One of the main reasons for erroneous estimates of the size of the Arab population in Judea, Samaria and Gaza is a constant and consistent ignoring the data of the migration balance . This, combined with non-credible reports on the size of births and mortality, and as a result, a misconception about the natural increase, it brings to distortions in assessing the real annual growth rate of the Arab population in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. This inevitably leads to errors in assessing the demographic trends in the population in the long term and the direction and intensity of future developments in this area.

1. Presentation for discussion at the meeting
of Sub-Committee for Judea and Samaria of the
Knesset Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defense
on the subject of the Region’s demography
By Yakov Faitelson
November 10, 2014

2. Emigration from Judea, Samaria and Gaza
is not a new phenomenon.
It has existed continuously for at least 65 years.
Nor will the Arab population within Palestine be able to grow indefinitely. Some
outmigration, even in the absence of forced expulsion, is inevitable. The tiny Gaza Strip is
now one of the most densely settled areas of the world, and there is a limit to its ability to
contain more people, even at the appalling levels of subsistence that now prevail.
“The Demographic War For Palestine”, by Janet Abu-Lughod
The Link, Vol. 19, No. 5, December 1986
One of the main reasons for erroneous estimates of the size of the Arab population in
Judea, Samaria and Gaza is a constant and consistent ignoring the data of the migration
balance .
This, combined with non-credible reports on the size of births and mortality, and as a result,
a misconception about the natural increase, it brings to distortions in assessing the real
annual growth rate of the Arab population in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.
This inevitably leads to errors in assessing the demographic trends in the population in the
long term and the direction and intensity of future developments in this area.

3. “Palestinians have poured out of the West Bank for the last 30 years, under Jordanian as
well as Israeli rule, according to Prof. Uziel Schmelz, a senior official at the Israeli Bureau of
Statistics. From 1952 to 1961, the West Bank population grew annually at a rate of only
0 .07 percent a year, because 150,000 residents emigrated over that period”.
"Perilous numbers game on the West Bank”, By Trudy Rubin, Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor August 16, 1983 http://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0816/081638.html
“…from the early 1950s until the eve of Israeli occupation, the average annual net migration
rate was around 20 per 1,000, which almost off-set the rate of natural increase”.
UNCTAD/ECDC/SEU/1. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 28 June 1994
Population and Demographic Developments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip until 1990.
Study prepared by Dr. Wael R. Ennab, UNCTAD consultant (Al-Najah University, the West Bank)
Prof. Justin McCarthy estimates that from 1950 to 1960 the number of emigrants from the West Bank
reached 200 thousand. "Most migrants from the West Bank went to the East Bank. Improving
economic conditions on the East Bank and Jordanian citizenship made the East Bank an
attractive target area for the migration of unskilled labor. …Palestinian skilled labor went all
over the Arab world and on to Europe and the Americas, taking advantage of opportunities
that were unavailable to the unskilled”.
Justin McCarthy, Palestine's Population During The Ottoman And The British Mandate Periods.
Migration. Migration After 1948. Posted on September 8, 2001
http://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/Palestine-Remembered/Story559.html

4. The Migration Balance data is crucial for correct estimate of the size of the
population in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.
Nevertheless, US CBS and PCBS are systematically ignoring the Migration Balance
data and claiming that there is no migration of these areas.
US Census.gov
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/region.php?
Downloaded on June 27, 2014, 20:18
International Data Base. Demographic Overview - Custom Region - West Bank
Demographic Indicators 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Migration
Net migration rate
(per 1,000 population)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net number of migrants
(in thousands)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Source Information: West
Bank
"I think the reason is political. Emigration is a political issue. In the confrontation between the
Palestinians and the Jews, emigration could be construed by some as a form of Palestinian
concession, or as a sign of Palestinian weakness.“
Dr. Khalil Shikaki, a researcher of Palestinian public opinion.
"The secret Exodus -- Palestinian Emigration”. By Uriya Shavit and Jalal Bana.
Ha'aretz (Magazine section); 5 October 2001 http://www.mefacts.com/cached.asp?x_id=11243

5. “The weapon par excellence adopted by the Jewish community to enhance its claim to
Palestine was migration; the weapon of the Palestinian Arab population to maintain its
legitimate claim to the country has been natural increase”.
“The Demographic War For Palestine”, by Janet Abu-Lughod, 1986
“Despite an Arab birthrate far higher than that of Israeli Jews, the ratio of Jews to non-Jews
in Eretz (greater) Israel remained almost stable from 1970 to 1981: 65 percent Jews to 35
(inching toward 36*) percent non-Jews. The reason: heavy Palestinian emigration”.
*- Change in the rate was due to rapid Natural increase for the non-Jewish citizens of Israel.
"Perilous numbers game on the West Bank”
By Trudy Rubin, Special correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor August 16, 1983
"... We find that the Jews were able to save the higher share of Israeli population through
migration to Israel, while , simultaneously, the natural growth rates of the Palestinians had
diminished, the displacement rates (emigration abroad) (were) higher ... and the
contraceptive programs helped to reduce the fertility rates ... and therefore the demographic
factor will play a limited and even marginal role in the conflict... “
Bissan Jehad Edwan القنبلة الديموغرافية في إسرائيل وخداع النفس بيسان عدوان
Project Manager and researcher at Madarek Center for the Right to Knowledge, Cairo, Egypt
http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=17080
Civilized dialogue-number: 11:10 - 16 / 4 / 2004 - الحوار المتمدن-العدد: 806
Theme: Palestinian issue المحور: القضية الفلسطينية
إننا نجد إن اليهود ومن خلال صافي الهجرة استطاعوا الحفاظ علي نسبتهم المرتفعة في إسرائيل في المقابل تتلاشي نتائج الزيادة الطبيعية الفلسطينية بسبب
ارتفاع معدلات النزوح وزيادة عدد الوفيات وبرامج تحديد النسل .... التي تساعد علي انخفاض معدلات الخصوبة.. الخ، لذا ا العامل الديمغرافي سوف يلعب
دورا محدودا بل هامشيا في الصراع.

6. “With regard to total fertility rate (TFR), overall, UNRWA figures show that Palestinian
refugees’ TFR decreased and it is nearly similar to population in the host countries, while the
age group (0-4) is smaller than the age group of (5-9) which indicates less birth rate in the
last five years (See Table 3)”.
Demographic Profile of Palestinian Migration. By Ismail Lubbad, PhD. The Forced Migration & Refugee
Studies Program. The American University in Cairo, Egypt. October 23-25, 2007
In fact, the age group (9-5) is smaller than the age group (14-10), therefore, it is indicating
that the decline in the birth rate has been decreasing for last 10 years, i.e. starting from 1996.

7. “Data from questionnaires carried out by the Institute of Development Studies in Birzeit
university during February 2007, indicates… that youth are the category most
desirable for migration, since the percentage of individuals aged between 18-29 years who
prefer migration has reached 43.8%, while it has reached 29.5% for the category aged
between 30-49 years (See Table 6)… Data also shows that singles were the category most
desirable for emigration, about 54.1% of the total persons who desire to emigrate”.
Demographic Profile of Palestinian Migration. By Ismail Lubbad
“It is noticed that populations in rural areas are more desirable to emigrate than
populations in urban and camp areas, as the percentages were 35.1% for villagers, 31.1%
for urban, and 32.2% for camp residents”.

8. “Actually, Israeli authority indicates that migration is negative while the PCBS estimates no
migration flow from/into the oPt since 2000 (zero migration).
Nevertheless, between July 2006 and June 2007, the number of arrivals and departures
Palestinians to/out of the Gaza Strip indicates that the difference is approximately 10,000
departures.
This matches the expectations of a public poll conducted by Beirzeit Development Program in
February 2007, which revealed that about 31% of the respondents expressed their desire to
migrate if they had the opportunity, which reflects an increased desire of emigration”.
Demographic Profile of Palestinian Migration. By Ismail Lubbad, PhD.
The Forced Migration & Refugee Studies Program. The American University in Cairo, Egypt.
October 23-25, 2007
“Birzeit University pollster Nader Said, who has monitored emigration attitudes for 12 years,
says… that the percentage (of Palestinians willing to relocate) surges to 44 percent among
Palestinians in their 20s and 30s. Among young men, it surges beyond 50 percent”.
“Fallout of Hamas's rule spurs Palestinian desire to flee”.
By Joshua Mitnick, Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor. October 24, 2006
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1024/p04s01-wome.html

9. “…the ensuing political and economic predicament of the West Bank and Gaza Strip resulted
in a constant flow of emigration from the Palestinian occupied territory”.
“International Migration and the Nation State in Arab Countries”.
Philippe Fargues, Director, Migration Policy Centre European University Institute, Italy
Middle East Law and Governance 5 (2013). An Interdisciplinary Journal.
In the Religious ruling “Fatwa” (May 14, 2007), entitled "No permit for emigration from
Palestine", signed by the Mufti of Jerusalem and Palestine region, Sheikh Muhammad Amin
Hussein, it was written as follows:
“There are many talks about emigration in our country of Palestine at these days, especially
among the young people, due to the security situation and severe economic consequences,
who express their desire to find a work in other countries. It is reflected in pursuing the gates
of the embassies and missions of Western countries and asking to obtain a visa to these
countries and to settle permanently there . .. "
On July 2, 2007, in an interview with "Asharq Al-Awsat“, the Arabic international newspaper
headquartered in London, Prime Minister of the Palestinian Emergency Government, Salam
Fayyad, said as follows:
"How can I deal with the problem of 40 to 50 thousand Palestinians who emigrated, and
many more who are not emigrated yet, just because they can not do it. We are losing about
it .... "

10. "The net balance of arrivals and departures for the West Bank in the period 1967-present is
always negative: on average about 10,000 annually, except in specific years, such as the
years of the Gulf Wars when Palestinians were forced to return home and the period after
the start of the peace process and the arrival of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
leaders and their families...
... the main reason for migration by Palestinians relates to the economic factors resulting
from the political instability and the infighting between the Palestinian parties".
“The available data on migration revealed that the Palestinian Territory was third among
sending countries in the Middle East and North Africa, after Jordan and Iran (World Bank,
2008). Recently, it has been noted that the arrivals-departures balance is negative; in the
first 8 months of 2009, the only Jordanian-Palestinian crossing border point the Karama
bridge registered about minus 44 thousand, while it was about minus 63 thousand during
the same period in 2008 (PSD, 2009)”.
“Highly-skilled migration into, through and from the southern and eastern Mediterranean and sub Saharan Africa.
The case of Palestine”.
Mustafa Khawaja, Director, Jerusalem Statistical Department, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). CARIM-AS
2010/30, Robert Shuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole (FI): European University Institute,
2010.

11. Data of the Migration Balance in Judea and Samaria
(as provided following the meeting at the Civil Administration of Judea and Samaria, which took place on Nov. 3, 2008
with the participation of: Lt. Col. Sharon Biton, Yoram Ettinger, Dr. Mike Wise and Yakov Faitelson)
The annual Migration Balance
(arrivals/departures through international crossings)
Year
Residents of the
Region
Allenby
Bridge
Ben Gurion
Airport
Rafah
Crossing
Point
Adam
Bridge
Other
Crossing
Points
Total
8,226 7 0 40 584 7,595 Judea & Samaria 1997
10,666 6 0 42 661 9,957 Judea & Samaria 1998
12,549 22 0 34 919 11,574 Judea & Samaria 1999
19,536 86 0 113 1,457 17,880 Judea & Samaria 2000
7,224 3 0 33 571 6,617 Judea & Samaria 2001
4,496 4 0 42 199 4,251 Judea & Samaria 2002
6,850 4 0 56 469 6,321 Judea & Samaria 2003
16,914 8 0 61 376 16,469 Judea & Samaria 2004
30,806 13 0 117 465 30,211 Judea & Samaria 2005
35,171 26 0 0 661 34,484 Judea & Samaria 2006
59,861 46 0 0 864 58,951 Judea & Samaria 2007

12. 20,000
10,000
-
(10,000)
(20,000)
(30,000)
(40,000)
(50,000)
(60,000)
(70,000)
Migration balance in Judea, Samaria and Gaza
1967-2009
Judea & Samaria חבל עזה יהודה והשומרון
Gaza
First
Intifada
Period of economic
depression in Israel and
prosperity of oil-producing
countries
Recession of oil prices
1984-1998
Rule of Hamas
Al-Aqsa
Intifada
Encouraging
emigration to
South America
with a grant of 500
Israeli pounds per
family
The Oslo
Agreements
The mass immigration
from the Soviet Union
and growth of demand
for construction workers
in Israel

15. Until the mid-70s of the 20th century the Data of the US CBS was matching
the Data of the ICBS, including Arab residents of East Jerusalem.
By 1993, the figures of ICBS for Arab population of Judea and Samaria,
including East Jerusalem and Arab emigrants from Judea and Samaria, were
higher than those of US CBS.
In 1994, the figures of US CBS and ICBS (including East Jerusalem residents
and Arab emigrants) were alike.
Since 1997, the US CBS assessments of total population of Judea and
Samaria, Arabs and Jews, are presenting a line, following a linear regression
model. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) refers to the Arab
population only, but including East Jerusalem residents.
In 2001 the PCBS had published the population forecast by the year 2024
which looks like a linear regression line. According to this forecast, the
population of Judea and Samaria should be 3,385,187 people in 2013, about
25% more than the latest estimate of the PCBS for this year.
One can see that PCBS population estimate figures for Judea and Samaria for
years from 2002 to 2007 were zigzagging, but from here on they are
compatible with figures of US CBS.

16. As Arab demographers noted by themselves, the Arab migration balance in Judea and
Samaria was consistently negative throughout the period, starting from the 50s of the 20th
century and up to the end of it, except for a few years.
The Arab migration balance in Judea and Samaria remained to be negative in the 21st century
too, while its dimensions had even increased. In recent years, the phenomenon that had
existed in the 50s of last century had had repeated once again, when the negative migration
balance offsets the Natural Increase of the Arab population almost completely.
Simultaneously, due to the positive progress in the level of education, especially among the
Arab women, as also the growing urbanization process, the Natural Increase of all Arabs in the
Land of Israel is rapidly declining. For the Arabs of Judea and Samaria it is dropping even more
rapidly than for the Arabs, citizens of Israel. One of the main reasons for this development is
due to the emigration of young people and thereby due to reducing the volume of the fertile
Arab population in Judea and Samaria.
According to the CIA FACTBOOK publications, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of the Arabs of
Judea and Samaria fell down to 2.83 child per woman in 2014, compared with 5.70 child per
woman in 1994. The TFR of Arabs had reduced more than by 50% in less than one generation.
For comparison, the TFR of Jews in Israel in 2013 was 3.1 and of the Jewish settlers in Judea
and Samaria it is even 5.05 child per woman. Annual growth of the Jewish population of
Judea and Samaria communities is the highest of all geographical areas from the
Mediterranean sea to the Jordan River and stood on the average of 5% annually.

17. Conclusions
Analysis of demographic multi-annual trends existing in Judea and Samaria indicates the stability of the
Arab population size in the recent years, around 1.5 million people.
If the population of East Jerusalem Arab residents would be also included, it would reach about 1.8
million people. The Jewish population, including the Jewish settlements in Judea, Samaria and the
residents of East Jerusalem ,will approach 600 thousand people in 2014 , or approximately 25% of the
total population.
If we’ll ignore the artificial division of Jerusalem to the Eastern and Western parts of the city and treat all
Jerusalem residents as part of the population of Judea and Samaria, then the Jewish population is
approximately 880 thousand people, or a third of the Total population of this geographic area.
Expanding the boundaries of Jerusalem area up to the size similar to the municipal area of the capital of
Jordan, Amman, which is 1,680 square kilometers, would bring the total Jewish population up to about 1
million people, or 36% of the Total population in the geographical area of Judea and Samaria.
Analysis of potential development in this direction is used as the basis for preparing the Master Plan for
Jerusalem carried out by the team of "Jerusalem 2050", headed by architect Shlomo Gertner, and
founded by Mr. Kevin Bermeister.
Further development of the population size in Judea and Samaria, Jews and Arabs alike, depends not
only on the natural demographic trends in this area ongoing for the last 65 years, but also on properly
planned and initiated political, economical and security actions.