“One refugee is a novelty, ten refugees are boring and a hundred refugees are a menace”. (Greenhill 2010:1) A look at the externalisation of EU immigration policy and the effect it has on the number of asylum seekers entering the EU borders.

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UNIVERSITY OF BATH
Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies
Externalisation of EU immigration policy: a
raised drawbridge?
___________________________________________________
Arsenia Nikolaeva
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the MA in
Contemporary European Studies (Euromasters) degree.
September 2011

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INDEX
Introduction………………………………………………………………………....3
I - Literature and Theoretical Insights…………………………………………….6
- 1.1 Securitisation theory…………………………………………………………..6
- 1.2 Externalisation of immigration policy vis-à-vis treaties……………………...8
- 1.3 Readmission treaties: New obligatory externalised cooperation………….....17
II - Case Study: Italy – Libya relations………………………………………………..19
Methodology……………………………………………………………………....20
Choice of partner for cooperation on externalisation and type of agreements
concluded………………………………………………………………………….21
- 2.1 Cooperation with a pariah state…………………………………………….22
- 2.2 Basing cooperation on material incentives or the hypocritical Pan-
Africanism……………………………………………………………................25
- 2.3 Informality of the agreements………………………………………………26
- 2.4 Adherence to the international human rights accords signed by partners
cooperating on externalisation of migration........................................................28
- 2.5 Effect of externalisation policy and border control mechanisms on the
number of refugee entries into the EU………………………………………….33
III - Arab Spring swept Maghreb, migrant weapons…………………………..39
IV – Conclusion…………………………………………………………………...44
- Recommendations………………………………………………………………46
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………49
List of Tables and Figures
Table 1: Asylum applicants and First Instance decisions on Asylum applications
2008-2010……………………………………………………….............................35
Figure 1: Quarterly detection of illegal border crossings by land and sea………...37
Table 2: Number of bona fide refugees possibly present on intercepted ships…....38
Figure 2: Number of bona fide refugees possibly turned away from EU borders...38

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INTRODUCTION
“One refugee is a novelty, ten refugees are boring and a hundred refugees are a menace”1
.
(Greenhill 2010:1)
Immigration has become such a discussed issue in the press and from a political tribune
that it seems that Europe has been exposed to this phenomenon for a long time. Eurobarometer
shows that, in the opinion of the EU citizens, immigration ranks higher than terrorism on the list
of concerns (Luedtke 2005:84). The portrayal of immigration as an apocalyptic issue is accepted,
the description of it as a ‘plague’ is not uncommon (De Haas 2008:1305).
In fact, before the 1990s Europe was a continent of emigration rather than immigration,
which resulted in large Diasporas of Europeans living away from the European continent. The
1990s propelled immigration into European political agenda with the first large inflows of
migrants2
fleeing the Yugoslav crisis. The peak of asylum claims happened in 1992 but after that
the numbers have dropped; the reasons for this were, as Brinkmann writes “inter alia … more
stringent asylum laws in the Member states” (2004:193). For more than a decade migrants
coming to the EU Member states came mostly in search of better life, although some still were
escaping torture or marginalisation and therefore were under the protection of international law
and eligible for asylum, among those Somalis fleeing a failed state and Eritreans, members of the
opposition, escaping from post-2001 political conflict. The wave of revolutions which swept
North African states in 2010 and 2011 has exponentially increased the number of eligible asylum
seekers which could migrate to Europe. This dissertation will deal with the migration through or
1
An unattributed but oft-quoted phrase in refugee literature.
2
The term migrant in this paper will be used as an umbrella term encompassing both economic migrants and
refugees (as defined by the 1951 UN convention). The term irregular migrants will be applied to all migrants that
use irregular means of entering a country taking into account that some of these migrants are eligible for seeking
asylum under international law.

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from the Maghreb countries to Europe and specifically with Italy and Libya cooperation on
migration control.
One of the most effective ways of distancing the issue of migration adopted by the
European Union has been the externalisation of its border controls and migrant determination
procedures through cooperation with countries of origin and transit states. While helping a
certain part of the EU population breathe freely, the use of ‘out of sight – out of mind’ approach
to dealing with migrants has a distinct effect on the fate of the irregular migrants which are
seeking protection from prosecution or war but are unable to enter EU by regular means. The
aim of this thesis is to analyse the effects of externalisation of EU immigration policy on the
possibility of seeking asylum in the EU member states.
A number of politicians have portrayed the immigration from the South as particularly
menacing, claiming there was a million of Sub-Saharan migrants in Libya waiting to leave for
the shores of Europe. The fear created by this political rhetoric changes the very fabric of
society, moving it from a more accepting and inclusive society of stability and homogeneity to a
more exclusive society of change and division. According to Young (1999), the fear is bred by
the public assessment of risk which is amplified by the mass media portraying crime. One can go
further and state that the links that certain media makes between crime and migrants directly
influences the public opinion on migration. Sensational reportage of the worn boats filled with
starving Africans, is one of an ‘invasion’ and makes many Europeans wish to retreat into the
‘Fortress Europe’ and pull up the drawbridge. However, the influence of media on public
opinion is not the aim of this paper and it will not be discussed in detail. It is this fear, however,
that makes any means of battling with migration flows acceptable.
First chapter contains theoretical and historical background. It will draw on existing
academic literature to outline the historical changes in the EU immigration policy and portrayal
of migration which ultimately led to a higher degree of externalisation. Firstly, the securitisation

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phenomenon as defined by the Copenhagen school of thought is analysed. The securitisation as a
main cause for validating the politicisation of the immigration issue which led to strengthening
of border controls is considered. Analysis of the treaties and policy developments involved in the
process of externalisation follows. While first chapter is general in dealing with migration policy,
the dissertation itself will focus on South to North migration to the EU and, thus, examples will
be drawn, exclusively, from African migration.
Second chapter will analyse in depth a case study of bi-lateral relations on externalisation
of immigration policy to the South of the EU, namely the association of Italy and Libya. There
are no official readmission treaties between these two countries or between EU and Libya;
therefore, it is an interesting case to examine, as while it has been informal, it has also been one
of the most successful alliances on externalisation in blocking illegal migration. The effect these
relations had on migration of refugees is to be discovered. The relations are analysed drawing
from both quantitative and qualitative methods of research. The aim would be to identify the
effect of cooperation of Italy and Libya on the ability of refugees to gain protection in the EU.
Chronologically, the alliance of Italy and Libya will be discussed up to February 2011, therefore
examining externalisation of immigration policy in peaceful time for Libya.
Third chapter looks at the events which have attracted our attention to the plight of the
migrants arriving in the South of the EU from the Maghreb region following the events of the
Arab Spring. The use of migrants as human weapons by Gaddafi are discussed as a possible
result of externalisation practises of Italy.
Conclusions are drawn in the fourth chapter. A number of suggestions will complete this
dissertation, looking at improving the effect of externalisation on the possibility for immigrants
to lodge an asylum claim and achieve protection from the European Union as is required by the
international human rights accords signed by the EU member states.

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I - Literature and Theoretical Insights
“Long before September 11 galvanized a new preoccupation with border security, issues
surrounding refugees and illegal immigrants had transmuted in many countries from a matter of
low politics to high politics, involving a shift in the definition of national security threats and in
the practise of security policy”.
(Greenhill 2010:5)
Securitisation theory
According to (Young 1999; den Boer 2008) our society has become a Risk society, where
catastrophes are accepted as a norm and fight against terrorism is a response to the anxiety with
which our contemporaries are ridden. Den Boer (2008) also observes a certain spill-over from
security politics into migration policy. This spill-over and strong link between security and
migration has been defined by a number of scholars as ‘migration-security’ nexus (Karyotis
2007, Miller 2001). This dissertation will, however, use the process of social construction of the
Copenhagen school. The process of securitisation3
of migration is a two-step process in which
migration is firstly declared to be a threat by a securitising agent4
through a ‘speech act’ (Buzan
1998:40) and further a governmental claim that this issue should be addressed vis-à-vis relating it
to the EU security agenda (Dover 2008; Huysmans 2000). Thus, according to Buzan (1998) a
real threat might not exist but by naming it a threat it must be dealt with as such.
Immigration was codified as a security issue in the EU policy in the early 90s, with the
general trend of broadening and deepening of the definition of what constitutes a security threat.
Much broader definition was accepted than the military threats, described in the works of
3
Here using the definition coined by the Copenhagen School of Security Studies: ‘naming is not just an act of
providing a label to a pre-existing object but the discursive formation of that object itself’ (Van Munster 2005:1).
4
Securitising agent is a social actor with a certain level of authority (i.e. a politician, media representative, security
expert).

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classical neorealist writers. However, immigration was only made a worldwide security threat
after the terrorist attacks of September 11th
2001. Prior it was considered an important and
politicised issue but the attacks and the following discussion in the media, has made terrorism
almost synonymous with immigration and therefore, opened the floor for discussion of restrictive
migration policies in the new era of War on Terror. Many political scientists mark September
11th
as a turning point for more restrictive immigration policy developments in the United States
and the European Union, as Baldwin-Edwards writes “the prevailing Eurocentric perspective on
Mediterranean migration lies almost exclusively in the security paradigm” (2006:311). Karyotis
writes of securitisation and the migration flows; “The political discourse concerning migration
reveals that national and supranational policy-makers in the EU have interpreted population
movements in terms of their danger to national security” (2007:1). Many political scientists, at
the same time, claim that the security threat from Africa is exaggerated in search of political
gains (De Haas 2008; Karyotis 2007).
The gradual dissolution of internal borders and free movement of people within the
European Union was achieved in the late 80s with the signing of the Schengen agreement. This
heightened the need for security of the external borders and caused, according to Pastore, “two
parallel processes: the gradual ‘Europeanization’ of internal security policies and the
‘externalization’ of security threats” (Pastore in Karyotis 2007:4). The breaking of internal
borders and its effect on the external borders had a profound effect on refugee travel to Europe,
as Professor James Hathaway predicted almost twenty years ago; “the evolution of a European
Union without internal barriers for members would be ‘devastating for refugees’ seeking access
to the territory” (Nessel 2009:644).
The more detrimental changes occurred following September 11th
2001 and the bombs in
Madrid underground in 2004 and London in 2005. The war waged on terror had a specific effect
on the migration issue; it fundamentally misinterprets the threat of terrorism coming from
migrants. The radicalisation of certain groups from Africa, for example, is linked to organised

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criminal gangs which traffic human beings, drugs and weapons (Dover 2008:114). Spanish
Presidency made war on terror its highest priority while equating it, openly, to the fight against
illegal migration (Karyotis 2007:8). The threat was greatly exaggerated by the media as well as
by politicians using anti-immigration as a political platform. Most politicians chose to overlook
the fact, that most of the terrorist activities in the European Union are “home-grown” (Monar
2010:24).
The Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting of 20 September 2001
discussed internal security and the possibility of safeguarding it, while complying with the
international protection obligations stemming from human rights accords. This had a direct effect
on asylum seekers, as Karyotis writes it could be interpreted as “an attempt to find legal ways to
exclude asylum seekers from the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention, focusing in
particular on those suspected of terrorist acts” (2007:7).
Securitisation inevitably led to externalisation, any immigrant could present a security
threat to the European Union simply by definition. Nazarski writes of the military connotations
of the language used in relation to migration, “as if it there is an invasion justifying the building
of a fortress as well as the adoption of a border agency (FRONTEX) and within this framework
the implementation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT)” (2008:40). An essential part
of the “securitization process” is the manipulation of the distinction between refugees and
migrants (Nessel 2009:668). Some migrants must be identified as refugees prior to being allowed
into Fortress Europe and other migrants, would be left out. Externalisation seemed like the
answer to the problem.
Externalisation of immigration policy vis-à-vis EU treaties.
The term ‘externalisation’ defines the process of transferral or exportation of
management of EU borders or classical migration controls from member states to third countries,
whether transit or sending (Billet 2010:74; Boswell 2003:622). Mechanisms used for

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externalisation of immigration policy are various; “extending and strengthening visa regimes,
offshore detention centres and offshore asylum processing, coastal patrols of the high seas and
the waters of third countries, military and intelligence operations and bilateral agreements”
(Taylor Nicholson 2011:6).
Firstly proposed and advanced by Blair government, externalisation was portrayed as
means of preventing deaths on the seas by bringing the possible places to lodge asylum claim
closer to the areas from where asylum seekers originated. The proposal included:
“’Regional Processing Areas’ (RPAs) and ‘Transit Processing Centres’
(TPCs); the former were to be located in the zones of origin of refugees
with the aim of strengthening reception capacities close to areas of crisis,
and the latter, positioned closer to EU borders, were envisioned as centres
where asylum seekers could submit their asylum claims” (Andrijasevic
2008:159).
Italy has also been advocating for the establishment of “procedures in order to process
asylum requests outside the territory of the European Union and which would then allow to
institutionalise entry channels to the EU for asylum seekers” (Paoletti and Pastore 2010:14).
Although the UK proposal of externalisation was refused at first due to negative public opinion
and Human Rights NGO protests, the EU soon set out on the road of externalising its migration
policy. From the 90s, when it has become a European rather than a National issue, the road
towards a higher degree of externalisation of migration policy has been a long one and the
measures adopted have had a direct effect on the ability of migrants to claim asylum. To follow
is a discussion of the treaties which acted as a catalyst for the externalisation of migration policy
and the effect that they had on the ability of migrants to be granted refugee status or, at the very
least, possibility of applying for it.
External factor of migration policy is not a new development; as far back as December
1998 a High-Level Working Group on Asylum and Immigration (HLWG) was created by the
General Affairs Council to create country specific Action Plans to control the growing influx of

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migrants by cooperating with and aiding the countries of origin of migrants, as well as the transit
states. Its main aims were two-fold, on the one hand it was meant to deal with the push factors in
the countries of origin, and its cross-pillar programmes were to include a wide range of
innovations from trade policy to development assistance. On the other hand, it would handle
immigration by increasing border controls. The Action Plans prepared by the HLWG were
fundamentally Eurocentric in the types of measures they offered. A number of critics observed
that in the Moroccan Action Plan, for example, out of 18 solutions proposed only one dealt with
developing the country of origin, while more than half dealt with suppressing and blocking
immigration (DGExPo 2006:6). This focus on the restrictive measures, rather than development,
will plague the externalisation of migration policy, favour the choice of short-term solutions in a
short-sighted manner and detrimentally affect the ability of migrants to claim asylum.
The Maastricht Treaty signed in 1992 gave the EU a coherent external dimension - the
Common Foreign and Security Policy as the third pillar of the Maastricht political infrastructure.
Although its priority was to ensure European security by restructuring Europe’s peripheral
environment through economic engagement, it also possessed a normative dimension, as
“Europe’s concern for good governance – also formed part of the security agenda in that it would
contribute towards domestic stability, thus minimising violent or destabilising spill-over effects
as far as Europe itself was concerned. It also partnered Europe’s desire, for Member States and
for the Union itself, for economic engagement for commercial purposes as well as a means of
building a common security agenda” (Joffé 2011:237). The Maastricht treaty codified the
securitisation of immigration by moving asylum and migration under the Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA) pillar (Chou 2009:546). From there on national civil servants were responsible for
dealing with asylum and immigration policy and they, thus, became the guardians of entry into
the EU. These developments have determined the way in which policy-making in migration
realm influences asylum seeking procedure and refugee protection:

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“since where you stand is influenced by where you sit, it seems natural that
these policy makers would be more likely to guard national interests and
defend national policy rather than to consider the situation in the countries
around the world, and the most appropriate policy Europe as a whole could
pursue in the interest of maintaining stability by guaranteeing protection to
refugees” (Van Selm 2005:10).
At the same time, new dialogue with non-EU countries of the Mediterranean basin was
initiated in order to promote peace, stability and prosperity. The vehicle through which this was
to be done was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), as was finalised at the Conference in
1995 in Barcelona. Fourteen Mediterranean partners and fifteen EU member states joined the
Barcelona Process. Cooperation on migration controls was one of the priorities of the dialogue.
Migration became an intergovernmental issue in 1997 with the signing of the Amsterdam
Treaty. The Amsterdam Treaty moved the issues of migration and asylum from the third to the
first pillar. Migration and asylum were always highly nationalised matters and Europeanization
of these issues was an important step as any changes adopted, such as externalisation were
harmonized vis-à-vis increased influence of EU institutions on the decision making process.
Transition period of five years saw EU member states sharing the legislative initiative with the
Commission, following that period the Commission gained monopoly over the decision making.
These developments marked a clear shift towards harmonized EU migration policy.
The Amsterdam Treaty established the areas of ‘freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ) for
the EU which emphasised that “free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the
prevention and combating of crime” (Treaty on European Union Art.2 as amended by the Treaty
of Amsterdam). Huysmans sees deepening securitisation in this development of (AFSJ):
“discourses and government technologies reifying immigrants, asylum-seekers, refugees and
foreigners as a dangerous challenge to society stability play a prominent role in connecting these
different issues’, facilitating the continued securitization of immigration” (2000:770).

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The first signs of securitisation of the immigration policy were becoming evident
complemented by the ideas of externalisation. The Amsterdam Treaty which entered into force
in 1999 mentioned externalisation, stating that EU members would engage in external migration
regulation in order to establish an area of freedom, security and justice within EU borders (Chou
2009:543). The European community removed the borders inside the EU and set out to
strengthen the borders of its periphery.
Treaty of Amsterdam brought in another important change, EC would be able to act as a
unitary and single actor in bi-lateral agreements with a third country as of 1999. Paoletti and
Pastore (2010) propose a term to describe cooperation between EU and third states or private
actors: ‘supralateral’5
relations.
The five-year Tampere programme 1999 was adopted in order to implement the
provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam in the area of asylum and immigration. The ‘external
dimension’ of EU migration policy has been formally accepted at the Special European Council
on Justice and Home Affairs which took place in Tampere in October 1999. The Presidency
Conclusions stated that immigration and asylum as part of the justice and home affairs issues
should be integrated into implementation of other EU policies and activities, including external
relations (Boswell 2003:620).
The goals of the Tampere programme, however, were more than honourable in regards to
asylum and protection of refugees, it was defined as:
“The first set of legally-binding EU-level agreements on
asylum; temporary protection for persons displaced by conflicts, a
common understanding of refugee status and subsidiary protection,
minimum procedural guarantees, minimum conditions for the reception of
asylum seekers and a regulation on deciding which Member State is
5
The term ‘supralateral’ will further be used in this dissertation to describe cooperation of the EU with a state or
private actor.

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responsible for assessing which asylum claim” (Migration Citizenship
Education 2011).
Tampere summit also concluded that EU member states were “committed to ensure the
absolute respect for the right to seek asylum by the full application of the Refugee Convention of
the UN (1951)” (Nazarski 2008:38). The main aspects of the Tampere Programme were: the
creation of a Common European Asylum System based on human rights, in particular the
Geneva Convention 1951 (Section II), the fair treatment of migrants (Section III), cooperation
with third countries on political, human rights and development issues (Section I), and increasing
the efficiency of the management of migration flows, including measures addressing illegal
immigration as part of a common return policy (Section IV) (Giuffre 2011:9).
In the meantime, cooperation with Third States on migration was becoming more and
more common, readmission agreements which will be discussed further in this dissertation were
becoming an inherent part of any cooperation treaty. At the Seville Council in 2002 Spanish
presidency even proposed penalising third counties that refused to collaborate on the issue of
migration by reducing their development assistance (DGExPo 2006:21).
Dublin Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 also known as Dublin II was signed in 2003. It
builds on the Dublin Agreement of the Former European Community (Dublin Convention)
signed in 1990. The objective of Dublin Regulation, as of Dublin Convention, is to decide which
country should deal with the asylum seeker after he or she lodges their asylum claim. It is a way
of disallowing ‘asylum shopping’, stopping the migrants from picking and choosing the most
favourable country to lodge their asylum claim or, indeed, lodging it in another state once a
Member State refuses them refugee status. However, the wish of migrants to lodge their claims
in one country rather that another is understandable even if they are genuine refugees. Denmark
and the Netherlands, for example, offer only a limited time span of protection for refugees from
the date of granting refugee status. This goes against UN 1951 Convention, which states that
refugee protection “should be limited only by the period of time during which protection is

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needed – something which is not known at the time at which asylum is requested” (Van Selm
2005:8). Many NGOs have criticised the Dublin convention as inherently unfair as it has been
put in place before complete harmonisation of migration laws in EU member states has been
achieved. Cases may result, in which a person entitled for international protection in one
Member State is not entitled to it in the state he or she is forced to apply in (Nazarski 2008:40).
Dublin Regulation, therefore, cannot function until total harmonisation of EU migration policies
has been achieved. The Parliament, in its resolution on the situation with refugee camps in Malta
in 2006, has also put the Dublin Convention in question stating that intolerable burden is placed
on the countries South and East of the EU where most migrants arrive.
In April 2004, the Council of the European Union adopted Council Directive 2004/83/EC
on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless
Persons as Refugees or as Persons who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content
of the Protection Granted (Qualification Directive). The Directive seeks to harmonize the refugee
procedures across the European Union; it establishes two different categories for those in need of
international protection: refugee status and subsidiary protection. The goal of the Directive is to
ensure minimal protection standards across all Member States and create common criteria for
identification of bona fide refugees. A scholarly debate followed with certain political scientists
welcoming the Directive as an instrument to raise and equalize the standards in the EU member
states, others stated that a downward pull will result in equalization: meaning that states which
had previously upheld higher standards of refugee protection in accordance to their international
obligations, are now keeping their standards to the required minimum (Nessel 2009:645-646).
The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and Amnesty International both asked in 2003
for the Qualification Directive to be improved as the proposal for it was “succumbing to the
lowest common denominator effect” (Brinkmann 2004:197).

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In addition the Qualification Directive introduced a list of “safe” third countries as a way of
reducing the number of refugees eligible for asylum in EU Member States. The list of safe
countries has a detrimental effect on the ability of migrants to claim asylum on individual basis.
Sanctions were introduced for private carriers that allow asylum seekers to board without the
required visa:
“Sanctioning private carriers for failing to adequately perform visa
inspections shifts the burden for determining who is in need of international
protection away from government officials, who are bound to uphold
international human rights laws and can be held accountable, onto private
individuals seeking to avoid monetary penalties. Such private individuals lack
the authority to grant protection and are untrained in refugee and asylum law”
(Nessel 2009:646-647).
The Hague Program was adopted at the Brussels European Council held in November 2004 and
was to operate in the period between 2005 and 2010. It had two important aims, one dealing with
harmonization of European migration policy with the final goal of creating common EU policy
on migration and asylum. The second phase of the Hague Program is directly related to the
question posed in this work as it deals with the external dimension of asylum and migration
(DGExPo 2006:5). The chapter in the Programme on the external dimension of asylum and
immigration describes the efforts that Member States are ready to devote to it. Security is placed
as the foremost issue and directly related to migration in general and externalisation of migration
policy in particular. It states that under the Hague Program, Member states will assist
cooperating third countries to “build border-control capacity, enhance document security and
tackle the problem of return” inter alia (EUR Lex 2006). One of the reasons has been the
increased number of tragic deaths which occurred of migrants trying to cross the sea to get to the
Southern shores of the EU. The other reason is the legislation prior to 2004 that mainly dealt

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with harmonization of EU policy within its borders and while that came to conclusion the
remaining issue which surfaced was keeping new migrants out (DGExPo 2006:6).
The Hague Program was, indeed, a large step towards ‘shared responsibility’ with
countries of origin and transit of migrants. It contains a “wide range of initiatives to build up a
“strong” return and readmission strategy” (Giuffre 2011:9). The cooperating countries would
not only be the places where certain border procedures, which were based in EU member states
prior, would take place but also these third countries will be held accountable for the success or
failure of stemming the immigration flow.
“In 2010, the existing tools of the Global Approach to Migration [adopted in 2005] were
increasingly applied globally to develop the external dimension of the EU's migration policy”
(European Commission 2011:11).
Lisbon Treaty has made the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) a core part of EU
legislation and as a primary Union Law it requires adherence to it for legislation to be considered
valid and legal, it is a “regional supranational instrument” reinforcing the protection of migrants
and asylum seekers in international and European law (Gil-Bazo 2008:33). Thus, Lisbon Treaty
gives more power to the ECJ to decide whether human rights are protected in creating and
adopting EU law according to CFR (Giuffre 2011:14). However, the CFR is not a treaty per se as
it has not been ratified by the Member states, so while CFR will have the legal value equal to
that of a treaty, “its relation with other international human rights instruments is not governed by
the Vienna Convention” (Gli-Bazo 2008:35).
While division of pillars is simplified vis-à-vis Lisbon Treaty provision, it will not
change the practises and decision-making procedures for EU asylum and immigration policy
which existed prior (Chou 2009: 554). “Lisbon Treaty brings asylum and immigration together
with all matters on policy cooperation and on civil and criminal law into a shared competence,
entitled ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (ASFJ) which was created by the Treaty of

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Amsterdam and constitutes now the Title V of Part III of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
EU (TFEU) (Article 67-89)” (Giuffre 2011:10).
Adopted in 2009, the Stockholm Programme 2010-14 opens up new possibilities for the
EU as a single actor in the international forum in the security issues, including migration (Monar
2010:24). Supralateral relations are becoming more and more common in migration and asylum
field.
The Stockholm programme also discusses a very important instrument used in the
externalisation of migration policy, it “portrays the readmission agreements as a building block
in EU migration management” (Giuffre 2011:12).
Readmission agreements – forced cooperation.
‘Readmission agreements’ were the first common-action instruments to be proposed by Member
States under European Community Law succeeding Treaty of Amsterdam which brought
migration and asylum issues under the control of the European community. The readmission
agreements are defined as:
“bi-lateral or multi-lateral treaties setting standards and procedures
indicating how return of irregular migrants is to be conducted. They
generally concern the return of own nationals or third country
nationals, means of establishing nationality, time limits for requests
for readmission, transit arrangements, exchange of personal data, costs
of transport” (Giuffre 2011:10).
The term ‘readmission’ is not used, however, in either Treaty establishing the European
Community (TEC) or the Treaty on the EU (TEU), therefore, Billet argues: “the competence to
conclude readmission agreements could be derived from a broad interpretation of the term

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‘repatriation’, which is meant to include also the readmission of migrants to transit countries”
(Billet 2010:60).
The 2002 European Council, in its Return Action Programme, defined return as “the
process of going back to one’s country of origin, transit, or another third country, including
preparation and implementation. It may be voluntary or enforced” (UNHCR Refworld 2002).
Readmission, on the other hand, is defined as “the act by a state accepting the re-entry of an
individual (own national, third country national, or stateless person) who has been found illegally
entering to, being present in, or residing in another state” (Giuffre 2011:2). In April 2002 the
Commission issued a Green Paper on return policy, which discussed the forced and assisted
repatriation of persons residing illegally in the European Union.
The Seville Council which took place in June 2002 saw the birth of the clause on the
compulsory inclusion of readmission agreements into any future cooperation with non-EU
countries (DGExPo 2006:7).
All readmission agreements reference Human Rights Conventions and contain non-
affection clauses6
but prior to 2005 no conventions were named explicitly, thus making the non-
affection clauses weak in nature. Only since the readmission agreement with Albania was signed
in 2005, are the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees, 1967 Protocol and
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms inter alia are mentioned
specifically (Billet 2010:72).
The case study which follows discusses externalisation cooperation and techniques on an
example of two countries, namely Italy and Libya and the effect of these practises on the asylum
seekers ability to seek protection in EU member states.
6
Non-affection clauses regulate the dominance of the agreement and other international obligations according to
international law, including the importance of human rights protection.

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II - Case Study: Italy – Libya relations
“…Italy is keen to ‘push’ back the immigration line through the planned ‘reception’ and
transit processing centres in the desert”
(Turner, Rincon and Sorensen in Sorensen 2006:92).
Italy and Libya relations have been ones of the most condemned for human rights
violations, not observing the non-refoulement principle and denying right to asylum, they have
also been ones of the most successful in stemming the migration flow through externalisation of
migration policy.
As a result of its geographical position, Italy has become a bridge between Europe and
Africa, Italy “is more exposed and vulnerable than other countries to any critical developments
in the political and economic situation of this area, so it is understandable that it occupies an
increasingly important position in Italian foreign policy” (Coraluzzo 2008:115). Italy possesses
7600 kilometres of coastline, and its islands of Sicily and Lampedusa are the main arrival points
for the African migrants attempting to enter EU by sea routes. Lampedusa, being conveniently
located just two hundred kilometres south of Sicily and three hundred kilometres north of Libya,
has become the main docking port for boats from Libya and Tunisia starting from the early 00s.
Emigration is not a new phenomenon for Italy, between 1865 and 1973, more than 25
million Italians left the country to work abroad, immigration, on the other hand, is quite a recent
development. Only in 1990 was the first piece of legislation, Martelli law dealing with migration,
passed. It aimed to attract attention of EU member states to Italy’s growing problem with
migrants and asked for certain ‘burden-sharing’ practices to be adopted (Turner, Rincon and
Sorensen in Sorensen 2006:88-89).
All EU member states of the Mediterranean basin have adopted a ‘pro-active diplomacy’
towards the Maghreb countries in order to share the burden of migration flows, France, Italy and

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Spain have been encouraging the European Union to cooperate with North African states while
concluding bi-lateral agreements on the issue of immigration and asylum. In 2003, during its
presidency, Italy presented a Programme of Measures to Combat Illegal Migration which
offered “police cooperation (including readmission agreements); reinforced border control; the
joint management of economic migration coupled with increased development aid” (Cassarino
2007:191) as possible solutions to migration issue.
In this chapter Italian choice of Libya as a partner for cooperation on externalization of
immigration policy is discussed and the effects of Italian-Libyan relations on asylum seekers and
their ability to gain protection in the EU are analysed.
Methodology
Inadequacy of statistics due to the informality and lack of transparency in agreements and
cooperation between Libya and Italy prevent us from being able to carry out accurate
quantitative analysis. Transparency is lacking in statistics presented by FRONTEX and by
governments of states involved in externalisation practises. The question posed by this
dissertation cannot be answered solely by the use of statistical data. Therefore, observation,
surveys and logical analysis of treaties and actions of the states mentioned in this case study,
namely Italy and Libya, become equally valuable in answering the question.
As the lack of statistical data prevents us from testing the hypothesis by purely
quantitative means, qualitative analysis is used to discuss effects of externalisation on asylum
seeking procedure taking into account the choice of cooperation partners by EU member states,
the agreements between Italy and Libya will be analysed and finally, the adherence of both
countries to the international human rights accords signed by them will be discussed with special
attention paid to the non-refoulement principle.

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This dissertation uses information from a number of surveys carried out by UNHCR and
Amnesty International and field research undertaken by political scientists such as Andrijasevic
working on the topic.
Statistics regarding the effect of externalisation policies on the number of refugees being
able to enter and claim asylum in the EU member states simply do not exist. However, we can
deduce the effects of border control mechanisms used in externalisation on the number of
refugees turned away from EU borders: FRONTEX water patrols, push backs, sanctions on
carriers and detention centres based in transit and countries of origin of migrants have all had a
measurable effect. This dissertation will use compiled data from FRONTEX annual risk reports
and Asylum application and first instance decisions data (EUROSTAT) in order to discover
trends in refugee entries to the EU in the period from 2008-2010 and influence which
externalisation policies had on these trends.
This dissertation, therefore, uses a mixture of quantitative and qualitative research
methods to answer the question posed, i.e. what effect does externalisation of immigration policy
have on the ability of migrants to lodge an asylum claim in one of the EU member states.
Choice of partner for cooperation on externalisation and type of agreements
concluded.
The choice of country to cooperate with on externalisation policy depends on a number
of things. Firstly, its proximate position to the peripheral borders of the EU is of utmost
importance, secondly, its wish to cooperate with the European Union. If the country wants to
join the EU in the long run, it makes the cooperation easier, if it does not, it will usually require
payment in order to take part in externalisation. However, externalisation practises, in theory,
must work according to the international human rights agreements and European Union’s

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fundamental principle, that of the protection of human rights and freedoms. In order for human
rights of refugees to be protected a number of characteristics must be present in the cooperating
third state. Libya is analysed as a suitable partner for stemming illegal migration flow while
allowing human rights of refugees to be protected.
2.1 Cooperation with a pariah state
Italian colonial past in Libyan regions of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica from 1911 to 1947,
as well as geographical position of Libya made the two countries likely partners. In the mid-90s,
Libya was still a pariah state with embargos from both US and Europe. However, Italy initiated
dialogues to integrate Libya back into the international community on the initiative of the first
Prodi government as far back as 1996 while formally not violating the international sanctions
against Libya over the Lockerbie case (Coraluzzo 2008:121). Italo-Libyan Commission was
established in 1997 and resumed diplomatic relations between Italy and Libya. Result of the
Commission’s work was an agreement signed on the 4th
of July 1998 by Foreign Minister Omar
al-Miuntasser and Lamberto Dini; “a historic joint document expressing Italian regret for the
suffering experienced by the Libyan people under colonialism and fascism” (Coraluzzo
2008:121).
Relations of Libya with Europe and the US improved slightly only a year later, following
its cooperation on the Lockerbie case in April 1999 which included the bombing of the Pan Am
flight 103 in 1988 over Scotland, Gaddafi handed over two suspected terrorists to the Scottish
tribunal set up in Holland. The release of five Bulgarian nurses which have been sentenced to
death for allegedly infecting children with HIV/AIDS was another step to making peace with the
international community. Further, cooperation of Libya with the US on the ‘war against terror’
and its disclosure of weapons programs in 2003 have led to further thawing of relations between
Libya and the west (Human Rights Watch 2006:11).

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Already in 2000, four years before the EU lengthy arms embargo was lifted, Italy and
Libya signed a cooperation treaty related to combating drugs, terrorism, organised crime and
undocumented migration. In 2004, the European Council finally removed “the restrictive
measures adopted by the EU in compliance with UN Resolutions 1992 and 1993, and remove[d]
the embargo on selling arms to Libya” (Coraluzzo 2008:123), this decision was welcomed by
Italy, which campaigned for reinforcing cooperation with Libya in the battle against illegal
immigration.
Still, it must be stated, that Libya to this day has no contractual relations with the EU,
which could be used as basis for cooperation on migration. It is not part of Barcelona process of
1999 and is not on the list of countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy which
makes it a strange choice of partner (DGExPo 2006:17). It also is not a signatory of the 1951 UN
Convention or the 1967 Protocol; therefore, it has little obligations in front of the international
community in regards to refugee rights protection.
While detention centres exist in Libya, refugee determination procedure does not take
place there. Libyan authorities have stated that the migrants can receive refugee status by making
a claim to Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the General People’s Congress in Libya or to a Libyan
embassy if they are abroad (Human Rights Watch 2006:20). However, no law establishing such
procedure exists and many migrants, who have made it to Europe and have been interviewed by
the Human Rights Watch or UNHCR, have stated that they do not attempt making a claim in
Libya as they feel it does not provide protection.
Libya also refuses to introduce asylum law or procedures and although there is a UNHCR
office in Tripoli, the government does not cooperate with it formally as it refused to sign an
Accord de Siège or Memorandum of Understanding with the agency (Human Rights Watch
2006:24). The UNHCR office grants “mandate status” and issues letters of attestation to those it
finds eligible for refugee status under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol but Libyan

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authorities still subject letter-holders to arrest and deportation. Libyan government does not
differentiate officially between refugees, asylum seekers, and irregular migrants, therefore,
UNHCR letters are not recognised by them. UNHCR continues to register refugees in Tripoli,
“as of July 31, 2009, UNHCR Tripoli has registered 8,506 mandate refugees, of whom 3,635
were Palestinian long-term residents in Libya and 2,653 were Iraqis. The rest included 781
Sudanese, 597 Somalis, 451 Eritreans, 144 Liberians, and 245 others” (Human Rights Watch
2009:51).
Only in 2008, UNHCR was granted more access to detention centres by the Libyan
government following formalisation of relations with a Libyan NGO, the International
Organization for Peace, Care and Relief (IOPCR). However, according to migrants interviewed
by Human Rights Watch, only detention centres in Misrata are visited by UNHCR and its partner
NGOs (2009:48).
More than 20 Non-governmental organisations have called upon Italy and the EU not to
cooperate with Libya, stating that “ratification and the implementation of the international
conventions guaranteeing human rights protection, such as the Geneva Convention (…) are, in
this respect, an essential prerequisite” (DGExPo 2006:18). However, Libya refused to sign the
Geneva Convention or the Protocol and the cooperation continued nonetheless.
The reality demonstrates that the countries chosen for cooperation on migration issues are
not chosen based on their “capacity to allow access and protection for refugees, but because of
their geographical position and their ability to act as a buffer and protect Europe from the
undesirables” (DGExPo 2006:16). Unfortunately, choosing a cooperation partner with a
totalitarian government while effective at first might have unwelcome consequences as chapter
three of this dissertation will explore in more detail.

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2.2 Basing cooperation on material incentives or the hypocritical Pan-Africanism
Another important factor is for a third state to have an incentive to cooperate in
externalisation policy of the EU. For some new Eastern members of the EU, the base for
cooperation was a promise of their future EU membership. They were ready and willing to take
part in externalisation practises and guard the EU frontiers from unwanted migrants. For Libya
there was never a possibility of becoming an EU member, therefore the incentives for
cooperation were mostly material in the form of pay outs by Italy. However, while accepting the
pay outs, Gaddafi’s government has not always showed willingness to control migration flows.
Most of the time the expulsions of migrants seemed hypocritical, as Colonel Gaddafi continued
propagandising Pan-Africanism and inviting Sub-Saharan migrants to work in Libya at the same
time.
Although Libya was portrayed as a transit country in the EU, before the Arab Spring
swept Maghreb many migrants considered it their final destination, not ready to risk the
dangerous sea journey, jobs in Libya for Sub-Saharan Africans were in abundance. Following
the 1992 UN embargo and the deterioration of the relationship between Libya and the
neighbouring Arab states Gaddafi opened the door to Sub-Saharan migrants, “the CEN-SAD
(Community of Sahelian-Saharan States) was created with the aim of suppressing all obstacles to
African unity and, in particular, authorized the free circulation of persons” (CARIM 2011:13). It
was also linked to the pan-African solidarity which Colonel Gaddafi started to propagandise in
1998 abandoning the Pan-Arabism in its favour. ‘Africa for Africans’ has become an oft-used
slogan in his speeches. In Sirte on the 9th
of September 1999, Gaddafi even voiced a vision for
the creation of ‘United States of Africa’, with a single army, currency and powerful leadership
(Paoletti 2011:221). Therefore, the cooperation to block migration into the EU and the
deportations of migrants from Libya seem less than sincere. In both 2004 and 2005, while mass
expulsions of African migrants were carried out in Libya, Gaddafi continued to state that

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“enormous Libyan projects necessitate a significant labour force from Africa” and “Libya is a
country belonging to all Africans” (Paoletti and Pastore 2010:10). Libyan government has taken
restrictive measures only in 2007, seemingly due to the pressure from the EU, and after many
years of welcoming Sub-Saharan workers it introduced visas for both Arabs and Africans and
enforced normative rules regarding labour and length of stay for guest workers, thus rendering a
large number of immigrants ‘illegal’(CARIM 2011:1). Still, the number of foreign nationals
living in Libya in the end of 2010 was estimated by the IOM to be 2.5 million, including “1
million Egyptians, 80,000 Pakistanis, 59,000 Sudanese, 63,000 Bangladeshis, 26,000 Filipinos,
10,500 Vietnamese and ‘a large population of Sub-Saharan Africans mainly from Niger, Chad,
Mali, Nigeria and Ghana’” (CARIM 2011:2).
The ‘Shared Responsibility’ pressure of the EU on Libya caused Gaddafi to adopt
drastic measures in dealing with immigrants. In the period 2003-2005 Libya deported around
140, 000 individuals to their countries of origin (Human Rights Watch 2006:52). Gaddafi did not
create centres for asylum seekers to make their claim but went a simpler route of expulsion, as
European Commission Mission stated in its report in 2004 “[T]he decision to return illegal
immigrants to their country of origin seems to be taken for groups of nationalities rather than
after having examined individual cases in detail” (Human Rights Watch 2006:52). No
determination procedure existed, simply when EU exerted more pressure on the Libyan
government to act in accordance to its obligations, Gaddafi ordered expulsions based on a similar
to ‘safe country of origin’ practise. Stemming the illegal flow of migrants seems as undesired by
Libyan government as allowing migrants to make a claim for refugee status. Therefore, the effect
of basing cooperation solely upon material incentives, without any checks or controls on the
actions of the third state, can be identified as negative for refugee human rights.
2.3 Informality of the agreements.

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None of the agreements between Libya and Italy have been made public, Italian
government has stated that disclosing the agreements would diminish their “success of
countering smuggling and trafficking networks responsible for organizing and profiting from
irregular migration from Libya into Italy” (Andrijasevic 2006:40). Yet for that very reason of
informality and lack of transparency, neither human right NGOs nor intergovernmental
organisations could have evaluated the accords.
An informal agreement has been signed between Italy and Libya in 2003, although the
contents of the pact have not been made public or submitted to the Italian Government for
approval, joint activities to control the migration flow have been undertaken since then
(Lutterbeck 2009:172). In 2003 alone, Italian government has spent EUR 5.5 million on
cooperation with Libya (Human Rights Watch 2006:101-102). Italian experts trained Libyan
police officers and a number of immigrant detention centres has been constructed in Libya with
Italian funding. Since 2003, Italy has been funding charter flights for the return of undocumented
immigrants from Libya to their countries of origin (Human Rights Watch 2006:102). Several
pilot schemes of interception at sea among them Ulysses, Triton and Neptune have been
conducted in 2003 and 2004 with cooperation of several EU Member states.
In 2005 Italian Minister of the Interior announced that Libya and Italy have reached yet
another “verbal agreement” to share responsibility for controlling undocumented migration and
in 2007 a pact was made by Italy and Libya to establish joint naval patrols along Libyan coast
(Lutterbeck 2009:172). Monitoring the participating states remains difficult. The problem of
accountability exists within readmission agreements, especially if those agreements are verbal
and informal, such as the agreements between Italy and Libya. This adds to the number of
concerns regarding the respect for the human rights according to European and international law,
and certainly, for the rights of people in need of protection (Cassarino 2007).

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In August 2008 Italy signed a Friendship pact with Libya, ‘The Treaty of Friendship,
Partnership and Cooperation between the Italian Republic and Great Socialist People’s Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya’. With this pact Italy agreed to pay $ 5 billion over the span of 20 years in
acknowledgement of deep wounds resulting from the Italian colonisation in Libya. The pact inter
alia called for increased cooperation in “fighting terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and
illegal immigration” (Human Rights Watch 2009:7). Both sides proclaimed that they would
respect ‘international legality’ and ‘the centrality of the United Nations’ (Paoletti and Pastore
2010:13). However, expulsions soon followed, in 2009 the practise of joint patrols and push
backs were initiated. The 2008 Friendship Pact between Italian republic and Great Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, only solidified the years of cooperation already existing on the
issue of migration control. The $5 billion compensation for the abuses committed during Italy’s
rule over Libya 1911-1943 was, described as an “investment” to stop irregular migration by a
Human Rights Watch report (2009:24).
2.4 Adherence to the international human rights accords signed by partners cooperating on
externalisation of migration.
If externalisation of immigration policy is to work in accordance with the international
treaties protecting the rights of refugees, both partners cooperating on the externalisation must
adhere to the international human rights accords which they have previously signed. This chapter
analyses the actions of both Italy and Libya in respect to international law and human rights
treaties which, in theory, should be respected. Expulsions from Lampedusa are discussed,
followed by a discussion of non-refoulement principle in relation to the push backs to Libya of
the boats intercepted in the Sicily channel.
Expulsions: Very few expulsions from Lampedusa seem to adhere to Italian and
international law regarding the safeguards which must be met such as legal counsel, interpreters,

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information to the persons to be expelled in the language they can understand and making them
aware of their right to appeal (Human rights Watch 2006:114). The determination of those
eligible for asylum is carried out on national rather than individual grounds, where Maghreb
nationals are expelled, while sub-Saharan Africans are transported to other centres in Italy where
they can, in theory, make their asylum claim. However, in reality, many Sub-Saharan migrants
are being expelled as well as North African citizens.
The European Parliament has adopted a resolution on Lampedusa in April 2005 in which
it strongly condemned the cooperation between Italy and Libya, stating that Libya practises
arbitrary arrest, detention and expulsion of migrants. The resolution also condemned the living
conditions, the determination process and the refusal of Italian government to allow UNHCR
access to the Lampedusa detention centre in March 2005 (EP 2005b). Ten NGOs called for the
European Commission to sanction Italy for: a) “Violation of the right of defence and of all
parties to be heard and hence the right to asylum as recognised by the Amsterdam treaty” and b)
“Violation of the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment provided for in
article 4 of the European Charter of fundamental rights and article 3 of the European convention
for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (Andrijasevic 2006:38). The
CPTAs were denounced by a number of NGOs for the inadequacy of information provided to
migrants about the possibility of lodging an asylum claim and failure to carry out individual
examination on case-by-case basis through in-depth interviews prior to expulsion. Access to an
interpreter is often denied and determination procedure is often conducted on the basis of
migrant’s skin colour and facial characteristics (Andrijasevic 2009:152). The resolution on
Lampedusa also stated that the EU sees no avenues for cooperating with Libya on migration
management as it is not part of the Barcelona process.
The European Parliament declared that “Italian authorities have failed to meet their
international obligations by not ensuring that the lives of the people expelled by them are not

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threatened in the countries of origin” (European Parliament 2005b). The accusations were
answered by Pisanu, the Interior Minister, who replied that expulsions were carried out in
accordance with international and Italian law based on the informal agreement with Libya
(Cassarino 2007:193-194). However, it must be stated that while vocally condemning the
cooperation of Italy and Libya, EU was doing little to stop it. In the same year another, more
conciliatory message was sent by the European Parliament to Libya, head of the delegation to
Libya, Simon Busuttil stated “We want to send the Libyan authorities a very specific message:
we are not here to point the finger at them or to ask them to police Europe’s borders. We are here
to seek cooperation on a common problem” (European Parliament 2005). In July 2009, four
years after the Resolution on Lampedusa, Jacques Barrot, the Vice-President of the European
Commission, stated in an interview with radio station Europe 1 that “he would very shortly
suggest to Libya that it open reception offices for people seeking political asylum” (ECRE
2009).
Non-Refoulement: prescribes broadly that no refugee should be returned in any manner
whatsoever to any country where he or she would be at risk of persecution. It is a principle oft
quoted in international refugee law and it has the most direct effect on asylum seekers possibility
to enter and then lodge a claim in one of EU member states.
Italy is a signatory to 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees which forbids
refoulement. However, in July 2003 Italy has issued a decree which enabled the Italian navy to
intercept and push back the ships carrying migrants as well as asylum seekers. In Italy it is the
Guardia di Finanza (customs police) rather than the coastguards which are responsible for
intercepting the boats, the agencies priority is to tackle smuggling rather than to rescue or
determine which migrants are eligible for refugee status (Human Rights Watch 2006:113). On
the 6th
of May 2009, Italy became the first post-World War II state to “forcibly return boat

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migrants on the high seas without doing any screening whatsoever to determine whether any
passengers needed protection or were particularly vulnerable” (Human Rights Watch 2009:4).
The Italian government uses the term “respingimento” (push back) in order to avoid the
term “espulsione” which would require a district judge to validate each expulsion. The collective
expulsions were also classed as refusal of entry (respingimento alla frontiera) rather than
expulsion, thus, invoking Article 10 of Law 189/2002 the Italian authorities are able to render
legal its actions as “expulsion needs to be decided by the judge and prohibits entry into Italy for
ten years while a refusal of entry is an administrative measure that does not ban the migrant form
entering the Italian territory in the future” (Andrijasevic 2009:155). Italian government tries to
argue that the push backs taking place on high seas without determination procedure are allowed,
which is inherently flawed as the Convention does not make a distinction from where the
migrants are returned but to where “places where their lives or freedom would be threatened on
account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion” (Human Rights Watch 2009:28).
UNHCR issued a statement in 2009, conveying its concerns over the effect that push
backs were having on ability of migrants to apply for asylum, it stated that Italy’s policy “in the
absence of adequate safeguards, can prevent access to asylum and undermines the principle of
non-refoulement” (UNHCR 2009). European Parliament has taken an ambiguous stand on the
matter of push backs and expulsions, in the Debates in Strasbourg Simon Busuttil stated that
while Italian Government has been criticised for promptly returning arriving migrants to Libya,
it will deter migrants from taking the dangerous journey across the Mediterranean and also
positively affect the human trafficking problem. Therefore, while human rights of migrants
should, certainly, be respected, the return system brings the end to the tragic deaths in the
Sicilian channel one step closer (European Parliament 2010).

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Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention or the 1967 Protocol, however, the
refoulement of refugees, goes not only against certain international laws to which Libya is party
but against Libyan law itself; Libya’s Constitutional Proclamation from 1969 forbids extradition
of refugees, furthermore Law 20 of 1991 ‘On Enhancing Freedom’ states that Libya “supports
the oppressed and the defenders on the road to freedom and they should not abandon the
refugees and their protection” (Human Rights Watch 2006:3).
Libya is also a signatory to the Convention against Torture, ratified in 1989 and the OAU
Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa of 1969 (African
Refugee Convention), which expands upon the 1951 UN Convention on the definition of
refugee. African Refugee Convention widens the definition of refugee of that of 1951
Convention by including not only those that possess a “well-founded fear of being prosecuted”
but also the people who flee “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country” (1969:2). Article 2(3)
of the African Refugee Convention speaks of the obligation of non-refoulement: “No person
shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or
expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical
integrity or liberty would be threatened”. Article 3 of the Convention against Torture states that
“No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”
(Convention Against Torture 1984).
Libya is also obliged to observe the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), which in article 13 explicitly forbids arbitrary expulsion, and entitles migrants to an
individual decision on their expulsion (Human Rights Watch 2010). The Green Charter for
Human Rights of the Jamahiriyan Era adopted in June 1988 also bears a constitutional status in
Libya and calls for the respect and protection of human rights. Libyan government repeatedly
stated that International conventions and treaties signed by Libya take precedence over domestic

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legislation, with the exception of legislation which stems from shari’a law (Human Rights Watch
2006:85). However, there is no proof that this is the case especially when human rights treaties
are concerned.
Furthermore, the duty to aid those who are in danger at sea is an ancient maritime
obligation. Pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea of 1974 (SOLAS), the International Convention on
Maritime Search and Rescue of 1979 (SAR), and the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, there is
an explicit obligation to rescue persons in peril on the high seas. The immigration status of the
persons in danger plays no role, as does the number of persons at risk, or their mode of travel.
The shipmaster is responsible for the initial rescue. And although the duty to rescue is clear, it is
significantly less clear what duties are owed from that point on. Once the initial rescue has
occurred, international law is silent as to any ongoing obligation owed by the shipmaster (Nessel
2009:632). However, push backs of people in danger back to Maghreb could be qualified as in
violation of the aforementioned laws.
Finally, Gaddafi has recognised the importance of migration for the EU and Italy and this
has given him a weapon to use against the European Union. If he required more pay outs, money
was given, if he refused to sign the UN 1951 Convention, it was accepted. The dire
consequences of this will be discussed in more detail in chapter three.
2.5 Effect of externalisation policy and border control mechanisms on the number of
refugee entries into the EU
Even with a general lack of statistical data on migration, one claim is quantitatively
testable. A common claim for countries involved in externalisation, especially if they are using
restrictive control mechanisms, is that they mostly affect the illegal entry of economic migrants.
This logic has been used by a number of governments when they did not carry our screening

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procedures on intercepted ships or before deportations and expulsions. Both Silvio Berlusconi
and the Minister of the Interior, Maroni have stated on a number of occasions that there are no
refugees on the boats arriving in Lampedusa from Africa but simply economic migrants that can
be and should be returned to the African shores. Just as Italy has done, Libya declared that all the
migrants it deports are economic migrants and do not require protection. In 2005 in an interview
with Human Rights Watch Sa’id Eribi Hafiana, Assistant Secretary of Foreign Liaison and
International Cooperation, stated “We do not have political refugees… the problem is Africans
who came in the framework of illegal immigration” (Human Rights Watch 2006:15). According
to UNHCR, there are, in fact, political refugees in Libya. In July 2004 Libya deported around
100 Eritreans which have been apprehended by the Eritrean government on arrival and held in
incommunicado detention (Amnesty International 2006). A refugee interviewed by the Human
Rights Watch in 2004 stated that a number of deportees were members of the Eritrean opposition
groups working from Sudan (Human Rights Watch 2006:58). Later that year a group of deported
Eritreans has hijacked a plane and landed it in Sudan where UNHCR recognised sixty of the
seventy-five deportees eligible for refugee status (Human Rights Watch 2006:3). A number of
detainees were also found to be Liberian by Human Rights Watch visiting the al-Fellah detention
centre, although Libyan authorities stated on numerous occasions that they would not deport
Liberians or Somalis (Human Rights Watch 2006:58). Deportation of true refugees is not
uncommon for both Italy and Libya. For our research on control and migration blocking
mechanisms, the important issue, therefore, is to determine the presence of bona fide refugees on
board of the intercepted ships, the effect of externalisation procedures on them and if the need
for determination procedures exists?
While the statements by Italian politicians paint one picture, the statistical data paints
another. Italy has quite a high rate of positive decisions on asylum applications. In fact,
aggregate data of positive decisions for asylum applications (Table 1) from a number of

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EUROSTAT reports shows that rate of recognition for refugees and protection on humanitarian
grounds to be relatively stable.
Year
Total applications
for asylum
Positive decisions at
first instance
Rate of Recognition
2008 20,225 9,740 48.16%
2009 22,000 8,440 38.36%
2010 11,325 4,305 38.01%
Table 1 Data compiled from EUROSTAT reports: Asylum applicants and First Instance decisions
on Asylum applications (2011, 2010, 2009)
Furthermore, Trapani district of Sicily, which encompasses the Island of Lampedusa, had
a 78 percent approval rate for those claims submitted in the period from January to August 2008
(Human Rights Watch 2009:11). This demonstrates that the claims lodged by those who arrived
by sea route had a higher percentage of refugees present among them.
Therefore, one can assume that there is a stable percentage of, at least, circa 38% of bona
fide refugees out of the total amount of migrants which make a claim.
FRONTEX and Sea Patrols 2008-2010:
The need to control European borders is very contemporary, while the outer borders of
the EU were fortified starting in 1992, the first elements of EU border management model were
only laid out in the Council of the European Union’s Plan for the management of the external
borders adopted on 14th
of June 2002 (Jeandesboz 2008:2). The securitisation of the migration
issue had a direct effect on the control of borders, which was enhanced vis-à-vis the use of
biometric and fingerprinting equipment, and by strengthening maritime surveillance with the
creation of agencies such as FRONTEX and expansion of their mandate and budget, the latter

36. 36 | P a g e
exponentially from 6 million Euros in 2005 to just under 90 million Euros in 2009 and 2010
(Taylor Nicholson 2011:6). FRONTEX was created in 2004 as defined by Regulation No.
2007/2004: “European agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external
borders of the Member States of the European Union” (Jeandesboz 2008:3). The agency is
dominated by ‘seconded national experts’, thus, once again, the national rather than humanitarian
interests are placed first. Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) were created by the
European Council Regulation EC No 863/2007.
EU Commission’s evaluation of the activities of FRONTEX for the years 2005-07
focuses solely on the technical issues, not taking into consideration the effects it has on
fundamental rights and freedoms of migrants, some of which could be refugees according to
international law. FRONTEX mandate does not contain an explicit reference to the respect of the
principle of non-refoulement. Although by definition, FRONTEX constitutes a part of the first
pillar of the EU, thus it is a Community body, and is responsible not only for adhering to the
fundamental values of the EU but also for expanding their reach as necessary (Jeandesboz
2008:15). Commission’s evaluation concluded, that ‘support for return operations’ is an effective
tool and well executed by FRONTEX. Therefore, FRONTEX remains a solely technical support
for EU Member states in their national pushback operations. So while the funding for
FRONTEX is increasing, the identification procedure is lacking in many pushback cases and
migrants are often denied “the possibility of lodging an asylum application except if the
interception took place beyond the territorial waters of those states” (Jeandesboz 2008:15).
In 2009, on June 18th
, for the first time FRONTEX operation has resulted in a push back
of migrants to Libya, in an operation entitled Nautilus IV (Human Rights Watch 2009:37). The
yearly statistics used in this dissertation refer to the three years following the 2008 Italy-Libya
friendship agreement and the first instances of push backs, while 2011 is not taken into account
as the revolutions in the Maghreb region and the wave of migrants that resulted from it distort
the picture. Statistics are available from the annual Risk Analysis report released by FRONTEX

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in 2011. The decrease in the amounts of detentions at the border of EU states due to push backs
and patrolling of the high seas by FRONTEX is shown in Figure 1.
7
While the number of entries by land remains roughly constant, the number of entries by
sea in 2010 fell by 73,200 entries from that in 2008. This is due inter alia to more stringent
controls by FRONTEX push backs and other externalisation practises. FRONTEX does not
conduct screening procedures on board of ships which it intercepts at seas, therefore, as we have
proven earlier the stable percentage of bona fide refugees present among the economic migrants
is also sent back to third states, which goes against the international human right accords to
which EU member states are signatory.
7
Fig. 1 Data taken from the FRONTEX Annual Risk Analysis (2011)
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
2008
Q1
2008
Q2
2008
Q3
2008
Q4
2009
Q1
2009
Q2
2009
Q3
2009
Q4
2010
Q1
2010
Q2
2010
Q3
2010
Q4
D
e
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
Quarterly detection of illegal border crossings by
land and sea.
Land
Sea

38. 38 | P a g e
Table 2 shows the possible number of bona fide refugees present on intercepted ships
derived from the stable percentage of refugees present among asylum applicants.
Year
Total illegal
entries
detected
Entries
by sea
Entries
by
land
Percentage of
proven bona
fide refugees
bona fide
refugee
entries by
sea
bona fide
refugee
entries by land
2008 157500 82500 75000 48.00% 39600 36000
2009 104000 43500 60500 38.00% 16530 22990
2010 104800 9300 95500 38.00% 3534 36290
Table 2
Using cross tab analysis we can construct a graph of the effect of new coordinated sea
patrols following the Italy-Libya pact of 2007 and FRONTEX push backs of 2008 on the number
of possible bona fide refugees turned away from the EU border. Fig. 2 is a constructed graph
which shows the correlation of the decrease in the illegal entries by sea routes and the number of
refugees possibly turned away without the chance of lodging an asylum claim and gaining
protection in one of the EU member states.
Fig. 2
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
number of bona fide
refugee possibly turned
away due to new sea
patrols as part of
externalisation techniques
illegal entries detected by
sea routes

39. 39 | P a g e
We can assume that the decrease of migrants entering the EU has caused a similar
decrease in the ability of refugees to enter EU member states and seek protection. Therefore, the
externalisation policies and new border controls such as FRONTEX have a blocking effect on all
types of migration including that of refugees.
Lack of transparency is another problem which has an effect on the ability of migrants to
seek protection and asylum. Pushbacks of boats arriving to Spain from Mauritania and Senegal
were based on the bi-lateral agreements which have not been released to the public. Same goes
for the informal agreements between Libya and Italy. Therefore, FRONTEX has not only failed
to protect possible refugees on board of those ships but also participated in practises of secrecy,
which goes against fundamental values of the European Union (Jeandesboz 2008:16).
In fact, the condemned politics of Italian government had the required result. Arrivals to
Italy from Libya according to the Ministero dell’Interno fell by 90%, “between 5 May and 31
December 2009 3,185 migrants landed on Italian coasts, compared with 31,281 over the same
period in 2008” (Paoletti and Pastore 2011:4). However, as this chapter demonstrated, for the
asylum seekers the success rate of Italian government could prove detrimental in achieving
protection with the doors to EU firmly sealed. Italy-Libya situation, in fact, demonstrates a
central problem of such successful control mechanisms, instead of reducing the number of
migrants with valid claims for refugee status through developing the countries of origin, the
cooperation simply keeps them in “suspension, often in countries in which their rights may not
be protected. In this way, they may expose migrants and asylum seekers to further danger and
human rights violations, and offer fewer avenues for redress “ (Taylor Nicholson 2011:2).
III - Arab Spring swept Maghreb, migrant weapons
In 2011 the situation in Libya changed drastically. The wave of revolutions sweeping the
Maghreb states has reached Libya, protesters against Colonel Gaddafi’s longstanding totalitarian

40. 40 | P a g e
regime took to the streets and the armed forces loyal to the government responded with violence.
The country descended into political turmoil. The agreements and cooperation on migration
between the two sides of the Mediterranean were suspended and FRONTEX operation Hermes
2011 was in full swing to protect the borders of the EU from illegal migrants (CARIM 2011:9).
The extraterritorial immigration controls that EU member states had in place in the south were
tested to the max and many were proving useless to stop the wave of migrants coming from the
violence-stricken Libya. By late March 2011, more than 25,000 people had arrived by boat on
the Italian island of Lampedusa. This caused a number of EU governments, especially France, to
call for reestablishment of EU’s internal borders to deal with the migrant influx. The Danish
centre-right government, Prime Minister Lars Loekke Rasmussen’s coalition, went as far as
closing its borders with Germany and Sweden and reintroducing stringent checks at its frontiers
(The New York Times 2011).
This dissertation demonstrates that the externalisation practises of EU member states and
their choice of partners for cooperation on the externalisation of EU immigration policy, the
money that they were ready to pay to the Libyan government and the human right offences
which they overlooked, had an important effect on the foreign relations of EU and Libya. It has
given Gaddafi a certain power to use against the EU when the revolution started.
In her book “Weapons of Mass Migration”, Greenhill proposes a theory of ‘coercive
migration’, arguing that migration could be used by weaker states as a power tool equal to army
or naval power; “costs are inflicted through the threat and use of human demographic bombs to
achieve political goals that would be utterly unattainable through military means” (2010:3).
Gaddafi’s tactics during the Libyan revolution seem to prove this theory and yet another negative
effect of externalisation of migration policy becomes evident.
Gaddafi has promised to "unleash an unprecedented wave of illegal immigration" on the
European Union. Indeed, an increase in number of boats arriving from Libya has seen a stark rise

41. 41 | P a g e
and it soon became known to the EU officials that the Libyan armed forces were not preventing
but rather encouraging the migration to the EU (UNHCR 2011). IOM report also states that a
number of people were forced onto the boats in Tripoli heading to Europe. The soldiers have
fired their guns indirectly, but also migrants did not have to pay for their journey or paid only a
nominal fee (IOM 2011). This suggests, in agreement with Greenhill’s theory of ‘coercive
migration’, that Gaddafi might have been trying to use migration flow as a weapon against the
EU to wane its support for operations in support of the rebels. Spokesman for the Libyan
government, Moussa Ibrahim stated “Because of the NATO aggression against our country and
because our coastal border guard is being hit daily … we are unable to deal with this situation
and that is why Europe is being flooded with illegal immigration” (Thestar.com 2011).
The tactics used by Gaddafi succeeded, one of the fundamental rights of the EU that of
the free movement of persons has been put in question. A number of member states asked for
reinstating the internal borders. While for Italy, the invasion from the South that was discussed in
the media for a number of years was becoming reality. More than 40,000 migrants arrived in
Lampedusa from Libya following the Arab Spring unrests; these numbers include Sub-Saharan
migrants and Libyans, those escaping the fighting and those that have seen an opportunity in the
European Union. It has become difficult to distinguish between true refugees and economic
migrants due to the sheer number of migrants arriving every day.
It is the second large wave of migration which resulted from the Arab Spring; just a few
months ago more than 50,000 Tunisians entered the EU. Migrants were mostly heading to
France with a dream of jobs and sending remittances home. As Tunisian migrants have
discovered, unfortunately, the job market in crisis ridden Europe with 24 million unemployed is
not kind to illegal residents, for many the economic dream has not come true. Many are ready to
return home but this goes only for the economic migrants as for genuine refugees returning
cannot be an option. If EU does not cooperate and try to ease the pressure on Sothern States,

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crime rates will inevitably go up and with this xenophobia among the southern European
population will grow. In Lampedusa angry mobs started gathering to try and prevent the boats
from docking with the beginning of the tourist season, an island which survives mostly on
tourism, Lampedusa is losing its income and xenophobia is rife. When an angry mob succeeded,
turning “one boat back (for the first time in Lampedusa's history), the Italian coastguard was
forced to create a landing area behind a line of armed police” (Lambert BBC 2011).
On one hand, the anger of Italians living on Lampedusa is understandable; the states do
have the right to control entry into their territory, residence and expulsion. On the other hand,
States must provide protection to those falling under their jurisdiction, as European Convention
of Human Rights states in Article 2 (in regards to rights to life), article 3 (prohibition of torture
and other inhuman or degrading treatments or penalties) and article 4 Protocol 4 (prohibition of
collective expulsions) (Nazarski 2008:38). EU Member States still widely range on the
qualification of the term ‘refugee’ although Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Geneva Refugee
Convention provides a definition generally accepted in the international law. However, the wave
of revolutions that swept Maghreb countries and the unrests in Libya specifically have made the
people escaping from there eligible to claim non-refoulement on humanitarian grounds if not
asylum, and those directly involved in the revolutionary fighting are refugees according to the
1951 UN Convention.
An investigation has been initiated in order to find the responsible for the deaths of boat
migrants in the waters between Libya and Italy. Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe
(PACE’s) migration committee appointed Tineke Strik to carry out investigation and prepare a
report entitled “Lives lost in the Mediterranean sea: who is responsible?” (Council of Europe
2011a). On the 7th
of September 2011 Strik visited Italy for a two day trip and interviewed
migrants who survived shipwrecks as well as officers of Italian coastguard units and NGO
representatives. At the end of her visit Mrs Strik stated “There is an obligation to help all people

43. 43 | P a g e
in distress. If anyone did not live up to this responsibility and deliberately did not assist them,
they must not be allowed to get away with it” (Council of Europe 2011c).
While PACE’s inquiry is useful for identifying those responsible for death in sea, not
much is being done to prevent those deaths by recognising refugees in externalised centres and
aiding their arrival in Europe not by dangerous dinghies but by legal channels. An extraordinary
meeting of Justice and Home Affairs took place on the 12th
of May 2011 on the issue of
migration in the south of the EU. The Commission stated, that it expects the Council to look “for
a more structured, comprehensive response to the challenges and opportunities of migration”
(EUROPA 2011). The meeting also aimed to discuss changes to be made to the FRONTEX
agency established in 2004.
“The proposals include reinforcing the legal framework to ensure full
respect of fundamental rights during FRONTEX activities and
enhancing the operational capacity of FRONTEX to support Member
States. With the new proposal, Member States would put more
equipment and more personnel at the Agency's disposal. FRONTEX
would be able to co-lead border patrols operations with EU Member
States or lease and buy its own assets (such as vessels or helicopters). It
would also be allowed to provide technical assistance to third countries
and deploy liaison officers in third countries” (EUROPA 2011).
It is evident, that the Maghreb revolutions and the wave of migration they caused have
attracted attention to the plight of sea migrants from Africa and the human right offences which
have been committed by the states involved in the externalisation of EU immigration policy to
the South of the EU borders. Only time will show if it will lead to improvement in the effect of
EU policy, and its implication by member states and cooperating third countries, on the refugees
seeking asylum in the European Union.

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Conclusion
“Security and Human Rights: A Necessary but Difficult Conciliation”
(Billet 2010:71)
The tragic history of terrorist attacks carried out in the United States and the European
Union has added to the already emerging phenomenon of the securitisation of the issue of
migration. As this dissertation demonstrates, this in turn has led not only to stricter border
controls but to a policy of externalising the determination procedures vis-à-vis cooperation with
neighbouring third states. Externalisation of migration policy is a goal which has not yet been
achieved fully but looking at the steps taken in order to reach a higher degree of externalisation
one can identify the main effects it had on asylum seekers and their ability to apply for refugee
status within the EU.
Externalisation has been posed as a positive phenomenon for asylum seekers, bringing
the places where applications could be lodged closer to the areas of conflict, thus, diminishing
the need to take a dangerous, illegal trip across the Mediterranean. In reality, the effects of
externalisation on asylum seeking have shown to be mostly negative so far, at least when
externalisation to the South countries, which do not possess the incentive of EU membership, is
concerned.
Firstly, it was aimed at and succeeded in reducing the overall number of migrants, and
due to the lack of determination procedures, it equally reduced the number of refugees entering
the EU. Creation of such agencies as FRONTEX demonstrates the route that EU has chosen to
take; development of the countries in Africa mentioned in a number of treaties has been
neglected, while most resources are thrown on fortifying the outmost borders of the EU.
Another issue which arises is the varying migration policies and practises that exist in the
EU member states, as well as their level of development. Van Selm (2005) concludes that there
is, in fact, no refugee policy in the EU, at best European Union has an asylum policy, Nazarski

45. 45 | P a g e
writes in 2008 that even asylum policy in Europe does not exist either: “States tend to treat
refugees as if they were irregular migrants and thus undesirable”(2008:39). As it seems, the
diminishing of illegal migration down to zero is not only a priority but also a benchmark of
success, narrow security principles increase surveillance and success has been measured by the
lowering of “the number of boats reaching Italian soil as opposed to a hypothetical breakthrough
in human-rights standards in Libya” (Paoletti and Pastore 2010:14). Italy provides a perfect
example treating all migrants as economic and refusing the asylum application procedure to a
great extent vis-à-vis interceptions at sea and externalisation to Libya. At the same time, the
agreements it has reached with Libya regarding migration prove that migration and asylum so far
remain in the domain ruled by nation states and EU while often condemning these relations for
human rights violations is not able or not wanting to prevent them.
Cooperation with states such as Libya on the issue of migration is inherently flawed, if
protecting human rights of refugees remains a part of the goal while combating illegal
immigration. A country which lacks asylum system could not be a possible protector of asylum
seekers. Unfortunately, EU member states, such as Italy, themselves have shown little adherence
to the UN 1951 Convention and other human rights treaties that it signed.
Lastly, the importance of migration for EU has created a weapon which can be used
against it, as was demonstrated by Gaddafi’s forces during the unrests in Libya in early 2011.
This has, once again, outlined the sad truth of migrants being used as ponds in the power struggle
with minimal incentive to protect refugees resulting from unrests.
This dissertation argues that just as a state should be held responsible when it sends a
person in its custody to a state that is known for human rights violations, so too must a state be
held responsible for human rights violations that occur as a result of outsourcing refugee
protection and the externalization of borders. The various international treaties should be
respected and while controlling the entry into its territory is a right of every sovereign state, the

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rights of refugees for seeking protection and have one’s dignity respected should not be
forgotten.
RECCOMENDATIONS
This dissertation deals with the fragile balance present in externalisation practise debate
between curbing illegal immigration and allowing people truly in need of protection to lodge an
asylum claim and gain refugee status in one of the EU member states. This only holds true, of
course, if we take as an axiom that the EU member states, signatory to the UN Convention and
Protocol, only strive to curb illegal immigration and not all migration, thus, impeding migrants
from lodging an asylum claim.
So far externalisation has had a negative effect on the ability of migrants to lodge asylum
claims as it seems to be aimed solely at stopping the migration flows and lacks determination
mechanisms to recognise and provide necessary protection to the refugees escaping violence or
prosecution in Africa or any other troubled region of the world. Nonetheless, externalisation has
the potential to succeed in recognising refugees closer to their countries of origin without urging
them to undertake the dangerous voyage across the Mare Nostrum;
 Comprehensive and transparent review of the externalisation practises and cooperation
with third states and private actors must be conducted by the EU and its Member States,
the international commitments to human rights protection must be taken into consideration.
 The criteria for the choice of partners for cooperation on externalisation of immigration
policy need to be re-evaluated, the proximity of the third state is important but if this
partner is already known for tyrannical government, human rights violations and
totalitarian regime giving them the upper hand can lead to dire consequences as the Libyan
revolution has demonstrated.

47. 47 | P a g e
 FRONTEX is a very successful actor in externalisation policy and effective at curbing
illegal migration across the Mediterranean but the procedure to identify refugees on board
the ships is lacking. As quantitative analysis in this dissertation shows, the determination
procedure is needed in order to not turn away the bona fide refugees truly in need of
protection. If trained staff, interpreters and lawyers were present on board, a number of
people needing international protection would not become victims to refoulement. A
system of checks and balances, more transparency and accountability are needed for
FRONTEX operations.
 Furthermore, interdiction policies and practices on the high seas or in the coastal waters of
transit and origin states must be assessed for cases of human rights violations. The PACE
report “Lives lost in the Mediterranean sea: who is responsible?” is a step in the right
direction, however, much more can be done.
 Human rights protection mechanisms should be incorporated into all readmission and third-country
agreements, so that any individual returned to a country for asylum processing is guaranteed fair
and humane treatment.
 Deportations of Sub-Saharan migrants carried out by Gaddafi were influenced, to a certain
extent, by the pressure from the European Union and not in the spirit of true Pan-
Africanism that Gaddafi claimed to support. It also went against the ECOWAS protocol on
the Free Movement of Persons signed in 1971. If EU pressure was aimed not only at
expulsions of illegal migrants but also at recognition of refugees, mass expulsions would
be less likely. This should be taken into account in future agreements, formal or informal.
 Material incentives to curb illegal migration exist for countries cooperating with the
European Union on the issue of externalisation, yet no incentives exist for recognising
refugees. This causes a total block of all migrants rather than providing stimulus to put
determination procedures in place in third countries. A simple and yet agile and adaptable
system could be introduced; e.g. paying the cooperating third states for each refugee

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recognised and deducting a certain amount for each economic migrant or refugee with fake
papers allowed into the EU. A system of checks and balances is needed for the initial time
of the functioning of the project but will become more relaxed as the time goes on. If a
similar system was in place in Libya, while not guaranteeing a functioning asylum system,
at least the refugees already recognised by the UNHCR would not have been deported.
 The state of emergency with Maghreb revolutions calls for sharing the burden and
movement of certain number of migrants to Northern States of the EU. If instead of
cooperation, member states continue reintroducing internal borders, the countries such as
Italy and France are to experience increased crime rates as the hungry and hopeless
migrants descend into crime.
 Development of the countries of origin of migrants remains the only long-term solution to
the problem of immigration. It calls for a long involvement in the countries before effects
would become visible but the migration problem cannot be solved with fences; stricter
border controls only urge migrants to find more dangerous routes and diversify crossing
points to enter the European Union. EU must widen its perspectives and pursue the long-
term solutions with more attention paid to economic, political and social causes of
migration. Cooperation with NGOs and countries of transit and origin of migrants in order
to develop education system, infrastructure and make these countries attractive for foreign
investment will achieve more to diminish the migration problem than any fence ever could.

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