have operated in an environment with insufficient personal responsibility. Top bankers dodged accountability for failings on their watch by claiming ignorance or hiding behind collective decision-making. They then faced little realistic prospect of financial penalties or more serious sanctions commensurate with the severity of the failures with which they were associated. Individual incentives have not been consistent with high collective standards, often the opposite.
- A new framework for individuals The Approved Persons Regime has created a largely illusory impression of regulatory control over individuals, while meaningful responsibilities were not in practice attributed to anyone. As a result, there was little realistic prospect of effective enforcement action, even in many of the most flagrant cases of failure. The Commission proposes a new framework for individuals with the following elements: a Senior Persons Regime, which would ensure that the key responsibilities within banks are assigned to specific individuals, who are made fully and unambiguously aware of those responsibilities and made to understand that they will be held to account for how they carry them out; a Licensing Regime alongside the Senior Persons Regime, to apply to other bank staff whose actions or behaviour could seriously harm the bank, its reputation or its customers; the replacement of the Statements of Principles and the associated codes of practice, which are incomplete and unclear in their application, with a single set of Banking Standards Rules to be drawn up by the regulators; these Rules would apply to both Senior Persons and licensed bank staff and a breach would constitute grounds for enforcement action by the regulators. Incentives for better behaviour Remuneration has incentivised misconduct and excessive risk-taking, reinforcing a culture where poor standards were often considered normal. Many bank staff have been paid too much for doing the wrong things, with bonuses awarded and paid before the long-term consequences become apparent. The potential rewards for fleeting short-term success have sometimes been huge, but the penalties for failure, often manifest only later, have been much smaller or negligible. Despite recent reforms, many of these problems persist. The Commission proposes a radical re-shaping of remuneration for Senior Persons and licensed bank staff, driven by a new Remuneration Code, so that incentives and disincentives more closely reflect the longer run balance between business risks and rewards. … A new approach to enforcement against individuals A more effective sanctions regime against individuals is essential for the restoration of trust in banking. The current system is failing: enforcement action against Approved Persons at senior levels has been unusual despite multiple banking failures. Regulators have rarely been able to penetrate an accountability firewall of collective responsibility in firms that prevents actions against individuals. The patchy scope of the Approved Persons Regime, which has left people, including many involved in the Libor scandal, beyond effective enforcement. …
- The PCBS made a number of recommendations that were incorporated into the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 (the “Act”). The Act made significant amendments to FSMA, in response to which the PRA and FCA are proposing the creation of a new Senior Persons Regime for Banks and PRA-designated investment firms. Significant Influence Function component of the Approved Person regime to be replaced by a Senior Managers Regime Each individual is required to have a “statement of responsibilities” Firms required to produce comprehensive responsibility maps which describe the firm’s management and governance arrangements, including keys risks, reporting lines and details regarding senior individuals and their responsibilities. A Certification Regime requiring firms to introduce self-certification schemes to involve all individuals in an SMR role and other individuals in role deemed to pose a risk of significant harm are fit and proper to carry out the role – wider group of people than before caught by regulatory framework. New set of Conduct Rules top replace the Statements of Principle for Approved Persons Reverse burden of proof Criminal offence for actions leading to failure of a firm.
- The PRA has specified a series of Senior Management Functions that are caught by the regime, and prescribed a long list of prescribed responsibilities for which individual responsibility equates to the need to be an SMF. The FCA then specifies further SMFs (beyond those designated by the PRA), and a set of functions, responsibility for which should sit with an SMF. The PRA and FCA’s rules for SMFs, although different in some respects, are intended to operate jointly as a single cohesive regime. The combined list of SMFs is potentially broader than the corresponding SIF functions.
- FCA states that all of the functions the PRA intends to specify should become SMFs. But as these functions will be designated by the PRA and subject to FCA consent on approval there is no need for the FCA to designate these functions. However, given the breadth of its objectives, the FCA also intends to specify a series of further SMFs in addition to those proposed by the PRA. Likely to catch individuals who may not be an approved person under current regime: Head of key business area Group Entity Senior Manager Significant Responsibility SMF N.b. Well-known former CEO of bank (trading style / brand) was not even an approved person.
- The SPR defines a 2nd tier of individuals – the Certification Regime 2nd tier of individuals (not SMFs) The PRA broadly defines that the Certification Regime should cover those individuals whose functions might involve a risk to the ‘safety and soundness of the relevant firm – i.e. are ‘material risk takers’ / have the potential to cause significant harm to the firm. FCA extends this further by capturing: Those individuals performing functions that would have been SIF functions under APER, but who fall outside of the new SMFs Individuals in customer-facing roles which are subject to qualification requirements (e.g. mortgage or investment advisors) Anyone who supervises or manages a Certified Person, if they are not an SMF holder. Individuals under the Certification regime will not be subject to regulatory approval – the onus has been put back on to firms to put in place a framework to ensure and certify that individuals in such roles are ‘fit and proper’ to carry out the role in question (i.e. have a comparable internal framework to that the regulator uses to govern SMFs – annual certification, statement of responsibilities, etc.). The FCA or PRA will assess the effectiveness of the Certification Regime within firms, and whether it is being operated as expected.
- Enforcement Action Reverse burden of proof, whereby individuals will be presumed culpable if a firm breaches a regulatory requirement, unless they can demonstrate otherwise. Criminal Offence Involved in decision making process (so not just decision maker) Aware of risk Individual’s conducts needs to be “far below what could reasonably be expected”. up to seven years in prison and/or an unlimited fine Not clear how easy it will be for the FCA to use these new powers – but underlying intention is clearly to hold individuals to account for their actions (or lack thereof).
- HM Treasury launched consultation to bring in staff of branches of non-UK banks Regulators generally not permitted to assess competence of CFs in branches of EEA banks. FCA may consult again on this in future Approved Persons in Solvency II firms consultation out – many of the proposals are comparable to SPR Proof will be in the pudding. Regulators’ intentions are clear, but practice may be challenging. How will firms attract and retain key individuals?
- Hands up if you feel your responsibilities are clearly and extensively documented? Hands up if you feel your firm already has a clear map of risks, responsibilities, accountabilities and reporting lines?
- Whilst the Senior Persons Regime clearly only applies to a relatively small number of firms, the FCA has shown increased appetite to take action against Approved Persons in other firms. Important that senior individuals protect themselves by being clear about what they are (and are not) responsible for and ensure everything they do in this regard is documented. The PRA and FCA are currently consulting on proposals for a comparable regime for the insurance industry – wider Approved Persons regime may follow. Continuing direction of travel towards greater individual accountability / liability is clear. What do you guys think?
- Now for the bit you have all been waiting for. Afraid there is no “magic bullet”. Not rocket science, but possibly challenging to implement.
- Non-PRA Firms should consider proposals outlined in Senior Persons Regime, and think about how / whether should introduce / replicate elements of this into their business model to protect against future regulatory action. When I was responsible for undertaking SIF interviews at the FSA, it was surprising how often, firms were unable to provide documented job descriptions, and candidates had no clear idea of their detailed responsibilities Clearly from an individual perspective this is not a good thing – but in a situation where the regulator is likely to look at personal accountability, it is better to be clear about what you are on the hook for. Nothing like the prospect of individual regulatory action to focus the mind / curtail excessive risk taking. In the regulators’ eye, evidence is key. “Knowing that you have robust governance and effective controls” is not good enough. If you can’t evidence it, the regulator will not believe you. I know that I am intelligent, witty and good looking…but lack evidence to support at least two of those statements!!
- When I was responsible for undertaking SIF interviews at the FSA, it was surprising how often, candidates had no clear idea of their detailed responsibilities Map Risks, Responsibilities, Accountabilities and Reporting lines. Some firms use a Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed (“RACI”) model / matrix? Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed (“RACI”) model? Doesn’t need to be complex, but may be challenging in practice. Firms produce reams of MI, but does it tell them anything useful One large group I am aware of banned all (non-regulatory) Board MI for one month and asked itself the question “What MI did we miss”? MI was only reintroduced if it was actually reviewed / discussed. Boards of legal entities need to have a meaningful role to play in strategy and business planning / management Conduct risk?
- Clear job descriptions Care with attestations Awareness of personal liability Conflict? Does this create a personal conflict (pressure to cover-up)?
- What controls? Training? Periodic reminder of obligations and liabilities a good idea. How many of your firms undertake new background checks when you change role? In the regulators’ eye, evidence is key.