MA Dissertation

Does the definition of ‘the refugee’ within the 1951 UNHCR Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees do enough for those today?
A critical assessment of how Turkish refugee policies and practice work to inhibit the role
and place of the Syrian ‘guest’, forcing their physical and normative presence into the
‘cracks between nations’.
Charlotte Ashton
Student number: 291885
MA International Studies and Diplomacy
Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy
School of Oriental and African Studies
Supervisor: Dr. Suthaharan Nadarajah
Word Count: 9,977
11 September 2015
This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MA
International Studies and Diplomacy of the School of Oriental and African Studies
(University of London).

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Declaration:
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 (Regulations for students of SOAS) concerning
plagiarism. I undertake that all material presented for examination is my own work and has
not been written for me, in whole or in part, by any other person(s). I also undertake that any
quotation or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been
duly acknowledged in the work, which I present for examination. I declare that I have not
incorporated in this dissertation without acknowledgement any work previously submitted by
me for any other course forming part of my degree. I give permission for a copy of my
dissertation to be held at the Schools’ discretion, following final examination, to be made
available for reference.
Programme of study: MA International Studies and Diplomacy
Date: 11 September 2015

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Table of Contents
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………..4
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..5
Approach………………………………………………………………………5
Complexities…………………………………………………………………...9
Structure……………………………………………………………………….10
Origins of Concern.......................................................................................................12
The UNHCR and the 1951 Convention………………………………………..16
Theoretical influences…………………………………………………………20
Refugee Renewal..........................................................................................................23
Moves Towards Adaptation……………………………………………………24
Comments on ‘Change’………………………………………………………..28
‘Guests’ in Turkey……………………………………………………………………31
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………….37
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………..40

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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide a critical assessment of the UNHCR’s definition of the
refugee as outlined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
subsequent 1967 Protocol. I depart from more commonly stated inadequacies of the 1951
Convention to illustrate how it is the terminology used within the definition itself which is
further forcing refugees into the cracks between nations and policies. Through a discussion of
the historical context in which the Convention came into being, I illustrate the way in which
both real-world events and theoretical underpinnings of the international system, in 1951,
produced a very narrow understanding of the refugee. My study then shows how it is not an
unprecedented phenomenon for the definition of the refugee to be updated and rethought in
line with on-going crises, as witnessed in the OAU Convention and the Cartagena
Declaration. Finally my thesis illustrates the effects of the unchanged 1951 Convention’s
wording on the role and place of the Syrian ‘guest’ (Ozden 2013) within Turkey.

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Introduction
Whilst many authors (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014: Crawford and Hyndman 1989; McNamara
1998), have written on the downfalls, heresies and inadequacies of the 1951 United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
(1951 Convention), few have applied these shortfalls to real-world events in which the effects
are most easily discernible. It is also striking that most of this literature was written in the
1990s or early 21st
Century, with very little, if any, scholarly or policy pieces being written
on the subject in the last five years. I would argue that this is a huge oversight within the
world of policy debate, as the flows of forcibly displaced people are doing anything but
slowing down. As the UNHCR declares that almost sixty million people are now forcibly
displaced (UNHCR 2014), states and public audiences are becoming ever more vocal on the
rights, protections and restrictions given to refugees whilst those within the academic world
capable of changing and commenting on such policies have fallen silent.
Approach
As this paper will demonstrate, what is needed is a theoretical discussion of the 1951
Convention in terms of its normative and institutional impact in regard to a contemporary
refugee crisis. This is necessary to illustrate the need for a revised international instrument
when approaching refugees within the contemporary world system. As the Convention was
being written, the world had just seen the end of the Second World War, a war that claimed
over sixty million lives and caused mass displacement of over fifteen million people. Such a
war, in its scale and array of participants, has never been witnessed again. However the

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international system has continued to evolve and expand since that time, having undergone
mass genocides, overthrown regimes and world order changes as seen through the
progression from realist thinking, from state concerns and capacity towards the rise of the
individual and human rights; the contemporary ‘liberal’ world order. It is staggering, then, to
think that despite the numerous institutions and norms which have been created or undergone
reinvigoration, such as the Right to Protect in the 1990s, the Convention Regarding the Status
of Refugees has remained unchanged since 1967. It is also key to understand, that signing the
Convention is not obligatory and in the same vein the changes which the 1967 Protocol
brought into being, the eradication of the temporal and geographical restrictions, are subject
to individual state discretion.
The Convention as it stands today is both precise and malleable. States are able to adopt
policies, which fit with the Convention’s mandates in principle but actually work against
them through their effects, as I will demonstrate in my discussion of Turkey’s policies today
towards Syrian refugees. The current juxtaposition of terminology, policy and practice is
becoming subjected to further challenges as the world continues to undergo dramatic shifts
due to the escalating and enduring events which affect the states within the international
community through challenging and changing both their thinking and their actions.
The static character of the Convention allows states to interpret the terminology as they wish;
this presents a major challenge when viewed in relation to the world today as opposed to the
context in which it was written. Refugees, as Henkin (1994) notes; ‘only have half a right…to
leave but not to be received’ (1998), this is due to the original wording used to define the
refugee in 1951. As the Convention describes, a refugee is;

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‘…A person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence has
a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable
or unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of that country ‘. (UNHCR
2011a: 3)
Thus, despite ever growing and numerous causes of forcible displacement, refugees, those
seeking asylum, are only provided the right to do so if fleeing from persecution, ‘not a right
to seek and enjoy refuge from grinding poverty, from civil war, from natural disasters’
(Henkin 1994:1079), as is now more commonly witnessed as the reasoning behind the
creation of refugees and their flows today. Scholars, such as Steinbock (1999), have
discussed the downfalls of the original phrasing used in the Convention but have failed to
apply this to a current refugee crises in which the effects of such interpretation can be most
fully felt.
This is most starkly seen today by those Syrians who, since 2011 have been seeking refuge
within the borders of Turkey. There is little academic literature written on the way in which
Turkey’s very specific undertaking of the Convention’s definition regarding who a refugee is
affecting the reception that Syrians have received in Turkey since the start of the Syrian civil
war. Thus my paper will focus on this event, to illustrate the way in which states are able to
use the 1951 Convention’s refugee definition and its subsequent changes within the 1967
Protocol to ensure that their nation’s security and welfare needs are not negatively affected
by influxes of displaced persons.

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Turkey’s use of the Conventions terminology and initial limitations, allowed them to at first
welcome Syrian refugees ‘unhappy at home to come to Turkey’ (Ozden 2013), as numbers
grew they continued to term those arriving as ‘guests’ (Ozden ibid) thus removing the
possibility of asylum. However, what is now evident is that due to their application of the
‘refugee definition’, they have foregone any external aid or help, particularly from the
UNHCR, for example, who have had such a presence in the Syrian refugee camps in
Lebanon. At present the Turkish state faces both a backlash from the Syrian community and
their own public as the situation deteriorates and they have fewer and fewer options for
support.
Complexities
Scholars, such as Jerzy Sztucki (1999), have questioned whether the definition is ‘universal
or obsolete?’ (ibid: 55), but have neglected to push for a change to the definition itself,
instead arguing that ‘ it is perhaps more important that states in practice follow common
sense…and apply the Convention definition in accordance with the “object and “purpose of
the Convention, rather than approach it in a legalistic manner’ (ibid: 78). Thus, it is not the
convention itself, as many scholars have argued (Crawford and Hyndman ibid; McNamara
ibid), but the definition, which needs attention. The need for a broader and more
encompassing phrasing of who ‘the refugee’ is, must be sought as numbers of forcibly
displaced only continue to grow due to more than just the arising of a ‘fear of persecution’.
My argument again goes beyond that of scholars, such as Newman (2003) and Duffield
(2008), who have questioned the international conception and procedures relating to the
refugee but have in turn limited their discussion to ideas of human security and argue that

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‘legal rights of refugees, institutional responses and support mechanisms, must be reoriented
within a framework of a broader definition of security’ (Newman 2003: 16). Instead I argue
that what is necessary is not broader definitions of security or asylum, but a changed
international understanding of the ‘refugee’ so that discussions and actions are not
immediately curtailed to those who ‘fear persecution’. The international community must
come to acknowledge just as Henkin (1994) argued that the contemporary era is witnessing
growing numbers of refugees fleeing all sorts of crises and oppression, whether they be
moral, legal or naturally brought about.
Whilst my approach aims to bring together the historical elements which have led to the
development of our definitional understanding of ‘the refugee’ through a discussion of both
the theoretical and historical events which worked to determine the reactions and thoughts of
signatory states at the time of conception. I risk simplifying the complexities behind my
suggestion of a modified UNHCR refugee definition for today’s international circumstances.
My paper neglects to examine each of the present 145 signatory states national and regional
policies in regards to their individual conceptions of ‘the refugee’ and their reasoning behind
such. Despite these shortcomings, my thesis aims to create a dialogue that raises the need for
a modified and contextualized international legal refugee definition by examining both the
complex history of the original 1951 Convention and the decisions made during the
conference and by providing a discussion of one of the original signatory states maintenance
of the terminology agreed in 1951 despite the expansion it underwent in the 1967 Protocol.
Turkey is unique in its location on the ‘edge’ of Europe, Asia and the Middle East, and its
proximity and experience of both the mass exodus of Syrians, as a result of the civil war
raging there, and also its place within Europe and their advancing discourses of securitization
in regards to migratory flows. What is also of vital importance, in my choice of providing a

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focus on Turkey, is its almost exclusive preservation of the geographical limitation of the
1951 Convention definition, which limits refugees to those who had become so due to events
occurring within Europe. My argument is simply that ‘the refugee’ does not and should not
exist solely in the cracks between nations, but should now be recognised within the state,
society and environmental contexts from which they are forced to become refugees. It is no
longer sufficient to provide refugee protection and status to those who ‘fear persecution’, as
the refugee experience becomes ever more affected by changing societal dynamics; from
civil war to famine.
Structure
My first chapter will provide a theoretical discussion of the production of the refugee regime
through a historical account of its creation in 1950 at the UN and its subsequent production
over the years. In doing so I will draw on the international relations theories which worked to
influence policy thought at that time, following the Second World War and prior to the end of
the Cold War, in order to demonstrate the way in which influential schools of thought such
as, realism and liberalism, shape the procedures enacted around the world. The second
section of my paper will draw attention to the two regional modifications that have been
made to the refugee definition since the 1951 Convention as found in the OAU Convention
and the Cartagena Declaration. My final chapter will provide an account of how the Turkish
state uses the 1951 Convention Relating to the Rights of Refugees, in order to establish both
internal and external security for their territory. I will then follow this with an exploration of
the growing refugee crises that millions of Syrians and bordering nations are currently facing
as a result of the on-going Syrian civil war, which began in March 2011. Policy has yet to
react to such shifts and thus is serving to exacerbate the problem of refugee protection,

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particularly in terms of forced displacement from Syria. As I will demonstrate, the effects of
the decades old normative underpinning of refugee practice is highly visible in the policies of
the Turkish government in relation to the vast numbers of Syrian ‘refugees’ who have fled
over the border in the past four years.

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Origins of concern
‘The refugee is intricately tied up in the very workings of international society. Each
concept relies on the other for its existence’. (Haddad 2008:47)
Refugee flows have been present in the international domain for centuries and can be dated
back to pre-modern times (Betts et al. 2012). Since the existence of the Celestial Empire in
the East and the Roman Empire in the West, ‘the concept of “refuge”, from which the word
“refugee” was derived, referred to cultural factors rather than to territorial boundaries’ (Lee
1996: 30). As an area of contention however, the formation of the modern state system at the
Peace of Westphalia in 1648, brought the issue of refugees to the forefront of international
concerns (Lee ibid; Barnett 2002). As monarchs ‘tried to impose territorial unity on their
states…[they] targeted religious minorities and others whose practices deviated from the
national norm’ (Betts et al ibid:7). Thus as the state-citizen relation became imbued within
the founding of the European state system, so too did refugees; those who through fear or
force, lost their protective citizenship status. As Haddad (ibid) explains; as the state became
nationalised, refugees became a vital part of the forging of nationalities and ideas of
belonging; ‘the refugee became the imagined outsider who allowed the concept of nation-
state to take hold’ (ibid: 47). Whilst national identity continued to form in relation to the
growth of the international state system, refugees became an ever-growing challenge to the
‘sedentary state-citizen-territory trinity’ (Haddad ibid: 47).
The movement of people between nations quickly became one of exclusionary dichotomies,
which worked to order people in ‘terms of space (inside versus outside), membership in a
specific community (citizen versus non-citizen) and agency (state versus individual)’ (Soguk

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1999: 73). Anderson (1983), in his seminal piece entitled ‘Imagined Communities’, argued
that communities and nations existed both in their physical forms and in the minds of those
placed within them; ‘in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (ibid: 15). Just
as borders and frontiers are ‘necessary to have for citizenship to have any meaning’ (Haddad
ibid: 54), the refugee formed the state border personified; a point of departure for ideas of
citizen and non-citizen.
Despite growing numbers of refugees following the consolidation of the European state
system, it was not until after the First World War when a global refugee regime became seen
as increasingly necessary. As individuals began to flee their home countries, they met
increasingly strict immigration laws. With the introduction of passports and administrative
barriers in the late 19th
and early 20th
centuries their movements were restricted and the
international community came to witness refugee crises on a massive scale (Betts et al. ibid:
8). In this environment, states saw that the restrictive measures they had placed on entry
worked to exacerbate the number of uprooted people who became stateless as a result of the
First World War and soon after the ‘break-up of Europe’s multinational empires’ (Betts et al.
ibid: 8), and thus work began on the first multilateral institutional framework which would
focus on meeting the needs of those who were forcibly displaced. In 1921, following
requests from the Red Cross movement, western governments via the League of Nations
established the first international coordinating mechanism for refugees; the Commissioner for
Refugees (Skran 1995). Its mandate however remained restricted to certain groups it was able
to help and this meant that the regime was neither effective nor enduring. They failed to
adopt a universal definition of ‘the refugee’ as governments feared that the super-
governmental authority would pressure states into recognising and receiving political
dissidents from other nations (Betts et al. ibid: 9).

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‘…Refugees were persecuted not because of what they had done or thought, but
because of what they unchangeably were – born into the wrong kind of race or the
wrong kind of class’. (Arendt cited in Gatrell 2013: 52)
Thus, even at its outset as an overarching institution, the terminology used to define a refugee
was limited by the fear of state’s domestic unrest and refugees were identified through a
‘category-oriented approach that identified refugees according to group affiliation and origin’
(Barnett ibid: 242). In 1933, however, a formalised and regularised definition was given in
the Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, which widened the scope
and gave way to a more encompassing understanding; those, primarily groups, facing a ‘lack
of protection and effective non-nationality’ (Barnett ibid: 242).
As tens of millions of people were displaced during the Second World War in Europe and
elsewhere, the Commissioner for Refugees failed to go far enough in alleviating the growing
refugee crisis; ‘[the] allies were confronted by millions of survivors who were “out of place”’
(Gatrell ibid: 89). Due to the lack of clearly defined procedures and classifications for
refugees and displaced persons, nations were able to find divergences between obligation and
recognition. International measures, such as the ‘Nansen passports’ which had been
introduced for refugees, proved ineffective in many scenarios, as states, following the Great
Depression in the 1930s, were unable and unwilling to undertake new financial obligations
thus refusing entry to many refugees (Barnett ibid: 243). In the years that followed, the
League of Nations and later the UN, established a number of intergovernmental bodies and
organisations which were intended to help with the growing number of refugees in Europe.
The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) was one such body, which
by late 1945 had served to repatriate around 7 million people, mostly within Soviet territories
(Gatrell ibid: 90). In 1947, the UNRRA was abolished and the International Refugee

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Organisation (IRO) was created. The IRO was given the comprehensive mandate of
registration, determination, repatriation, protection and resettlement of all Second World War
refugees. With its termination already determined to be in June of 1950, it was apparent that
the organisation would not be able to accomplish these tasks (Feller 2001: 130). States party
to the IRO, however, did adopt the first universal definition of the refugee based on
‘individualised persecution or fear of persecution’ (Betts et al ibid: 12). Thus the idea of
refugees as ‘groups’ gave way to notions of the individual and their rights to flee from
political oppression as suited the liberalism of the policy world and the human rights based
thinking which, characterised the following years. In this way, western powers hoped that the
IRO would work to achieve two goals;
‘First, to resolve longstanding refugee situations with the potential to destabilise
European economies still recovering from the ruins of war, and second, to
“internationalise” the refugee problem by distributing refugees and refugee costs
among a number of North and South American, Western European, Australasian and
African countries’. (Betts et al ibid: 12)
As the leading supporter, of the IRO and its mandate, when the US’s focus and funding
shifted from refugee policy towards the Soviet Union, discussions became centred on the
need for a multilateral approach. On the 4 December 1950, the General Assembly adopted the
Statute of the UNHCR and the IRO was terminated (Feller ibid: 130). The deliberations that
followed are, I argue, crucial to understanding how the definition of the refugee within the
1951 Convention came to be intentionally restrictive for political reasons, and thus today is
inadequate in providing for the millions of forcibly displaced people seeking asylum for
reasons other than ‘persecution’.

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The UNCHR and the 1951 Convention
The need for an overarching specialised international organisation to protect refugees was the
founding premise agreed on by states. However, it was the scope and functions of the
UNHCR, which met with differing opinions from governments (Betts et al ibid: 13). The
United Kingdom, for example, due to their largely ‘protected’ geographical location, believed
that refugees should be the responsibility of host states, whilst the US sought a temporary
organisation with narrow authority by withholding funding and, the independent authority it
would need to carry out a relief role (Betts et al. ibid). This was in stark contrast to that of
Western European governments, such as France, who were in desperate need of operational-
funds to assist them with the refugees they had within their borders. India and Pakistan
further argued that the UNHCR needed the ability to raise funds and thus had to be a ‘strong
permanent organisation with global responsibilities’ (Betts et al. ibid: 14). Hence many state
governments sought to influence the role and functions of the UNHCR from the outset, their
national interests worked to guide their wants for the international refugee regime and in
doing so, I would argue, forced the refugee both present and future into the ‘cracks between
nations’, as they, the states, pursued their own political and domestic interests. This is best
illustrated within the two very specific functions the General Assembly adopted in Resolution
428(V) on the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees on the 14
December 1950: ‘to protect refugees and to find permanent solutions to their plight, either
through voluntary repatriation or through their assimilation within new national
communities’ (Betts et al. ibid: 14). The UNHCR then, had been shaped to allow for the
interests and concerns of the most powerful states and in particular the US and the UK, with
further reaching parameters and greater autonomy as requested by states such as France and
India.

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Refugees now had to negotiate their repatriation or avoidance of such, from the confines of
‘assembly centres’ and camps, and this brought about new concerns from governments at the
time; human security. The camps provided a space for patriotic leaders amongst the displaced
to ‘advertise ideas of historic suffering and the potential for national deliverance’ (Gatrell
ibid: 91). Those in government positions and experts on refugee care came to see refugees
and their centres as a ‘problem [which], brought together political, legal, cultural and
economic considerations’ (Gatrell ibid: 91), ranging from fears of the spread of communism
to notions that refugees may be seeking economic betterment within third countries, rather
than fleeing from persecution, the refugee had become securitised (Hettne 2010; Andrijasevic
and Walters 2010). Once again ‘the refugee’ was reduced to political consideration, mainly
those of western states, who wished for the resettlement of refugees and for the crisis to end
but who also expected this to be done on their terms and avoiding any negative knock-on
impacts within their own nations. This can be seen in the huge number of selected ‘transfers,
expulsions and deportations’ (Gatrell ibid: 91) witnessed in the years that followed the end of
the Second World War. Winston Churchill, for example, supported the movement of all
ethnic Germans from east of the Curzon Line in the name of disentanglement and the creation
of friendship, whilst the new communist government in Bulgaria expelled 250,000 ethnic
Turks (Gatrell ibid: 92). Thus as Malkki (1995) notes, ‘“the refugee” as a specific social
category and legal problem of global dimensions did not exist in its full modern form before
this period [the end of World War II]’ (ibid: 498).
Following the establishment of the UNHCR, the drafting of the UN refugee convention
commenced, again western governments, largely led by the US, negotiated over the scope of
responsibilities and ultimately the definition that would cover the refugee. During the final
discussions only twenty six countries were present, with the majority being nations within

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Europe and no representatives from Africa or Asia (UNHCR 2011b: 6), ‘western
governments, led by the US and France, argued for limiting the responsibilities of state who
were signatories to the convention…[whilst] [t]he British argued for a broad global definition
covering all refugees’ (Betts et al. ibid: 16). Displaying, once again, the narrow mandate and
limited life the UNHCR and the Convention were presumed to have, the French and the US
governments rallied against the British call for a global and far-seeing definition, as they
argued that nations should know in advance which refugees, in what quantities and in what
locations they had to adhere to their commitments if they were expected to agree to the
convention (Betts et al. ibid: 16). The negotiations ended with the view that the convention
should serve to provide legal protection to mainly European refugees, thus asserting a
geographical limitation and narrowing the signatories obligations and removing the global
definition as argued for by the British. The conference did determine a more encompassing
definition of who exactly a refugee was and the parameters under which they could be
defined as such;
‘[T]he term “refugee” shall apply to any person who[,]…owing to well-founded fear
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear,
is unwilling to return to it’. (Article 1 A (1) UNHCR 2011b: 14)
As noted above, this definition whilst broad in its determining of grounds for persecution,
which reflect the political scenery at the time of its conception in 1951, is narrow and I would

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argue, in contrast to authors such as Carlier (1999), out-of-date and inadequate in noting the
reasons as to why people become refugees in the modern era.
With growing numbers of refugees today, the convention could not have predicted such shifts
in world dynamics, events that would produce forced displacement for reasons other than
persecution or even that flows of movement would become global in scope and make-up.
Malkki (1995) argues that, ‘there is no “proto-refugee” of which the modern refugee is a
direct descendant, any more than there is a proto-nation of which the contemporary nation
form is a logical, inevitable outgrowth’ (Malkki 1995: 497). Yet the convention tried to
define the refugee in 1951 and for over sixty years this definition has remained the sole
international instrument, legally binding 145 states to respect and uphold this understanding
of the refugee. Sixteen years after the Convention entered force, states party to the 1951
Convention met in recognition of the ‘new refugee situations that [had] arisen since the
Convention was adopted and that the refugees concerned may not fall within the scope of the
Convention’ (UNHCR 2011b: 46). Whilst this illustrates the acknowledgement of changing
refugee formations, the 1967 Protocol however, only sought to remove the temporal
limitations; those of events occurring before 1 January 1951 as defined in Article 1A (2)
(UNHCR 2011b: 46), at the same time as extending Article 1B(1) of the Convention to allow
states to choose either to maintain adherence to the original geographical limitation of events
occurring within Europe or to agree to a more encompassing scope which provided for
‘events occurring in Europe or elsewhere’ (UNHCR 2015a: 5).
Thus the one international legal instrument determining refugee status; the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, was determined at a time in which individual state
interests focused on the impact of both the economic depression of the 1930s and the end of

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the Second World War. It was a time when the policy world was dominated by realist
conceptualisations of the world, consisting of individual states, separate from events within
the anarchical world system and consequently forming unified solitary entities (Weiss 1997).
What was privileged in both policy and practice were the material competencies and military
defence of territory over that of human displacement and refugee protection (Newman 2003:
7-8). I argue that this was reflected within both the statute of the UNHCR and the definition
of “the refugee”, as both were kept within narrow parameters and provided with limited
scopes for action. Due to the international world order as defined by realism at the time;
‘each state, as a result of its geographical location, internal political composition, and
national prejudices and philosophy, [reacted] to the question of the refugee in light of its
parochial interests’ (Fragomen ibid: 46).
Theoretical Influences
As the Cold War era came into being so too did an increased awareness of the impetus and
affects of conflict and political and normative developments. Individuals, institutions and
communities soon became central components within policy spheres, as processes of
decolonization and development started to change world dynamics; notions of liberal peace
came to replace dominant ideals of realist capabilities (Slaughter 2005). This is illustrated in
the normative move towards the idea of;
‘…An ethical responsibility to reorient security around the individual in a
redistributive sense, in the context of changes in political community and the
emergence of transnational norms relating to human rights’. (Newman 2003: 7)

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Liberalism re-emerged as ideas of peace and globalism came to form the dominant paradigm.
As liberal conceptions of political thought came to the forefront of policy spheres, individuals
and their well being gained greater importance within international governance and public
discourse. In turn, ideas of security, and the discourse surrounding it, underwent a shift in
focus from the state to the personal, as communities, groups and individuals came to signal
threats in relation to the stability of states and more widely international order. ‘Human
security’ then has become a key point of comment within political, public and theoretical
debates and as Stern and Ojendal (2010) note this is due to the move within global policy
discourse to ‘speak of the globe (or the international community) as the appropriate realm
through which to guarantee security and human rights’ (Stern and Ojendal ibid: 16).
When placed in relation to refugees and their growing numbers, this focus on human security
is expressed in its starkest terms by Kostakos et al. (1991), who wrote on Britain’s agenda at
the UN in the context of the then fading Cold War dynamics as discussed at the Foreign
Commonwealth conference in 1989 (Ashton 2015: 6). Participants noted that the phrase
‘global riot control’ came to encompass much of the talks, which centred on themes of;
narcotics, the environment, terrorism and refugees (Kostakos et al. 1991). Refugees had
become something to control for fear that they would disrupt stability and development
within ‘developed’ nations such as the UK and also within those of the ‘Third World’
forming, as McConkey (2008) noted, the enforcement rationale for humanitarian actions by
the UN in response to ‘threats’ of disruption such as refugee movements (ibid: 80).
Ideas of the ‘global community’ have today become common parlance within both the
political and public spheres (Allen 2008). It is very clear however, as I along with Duffield
(ibid) and Newman (ibid) argue, that this has yet to translate into a transformation of

22

migratory policies or most crucially the protection or rights of the refugee. The notion of the
state as an isolated unit, unconnected to events outside of its borders, continues to be
paramount particularly when considering notions of citizens as ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’
(Newman ibid: 9). ‘Global citizenship’ can only go so far when statist ideas continue to push
those forced to leave their ‘home’ states into the ‘cracks between nation-states’. Whilst
concepts of ‘global citizenship’, extensive human rights and structures such as the ‘Right to
Protect’ have all come into being, those who are arguably the most vulnerable within
international society remain refugees who, despite a dedicated UN organisation, continue to
face the confines of the original 1951 Convention.

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Refugee Renewal
‘…Asylum has become politicised, many countries have adopted procedural and
physical deterrence mechanisms to prevent refugees from accessing protection’
(Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014: 574)
Multiple scholarly works (Nicholson and Twomey 1999;Gatrell 2013; Nyers 2006) have
focused on the evolving nature of the refugee and the circumstances which have come to
forcibly displace them, beyond that of persecution whilst the concept of an updated 1951
Convention definition has remained neglected. The authors within Nicolson and Twomeys’
(1999) edited volume, which focuses on the international refugee concepts and regimes,
devote the first part of their book to ‘the evolving refugee definition’ (ibid). Despite the
prioritisation of issues of interpretation and validity, the scholars (Steinbock 1999; Sztucki
1999; Tuitt 1999) have argued for its continued importance in the international order as it was
written in 1951 and should thus be at states discretion as to how they employ it (Sztucki ibid).
Alternatively, Carlier (ibid) has proposed, a ‘theory of three scales’ that should be adopted in
line with the Conventions definition; ‘to lead to clearer reasoning being applied whenever
decisions have to be made on the recognition or refusal of refugee status’ (ibid: 37). The
scale, Carlier (ibid) sets out, aims to answer whether there is a risk of that person facing
persecution if they were to return to the country from which they have fled? In asking this he
employs three gauges; risk, persecution and proof and, for a person to be deemed a refugee
each scale must be answered by meeting different levels; ‘minimal’, ‘serious’ and
‘reasonable’ respectively (ibid: 52). Thus there must be a minimal risk of a well-founded fear
of persecution, at which point the violation of human rights as a result of persecution must be

24

serious and finally there must be a reasonable level of proof (ibid: 52). Whilst I acknowledge
that such a scale would provide a useful tool in understanding state’s decisions on refugee
status, this does not go far enough in ensuring a more concrete and encompassing form of the
refuge within society today as it still allows a state to determine there gauge of each ‘level’;
one nation’s conception of a minimal risk may be very different from another’s and so on.
Since its inception the refugee has become further embedded within world politics, from the
Cold War to the rise of decolonization and the increasing number of civil wars; the focus of
refugee programmes has been led away from the Eurocentric basis towards one of global
concerns; security, development and containment (Duffield 2008). Whilst the UNHCR office
has expanded its programmes and activities, “the refugee” has remained contained within the
realm of fears of ‘persecution’ as the international sphere has continually undergone
paradigm-shifting events, which have forced ever more people into the domain of “the
refugee”. Despite increased numbers of refugee crises, in 2001, the importance of the 1951
Convention and the subsequent 1967 Protocol was reaffirmed by signatory states that, issued
a declaration stating their continued commitment to the principles and legal instruments
contained within the Convention and Protocol (UNHCR 2011b: 4).
My paper will now turn towards a discussion of two national and regional definitional models
that have tried to adapt to the evolving refugee problems, as they have both worked to
acknowledge that whilst fear of persecution is still a factor as defined in the 1951
Convention, there are now multiple reasons for flight which can not so easily be discerned as
solitary in nature.
Moves towards adaptation

25

Since the conception of the UNHCR’s refugee definition there have, however, been two legal
and normative developments of the term ‘refugee’ and the circumstances under which the
definition applies. What is important to note is that both of these definitional modifications
have been domestic or regional in their scope, neither challenging nor replacing the
international reach of the 1951 Convention.
As African, Central and Latin American countries continued to experience ‘massive influxes
of people fleeing to neighbouring countries, owing to combinations of war, political
instability, internal civil strife, economic turmoil, and natural disasters’ (Arboleda 1991:
186), they have found ways to adapt and conform to the principles of humanitarianism and
the ‘dictates of pragmatism’ (Arboleda ibid: 186). Arboleda (ibid), notes that despite these
displaced persons forming the largest UNHCR beneficiary group, under the UNHCR’s legal
guidelines and definition, they may not actually legally qualify as refugees thus acting as the
causation behind the making of the broader refugee definitions found in both the OAU
Convention and the Cartagena Declaration (ibid: 186), as discussed below.
In 1969, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) organized a Convention Governing the
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, in response to the ‘constantly increasing
number of refugees in Africa…[and with a desire to find] ways and means of alleviating their
misery and suffering as well as providing them with a better life’ (OAU 1969a: 2). Within
Article 1 of the OAU Convention two definitions are present, the first is the traditional treaty
definition as noted in the UNHCR Convention owing to a well-founded fear of persecution
(Miranda 1990: 322). The second definition, however, diverges from this to provide a much
more encompassing and contextually accurate conception of the refugee;

26

‘The term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression,
occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either
part or the whole of his country or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of
habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside of his country of
origin or nationality’. (OAU Article 1(2) 1969a: 3)
As Miranda (ibid) notes, this second definition clearly allows for refugees to be those
involved in situations of internal or external armed conflict, widespread disease and famine
or a breakdown in public order (ibid: 323). The OAU permits the UNHCR to involve itself
with both types of refugees, and asserts that the provisions within the OAU Convention are a
‘regional complement in Africa of the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of the
Refugees’ (OAU Article VIII (2) ibida:8). The OAU Convention came into force on 20 June
1974 and formed a binding legal instrument under regional law in Africa (Arboleda 1991:
185). The Convention came at a time when the need for a definition that more closely
reflected the realities within Africa, ‘during a period of violent struggle for self-determination
and national development’ (ibid: 186), was vital. It is interesting that the OAU acknowledged
the need for a broader definition whilst also extending the scope of the UNHCR within
Africa. The OAU then recognised that both the 1951 refugee definition was not
comprehensive enough in its initial wording, but also that the UNHCR definition and the
organisation itself was still a valid and useful international instrument for approaching the
refugee figure. As I will now show, this is further witnessed in the adaptation within the
Central and Latin American refugee regime.
With a long history of the legal recognition of refuge and asylum, Latin and Central
American countries, since the Montevido Treaty in 1889, have had numerous regional

27

conventions dealing with those seeking refuge from persecution (Arboleda ibid: 198). Facing
rising numbers of refugees in the 1980s throughout Latin America, previous asylum regimes
were challenged by the sheer numbers of those displaced. Latin and Central American
governments had come to see that the definition given in the 1951 Convention was too
precise in its wording to adequately account for the mass exodus the region faced (Arboleda
ibid: 200). As decided in the earlier 1981 Colloquium, a broader refugee definition had to be
sought to deal with the evolving crises, just as the OAU Convention had strived to do in 1969
(Arboleda ibid: 202). In 1984, fifteen years after the OAU Convention had been held, the
Republic of Colombia sponsored ‘a colloquium on the international protection of refugees in
Central America, Mexico and Panama’ (Miranda ibid: 323-324). Just as the OAU Convention
worked to complement the work of the UNHCR, so too did the Cartagena Declaration, which
worked in cooperation with the UNHCR. The Declaration itself ‘found an inspiring influence
in the provisions of the 1969 OAU Convention’ (International Protection (SCIP) 1992).
During the discussions ‘ a set of principles and criteria guiding the States signatories…on the
treatment of refugees…[was sought] to provide a much needed common framework’
(International Protection (SCIP) 1992). The Declaration sought objective decision-making
when nations came to consider the particular groups or individuals seeking refuge and, in
doing so required that refugees met two conditions before being declared as such:
‘…[T]hat there exists a threat to life, security or liberty; and that the threat result from
one of five factors: generalized violence; foreign aggression; international conflicts;
massive violations of human rights; or circumstances seriously disturbing public
order’. (Arboleda ibid: 203; International Protection (SCIP): 1992)

28

The language found in the above definition reflects both the driving forces behind refugee
movements within Central and Latin America at the time and also creates a contrast in the
stark legal terminology used in both the 1951 UNHCR Convention and the later OAU
Convention. Use of such pressing and affecting language shows, I argue, that despite the
overarching legality of matters of refugee crises, when situations arise in need of urgent
attention, nations are able to supersede the norm of formalized and legal discourse to
highlight the true nature of the situations refugees are facing. It is also key to note again, that
despite its acknowledgement of a need for a more encompassing refugee definition, the
Cartagena Declaration just as the OAU had done in 1969, maintained the need for the
categories determined in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol to be retained within the
regional definition (International Protection 1992). The Executive Committee of the UNHCR
even ‘welcomed the use of regional approaches in resolving refugee problems of regional
scope as amply demonstrated by the Colloquium’ (UNHCR Executive Committee as cited in
Fischel de Andrade 1998:394).
Comments on ‘change’
As I have illustrated above, two major attempts at redefining ‘the refugee’ have come about
in the years following the 1951 UNHCR Convention and its 1976 Protocol. With western
understandings of the ‘liberal core’ (Laffey and Nadarajah 2012) being situated within the
‘developed’ nations of Europe and North America most predominantly, it is interesting to
note that both the OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration were produced within
Africa and Latin America respectively. It seems that, despite championing humanitarianism
and global responsibility for those most in need of aid and development, the ‘west’ and the
international organizations it promotes, such as the UNHCR, have neglected to adequately

29

adapt to the changing causes creating refugees globally. Whilst this may have been
attributable to greater numbers of displaced persons within the ‘third world’, and particularly
the nations of Central and Latin America and Africa in the years following the end of the
Second World War, it is now evident that Europe faces one of the largest humanitarian crises
it has seen since 1945. Now, as hundreds of thousands of people flow from the Middle
Eastern and African nations fleeing war, civil strife and chronic poverty, ‘fortress Europe’
(Chou 2009) is facing ever-increasing pressures to find solutions for the huge numbers of
displaced trying to reach European nations in search of safety and security.
The mass movement of persons is one of the few concerns, which has an impact on every
continent and almost every nation state in the world (Ager 2003: 1) and yet international
procedures for state action are limited to individual interpretations of one Convention written
over sixty years ago.
A question that must be asked is, “why, if the nations of the ‘illiberal periphery’; the ‘third
world’, have managed to come together in times of mass exodus and refugee crises, can
those, who first worked to form the UNHCR and subsequently its definition of ‘the refugee’,
stand by as the numbers of forcibly displaced rises, facing little or no recognition of their
place in the international society?” As I demonstrate in the final section of my paper, the
Turkish state has continued to use its own interpretation of terminology, both in regards to
the 1951 Convention definition and its subsequent national refugee policies, to aid the state in
maintaining the power it can exercise over the durations that those flowing through the
national borders can remain within Turkey. This more detailed and contemporary
examination of an unfolding refugee crisis within a European nation highlights, I argue, the
need for a more nuanced and contextualised international legal definition for refugees in

30

order to afford the ever-growing numbers, the stability they seek.

31

‘Guests’ in Turkey
‘The number of individuals forced to leave their homes per day due to conflict and
persecution [has] increased four-fold in four years. During 2014…an average of
42,500 individuals per day [were forced] to leave their homes and seek protection
elsewhere. This compares to…10,900 in 2010’. (UNHCR 2014b: 2)
Whilst I have explored the ways in which the nations within Africa, Latin and Central
America have worked to create new and contextualised definitions for refugees within their
regions, the status and legal definition of a refugee within Europe is still as the European
Council on Refugees and Exile states; ‘set out in the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees that has been signed and ratified by all EU member states’ (ECRE 2015).
It is, as Carlier (1999) notes, remarkable that the regional instruments as seen in the OAU
Convention, the Cartagena Declaration and the ‘non-binding Joint Position of the European
Union on the harmonised application of the definition of the term refugee, make direct
reference to the [1951] Geneva Convention definition, albeit in the former to extend its
content, and in the latter to restrict its interpretation’ (ibid: 38). I argue that what is crucial to
this continuing employment of the 1951 Convention definition without modification is the
fact that whilst Europe ‘has evolved from a refugee producing continent into a place of
asylum for refugees, coming from conflicting areas’ (Bacaian 2011: 11).
As numbers of asylum seekers continue to rise within Europe (UNHCR 2015c: 131), both
public and policy debates have arisen over the need for increased action to deal in particular
with the growing numbers of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea driven in

32

the largest numbers from Syria and Eritrea (UNHCR 2015c: 132; Kuenssberg 2015; The
Guardian 2015). These figures look to be far from dissipating, as the total number of persons
of concern from Syria reaches almost 4.1 million (UNHCR 2015d). I will draw on the
Turkish states employment of the 1951 Convention and its refugee definition in order to
illustrate my argument, that the 1951 refugee definition is both a constraint and enabler in
allowing states to determine who and when they classify refugees as such, in line with both
their regional and domestic interests. In 1970, Fragomen wrote on the importance of the
definition for refugees; ‘the policy of any body – international, national or private- toward the
refugee is a function of the definition utilized to designate an individual or group of
individuals as refugees’ (ibid: 46), this is starkly apparent within the Turkish state.
The Turkish nation’s reactions and provisions towards the mass inflow of Syrians provides, I
contend, a startling juxtaposition of policies which highlight the key tenant of my paper, that
the 1951 Convention definition of ‘the refugee’ can and is being used to limit host states
responsibility and action through the employment of its terminology.
In 2014, for the first time, Turkey became the largest refugee-hosting country in the world,
receiving 1.59 million people (UNHCR 2014b: 2), the majority of which arrived from Syria
as they fled from the civil war, which began there in March 2011. Many neighbouring
nations, such as Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt, have also continued to receive those
forcibly displaced from Syria, as the number of UNHCR registered Syrian refugees in those
nations reached 2.1 million on 6 September 2015 (UNHCR 2015d). Whilst these states;
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt, were already under extreme pressure from existing refugee
populations pre-dating the Syrian influx, Turkey at the outset of the civil war provided the
most stable host country in the region (Bidinger et al. 2014: 1).

33

In 1951, Turkey was one of the original signatories of the UNHCR Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees, which, as discussed in Chapter One, encompassed both a temporal
and geographical limitation in regards to its scope. Whilst the former restriction was, from
the outset, at the discretion of each nation-state, the geographical limitation which held that it
was ‘persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe’ (UNHCR
2011b: Article 1B: 1-2) remained in place until the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees where it was expanded to encompass ‘Europe and elsewhere’. Turkey however was
one of only three states which opted to uphold the geographical limitation; Congo and
Madagascar being the other two, ‘thus Turkey can only legally accept European asylum
seekers as “refugees” stricto sensu’ (Soykan 2012: 38). Despite this seemingly restrictive
and cautious approach to accepting refugees from outside of Europe, Turkey has welcomed
Syrians since the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011. By the end of April 2011, as growing
numbers of Syrians had begun to cross into the Hatay region of Turkey, the Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu announced that Turkey was ready to allow Syrians into Turkey
“who [were] not happy at home” (Ozden 2013: 1). By December 2011, six refugee camps
had been set up and the Turkish government had registered 8,000 Syrians, and numbers
continued to rise as many Syrians moved into apartments within cities remaining
unaccounted for.
‘No other neighbouring country has been as kind. All other countries now require a
visa for Syrians whilst only Turkey continues to allow refugees to enter with nothing
but a passport’. (Muhammad, a Syrian refugee in Istanbul quoted in Fitzherbert 2015)

34

Whilst this would seem to hold an impressive standard for refugee protection and
international humanitarian assistance for evolving emergency crises, the Turkish government
through its maintenance of the 1951 UNHCR geographical limitation has ensured, that apart
from its statements of support, it is under no legal obligation to provide care for Syrians and
can thus ask Syrians to leave whenever they want (Fitzherbert ibid; Icduygu 2015). Syrians,
as citizens located outside of Europe, are thus recognised as ‘guests’ not ‘refugees’ by
Turkish authorities and are also not considered asylum seekers, revoking their right to be
resettled in a third country with the support of the UNHCR (Ozden ibid: 5). This has meant
that the Turkish government, in removing the UNHCR’s role in regards to Syrian ‘guests’,
has retained control over the Syrian migrant population and thus has been able to carry out its
policy towards Syrians based on ‘generosity’ rather than one based on rights and legal
instruments (Ozden ibid: 5).
Three years after the initial flows of Syrian ‘guests’ over Turkish borders the new Law on
Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) came into force. Reflecting the desire for
Turkish legislation to be brought in line with EU standards, the LFIP codified legal
regulations regarding aliens’ status in Turkey, from work permits to immovable property as
well as ‘regulating the entry, residence and deportation of foreigners’ (Dardagan Kibar 2013:
109). For the UNHCR this was considered ‘an important advancement for international
protection, and for Turkey itself’ (UNHCR 2013), however, as many scholars, think tanks
and journalists have noted due to the continued importance placed on the 1951 Convention
and its refugee definition, Syrians remain very vulnerable to both the whim of the Turkish
state as well as in terms of the limited rights they are afforded whilst they remain outside of
refugee status (Chastain 2015; AIDA 2015; Icduygu 2015). Despite the shortcomings of the
LFIP in terms of protection for Syrian refugees, the Turkish state has instigated a ‘temporary

35

protection regime’ for Syrians which encompasses three main principles; an open border
policy, non-refoulement, and finally registration with the Turkish authorities and support
inside camps (Icduyugu ibid: 8). However, as Ozden (ibid) notes, this regime has also failed
to go far enough in providing stability and protection for the millions of Syrians now within
the borders of Turkey. The open-door policy, for example, is fully functioning for all Syrians
who present valid passports when entering the country. However, for those whose passports
have expired, or in the chaos and confusion have been lost, are facing extreme difficulties,
with many Syrians crossing the minefields between Syria and Turkey (ibid: 5) in order to
gain entry. There have also been ‘instances of the Turkish soldiers at the border region
shooting at Syrians trying to enter Turkey irregularly and injuring some in the legs’ (Ozden
ibid: 5). The non-refoulement or no forcible returns policy has also been subject to
exceptions; as Syrians unhappy with conditions within the camps, particularly within the
extreme winter and summer temperatures, were deported at the Kilis border crossing due to
alternative camps within Turkey being at full capacity (Ozden ibid: 6).
Whilst it must be acknowledged that the Turkish state provided a fast-acting and welcoming
environment for Syrians fleeing the growing violence and destruction, it is also evident that
the adoption of the 1951 UNHCR Convention’s refugee definition has allowed the Turkish
government to preserve its control over the influx of Syrians and their subsequent actions
within the state. Despite international and domestic criticism of its maintenance of the
geographic limitation as set out in 1951, the government has continued to apply the original
definition in its most recent legislation (Icduyugu 2015: 5). Turkey is a state in which the
effects of the original terminology and circumstances of the Conventions’ creation have come
to be most starkly witnessed in regards to ‘refugee’ or in this case ‘guest’ treatment. This
narrow construct of ‘the refugee’ is no longer sufficient in dealing with the 1.9 million

36

registered Syrians in Turkey (UNHCR 2015d), fleeing from circumstances brought about as
result of events other than persecution. Whilst ‘immigration policies in Turkey have been
slow to legally recognise the immigration of people who fall outside the parameters of
“Turkish descent and culture”’ (Icduyugu ibid: 5), I argue that refugee crises now transcend
the national regimes into which they fall and more must be done on an international scale to
aid those who find themselves falling through the cracks both between nations and
legislature. As Icduyugu (ibid) argues; ‘there is neither an overarching [Turkish] national law
nor a well established functioning international legal framework to govern [the Syrian
refugee crisis…it] is not a one-time incident, but rather a long-term issue’ (ibid: 12).
Within the Turkish framework the geographical limitation of the 1951 Convention could be
lifted to alleviate the problem of Syrian refugees as all other European nations along with
almost all of the 145 signatories have already done. Whereas this seems a very unlikely
modification when looking at Turkey’s most recent policy developments both within the
LFIP and the temporary protection regime, as the crisis only continues to worsen and the
acknowledgement of the long-term nature of the civil war becomes apparent, it may force the
Turkish state to acknowledge the need for support from the UNHCR for both Syrian refugee
registration and care.
If the Turkish state were to change their outlook on the definition of refugees within today’s
world, it would present, I argue, a paradigm shifting event in the evolution of the refugee not
only due to its re-thinking of the only international refugee legal regime but also as it itself
stands on the borders of Europe, Asia and the Middle East.

37

Conclusion
This paper, through an analysis of the 1951 Convention and the circumstances under which it
was created, has argued for a modified version of the refugee definition in light of changes
within both the international system and the plight of refugees. Whilst scholars (Carlier 1999;
Steinbock 1999; Sztucki 1999) have pushed for additional scales or behavioural changes
within state thinking, they have neglected to focus on a renewal of the international refugee
definition itself. Drawing on the renewed regional definitions implemented by the OAU
Convention and the Cartagena Declaration, I have shown how it is both plausible and
possible to evaluate the definition of the refugee, as presented in 1951, and to develop
through regional agreement new and contextualised conceptions of the refugee in light of on-
going events.
Whilst ‘the refugee’ is a timeless phenomenon, it is one of constructed technicalities,
geographical positioning and institutionalized determination. A figure, which, as we know it,
has formed following the aftermath of war in Europe, the principle elements of both
international law and practice produced out of notions of humanitarian responsibility and
domestic security. Yet, despite evolution in thinking towards both security and global
humanitarianism, the figure of the refugee has remained confined to the realms of
persecution. The ever-growing numbers of forcibly displaced peoples has, it seems, failed to
prompt states and more directly the UNHCR into acknowledging the numerous motivations,
which force people into the cracks between nations.

38

Turkey provides both a key example and, as I have argued, an influential state due to both its
geographical location and the current events in which it is embroiled, through which to view
the need for a change in the terminology and limitations of the 1951 Convention and its
subsequent 1967 Protocol. The Syrian civil war shows no signs of dissipation and, as it nears
the fifth anniversary of its conception, the refugee crisis continues to grow and affect ever
more states as refugees strive to find protection and stability throughout the Middle East and
Europe. Many Syrians, however, fail to qualify as refugees, especially within the state
boundaries of Turkey, where they are subject to government ‘generosity’ over international
legal rights of protection and care.
Despite acknowledgement from Antonio Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
of ‘a paradigm change, an unchecked slide into an era in which the scale of global forced
displacement as well as the response required is now clearly dwarfing anything seen before’
(UNHCR 2014b: 3), little consideration or action has gone towards seeking an expanded
international definition of the refugee in the modern era. When so many international
institutions and norms have been created or undergone modification, such as the Right to
Protect in the 1990s, it is I think staggering that the Convention Regarding the Status of
Refugees has remained completely unchanged since 1967, with almost no further policy or
scholarly work produced on the 1951 Convention, focusing either on its validity or its
obscurity within the last five years, despite the record breaking figures on refugee numbers in
the last few years (UNHCR 2014b). Due to space constraints, this paper has only begun to
explore the intricacies of shifting the 1951 international legal refugee regime towards a more
encompassing definition. Further policy and academic research needs to be done to meet the
on-going policy challenges that refugee flows, such as those from Syria, present, when taken
in line with the nuances of the 1951 Convention to understand the complexities which

39

underly the continued importance that states impress upon the 1951 Conventions definition,
despite open-acknowledgement from many states (Icduyugu ibid: 5) of its constraining
chracteristics. The definition created to protect those most vulnerable following the Second
World War now forms a barrier to so many refugees who instead fall between the cracks of
nations as the terminology fails to recognise their plight.

40

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