OEF 13-14 narrative history for 2d Cavalry Regiment

1
22DD CCAAVVAALLRRYY RREEGGIIMMEENNTT
OOPPEERRAATTIIOONN EENNDDUURRIINNGG FFRREEEEDDOOMM
JJUULLYY 22001133--AAPPRRIILL 22001144
1. INTRODUCTION.
In July 2013, the Second Regiment of Dragoons were called to service once again.
Soldiers from the 2d Cavalry began their preparation for the deployment to Kandahar Province,
Afghanistan in March 2013 with a Mission Readiness Exercise at Hohenfels. The mission was
very unique as compared to past deployments. Dragoons were tasked with training the Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) as a Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). This
requirement was extremely taxing on personnel and 2CR was actually augmented with hundreds
of personnel to man mission specific Security Force Assistance Teams (SFATs). All maneuver
Squadrons were task organized to fulfill this mission as opposed to fighting as counterinsurgents
as they had done the previous two rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan. The agility of 2CR leaders
and Soldiers enabled the Regiment to transform into an advise and assist force in time to coach
ANSF to secure their own country for the 2014 Presidential and Provincial Council elections.
This narrative documents the operations conducted by 2d Cavalry while deployed in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom from July 2013 to April 2014. While there are many
details of operations held at a higher level of classification, this summary provides a
comprehensive look at how the 2d Cavalry operated under the command of COL D.A. Sims and
provides insight to the challenges and opportunities Dragoons encountered along the way.
Although the nature of this deployment was incredibly dynamic and complex, Dragoons fulfilled
their motto – Toujours Pret! Always Ready!
2. MISSION.
CTF DRAGOON, in partnership with ANSF, disrupts enemy capabilities and secures
decisive terrain in Kandahar Province in order to protect the population and dislocate the enemy
from their safehavens.
3. KEY PERSONNEL.
Duty Position Name Duty Location Tenure ISO OEF
CTF Commander COL DA Sims Kandahar Airfield 12 JUL13 – APR 14
CTF CSM CSM Wilbert Engram Kandahar Airfield 12 JUL 13 – APR 14
CTF Executive Officer MAJ Michael Berriman Kandahar Airfield 04JUL13 – 05JAN14
CTF Executive Officer MAJ Tom Fournier Kandahar Airfield 05JAN14 – APR14
CTF Operations Officer MAJ Samuel Edwards Kandahar Airfield 12 JUL 13 – APR 14
TF War Eagle (1/2CR) CDR LTC Phillip Gage FOB Zangabad 10 JUL 13 – JAN 14
TF War Eagle (1/2CR) CSM CSM Martin Celestine FOB Zangabad 10 JUL 13 – JAN 14
TF War Eagle XO MAJ Ben Zweibelsen FOB Shoja 10 JUL 13 – JAN 14
TF War Eagle S3 MAJ Robert Green FOB Zangabad 10 JUL 13 – JAN 14
TF Cougar (2/2CR) CDR LTC Charles Svelen FOB Frontenac 26 AUG 13 – APR 14
TF Cougar (2/2CR) CSM CSM Christoher Spivey FOB Frontenac 26 AUG 13 – APR 14
TF Cougar XO MAJ Matthew McQuilton FOB Frontenac 10 JUL 13 – JAN 14

2
TF Cougar S3 MAJ Tom Fournier FOB Frontenac 26AUG13–05JAN14
TF Cougar S3 MAJ Shawn Conlin FOB Frontenac 01JAN14 – APR 14
TF Wolfpack (3/2CR) CDR LTC Eric Smith FOB Pasab 22 AUG 13 – APR14
TF Wolfpack (3/2CR) CSM CSM Michael Martin FOB Pasab 22 AUG 13 – APR 14
TF Wolfpack XO MAJ William Dougherty FOB Pasab 22 AUG 13 – APR 14
TF Wolfpack S3 MAJ Timothy Peterman FOB Pasab 22AUG13–01JAN14
TF Wolfpack S3 MAJ Dave Preston FOB Pasab 01JAN14 - APR 14
TF Saber (4/2CR) CDR LTC Christopher Budihas FOB Lindsey 11 JUL 13 – APR 14
TF Saber (4/2CR) CSM CSM Robert Ochsner FOB Lindsey 11 JUL 13 – APR 14
TF Saber XO MAJ John Horning FOB Lindsey 11 JUL 13 – APR 14
TF Saber S3 MAJ Clarence Wilhite FOB Lindsey 11 JUL 13 – APR 14
TF Hell (FA) CDR LTC Steven Fandrich FOB Walton 23 AUG 13 – APR 14
TF Hell (FA) CSM CSM Stanley Akins FOB Walton 23 AUG 13 – APR 14
TF Hell XO MAJ Michael Teague FOB Walton 23 AUG 13 – JAN 14
TF Hell S3 MAJ Brad Fausnaugh FOB Walton 23 AUG 13 – APR 14
TF Muleskinner (RSS) CDR LTC Kenneth Bradford Kandahar Airfield 10 JUL 13 – APR 14
TF Muleskinner (RSS) CSM CSM Michael Perry Kandahar Airfield 10 JUL 13 – APR 14
TF Muleskinner XO MAJ Tanner Roy Kandahar Airfield 10 JUL 13 – MAR 14
TF Muleskinner S3 CPT Thomas Hearon Kandahar Airfield 10 JUL 13 – APR 14
SFAT S201 OIC COL Michael Atwell JRAC, OCC-R 8 JUL 13 – JAN 14
SFAT S201 NCOIC SFC Donald Thompson JRAC, OCC-R 8 JUL 13 - APR 14
SFAT S220 OIC COL Anthony Burgess FOB Walton 8 JUL 13 - APR 14
SFAT S220 NCOIC SGM Tyrone Spratt FOB Walton 8 JUL 13 - APR 14
SFAT 101 OIC LTC Travis Cornett FOB Lindsey 8 JUL 13 - APR 14
SFAT 101 NCOIC SFC Kenneth Beecroft FOB Lindsey 8 JUL 13 - APR 14
SFAT 301 OIC LTC Peter Zike FOB Pasab 8 JUL 13 – DEC 14
SFAT 301 NCOIC MSG Quinnus Caldwell FOB Pasab 8 JUL 13 - APR 14
SFAT 401 OIC LTC Robert Ballagh FOB Lindsey 8 JUL 13 - APR 14
SFAT 401NCOIC MSG Stevan Nave FOB Lindsey 8 JUL 13 - APR 14
Figure 1: CTF DRAGOON Key Leaders

3
4. LINEAGE / BACKGROUND.
The Second Dragoons are the oldest, continuously serving cavalry regiment in the United
States Army. From its formation in 1836 to fight in the Second Seminole War, to its numerous
deployments to the Middle East, the Regiment has distinguished itself in several major
campaigns: the Indian Wars, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, both
World Wars, and the Persian Gulf War. Along the way, members of the Regiment served
gallantly in action and 20 were awarded Medals of Honor. A comprehensive history of the
Dragoons can be found at: http://history.dragoons.org.
Figure 2: 2CR OEF CREST
5. DEPLOYMENT OVERVIEW.
a. Deployment Location: CTF DRAGOON’s area of operations consisted of all 16 districts
of Kandahar Province and encompassed an area approximately 20,858 sq miles (54,022 sq km)
with 1,175,000 people. CTF DRAGOON operated out of Kandahar airfield, collocated with
Regional Command – South (RC(S)), about 12 km southeast of Kandahar City. TF WAR
EAGLE operated out of FOB Zangabad, Panjwai; TF COUGAR operated out of FOB Frontenac,
Shah Wali Kot; TF WOLFPACK operated out of FOB Pasab, Zharay; TF SABER operated out
of FOB Lindsey, Daman; TF HELL operated out of FOB Walton, Dand; and TF
MULESKINNER operated out of Kandahar Airfield. Major population centers included
Kandahar City, Spin Boldak, Bazaar-e-Panjwai, Zangabad, Nakoney, Takt-e-Pul, Sahabay,
Surkhabad, Sardagh, Baghtu, and Hutal. The social fabric woven throughout Kandahar consisted
of over seventeen separate tribes and sub-tribes. Major tribal rivalries included the Poplazai and
Barakzai in central and northern Kandahar and the Noorzai and Ishaqzai in western Kandahar.
Other prevalent tribes throughout the area of operations consisted of the Achekzai, Alizai, and
Alikozai.

4
b. Home-station Mission Analysis: Home station mission analysis consisted primarily of
determining how to transform a robust cavalry regiment into a Security Force Advise and Assist
Brigade (SFAB). Following the Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE), the strength of the
Regiment was over 4,200 people strong. Orders and guidance coming from United States Army
Europe (USAREUR) changed on a weekly and sometimes daily basis. Originally 2CR conducted
mission analysis for sending the majority of the Regiment to Kandahar, with its reconnaissance
squadron deploying to Regional Command-North (RC (N)). This later transformed into the
Regiment deploying to Kandahar, but at a significantly reduced strength of around 3,000 people
and with five Security Force Advise and assist Teams (SFATs). In the final two months leading
up to deployment, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) instructed 2CR to increase the number
of SFATs to 20. This was a difficult task considering the number of senior officer and Non-
Commissioned Officer (NCO) requirements. Dozens of augmentees were flown into Germany in
May and June for deployment in July. Having just returned from Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul a
year prior, 2CR had many resident experts on the enemy situation. Therefore focus for mission
analysis remained on force disposition and task organization, with a priority on SFATs.
FIGURE 3: AO DRAGOON

5
6. PREPARATION OVERVIEW.
a. Road-to-War: Preparations for deployment officially began in November 2012. On the
13NOV12, 2CR initiated leader reset – transitioning almost every commander at the Troop,
Squadron and Regimental level by January 2013. In addition, several training events began,
including culture and language training, Combat Life Saver (CLS) training, range densities,
Company Intelligence Support Team (COIST) training and UAV training. In December 2012,
CTF DRAGOON sent all SFAT personnel to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Ft
Polk, Louisiana to attend the SFAT Academy. Training focused on mentoring and advising
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the conduct of Key Leader Engagements (KLEs),
cultural awareness, and language training. The training was a good first step towards preparing
the team members for their advisor roles. Finally, CTF DRAGOON conducted Theater Specific
Individual Requirements Training (TSIRT) throughout June 2013. In addition to all the
deployment training requirements, 2CR retained responsibility for various USAREUR
Contingency Plans with the ability to deploy at any time.
b. Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS): CTF DRAGOON conducted their PDSS from 15-
27APR13, following the Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE). The Regimental Commander,
Operations Sergeant Major, Regimental primary staff, Squadron Command Teams and key
SFAT leadership attended the PDSS. Due to the unique transition requirements with 2CR
conducting a Relief In Place (RIP) with two brigades, the PDSS was split among both elements.
Issues with flights from Manas, Krygystan delayed the trip and 2CR only had three days on the
ground in Kandahar. They spent one day with each of the brigades, who provided an operations
and intelligence brief and an aerial reconnaissance of their respective Areas of Operations (AOs).
This initial interaction enabled enduring coordination with the counterparts whom 2CR key
personnel would later replace. Most significantly, this initial assessment of the operating
environment allowed 2CR to adjust numbers for deploying personnel to meet mission
requirements with the pending retrograde.
c. Capstone Training: The Regiment prepared for the Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE) at
Hohenfels, Germany in March 2013 in good standing, having just completed a Decisive Action
Training Environment (DATE) rotation in October 2012. The exercise began on 05MAR13 with
a three day Digital Exercise (DIGEX) and a seven day Command Post Exercise (CPX), which
included platoon and troop level Situational Training Exercises (STX). Finally, the force on
force portion of the exercise occurred from 16-21MAR13. Just prior to the MRE, CENTCOM
informed 2CR that TF SABER (4/2CR) would be deployed with the Regiment to Kandahar,
rather than supporting RC(N). 2CR also received instruction during this period to field an
additional 15 teams. Therefore, CTF DRAGOON planners worked with the Joint Multinational
Training Center (JMRC) to conduct a readiness exercise at Grafenwoehr, Germany during the
Regiment’s block leave period in July to get the SFAT members trained for deployment.
d. Family Readiness / Support Operations: Several family related events led up to the
Regiment’s deployment. The Regiment exercised a great deal of effort to identify and activate

6
the Dragoon Ready Reserve (DR2). The Regimental Commander intended for the DR2 to serve
as much more than a rear detachment, rather a robust command of over 1000 Soldiers who
retained responsibility for numerous NATO partnership training events in the European theater.
Throughout the deployment, the DR2 grew to about half the total size of the Regiment. Family
support began with a series of informational events, where spouses were given exposure to
numerous support services and deployment resources. Finally, the Week of the Dragoon
occurred from 20-23 MAY. The Week of the Dragoon consisted of numerous sporting
competitions and finished on 23MAY13 with Dragoon family day. Family day consisted of
music, entertainment a bonfire, and in true Bavarian fashion, plenty of the Regiment’s Dragoon
Helles German beer! The well supported family readiness groups continually provided support
and readiness to the Dragoons as they conducted their operations both in Europe and
Afghanistan. Throughout the deployment, CTF DRAGOON and the DR2 maintained weekly
communications for increased situational awareness and to address concerns.
7. ONWARD MOVEMENT.
a. Reception, Staging, Onward-movement and Integration (RSOI): RSOI initiated at Manas
airbase, Krygystan consisted of vehicle rollover training and ballistic plate testing. Most
elements spent about 48 hours on ground at Manas. Additional required training at Kandahar
included counter-IED awareness training, small arms zeroing, and the issue of undergarment
protective equipment. Most soldiers were on ground at Kandahar Airfield for an average of four
days prior to pushing out to their respective Tactical Infrastructure (TI).
b. Relief-In-Place (RIP) / Transfer of Authority (TOA): CTF DRAGOON first conducted
RIP with CTF 4-2 and all of the southern Kandahar districts. CTF 4-2 performed exceptionally
and gained a significant amount of traction with the local populace in volatile districts, such as
Panjwai. Most staff members received an approximate 8 day transition from their counterparts.
About eight weeks after the Transfer of Authority (TOA) with CTF 4-2, CTF DRAGOON
conducted an additional RIP with CTF READY FIRST (1/1AD) and the northern Kandahar
districts. The Brigade level RIP occurred at a slightly faster pace, as most Dragoons were already
familiar with the battlespace to their north. The three remaining Squadrons (TF COUGAR, TF
WOLFPACK and TF HELL) deployed and conducted RIP with the battalions from CTF
READY FIRST in September 2013. The Regimental HQ’s work over July and August 2013 in
southern Kandahar served as a good shaping operation to assume the mission for the remainder
of Kandahar Province from 1/1AD.
c. Initial In-Theater Mission Analysis: Upon the Transfer of Authority (TOA) from CTF 4-2,
CTF DRAGOON prioritized detailed mission analysis based on the enemy situation. District by
district, CTF DRAGOON conducted a deep dive on sources of instability, tribal friction points,
key influencers and requirements for retrograde and transition. As a result, 2CR developed
priorities for subordinate squadrons and allocated resources. Additionally, the Regiment
conducted mission analysis for the areas of operation for the remaining three squadrons yet to
deploy. As the final three squadrons arrived at Kandahar, the Regiment provided an overview of
sources of instability for their respective areas of operation.

7
d. Initial CTF DRAGOON to Higher Headquarters Mission Nesting: 2CR conducted initial
mission analysis based on the CJTF 3 construct focused more on transition and retrograde than
combat operations. RC(S) conducted a RIP/TOA over the same time period as 2CR, thus clarity
of mission and expectations were initially difficult to discern. However, the neutralization of
enemy operations quickly emerged as the main effort. CTF DRAGOON published Operation
Dragoon Fortitude, in concert with RC(S)’s Operation Iron Fortitude, which outlined key tasks,
objectives and endstates through December 2014.
8. DEPLOYMENT OVERVIEW.
a. Campaign Plan Support: On 9 September 2013, the 2CR Regimental staff traveled to FOB
Pasab with all Squadron Commanders, Sergeants Major and S3’s to brief Operation Dragoon
Fortitude. Operation Dragoon Fortitude provided the enduring guidance and intent under which
all operations were subsequently conducted for CTF DRAGOON’s deployment. Following the
Operations Order (OPORD) brief, squadrons provided a back brief to confirm guidance and
intent. This event effectively served as the start point for synchronized Regimental operations.
The Regiment then developed a comprehensive campaign plan that outlined objectives over time
and space that assisted in the accomplishment of 2CR’s mission. Though slow to develop,
largely because of the condensed planning timeline of the Afghan National Army (ANA), the
2CR targeting process initiated under five Lines of Effort (LoEs): Security (Red), Afghan
National Security Force Development (ANSF DEV) (Green), Governance and Development
(White), Force Posture (Blue), and Dragoon Total Fitness (DTF). The Regiment placed
significant effort into the overarching mission – which was Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA) the
ANSF through our 19 SFATs. Additionally, RC(S) tasked CTF DRAGOON to transition or
close 10 of 14 total Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) or Combat Out-Posts (COPs) in Kandahar
Province. Finally, 2CR conducted all these operations in concert with the 2014 Presidential and
Provincial Council elections process, with the actual vote occurring on 5 April 2014.

8
FIGURE 4: CTF DRAGOON INITIAL OPERATIONAL APPROACH
b. CTF DRAGOON Operations: CTF DRAGOON began the majority of combat operations
in the horn of Panjwai and what was formally called the Ground Defense Area (GDA). Upon
arriving at Kandahar Airfield, denying the enemy the ability to launch 107mm and 122mm
rockets at the airbase one of the most challenging missions for 2CR. CTF SABER had almost
sole responsibility for this mission, with a handful of Romanians. In addition, TF WAR EAGLE
retained the responsibility to deny enemy efforts to regain lost terrain in Panjwai, as one of the
key approaches to Kandahar City. As TF WOLFPACK deployed, plans to disrupt the enemy in
the narco-facilitation district of Maiwand and in Zharay district – the birthplace of the Taliban,
developed in earnest. TF WOLFPACK subsequently assumed control of Panjwai district as well,
controlling three vital districts west of Kandahar City. To the north, TF COUGAR retained
responsibility for the third key approach to Kandahar City – Arghandab District. Collectively,
Panjwai, Zharay and Arghandab represented the vast majority of coalition deaths and enemy
lethal activity over the previous 12 years. Operations were subsequently focused on disrupting
the enemy in Panjwai, Zharay, Arghandab and the area around Kandahar Airfield ahead of the
Presidential and Provincial Council elections on 05APR2014. In October, the campaign plan
adapted to the changing environment. The new objectives were broken down by enemy (Red),
ANSF (Green), Governance/I2A (White), Force Posture (Blue) and Dragoon Total Fitness
(Purple). For the Red Line of Effort (LoE), the objectives were to neutralize enemy support
zones within Zharay, Arghandab, Panjwai, and Maiwand; deny the enemy influence over the
population; and secure Kandahar City through the active layered security framework ahead of
the elections. For the Green LoE, objectives were the establishment of an effective and

9
synchronized operational readiness cycle; and a shift to Brigade centric operations and focused
enabler integration at the Brigade level and above. For the White LoE, objectives were to disrupt
enemy facilitation routes and command and control; facilitate the completion of voter
registration Phase II; transfer key relationships in Panjwai as TF War Eagle redeployed; and
amplify Afghan confidence in ANSF and GIRoA. For the Blue LoE, objectives were the
maintenance of impartiality throughout the elections process; force arrayal reduced in
conjunction with Resolute Support Mission requirements; and lines of communication and
freedom of movement retained. Finally, for the Purple LoE, objectives were the education of
Dragoons on coping mechanisms, critical thinking and adaptation skills; understanding the whole
person concept while improving well being; and improving team and family dynamics. CTF
DRAGOON fulfilled all these overarching objectives and significantly degraded the enemy’s
will to continue while bolstering GIRoA and ANSF capabilities and reach.
(1) Security Force Advise and assist Team (SFAT) Operations. As stated by the
Commander, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command (COMIJC) in
October 2013, the mission of the Second Regiment of Dragoons was to Train, Advise and Assist
(TAA). To accomplish this mission, 2CR originally resourced 20 SFATs. Over the first 90 days,
CTF DRAGOON reduced the number of SFATs to 14 due to efficiencies in the organization and
proficiency of the ANSF. The SFATs served a very important roll with the retrograde of U.S.
personnel from Afghanistan. Retrograde occurred according to a number of conditions that were
phased over space and time. The ANSF ability to retain key security gains achieved through
previous fighting seasons and the terrain handed over by ISAF as retrograde occurred and
remained among the most important of these conditions. The ANSF were, for the most part, good
at conducting operations. However, maintenance and logistics issues plagued the ANSF and
served as a primary area of focus for all operational SFATs. In addition, CTF DRAGOON
fielded a number of SFATs responsible for advising key GIRoA and security officials, to include
the Provincial Governor, Governor Torylay Wesa, the Provincial NDS Chief, Issa Mohammad,
the Provincial Chief of Police, MG Abdul Raziq and the 1/205th
and 3/205th
Brigade
Commanders, BG Habibi and BG Murtaza respectively.
(2) Operation Damavand 1 – 17-24 AUG 13. On 17AUG13, TF WAR EAGLE, In
Partnership With (IPW) 2/1/205th
Kandak (KDK) initiated a series of operations designed to
deny the enemy safe haven in key southwestern Panjwai population clusters. These operations
enabled the ANSF to gain and hold key terrain toward the end of the fighting season that
ultimately enabled them to set conditions for successful voter registration and elections in the
spring of 2014. Following the completion of operations, the District Governor (DGOV) of
Panjwai, Haji Faizal Mohammad, conducted a shura with local security officials and hosted a
press conference. During the press conference, the District Chief of Police (DCOP), Sultan
Mohammad, escorted six news agencies around a compound filled with the hundreds of
explosives, weapons, ammunition, electronic switches and motorcycles fitted with explosives.
Additionally, Sultan Mohammad brought out a Taliban detainee and let the media question the
insurgent’s motives. The press conference remained in the news for five days and was perceived
as incredibly successful.

10
FIGURE 5: OPERATION DAMAVAND 1 (PANJWAI ATTACK)
FIGURE 6: DAMAVAND 1 STORYBOARD
(3) Operation OCAB – 9-14 SEP 13. Operation OCAB was conducted in Khakrez in
support of the Afghan enduring operation, Strong Borders South. TF COUGAR conducted this
operation in partnership with 1/1/205 as their first partnered mission. TF COUGAR and 1/1/205th

11
cleared the villages of Naser, Karzalay and Baghak IOT deny the enemy support zones within
Khakrez district. The operation served as a successful starting point for an enduring partnership.
(4) Operation Turyaalay (Brave) – 17-20 SEP 13. TF COUGAR conducted Operation
Turyaalay as an attempt to collect information by emplacing blocking positions while Special
Operations Tasks Force – South (SOTF-S) conducted clearing operations in Chenartu Valley to
the north. This operation integrated Inform and Influence Activities (IIA) by encouraging the
ANSF to conduct shuras with leadership as villages were cleared, passing out hand crank radios
and posters amplifying the success of ANSF.
FIGURE 7: OPERATION TURYAALAY STORYBOARD
(5) Operation Damavand III – 02-06 OCT 13. TF WAR EAGLE assisted 2/1/205 and
6/1/205 in another of the Damavand series of operations aimed at denying enemy safe haven in
the southwestern horn of Panjwai. The purpose of the operation was to push the forward line of
ANSF troops (FLOT) west of Talukan. Subsequently, Damavand IV enabled the ANSF to build
a road from route Hyena south to the Dari Rud (River) to assist in holding terrain east of the
road. As with Damavand I, Damavand III generated a considerable amount of success. The 2nd
KDK continued to outshine peer KDKs. ANSF seized hundreds of Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs), weapons and ammunition throughout the operations. They successfully
integrated the Religious Cultural Advisor (RCA), Public Affairs Officer (PAO) and Information
Operations (IO) officer into operations. The RCA handed out sacks of flour, the IO officer ran a
radio station from FOB Zangabad and the PAO documented the entire operation. As each village
was cleared, village leaders were engaged by ANSF and district officials, effectively linking the
district government to the village level. This process is significant, as district leadership can
more effectively understand local grievances and apply more appropriate resources and emphasis

12
with a ground truth knowledge of the problems that face the constituents. Finally, BG Habibi
conducted an interview with a radio station following the completion of operations,
complimenting both the ANSF for their professionalism and the population for their support and
assistance in ridding the enemy from population centers.
FIGURE 8: OPERATION DAMAVAND III
(a) Damavand III Day 1 Summary. Due to a freeze on all patrols and air support the
only ISAF forces involved in the day’s operation were the TF War Eagle TOC and Close Air
Support. Through PGSS and ISR feeds, TF War Eagle provided overwatch and C2 support to
2/1/205th
Kandak’s clearing effort and assisted with the execution of targets supporting ANA
efforts.
(b) Damavand III Day 2 Summary. 6th
KDK cleared Najet and Secured Molla Dust with
nothing significant to report. Overnight they continued to man blocking positions IVO
Charayon. 2nd
KDK cleared through the Pointed Finger POL finding 43x IEDs and receiving no
casualties as a result of IED blasts. Once the Pointed Finger POL was cleared, the ANA
maneuvered north and cleared the compounds at the western edge of the 5-Guys POL. The only
casualties sustained by the ANSF were from small arms fire and one of them was accidentally
self-inflicted. TF WAR EAGLE supported the ANSF operation through air support, intel support
and medical aid when needed. No air strikes were conducted and no confirmed enemy KIA or
WIA were reported.
(c) Damavand III Day 3 Summary. War Eagle TOC observed the ANA clearing
operation throughout the day and supported them with ISR, CCA, CAS and PGSS assets. While
observing ANA operations, three enemy were engaged after observed maneuvering with

13
weapons on ANA forces. The ANA were in two separate small arms fire engagements resulting
in no reported BDA, however they discovered five caches.
FIGURE 9: DAMAVAND III MISO OPERATIONS
(d) Damavand III Final Roll Up – 05 OCT 13. The final day of Operation Damavand III
was uneventful, with no enemy activity reported. The final BDA roll up was: 3x ANA WIA,
1xAUP WIA, 7x EKIA, 1x GBU-54 v4 expended, 3x Hellfires, 60 rds x 30mm, 4x smoke
dropped by CCA, 1x IED explosion, 54x IEDs F/C, 60kg HME, 300m wire, 90x oil cans, 35x
batteries, 10x empty jugs, 3x mine sweepers, 1x RPG, 4x AK-47’s, 1x G-3 sniper rifle, 1x RPG
launcher, 50x AK-47 rnds, 2x RPG rnds, 1x 82mm MTR round, 1x 82mm base plate, 1x 82mm
bipod, 100x PKM rnds, 1x motorcycle.
(6) District AUP SFAT Training – 7-11OCT13. At the beginning of October, the District
AUP SFAT traveled to nearly every District center to conduct training with the AUP on vehicle
search procedures and first aid techniques. The training was well received at all locations and the
SFAT set the conditions to return to the sites for follow on training.
(7) COP Shoja Transfer – 12 OCT 13. On 12 OCT 13, TF WAR EAGLE transferred the
first of 10 total bases that were transferred over CTF DRAGOON’s tenure in Kandahar. TF
WAR EAGLE significantly reduced COP Shoja to a sustainable size for 6/1/205th
. On 12 OCT
13, WAR EAGLE 6, provided some closing remarks and officially handed the base over to LTC
Dastegir. This event marked a significant transition in Panjwai district. Just three years earlier,
intense fighting took place in this area and ISAF constructed COP Shoja to hold terrain at the

14
northern end of the Adamzai chain, which the enemy previously used as a safe haven to project
operations into western Kandahar City. As of this transfer, the 6th
KDK of 1/205th
effectively
held the terrain and disrupted enemy remnants in the area.
FIGURE 10: COP SHOJA TRANSFER
(8) Combined Arms Breach – 13OCT13. On 130330OCT13, TF WOLFPACK Recon
PLT and 1/62nd
Engineers conducted a combined arms breach west along HWY 1 to enable
freedom of movement for ISAF and ANSF. At 0800, a Husky struck an IED which resulted in a
damaged front end, but no casualties. The element conducted self recovery while coordinating
with the AUP to provide security during recovery efforts.
(9) Operation Eagle’s Nest – 15OCT13. WOLFPACK 6 and 3/3/205th
Kandak
Commander, LTC Shir Ali, conducted an aerial reconnaissance and resupply of 1st
Tolai, 3rd
Kandak elements stationed in Ghorak District, Kandahar. While in Ghorak, LTC Shir Ali
engaged the District Governor, Popalzai tribal elder and the AUP commander. LTC Shir Ali’s

15
visit provided his Soldiers with an unexpected morale boost on the Eid. He boasted that his
relationship with SFAT 3202, as well as TF WOLFPACK Commander, LTC Eric Smith, is “the
best relationship he has had with any of his 6 advisory teams and battalions.” The simple
provision of transportation significantly assisted with improved partner relations.
FIGURE 11: 3/3/205th KDK CDR INSPECTS HIS SOLDIERS AND SPEAKS WITH THE DGOV
(10) 4/3/205th
ANA Illumination Mission – 20OCT13. On the morning of 20 October, 4th
Kandak Battery Commander, 1LT Miryarbik, successfully fired four illumination rounds from
COP Sakari Karez. During the preparation of laying the gun and gathering information from the
fire direction center, only one minor mistake was made due to a gun data translation error, which
was quickly fixed. The Kandak demonstrated proficiency with their ability to operate the D-30
and create gun data in a sufficient amount of time.
FIGURE 12: 4/3/205th D-30 CANON IS PREPARED BY ANA FOR ILLUMINATION MISSION
(11) Downed Shadow Recovery – 21OCT13. At 211150OCT13, TF COUGAR received a
report that a Shadow UAV experienced engine failure and crashed south of FOB Frontenac. At
1330, TF COUGAR coordinated for a combined arms QRF, comprised of 3rd
PLT Eagle Troop,
2nd
PLT 849th
Engineers, an EOD team and the ANA and began movement to retrieve the
Shadow. By 1820, the Shadow was recovered and all personnel and equipment were accounted
for.
(12) ALP MEDEVAC – 22OCT13. At 221522OCT13, TF WAR EAGLE observed an
explosion IVO ALP conducting dismounted operations. The ALP triggered an IED and 30

16
minutes later, they arrived at FOB Zangabad. One ALP sustained shrapnel wounds to the face
and hands, while the other was a double amputee. By 1646, MEDEVAC was wheels up to
Kandahar Regional Military Hospital. The Physician’s Assistant, CPT Rose, effectively triaged
the patients and worked with the TOC to coordinate timely movement to the TOC, likely saving
the lives of the ALP.
(13) Operation Ronin Thunder 2 – 22OCT13. 2nd
PLT, Killer Troop moved to FOB
Sakari Karez on 22OCT13 to meet with LTC Husani, 4/3/205th
Kandak commander and oversee
an ANA D-30 artillery illumination fire mission. At 1830, the Kandak successfully fired three
illumination rounds. The preparation and fire mission were seen as excellent team building
activities – and prior to departure, the SFAT ate dinner with LTC Husani who then warned the
SFAT of a probable IED emplacement just outside FOB Azizzulah. The team effectively
bypassed the possible IED and coordinated for clearance.
(14) Dand School Supply Distribution by TF SABER – 22OCT13. DAUP (K) SFAT,
and TF SABER staff members gathered at Dand DHQ before the regularly scheduled Security
Shura to hand deliver school supplies for 128 students including notebooks, crayons, colored
pencils, rulers, legal pads, markers, toys, school bags, and other materials. Leaders from both
elements delivered the materials with DCOP 1LT Barialai Safi, AUP staff officers and several
school administrators, as well as their teachers. Other supplies were left on hand for the school’s
headmaster to oversee for future distribution and as needed educational functions.
(15) Operation ATAL OCAM 112: 19-27OCT13. On 19OCT13, 1/1/205th
ANA briefed
SFAT 2202 on their plan to clear key villages in Mya Neshin District, Kandahar Province. This
operation was entirely planned and executed by the ANA with only recommendations by ISAF
along the way. The ANA coordinated with the AUP and the Special Operations Kandak to
complete the operation. On the 27th
, cleared Kariz and Sayed Osan, where they found/cleared 18
IEDs and took zero casualties.
(16) TF WOLFPACK Operation Reshaken Namoden Taliban – 24OCT13. On
240828OCT2013, A joint 4th
Kandak and US element was engaged by precise medium machine
gun fire from an unknown sized enemy element approximately 800m to their south, resulting in
one ANA WIA. Upon seeing the ANA soldier go down, SFC Josef Materne ordered SGT Solis
to follow him to secure the wounded and render aid. Simultaneously, SSG Craddock and SSG
Rowlands moved to the location of the wounded to assist. SFC Materne and SGT Solis moved
the wounded to cover while SSG Rowlands called up a 9-line MEDEVAC and SSG Craddock
prepared the HLZ. Their actions no doubt saved the life of the ANA soldier. For these actions,
SFC Materne and SSG Craddock were awarded the Bronze Star with valor and SSG Rowlands
and SGT Solis were awarded the Army Commendation Medal with valor. Subsequently, at 0953,
a Stryker section, led by K46, struck an IED while enroute to COP Atta Mohammed. The strike
resulted in one US WIA (routine) and one Stryker mobility kill. K37 and the Combined Arms
Breaching Team (CAB-T) maneuvered to the disabled Stryker to conduct recovery Operations.
Upon arrival, a secondary IED was discovered, consisting of a pressure plate attached to a cheese
wheel with approximately 40lbs of UBE. The engineers blew the cheese wheel in place and
recovered the damaged Stryker. The U.S. WIA was evacuated to KAF for further evaluation.

17
(17) Karez Kalay Clearance – 27OCT13. On 27OCT13, E Troop, TF COUGAR,
supported the ANA as they cleared Karez Kalay in Shah Wali Kot and Mya Neshin Districts.
During the initial clearance, the ANA found and cleared 17 IEDs. ISAF was minimally involved
in the operation, with the AUP manning blocking positions and the ANA conducting the
clearance.
(18) Ronin Kaboom – 27OCT13. 2nd
PLT, Killer Troop participated in a partnered IED
disposal along HWY 1 on 27OCT13. The area was deliberately cleared using mine rollers and
minehounds and the platoon used the Doking to clear a path to the IED. At 1000hrs, the enemy
began emplacement of an IED about 1km to the south of 2nd
PLT. TF WOLFPACK confirmed
emplacement and hostile intent. TF WOLFPACK then used 120mm mortars to aggress the
enemy. The mortars wounded the insurgent, who a sympathizer then evacuated via motorcycle.
(19) Checkpoint Alizi Complex Attack – 02NOV13. At 022151 TF WAR EAGLE
informed TF WOLFPACK that about 12 enemy were moving from their AO travelling along the
Arghandab river to a structure 273m west of checkpoint Alizi, where they staged for about 35
minutes. Three enemy began movement north of the structure, setting over watch of the Alizi
checkpoint. At 022220NOV13, 12x INS began moving in line setting up multiple positions: one
support by fire position consisting of three enemies (RPG, PKM, AK 47’s) west of the
checkpoint and direct attack by fire positions consisting of nine enemies (AK47’s, PKM). After
enemy personnel got into positions INS began to fire at 2242 with AK47 and 1x RPG impacting
the south tower of the compound. At 2250, TF War Eagle fired a 120mm illumination round,
followed by a 155mm Excalibur round from TF WOLFPACK and a 120mm APMI from TF
WAR EAGLE. This initial volley killed two enemy and wounded another - setting the enemy in
retreat, south across the Arghandab riverbed. TF WAR EAGLE and TF WOLFPACK both
continued to engage the enemy as they retreated further in to Panjwai. At 0143 on the 3rd
of
NOV, CCA arrived on station and killed two more enemy. In the end, five enemy were killed
and two were wounded with only two ALP wounded in action. At 0430, local nationals were
observed evacuating the casualties to a compound in Sayedon.
(20) Operation Hamla-e-Gorg VII – 02-03NOV13. TF WOLFPACK, in partnership with
3/3/205th
and Zharay AUP deliberately occupied the north/south corridor within the Tangli
Valley and established a patrol base for command and control. During the two day mission,
ANSF units worked side-by-side with TF WOLFPACK’s 3202 advisors, two maneuver platoons,
and ODA 7323 to clear 2.5 km’s, as well as ten ISAF-identified compounds of interest within the
area.
(21) Ghorak AUP Aerial Resupply and Kandahar City 2nd
Kandak Training – 3-
10NOV13. 15 Tons of flour and seven cases of cooking oil were delivered to the AUP in
Ghorak, through coordination with TF HELL and the AUP SFATs. ANSF coordinated the
delivery of supplies to FOB Walton and subsequently, Ghorak. Focus on the AUP staff
continued to build on the Kandak level partnership between TF Hell and the KC-AUP. Police

18
Sub-Stations received training in First Aid and CIED, thereby increasing their ability to operate
independently. Overall, 6 PSSs and 3 D-AUP received training.
FIGURE 13: GHORAK RESUPPLY AND KANDAHAR CITY AUP TRAINING
(22) Transition of FOB Azizullah – 15NOV13. On the 15th
of November, 3/205th
assumed control of FOB Azizullah. FOB Azizullah was the last piece of TI occupied by ISAF in
Maiwand District and set the tone for continued ISAF retrograde to come. Killer Troop, who
previously occupied Azizullah, relocated back to FOB Pasab for continued operations.
(23) Closure of Advisor Alcove – 16NOV13. 1st
and 2nd
Platoons, Nemesis Troop, TF
SABER officially transferred Advisor Alcove over to the ANSF on the afternoon of the 16th
.
This area was used SFAT personnel who worked with the OCC-R and 3rd
Zone Afghan Border
Police (ABP), as well as Soldiers from Comanche Troop who secured the SFATs. The closure
occurred 15 days early, providing valuable combat power to other areas in the defense of KAF.
Once equipment was retrograded, the area was transferred to Facilities manager for the Kandahar
Provincial Headquarters.
(24) Operation OCAB Attal (Jungle Operation) – 17-19NOV13. After much folklore
discussion and anticipation, the ANSF planned and executed a clearance of the “Jungle,” which
was the vegetated area north of the Dahla Dam in Shah Wali Kot. It was long known that the
jungle provided the enemy concealment and munitions storage, but the true extent was not fully
understood. The clearance was intended to be a combined operation between the ANA and the
AUP, with the establishment of a checkpoint at Siah Sang as the endstate. Siah Sang was a
village located in the saddle of the mountains that flanked the eastern side of the Arghandab river
and Dahla dam. Conditions were set on the 15th
with the drop of 5,000 leaflets conducted by
Regiment over key population centers known to be supportive of enemy activity. The operation
began on the 17th
with the clearance of Route Crazy Horse with the 849th
Engineers and 3rd
Platoon, Eagle Troop, TF COUGAR. Subsequently, Fox Troop, TF COUGAR moved to Route
Vermont to conduct a deliberate breach with 1st
Kandak, 1/205th
. On the morning of the 18th
, the
Support Platoon for TF COUGAR conducted refueling operations for 3rd
Platoon, Eagle Troop
and the 849th
Engineers – who then continued the clearance of Route Crazy Horse. The
Combined Arms Breaching Team continued the clearance of enemy emplaced obstacle belts
along Route Crazy Horse, when one vehicle hit an IED and became a mobility kill.

19
Simultaneously, SFAT 2202 and 1/1/205th
directed fires from 1st
Brigade’s D-30 Howitzers onto
targets in the jungle. The damaged vehicle was recovered and the support platoon again
conducted Class III resupply operations. On the 19th
, ANA began the actual clearance of the
jungle, crossing the Arghandab river around 0930. Cave complexes and bed down locations were
cleared, as well as complex IEDs located in makeshift bird’s nests and trip wires woven through
the trees. Several anti-personnel mines and HME filled water bottles were found and cleared
throughout the day. From 1200-1400, representatives from GIRoA and the AUP, commanded by
Bacha Khan, conducted a shura with elders at Siah Sang village. GIRoA and AUP leaders began
the shura by handing out humanitarian aid, such as blankets, children’s jackets, and school
supplies. Village elders were happy to see security forces conducting operations around their
village and expressed desire for the AUP to stay in the area permanently. Overall, the operation
was assessed as successful for a few reasons. First, this was the first large-scale combined
operation planned and conducted with GIRoA, ANA and AUP. Second, the integration of the
local Afghan Special Operations Kandak assisted significantly with prepping the environment
and establishing relationships. Finally, an after action review was conducted by all parties and
plans for follow on operations were outlined for future execution. As with most operations, the
most difficult piece is the coordination of simultaneous and supporting execution. This occurred
in Operation OCAB Attal.
FIGURE 14: ANA CONDUCT COMBAT OPERATIONS AROUND DAHLA DAM

20
(25) POO Site Discovery by TF SABER – 18NOV13. On the afternoon of the 18th
, a
dismounted element of Nemesis Troop was clearing a ditch near Kandahar Airfield and
discovered suspicious terrain through careful attention to detail. LT Sorrenti observed a
suspicious dirt mound with a large rock placed on top and complimentary aiming sticks. Upon
further investigation, pieces of wire were discovered and the intended azimuth of 197 degrees
pointed directly at KAF.
FIGURE 15: DISCOVERED POO SITE, AIMING STICKS AND ROCKET WIRE
(26) TF WOLFPACK Operation Shadow Recovery – 19NOV13. At 2245 on 19 NOV,
the UAS platoon at FOB Pasab notified Wolfpack TOC that a Shadow UAS crash landed after
engine failure shortly after takeoff. TF WOLFPACK immediately spun up the QRF and notified
ANA partners – both elements moved to secure the site simultaneously. The ANA were first at
the scene and secured the site with a wide perimeter. 20 minutes later, the QRF arrived on site,
secured the Shadow and transported it back to Pasab. This event was significant in that the ANA
assisted ISAF with little to no prodding from ISAF in a timely, professional manner.
(27) Local National Tractor Recovery – 20NOV13. On the afternoon of the 20th
, a
Stryker accidentally clipped the edge of a trailer attached to a moving tractor on Route Bear
which subsequently rolled off Route Bear into the Arghandab River. TF COUGAR quickly
attempted recovery with assets they had on hand, but were unable to extract the tractor from the
river. On 21NOV, Fox Troop dispatched their 30-ton crane to extract the tractor and the load of
corn that the tractor was hauling from the Arghadab River. While the incident was unfortunate,
the farmer was satisfied and significant discontent was averted following the claims payment.

21
FIGURE 16: LOCAL NATIONAL TRACTOR EXTRACTED FROM THE ARGHANDAB RIVER
(28) Kandahar City Operations – 23-30NOV13. TF HELL had a busy week from 23-
30NOV in and around Kandahar City. First, there was an attempted assassination on MG Raziq
and an IED attack at Lamar Restaurant near the soccer stadium. AUP in PSS 3 discovered and
blew in place an IED and there were two AUP targeted killings. The AUP mentored by TF
HELL performed admirably in all cases and security assessments were reviewed for all tactical
infrastructure owned by TF HELL to mitigate any potential risks.
(29) TF WOLFPACK Support to the Clearance of Sorbagal – 26NOV13. Killer Troop,
TF WOLFPACK assisted 6/3/205th
CDR, COL Rohani with the planning and clearance of
Sorbagal. Throughout the course of the day, ANA were engaged in several firefights.
Unconfirmed reports from the ANA commander identified 5x EKIA and 3 x EWIA and 2nd
Platoon confirmed 2x IEDs blown in place on the objective. Upon completing the mission, ANA
quickly withdrew. While Killer Troop retrograded down RTE Shahaydeen, they witnessed
several explosions and heard audible small arms fire along the route. Upon reaching CP 2,
assisted the AUP in clearing a compound of interest. While enroute 4th
Platoon was engaged by
three enemy with small arms. After 4th
Platoon returned fire and lost PID, Killer 6 made the call
to withdraw, as it appeared the enemies were attempting to bait Killer Troop into a choke point
and potential ambush. Overall the operation was a successfully planned and partnered (ANA,
AUP, ANCOP) mission with Killer Troop supporting.
(30) FOB Zangabad Transfer – 27NOV13. In a matter of two months, FOB Zangabad
went from a Squadron sized FOB to being transitioned to the ANA. FOB Zangabad was one of
the most active pieces of U.S. Tactical Infrastructure (TI) due to its proximity to enemy activity
in the horn of Panjwai. FOB Zangabad was the second piece of TI transitioned by TF WAR
EAGLE, leaving only FOB Masum Ghar in all of Panjwai. The transition signified progress and
the ability of ANSF to secure their own population, and the ANSF used this to their benefit –
asking the Taliban why they continued to fight with the departure of ISAF.
(31) SVIED at PB Luke – 29NOV13. During retrograde operations at PB Luke, an
enemy Suicide Vest attacker approached 1st
Platoon, Outlaw Troop as they were descoping
concertina wire and providing exterior security. As Outlaw Soldiers conducted escalation of

22
force procedures, the dismount detonated an SVIED approximately 30m from the nearest
Soldier. At 1353, 1st PLT, Outlaw initiated movement to the KAF Role III hospital with three
U.S. WIA. TF Saber’s primary QRF (2nd
Platoon, Ghost) transported Saber 7 and Outlaw 7 to
Role III and subsequently escorted EOD to PB Luke to conduct post-blast analysis. 3rd
Platoon
Outlaw escorted one additional casualty to KAF Role III. Six Soldiers were treated for shrapnel
wounds and four Soldiers, as well as one linguist, were treated for possible Mild Traumatic Brain
Injury. The attack occurred across the street from local power broker, Haji Pir Mohammad and
had a pattern of suspicious behavior that occurred with children spotters and phone calls in the
days leading up to the engagement. PB Luke did close later on the 29th
, despite enemy attempts
at disruption.
(32) Transfer of COP Jannat – 03DEC13. On 031000DEC13, COP Jannat was officially
transferred to the 3/1/205th
ANA from Fox Troop, TF COUGAR. COUGARs spent the
preceding months disrupting enemy elements in Arghandab and setting conditions with descope
operations for the transfer. COP Jannat was the last remaining piece of U.S. Tactical
Infrastructure (TI) in Arghandab District – an area where, four years earlier, some of the most
intense fighting in all of Afghanistan took place. The transition served as a powerful message to
both the enemy and the people of Arghandab – progress continues.
FIGURE 17: AFGHANS OBSERVE THE LOWERING OF THE AMERICAN FLAG AND RAISING THE AFGHAN FLAG
(33) Engagement with Haji Tor Ghani, Bagh-e-Pol ALP Commander – 04DEC13. Haji
Tor Ghani (HTG) was engaged by WOLFPACK 6 and HELL 6 on 04DEC13 to build rapport
and discuss issues regarding security. HTG was a former Mujahedeen commander who has been
fighting since since the age of 16. He moved to Pakistan after the Taliban took over in the 1990’s
and he returned to Kandahar after 9/11. He controls the security forces on the western edge of
Kandahar City and his influence in the area is critical to enduring security. WOLFPACK 6 and
HELL 6 gained valuable insight on enemy staging areas, illegal taxation at checkpoints, the
Afghan Local Police (ALP) and the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA).

23
FIGURE 18: WOLFPACK AND HELL 6 MEET WITH HAJI TOR GHANI, ZHARAY ALP CDR
(34) Operation SABER Blitzkrieg – 4DEC13. TF Saber executed SABER
BLITZKREIG II, a combined-arms live fire exercise Southeast Daman to maintain proficiency
among troop and Squadron Fire Support elements. Historical reporting indicates the area has
been used for insurgent trafficking of arms and equipment from Arghistan District, and limited
ISAF presence has allowed for freedom of maneuver through the area. Fire support assets
included OH-58Ds, 120mm mortars, and 60mm mortars, while JFOs and JTACs practiced type
1, 2, and 3 control for CAS. TF Saber conducted the fire missions with complementary focused
intelligence collection to exploit disruption effects.
FIGURE 19: OPERATION SABER BLITZKRIEG
(35) Operation Chamtoo – 07-20DEC13. 1/205th
and 3/205th
ANA BDEs conducted the
first Corps level operation during CTF DRAGOON’s tenure in Afghanistan. All pillars of ANSF
security were involved in the operation, with the majority of combat operations taking place in
Panjwai, Zharay, Maiwand and Shah Wali Kot. 1/205th
cleared 20 villages, found 10 caches,
found and cleared 122 IEDs, killed 23 enemy, took six detainees, reintegrated 23 Taliban with a
press conference and operated a radio station throughout the operation. 3/205th
cleared 38
villages, cleared four caches, found and cleared 14 IEDs, killed seven enemy and took eight
detainees. Additionally, they developed and recorded radio messages for entry into compounds
of interest and initiated a weekly radio show for the Zharay District Governor. Throughout the
duration of the operation, TF WOLFPACK conducted lethal strikes in support of ANSF
operations, killing six enemies of peace. Killer Troop, TF WOLFPACK, forward positioned a

24
QRF in DeMaiwand, Maiwand District which led to the successful evacuation of two ANA
casualties during the operation. In addition, on the 19th
, Killer Troop conducted a deliberate
clearance of Route Shaheydan to Gharmabak Pass with 3/205th
ANA. TF COUGAR supported
Shah Wali Kot District Chief of Police, Bacha Khan, and the 1/205th
with the clearance of
several compounds of interest. On the morning of 9DEC13, 2nd
Platoon, Fox Troop, TF
COUGAR struck an IED while clearing Route Monkey in Shah Wali Kot. The blast destroyed
the mine roller attached to the Stryker, but the occupants were uninjured. 845th
Engineers moved
up to check for secondary devices and repair the road. TF COUGAR recovered the vehicle and
returned to FOB Frontenac. Overall, the operation was assessed as extremely successful, setting
enemy operations back at least four weeks. In addition, the Taliban were forced to make
decisions on high level changes and assessed that Kandahar Province was essentially lost to
GIRoA control.
FIGURE 20: TALIBAN REINTEGRATION CEREMONY AND DETAINEE (CENTER)
(36) COP Shurandam/BP3 Retrograde – 7-13DEC13. Cobra Battery, TF HELL
conducted significant retrograde operations from COP Shurandam in preparation for transition to
the AUP. They retrograded 42 TEUs of material while simultaneously increasing the level of
active patrolling in surrounding villages. COP Shurandam was transferred to the AUP on the 28th
and Bagh-e-Pul was officially transferred on the 31st
.

25
FIGURE 21: BP3 AND SHURANDAM RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
(37) A Week in the Life of WOLFPACK – 11-18DEC13. In addition to participating in
Operation Chamtoo, TF WOLFPACK moved Iron Troop to FOB Masum Ghar from FOB Pasab
and conducted two Combined Arms Breaches. They also descoped two Logistic Support Areas
(LSA) to downsize FOB Pasab with the pending retrograde. Killer Troop conducted a squad
level competition and TF WOLFPACK conducted a 5k holiday run, followed by a USO holiday
event.
FIGURE 22: WEEK IN THE LIFE OF THE WOLFPACK
(38) Fox Troop Change of Command – 14DEC13. After 18 months in command, CPT
Ryan Feeney handed over command of Fox Troop to CPT Broyles. CPT Feeney served as troop
commander through Platoon Live Fires, EIB qualification, the Decisive Action Training Exercise
and the Mission Readiness Exercise.

26
FIGURE 23: CPT FEENEY CHANGES COMMAND OF FOX TROOP WITH CPT BROYLES
(39) COP Pacemaker Retrograde and Transition – 16-29DEC13. On the 16th
, TF
COUGAR retrograded the remaining M777 Howitzer to Spin Boldak, shortly followed by the
remaining containers and surveillance balloon. Distinguished visitors stopped by for one last
Christmas meal on the 25th
, and on the 29th
1/1/205th
assumed responsibility of the COP. Eagle
Troop then repositioned to FOB Frontenac to prepare for subsequent redeployment.
FIGURE 24: RETROGRADE OF COP PACEMAKER AND CHRISTMAS DINNER

27
(40) TF SABER Medical Training – 17DEC13. 2nd
Platoon, Nemesis Troop, TF SABER
instructed AUP at Checkpoint Black 32 on medical procedures on the 17th
of December.
Nemesis Troop medics, SPC Molina and SPC Hooker trained the AUP on tourniquet application,
chest and abdominal hemorrhages. The AUP were very receptive to the training and asked for
continued training with Nemesis Troop.
(41) SSG Jesse Williams Killed in Action – 17DEC13. On the evening of 16 DEC 13,
SSG Jesse Williams provided Electronic Warfare (EW) support to part of a
combined arms breach team while assigned to the Regimental Support
Squadron. Upon completion of his mission, he was asked by the Combat
Aviation Brigade supporting Kandahar if he wanted to accompany the unit on
a counter-repeater mission in Zabul Province. It was common for 2CR EW
NCOs to ride-along on these missions to increase technical competence on
various EW capabilities. While on this mission, the UH-60 helicopter on which
SSG Williams was riding crashed in a ravine in Shajoy District, Zabul Province on the afternoon
of 17 DEC 13. SSG Williams was an excellent NCO who was excelling in the EW field as
shown by his recent promotion to SSG. His efforts directly contributed to the success of the
Regimental Support Squadron and the entire Regiment.
(42) Eagle Troop Kinetic Strike – 22DEC13. Eagle Troop followed and supported 6th
Kandak, 4/205th
ANA and AUP on the 22nd
when around 1200, the element came under small
arms fire along Route Robyn East near Ghilang village. The element in contact was provided air
support, which engaged the enemies. Final BDA was two enemies KIA. The mission continued
and the ANSF later met with local villagers in Ghilang to reestablish a GIRoA presence in the
village.
(43) Kellie Pickler Visits CTF DRAGOON – 22-27DEC13. As Christmas approached in
late December, spirits of Soldiers in CTF DRAGOON were raised as Kellie Pickler traveled
around Kandahar entertaining troops. She made visits to every Squadron and even sang the 12
days of Christmas in the Regimental TOC.
FIGURE 25: KELLIE PICKLER ENTERTAINS TF HELL AT FOB WALTON

28
(44) TF WOLFPACK Charshaka Area Reconnaissance – 24DEC13. On 24DEC13, 2nd
Platoon, Killer Troop conducted an area reconnaissance of Charshaka with ANA from
4/1/3/205th
. The patrol stopped at AUP checkpoints as well as village gathering points to meet
with leaders and distribute school supplies. The ANA commander concluded the patrol at the
Charshaka Mosque, which is a known Taliban meeting place. The commander met with the
Mullah and expressed the enduring presence that the ANSF would maintain.
(45) TF SABER Civil Engagements – 24 and 27DEC13. Nemesis Troop and the
Romanian “Red Scorpions” conducted joint operations to Kvosh Ab village, where they met with
village leaders and handed out blankets, jackets, soccer balls and school supplies. TF SABER
used this opportunity to photograph key leaders and develop a greater understanding of
personnel in vicinity of known POO sites around KAF.
FIGURE 26: NEMESIS TROOP AND THE AUP HAND OUT SCHOOL SUPPLIES AND MEET ELDERS
(46) Operation Treasure Chest – 29DEC13. At the end of December, 2nd
PLT, Killer
Troop conducted an operation to investigate historical compounds of interest IVO AUP
checkpoint 2 on route Shahayden. The mission consisted of linkup with Special Forces and an
AUP search of a compound of interest. At 1500, eight Dragoons and four AUP moved toward
the objective, finding it abandoned. The officers stated that another compound 800meters away
did have reports of Taliban activity, so the patrol decided to investigate it (41R PR 9588 0676).
While moving toward a much larger square-shaped compound, the police officer’s ICOM radios
began to light up with chatter. Taliban spotters in the area had eyes on the patrol moving in their
direction and they began moving to initiate an ambush. As the patrol continued to clear up to the
compound, with machines guns over-watching movement, the radio chatter became silent. The
patrol continued and the 4 AUP searched the compound for any weapons or intelligence. Three
Strykers locked down the outer corners of the compound to prevent ambush on the dismounted
element. After 20 minutes of searching, the officers exited the compound with nothing serious to
report, other than a terrified family found inside. The family was questioned and only said that
they were inside the building to hide from the fighting and violence between the ANSF and
Taliban forces. Once completed, the patrol walked back to the checkpoint, closed out business
with AUP leadership and departed back to DSP Maiwand.
(47) Afghans Notify TF SABER of IEDs – 29DEC13. On the evening of the 29th
, one
Afghan male and four children stopped 2nd
Platoon, Nemesis Troop, TF SABER to inform them

29
that two Afghan males emplaced an object in a hole during prayer time. Nemesis subsequently
contacted the AUP who arrived to investigate the hole and provide overwatch through the night.
The next morning, the Romanian Red Scorpians arrived on site with EOD and confirmed a 40-60
lbs. jug of HME with detonation cord was located in the hole. Additionally, a second IED was
found with a crush bowl wired to another 40-60 lbs jug of HME. Both IEDs were detonated
under a controlled environment and units returned to FOB Lindsey.
(48) Counternarcotics Team Drug Burn – 8JAN14. On 8 January the ANSF
Counternarcotics Team destroyed 67 metric tons of illegal drugs that included opium, heroin,
morphine, poppy seed, and various opium production chemicals. The AUP independently
captured these narcotics throughout several months of operations and conducted a press
conference with the Kandahar Provincial Governor to commemorate the event.
FIGURE 29: AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES DESTROY 67 TONS OF ILLEGAL DRUGS
(49) Attack on FOB Pasab – 20 JAN14. At 10:24 on 20 January, insurgents attacked
FOB Pasab utilizing a VBIED to breach the outer perimeter and allow for six enemy combatants
to enter the base. Dismounted elements from the Regiment’s Shadow Platoon, 3rd
Platoon Iron
Troop, and scouts form 1/8 CAV immediately began to engage the enemy. As 1/8 CAV and
Wolfpack’s Reconnaissance Platoon moved to secure the breach site, CW2 Edward Balli and
SSG Tyrone Jones directly engaged and killed two of the enemy combatants as they entered the
base before enemy fire mortally wounded Chief Balli and injured SSG Jones. The Wolfpack
QRF eliminated the remaining insurgents shortly after and secured the breach site. At 1700 the
Zharay District Governor Jamal Agha held a press conference where he excoriated the Taliban
for the attack and praised the US forces for the quick and decisive actions that defeated the
enemy’s attack on FOB Pasab.

30
FIGURE 30: SOLDIERS INVESTIGATE THE ASSAULT SITE ON FOB PASAB.
(50) Chief Warrant Officer 2 Edward Balli Killed in Action – 20 JAN 14. On Monday,
20 JAN 14, Taliban militants drove a jingle truck filled with explosives within
close proximity of the back wall at FOB Pasab. Upon detonation, a van drove
to the site of the explosion where eight enemy fighters dressed in ACUs with
suicide vests jumped out to assault the breach. CW2 Balli was a UAV pilot
who happened to be working at FOB Pasab in close proximity to the breach.
CW2 Balli was fatally wounded during the incident by small arms fire. CW2
Balli was on his third deployment and significantly contributed to surveillance
of enemy activity and support to coalition Soldiers on hundreds of missions in western Kandahar
Province.
(51) 5 District Shura – 01FEB14. On 01 February Haji Faizel Mohammad hosted the
Five District Shura at the Panjwai District Center. Attendees included the respective governors
and police chiefs from Panjwai, Zharay, Arghandab, Dand, and Maiwand as well as provincial
leadership that included MG Abdul Raziq, PGOV Toorelai Wesa, Chairman of the Kandahar
Peace Council, Atta Mohammad and various representatives from provincial line ministries.
This shura marked a significant turning point in the conversation amongst GIRoA leaders in
Kandahar as those in attendance focused their efforts on governance, development, and
education as opposed to security concerns. Each district governor spoke to the shura about the
challenges in their respective districts and in many cases requested assistance with hiring
teachers to fill newly re-opened schools or the acquisition of development projects for their
constituents in the wake of major security gains by the ANSF.
FIGURE 31: GOVERNOR WESA AND MG RAZIQ ATTEND THE FIVE DISTRICT SHURA
NYTimes: Javed Tanveer/Agence France-Presse —
Getty Images

31
(52) Operation Hell’s Gate – 3FEB-4MAR14. Through the month of February TF Hell
partnered with the Afghan Police to conduct disruption operations within Kandahar City. TF
Hell and the police primarily conducted operations on the western side of the city in order to
enable the police in providing security for the upcoming elections. TF Hell also conducted a
series of engagements throughout the city to encourage increased patrolling to maximize the
physical presence of security forces. TF Hell incorporated persistent surveillance through their
use of the ALTUS system in order to supplement AUP clearances during the operation.
(53) Operation Chamtoo II - 9-26FEB14. On 9 February 1/205th
, 3/205th
, and the AUP
conducted the second in a series of three major operations in Kandahar Province leading up to
the elections. Chamtoo II expanded the ANSF’s influence into Taliban held territory in Shah
Wali Kot and Maiwand following the successful clearance of Panjwai during Chamtoo I. 1/205th
ANA cleared 66 villages resulting in 3 enemies killed, 189 IEDs cleared, and over 700lbs of
explosives recovered. After successful clearances in the Horn of Panjwai, 1/205 focused their
efforts in Shah Wali Kot where Fox Troop from TF Cougar assisted the ANA with the
construction of a new checkpoint in the village of Siah Sang. Fox troop established a patrol base
near the village in order to provide persistent surveillance with the REAP-XL system and
supplement ANSF security during the construction of the checkpoint. The checkpoint was
designed to deny the enemy a key facilitation route into the province and also secure polling sites
to be used during the elections on 5 April. 3/205 cleared 20 villages resulting in six insurgents
killed, 64 IEDs found and cleared and over 3,147 lbs of HME recovered. Third brigade focused
on a major clearance in southwestern Maiwand through Band-e-Timor where they established a
new base named COP Selab. During the operation the 6th
Kandak commander LTC Rohani was
killed when his vehicle struck an IED during a patrol. Killer Troop, 3rd
Squadron partnered with
the Kandak and provided assistance in building the new COP as well as deliver additional
surveillance capability with the REAP-XL. Operation Chamtoo II also solidified ANSF gains in
Panjwai and drove the Taliban from the western villages in Panjwai namely Mushan and Doab.
The operation tightened the local security forces hold on the province while delivering a decisive
blow to a struggling insurgency.

32
FIGURE 32: FOX TROOP IN SIAH SANG, SCHOOL BOOK DISTROBUTION IN PANJWAI, COP SELAB BUILD IN BAND-E-
TIMOR, AND KILLER TROOP JOINT PATROL WITH ANA
(54) Operation Alamo Scout XIII - 10-11FEB14. From 10-11 February 2014, P Troop,
4th
Squadron conducted joint patrols with the 2nd
Mobile Strike Force (MSF) near Qazi Karez,
and Mard Kala. The operation was intended to intimidate local area insurgents and deter them
from emplacing IEDs and rockets in vicinity of Kandahar Airfield. The MSF conducted
engagements in each of the villages to talk to the residents about Taliban presence and re-assure
the people that the ANSF are more than capable of providing security for their village.
Operations like Alamo Scout have kept violence levels around the airfield to an all time low and
were also successful in establishing new relationships between locals and the ANSF.
FIGURE 33: THE MSF AND SABER CONDUCT JOINT PATROLING IN SUPPORT OF OPERATION ALAMO SCOUT
(55) RSS Trains 5th
Kandak 1/205 – 13FEB. The Regimental support squadron provided
instruction to the 5th
Kandak 1/205 on how to trouble shoot transmission and electrical systems
on their vehicles. RSS worked side by side with the ANA mechanics in order to help them
improve their ability to read schematics and develop a better system by which their vehicle fleet
is serviced.
FIGURE 34: RSS MECHANICS TRAINING THE 5TH KANDAK 1/205

33
(56) Presidential Election Preparations – FEB-MAR14. During the months of February
and March 2014, the ANSF in partnership with the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission
focused a great deal of effort on planning for the elections, held on 5 April. CTF Dragoon
conducted engagements, partnered planning, and monitored the progress of the preparations of
the ANSF to ensure proper coordination between ANSF pillars. Key to CTF Dragoon’s effort
was the establishment of Election Operation Centers (EOCs) in each district to gather
representatives from the ANA, AUP, and NDS and encourage unified action on Election Day.
Planning considerations included the movement of ballots, polling site security, and the security
of presidential candidates campaigning in Kandahar. The ANSF demonstrated their ability to
provide requisite security during a visit from the President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai, as well
as two major campaign events hosted by Zalmai Rassoul and Gul Agha Sherzai.
FIGURE 35: ARGHANDAB ELECTIONS OPERATION CENTER, ELECTIONS GRAFITI IN KANDAHAR CITY, AND A
BILLBOARD ENCOURAGING WOMEN TO VOTE ON ELECTION DAY.
(57) Operation Chamtoo III – 5-26MAR14 . From 5 to 26 March 2014 the ANSF
conducted its second major Corps level operation across Kandahar. The purpose of the operation
was to disrupt enemy forces in Kandahar and establish security around polling sites for the
upcoming elections. First and third brigade of the 205th
Corps cleared a total of 62 villages
discovering 50 IEDs and 70 kg of HME. Operations for 1/205 focused in Northwestern Shah
Wali Kot around Kundelin and Kajur villages, while 3/205 conducted operations in Ghorak,
Khakrez, and Band-e-Timor. Third Brigade continued its outreach to the Afghan population
holding a shura in the displaced persons camp in Zharay in which they handed out food items to
needy villagers. The operation was not as dynamic is the previous Chamtoo Operations, however
was successful in providing security to previously at risk polling sites and disrupting enemy
movement in Kandahar leading into the elections.
(58) 4/4 ID Relief in Place. CTF Mountain Warrior, 4/4 ID, arrived in Kandahar in
March 2014 to conduct a relief in place with CTF Dragoon. TF Steel, 1-77 FA conducted a
transfer of authority at FOB Walton on 21 MAR while TF Red Warrior, 1-12IN conducted their
transfer on 25MAR. TF Cougar cased their colors during an end of mission ceremony at FOB
Frontenac on 27 March. TF Muleskinner conducted their transfer with TF Blacksmith, 704th
BSB on 28 March.

34
FIGURE 36: TF COUGAR CONDUCTS END OF MISSION CEREMONY AT FOB FRONTENAC ON 27 MARCH 2014
c. CTF DRAGOON War fighting Functions (WFF): Deployment in support of the final
stages of Operation Enduring Freedom required some unique leverage of all WFF. Not only were
WFF leaders expected to fulfill their own responsibilities, they were also expected to know and
assist with their respective Afghan counterpart’s responsibilities. To assist with the significant
number and requirements of the SFATs, CTF DRAGOON created the ANSF DEV cell to
manage the multitude of efforts occurring across the operating environment. ANSF DEV
operated across all WFF and organized as such. The synchronization of all WFF occurred
through the targeting process. The high optempo made synchronization difficult due to the
numerous moving pieces involved with training the ANSF and transferring bases. However, only
through this deliberate synchronization were plans optimized for execution.
(1) With the transition of control to ANSF, the Intelligence WFF became more difficult
to manage as ISAF were not directly actioning targets, but rather influenced the ANSF to execute
targets with the loss of direct access to sources of information. Increasingly, the GIRoA, ANSF
and informal powerbrokers became more important than the enemy alone. With extensive
personnel retrograde requirements, the Intelligence WFF conducted their operations with the
majority of their personnel back in Germany organized under the Dragoon Intel Support Element
(DISE). The DISE provided daily input to the Intelligence WFF and assisted significantly with
the Regiment’s understanding of the Operating Environment (OE), which became even more
critical for the RIP with 4/4ID and Afghan elections.
(2) The Fires WFF focused almost exclusively on the targeting process to achieve key
objectives and benchmarks for retrograde and transition. In addition, Fires managed the
retrograde of artillery assets across the battlespace. Subordinate TFs initially managed six total
howitzers across AO DRAGOON. The observation of artillery required a more deliberate
approach as there were fewer soldiers on the battlefield to observe impact. The integration of the
Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS) provided an additional tool for use in conjunction

35
with fires, but also complicated the process on occasion. The management of the Regimental
targeting process was crucial to properly prioritize Regimental efforts in a very dynamic
operating environment.
(3) The Sustainment WFF required some of the most taxing efforts. Sustainment focused
on the closure or transition of 10 outlying COPs and FOBs, as well as sustaining those that
remained. The amount of property moved out of theater astonished even the most casual
observers – literally thousands of containers full of equipment. One aspect of this process that
few understood was the outflow of civilian contractors. For every piece of Tactical Infrastructure
(TI) transitioned, numerous contractors were repositioned or sent home. Finally, all sustainment
operations required a Combined Arms Breaching Team (CAB-T). The CAB-T emerged as
RC(S)’s method of clearing routes and conducting reconnaissance in support of all operations.
Prior units received numerous casualties while conducting route clearance. The new combined
arms approach significantly reduced risk to soldiers and ensured all clearance and reconnaissance
efforts were tied to operations.
(4) All Movement and Maneuver occurred in partnership or in support of ANSF
operations. Requirements for partnership became frustrating on several occasions as CTF
DRAGOON elements knew where pressure need be applied, but ANSF were often unable or
unwilling to conduct operations as needed from the ISAF perspective. CTF DRAGOON applied
numerous Inform and Influence capabilities, to include Electronic Warfare (EW) to achieve
effects on the enemy in areas ISAF maneuver forces no longer conducted operations. As
depicted in CONOPs above, ISAF movement and maneuver elements continued to plan and
participate in ANSF led operations. Operations conducted provided important, lasting effects on
enemy safe havens and support zones, which assisted ANSF in retaining key terrain.
(5) The Protection WFF required due diligence to prevent enemy exploitation as CTF
DRAGOON forces retrograded. The enemy consistently expressed their desire to conduct last
opportunity attacks with the U.S. departure, which required dedicated focus from the Protection
WFF. Protection efforts included the assessment and reinforcement of individual COPs and
FOBs, increased force protection measures and the realignment and integration of ANSF into the
overall security plan. In addition, the protection WFF was extremely involved in the base
transition or closure process. Planning and coordination for a transition or closure by the
protection WFF was absolutely critical in the overall success of the force retrograde.
(6) In the first five months of deployment, CTF DRAGOON reduced numbers by over
1,000 personnel while maintaining the same operational footprint. Leaders took a hard look at
Mission Command and assumed some risk with required force reductions. Commands thinned
their ranks in order to retain combat power at lower levels. With mandated reductions in troop
levels, commanders made hard decisions to reduce command and control elements in favor of
maintaining force projection capability. In addition, communications systems that were in some
cases 5-10 years old, were reconfigured to accommodate the changes in force posture. Later, as
elections approached, 2CR had the challenge to conduct a RIP with 4/4ID and outflow of the
remainder of the Regiment, while maintaining overall command and control through the
elections of 5 APR 14. This was an extremely difficult task and required much advance

36
coordination with 4/4ID to maximize knowledge of key plans, relationships and capabilities. It
was the detailed planning and force posture management that facilitated the execution of this key
transition while maintaining the proper security posture for the elections.
9. CONCLUSION.
Comprehensively, CTF DRAGOON employed an extremely versatile and agile force that
made an exceptional impact across RC(S) during a critical time in the transition of security to
Afghan Forces and the election of a new President and Provincial Council representatives. While
assuming battlespace from two brigades with less than half the number of Soldiers, retrograding
ten pieces of Tactical Infrastructure, advising two ANA Brigades, two Battalions of Afghan
Uniform Police in Kandahar City, and 16 District governorates, CTF DRAGOON displayed
exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service, heroic deeds and
valorous actions.
The tasks with which CTF DRAGOON was charged were incredibly dynamic and
complex. Dragoons truly participated in every aspect of Unified Land Operations. The pre-
deployment training and expectation management initially undertaken and maintained by the
Regiment enabled Dragoons to be an adaptive, agile force. Whether training the ANSF, closing a
combat outpost, defending against a hasty attack at FOB Pasab, or assisting the Afghans with
election security planning, CTF DRAGOON embodied the motto – Toujours Pret!
2d Cavalry Regiment remains Always Ready!

OEF 13-14 narrative history for 2d Cavalry Regiment

More Related Content

What's hot

Similar to OEF 13-14 narrative history for 2d Cavalry Regiment

Recently uploaded

OEF 13-14 narrative history for 2d Cavalry Regiment