Is the following a logically correct inference? Either prove that it is (use the rules of inference or the tree method) or else give a counterexample. To get you started, first identify all the atomic propositions and replace them with a symbol (e.g. \"God exists\" can be replaced by G, \"God can prevent evil\" by P, etc.). Then translate each sentence into a compound proposition. If God exists, then God is omnipotent. If God exists, then God is omniscient. If God exists, then God is benevolent. If God can prevent evil, then if God knows that evil exists then God is not benevolent if God does not prevent evil. If God is omnipotent then God can prevent evil. If God is omniscient, then God knows that evil exists if it does indeed exist. Evil does not exist if God prevents it. Evil exists. God does not exist Of course, showing that the inference is correct does not prove that the conclusion is correct, since the premises can be false. The early philosophers, notably Rene Descartes, nonetheless made logical arguments to try and prove the existence of God. In all such inferences, believing in the truth of the premises is a matter of faith, not logic. Solution 1) God is transcendent (that is, almighty). (2) God is omniscient (that is, all-knowing). (3) God is flawlessly great. (4) Evil exists. Any a few of them may be valid in the meantime; however its absolutely impossible that every one of them could be valid. As it were, (1) through (4) shape a sensibly conflicting set. What is saying that something is consistently conflicting? (5) An arrangement of articulations is legitimately conflicting if and just if: (a) that set incorporates an immediate disagreement of the frame \"p and not-p\"; or (b) an immediate inconsistency can be reasoned from that set. None of the announcements in (1) through (4) straightforwardly repudiates some other, so if the set is sensibly conflicting, it must be on the grounds that we can reason an inconsistency from it. This is accurately what atheologians claim to have the capacity to do. Atheologians guarantee that an inconsistency can without much of a stretch be concluded from (1) through (4) once we thoroughly consider the ramifications of the perfect traits refered to in (1) through (3). They reason as takes after: (6) If God is transcendent, he would have the capacity to keep the greater part of the abhorrent and enduring on the planet. (7) If God is omniscient, he would think about the majority of the abhorrent and enduring on the planet and would know how to kill or avoid it. (8) If God is flawlessly great, he would need to keep the majority of the insidious and enduring on the planet. Explanations (6) through (8) mutually infer that if the ideal God of belief in a higher power truly existed, there would not be any shrewd or enduring. Be that as it may, as we as a whole know, our reality is loaded with a stunning measure of malevolent and enduring. Atheologians guarantee that, on the off chance that we reflect upo.

1. Is the following a logically correct inference? Either prove that it is (use the rules of inference or
the tree method) or else give a counterexample. To get you started, first identify all the atomic
propositions and replace them with a symbol (e.g. "God exists" can be replaced by G, "God
can prevent evil" by P, etc.). Then translate each sentence into a compound proposition. If God
exists, then God is omnipotent. If God exists, then God is omniscient. If God exists, then God is
benevolent. If God can prevent evil, then if God knows that evil exists then God is not
benevolent if God does not prevent evil. If God is omnipotent then God can prevent evil. If God
is omniscient, then God knows that evil exists if it does indeed exist. Evil does not exist if God
prevents it. Evil exists. God does not exist Of course, showing that the inference is correct does
not prove that the conclusion is correct, since the premises can be false. The early philosophers,
notably Rene Descartes, nonetheless made logical arguments to try and prove the existence of
God. In all such inferences, believing in the truth of the premises is a matter of faith, not logic.
Solution
1) God is transcendent (that is, almighty).
(2) God is omniscient (that is, all-knowing).
(3) God is flawlessly great.
(4) Evil exists.
Any a few of them may be valid in the meantime; however its absolutely impossible that every
one of them could be valid. As it were, (1) through (4) shape a sensibly conflicting set. What is
saying that something is consistently conflicting?
(5) An arrangement of articulations is legitimately conflicting if and just if: (a) that set
incorporates an immediate disagreement of the frame "p and not-p"; or (b) an immediate
inconsistency can be reasoned from that set.
None of the announcements in (1) through (4) straightforwardly repudiates some other, so if the
set is sensibly conflicting, it must be on the grounds that we can reason an inconsistency from it.
This is accurately what atheologians claim to have the capacity to do.
Atheologians guarantee that an inconsistency can without much of a stretch be concluded from
(1) through (4) once we thoroughly consider the ramifications of the perfect traits refered to in
(1) through (3). They reason as takes after:
(6) If God is transcendent, he would have the capacity to keep the greater part of the abhorrent
and enduring on the planet.
(7) If God is omniscient, he would think about the majority of the abhorrent and enduring on the
planet and would know how to kill or avoid it.
(8) If God is flawlessly great, he would need to keep the majority of the insidious and enduring

2. on the planet.
Explanations (6) through (8) mutually infer that if the ideal God of belief in a higher power truly
existed, there would not be any shrewd or enduring. Be that as it may, as we as a whole know,
our reality is loaded with a stunning measure of malevolent and enduring. Atheologians
guarantee that, on the off chance that we reflect upon (6) through (8) in light of the reality of
detestable and enduring in our reality, we ought to be directed to the accompanying conclusions:
(9) If God thinks about the greater part of the abhorrent and enduring on the planet, knows how
to wipe out or forestall it, is sufficiently capable to avert it, but then does not avoid it, he should
not be consummately great.
(10) If God thinks about the greater part of the insidious and enduring, knows how to dispense
with or anticipate it, needs to avert it, but does not do as such, he should not be almighty.
(11) If God is sufficiently intense to keep the greater part of the abhorrent and enduring, needs to
do as such, but then does not, he should not think about the greater part of the agony or know
how to dispose of or counteract it—that is, he should not be all-knowing.
From (9) through (11) we can derive:
(12) If insidious and enduring exist, then God is either not all-powerful, not omniscient, or not
flawlessly great.
Since insidious and enduring clearly do exist, we get:
(13) God is either not transcendent, not omniscient, or not superbly great.
Putting the point all the more obtusely, this line of contention proposes that—in light of the
shrewd and enduring we find in our reality—if God exists, he is either weak, insensible or
devilish. It ought to be evident that (13) clashes with (1) through (3) above. To make the
contention all the more clear, we can consolidate (1), (2) and (3) into the accompanying single
articulation.
(14) God is transcendent, omniscient and flawlessly great.
It is extremely unlikely that (13) and (14) could both be valid in the meantime. These
announcements are sensibly conflicting or opposing.
Explanation (14) is just the conjunction of (1) through (3) and communicates the focal conviction
of traditional belief in higher powers. Notwithstanding, atheologians assert that announcement (
13) can likewise be gotten from (1) through (3). [Statements (6) through (12) imply to show how
this is done.] (13) and (14), be that as it may, are coherently conflicting. Since a disagreement
can be reasoned from articulations (1) through (4) and in light of the fact that all theists trust (1)
through (4), atheologians guarantee that theists have coherently conflicting convictions. They
take note of that thinkers have dependably trusted it is never sound to think something opposing.
Along these lines, the presence of malevolent and enduring makes theists' confidence in the
presence of a flawless God silly.

3. Can the adherent to God escape from this problem? In his smash hit book When Bad Things
Happen to Good People, Rabbi Harold Kushner (1981) offers the accompanying break course for
the theist: preclude reality from claiming (1). As indicated by this proposition, God is not
disregarding your torment when he doesn't act to forestall it in light of the fact that—as an
omniscient God—he thinks about the greater part of your affliction. As an impeccably decent
God, he likewise feels your torment. The issue is that he can't make a move since he's not all-
powerful. As indicated by Kushner's depiction, God is something of a kind-hearted weakling.
He'd get a kick out of the chance to help, however he doesn't have the ability to take care of
abhorrent and enduring. Preventing reality from securing either (1), (2), (3) or ( 4) is absolutely
one route for the theist to escape from the consistent issue of wickedness, however it would not
be an extremely agreeable choice to numerous theists. In the rest of this article, we will look at
some mystical reactions to the intelligent issue of fiendishness that don't require the deserting of
any focal precept of belief in higher powers.
2. Coherent Consistency
Theists who need to counter the intelligent issue of underhandedness need to figure out how to
demonstrate that (1) through (4)— maybe notwithstanding starting appearances—are predictable
all things considered. We said over that an arrangement of articulations is consistently
conflicting if and just if that set incorporates an immediate inconsistency or an immediate
disagreement can be found from that set. That implies that an arrangement of articulations is
coherently steady if and just if that set does exclude an immediate inconsistency and an
immediate disagreement can't be found from that set. As it were,
(15) An arrangement of explanations is sensibly steady if and just in the event that it is workable
for every one of them to be valid in the meantime.
See that (15) does not state that predictable explanations should really be valid in the meantime.
They may all be false or some might be valid and others false. Consistency just requires that it be
feasible for the majority of the announcements to be valid (regardless of the possibility that that
probability is never realized). (15) likewise doesn't say anything in regards to credibility. It
doesn't require the joint of a reliable arrangement of explanations to be conceivable. It might be
exceedingly far-fetched or far-fetched that a specific arrangement of proclamations ought to all
be valid in the meantime. Be that as it may, unlikelihood is not an indistinguishable thing from
inconceivability. For whatever length of time that there is nothing opposing about their
conjunction, it will be conceivable (regardless of the possibility that impossible) for them all to
be valid in the meantime.
This brief exchange permits us to see that the atheological guarantee that announcements (1)
through (4) are intelligently conflicting is a fairly solid one. The atheologian is keeping up that
announcements (1) through (4) couldn't in any way, shape or form all be valid in the meantime.

4. At the end of the day,
(16) It is unrealistic for God and malevolence to exist together.
The sensible issue of malevolence claims that God's power, omniscience and incomparable
goodness would totally preclude the likelihood of shrewdness and that the presence of malice
would do likewise for the presence of a preeminent being.