Summer School “The EU area of freedom, security and justice”, July 1-3, 2017 Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece The Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, in collaboration with the Jean Monnet Chair of the Democritus University of Thrace organize a summer school entitled “The EU area of freedom, security and justice”, that will take place in July 1-3, at the Conference Room of the University of Macedonia.

1. Dimitrios V. Skiadas, MJur, PhD
Associate Professor of European Governance
Dept. of International and European Studies
University of Macedonia

4. EUROPOL Findings

5.  Over 90% of illegal immigrants coming to the EU, are being “facilitated” in their
efforts by criminal groups and/or organizations.
 Migratory flows do not follow a stable path and direction but they are affected by
factors such as border controls and weather c0nditions. This leads to seeking
alternative routes of migration.
 The smugglers have organized their networks along the migratory routes. Over 250
points for facilitating illegal migration have been located in and out of EU.
 The basic structure of the smuggling networks entails a) the “persons in charge”
who coordinate the activities during the migratory course, b) the “organizers” who
regulate all relevant activities at local level through their personal “connections” and
c) the “occasional service providers” who operate at a very basic level.
 Smuggling illegal immigrants is a profitable activity with low operating costs and
constant high demand. The annual turnover for 2015 has been estimated at 5-6
billion USD, cash being the main means of payment.
 Those involved in smuggling illegal immigrants, are involved also in other criminal
activities (polycriminality)
 The smuggled immigrants become, at an increasing rate, victims of labor or sexual
exploitation, as a means of payment for the smuggling services.
 It has been found that terrorists use the method of smuggling illegal immigrants in
order to enter (or re-enter) the EU, either as smugglers or as illegal immigrants.

6. EU BORDER CONTROL & MIGRATION
 In 2009, it was estimated that the economic recession in the vast majority of EU Member States
had led to a sharp increase in unemployment rates, prompting numerous governments to
introduce measures to protect domestic labour markets. The measures amounted to new
immigration restrictions aimed, successfully, at reducing the influx of migrants and encouraging
their departure.
 Thus a strongly negative statistical correlation was established between rising unemployment
rates in Member States and the detections of irregular migrants. Notwithstanding the
complexity of the issue, the correlation could signal that irregular migration is mainly a function of
labour demand in destination countries and is largely predictable. As a result, the decreasing trend
in irregular migration at that time (2009) represented a kind of a pause that ended when labour
demand in Member States started to rise again (2013 onwards). Also the developments in the wider
area of Mediterranean (Arab Spring, civil war in Syria, etc.), created new migratory flows.
 There are TWO main strategic approaches on migration by the EU
 The first is being developed within the framework of the EU Policy on Migration, as this is a
field of shared competence between the Union and its Member States, and it entails a) measures of
managing migratory flows and b) measures for controlling and averting migration (see
FRONTEX Actions i.e. TRITON, POSEIDON, etc)
 The second tackles migration as a source of danger for the security of the EU Member States
and the safety of their people, and it is being developed within the framework of the European
(now Common) Security and Defence Policy (see i.e. Operation SOPHIA)

8. The Schengen Area
 The main objective of the EU is to promote European integration by establishing a single
internal market in its Member States based on the free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital.
 Based on this approach, during the 1980s, five Member States (Belgium, France, Germany,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands) created a territory without internal borders by signing an
agreement in a small town in Luxembourg called Schengen, hence the “Schengen area” – a
territory in which the free movement of persons is guaranteed.
 The original agreement was complemented in 1990 by a convention. When this convention
entered into force in 1995 it abolished checks at the internal borders and created a single
external border. Whatever their location (land or sea), officers working at the external border
perform border checks in accordance with identical procedures. The rules governing visas
and the right to asylum are also common for all Schengen countries.
 In order to keep a balance between freedom and security, participating member states agreed to
introduce so-called “compensatory measures”. These are focused on cooperation and
coordination of the work of the police and judicial authorities, especially in order to combat
organised crime networks and safeguard internal security.
 In 1999, with the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, this intergovernmental cooperation
was incorporated into the EU framework.

9. The Dublin System
 The Dublin Regulation (Regulation 343/2003) establishes the criteria and mechanisms for
determining which EU Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application. The
rules aim to ensure quick access to asylum procedure and the examination of an application in
substance by a single, clearly determined, Member State.
 The core principle under the current Dublin regime is that the responsibility for examining
an asylum claim lies first and foremost with the Member State which played the greatest
part in the applicant’s entry to the EU. In most cases this means it is the Member State of
first entry. It can also be a Member State which has issued a visa or residence permit to a
third country national, who then decides to stay and apply for asylum when this authorisation
expires. Family unity and protection of unaccompanied minors are the main reasons to
derogate from these rules. This principle is based on the assumption that all EU Member
States are considered to be “safe states” i.e. they meat the criteria set by the 1951 Geneva
Convention on Refugees and Asylum Seekers.
 In practice, this means the responsibility for the vast majority of asylum claims is placed on a
small number of Member States (such as those in Southern Europe), stretching their capacity
beyond its limits. It became evident that the Dublin system, however, could not ensure a
sustainable sharing of responsibilities for asylum applicants across the EU.
 Thus the entire system was put on hold when the ECHR (Case M.S.S. vs Belgium and
Greece, Νο. 30696/09, 21st January 2011) and the ECJ (Cases C-411/2010 & C-493/2010)
found that the national systems on granting asylum to immigrants have severe problems,
causing lengthy delays, and providing very limited possibilities for a successful application.
Since 2011 the Dublin System is under review for a complete reform, especially taking into
account the lesson from the recent migration crisis.

11. The EU-Turkey “Agreement”
 On 18 March 2016, EU Heads of State or Government and Turkey agreed on the EU-Turkey
Statement to end the flow of irregular migration from Turkey to the EU and replace it with
organised, safe and legal channels to Europe.
 Core principle of the EU-Turkey Statement : All new irregular migrants or asylum seekers
crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands will be returned to Turkey, after an individual assessment
of their asylum claims in line with EU and international law, Turkey being considered a “safe
country” under international humanitarian law. For every Syrian being returned to Turkey, another
Syrian will be resettled to the EU from Turkey directly (1:1 mechanism). In parallel, the EU will
make available significant resources under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey to support refugees in
Turkey.
 Everyone who applies for asylum in Greece has their applications treated on a case-by-case basis, in
line with EU and international law requirements and the principle of non-refoulement. In each case
there are individual interviews, individual assessments and rights of appeal. There are no blanket or
automatic returns of migrants or asylum seekers.
 Critical Development: On 28 February 2017 the ECJ, adjudicating on the actions of three
immigrants against the EU-Turkey Agreement, found (Cases T-192/16, T-193/16 & T-257/16) that
this agreement, with regard to its contents and despite its expressed wording (“… the EU and Turkey
today decided to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. In order to achieve this goal,
they agreed on the following additional action points…”) that it is was not a part of EU Law, but
a simple international law agreement, which imposes no obligations on the EU itself but only
on its Member States and Turkey. Thus any violation of this agreement’s terms must be examined
by the national courts or the International Court of Justice.

12. Establishing FRONTEX
 Since 1999 strengthening cooperation in the area of migration, asylum and security became a
priority for the EU, and this led to the creation of the External Border Practitioners Common
Unit, composed of officials from national border control services. The Common Unit coordinated
national projects of Ad-Hoc Centres on Border Control, tasked with overseeing EU-wide pilot
projects and common operations related to border management. In 2002, there were six ad-hoc
centres: Risk Analysis Centre (Helsinki, Finland), Centre for Land Borders (Berlin, Germany),
Air Borders Centre (Rome, Italy), Western Sea Borders Centre (Madrid, Spain), Ad-hoc
Training Centre for Training (Traiskirchen, Austria), Centre of Excellence (Dover, United
Kingdom), Eastern Sea Borders Centre (Piraeus, Greece).
 These developments did not mean, however, that there was a EU Coast Guard or a Border Guard.
The EU Members remained in charge of managing their external borders, which also constitute the
EU’s borders based on the Schengen Borders Code. The EU provided financial support to such
Member States.
 In 2004, with the objective of improving procedures and working methods of the Common Unit,
and in order to promote cooperation and coordination between the national border guard authorities
through joint operations the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation
at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) was
established by Regulation 2007/2004.
 Frontex began its operations on 3 October 2005, being the first EU agency to be based in one of
the new EU member states from 2004 (Warsaw-Poland), something that caused an initially
unsuccessful recruitment for Frontex.

13.  While it remained the task of each member state to control its own borders, Frontex was
vested to ensure that they all do so with the same high standard of efficiency. Its main tasks
were:
 coordinating cooperation between member states in external border management.
 assisting member states in training of national border guards.
 carrying out risk analyses.
 following research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders.
 helping member states requiring technical and operational assistance at external borders.
 providing member states with the necessary support in organising joint return operations.
 Frontex was centrally and hierarchically organised with a management board, consisting of
one person of each member state as well as two members of the Commission. The member
states representatives were operational heads of national security services concerned with
border guard management. Frontex also had representatives from and worked closely
with Europol and Interpol. The Management Board was the leading component of the agency,
controlling the personal, financial, and organisational structure, as well as initiating operative
tasks in annual work programmes. Additionally, the Board appoints the Executive Director. In
2015, Frontex had 336 employees and 78 seconded officials from the member states. This
dependency of the organisation on staff secondments was identified as a risk, since valuable
experience is lost when such staff leave the organisation and return to their permanent jobs.
 Special European Border Forces of rapidly deployable border guards, called Rapid Border
Intervention Teams (RABIT) who are armed and patrol cross-country land borders, were
created by the Council (Ministers of Interior) in April 2007 to assist in border control,
particularly on EU’s southern coastlines. Furthermore armed border force officers were
deployed to the Greece–Turkey border in October 2010.

14. Transforming FRONTEX into EBCG
 The Commission was prompted to take swift action due to the refugee crisis, which brought to
the forefront the need to improve the security of the EU’s external borders. The migrant crisis
also demonstrated that FRONTEX, which had a limited mandate in supporting the Member
States to secure their external borders, has inadequate staff and equipment and lacks the
authority to conduct border management operations and search-and-rescue efforts.
 On 15.12.2015, the European Commission put forward a proposal to establish a European
Border and Coast Guard (EBCG), designed to ensure shared European management of
the external borders of the European Union. The proposed European Border and Coast
Guard Agency (EBCGA) would replace FRONTEX and have increased powers, namely shared
responsibility with national authorities over border management; the EBCGA and the national
border authorities together would constitute the EBCG.
 The legal grounds for the proposal are article 77, paragraph 2(b) and (d), and article 79,
paragraph 2(c), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article 77 grants
competence to the EU to adopt legislation on a “gradual introduction of an integrated
management system for external borders,” and article 79 authorizes the EU to enact legislation
concerning the repatriation of third-country nationals residing illegally within the EU.
 The political pressure caused by the migration crisis lead to a speedy adoption of the proposal
by the Cpuncil and the Parliament. Thus, in 2016 FRONTEX evolved into the EBCG by
Regulation 1624/2016, which became operational on 6.10.2016. Its competences, budget and
human resources are being increased gradually (budget from 238 million Euros in 2016 to 322
million Euros in 2020, and staff from 417 in 2016 to 1000 in 2020).

15.  With regard to EBCG scheme, this unifies the EBCGA and the Member States’ authorities
responsible for border management, including coast guards. National authorities would
continue to exercise the day-to-day management of their respective external borders.
 The EBCGA’s enhanced features include the following elements, which have caused some
concerns, as follows:
 Enhanced Supervisory Role
 A Monitoring and Risk Analysis Center. The Center is authorized to carry out mandatory
vulnerability assessments concerning the capacities of the Member States to face current or
upcoming challenges at their external borders.
 Concerns
 Need to clarify the relationship between the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism and the
Vulnerability Assessment model
 Need to ensure that the Agency’s supervisory role does not prejudice working relations in the
field of operational cooperation.
 Need to introduce a fundamental rights component into the Assessments.

16.  Enhanced Regulatory Role
 Member States are obliged to provide the Agency with relevant information for its risk
analysis.
 Concerns
 Need for a more specific explanation of what constitutes “relevant information” in order to
help to clarify the extent of this obligation.
 If the Agency is to be given access to European databases, this would have to be under strict
conditions, taking into account relevant data protection legislation.
 Enhanced Operational role
 A European Return Office. This Office enables the deployment of European Return
Intervention Teams composed of escorts, monitors, and return specialists to return illegally
present third-country nationals. These nationals would be given a uniform European travel
document for return. The Office would also establish and deploy EBCG Teams for joint
operations and rapid border interventions, as needed.
 Availability of human and technical resources: In emergency situations, Member States are
required to provide border guards, with no possibility to invoke an emergency situation
requiring their deployment at home. Similar, yet weaker provisions have been included as
regards the obligation to make available technical equipment. The Agency will be allowed to
acquire its own equipment.

17.  The right to intervene. Member States may request joint operations, rapid border
interventions, and deployment of the EBCG Teams to support national authorities when a
Member State experiences an influx of migrants that endangers the Schengen area. In such a
case, especially when a Member State’s action is not sufficient to handle the crisis (especially
when a Member State does not follow up on the recommendations from the Vulnerability
Assessment or in a situation where insufficient external border controls would put the overall
functioning of the Schengen area at risk), the Commission has the legal authority to adopt an
implementing decision on whether a situation at an external border requires urgent action at
the EU level. Based on this decision, the EBCGA would be able to intervene and deploy
EBCG Teams to undertake necessary measures, even without a request from the State
concerned.
 Concerns
 The right to intervene is a point of contention between a number of EU Members and the
Commission, especially those Members whose borders form the external borders of the EU,
such as Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Poland. These countries claim that intervention by
the EBCGA should be possible only with the consent of the affected Member
States. Otherwise, this right of intervention poses a very serious issue from the State’s
sovereignty point of view, as it signifies the granting of power to an EU body on an issue
which is in the heart of a State’s sovereign authority (border control).
 Both the unqualified obligation to make border guards available for rapid border interventions
and the ‘right to intervene’ under the Commission’s proposal arguably contravene the
Member States’ ultimate responsibility for internal security under the Treaties (Article 4(2)
TEU and Article 72 TFEU).

21. EU Operations on Migration

22. Operation «POSEIDON» (in Greece)
 Since 2006, FRONTEX (and now EBCG) supports Greece with guest officers, who perform
border surveillance, assist in the identification and registration of incoming migrants, as well
as debriefing and screening. Operation “Poseidon” is increasingly becoming a multipurpose
operation covering a number of aspects of cross border crime including smuggling of illegal
substances, weapons, detection, forged documents and many other coast guard functions such as
SAR, detection of illegal fishing and maritime pollution.
 When migratory pressure on this route dramatically increased in 2015, the Operation was
strengthened on Greece’s most affected islands in the Eastern Aegean, by bringing additional
officers, vessels and aircraft to help in patrolling and search and rescue operations, as well as in
assisting the Greek authorities with the identification and registration of arriving migrants and
refugees, along with interpreters and forged document experts, and with regard to returns and
readmissions from the hotspots.
 The area of operation covers the sea borders between Greek and Turkey and the Greek
islands.

23. Operation «TRITON» (in Italy)
 Operation TRITON succeeded Operation MARE NOSTRUM, initiated by Italy in 2013 to control
migratory flows from Africa and Middle East, after the Lampedusa tragic incidents (more than
500 people drowned in a few days in October 2013), including SAR missions. The enormous cost of
the Operation (114 million Euros) caused Italy to suspend the Operation, but after a series of new
accidents with more than 1000 people drowned within a week in April 2015, the EU developped
Operation TRITON, using FRONTEX.
 While the primary focus of Operation TRITON is border control and surveillance, search and
rescue remains also a priority. The scope of Operation TRITON has been expanded to cover the
detection of drug smuggling, illegal fishing and maritime pollution, as well as the registration of
the arriving migrants, and the collection of intelligence about people smuggling networks
operating in Libya and other African countries on the smuggling routes (the relevant information is
sent to the Italian authorities and Europol).
 All vessels and aircraft deployed within the framework of TRITON operate under the command of
the Italian Ministry of Interior.
 The operational area of Triton covers the territorial waters of Italy as well as parts of the search
and rescue (SAR) zones of Italy and Malta. It stretches 138 NM South of Sicily.

24. Operations in Western Mediterranean
 Within the framework of the Operations Hera, Indalo & Minerva, initiated and managed by
FRONTEX, officers, aircrafts and sea vessels are deployed, in cooperation with the Spanish
authorities in order to perform actions for border surveillance, search and rescue. Furthermore,
support is being provided, by specialized personel, in order to identify forged travelling documents,
stolen vehicles, and illegally imported goods and substances (i.e. drugs).

25. Cooperation between FRONTEX and NATO in
the Aegean Sea
 On 11 February 2016 NATO Defence Ministers decided to deploy ships to the Aegean Sea to
support Greece and Turkey, as well as the European Union’s border agency FRONTEX, in their
efforts to tackle the refugee and migrant crisis.
 NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2) arrived in the Aegean Sea within 48 hours of the
Ministers’ decision. It is conducting reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance in the
territorial waters of Greece and Turkey, as well as in international waters..
 NATO’s deployed ships ships are providing (through liaison arrangements between Allied Maritime
Command and FRONTEX) real-time information to the coastguards and relevant national
authorities of Greece and Turkey, as well as to FRONTEX, helping them in their efforts to tackle
this crisis and take even more effective action. Furthermore, Greek, Turkish and FRONTEX liaison
officers have been deployed to the NATO Aegean activity, which also enables the exchange of
information.
 At political level, in July 2016, NATO leaders also agreed, in principle, on a possible NATO role in
the Central Mediterranean, to complement or support the EU’s Operation “Sophia”

26. Operation «Sophia»
 Operation European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med) or Operation
«Sophia» - area of operations: Central & South Mediterranean Sea.
 It is the first EU mission within the ESDP framework, after the amendments introduced by the
Lisbon Treaty (in force since 2009), on EU “peacekeeping, humanitarian and military missions”
 It has been prepared and formulated during the first semester of 2015 by the competent EU bodies
and it was approved by Council Dec. 778/2015, as a military operation to disrupt the entire system
and network of smuggling humans, with an operational mandate, initially active for 12 months.
 The core mandate is “to undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and
enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to
contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking
networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean and prevent the further loss of life at sea.”
 By Council Dec. 993/2016 the Operation’s mandate was extended until July 2017 and reinforced by
two supporting tasks: a) training of the Libyan coastguards and navy; b) contributing to the
implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.
 Why “Sophia”: Sophia is a baby born on 24 August 2015 at 04.15 am on board the German frigate
“Schleswig-Holstein”, operating in the Central Mediterranean Sea as part of EUNAVFOR MED
Task Force. Born from a Somali mother rescued together with other 453 migrants, Sophia was
named after the Prussian princess Sophia of Schleswig-Holstein (1866 - 1952). Based on that
incident, it was decided to rename Operation EUNAVFOR MED, to “Sophia”, to honor the lives of
the people saved, and to highlight the importance of fighting the smugglers and the criminal
networks as a way of protecting human life.

28.  Operation SOPHIA is designed around 4 phases :
 Phase One: deployment of forces to build a comprehensive understanding of smuggling activity
and methods, (now completed)
 Phase Two: boarding, search, seizure and diversion of smugglers' vessels on the high seas under
the conditions provided for by applicable international law. This activity will be extended into
Territorial Waters upon the release of any applicable United Nation Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) and the concerned coastal State consent;
 Phase Three: taking operational measures against vessels and related assets suspected of being
used for human smuggling or trafficking inside the coastal states’ territory. Once again, this is
subject to the necessary legal framework established by UNSCR and following coastal state
consent;
 Phase Four: withdrawal of forces and completion of the operation.
 It is an operation with full military characteristics, with specific rules of engagement, rules of
apprehending and detaining smugglers, rules of treating smuggled people (even hostages).

29. Legal Considerations & EU Operations on Border
Control
 There are two approaches that can be used in examining the Legal Considerations regarding
the EU Operations on Border Control.
 The first is the “Sovereignty Approach” focusing on issues arising from the intervention of
EU forces on ships under a state’s flag or in territorial waters or in other zones of another state.
 The second is the “Humanitarian Approach” focusing on issues arising from the impact of
the EU activities on the human rights of the people involved in these operations, ie the
migrants, as well as the smugglers,.
 These two approaches are distinct and yet mutually influential, as their elements interact.

30. Sovereignty Approach

34.  Coastal State Jurisdiction in the Territorial Sea
 art. 2 UNCLOS on the legal status of the territorial sea states that “the sovereignty of a coastal
State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters…to an adjacent belt of sea,
described as the territorial sea”.
 Innocent Passage in the Territorial Sea (articles 17 to 32 of UNCLOS)
 art. 17 UNCLOS: Ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea .
 art. 19 UNCLOS: Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with UNCLOS and
with other rules of international law. List of activities that are considered not to constitute
innocent passage through the territorial sea, for example:
 the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State
 any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.
 art. 27 UNCLOS: addresses the criminal jurisdiction of a coastal State aboard foreign ships
passing through its territorial sea.

35.  High Seas: art. 87 UNCLOS: Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid
down by this Convention and by other rules of international law
 Exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state: art. 91 UNCLOS: Every State has the right to sail
ships flying its flag and ships have the nationality of the flag flown - art. 92 UNCLOS: Ships
shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for
in international treaties or in this Convention, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on
the high seas
 Right of visit: art.110 UNCLOS: Except where acts of interference derive from powers
conferred by treaty, a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship is not justified
in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that foreign ship – applicable
also to ships without nationality.
 Naval interdiction programmes/pre-border operations: Action of one state or more,
undertaken on the basis of an international agreement, aimed at exercising the right of visit in
relation to criminal activities not listed in article 110 UNCLOS, performed by ships without
nationality or by vessels sailing the flag of a state or a group of states.
 There is no internationally accepted definition of at sea interception or interdiction.
According to the Executive Committee of the UNHCR interception or interdiction occurs
when mandated authorities representing a State: (i) prevent embarkation of persons on an
international journey, (ii) prevent further onward international travel by persons, who have
commenced their journey, (iii) assert control of vessels where there are reasonable grounds to
believe the vessel is transporting persons contrary to international or national maritime law.
 EU is part of UNCLOS: Initially, under the form of European Communities, the EU was
granted the observer status, with regard to UNCLOS. In 1998, by Council Dec. 392/98, the EU
became a contracting party to UNCLOS, to the measure of competences conferred upon it by
its Member States.

36. The EU maritime domain encompasses the EU Member States’ maritime zones as well as
all maritime-related activities carried out therein by cargo, small boats and vessels
flagged, owned, managed by or bound to the EU. Beyond the above, it also comprises any
Search and Rescue Area and any Area of Operations that has been designated for an EU
Maritime Operation under civil or military authority.
 Maritime surveillance is “the effective understanding of all activities carried out at sea that
could impact the security, the safety, economy, or environment of the European Union
and its Member States”
 In the EU context, interdiction is seen as a two-step process: first, the stopping, boarding,
inspection, and search of a ship at sea suspected of prohibited conduct (boarding); and,
second, where such suspicions prove justified, taking measures including any combination of
arresting the vessel, arresting persons aboard, or seizing cargo (seizure). Seizure is always
conditioned on and preceded by boarding.
 The right of approach is not included within the concept of interdiction as it is not
unlawful for a governmental vessel on the high seas to draw near a foreign vessel to observe its
flag or other marks of nationality. Such actions are not being regarded as hostile. Yet, the right
of approach can be an interception measure, since the concept of interception is much broader
as set out in the UNHCR definition.

37.  Also the EU Schengen Borders Code with regard to the surveillance of the sea external
borders uses the notion of “interception” in a broad sense; given that the main purpose of
border surveillance is to prevent unauthorized border crossings, to counter cross-border
criminality, and to take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally, the
relevant measures to be taken in the course of a surveillance operation against vessels, with
regard to which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that they carry persons intending
to circumvent the checks at border crossing points, may include, inter alia: (1) approaching the
vessel; (2) a request for information; (3) stopping, boarding, and searching the ship; (4) seizing
the ship and apprehending persons on board; and (5) ordering the ship to modify its course
outside of or toward a destination other than the territorial waters or contiguous zone, or
escorting the vessel, or steaming nearby until the ship is heading on such course.
 However, a significant obstacle to the effectiveness of the Operations lay in the contrasting
interpretations of the International Law of the Sea by Member States as well as in the
definition of the operational area.
 This led to a limited maritime surface contribution from Member States to the joint operations.
 Operations are generally regarded as successful in improving cooperation and knowledge
sharing among Member States, as well as in streamlining procedures, and they ensure an
increased degree of uniformity in the handling of irregular immigrants, traffickers and so on.
 Moreover it seems that they produce results on the ground (judging from the figures mentioned
above).

38.  Especially with regard to Operation SOPHIA (as it is a full scale military operation) there
have been considerations on the legitimacy of the action taken by the participants. Its own
statute (Council Dec. 778/2015) provides that the forces involved shall conduct the measures
of the second and third phase in accordance with any applicable UN Security Council
Resolution or consent by the coastal State concerned, under the conditions set out in that
Resolution or consent, except for operations in the high seas against vessels without nationality
subject only to international law and therefore exposed to the authority of all states.
 This has been deemed as a vague provision, posing serious interpretation problems
concerning the requirements for the use of military force, especially by conditioning the use of
these measures using the wording "any applicable UN Security Council Resolution”. The test-
case was Libya. Given that there could not be a legally valid consent by that state (at the time
a chaotic country with two rival governments in Tobruk and in Tripoli), only a Resolution
could provide a way out. This was adopted on 9 October 2015 (Security Council Resolution
2240 relating to cooperation to combat smuggling of migrants and human trafficking in
Libya’s territorial sea and on the high seas off the coast of Libya). This Resolution authorizes
Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations [like the EU], to
inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels that they have reasonable grounds to
suspect are being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking from Libya, provided that
such Member States and regional organizations make good faith efforts to obtain the consent
of the vessel’s flag State prior to using the authority granted to them.
 This Resolution is the result of a compromise: while enabling EU to break the deadlock
and implement coercive measures on the high seas, it fails to authorize the measures in
Libya's waters and coast, thus compromising the operation by delaying and limiting its
action. Thus it allows the door to remain open to the use of force other than that authorized by
Security Council or Libya's consent, consonant with a realist rejection of consent as an
essential condition of legitimacy, certain that Libya's government is incapable of controlling all
Libyan territory.

39.  .
 Evidently, Resolution 2240 does not bind EU to Libyan consent as the Security Council
does not "decide" but only "calls on“ Member States to assist in taking coercive measures in
Libyan waters on Libya's "request." It seems reasonable to assume that the Security Council
allows the EU to decide to implement these measures even without the consent of the Libyan
government, albeit in accordance with international law.
 This leads to asking whether ensuring respect for international law really requires Security
Council authorization of raids and other such coercive measures or indeed Libya's consent.
 Based on these provisions, the EU provided, within the Operation SOPHIA’s rules, that the
EU will first seek to obtain permanent consent from certain flag states (without, however,
specifying how this will be achieved, but obviously this involves a certain form of standing
agreements, which are also in line with the EU law). If such consent has not been obtained,
the Operation Commander will seek the ad hoc consent of the flag state of vessels
suspected of being engaged in the smuggling of migrants from Libya. The ‘good faith efforts’
mentioned in Resolution 2240 ‘will be considered to have been exhausted if there is no
response to the request made within 4 (four) hours from the time of the request within the
given time preparatory measures are authorized. Thus, for the EU, ‘good faith efforts’ mean
requesting the flag state for its consent to board the suspect vessel and waiting for four
hours for that state to respond, after which the authority of Resolution 2240 is triggered and
the boarding takes place without the respective flag state’s consent.

40. Humanitarian Approach
 Based on well-established international customary law, UNCLOS provides for the duty to
render assistance
 art. 98 UNCLOS: Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he
can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers:
 • (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost;
 • (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their
need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him;
 Furthermore, the same provision requires coastal states to maintain a search and rescue
service.
 In addition to these provisions, the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS) requires ship masters, on hearing about a vessel in distress, to provide assistance
and inform the search and rescue service that they are doing so.
 Also, the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR
Convention) requires parties to provide assistance to anyone in distress regardless of the
nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is found.
 So it is clear that, when vessels respond to persons in distress at sea, they are not engaged in
interdiction. However, the issue is less clear when the vessels involved are operating in a
(police or military) mission to prevent irregular immigrants from crossing sea borders, usually
along with their smugglers (who hide amongst them).

41.  Furthermore, carrying out rescue operations does not exhaust the duty to render assistance,
which extends to the disembarkation of the rescued people in a place of safety.
 According to IMO Facilitation Committee’s Principles relating to administrative procedures
for disembarking persons rescued at sea, if disembarkation from the rescuing ship cannot
be arranged swiftly elsewhere, the Government responsible for the SAR area should accept
the disembarkation of the persons rescued in accordance with immigration laws and
regulations of each Member State into a place of safety under its control in which the persons
rescued can have timely access to post rescue support.
 The choice of the place of safety : The need to avoid disembarkation in territories where
the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded fear of persecution would be
threatened is a consideration in the case of asylum seekers and refugees recovered at sea.
 Relevant: Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees forbids a country
receiving asylum seekers from returning them to a country in which they would be in likely
danger of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion (non-refoulement principle)
 According to UNHCR and IMO, shipmasters are invited – for cases in which people rescued at
sea claim asylum – to alert the closest RCC (Rescue Co-ordination Centre); contact the
UNHCR; [to] not ask for disembarkation in the country of origin or from which the individuals
fled; [to] not share personal information regarding the asylum seekers with the authorities of
that country, or with others who might convey this information to those authorities.
 All these are applicable in the cases of the EU Operations, as the UN General Assembly
Resolution 70/235 on Oceans and Law of the sea (23 December 2015), refers to migration by
sea and calls upon States to ensure that masters on ships flying their flag take the steps
required by relevant instruments to provide assistance to persons in distress at sea and
recognizes that all States must fulfil their search and rescue responsibilities in accordance with
international law, including UNCLOS.

42.  The FRONTEX Operations have been criticized for not adhering these rules.
 There have been occasions in which no information was provided about where the interception
took place and how the FRONTEX staff managed to check if there were people falling under the
‘non-refoulement rule’ of the United Nations 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees.
 There are numerous reports of interceptions by border patrols taking place in international
waters (beyond the 24 nautical miles zone of territorial waters), where the boats are intercepted
and escorted back to the state where they set off for the crossing of the Mediterranean or the
Atlantic. And this happened prior to any screening to see whether some of those on board these
boats would fall under the ‘non-refoulement rule’. Migrants are then deported to countries which
are considered as de facto safe third countries although, like in the case of Libya, have not
ratified the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or have a working
asylum system in place.
 The same concerns were voiced in the case of the EU-Turkey “agreement” due to Turkey’s
verified poor performance on adhering international humanitarian and human right law.
 This procedure has been critized as being in breach of international and European law
unless the respective authorities checked if each single migrant was in need of international
protection, that is to say eligible to seek asylum.
 Deported migrants are then brought into detention camps where they wait for further
resettlement to their countries of origin. The conditions in those detention camps are often
reported to be below humanitarian standards.
 This negative image is further enhanced by the fact that both the pre-operational risk analysis
plus the evaluation reports on various missions, are not made accessible to the public.

43. Final Remarks
 There is a new approach to the security of global assets/interests/values, called the "immediate
security approach" based on a few key requirements related to the responsibility to protect
norm and intervention for tutelary purposes ("tutelary" intervention). This type of
intervention (which includes humanitarian intervention) includes forms of military coercion
(raids and other military measures) on ships and aircrafts in the sea and air space as well as
in the territory of other states without UN authorization to use force, even without the
consent of the territorial state concerned in cases of urgent necessity due to serious
violations of fundamental rights when the territorial state is "unwilling or unable" to act.
 In such a case, the intervention is not directed "against" the territorial state. Rather, it
aims to protect the internationally recognized fundamental interests themselves. This type
of action is "collective" in nature and is made possible by the "exceptional widening of the
material and coercive powers" of the states engaged in the intervention and exercised
outside their own jurisdiction. Limitations to sovereignty are not punitive, although they
compel the territorial state to tolerate the implementation of the collective will by reason
of the greater value accorded to global interests beyond the particular interests of
individual states. The force that intervening states use in a complementary or substitutive way
can therefore not be considered "international force."
 Such an intervention is not subject to prior authorization by the UN, however, as a form of
collective guarantee of global interests, it remains under the UN's strict political control. It
must be performed in compliance with any applicable Resolutions as well as the criterion of
proportionality and the mandatory nature of jus cogens norms imposing respect for life and the
safety of migrants. In specific cases, such an action is considered legitimate provided the
appropriate UN bodies (General Assembly, Security Council) and public opinion have not
censured the intervention.

44.  Operation SOPHIA has all the distinctive features required for "tutelary" intervention.
Coherence is signaled by the mission's expressly stated collective purpose, which aims at
combating human trafficking rather than defending the national interests of EU member states,
being also open to participation by third states. Furthermore, Libya and most states bordering
the Mediterranean are "unwilling or unable" to stem the spread of this phenomenon. Finally,
the need for intervention was officially presented as “urgent”, highlighting the necessity to
respond in an immediate and joint way to an exceptional situation that requires an exceptional
and coordinated response.
 All the EU operations offer a mixed image. On the one hand, the instruments of sea borders
surveillance and cooperation with third countries have now generally included human rights
safeguards (i.e. the internal complaint mechanism of the new EBCG Agency, and its increased
obligation to report more information to the Parliament and the Council). Operation Sophia’s
statute also explicitly states that it will be conducted in accordance with the principle of non-
refoulement and international human rights law. Even the more controversial EU-Turkey Deal
committed to protect all migrants in accordance with the relevant international standards and
in respect of the principle of non-refoulement.
 On the other hand, uncertainty remains as to the implementation, monitoring and control of
these human rights safeguards. Without clear accountability measures, there is no guarantee
that the safeguards included in the above instruments will be duly complied with, not ending
up as mere declarations. Furthermore, the primary aim of existing EU external migration
policies and operations is still the protection of the EU external borders against those
seeking refuge. The recurring tragedies off the coasts of the Mediterranean should however
prove the limits of repressive measures against migration and provide an incentive for the EU
to adjust its priorities towards the rescue of migrants, by intensifying, in action, the protection
of their most basic human rights.

45. Thank you very much for your patience
and your attention!!!!
The contents of this presentation have been extracted
from the texts and materials included in the folder “Materials” in which further analysis is made