Lecture on Blum, Racism: What It Is And What It Isn't & on Kelly and Roeder, Racial Cognition and the Ethics of Implicit Bias Blum The subject matter of the present discussion is how we should communicate about racism – about our moral vocabulary. Blum starts his article by pointing out that not all racial problems are racist problems, or that not all racial wrongs are racist wrongs. He is suggesting that we do a disservice to ourselves and to others if we do not keep this distinction in mind and if we do not employ it accordingly in our communication. It would be a “cheapening of the moral force of the idea of 'racism'”. In order to make this distinction between racial problems and racism, Blum defines racism accordingly. Racism has two components. One, inferiorization, and, two, antipathy. A racist views or treats persons of another race as inferior – because of their race. And, a racist hates or strongly dislikes persons of another race – because of their race. Blum points out that even though the two components are related, and often occur together, it is also possible for one to occur without the other. Occurrence of one without the other is sufficient for racism to be taking place. But, since racism is possible without one of these, neither one of the two elements is necessary for racism to be taking place. We can now go to Blum's examples. Blum gives us five examples to think about. Example one – a stereotype of black persons as intellectually inferior. Blum's analysis and conclusion – this stereotype is racist since it contains the first, inferiorization, element of racism. Example two – a stereotype of black persons as good dancers. Blum's analysis and conclusion - this stereotype, as such, is not racist. It is not racist – because it attributes a positive attribute to black persons. Therefore, there is neither inferiorization nor racism here. However, Blum's analysis consists of two additional comments. Comment one – the stereotype is still morally objectionable or immoral, in that it overgeneralizes about a group and blinds us to the internal diversity of the group. This stereotype discourages us from treating members of the group as individuals. This is a Kantian moral objection – individuals are not recognized as choosing for themselves to be and be seen as who they are but, rather, individuals are recognized in terms of who the person judging them chooses for them be seen and treated as. Even though racism also commits this Kantian moral wrong (inferiorization and antipathy are also forms of misrecognition of who persons choose themselves to be), misrecognition as such is not racism – since misrecognition can occur without basis in race. One can misrecognize persons on the basis of gender, eye color, profession, etc. This blinding is also morally problematic from the standpoint of the principle of democracy – that, in order for democracy to function, we must encounter and be challenged by pe.

1. Lecture on Blum, Racism: What It Is And What It Isn't & on
Kelly and Roeder, Racial Cognition and the Ethics of Implicit
Bias
Blum
The subject matter of the present discussion is how we should
communicate about racism – about our moral vocabulary.
Blum starts his article by pointing out that not all racial
problems are racist problems, or that not all racial wrongs are
racist wrongs. He is suggesting that we do a disservice to
ourselves and to others if we do not keep this distinction in
mind and if we do not employ it accordingly in our
communication. It would be a “cheapening of the moral force
of the idea of 'racism'”.
In order to make this distinction between racial problems and
racism, Blum defines racism accordingly. Racism has two
components. One, inferiorization, and, two, antipathy. A racist
views or treats persons of another race as inferior – because of
their race. And, a racist hates or strongly dislikes persons of
another race – because of their race.
Blum points out that even though the two components are
related, and often occur together, it is also possible for one to
occur without the other. Occurrence of one without the other is
sufficient for racism to be taking place. But, since racism is
possible without one of these, neither one of the two elements is
necessary for racism to be taking place.

2. We can now go to Blum's examples. Blum gives us five
examples to think about.
Example one – a stereotype of black persons as intellectually
inferior. Blum's analysis and conclusion – this stereotype is
racist since it contains the first, inferiorization, element of
racism.
Example two – a stereotype of black persons as good dancers.
Blum's analysis and conclusion - this stereotype, as such, is
not racist. It is not racist – because it attributes a positive
attribute to black persons. Therefore, there is neither
inferiorization nor racism here. However, Blum's analysis
consists of two additional comments.
Comment one – the stereotype is still morally objectionable or
immoral, in that it overgeneralizes about a group and blinds us
to the internal diversity of the group. This stereotype
discourages us from treating members of the group as
individuals. This is a Kantian moral objection – individuals are
not recognized as choosing for themselves to be and be seen as
who they are but, rather, individuals are recognized in terms of
who the person judging them chooses for them be seen and
treated as. Even though racism also commits this Kantian moral
wrong (inferiorization and antipathy are also forms of
misrecognition of who persons choose themselves to be),
misrecognition as such is not racism – since misrecognition can
occur without basis in race. One can misrecognize persons on
the basis of gender, eye color, profession, etc. This blinding is
also morally problematic from the standpoint of the principle of
democracy – that, in order for democracy to function, we must
encounter and be challenged by persons who are different than
we are and hold views different from our own.

3. Blum's comment two – the stereotype is morally objectionable
in that “good dancer” used to mean intellectually inferior in
another historical context in the past. However, this does not
mean that that “good dancer” means the same in the present
context.
Example three. Ms. Verano is a fourth grade white teacher who
does not have many (if any) black friends, and does not feel
comfortable with black parents. She has racial anxiety – on the
account that she fears that her communication may be
misinterpreted by black persons as offensive without her
intending to. As a result, she is awkward, defensive and
inattentive with black persons and does not effectively
communicate with black parents in her class. As a result, black
children in her class are not as well guided as the white
children, on the basis of the teacher's feedback to the parents –
and the education of the black children suffers. I this sense, the
black children are discriminated against in Ms. Verano's class.
Blum's analysis and conclusion – Verano is guilty of a racial
wrong (since there is harm to the children and they are
discriminated against) but not of racism (since Verano does not
view or treat black persons as inferior or has antipathy toward
them). Verano has racial anxiety or racial discomfort – but is
not a racist. She is, of course, culpable for her racial anxiety,
and must undertake steps to eliminate it, but she is not a racist
and is not morally culpable for racism.
Example four. Teacher asks for a “black point of view” from a
Haitian-American student in her class. Here we have the same
kind of racial homogenization as in the second example, and, it
is morally wrong for the same reasons, but, again, it is not
racist if the teacher does not view or treat black persons as

4. inferior and does not have antipathy toward them on the basis of
their race.
Example five. A skirmish was taking a place outside of a diner
in Rhode Island, and Officer Young, a black off-duty
policeman, stepped outside of the diner with his gun in an
attempt to resolve the disorder. Two white police officers
arrived, and shot and killed Officer Young after they yelled for
him to drop his weapon and he did not. A worry arose that
white person would not have been shot in such haste – and that
Officer Young was a victim of racism. Blum's analysis and
conclusion are as follows. There are strong reasons from the
history of the two white officers that they neither view nor treat
black persons with antipathy and inferiorization, and therefore
they are not racists; since they are not racists in their
motivation. However, Blum concludes, there may still be
racism involved – in the stereotype that links black persons with
violence and by which the white officers were guided. Many
people are prey to such stereotypes without themselves being
racists.
The afterthought for the purposes of our class is that the source
of racist stereotypes is, to a significant degree, communication.
We mean here both mass media that relies on such stereotypes –
that we have seen discussed for us by Patterson and Wilkinson,
as well as Murphy – ands our interpersonal communication. For
example, our jokes are frequently full of such stereotypes, but
also other types of our interpersonal communication are also
filled with such stereotypes.
We will look at the topic of racism in jokes shortly.
Meanwhile, let us also acknowledge, that Blum offers to us a
possibility to reflect on racism in stereotypes due to his

5. definition of racism, according to which not all racially
discriminatory behavior is racist, and due to which we looked at
racism beyond the motivation of persons, and, specifically, in
stereotypes.
Kelly & Roeder
Our interest in this Kelly and Roeder article comes insofar as
we ask the following question with regard to the Blum article:
what does it mean to say that a person is not racist in his
motivation yet acts upon a racist stereotype?
Kelly and Roeder appeal to a recognized phenomenon of snap
judgments uncovered by experimental cognitive psychologists.
They are judgments that we rely on in our behavior and that we
make “quickly, … without moderating influence of
introspection and deliberation and often without conscious
intention … relatively automatic processes.” Snap judgments
associateideas together – unconsciously, and without our
control, as it were. They are revealed by the Implicit
Association Test – in which experimenters ask subjects to
record very fast (before they have time to think) how they
associate ideas.
These Implicit Association Tests revealed that one type of such
associations that people in our society form is the Implicit
Racial Bias. One experimenter demonstrated the existence of
what has come to be known as the Weapon Bias – a popular
snap judgment many persons have by which they associate
images of black people with images of weapons. The Weapon
Bias would explain the Officer Young incident analyzed by
Blum with a conclusion that the white police officers were not
racist yet they were prey to a racist stereotype. They possessed
the weapon bias and made a snap judgment on its basis that the

6. black man with a gun (Officer Young) is a lethal threat.
Like Blum, Kelly and Roeder attempted to think through
whether a person is morally culpable for the implicit racial bias,
or a stereotype, that they are prey to. Like Blum, they
concluded that the racist bias, stereotypes, and unconscious (or,
in the language of cognitive psychology, “implicit”) attitudes
are “morally wrong – and condemnable – but that the person
himself cannot be blamed for having them.”
The interesting thing about the Kelly and Roeder article is that
they investigate the possibility of something like the Weapon
Bias being “rational.” What do they mean by rational here?
They mean that if a person has in fact been exposed to images
and stories from which that conclusion follows, then it is
rational for that person to draw that conclusion. To this, Kelly
and Roeder comment that even though the bias may be rational
in the sense of logical inference, it is still morally reprehensible
as it homogenizes and does not respect individuals as
individuals. We have seen Blum make this same Kantian
criticism in his article in his example three.
For the purposes of our class, it would make sense to point out
that the data from which the carriers of Implicit Racial Bias
derive their bias, is not necessarily one of their personal
experience, or statistical in the rigorous scientific sense, but is
likely originating from the images that we are bombarded by
from mass media, and, perhaps even from the interpersonal
communication in which we participate. Both of these sources
of the Implicit Racial Bias are morally reprehensible and should
be refrained from.