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![2
As to why and how Kennedy began to expand America's presence in this part of the
southeastern Asian subcontinent. The following source outlines the backdrop behind
America’s slow and expanding involvement in the conflict8
This initial commitment to a continued engagement in Vietnam, was necessitated on the
premise of the “Domino theory” 9 which the Kennedy administration embraced. However as
early as 1961, the president was searching for ways, no so much to escalate, but rather refine
any military commitment to Vietnam 10
Kennedy and his advisors had begun to realize that the deteriorating situation essentially
diminished any hope of exiting from Vietnam, prior to the 1964 presidential election.
Additionally the president, an avid student of the nuances of foreign policy, feared any kind of
escalation would make withdrawal all but impossible.
All through the summer and autumn of 1963, events bore out these fears.
The reactionary policies of the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem11, which included religious
persecution, met with disapproval from the Kennedy administration.
The newly appointed Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge 12 had been in
consultation with military leaders and received information that a military coup had been
planned. Essentially, all that was needed, was a green light and it was supplied by Cable 243
13 and with Lodge’s assurances, the coup was able to proceed.
While Diem had been considered the best hope for stability in South Vietnam by both the
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, 196314 represented a turning point, for many reasons
so much so, a number of red flags had begun to be raised, due to the success of the North
Vietnamese and Vietcong.
The inadequacies of the Vietnamese military to contain these successes, “ARVN forces faced
a devastating defeat by the National Liberation Front in the Battle
of Ap Bac...”(Chloe Koscheva-Scissons 2015:62) had set off debates in Washington on the
continuing commitment of military resources in the growing conflict, the issue was becoming
a question between either escalation or withdrawal.
These debates revolved around Kennedy’s own concerns, stemming from the advice he had
received from De Gaulle, he had been prompted to initiate an examination of the situation
regarding [both] RVN 15 (and Laos, however the Geneva accords 16in July 1962 was one less
preoccupation for Kennedy and his advisors).
The Vietnam situation, however was another proposition entirely and this prompted the review,
already mentioned and as has been pointed out earlier, this was entirely due to the growing
deterioration on the ground (the excesses of the Diem regime, the Buddhist suicides and the
failures of the ARVN
8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:MPHyde/sandbox
9 http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/domino-theory
10 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Vietnam_(1959%E2%80%9363)
11 http://www.britannica.com/biography/Ngo-Dinh-Diem
12 http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000394
13 https://worldhistoryproject.org/1963/8/24/cable-243-is-sent-to-henry-cabot-lodge-jr-the-us-ambassador-
to-south-vietnam
14 http://www.vietnamgear.com/war1963.aspx
15 http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Republic_of_Vietnam
16 http://tswil.weebly.com/the-geneva-accord-of-1962.html](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/8b8a5a0c-cb46-4eb7-83d4-9e045a329173-160410214136/85/Kennedy-and-Vietnam-Hard-Copy-version-2-320.jpg)
![3
The examination of the Vietnam situation occurred just two months before Kennedy’s
assassination, both Robert McNamara 17 and Maxwell Taylor 18 undertook a 10 day fact finding
mission 19 to Vietnam, to evaluate matters and make recommendations to the President, on
what might be the best course of action to take.
“The report of the McNamara-Taylor mission, dated 2 October I963, concluded
that '[t]he military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress',
and that, despite 'serious political tensions' and the growing unpopularity of the
regime, there was 'no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup”
(Geoffrey Warner 1997:341).
However despite the findings of the report submitted to the President and earlier
recommendations made by Taylor and Walt Rostow 20 in October, 1961 in which they made
the following recommendations.
“…that 6,000 to 8,000 American combat troops in the guise of "flood-relief
workers" be dispatched to South Vietnam. Less well remembered is the Taylor-
Rostow suggestion that the United States should consider liberating the north if
the North Vietnamese maintained their aggression: that they "not only had
something to gain—the South—but a base to risk—the North—if war should
come." This aggressive proposal was supplemented by Rostow's idée fixe:
bombing the north. As Taylor and Rostow cabled Kennedy on 23 October 1961,
"NVN [North Vietnam] is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing, a
weakness which should be exploited diplomatically in convincing Hanoi to lay
off SVN [South Vietnam]." (David Milne 2007:179)
However despite these recommendations, Kennedy remained sceptical.
“I don't recall anyone who was strongly against, except one man, and that was
the President. The President just didn't want to be convinced that this was the
right thing to do.... It was really the President's personal conviction that U.S.
ground troops shouldn't go in.” (Maxwell Taylor).
The President would raise the vexing issue of Vietnam in an interview he gave in September,
1963 on the Huntley-Brinkley Report21: The president in this interview, clearly subscribed to
the idea of a “Domino Theory”, while at the same time indicated that the status quo, as was the
case with Vietnam in the earlier part of his administration was preferable.
To conclude, it is clear that in the final analysis, the assassinations of Diem and then Kennedy
would move Vietnam into a higher realm of policy consciousness.
All told Kennedy exhibited a steadfast reluctance to commit in a full-scale engagement in
Vietnam and despite all the reports and advise he had received, advocating large scale
involvement in Vietnam, the evidence suggests that Kennedy continued to explore alternatives.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bostdorff, Denise M., and Steven R. Goldzwig. “Idealism and Pragmatism in
American Foreign Policy Rhetoric: The Case of John F. Kennedy and
Vietnam”. Presidential Studies Quarterly 24.3 (1994): 515–530. Web...
17 https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_McNamara
18 http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/mdtaylor.htm
19 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/ch3
20 http://www.britannica.com/biography/W-W-Rostow
21 http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHA-213-003.aspx](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/8b8a5a0c-cb46-4eb7-83d4-9e045a329173-160410214136/85/Kennedy-and-Vietnam-Hard-Copy-version-3-320.jpg)
Kennedy and Vietnam -Hard Copy version
- 1. 1 10/04/2016 AUTHOR: MICHAEL P.HYDE STUDENT NUMBER: 114710771 WORD COUNT: 1,208 Kennedy and Vietnam Vietnam was not easy and especially for the ultimate cold warrior which Kennedy was. If anything, the president was ambiguous about Vietnam and it was not yet considered to be of any real consequences by him or his advisors, but that was to change in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs 1 and the construction of the Berlin Wall 2 The rhetorical flourish of the words, “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty”… Gained resonance in the aftermath of the meeting with Nikita Khrushchev 3 in Vienna and the president sensitive to his youth and inexperience, knew he couldn't just be a passive bystander and South East Asia represented an opportunity; decisions had to be made on Laos - a possible flash point. “On the day before his inauguration, the thirty-fifth president of the United States was notified of a deteriorating civil war in Laos4. A departing President Eisenhower 5 ominously warned the new chief executive: "You might have to go in there and fight it out."(Richard Patrick 1978:4) However while Eisenhower had counseled greater involvement in Laos, Kennedy would hear conflicting advice from the French President, Charles De Gaulle 6 when he visited Paris in the Spring of 1961 “…Southeast Asia did not offer a good terrain for Western troops, De Gaulle told him, nor indeed for Western politics. The French experience in the region had made clear that military action could never achieve lasting success, and therefore the best solution was neutralization. When Kennedy responded that at least the threat of American military intervention might be necessary in Laos, De Gaulle shook his head. "For you," he said, "intervention in this region will be an entanglement without end." Nationalism would always prove stronger than "any foreign authority," and "you are going to see this."…” (Frederik Logevall 1992:75) One might be excused to presume that Kennedy was unfamiliar with the overall situation in South East Asia and Vietnam in particular, however this was not the case7, as the new President knew about Vietnam on a more intimate level. 1 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/bay-of-pigs 2 http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Berlin_Wall 3 http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Nikita_Khrushchev 4 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24 5 http://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/dwight-d-eisenhower 6 http://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-de-Gaulle-president-of-France 7 (Presidential Studies Quarterly 24.3 (1994):515–530. Web...)
- 2. 2 As to whyand how Kennedy began to expand America's presence in this part of the southeastern Asian subcontinent. The following source outlines the backdrop behind America’s slow and expanding involvement in the conflict8 This initial commitment to a continued engagement in Vietnam, was necessitated on the premise of the “Domino theory” 9 which the Kennedy administration embraced. However as early as 1961, the president was searching for ways, no so much to escalate, but rather refine any military commitment to Vietnam 10 Kennedy and his advisors had begun to realize that the deteriorating situation essentially diminished any hope of exiting from Vietnam, prior to the 1964 presidential election. Additionally the president, an avid student of the nuances of foreign policy, feared any kind of escalation would make withdrawal all but impossible. All through the summer and autumn of 1963, events bore out these fears. The reactionary policies of the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem11, which included religious persecution, met with disapproval from the Kennedy administration. The newly appointed Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge 12 had been in consultation with military leaders and received information that a military coup had been planned. Essentially, all that was needed, was a green light and it was supplied by Cable 243 13 and with Lodge’s assurances, the coup was able to proceed. While Diem had been considered the best hope for stability in South Vietnam by both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, 196314 represented a turning point, for many reasons so much so, a number of red flags had begun to be raised, due to the success of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. The inadequacies of the Vietnamese military to contain these successes, “ARVN forces faced a devastating defeat by the National Liberation Front in the Battle of Ap Bac...”(Chloe Koscheva-Scissons 2015:62) had set off debates in Washington on the continuing commitment of military resources in the growing conflict, the issue was becoming a question between either escalation or withdrawal. These debates revolved around Kennedy’s own concerns, stemming from the advice he had received from De Gaulle, he had been prompted to initiate an examination of the situation regarding [both] RVN 15 (and Laos, however the Geneva accords 16in July 1962 was one less preoccupation for Kennedy and his advisors). The Vietnam situation, however was another proposition entirely and this prompted the review, already mentioned and as has been pointed out earlier, this was entirely due to the growing deterioration on the ground (the excesses of the Diem regime, the Buddhist suicides and the failures of the ARVN 8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:MPHyde/sandbox 9 http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/domino-theory 10 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_Vietnam_(1959%E2%80%9363) 11 http://www.britannica.com/biography/Ngo-Dinh-Diem 12 http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=L000394 13 https://worldhistoryproject.org/1963/8/24/cable-243-is-sent-to-henry-cabot-lodge-jr-the-us-ambassador- to-south-vietnam 14 http://www.vietnamgear.com/war1963.aspx 15 http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Republic_of_Vietnam 16 http://tswil.weebly.com/the-geneva-accord-of-1962.html
- 3. 3 The examination ofthe Vietnam situation occurred just two months before Kennedy’s assassination, both Robert McNamara 17 and Maxwell Taylor 18 undertook a 10 day fact finding mission 19 to Vietnam, to evaluate matters and make recommendations to the President, on what might be the best course of action to take. “The report of the McNamara-Taylor mission, dated 2 October I963, concluded that '[t]he military campaign has made great progress and continues to progress', and that, despite 'serious political tensions' and the growing unpopularity of the regime, there was 'no solid evidence of the possibility of a successful coup” (Geoffrey Warner 1997:341). However despite the findings of the report submitted to the President and earlier recommendations made by Taylor and Walt Rostow 20 in October, 1961 in which they made the following recommendations. “…that 6,000 to 8,000 American combat troops in the guise of "flood-relief workers" be dispatched to South Vietnam. Less well remembered is the Taylor- Rostow suggestion that the United States should consider liberating the north if the North Vietnamese maintained their aggression: that they "not only had something to gain—the South—but a base to risk—the North—if war should come." This aggressive proposal was supplemented by Rostow's idée fixe: bombing the north. As Taylor and Rostow cabled Kennedy on 23 October 1961, "NVN [North Vietnam] is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing, a weakness which should be exploited diplomatically in convincing Hanoi to lay off SVN [South Vietnam]." (David Milne 2007:179) However despite these recommendations, Kennedy remained sceptical. “I don't recall anyone who was strongly against, except one man, and that was the President. The President just didn't want to be convinced that this was the right thing to do.... It was really the President's personal conviction that U.S. ground troops shouldn't go in.” (Maxwell Taylor). The President would raise the vexing issue of Vietnam in an interview he gave in September, 1963 on the Huntley-Brinkley Report21: The president in this interview, clearly subscribed to the idea of a “Domino Theory”, while at the same time indicated that the status quo, as was the case with Vietnam in the earlier part of his administration was preferable. To conclude, it is clear that in the final analysis, the assassinations of Diem and then Kennedy would move Vietnam into a higher realm of policy consciousness. All told Kennedy exhibited a steadfast reluctance to commit in a full-scale engagement in Vietnam and despite all the reports and advise he had received, advocating large scale involvement in Vietnam, the evidence suggests that Kennedy continued to explore alternatives. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bostdorff, Denise M., and Steven R. Goldzwig. “Idealism and Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy Rhetoric: The Case of John F. Kennedy and Vietnam”. Presidential Studies Quarterly 24.3 (1994): 515–530. Web... 17 https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_McNamara 18 http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/mdtaylor.htm 19 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/ch3 20 http://www.britannica.com/biography/W-W-Rostow 21 http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHA-213-003.aspx
- 4. 4 Koscheva-Scissons, Chloe. CrossingOceans with Words: Diplomatic Communication during the Vietnam War, 1945-1969. Diss. Bowling Green State University, 2015. Logevall, Fredrik “De Gaulle, Neutralization, and American Involvement in Vietnam, 1963-1964”. Pacific Historical Review 61.1 (1992): 69–102. Web... Milne, David. The Journal of Military History, Volume 71, Number 1, January 2007, pp. 169-203 (Article) Patrick, Richard. “Presidential Leadership in Foreign Affairs Reexamined: Kennedy And Laos Without Radical Revisionism”. World Affairs 140.3 (1978): 245–258. Web... Taylor, Maxwell. “Robert F. Kennedy and His Times", Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Warner, Geoffrey. “The United States and Vietnam: From Kennedy to Johnson”. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944- ) 73.2 (1997): 333–349. Web... "Huntley-Brinkley Report," 9 September 1963