This document provides a summary of an internship report examining the impact of anchoring on charitable contributions and corporate social responsibility (CSR) spending. The report is divided into three parts: 1) an overview of CSR including benefits to firms, 2) a literature review on anchoring effects showing their robust influence on judgments, and 3) a description of two experiments conducted that confirm charitable donations and CSR spending are contaminated by anchors. The internship aimed to study how anchoring may impact companies meeting the minimum 2% CSR spending limit imposed by Indian law.

1. Internship Report
The Impact of Anchoring on Charitable Contributions and CSR Spending
SUBMITTED BY:
Jatan Gogri
Second Year UG, Economics & Finance
UoLIP-the LSE
jatangogri@gmail.com
MENTOR:
Dr. Naman Desai
Finance & Accounting Area
Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
namand@iimahd.ernet.in

2. Contents
Preface
Part1:CSR
1
Part2: TheInevitable Anchoring Effect
4
Part3:Experiments
7
References
11

4. PREFACE
This report aims to summarize my internship study wherein fundamental
objective was to examine the potential consequences of the Anchoring effect on
charitable contributions and CorporateSocial Responsibility (CSR) spending in
the context of the minimum CSR spending limits imposed by the Companies
Act (2013), in India.
The report is divided into three parts. Part 1 summaries the various benefits
gained by firms who indulge in CSR activities and new 2% rule. Providing
literature review of the Anchoring effect and its possible application to the 2%
rule is the main theme of part 2. Part 3 presents the two experiments I assisted
in, wherein the results confirm contamination of the charitable donation amount
and CSR spending by an anchor.
More importantly, I would like to thank my mentors, Dr. Naman Desai and
Dr.Viswanth Pingali, for providing a free space to chase my own curiosities,
and in turn, experience grow. Thanks, again! 
Jatan Gogri

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PART 1
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR)
Introduction
There is no single universally accepted definition of CSR. It can be defined as
“discretionary business practices and contributions of corporate resources intended to
improve societal well-being” (Kotler & Lee, 2005) Not to ignore the fact, this is just one of
myriad interpretations of CSR. However, the key elements incorporated in most of the
definitions for CSR; in recent literature are: First, CSR refers to corporate actions that respect
and consider the interests of stakeholder groups; other than their shareholders and debt
holders. Second, those corporate actions go beyond the interests of the firm and that which
are required by law. In the Indian context, the World Bank Council for Sustainable
Development states CSR as a tool to improve overall human development and social
inclusion. More specifically, the World Bank envisions CSR as an activity that will ensure
that corporations will work with government, civil society, and community to improve the
lives of the underprivileged people of India by making growth more inclusive (World Bank,
2013).
Benefits of indulging in CSR
Theodore Levitt authored the HBR article “The Dangers of Social Responsibility,” in
which he cautions that “government’s job is not business, and business’s job is not
government” (1958, p. 47). Free-market propagandist Milton Friedman (1970) expressed the
same sentiment and added that the mere existence of CSR was a signal of an agency problem
within the firm. An agency theory perspective implies that CSR is a misuse of corporate
resources that would be better spent on valued-added internal projects or returned to
shareholders. However, recent research has suggested several economic and strategic benefits
accruing to companies that invest in CSR activities. For instance, there has been substantial

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evidence indicating that companies with a good CSR spending record, and voluntarily
disclosure of their CSR activities enjoy a significantly reduced cost of capital in comparison
to similar corporate houses that have a poor CSR performance record (Ghoul et al., 2011;
Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Richardson & Welker, 2001). Research also suggests that, CSR
activities can also lead to better financial performance by; improving the firm’s reputation
among customers which results in increased sales, improvement in the firm’s reputation with
regulators which helps in receiving more favorable treatment from such regulators,
improvement in ability to attract, retain and motivate employees, etc. (Dhaliwal et al., 2012;
Modi & Mishra, 2013; Korschun et al., 2014).
Research in the field of marketing indicates that there is a positive association
between a company’s CSR activities and consumers’ attitudes towards the company and its
products (Brown & Dacin, 1997; Creyer & Ross, 1997; Ellen, Mohr & Webb, 2000). Positive
CSR also raises the degree of brand loyalty, which in turn can make consumers less prone to
attitude change and reduce the effectiveness of competitors’ persuasion attempts (Krasnikov
et al., 2009). Additionally, Minor & Morgan (2011) indicate that a company’s CSR activities
can provide some insurance to the company against loss of reputation during turbulent
circumstances.
The 2% Rule
The Indian government became the first regulator in the world to mandate a minimum
CSR spending. In India, the concept of CSR is governed by clause 135 of the Companies Act,
2013, which was passed by both Houses of the Parliament, and had received the assent of the
President of India on August 29, 2013. The CSR provisions within the Act are applicable to
companies (publicly listed as well as private) with an annual turnover of 1,000 crore INR and
more, or a net worth of 500 crore INR and more, or a net profit of five crore INR and more.
These companies are mandated to annually spend 2% of average net profit of past three years
on certain approved CSR activities; the eligible activities have been specified under Schedule
VII of the Act. Additionally, the new Companies Act requires the board of the company to
disclose its CSR spending in their financial statements and in a separate individual CSR
report and publish the details on the company’s official website. If the company fails to spend
the prescribed amount, the board, in its report, shall specify the reasons. Through its disclose-

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or-explain mandate, the state encourages that all corporate bodies contribute transparently to
the betterment of the society as a whole, which in turn would make corporate growth more
inclusive and sustainable.

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PART 2
THE INEVITABLE ANCHORING EFFECT
Introduction
Cognitive Scientist Herbert Simon (1957) originally proposed the idea that human
judgements are based on Heuristics. Heuristics can be defined as the, “judgmental shortcuts
that generally get us where we need to go – and quickly – but at the cost of occasionally
sending us off course.” (Gilovich & Savitsky, 1996) The Seminal paper, Judgement under
uncertainty: heuristics and biases (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) described three heuristics
that are employed to assess probabilities and to predict values; which lead to systematic bias.
Adjustment and anchoring (1974) being one of them. Anchoring is a judgemental heuristic
wherein the final estimate is contaminated by an exposure to an explicit (Cervone & Peake,
1986; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) or an implicit (Northcraft &
Neale, 1987; Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996) anchor. The classic experiment to
demonstrate anchoring, conducted by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman goes on
following lines…Subjects were asked two questions. First, whether the percentage of African
nations in the United Nations (UN) is higher or lower than an arbitrary number-the anchor
that had ostensibly been determined by spinning a wheel of fortune (65 percent or 10
percent). Participants were then asked to give their best estimate of this percentage. Absolute
judgments were assimilated to the provided anchor value. The mean estimate of those who
saw 10 and 65 were 25 percent and 65 per cent, respectively.
Literature Review
Anchoring effect is one most the most robust and easily replicable phenomenon in the
field of experimental psychology. Anchoring effects pervade a variety of judgments, from the
trivial; estimating the mean temperature in Antarctica (Strack & Mussweiler, 1999) to the
apocalyptic; estimating the likelihood of nuclear war (Plous, 1989). In particular, they have
been observed in a broad array of different judgmental domains such as: General knowledge
questions (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), Price estimates (Strack, Mussweiler, & Pfeiffer,
2000; Northcraft & Neale, 1987), Estimates of self-efficacy (Cervone & Peake, 1986),
Probability assessments (Plous, 1989), Evaluations of lotteries and gambles (Chapman &

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Johnson, 1994), Legal judgement (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Englich & Mussweiler,
2001), and Negotiation (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). This could be the reason why first
offers may influence the final negotiation outcome, because they serve as judgmental anchors
to which the final outcome is assimilated.
Not only is this heuristic pervasive in a plethora of laboratory and real-world settings,
its influence is also remarkably robust. Surprisingly, anchoring is independent of many
potentially moderating variables. For one thing, anchoring occurs even if the anchor values
are clearly uninformative for the critical estimate (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Strack &
Mussweiler, 2000). Further, anchoring remains uninfluenced by the extremity of the anchor
(Chapman & Johnson, 1994; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) so that even extremely implausible
starting points yield an effect. For instance, in one of the studies (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997)
estimates for Mahatma Gandhi’s age were assimilated to an unreasonably high anchor value
of 140 years. Furthermore, the Anchoring effect appears to be independent of participants’
motivation (Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996). Specifically, there was an
unsuccessful attempt to improve accuracy by awarding a prize for the best estimate. In
addition, it has been demonstrated that anchoring occurs independently of participants’
expertise (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). For example, study in the
legal domain (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001) wherein experienced judges and inexperienced
law students were both influenced by the anchor sentencing demand given by a computer
science student to similar degrees. Furthermore, anchoring effects are characterized by an
exceptional temporal robustness and persist over fairly long periods of time. In one study,
anchoring effects were still apparent one week after the anchor value had been considered
(Mussweiler, 2001).
Another striking demonstration of the robustness of the phenomenon, stems from
research demonstrating that explicit instructions to correct for a potential influence of an
anchor do not mitigate the effect (Wilson et al., 1996). Even explicitly forewarning judges
about the potential distortion and informing them about its direction does not diminish the
effect. The literature clearly indicates that anchoring is a ubiquitous and highly robust
phenomenon; difficult to escape. Some research (Mussweiler, Strack, Pfeiffer, 2000) has been
conducted to overcome this inevitable anchoring effect. This real world setting study
demonstrated that de-bias effect can be achieved by applying a consider-the-opposite
strategy; generating reasons why an anchor is inappropriate.

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“The terms Anchor and Anchoring effect have been used in the psychological
literature to cover a bewildering array of diverse experimental manipulations and results,
ranging from the effects of unjudged a stimuli on psychological states (Helson, 1964) to early
bids and offers in negotiations (Neal & Bazerman, 1991)” (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995) For
this report, an anchor is an arbitrary value which is considered by the subject before making a
numerical estimate.
Possible Implications of the 2% rule owing to the Anchoring effect
For long, the Anchoring effect had rather remained the enigmatic Anchoring effect.
“In current psychological research, few phenomena are easier to demonstrate and harder to
explain than the so-called anchoring effect.’’(Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) Earlier experiments
focused on either verifying or demonstrating the Anchoring effect in various scenarios, or
were inconclusive about the psychological mechanisms that underlie anchoring. However,
Daniel Kahneman suggests in his book, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011); the psychology of
the Anchoring effect has finally been understood. The agenda of this study as conceived by
my mentors, Dr. Naman Desai and Dr. Vishwanath Pingali, is to examine the prevalence of
the Anchoring effect during charitable donations and possible implications of the 2% rule. A
potential problem with the 2% rule is that large companies, who usually spend more than 2%
of their profits on CSR related activities, could “anchor” their CSR spending on the minimum
stipulated limits which, in turn, could actually reduce their CSR spending. Such a result
would be contrary to the objectives of establishing such a minimum limit. Hence, we examine
the impact of anchoring on charitable contributions, and on the CSR spending of companies.
Two experiments were conducted to examine our primary research questions. The
first experiment was conducted to establish the effects of reference points on decisions related
to charitable giving. The experiment result suggests that participants did anchor on the
minimum stipulated limit while deciding on the amount of charitable contribution. The
second experiment was conducted to examine if anchoring specifically affected CSR
investment decisions. The results of the experiment indicated that the amount of reported
CSR spending was lower when the minimum 2% rule was imposed versus when it was not.
Furthermore, the results also indicate that when the 2% rule was not imposed the participants
appeared to anchor on the overall financial requirement of the CSR activity.

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PART 3
EXPERIMENTS
Hypothesis
Despite the several strategic benefits already available to companies investing in CSR
activities (Malik, 2014), the Indian Government decided to impose minimum CSR spending
limits on companies. This minimum spending limit does have the potential of increasing the
number of companies investing in CSR activities. However, certain large companies whose
CSR related spending were in excess of 2% of their profits could start anchoring on the
minimum 2% limit, in turn, reducing their investment in social causes. Additionally, once the
2% rule takes effect, it might be difficult for the company’s management to explain any CSR
spending in excess of 2% to the shareholders.
Formally stated:
H1: Individuals and companies subject to minimum spending limits on social causes will
anchor on the stipulated minimum limits, and as a result, invest less in such social causes than
individuals and companies which are not subject to such minimum spending limits.
There could be other variables which could act as anchors in the absence of minimum
spending limits. One such factor could be the total requirement of a CSR project. If a
company decides to finance a CSR activity only partially, then, in the absence of a minimum
spending limit, it is possible that the total financial requirements of a CSR activity could act
as an anchor while deciding on the amount of CSR investment in a particular activity.
Formally stated:
Q1: In the absence of a minimum CSR spending limit would the amount of CSR spending be
anchored on the total funding requirement of a CSR activity?

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Experiment Design
Two between-subjects experiments were conducted to test our hypotheses. The first
experiment was conducted to investigate if the donors were anchoring themselves to a
reference point. The experiment was conducted on undergraduate students in their last year of
study (before graduating) with the average age of 20.34 years. The participants were divided
in two treatments and were asked to answer 10 (multiple choice) quantitative aptitude
questions within a time limit of 15 minutes.1 The participants were paid 50 INR for every
correct answer and no penalty was imposed for inaccurate answers. Participants who were
unable to answer two questions (or less) correctly were still paid 100 INR for participating in
the study. After the pay outs were determined, participants in one treatment (control group)
were asked to voluntarily contribute a portion of their winnings to a charity of their choice.
The second treatment (treatment group) was similar to the first except that in this treatment a
minimum contribution limit of 5% was imposed on all winnings, and then the participants
had the option to voluntarily contribute any additional amount to a charity of their choice.2
The second experiment was conducted to examine how company executives react to
minimum CSR spending limits while deciding on the amount to be spent on a particular CSR
activity. The second experiment was a 2x2 between-subjects experiment where the presence
or absence of minimum spending limit and the total requirement of a CSR project (50 crores
INR versus 250 crores INR) were manipulated across treatments. All the participants of this
experiment were middle and top level company executives; who reported an average work
experience of 18.45 years. In this experiment the participants were provided with a brief
company description, the abbreviated financial statements of a company and a potential CSR
opportunity (improving schools’ infrastructure for the underprivileged). They were then asked
to determine the amount of CSR spending that would be committed on behalf of the company
on that particular project. This experiment was conducted to specifically examine if the
participants would anchor on the 2% minimum while deciding on their CSR spending.
Additionally, we also examined if the executives would anchor on the total requirements of
the social cause when no minimum spending limits were imposed.
1 The questions were selected from various GMAT practice tests.
2 The minimum 5% of contribution was also given to a charity of the participants’ choice.

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Results
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate that, participants in the first experiment
contributed significantly more to a charity of their choice when no minimum contribution
limit was imposed, compared to when their earnings were subject to a 5% minimum
contribution (38.5% versus 24.9%).3
The results of the first experiment strongly indicate that
anchoring affects participants’ decision making related to charitable contributions.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 1 (Indicating Charitable Contributions as
a Percentage of Total Earnings)
Treatment N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
1 42 0.385 0.176 0.04 0.80
2 41 0.249 0.145 0.05 0.53
Total 83 0.318 0.174 0.04 0.80
Treatment 1 = no mandatory contribution
Treatment 2 = 5% mandatory contribution
The second experiment was conducted to examine if the anchoring effects observed in
the context of charitable contributions actually extend to individuals making CSR spending
decisions. The descriptive statistics in Table 3 indicate that the CSR spending was higher
when no minimum was stipulated compared to conditions where a 2% minimum spending
limit was imposed. This result holds true irrespective of the overall requirement of the social
project (32.12 versus 25.42 and 28.49). Additionally, the CSR spending is the highest (42.40)
for the condition where fund requirement is relatively high (INR 250 crores versus INR 50
crores) and where no minimum CSR spending limits are imposed.
3 The contributions were significantly greater than the minimum 5% because of two primary
reasons. First, the 5% of total earnings might have appeared to be too less in absolute numbers (For e.g.
5% of Rs 200 is only Rs 10 which is a very small and insignificant amount in India. Second, the currency
denomination is such that participants would have found it difficult to contribute exact percentages and
hence they may have rounded up or down to multiples of 10, 20 or 100 which are the most commonly
used currency notes in India.

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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 2 Indicating Amount of CSR Spending
Mean (Std. Dev) Mean (Std. Dev)
Project Requirement 50 crores Project Requirement 250 crores
Minimum 2% 25.42 (2.44) 28.49 (8.00)
No Minimum 32.12 (10.67) 50.90 (38.88)
Conclusion
The results of this study have important implications for policy makers and regulators. While
the setting of a minimum CSR spending potentially increases the number of companies
investing in CSR activities, the minimum spending limit could actually act as an anchor and
potentially reduce the amount of CSR spending of certain large companies which spend more
than 2% of their profits on such activities which they are not legally obliged to. Therefore,
before stipulating any minimum limits regulators should clearly understand the implications
of such limits and also conduct a detailed analysis before deciding on the magnitude of any
minimum spending limit. Additionally, experiment results clearly suggest that corporate
bodies could ignore the strategic benefits gained through positive CSR investment and
instead anchor themselves solely on the minimum stipulated spending limit. This is consistent
with the past empirical evidence, which have persistently proved Anchoring effect to be a
robust, almost inescapable phenomenon.
More interestingly, our results also indicate that in the absence of minimum CSR spending
limits, the CSR spending appeared to be driven by the total requirement of the CSR project. If
such an anchoring leads to greater CSR spending than regulators should try and increase
awareness about the requirements of various CSR activities rather than imposing minimum
spending limits on corporations. Any such spending limit should be set strategically,
systematically and thoughtfully.

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*Information about the 2% rule and Companies Act, 2013 was collected from:
http://www.mca.gov.in/SearchableActs/Section135.htm