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1
Layers of Protection Analysis
ANGELA E. SUMMERS, PH.D., P.E.
SIS-TECH Solutions, LLC
We’re Proven-in-Use.
2
Defining risk tolerance
Risk Matrix
Risk Graph
Quantitative
-
-
-
-
a
1
1
2
1
3
a
1
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
3
2
4
3
5
h
8
-
-
a
1
W1
W2
W3
2
2
4
3
5
2
4
3
5
3
6
4
7
3
6
3
6
4
7
C1
C2
C3
C4
P1
P2
P1
P2
F1
F2
F1
F2
PFDavg= Ft/Fnp = Tolerable Frequency
Process Demand Frequency
RISK REDUCTION FACTOR REQUIRED MATRIX
4 10 10 1000 1000 TH
3 NR 10 100 1000 1000
2 NR NR 10 100 100
1 NR NR NR 10 10
1 2 3 4 5
CONSEQUENCE
FREQUENCY
3
Independent Protection Layer (IPL) Analysis Objective
Drive the consequence
and/or frequency of
potential incidents to an
tolerable risk level
Intolerable Risk
Tolerable Risk
Risk = frequency * consequence
4
Initiating Cause
Process Deviation
Initiating causes
Equipment failures
• instrumentation
• pumps
• compressors
human errors
loss of mechanical integrity
Initiating cause frequency
5
Consequence
Based on detailed description of hazard
scenario.
Examine safety, environmental, and economic
risks.
Often considers the possibility of escaping the
incident and the frequency of exposure to the
potential incident.
Assessment may be qualitative or quantitative
(consequence modeling)
6
Unmitigated Risk
Incident Frequency = Initiating Cause Frequency
Consequence = Scenario Consequence
Initiating
Cause
Consequence
Unmitigated Risk
IS IT TOLERABLE?
7
Risk Tolerance
Compare unmitigated risk to risk
tolerance.
If unmitigated risk is greater than risk
tolerance, independent protection layers
are required.
8
What are IPLs?
Independent
Protection Layers are
often depicted as an
onion skin.
Each layer is
independent in terms
of operation.
The failure of one
layer does not affect
the next.
Basic Process Control Systems
Non-safety Process alarms
Operator Supervision
PREVENTION
Safety Critical Process Alarms
Safety Instrumented Systems
MITIGATION
Mechanical Mitigation Systems
Fire and Gas Systems
PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE
COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Process Design
9
Independent Protection Layer Restrictions
Sufficiently independent so that the failure of
one IPL does not adversely affect the
probability of failure of another IPL
Designed to prevent the hazardous event, or
mitigate the consequences of the event
Designed to perform its safety function during
normal, abnormal, and design basis
conditions
Auditable for performance
10
IPL
IPLs can provide
Prevention (active – lower probability)
• Alarm with operator response
• Safety Instrumented System
Mitigation (active – lower probability/consequence)
• Pressure relief valve
Protection (passive – lower consequence)
• Dikes
• Mechanical design
• Barricades
11
Mitigated Risk – Reduce Frequency Only
IPL1
PFD1
IPL2
PFD2
Key:
Thickness of arrow represents frequency of
the consequence if later IPLs are not
successful
Impact
Event
frequency
Mitigated Risk =
reduced frequency * same
consequence
IPL3
PFD3
Unmitigated Risk =
frequency * consequence
12
IPL1 IPL2 IPL3
Scenario
Consequence
Initiating Event
Failure
Failure
Failure
Success
Success
Success
Safe Outcome
Safe Outcome
Safe Outcome
Consequences
exceeding criteria
Key:
Thickness of arrow represents frequency of
the consequence if later IPLs are not
successful
Impact
Event
frequency
Preventive
Feature
Preventive
Feature
Preventive
Feature
Unmitigated
Risk
REDUCE
FREQUENCY
TO ACHIEVE
TOLERABLE
RISK
Mitigated Risk = reduced
frequency * same consequence
PFD=0.1 PFD=0.01 PFD=0.1
Scenario
Consequence
Initiating Event
Frequency = 1/yr
Failure = 0.1
Failure = 0.01
Failure= 0.1
Success = 0.9
Success = 0.99
Success=0.9
Frequency = 0.9/yr
Safe Outcome
Frequency = 0.099/yr
Safe Outcome
Frequency = 0.0009/yr
Safe Outcome
Frequency = 0.0001/yr
Consequences
exceeding criteria
Key:
Thickness of arrow represents frequency of
the consequence if later IPLs are not
successful
Impact
Event
frequency
Preventive
Feature
Preventive
Feature
Preventive
Feature
Unmitigated
Risk
Mitigated Risk = reduced
frequency * same consequence
14
Mitigated Risk – Reduce Frequency and Consequence
IPL1
PFD1
Key:
Thickness of arrow represents frequency of
the consequence if later IPLs are not
successful
Impact
Event
frequency
Unmitigated Risk =
frequency * consequence
IPL2
PFD2
Mitigated Risk =
reduced frequency * same
consequence
CMS1
PFDN
Mitigated Risk =
reduced frequency *
reduced consequence
PFD=0.1 PFD=0.1 PFD=0.01
Different Scenario
Consequence Occurs
Key:
Thickness of arrow represents frequency of
the consequence if later IPLs are not
successful
Impact
Event
frequency
Unmitigated
Risk
Initiating Event
Frequency = 1/yr
Failure = 0.1
Failure = 0.1
Failure = 0.01
Success = 0.9
Success = 0.9
Success= 0.99
Frequency = 0.9/yr
Safe Outcome
Frequency = 0.09/yr
Safe Outcome
Frequency = 0.0099/yr
Mitigated Release,
tolerable outcome
Frequency 0.0001/yr
Consequences
exceeding criteria
Mitigative
Feature
Preventive
Feature
Preventive
Feature
Mitigated Risk = reduced
frequency * reduced consequence
16
SIL
One SIL Assignment Technique
17
Summary
“A man is rich in proportion to the number
of things he can afford to let alone.”
Henry David Thoreau
Industry will be judged on how it balances the
preservation of life and the environment with the
need for revenue and profits.
Engineers are charged with
achieving the balance.

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layersofprotection-angela-summers (1).ppt

  • 1. 1 Layers of Protection Analysis ANGELA E. SUMMERS, PH.D., P.E. SIS-TECH Solutions, LLC We’re Proven-in-Use.
  • 2. 2 Defining risk tolerance Risk Matrix Risk Graph Quantitative - - - - a 1 1 2 1 3 a 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 3 2 4 3 5 h 8 - - a 1 W1 W2 W3 2 2 4 3 5 2 4 3 5 3 6 4 7 3 6 3 6 4 7 C1 C2 C3 C4 P1 P2 P1 P2 F1 F2 F1 F2 PFDavg= Ft/Fnp = Tolerable Frequency Process Demand Frequency RISK REDUCTION FACTOR REQUIRED MATRIX 4 10 10 1000 1000 TH 3 NR 10 100 1000 1000 2 NR NR 10 100 100 1 NR NR NR 10 10 1 2 3 4 5 CONSEQUENCE FREQUENCY
  • 3. 3 Independent Protection Layer (IPL) Analysis Objective Drive the consequence and/or frequency of potential incidents to an tolerable risk level Intolerable Risk Tolerable Risk Risk = frequency * consequence
  • 4. 4 Initiating Cause Process Deviation Initiating causes Equipment failures • instrumentation • pumps • compressors human errors loss of mechanical integrity Initiating cause frequency
  • 5. 5 Consequence Based on detailed description of hazard scenario. Examine safety, environmental, and economic risks. Often considers the possibility of escaping the incident and the frequency of exposure to the potential incident. Assessment may be qualitative or quantitative (consequence modeling)
  • 6. 6 Unmitigated Risk Incident Frequency = Initiating Cause Frequency Consequence = Scenario Consequence Initiating Cause Consequence Unmitigated Risk IS IT TOLERABLE?
  • 7. 7 Risk Tolerance Compare unmitigated risk to risk tolerance. If unmitigated risk is greater than risk tolerance, independent protection layers are required.
  • 8. 8 What are IPLs? Independent Protection Layers are often depicted as an onion skin. Each layer is independent in terms of operation. The failure of one layer does not affect the next. Basic Process Control Systems Non-safety Process alarms Operator Supervision PREVENTION Safety Critical Process Alarms Safety Instrumented Systems MITIGATION Mechanical Mitigation Systems Fire and Gas Systems PLANT EMERGENCY RESPONSE COMMUNITY EMERGENCY RESPONSE Process Design
  • 9. 9 Independent Protection Layer Restrictions Sufficiently independent so that the failure of one IPL does not adversely affect the probability of failure of another IPL Designed to prevent the hazardous event, or mitigate the consequences of the event Designed to perform its safety function during normal, abnormal, and design basis conditions Auditable for performance
  • 10. 10 IPL IPLs can provide Prevention (active – lower probability) • Alarm with operator response • Safety Instrumented System Mitigation (active – lower probability/consequence) • Pressure relief valve Protection (passive – lower consequence) • Dikes • Mechanical design • Barricades
  • 11. 11 Mitigated Risk – Reduce Frequency Only IPL1 PFD1 IPL2 PFD2 Key: Thickness of arrow represents frequency of the consequence if later IPLs are not successful Impact Event frequency Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * same consequence IPL3 PFD3 Unmitigated Risk = frequency * consequence
  • 12. 12 IPL1 IPL2 IPL3 Scenario Consequence Initiating Event Failure Failure Failure Success Success Success Safe Outcome Safe Outcome Safe Outcome Consequences exceeding criteria Key: Thickness of arrow represents frequency of the consequence if later IPLs are not successful Impact Event frequency Preventive Feature Preventive Feature Preventive Feature Unmitigated Risk REDUCE FREQUENCY TO ACHIEVE TOLERABLE RISK Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * same consequence
  • 13. PFD=0.1 PFD=0.01 PFD=0.1 Scenario Consequence Initiating Event Frequency = 1/yr Failure = 0.1 Failure = 0.01 Failure= 0.1 Success = 0.9 Success = 0.99 Success=0.9 Frequency = 0.9/yr Safe Outcome Frequency = 0.099/yr Safe Outcome Frequency = 0.0009/yr Safe Outcome Frequency = 0.0001/yr Consequences exceeding criteria Key: Thickness of arrow represents frequency of the consequence if later IPLs are not successful Impact Event frequency Preventive Feature Preventive Feature Preventive Feature Unmitigated Risk Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * same consequence
  • 14. 14 Mitigated Risk – Reduce Frequency and Consequence IPL1 PFD1 Key: Thickness of arrow represents frequency of the consequence if later IPLs are not successful Impact Event frequency Unmitigated Risk = frequency * consequence IPL2 PFD2 Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * same consequence CMS1 PFDN Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * reduced consequence
  • 15. PFD=0.1 PFD=0.1 PFD=0.01 Different Scenario Consequence Occurs Key: Thickness of arrow represents frequency of the consequence if later IPLs are not successful Impact Event frequency Unmitigated Risk Initiating Event Frequency = 1/yr Failure = 0.1 Failure = 0.1 Failure = 0.01 Success = 0.9 Success = 0.9 Success= 0.99 Frequency = 0.9/yr Safe Outcome Frequency = 0.09/yr Safe Outcome Frequency = 0.0099/yr Mitigated Release, tolerable outcome Frequency 0.0001/yr Consequences exceeding criteria Mitigative Feature Preventive Feature Preventive Feature Mitigated Risk = reduced frequency * reduced consequence
  • 17. 17 Summary “A man is rich in proportion to the number of things he can afford to let alone.” Henry David Thoreau Industry will be judged on how it balances the preservation of life and the environment with the need for revenue and profits. Engineers are charged with achieving the balance.