The document provides highlights from recent energy outlooks published by IEA, OPEC, and EIA:
- 2022 estimates from the agencies largely align but 2023 forecasts diverge more due to uncertainties.
- By 2030, scenarios show energy demand rising 8-12% except in IEA's NZE scenario. Fossil fuels remain a large share of the mix.
- By 2045, scenarios vary from a 15% decline to a 28% rise in primary energy demand. Fossil fuels remain above 50% in most scenarios.
- Comparisons to other outlooks show a wide range of projections underscoring transition uncertainties and policy impact.
This document compares the 2022 baseline liquids data from the IEA, OPEC, and EIA. It finds that while the agencies are generally aligned on OECD demand estimates, non-OECD demand estimates diverge by up to 0.5 mb/d, primarily in the Middle East, Latin America, and non-OECD Asia. The document also notes some differences in how the agencies classify and report data that can impact comparability, such as the treatment of biofuels and refinery processing gains. Improving consistency and transparency in baseline data is important for enabling more robust comparisons of future energy outlooks.
The Energy Outlook sets out a base case which outlines the 'most likely' path for global energy markets until 2035, based on assumptions and judgments about future changes in policy, technology and the economy. The Outlook also develops alternative cases to explore key uncertainties
The document is an overview from the U.S. Energy Information Administration's International Energy Outlook 2017. It projects that world energy consumption will increase 28% between 2015-2040, with over half of that growth occurring in non-OECD Asia due to strong economic growth. The industrial sector continues to account for the largest share of energy use through 2040. Renewables experience the fastest growth of any energy source, though fossil fuels remain the primary source of global energy. Economic growth is projected to be highest in non-OECD regions, particularly Asia, driving increased energy demand.
The document summarizes key highlights from the 2022 Statistical Review of World Energy. It notes that primary energy use increased 1% in 2022 to reach 2.8% above 2019 levels, driven mostly by non-OECD countries. Carbon emissions reached a new record high in 2022 of 39.3 billion tonnes, with energy-related emissions increasing 0.9%. Global prices of oil, natural gas, coal, and key minerals like lithium and cobalt increased sharply in 2022.
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/0484(2017).pdf
International Energy Outlook 2017
World energy consumption is projected to increase by 28% by 2040, according to the International Energy Outlook 2017 (IEO2017), released today by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Most of the world’s growth in energy demand is projected to take place in countries outside of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). China and the other non-OECD Asia nations alone account for more than 60% of the projected increase in world energy demand
The document is BP's 2018 Energy Outlook, which explores scenarios for the global energy transition out to 2040. It considers a range of scenarios that differ in their assumptions about policies, technologies, and energy market developments. The main scenario, called Evolving Transition, sees global energy demand growing by one third by 2040 as prosperity increases worldwide. Renewable energy is the fastest growing source and accounts for 40% of the increase in primary energy. However, carbon emissions continue rising, indicating more action is needed to achieve climate goals.
BP Energy Outlook
The Energy Outlook explores the forces shaping the global energy transition out to 2040 and the key uncertainties surrounding that transition. It shows how rising prosperity drives an increase in global energy demand and how that demand will be met over the coming decades through a diverse range of supplies including oil, gas, coal and renewables.
This document compares the 2022 baseline liquids data from the IEA, OPEC, and EIA. It finds that while the agencies are generally aligned on OECD demand estimates, non-OECD demand estimates diverge by up to 0.5 mb/d, primarily in the Middle East, Latin America, and non-OECD Asia. The document also notes some differences in how the agencies classify and report data that can impact comparability, such as the treatment of biofuels and refinery processing gains. Improving consistency and transparency in baseline data is important for enabling more robust comparisons of future energy outlooks.
The Energy Outlook sets out a base case which outlines the 'most likely' path for global energy markets until 2035, based on assumptions and judgments about future changes in policy, technology and the economy. The Outlook also develops alternative cases to explore key uncertainties
The document is an overview from the U.S. Energy Information Administration's International Energy Outlook 2017. It projects that world energy consumption will increase 28% between 2015-2040, with over half of that growth occurring in non-OECD Asia due to strong economic growth. The industrial sector continues to account for the largest share of energy use through 2040. Renewables experience the fastest growth of any energy source, though fossil fuels remain the primary source of global energy. Economic growth is projected to be highest in non-OECD regions, particularly Asia, driving increased energy demand.
The document summarizes key highlights from the 2022 Statistical Review of World Energy. It notes that primary energy use increased 1% in 2022 to reach 2.8% above 2019 levels, driven mostly by non-OECD countries. Carbon emissions reached a new record high in 2022 of 39.3 billion tonnes, with energy-related emissions increasing 0.9%. Global prices of oil, natural gas, coal, and key minerals like lithium and cobalt increased sharply in 2022.
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/0484(2017).pdf
International Energy Outlook 2017
World energy consumption is projected to increase by 28% by 2040, according to the International Energy Outlook 2017 (IEO2017), released today by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). Most of the world’s growth in energy demand is projected to take place in countries outside of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). China and the other non-OECD Asia nations alone account for more than 60% of the projected increase in world energy demand
The document is BP's 2018 Energy Outlook, which explores scenarios for the global energy transition out to 2040. It considers a range of scenarios that differ in their assumptions about policies, technologies, and energy market developments. The main scenario, called Evolving Transition, sees global energy demand growing by one third by 2040 as prosperity increases worldwide. Renewable energy is the fastest growing source and accounts for 40% of the increase in primary energy. However, carbon emissions continue rising, indicating more action is needed to achieve climate goals.
BP Energy Outlook
The Energy Outlook explores the forces shaping the global energy transition out to 2040 and the key uncertainties surrounding that transition. It shows how rising prosperity drives an increase in global energy demand and how that demand will be met over the coming decades through a diverse range of supplies including oil, gas, coal and renewables.
The document is BP's 2018 Energy Outlook, which explores scenarios for the global energy transition out to 2040. In the Evolving Transition scenario, global GDP more than doubles by 2040 due to rising prosperity in developing economies. This drives a 35% increase in global energy demand, partly offset by faster gains in energy efficiency. Industrial demand accounts for around half of increased energy use, while transport growth slows sharply. Renewables see the fastest growth and provide 40% of additional energy, resulting in the most diversified fuel mix ever by 2040. However, carbon emissions continue rising, indicating more action is needed to achieve climate goals.
The document summarizes bp's Energy Outlook 2022, which explores three scenarios (Accelerated, Net Zero, New Momentum) for the global energy transition to 2050. Accelerated and Net Zero result in substantial reductions in carbon emissions of around 75% and 95% respectively by 2050, aligned with limiting warming to below 2C and 1.5C. New Momentum sees more gradual changes aligned with current policy ambitions, with emissions 20% below 2019 levels by 2050. Across the scenarios, final energy demand peaks as efficiency gains accelerate, while renewable energy like wind and solar expand rapidly alongside technologies like hydrogen, bioenergy and CCUS.
New IEA report sees global energy-related CO2 emissions rising by 1.5 billion tonnes in 2021, driven by a strong rebound in demand for coal in electricity generation
The document summarizes the International Energy Agency's findings about the expected impact of economic recoveries on global energy demand and CO2 emissions in 2021. It finds that while the Covid-19 pandemic is still affecting energy use, stimulus packages and vaccine rollouts are boosting economic growth and energy demand. Global energy demand is projected to rise above 2019 levels, with emerging markets driving most of the increase. As a result, global energy-related CO2 emissions are expected to have their second largest annual increase, growing by almost 5% in 2021 and reversing most of the decline seen in 2020. Renewables remain the fastest growing energy source but increased use of coal and oil could push emissions above pre-pandemic levels.
EY Price Point: global oil and gas market outlook, Q2 | April 2022EY
The theme for this quarter is rearrangement. The loss, or potential loss, of Russian oil and gas supplies is forcing producers, refiners and traders to rethink the flow of crude oil and refined products from the wellhead to the gas pump in light of sanctions, potential sanctions and the risk of reputational damage. Countries, companies and consumers will all be searching for ways to adapt, and the outcome of the race to bring alternatives to market could alter the global energy landscape for years to come.
It is likely crude oil and LNG prices will remain elevated for some time. The process of diverting Russian oil through countries unwilling to sanction it will take time and there is little indication OPEC members are willing (or able) to increase production to make up for the loss of Russian crude. Spare capacity sat at 3.7 mbpd at the end of 2021, just above where it was in January 2020. Currently, sanctioned Venezuelan and Iranian production (about 3 mbpd below their peak) could fill the gap, but political and commercial obstacles remain. At today’s prices, US shale production is attractive, but the fastest the industry has been able to grow is between 1mbpd and 2mbpd per year. The LNG infrastructure was already stretched before the war in Ukraine and there is little prosect of finding new supplies soon.
As the largest buyer of Russian energy, Europe will be the epicenter. There is a deeply embedded bias there in favor for renewable energy, and the current crisis is certain to result in an all-out effort to accelerate the build-out of wind and solar power. The capacity to add new green energy is limited though by the project pipeline and supply chains for solar panels and wind turbines, and it is likely that much of the shortfall will be made up with the new LNG infrastructure.
The document summarizes key findings from an Accenture analysis of how demand for different energy sources may change between now and 2035. It identifies five portfolio plays that could help oil and gas companies succeed in the changing energy landscape: 1) Growing natural gas demand, especially in Asia. 2) Producing oil at the lowest possible cost. 3) Developing carbon capture and industrial efficiency technologies. 4) Producing "blue" hydrogen from natural gas with carbon capture. 5) Winning in biofuels and low-carbon products like bio-lubricants. The analysis projects continued overall energy demand growth but significant changes in the fuel mix across regions and sectors.
Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Energy Sector
Dr. Fatih Birol
Chief Economist
International Energy Agency
World Energy Council
Rome, 19th March 2009
The document discusses how the global financial crisis is impacting energy investment and climate change efforts. It notes that investment in renewable energy declined in the last quarter of 2008 due to higher financing costs and lower oil and gas prices. Across the energy industry, consolidation is expected as large companies acquire assets from struggling smaller producers. The crisis also threatens progress on reducing emissions as investment in low-carbon technologies declines without government intervention.
This document presents three scenarios for the future growth of wind energy capacity and generation globally and by region up to 2030 and 2050:
1) The Reference scenario, based on current policies, projects global wind capacity reaching 573GW by 2030, lower than the other scenarios.
2) The Moderate scenario includes enacted and planned policies, with global capacity reaching 1,778GW by 2030, led by growth in China, India, and Europe.
3) The Advanced scenario represents a "wind energy vision" with a strong commitment to renewables, resulting in over 2,342GW globally by 2030, significantly transforming electricity systems.
The document discusses the digital future of the oil and gas industry. It notes that the industry faces challenges from lower oil prices, aging infrastructure and workforces, and increased environmental scrutiny. However, the long term demand for energy is still expected to rise significantly due to global population and economic growth. The document argues that the industry can overcome these challenges through increased digitization and use of industrial internet/IoT solutions. These solutions can optimize asset performance, reduce downtime and costs, improve safety and efficiency, and capture institutional knowledge as workforces age. Overall, increased digitization is presented as a key way for the industry to navigate current challenges and meet rising long term energy demand.
Energy power shift 04 2015 rallis vasilis Vasilis Rallis
Webinar, Manchester Business School, MBA Energy and Industry Club
A general outlook on the energy industry and changes shaping the future. The presentation describes the shifting trends in Oil, Gas, Power (Electricity and RES), Climate Change and emerging business models
This document summarizes a report on present global energy use and future demands. It outlines the methodology used, which includes forecasting energy supply and demand at the country and regional level based on projections for population, GDP per capita, and energy intensity. Key findings include that total energy demand will continue growing but at a slower rate, developing regions will account for most demand growth, and natural gas and renewables will experience the largest increases while coal's share declines.
Mark Walkington on the Ministry of Economic Development's energy projectionsmhjbnz
The document discusses New Zealand's energy outlook according to a reference scenario and two alternative scenarios. The reference scenario assumes current policies and technologies and predicts that renewable energy such as biomass will see the greatest growth. Transport energy demand is dominated by road transport and heavy fleet demand increases more than light fleet. The alternative scenarios consider higher carbon prices and more electric vehicles, biofuels, and fuel switching to biomass, with the goal of reducing reliance on imported oil and lowering emissions.
The document summarizes key findings from the World Energy Outlook 2018 report. It presents three scenarios for global energy demand and supply - New Policies Scenario, Current Policies Scenario, and Sustainable Development Scenario. Electricity demand is projected to increase 60% by 2040 with developing countries driving most growth. Renewable energy capacity is also expected to rise significantly under all scenarios, reaching 52-68% of total generation by 2040 depending on the scenario. The Sustainable Development Scenario aims for 100% global electricity access by 2030 and a halving of CO2 emissions by focusing on energy efficiency and the use of renewable sources like solar and wind power.
OECD Green Talks LIVE - Investing in Climate, Investing in GrowthOECD Environment
Combining ambitious climate action and economic reforms will boost GDP over time rather than harm growth. By 2021, GDP across G20 economies could increase 1% and by 2050 the growth effect could rise to 2.8% when accounting for avoided climate damages. While upfront infrastructure investments are needed to transition to renewable energy, these will be offset by savings from lower fossil fuel expenditures. More ambitious climate policies that place an accurate price on carbon can be achieved without damaging economic growth when paired with economic reforms.
- Global GDP more than doubles by 2035 driven by population growth and productivity increases, especially in emerging economies like China and India.
- Growing economies require more energy, with total primary energy consumption increasing by 34% between 2014-2035.
- Virtually all energy demand growth occurs in emerging economies as energy use in OECD countries barely grows. China's energy demand growth slows substantially but is partially offset by increased use in other developing countries like India.
Meta-review of long-term energy & carbon pricesLeonardo ENERGY
This report presents the findings of a study on future energy and carbon costs, based on a review of 13 long-term scenarios for the energy transition
- Coal, oil, gas, electricity, and carbon future prices are included (throughout this report referred to as “energy vectors”)
- Facts and trends impacting future prices are identified, but not analyzed
- EU countries with available information and in different stages of the energy transition are included
The findings can be summarized as follows:
- Most scenarios expect coal prices will remain virtually flat, with yearly price increases that are lower than those of other fossil fuels.
- Oil prices will be affected by limited supply and a decreasing demand. Most scenarios project a moderate growth of oil real prices from 2020 to 2050, except for particular extreme cases.
- Natural gas demand is projected to increase, but price increases will be moderated by abundant global supply. Natural gas demand is projected to increase, but price increases will be moderated by abundant global supply.
- It is expected that end-user electricity prices will rise driven by fossil fuel prices, carbon prices, and increasing generation costs from RES. Industrial electricity prices are projected to increase in the short term and then stabilize towards 2050. Industrial electricity prices rise under scenarios with higher RES
- CO2 prices will increase and will shift the profitability of carbon intensive technologies towards less carbon intensive ones. All considered scenarios project a strong yearly growth of carbon prices . However, there is a wide variation of estimates.
- Coal, oil or gas prices are not correlated with RES penetration.
The above findings are essentially assumptions behind some of the major scenarios using in energy policy planning. The analysis includes scenarios from Ecofys, the European Commission, DNV GL, Greenpeace, Eurelectric, European Climate Foundation, McKinsey, Enerrgynautics, Fraunhofer, Stanford, Imperial College and NERA.
Annual report from BP looking at their best guesses about where energy, of all kinds, is heading from now until 2035. In this year's report, BP predicts (1) By 2035, across the entire world, 80% of all energy will come from fossil fuels. (2) Natural gas is the largest-growing fossil fuel and by 2035 it will have replaced coal as the #2 source of energy in the world. (3) The U.S. will achieve overall energy self-sufficiency by 2021, and oil self-sufficiency by 2030.
The document is BP's 2018 Energy Outlook, which explores scenarios for the global energy transition out to 2040. In the Evolving Transition scenario, global GDP more than doubles by 2040 due to rising prosperity in developing economies. This drives a 35% increase in global energy demand, partly offset by faster gains in energy efficiency. Industrial demand accounts for around half of increased energy use, while transport growth slows sharply. Renewables see the fastest growth and provide 40% of additional energy, resulting in the most diversified fuel mix ever by 2040. However, carbon emissions continue rising, indicating more action is needed to achieve climate goals.
The document summarizes bp's Energy Outlook 2022, which explores three scenarios (Accelerated, Net Zero, New Momentum) for the global energy transition to 2050. Accelerated and Net Zero result in substantial reductions in carbon emissions of around 75% and 95% respectively by 2050, aligned with limiting warming to below 2C and 1.5C. New Momentum sees more gradual changes aligned with current policy ambitions, with emissions 20% below 2019 levels by 2050. Across the scenarios, final energy demand peaks as efficiency gains accelerate, while renewable energy like wind and solar expand rapidly alongside technologies like hydrogen, bioenergy and CCUS.
New IEA report sees global energy-related CO2 emissions rising by 1.5 billion tonnes in 2021, driven by a strong rebound in demand for coal in electricity generation
The document summarizes the International Energy Agency's findings about the expected impact of economic recoveries on global energy demand and CO2 emissions in 2021. It finds that while the Covid-19 pandemic is still affecting energy use, stimulus packages and vaccine rollouts are boosting economic growth and energy demand. Global energy demand is projected to rise above 2019 levels, with emerging markets driving most of the increase. As a result, global energy-related CO2 emissions are expected to have their second largest annual increase, growing by almost 5% in 2021 and reversing most of the decline seen in 2020. Renewables remain the fastest growing energy source but increased use of coal and oil could push emissions above pre-pandemic levels.
EY Price Point: global oil and gas market outlook, Q2 | April 2022EY
The theme for this quarter is rearrangement. The loss, or potential loss, of Russian oil and gas supplies is forcing producers, refiners and traders to rethink the flow of crude oil and refined products from the wellhead to the gas pump in light of sanctions, potential sanctions and the risk of reputational damage. Countries, companies and consumers will all be searching for ways to adapt, and the outcome of the race to bring alternatives to market could alter the global energy landscape for years to come.
It is likely crude oil and LNG prices will remain elevated for some time. The process of diverting Russian oil through countries unwilling to sanction it will take time and there is little indication OPEC members are willing (or able) to increase production to make up for the loss of Russian crude. Spare capacity sat at 3.7 mbpd at the end of 2021, just above where it was in January 2020. Currently, sanctioned Venezuelan and Iranian production (about 3 mbpd below their peak) could fill the gap, but political and commercial obstacles remain. At today’s prices, US shale production is attractive, but the fastest the industry has been able to grow is between 1mbpd and 2mbpd per year. The LNG infrastructure was already stretched before the war in Ukraine and there is little prosect of finding new supplies soon.
As the largest buyer of Russian energy, Europe will be the epicenter. There is a deeply embedded bias there in favor for renewable energy, and the current crisis is certain to result in an all-out effort to accelerate the build-out of wind and solar power. The capacity to add new green energy is limited though by the project pipeline and supply chains for solar panels and wind turbines, and it is likely that much of the shortfall will be made up with the new LNG infrastructure.
The document summarizes key findings from an Accenture analysis of how demand for different energy sources may change between now and 2035. It identifies five portfolio plays that could help oil and gas companies succeed in the changing energy landscape: 1) Growing natural gas demand, especially in Asia. 2) Producing oil at the lowest possible cost. 3) Developing carbon capture and industrial efficiency technologies. 4) Producing "blue" hydrogen from natural gas with carbon capture. 5) Winning in biofuels and low-carbon products like bio-lubricants. The analysis projects continued overall energy demand growth but significant changes in the fuel mix across regions and sectors.
Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Energy Sector
Dr. Fatih Birol
Chief Economist
International Energy Agency
World Energy Council
Rome, 19th March 2009
The document discusses how the global financial crisis is impacting energy investment and climate change efforts. It notes that investment in renewable energy declined in the last quarter of 2008 due to higher financing costs and lower oil and gas prices. Across the energy industry, consolidation is expected as large companies acquire assets from struggling smaller producers. The crisis also threatens progress on reducing emissions as investment in low-carbon technologies declines without government intervention.
This document presents three scenarios for the future growth of wind energy capacity and generation globally and by region up to 2030 and 2050:
1) The Reference scenario, based on current policies, projects global wind capacity reaching 573GW by 2030, lower than the other scenarios.
2) The Moderate scenario includes enacted and planned policies, with global capacity reaching 1,778GW by 2030, led by growth in China, India, and Europe.
3) The Advanced scenario represents a "wind energy vision" with a strong commitment to renewables, resulting in over 2,342GW globally by 2030, significantly transforming electricity systems.
The document discusses the digital future of the oil and gas industry. It notes that the industry faces challenges from lower oil prices, aging infrastructure and workforces, and increased environmental scrutiny. However, the long term demand for energy is still expected to rise significantly due to global population and economic growth. The document argues that the industry can overcome these challenges through increased digitization and use of industrial internet/IoT solutions. These solutions can optimize asset performance, reduce downtime and costs, improve safety and efficiency, and capture institutional knowledge as workforces age. Overall, increased digitization is presented as a key way for the industry to navigate current challenges and meet rising long term energy demand.
Energy power shift 04 2015 rallis vasilis Vasilis Rallis
Webinar, Manchester Business School, MBA Energy and Industry Club
A general outlook on the energy industry and changes shaping the future. The presentation describes the shifting trends in Oil, Gas, Power (Electricity and RES), Climate Change and emerging business models
This document summarizes a report on present global energy use and future demands. It outlines the methodology used, which includes forecasting energy supply and demand at the country and regional level based on projections for population, GDP per capita, and energy intensity. Key findings include that total energy demand will continue growing but at a slower rate, developing regions will account for most demand growth, and natural gas and renewables will experience the largest increases while coal's share declines.
Mark Walkington on the Ministry of Economic Development's energy projectionsmhjbnz
The document discusses New Zealand's energy outlook according to a reference scenario and two alternative scenarios. The reference scenario assumes current policies and technologies and predicts that renewable energy such as biomass will see the greatest growth. Transport energy demand is dominated by road transport and heavy fleet demand increases more than light fleet. The alternative scenarios consider higher carbon prices and more electric vehicles, biofuels, and fuel switching to biomass, with the goal of reducing reliance on imported oil and lowering emissions.
The document summarizes key findings from the World Energy Outlook 2018 report. It presents three scenarios for global energy demand and supply - New Policies Scenario, Current Policies Scenario, and Sustainable Development Scenario. Electricity demand is projected to increase 60% by 2040 with developing countries driving most growth. Renewable energy capacity is also expected to rise significantly under all scenarios, reaching 52-68% of total generation by 2040 depending on the scenario. The Sustainable Development Scenario aims for 100% global electricity access by 2030 and a halving of CO2 emissions by focusing on energy efficiency and the use of renewable sources like solar and wind power.
OECD Green Talks LIVE - Investing in Climate, Investing in GrowthOECD Environment
Combining ambitious climate action and economic reforms will boost GDP over time rather than harm growth. By 2021, GDP across G20 economies could increase 1% and by 2050 the growth effect could rise to 2.8% when accounting for avoided climate damages. While upfront infrastructure investments are needed to transition to renewable energy, these will be offset by savings from lower fossil fuel expenditures. More ambitious climate policies that place an accurate price on carbon can be achieved without damaging economic growth when paired with economic reforms.
- Global GDP more than doubles by 2035 driven by population growth and productivity increases, especially in emerging economies like China and India.
- Growing economies require more energy, with total primary energy consumption increasing by 34% between 2014-2035.
- Virtually all energy demand growth occurs in emerging economies as energy use in OECD countries barely grows. China's energy demand growth slows substantially but is partially offset by increased use in other developing countries like India.
Meta-review of long-term energy & carbon pricesLeonardo ENERGY
This report presents the findings of a study on future energy and carbon costs, based on a review of 13 long-term scenarios for the energy transition
- Coal, oil, gas, electricity, and carbon future prices are included (throughout this report referred to as “energy vectors”)
- Facts and trends impacting future prices are identified, but not analyzed
- EU countries with available information and in different stages of the energy transition are included
The findings can be summarized as follows:
- Most scenarios expect coal prices will remain virtually flat, with yearly price increases that are lower than those of other fossil fuels.
- Oil prices will be affected by limited supply and a decreasing demand. Most scenarios project a moderate growth of oil real prices from 2020 to 2050, except for particular extreme cases.
- Natural gas demand is projected to increase, but price increases will be moderated by abundant global supply. Natural gas demand is projected to increase, but price increases will be moderated by abundant global supply.
- It is expected that end-user electricity prices will rise driven by fossil fuel prices, carbon prices, and increasing generation costs from RES. Industrial electricity prices are projected to increase in the short term and then stabilize towards 2050. Industrial electricity prices rise under scenarios with higher RES
- CO2 prices will increase and will shift the profitability of carbon intensive technologies towards less carbon intensive ones. All considered scenarios project a strong yearly growth of carbon prices . However, there is a wide variation of estimates.
- Coal, oil or gas prices are not correlated with RES penetration.
The above findings are essentially assumptions behind some of the major scenarios using in energy policy planning. The analysis includes scenarios from Ecofys, the European Commission, DNV GL, Greenpeace, Eurelectric, European Climate Foundation, McKinsey, Enerrgynautics, Fraunhofer, Stanford, Imperial College and NERA.
Annual report from BP looking at their best guesses about where energy, of all kinds, is heading from now until 2035. In this year's report, BP predicts (1) By 2035, across the entire world, 80% of all energy will come from fossil fuels. (2) Natural gas is the largest-growing fossil fuel and by 2035 it will have replaced coal as the #2 source of energy in the world. (3) The U.S. will achieve overall energy self-sufficiency by 2021, and oil self-sufficiency by 2030.
Similar to IEA IEF OPEC Outlook Comparison Report 2023 (20)
The Big Oil Reality Check report finds that the climate pledges and plans of 8 international oil and gas companies fail to align with international agreements to phase out fossil fuels and to limit global temperature rise to 1.5ºC.
Publication May 2021
IEA publication, May 2024
Critical minerals, which are essential for a range of clean energy technologies, have risen up the policy agenda in recent years due to increasing demand, volatile price movements, supply chain bottlenecks and geopolitical concerns. The dynamic nature of the market necessitates greater transparency and reliable information to facilitate informed decision-making, as underscored by the request from Group of Seven (G7) ministers for the IEA to produce medium- and long-term outlooks for critical minerals.
The Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024 follows the IEA’s inaugural review of the market last year. It provides a snapshot of industry developments in 2023 and early 2024 and offers medium- and long-term outlooks for the demand and supply of key energy transition minerals based on the latest technology and policy trends.
The report also assesses key risks to the reliability, sustainability and diversity of critical mineral supply chains and analyses the consequences for policy and industry stakeholders. It will be accompanied by an updated version of the Critical Minerals Data Explorer, an interactive online tool that allows users to explore the latest IEA projections.
Science Publication
Global projections of macroeconomic climate-change damages typically consider
impacts from average annual and national temperatures over long time horizons1–6
.
Here we use recent empirical fndings from more than 1,600 regions worldwide over
the past 40 years to project sub-national damages from temperature and precipitation,
including daily variability and extremes7,8
. Using an empirical approach that provides
a robust lower bound on the persistence of impacts on economic growth, we fnd that
the world economy is committed to an income reduction of 19% within the next
26 years independent of future emission choices (relative to a baseline without
climate impacts, likely range of 11–29% accounting for physical climate and empirical
uncertainty). These damages already outweigh the mitigation costs required to limit
global warming to 2 °C by sixfold over this near-term time frame and thereafter diverge
strongly dependent on emission choices. Committed damages arise predominantly
through changes in average temperature, but accounting for further climatic
components raises estimates by approximately 50% and leads to stronger regional
heterogeneity. Committed losses are projected for all regions except those at very
high latitudes, at which reductions in temperature variability bring benefts. The
largest losses are committed at lower latitudes in regions with lower cumulative
historical emissions and lower present-day income.
Science Publication: The atlas of unburnable oil for supply-side climate poli...Energy for One World
Nature Communication, Publication 2024
To limit the increase in global mean temperature to 1.5 °C, CO2 emissions must
be drastically reduced. Accordingly, approximately 97%, 81%, and 71% of
existing coal and conventional gas and oil resources, respectively, need to
remain unburned. This article develops an integrated spatial assessment
model based on estimates and locations of conventional oil resources and
socio-environmental criteria to construct a global atlas of unburnable oil. The
results show that biodiversity hotspots, richness centres of endemic species,
natural protected areas, urban areas, and the territories of Indigenous Peoples
in voluntary isolation coincide with 609 gigabarrels (Gbbl) of conventional oil
resources. Since 1524 Gbbl of conventional oil resources are required to be left
untapped in order to keep global warming under 1.5 °C, all of the above-
mentioned socio-environmentally sensitive areas can be kept entirely off-
limits to oil extraction. The model provides spatial guidelines to select
unburnable fossil fuels resources while enhancing collateral socio-
environmental benefits.
This document is a report from the Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development summarizing the current state of financing for sustainable development. It finds financing gaps have increased to $4 trillion annually for developing countries. Progress on reducing poverty and hunger has stalled or reversed in some cases. Many developing economies face high debt burdens, exacerbating financing challenges. The report calls for $500 billion in additional annual investments in sustainable development and climate action through measures like development bank reforms, debt relief for vulnerable countries, and international financial system reforms to better support developing countries in achieving the SDGs. It will help inform discussions at the upcoming Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development.
This report analyzes global trends in corporate sustainability policies and practices. It finds that nearly 10,000 listed companies representing $85 trillion in market capitalization disclosed sustainability information in 2022. Most large companies report greenhouse gas emissions and set reduction targets, though target baselines are often missing. The report also examines board oversight of sustainability issues, executive compensation linked to ESG metrics, corporate lobbying activities, and stakeholder engagement practices. It concludes by recommending flexibility in disclosure standards and increased assurance of sustainability reports.
European Court of Human Rights: Judgment Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and ...Energy for One World
The European Court of Human Rights found Switzerland in violation of its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to protect citizens from climate change. The Court ruled that Article 8, the right to respect for private and family life, includes protection from serious adverse effects of climate change. However, it found the individual applicants did not have standing, while the applicant association representing over 2,000 older women did have standing. The Court also found Switzerland violated Article 6 by failing to properly consider the association's complaints in domestic courts. Overall, Switzerland failed to implement sufficient legislation and measures to meet its climate change targets in line with its international commitments.
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
This report explores the significance of border towns and spaces for strengthening responses to young people on the move. In particular it explores the linkages of young people to local service centres with the aim of further developing service, protection, and support strategies for migrant children in border areas across the region. The report is based on a small-scale fieldwork study in the border towns of Chipata and Katete in Zambia conducted in July 2023. Border towns and spaces provide a rich source of information about issues related to the informal or irregular movement of young people across borders, including smuggling and trafficking. They can help build a picture of the nature and scope of the type of movement young migrants undertake and also the forms of protection available to them. Border towns and spaces also provide a lens through which we can better understand the vulnerabilities of young people on the move and, critically, the strategies they use to navigate challenges and access support.
The findings in this report highlight some of the key factors shaping the experiences and vulnerabilities of young people on the move – particularly their proximity to border spaces and how this affects the risks that they face. The report describes strategies that young people on the move employ to remain below the radar of visibility to state and non-state actors due to fear of arrest, detention, and deportation while also trying to keep themselves safe and access support in border towns. These strategies of (in)visibility provide a way to protect themselves yet at the same time also heighten some of the risks young people face as their vulnerabilities are not always recognised by those who could offer support.
In this report we show that the realities and challenges of life and migration in this region and in Zambia need to be better understood for support to be strengthened and tuned to meet the specific needs of young people on the move. This includes understanding the role of state and non-state stakeholders, the impact of laws and policies and, critically, the experiences of the young people themselves. We provide recommendations for immediate action, recommendations for programming to support young people on the move in the two towns that would reduce risk for young people in this area, and recommendations for longer term policy advocacy.
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IEA IEF OPEC Outlook Comparison Report 2023
1.
2. Table of Contents
Introduction……………………….…………………………...… 3
High-Level Takeaways…………………………………………. 4
2022-2023 Forecast Highlights ….…………………..……..… 5
2030 Outlook Highlights ……..…………………………....…... 6
2045 Outlook Highlights ……..………………………………… 7
Comparing IEA and OPEC to Other Energy Outlooks…..….. 8
Baseline 2021 Liquids Data ………………………………...... 9
IEA WEO and OPEC WOO Baseline Energy Data…………15
2022 & 2023 Liquids Outlook Comparisons………………... 20
IEA and OPEC Outlooks to 2030……………………………. 34
IEA and OPEC Outlooks to 2045……………………………. 44
Additional Context: IEA and OPEC Scenarios Alongside
Other Energy Outlooks……………………………………….. 59
Appendix……………………………………………………….. 73
2
3. Introduction: IEA-IEF-OPEC Trilateral Program of Work
Bolsters Energy Data Transparency and Market Stability
• IEA and OPEC energy outlooks shape consensus views and influence policy and investment decisions
worldwide. Given their influence, it is vital to understand these outlooks and the assumptions underlying the
various scenarios.
• The Cancun IEF Ministerial Declaration (2010) called for the IEA, IEF, and OPEC to organize an annual
symposium on energy outlooks. This mission has only become more important considering the recent global
pandemic, geopolitical upheaval, and progress toward energy transitions.
• This report will inform the 13th IEA-IEF-OPEC Symposium by comparing the key scenarios and underlying
methodologies of IEA and OPEC’s most recent outlooks and placing them in the broader context of outlooks
produced by other key industry organizations and market players.
• Promoting greater transparency of energy outlook methodologies, assumptions, and data comparability can
help bring stability to the market by driving informed policies and informed investment decisions.
Primary Outlooks Compared in this Report
Short-term Long-term
IEA
Report Name Oil Market Report World Energy Outlook
Publication Date Dec 2022 Oct 2022
OPEC
Report Name Monthly Oil Market Report World Oil Outlook
Publication Date Dec 2022 Oct 2022
EIA
Report Name Short-term Energy Outlook N/A
Publication Date Dec 2022 N/A
3
4. Wide-Ranging Energy Outlooks Underscore Importance of
Clear, Predictable, and Achievable Policies
• Successive shocks have rocked the world, including energy markets, over the past several years. Since last
year’s Outlook Symposium, the economic outlook for the near-term has deteriorated significantly while the
geopolitical risks, and price volatility, across the energy sector have surged. For policymakers, security of
supply has re-emerged as a top priority.
• Long-term demand uncertainty is now compounded by acute near-term risks, particularly in oil and gas
markets. Market uncertainty fuels price volatility – harming consumers, investors, businesses, and
governments.
• The only sure antidote to high energy prices and volatility is ensuring adequate investment and supplies for
both now and the future. Underinvestment threatens to undermine energy security and it can also stall
progress on climate goals by increasing reliance on more carbon-intensive options in the short-term.
• Energy investment decisions are informed by energy demand outlooks and scenarios. While aspirational
scenarios are essential for tracking global progress towards climate goals, it is equally important to provide
outlooks based on current policy and consumer trends. Investment decisions should be based on scenarios
anchored in reality in order to prevent future supply shortfalls.
• Clear descriptions or assessments on the likelihood of scenario outcomes based on recent trends,
investment levels, consumer behavior and policy enforcement could enhance the usefulness of outlooks for
investors and policymakers.
• The wide range of energy scenarios presented in this report underscores the importance for policymakers to
provide clear, predictable, and achievable policies/regulations and highlights the challenges ahead for
achieving a just and orderly transition for all.
4
5. 2022-2023 Forecast Highlights:
• The following is based on December 2022 monthly reports from IEA, OPEC, and EIA.
• Agencies’ 2022 estimates largely align:
• Global demand grew by 2.3-2.6 mb/d year-on-year
• Non-OPEC + OPEC NGLs supply grew by 2.0-2.1 mb/d
• The range for 2023 forecasts widens amid uncertainty around (1) OECD demand growth; (2) Chinese
demand growth; (3) Russian production; and (4) US supply.
• 2023 demand growth forecasts range between 1.0-2.2 mb/d.
• EIA is on the low end and is the only agency to forecast a contraction in OECD demand.
• 2023 non-OPEC + OPEC NGLs supply growth forecasts range between 0.7-1.6 mb/d.
• OPEC is on the high end and sees Russian supply falling by 0.9 mb/d vs. IEA and EIA’s forecast of a 1.4
mb/d year-on-year drop in Russian supply.
• All three agencies imply a higher “call on OPEC” in 2023 compared to 2022, but the amounts diverge by
>1.0 mb/d due to different demand and non-OPEC supply forecasts.
• IEA’s 2023 forecasts imply the highest “call on OPEC” at 29.9 mb/d – which is 0.7 mb/d higher than OPEC’s
actual production in December 2022 (based on IEA’s estimate of 29.2 mb/d).
5
6. 2030 Outlook Highlights:
• Typically, this report would compare IEA and OPEC medium-term outlooks. IEA’s medium-term oil outlook
was scheduled to be released in March 2022. However, due to the unique market upheaval that occurred
following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, IEA did not publish its medium-term oil outlook. Therefore, this report
will compare outlooks to 2030 using IEA’s WEO 2022 and OPEC’s WOO 2022 and resume detailed
medium-term comparisons in next year’s report.
• Only IEA’s NZE scenario shows a substantial ~10% decline in total primary energy demand by 2030.
Meanwhile, base case scenarios show an 8-12% increase.
• Renewable, hydro, biomass, and nuclear are expected to grow by a total 32-67% by 2030 in all 6 scenarios.
• While 3 of the 6 IEA and OPEC scenarios see total fossil fuel demand falling between 2021 and 2030, fossil
fuel’s share of total primary demand will remain a robust 62-77% (vs. 80% in 2021).
• Oil demand increases between 2021 and 2030 in 4 of the 6 scenarios. Non-OECD will drive the growth.
• Natural gas demand only grows to 2030 in 3 of the 6 scenarios.
• Coal demand is expected to fall in all scenarios. The size of the decline ranges from 5% (in OPEC Ref
and LF scenarios) to 46% in IEA’s NZE scenario.
• Liquids supply is expected to rise 5-13 mb/d in IEA’s STEPS and APS and OPEC Reference scenarios (the
remaining 3 scenarios did not provide this data). The drivers of liquids supply growth include OPEC
countries, Latin America and OECD Americas.
• Biofuels share of total liquids supply will increase from 3% to 7% in IEA’s APS. (The share remains
roughly flat in STEPS and OPEC Ref.)
6
7. 2045 Outlook Highlights:
• Global GDP growth will slow to under 3% per year following 2030.
• 3 of the 6 scenarios see robust growth in primary energy demand to 2045 (up 16% to 28% compared to
2021). However, IEA’s NZE scenario shows primary energy demand plummeting by 15% by 2045 vs. 2021 –
illustrating a break with the historical relationship between economic growth and energy demand growth.
• Renewable, hydro, biomass, and nuclear are expected to grow by a total 90-218% by 2045 in all 6
scenarios.
• While renewables are expected to see substantial growth across all scenarios – non-fossil fuel demand
(renewables, biomass, nuclear, hydro, etc.) will not reach fossil fuel’s 2021 demand levels by the end of the
forecast period.
• IEA’s NZE scenario has the highest non-fossil fuel energy forecast for 2050 at 211 mboe/d, but this is still
slightly below IEA’s estimate of 2021’s fossil fuel demand of 239 mboe/d.
• 4 of the 6 scenarios show fossil fuels accounting for more than 50% of primary energy in 2045 (vs. current
share of ~80%).
• Liquid demand grows and plateaus in IEA STEPS and OPEC Ref, while it peaks and declines in IEA’s APS
and NZE.
• The NZE scenario assumes by 2030, 60% of all cars sold are EVs and no new ICE light-duty vehicles
are sold after 2035.
• IEA STEPS and APS and OPEC’s Ref all see higher oil demand in the petrochemical sector at the end of
the forecast period.
• Liquids supply increases by 14-15% by 2045 in IEA STEPS and OPEC Ref scenario driven by OPEC
members, Latin America, and biofuels.
7
8. Comparing IEA and OPEC to Other Long-Term Energy
Outlooks:
• To gain a better sense of how IEA and OPEC projections compare against other industry-leading energy
outlooks, we gathered data on 18 additional scenarios from 7 sources.
• 75% of all scenarios surveyed show end-period primary energy demand at higher levels than 2021.
• Forecasts for total liquids demand in 2050 diverge by 92 mb/d – slightly smaller than the size of today’s
global market. Scenarios based on current trends and policies show demand plateauing, while net zero
scenarios show a peak and collapse.
• Excluding a high outlier, scenarios for natural gas demand in 2050 diverge by 5,100 bcm – an amount that is
still 25% larger than today’s global gas market.
• More than half of all scenarios show:
• Coal demand falling by more than 50% by 2050
• Fossil fuels accounting for more than 50% of total primary energy demand in 2050
• Nuclear demand increasing by more than 50% by 2050
• The range of projections for renewable demand in 2050 is four times greater than current global renewable
demand.
• Most scenarios show electricity demand growing by 80% by 2050, with more ambitious net zero scenarios
showing up to 200% growth vs. 2021.
• Most net zero scenarios show carbon capture expanding to 6-8 Gt of CO₂/year by 2050.
• The wide range in scenarios underscores the uncertainty in future energy demand, the wide-ranging
potential impact of policies, and the immense challenge ahead for achieving a smooth and equitable
transition.
8
9. IEA OMR and OPEC MOMR Baseline 2021 Liquids Data
(as of December 2022)
9
10. Divergences Still Exist in Historical Liquids Baseline Data –
Particularly in Non-OECD Demand Estimates
• Comparability of baseline historical data is the first
step toward enhancing comparability of outlooks.
• The largest divergences in current baseline data
exist in non-OECD demand – similar to previous
years.
• IEA and OPEC have made significant progress in
recent years in making data comparable, but some
issues still exist classification of bunker fuels,
biofuels, and some other products.
• While OPEC includes biofuels in each region’s
total liquids supply, IEA only includes global
biofuels supply separately. Unless otherwise
states, this report adds IEA regional biofuels data –
both historical and forecast data – to IEA’s regional
liquids supply data.
• EIA supply includes refinery processing gains in
country-level supply and does not separate them
out as in IEA and OPEC data. This report subtracts
estimated regional processing gains in historical
and forecasted EIA data to make it more
comparable to IEA and OPEC.
10
11. Largest Baseline Demand Divergences Stem from the
Middle East, Latin America, and China
Non-OECD demand estimates range 0.7 mb/d vs. OECD demand’s 0.0 mb/d
11
2021 Total Liquid Demand Estimates by Agency
million barrels per day
IEA OPEC EIA
Range
(high-low)
Total OECD 44.83 44.83 44.88 0.05
Americas 24.32 24.32 24.50 0.18
Europe 13.13 13.13 13.12 0.01
Asia Oceania 7.38 7.38 7.26 0.12
Total Non-OECD 52.85 52.18 52.68 0.67
Asia 28.81 28.37 28.50 0.44
China 15.43 14.97 15.27 0.46
Middle East 8.48 7.79 8.74 0.95
Latin America 5.94 6.23 5.56 0.67
Europe and Eurasia 5.63 5.58 5.51 0.12
Russia 3.66 3.61 3.51 0.15
Africa 3.99 4.22 4.37 0.38
World 97.67 97.01 97.56 0.66
0.01
0.05
0.12
0.12
0.15
0.18
0.38
0.44
0.46
0.66
0.67
0.67
0.95
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
OECD Europe
Total OECD
Non-OECD Europe
OECD Asia Oceania
Russia
OECD Americas
Africa
Non-OECD Asia
China
World
Total Non-OECD
Non-OECD Latin America
Middle East
Million barrels per day
Range in Agencies' 2021 Liquid Demand Estimates
Source: IEF, IEA Dec 2022 OMR, OPEC Dec 2022 MOMR, EIA Dec 2022 STEO
* The data in this section reflect the estimates as of the December 2022 publications. Since December, EIA has revised down 2021 global demand by a significant 0.44
mb/d, including a 0.08 mb/d reduction to OECD estimates and a 0.36 mb/d reduction to non-OECD demand estimates. It now sees 2021 global demand at 97.12 mb/d.
12. OECD Americas, OPEC NGLs and Non-OECD Asia Drive
Baseline Supply Differences
12
2021 Total Liquid Supply Estimates by Agency
million barrels per day
IEA* OPEC EIA**
Range
(high-low)
Total OECD 29.89 29.52 29.92 0.40
Americas 25.56 25.25 25.58 0.33
United States 17.97 17.85 18.01 0.16
Europe 3.80 3.76 3.82 0.06
Asia Oceania 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.03
Total Non-OECD 31.65 31.87 31.86 0.22
Asia 7.37 7.49 7.60 0.23
Middle East 3.08 3.24 3.08 0.16
Latin America 5.99 5.95 6.05 0.10
Europe and Eurasia 13.88 13.84 13.74 0.14
Africa 1.33 1.35 1.39 0.06
Processing Gains 2.25 2.29 2.25** 0.04
Total Non-OPEC 63.79 63.68 64.03 0.35
Total OPEC 31.55 31.63 31.66 0.11
OPEC Crude 26.43 26.35 26.28 0.15
OPEC NGLs 5.12 5.28 5.38 0.26
World 95.34 95.31 95.70 0.39
* Regional biofuels were added to IEA total liquids supply using IEA’s OMR Table 17 World’s Biofuels Production estimates
** Regional refinery processing gains were estimated using EIA and IEF data and subtracted from EIA regional total liquids supply
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.06
0.10
0.11
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.16
0.22
0.23
0.26
0.33
0.35
0.39
0.40
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
OECD Asia Oceania
Processing Gains
Africa
OECD Europe
Non-OECD Latin America
Total OPEC
Non-OECD Europe
OPEC Crude
US
Middle East
Total Non-OECD
Non-OECD Asia
OPEC NGLs
OECD Americas
Total Non-OPEC
World
Total OECD
Million barrels per day
Range in Agencies' 2021 Liquid Supply Estimates
Source: IEF, IEA Dec ‘22 OMR, OPEC Dec ‘22 MOMR, EIA Dec ‘22 STEO
13. Agencies Largely Agree on OECD Stock Change But Net
Global Stock Change and Miscellaneous to Balance
Estimates for 2021 Differ By >0.6 mb/d
13
2021 Stock Change and Miscellaneous Items
million barrels per day
IEA OPEC EIA
Range
(high-low)
Total OECD -1.22 -1.21 -1.18 0.04
Commercial -1.06 -1.06 -1.06 0.00
Government/SPR -0.16 -0.16 -0.12 0.04
Oil-on-water -0.05 0.15
-0.68*
0.21
Miscellaneous to
balance
-1.07 -0.63 0.45
Net Global Stock
Change and
Miscellaneous Items
-2.33 -1.70 -1.86 0.66
• The net global stock change and miscellaneous items equal the difference between annual global supply
and global demand estimates.
• In 2021, IEA estimated the net global stock change and miscellaneous items was at -2.33 mb/d compared to
OPEC’s -1.70 mb/d. This is primarily due to IEA’s higher global demand estimate (97.67 mb/d vs OPEC’s
97.01 mb/d).
• Within the components of miscellaneous items, IEA saw a 0.05 mb/d decrease in oil-on-water while OPEC
estimated a 0.15 mb/d increase.
Some differences may exist due to rounding
* EIA does not provide a breakdown of oil-on-water and miscellaneous to balance
94.0
94.5
95.0
95.5
96.0
96.5
97.0
97.5
98.0
IEA OPEC EIA
Global Supply Global Demand
2021 Global Oil Balances
million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA Dec 2022 OMR, OPEC Dec 2022 MOMR, EIA Dec 2022 STEO
2.33 mb/d
1.70 mb/d
1.86 mb/d
14. IEA, OPEC, and EIA All Estimate OECD Commercial
Inventories End 2021 at ~2650 mb, Down Nearly 600 mb
from 2020 Highs
Jul-20, 3,221
Dec-21, 2651
2500
2600
2700
2800
2900
3000
3100
3200
3300
3400
Jan-19 Jul-19 Jan-20 Jul-20 Jan-21 Jul-21
EIA OPEC IEA
OECD Commercial Inventories
Million barrels
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
14
16. Largest Baseline Divergences in the Long-Term Outlooks
Exist in Bioenergy, Coal, and Gas
Different conversion efficiency assumptions could contribute to the gaps in historical data
16
88.4
70.5
79.8
14.6
7.5
31.6
8.1
88.3
66.4
74.7
15.2
7.5
26.2
7.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2021 IEA
2021 OPEC
2021 World Primary Energy
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
0.1
4.1
5.1
-0.5
0.0
5.4
0.7
15.4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
IEA vs. OPEC: 2021 World Primary Energy
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
17. The Largest Differences in IEA and OPEC Estimates of 2021
Fuel Share of Total Primary Energy Are in Oil and Bioenergy
IEA sees 15.4 mboe/d higher total primary energy demand in 2021 vs. OPEC
17
29% 31%
23% 23%
26% 26%
5% 5%
2% 3%
11% 9%
3% 3%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
IEA OPEC
2021
Oil Gas Coal Nuclear Hydro Bioenergy Other Renew
2021 World Primary Energy Fuel Share
Percent of total primary energy
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
18. Baselines for Natural Gas and Coal Diverge More than Oil
Non-OECD coal demand estimates for 2021 diverge by >5 mboe/d
18
• The lack of baseline data harmonization can make
it difficult to compare historical and projected data.
• Enhancing transparency on conversion
assumptions can help enable data harmonization.
• Additionally, harmonizing treatment of bunkering
fuels can improve comparability.
• IEA’s WEO includes bunkering fuels in the global
energy estimates but not in regional estimates.
Whereas OPEC includes bunkering in the regional
estimates.
38.4
49.9
14.6
4.3 3.1
88.4
38.5
49.8
14.2
4.8 3.4
88.3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA OPEC
2021 Oil Demand
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
*IEA WEO excludes bunkering fuels from regional estimates. This chart has been adjusted
to include regional bunkering in IEA estimates to make it comparable to OPEC.
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
14.3
65.5
44.6
8.7
2.3
79.8
14.4
60.3
40.3
8.0
2.5
74.7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA OPEC
2021 Coal Demand
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
31.8
38.7
6.1
1.2
9.0
70.5
29.7
36.7
5.5
1.1
8.4
66.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA OPEC
2021 Natural Gas Demand
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
19. Biomass Baseline Data Differs by 5.4 mboe/d with
Significant Differences in Both OECD and Non-OECD
Regional Data
19
10.0
4.6
2.1
0.2
1.1
14.6
10.4
4.8
2.3
0.3
1.1
15.2
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
14.0
16.0
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA OPEC
2021 Nuclear Demand
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
2.6
4.9
2.3
0.3 0.4
7.5
2.5
5.0
2.3
0.3 0.3
7.5
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA OPEC
2021 Hydro Demand
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
8.5
23.2
3.2 4.1
0.2
31.6
6.9
19.4
2.7 3.8
0.2
26.2
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA OPEC
2021 Biomass Demand
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
3.6
4.5
2.7
0.3 0.0
8.1
3.5
4.0
2.3
0.3 0.0
7.4
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA OPEC
2021 Other Renewables Demand
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
20. IEA OMR and OPEC MOMR’s 2022-2023 Liquids Outlook
(as of December 2022)
20
21. Both IEA and OPEC See Global Economic Outlook
Deteriorating in 2023
IEA sees a steeper drop in growth with OECD coming to a standstill and Russia posting a
second year of negative growth
Short-term GDP Growth Assumptions
2022 2023
IEA OPEC Range IEA OPEC Range
World 3.2% 2.8% 0.4 1.3% 2.5% 1.2
OECD 2.4% 2.4% 0.0 0.0% 0.8% 0.8
US 2.1% 1.7% 0.4 0.1 % 0.8% 0.7
EU* 3.3% 3.0% 0.3 0.0 % 0.3% 0.3
Japan 1.5% 1.5% 0.0 0.7% 1.0% 0.3
Non-
OECD
3.7% 3.2% 0.5 3.1% 3.8% 0.7
China 3.0% 3.1% 0.1 4.5% 4.8% 0.3
India 6.8% 6.5% 0.3 4.4% 5.6% 1.2
Brazil 2.8% 1.5% 1.3 1.0% 1.0% 0.0
Russia -3.0% -5.7% 2.7 -2.9% 0.2% 3.1
21
Note: IEA GDP assumptions are based on analysis from Oxford Economics
* IEA provides estimates for the EU while OPEC uses Euro Zone grouping
3.2%
2.4%
3.7%
1.3%
0.0%
3.1%
2.8%
2.4%
3.2%
2.5%
0.8%
3.8%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
World OECD Non-OECD World OECD Non-OECD
2022 2023
IEA OPEC
IEA and OPEC GDP Growth Assumptions
Annual growth
Source: IEF, IEA Dec 2022 OMR, OPEC Dec 2022 WEO
22. Range in Agency Forecasts Widens in 2023 Driven by
OECD Demand and Russian Supply
• IEA, OPEC, and EIA are fairly aligned on 2022
global demand estimates, with only a 0.3 mb/d
range between the high (IEA) and low (OPEC).
• The range for 2023 demand widens to 1.0 mb/d
with OPEC forecasting the highest and EIA the
lowest.
• Notably, EIA sees 2023 OECD demand at 0.7
mb/d below IEA and OPEC’s forecast.
• Agencies’ 2022 non-OPEC and OPEC NGLs
supply estimates range 0.4 mb/d with EIA seeing
stronger non-OPEC (excluding Russia) supply.
• 2023 supply forecasts diverge by 0.9 mb/d, with
Russian outlooks ranging 0.6 mb/d.
22
46.1 46.2 46.1 46.5 46.5 45.8
53.8 53.4 53.7 55.2 55.2 55.0
99.9 99.6 99.8 101.6 101.8 100.8
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
IEA OPEC EIA IEA OPEC EIA
2022 2023
OECD Non-OECD
2022 & 2023 Liquid Demand Forecast By Agency
Million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA Dec 2022 OMR, OPEC Dec 2022 MOMR, EIA Dec 2022 STEO
54.6 54.6 54.9 56.7 57.0 57.1
11.0 11.0 10.9 9.6 10.1 9.5
5.3 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5
71.0 71.0 71.4 71.7 72.6 72.1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
IEA OPEC EIA IEA OPEC EIA
2022 2023
Non-OPEC (ex Russia) Russia OPEC NGLs
2022 & 2023 Liquids Supply Forecast By Agency
Million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA Dec 2022 OMR, OPEC Dec 2022 MOMR, EIA Dec 2022 STEO
23. Annual Demand Growth Forecasts for 2023 Span 1.2 mb/d
While Non-OPEC Supply + OPEC NGLs Range 0.9 mb/d
23
1.3 1.4 1.2
0.4 0.3
-0.3
1.0
1.2
1.1
1.3
1.9
1.3
2.3
2.6
2.3
1.7
2.2
1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
IEA OPEC EIA IEA OPEC EIA
2022 Y/Y 2023 Y/Y
OECD Non-OECD
2022 & 2023 Liquid Demand Growth Forecast By Agency
Million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA Dec 2022 OMR, OPEC Dec 2022 MOMR, EIA Dec 2022 STEO
1.7 1.7 1.7
2.1
2.4 2.1
0.2 0.2 0.2
-1.4
-0.9
-1.4
2.1 2.0 2.0
0.7
1.6
0.7
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
IEA OPEC EIA IEA OPEC EIA
2022 Y/Y 2023 Y/Y
Non-OPEC (ex Russia) Russia OPEC NGLs Net Total
2022 & 2023 Liquids Supply Growth Forecast By Agency
Million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA Dec 2022 OMR, OPEC Dec 2022 MOMR, EIA Dec 2022 STEO
• Global demand growth is expected to slow in 2023
(vs. 2022) as growth in OECD countries weakens
substantially.
• EIA sees the weakest global demand growth (1.0
mb/d y/y) and is the only forecast of the three to
see a demand contraction in the OECD.
• Non-OECD demand is expected to rise faster in
2023 vs. 2022 as a bounce back in Chinese
demand offsets slowdowns elsewhere.
• On the supply side, the largest divergence in 2023
growth is in Russian production forecasts.
• IEA and EIA both expect a 1.4 mb/d y/y drop in
Russian output in 2023, while OPEC sees a 0.9
mb/d annual decline.
24. Largest 2022-23 Demand Divergences Stem from Middle
East, Latin America, and China
24
2022-2023 Liquid Demand Forecast by Agency
2022 2023
million barrels per
day
IEA OPEC EIA
Range
(high-
low)
IEA OPEC EIA
Range
(high-
low)
Total OECD 46.08 46.20 46.08 0.12 46.47 46.53 45.83 0.70
Americas* 25.00 25.08 25.19 0.19 25.13 25.34 25.19 0.21
Europe 13.64 13.65 13.59 0.06 13.74 13.68 13.42 0.32
Asia Oceania 7.44 7.47 7.30 0.17 7.61 7.51 7.22 0.39
Total Non-OECD 53.84 53.36 53.74 0.48 55.16 55.24 54.99 0.25
Asia 28.90 28.93 28.92 0.03 30.23 30.05 29.88 0.35
China 15.01 14.79 15.16 0.37 15.83 15.31 15.76 0.52
Middle East** 9.04 8.22 9.28 1.06 9.14 8.55 9.52 0.97
Latin America 6.09 6.41 5.73 0.68 6.12 6.55 5.74 0.81
Europe and
Eurasia
5.64 5.44 5.32 0.32 5.52 5.54 5.26 0.28
Russia 3.72 3.53 3.40 0.32 3.57 3.61 3.33 0.28
Africa** 4.17 4.36 4.49 0.32 4.15 4.55 4.59 0.44
World 99.93 99.56 99.82 0.37 101.64 101.77 100.82 0.95
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.7
1.1
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.7
0.8
1.0
1.0
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25
Non-OECD Asia
OECD Europe
Total OECD
OECD Asia Oceania
OECD Americas
Russia
Africa
Non-OECD Europe
China
World
Total Non-OECD
Latin America
Middle East
OECD Americas
Total Non-OECD
Russia
Non-OECD Europe
OECD Europe
Non-OECD Asia
OECD Asia Oceania
Africa
China
Total OECD
Latin America
World
Middle East
2022
2023
million barrels per day
Range in Agencies' 2022-2023 Demand
Forecasts
Source: IEF, IEA Dec 2022 OMR, OPEC Dec 2022 MOMR, EIA Dec 2022
25. Range in 2023 Global Demand Growth is 4x Larger Than
2022 With Uncertainty Evenly Dispersed Across OECD and
Non-OECD Regions
25
2022-2023 Liquid Demand Growth Forecast by Agency
2022 vs. 2021 2023 vs. 2022
million barrels per
day
IEA OPEC EIA
Range
(high-
low)
IEA OPEC EIA
Range
(high-
low)
Total OECD 1.25 1.37 1.20 0.16 0.39 0.33 -0.25 0.64
Americas* 0.68 0.76 0.69 0.08 0.13 0.26 0.00 0.26
Europe 0.51 0.52 0.47 0.05 0.10 0.03 -0.17 0.27
Asia Oceania 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.04 -0.08 0.25
Total Non-OECD 1.00 1.18 1.06 0.18 1.32 1.89 1.25 0.63
Asia 0.09 0.57 0.42 0.47 1.33 1.11 0.96 0.37
China -0.42 -0.18 -0.11 0.31 0.82 0.51 0.60 0.30
Middle East** 0.56 0.42 0.54 0.13 0.10 0.33 0.24 0.23
Latin America 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.01 0.13
Europe and
Eurasia
0.02 -0.13 -0.19 0.21 -0.12 0.10 -0.06 0.21
Russia 0.07 -0.08 -0.11 0.18 -0.15 0.08 -0.07 0.23
Africa** 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.06 -0.02 0.19 0.10 0.21
World 2.27 2.55 2.26 0.29 1.71 2.22 1.00 1.21
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.6
0.6
1.2
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25
Latin America
OECD Europe
OECD Asia Oceania
Africa
OECD Americas
Middle East
Total OECD
Total Non-OECD
Russia
Non-OECD Europe
World
China
Non-OECD Asia
Latin America
Africa
Non-OECD Europe
Middle East
Russia
OECD Asia Oceania
OECD Americas
OECD Europe
China
Non-OECD Asia
Total Non-OECD
Total OECD
World
2022
2023
million barrels per day
Range in Agencies' 2022-2023 Demand Growth
Forecasts
Source: IEF, IEA Dec 2022 OMR, OPEC Dec 2022 MOMR, EIA Dec 2022 STEO
26. Agencies Lowered 2022 Global Demand Growth Forecasts
Steadily Through the Year & Are Now Converging ~2.4 mb/d
IEA estimated >0.2 mb/d steeper decline in Chinese demand growth at end-2022
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
IEA OPEC EIA
Global Demand Growth: Evolution of 2022 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
26
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
IEA OPEC EIA
Non-OECD Demand Growth: Evolution of 2022 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
IEA OPEC EIA
OECD Demand Growth: Evolution of 2022 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
IEA OPEC EIA
Chinese Demand Growth: Evolution of 2022 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
27. Uncertain Economic Headwinds Drive Widening
Divergences in 2023 Demand Growth Forecasts
EIA alone sees declining OECD demand; OPEC sees higher non-OECD (ex-China) growth
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
2.8
3.2
IEA OPEC EIA
Global Demand Growth: Evolution of 2023 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
27
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.2
IEA OPEC EIA
Non-OECD Demand Growth: Evolution of 2023 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
IEA OPEC EIA
OECD Demand Growth: Evolution of 2023 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
IEA OPEC EIA
Chinese Demand Growth: Evolution of 2023 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
* EIA first published a 2023 forecast in Jan 2022; IEA in June 2022; and OPEC in July 2022
28. Russia Drives Largest Divergence of 2023 Supply Forecasts
28
2022-2023 Liquid Supply Forecasts by Agency
2022 2023
million barrels per
day
IEA* OPEC EIA**
Range
(high-
low)
IEA* OPEC EIA**
Range
(high-
low)
Total OECD 31.12 30.73 31.09 0.39 31.52 32.36 32.52 0.16
Americas 27.05 26.64 26.85 0.41 28.21 27.95 27.88 0.33
USA 19.24 18.98 19.26 0.28 20.22 20.13 20.11 0.11
Europe 3.58 3.60 3.75 0.17 3.83 3.91 4.17 0.35
Asia Oceania 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.00 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.03
Total Non-OECD 32.24 32.44 32.47 0.23 30.43 32.29 31.67 0.86
Asia 7.42 7.53 7.66 0.24 7.47 7.63 7.76 0.29
Middle East 3.21 3.34 3.21 0.13 3.24 3.37 3.16 0.21
Latin America 6.36 6.34 6.45 0.11 6.81 6.68 6.90 0.22
Europe and
Eurasia 13.95 13.91 13.81 0.14 12.65 13.27 12.52 0.75
Russia 11.04 10.96 10.93 0.11 9.62 10.11 9.49 0.62
Africa 1.30 1.32 1.34 0.04 1.27 1.35 1.34 0.08
Processing Gains 2.31 2.40 2.31 0.09 2.35 2.47 2.35 0.12
Total Non-OPEC 65.68 65.57 65.87 0.30 66.31 67.11 66.54 0.80
Total OPEC n/a n/a 34.11 n/a n/a n/a 34.52 n/a
OPEC Crude n/a n/a 28.61 n/a n/a n/a 29.00 n/a
OPEC NGLs 5.34 5.39 5.50 0.16 5.39 5.44 5.52 0.13
World n/a n/a 99.98 n/a n/a n/a 101.06 n/a
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.4
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.6
0.8
0.8
0.9
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
OECD Asia Oceania
Africa
Processing Gains
Russia
Non-OECD Latin America
Middle East
Non-OECD Europe
OPEC NGLs
OECD Europe
Total Non-OECD
Non-OECD Asia
USA
Total Non-OPEC
Total OECD
OECD Americas
OECD Asia Oceania
Africa
USA
Processing Gains
OPEC NGLs
Total OECD
Middle East
Non-OECD Latin America
Non-OECD Asia
OECD Americas
OECD Europe
Russia
Non-OECD Europe
Total Non-OPEC
Total Non-OECD
2022
2023
million barrels per day
Range in Agencies' 2022-2023 Supply
Forecasts
Source: IEF, IEA Dec ‘22 OMR, OPEC Dec ‘22 MOMR, EIA Dec ‘22 STEO
* Regional biofuels were added to IEA total liquids supply using IEA’s OMR Table 17 World’s Biofuels Production estimates
** Regional refinery processing gains were estimated using EIA and IEF data and subtracted from EIA regional total liquids supply
29. 2023 Russian and US Supply See Largest Range in Growth
29
2022-2023 Liquid Supply Growth Forecasts by Agency
2022 vs. 2021 2023 vs. 2022
million barrels per
day
IEA* OPEC EIA**
Range
(high-
low)
IEA* OPEC EIA**
Range
(high-
low)
Total OECD 1.23 1.21 1.18 0.05 1.40 1.63 1.43 0.23
Americas 1.50 1.39 1.26 0.24 1.16 1.31 1.03 0.28
USA 1.27 1.13 1.25 0.14 0.98 1.15 0.85 0.30
Europe -0.22 -0.16 -0.05 0.17 0.25 0.31 0.42 0.17
Asia Oceania -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.03
Total Non-OECD 0.59 0.57 0.62 0.05 -0.81 -0.16 -0.80 0.66
Asia 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.05
Middle East 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.08
Latin America 0.38 0.39 0.37 0.02 0.45 0.33 0.44 0.11
Europe and
Eurasia 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 -1.30 -0.64 -1.29 0.66
Russia 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.01 -1.42 -0.85 -1.44 0.59
Africa -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06
Processing Gains 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.03
Total Non-OPEC 1.89 1.89 1.84 0.05 0.63 1.54 0.67 0.91
Total OPEC n/a n/a 2.45 n/a n/a n/a 0.41 n/a
OPEC Crude n/a n/a 2.33 n/a n/a n/a 0.39 n/a
OPEC NGLs 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03
World n/a n/a 4.28 n/a n/a n/a 1.08 n/a
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.6
0.7
0.7
0.9
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Non-OECD Europe
Russia
Non-OECD Asia
Non-OECD Latin America
Africa
OECD Asia Oceania
Middle East
Processing Gains
Total Non-OECD
Total Non-OPEC
Total OECD
OPEC NGLs
USA
OECD Europe
OECD Americas
OECD Asia Oceania
Processing Gains
OPEC NGLs
Non-OECD Asia
Africa
Middle East
Non-OECD Latin America
OECD Europe
Total OECD
OECD Americas
USA
Russia
Non-OECD Europe
Total Non-OECD
Total Non-OPEC
2022
2023
million barrels per day
Range in Agencies' 2022-2023 Supply Growth
Forecasts
Source: IEF, IEA Dec ‘22 OMR, OPEC Dec ‘22 MOMR, EIA Dec ‘22 STEO
* Regional biofuels were added to IEA total liquids supply using IEA’s OMR Table 17 World’s Biofuels Production estimates
** Regional refinery processing gains were estimated using EIA and IEF data and subtracted from EIA regional total liquids supply
30. 2022 Non-OPEC Supply Growth Estimates Have Converged
~1.9 mb/d
30
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
IEA OPEC EIA
Russian Liquid Supply Growth: Evolution of 2022 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
IEA OPEC EIA
Non-OPEC Liquid Supply Growth: Evolution of 2022 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
• The evolution of forecasts shows how Russian
supply was much more resilient in 2022 compared
to some early estimates.
• Russian supply is now estimated to have seen a
slight year-on-year increase in 2022.
• US production is estimated to have increased by
~1.1-1.3 mb/d in 2022, accounting for 60-70% of
total net non-OPEC production growth.
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
IEA OPEC EIA
US Liquid Supply Growth: Evolution of 2022 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
31. 2023 Non-OPEC Supply Growth Forecasts Range From 0.6
mb/d to 1.5 mb/d With Diverging Views on Russia and US
31
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
IEA OPEC EIA
Russian Liquid Supply Growth: Evolution of 2023 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
IEA OPEC EIA
Non-OPEC Liquid Supply Growth: Evolution of 2023 Forecasts
Y/Y growth in million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
• OPEC sees ~0.9 mb/d stronger non-OPEC supply
growth in 2023 compared to IEA and EIA.
• OPEC’s forecast shows more robust growth from
the US and less steep of a fall in Russian supply.
• IEA and EIA forecasts show Russian production
declines fully offsetting US production gains in
2023.
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
IEA OPEC EIA
US Liquid Supply Growth: Evolution of 2023 Forecasts
Y/Y growth million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
* EIA first published a 2023 forecast in Jan 2022; IEA in June 2022; and OPEC in July 2022
32. OPEC Sees More Resilient Russian Supply in 2023 and
Weaker US Supply in 2022 Compared to Both IEA and EIA
32
18.0
18.5
19.0
19.5
20.0
20.5
21.0
1Q22 2Q22 3Q22 4Q22 1Q23 2Q23 3Q23 4Q23
IEA
OPEC
EIA
2022-2023 Quarterly US Production* Forecasts By Agency
million barrels per day
* Includes onshore and offshore crude, condensate, NGLs, biofuels, and other liquids except
for refinery processing gains
Source: IEF, IEA Dec 2022 OMR, OPEC Dec 2022 MOMR, EIA Dec 2022 STEO
9.0
9.5
10.0
10.5
11.0
11.5
1Q22 2Q22 3Q22 4Q22 1Q23 2Q23 3Q23 4Q23
IEA
OPEC
EIA
2022-2023 Quarterly Russian Production Forecasts By Agency
million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA Dec 2022 OMR, OPEC Dec 2022 MOMR, EIA Dec 2022 STEO
33. IEA, OPEC, and EIA See the “Call on OPEC Crude” Rising in
2023 as Demand Rises Faster than Non-OPEC Supply
• The “call on OPEC crude” is a calculation and not
a forecast of actual OPEC production.
• It is estimated by subtracting a forecast for non-
OPEC production and OPEC NGLs from global
demand.
• The “call on OPEC” estimates what OPEC would
need to produce to balance global supply and
demand.
• All three agencies show a higher “call on OPEC” in
2023 compared to 2022, but the amounts diverge
by >1.0 mb/d due to different demand and non-
OPEC supply forecasts.
• IEA’s 2023 forecasts imply the highest “call on
OPEC” at 29.9 mb/d – which is 0.7 mb/d higher
than OPEC’s actual production in December 2022
(based on IEA’s estimate of 29.2 mb/d).
33
26.5
27.0
27.5
28.0
28.5
29.0
29.5
30.0
IEA OPEC EIA
Evolution of 2022 Call on OPEC
million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
27.5
28.0
28.5
29.0
29.5
30.0
30.5
31.0
IEA OPEC EIA
Evolution of 2023 Call on OPEC
million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA OMR, OPEC MOMR, EIA STEO
Forecast vintage
* EIA first published a 2023 forecast in Jan 2022; IEA in June 2022; and OPEC in July 2022
35. IEA and OPEC Scenario Descriptions and Assumptions
IEA WEO 2022 Scenarios OPEC WOO 2022 Scenarios
Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS):
This scenario looks at what governments are actually doing to
reach the targets and objectives they have set out. It considers
policies that have been implemented or are under
development.
This pathway is associated with an average increase of 2.5 °C
by 2100 (with a 50% probability).
Reference Case:
This scenario assumes continued progress in energy policies
that have been announced and enacted to the extent they are
technically and financially viable.
Announced Pledges Scenario (APS):
This scenario assumes that governments will meet in full and
on time, all of the climate-related commitments that have been
announced, including net zero emissions targets and pledges
in NDCs.
This pathway is associated with an average increase of 1.7 °C
by 2100 (with a 50% probability).
Advanced Technology Scenario (AT):
This scenario provides an alternative emissions reduction
pathway consistent with the long-term goals of the Paris
Agreement. It focuses on greater deployment of CCUS,
hydrogen, and increased adoption of the circular carbon
economy (CCE).
Net Zero Emissions by 2050 (NZE):
This scenario works backwards from the defined outcome of
achieving net zero emissions by mid-century and stabilizing
temperatures at 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.
Laissez-Faire Scenario (LF):
This scenario assumes improved energy access in least
developed countries and a quicker transition to modern energy
sources. It assumes policies will be tightened in the future but
in a more isolated manner.
35
36. IEA and OPEC Assume 3.2%-3.3% Global Growth This
Decade, With Some Differences at the Regional-Level
IEA’s oil price assumptions are largely in line with last year’s publication; OPEC does not
provide price assumption data
36
3.3
2.0 1.9
-1.1
4.7
7.2
5.0
3.2
2.2 2.0
0.2
5.1
6.3
4.4
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
World OECD
Americas
OECD
Europe
Russia China India Other non-
OECD
Asia
IEA (2021-2030)
OPEC (2021-2027)
Average Annual Real GDP Growth Rates*
% per annum
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
* IEA and OPEC’s regional classifications differ, so we construct the following regional classifications to allow for intercomparison: OECD Americas is North America for IEA, and OECD
Americas for OPEC; OECD Europe is the European Union for IEA, and OECD Europe for OPEC, Other non-OECD Asia is Southeast Asia for IEA, and Other non-OECD Asia for OPEC.
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Historical STEPS ('22 WEO)
APS ('22 WEO) NZE ('22 WEO)
STEPS ('21 WEO) APS ('21 WEO)
NZE ('21 WEO)
IEA Crude Oil Price Assumptions by Scenario
USD per barrel (USD 2021)
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022
37. Reference Scenarios Show Primary Energy Demand
Growing Between 2021 and 2030
Renewable energy is set to more than double in most scenarios, but fossil fuels will still
account for 62-77% of total primary demand in 2030
• Only IEA’s NZE sees a
substantial fall in global primary
energy between 2021 and 2030.
• OPEC AT shows a marginal
decline and IEA APS shows a
slight increase.
• IEA STEPS is most similar to
OPEC Ref and LF, although
STEPS sees stronger renewable
demand than both OPEC
scenarios.
• Oil demand is seen increasing in
all scenarios except IEA NZE
and APS.
• Coal demand is expected to fall
in all scenarios. The size of the
decline ranges from 5% (in
OPEC Ref and LF scenarios) to
46% in IEA’s NZE.
37
88.4 88.3 95.2 86.2
69.1
98.9 92.6 100.3
70.5 66.4
72.7
64.4
54.6
74.9
55.5
76.1
79.8 74.7
72.8
64.2
42.8
70.7
48.2
71.1
14.6
15.2
17.6
18.7
20.5
17.8
7.5
7.5
8.8
9.1
9.9
8.7
31.6
26.2
36.4
37.5
36.9
30.0
8.1
7.4
20.4
26.1
36.3
17.8
87.9
74.6
301
286
325
307
270
319
284
322
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
IEA OPEC IEA STEPS IEA APS IEA NZE OPEC Ref OPEC AT OPEC LF
2021 2030
Oil Gas
Coal Nuclear
Hydro Bioenergy
Other Re Renewable and Nuclear (OPEC AT & LF)
World Primary Energy Demand Outlook to 2030
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
38. All of the Scenarios See Renewables + Nuclear Growing By
>30% Between 2021 and 2030
Half of the scenarios show fossil fuel demand growing between 2021 and 2030
1%
35%
8%
-10%
47%
2%
-30%
67%
-10%
7%
32%
12%
-14%
56%
-1%
8%
32%
13%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Fossil Fuels Renewables + Nuclear* Total
IEA STEPS IEA APS IEA NZE OPEC Ref OPEC AT OPEC LF
% Change in World Primary Energy by Source: 2030 vs. 2021
% change by energy source
* Renewables + Nuclear includes nuclear, hydro, biomass, and other renewables
* Renewables are grouped with nuclear to be able to compare all scenarios. OPEC’s LF and
AT only report the aggregate and not components for renewables and nuclear.
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
38
2
21 24
-24
29
6
-72
42
-31
15
18
33
-33
32
-2
18 18
36
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
Fossil Fuels Renewables + Nuclear* Total
IEA STEPS IEA APS IEA NZE OPEC Ref OPEC AT OPEC LF
* Renewables + Nuclear includes nuclear, hydro, biomass, and other renewables
* Renewables are grouped with nuclear to be able to compare all scenarios. OPEC’s LF and
AT only report the aggregate and not components for renewables and nuclear.
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
Change in World Primary Energy by Source: 2030 vs 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
39. Fossil Fuels Will Still Account For 62-77% of Total Primary
Energy Demand in 2030 (vs. ~80% in 2021)
• Oil’s share of total primary
energy demand is expected to
remain flat or grow in 4 of the 6
scenarios.
• Nuclear’s share of primary
energy demand is expected to
stay flat or grow in IEA scenarios
and OPEC reference (OPEC AT
and LF scenarios only report
nuclear demand aggregated with
renewables).
• Renewable demand (excluding
hydro and bioenergy) is expected
to more than double in all IEA
scenarios and OPEC reference.
39
29% 31% 29% 28% 26%
31% 33% 31%
23% 23%
22% 21%
20%
23% 20% 24%
26% 26%
22%
21%
16%
22%
17%
22%
5% 5%
5%
6%
8%
6%
2% 3%
3%
3%
4%
3%
11% 9%
11%
12%
14%
9%
3% 3%
6% 8%
13%
6%
31%
23%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
IEA OPEC IEA STEPS IEA APS IEA NZE OPEC Ref OPEC AT OPEC LF
2021 2030
Oil Gas Coal Nuclear Hydro Bioenergy Other Renew Renewable and Nuclear (OPEC AT & LF)
World Primary Energy Demand Fuel Share Outlook to 2030
Percent of total primary energy
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
40. Non-OECD Countries Drive Growth in Fossil Fuel Demand
to 2030
Nearly all scenarios show declining OECD demand for oil, gas, and coal by 2030
40
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Oil Demand: 2030 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Coal Demand: 2030 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Natural Gas Demand: 2030 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Fossil Fuel Demand: 2030 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
41. Non-OECD Countries Lead Growth in Nuclear, Hydro, and
Other Renewables Demand
41
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Nuclear Demand: 2030 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Hydro Demand: 2030 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Biomass Demand: 2030 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Other Renewables Demand: 2030 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
42. Biofuels Play a Bigger Role in IEA APS – Accounting for 7%
of Total Liquids Supply by 2030
OPEC’s reference case shows ~2.6 mb/d higher liquids supply vs. IEA STEPS in 2030
42
31.5 31.6
35.9 32.5 36.1
16.8 16.7
20.7
18.8
20.1
10.9 10.8
8.8
8.5
10.4
31.1 31.3
34.5
30.9
35.8
2.3 2.3
2.5
2.3
2.8
2.7 2.5
4.4
7.1
3.3
95.3 95.2
105.8
100.1
108.4
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
IEA OPEC IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC
Reference
2021 2030
Total OPEC Supply US Russia
Other Non-OPEC Processing Gains Biofuels
Liquids Supply Sources by Scenario
Million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
33% 33% 34% 32% 33%
18% 18% 20% 19% 19%
11% 11% 8%
8% 10%
33% 33% 33%
31%
33%
2% 2% 2%
2%
3%
3% 3% 4%
7%
3%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
IEA OPEC IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC
Reference
2021 2030
Total OPEC Supply US Russia
Other Non-OPEC Processing Gains Biofuels
Liquids Supply Sources by Scenario
Million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
43. OPEC Reference Sees a Less Steep Decline in Russian
Supply Compared to IEA Scenarios
IEA APS sees more robust biofuels growth and lower OPEC-member growth
43
3.6
4.2
-0.5
1.6
3.1
-2.1
5.2
4.4
0.2
1.6
11.4
0.3
1.4
-0.9 -0.9
2.4
-2.4
-0.6
1.0
0.0
4.5
4.9
4.6
4.1
0.4
3.8
2.8
-0.4
8.3
4.4
0.5
0.8
13.2
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
OECD OECD
Americas
OECD
Europe
Non-OECD Latin
America
Russia Total Non-
OPEC*
OPEC Processing
Gains
Biofuels World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Reference
Liquids Supply by Source: 2030 vs. 2021
Million barrels per day
*Total non-OPEC excluding processing gains
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
Note: These IEA regional supply estimates
do not include biofuels while OPEC’s do.
This difference in reporting contributes to
divergences in the regional data.
45. Agencies See Global Growth Moderating at Below 3% Per
Annum with Large Divergences Seen in Non-OECD Asia
IEA’s oil price assumptions are largely in line with last year’s publication; OPEC does not
provide price assumption data
45
* Because the IEA and OPEC’s regional classifications differ, we construct the following regional classifications to allow for intercomparison: OECD Americas is North America for IEA, and
OECD Americas for OPEC; OECD Europe is the European Union for IEA, and OECD Europe for OPEC, Other non-OECD Asia is Southeast Asia for IEA, and Other non-OECD Asia for
OPEC.
2.6
2.0
1.2
0.7
2.8
4.4
3.3
2.9
2.0
1.2
1.4
3.4
6.0
3.4
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
World OECD
Americas
OECD
Europe
Russia China India Other non-
OECD
Asia
IEA (2030-2050)
OPEC (2027-2045)
Average Annual Real GDP Growth Rate*
% per annum
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Historical STEPS ('22 WEO)
APS ('22 WEO) NZE ('22 WEO)
STEPS ('21 WEO) APS ('21 WEO)
NZE ('21 WEO)
IEA Crude Oil Price Assumptions by Scenario
USD per barrel (USD 2021)
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022
46. Half of the Scenarios See Robust (+16% to 28%) Growth in
Primary Energy Between 2021 and 2045
OPEC Reference and IEA STEPS show plateauing liquids demand while APS and NZE
show a peak and decline
46
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Historical IEA STEPS IEA APS
IEA NZE OPEC Ref
Global Liquids Demand
Million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
220
240
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
IEA STEPS IEA APS
IEA NZE OPEC Ref
OPEC Advanced Technology OPEC Laissez-Faire
Global Primary Energy Outlook
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO
47. Despite Robust Growth, Non-Fossil Fuel Demand Will Not
Surpass Fossil Fuel’s 2021 Levels in the Forecast Period
47
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Ref
OPEC Advanced Technology
OPEC Laissez-Faire
Fossil Fuel Primary Energy Outlook
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Non-Fossil Fuel Primary Energy Outlook
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO
2021 Fossil Fuel Primary Energy Demand (IEA)
48. Two-Thirds of the Scenarios Show Fossil Fuels Accounting
for >50% of Total Primary Energy in 2045 vs. 80% in 2021
48
• Fossil fuel’s share of total primary demand
declines over time in all scenarios, albeit at
different paces.
• Scenarios showing a substantial increase in total
primary energy demand have the highest share of
fossil fuels in 2045.
• IEA’s NZE shows the most aggressive phase-out
of fossil fuels and is accompanied by a 15%
decline in total primary energy by 2045.
• NZE shows the share of fossil fuels in total primary
energy reaching 62% by 2030, lower than the
proportion reached 15 years late (2045) in STEPS
and OPEC’s Reference and Laissez-Faire.
2021
2030
2035
2040 2045
2021
2030
2035
2040
2045
240
260
280
300
320
340
360
380
10%
30%
50%
70%
90%
Total
Primary
Energy
(mboe/d)
Share of fossil fuels in total primary energy
IEA STEPS IEA APS
IEA NZE OPEC Ref
OPEC Advanced Technology OPEC Laissez-Faire
Share of Fossil Fuels in Total Primary Energy Demand
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
49. Primary Energy Demand Grows Between 2021 and 2045 in
Base Case Scenarios
“Other renewables” see the most significant growth across all scenarios to 2045
• Scenarios consistent with the
Paris Agreement show Primary
Energy roughly at or below 2021
levels in 2045 – implying a
decoupling of GDP growth and
energy demand growth.
• IEA scenarios and OPEC
reference scenario show “other
renewables” at 4-12 times higher
in 2045 compared to 2021 levels.
• Oil demand and natural gas
demand are higher in 2045 in
IEA STEPS and OPEC reference
and laissez-faire scenarios.
• IEA STEPS and OPEC
Reference see very similar total
primary energy demand in 2045
– although OPEC sees a higher
share of fossil fuel demand.
49
88.4 88.3 95.2
58.9
25.9
100.6
84.1
106.4
70.5 66.4
72.3
48.2
22.3
85.3
53.7
90.3
79.8 74.7 58.1
30.3
9.8
58.2
24.6
57.9
14.6
15.2 21.2
25.0
29.5
23.3
7.5
7.5 11.0
12.2
13.9
10.4
31.6
26.2
44.9
53.7
48.9
34.9
8.1
7.4
45.9
72.8
104.4
38.3
131.3
111.6
301
286
350
302
255
351
294
366
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
IEA OPEC IEA STEPS IEA APS IEA NZE OPEC Ref OPEC AT OPEC LF
2021 2045
Oil Gas Coal Nuclear Hydro Biomass Other Re Renewable and Nuclear (OPEC AT & LF)
World Primary Energy Outlook to 2045
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
50. Renewables + Nuclear Primary Energy See 90%-220%
Increase Between 2021 and 2045
Coal sees sharp decline in all scenarios driving fossil fuel demand lower
50
-5%
99%
16%
-42%
165%
0%
-76%
218%
-15%
6%
90%
23%
-29%
133%
3%
11%
98%
28%
-100%
-50%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
Fossil Fuels Renewables + Nuclear Total
IEA STEPS IEA APS IEA NZE OPEC Ref OPEC AT OPEC LF
% Change in World Primary Energy by Source: 2045 vs. 2021
% change by energy source
* Renewables + Nuclear includes nuclear, hydro, biomass, and other renewables
* Renewables are grouped with nuclear to be able to compare all scenarios. OPEC’s LF and
AT only report the aggregate and not components for renewables and nuclear.
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
-13
61
49
-101
102
0
-181
135
-46
15
51
65
-67
75
8
25
55
80
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
Fossil Fuels Renewables + Nuclear* Total
IEA STEPS IEA APS IEA NZE OPEC Ref OPEC AT OPEC LF
Change in World Primary Energy by Source: 2045 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
* Renewables + Nuclear includes nuclear, hydro, biomass, and other renewables
* Renewables are grouped with nuclear to be able to compare all scenarios. OPEC’s LF and
AT only report the aggregate and not components for renewables and nuclear.
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
51. Renewables + Nuclear Share of Primary Demand Increases
From ~20% in 2021 to 30%-77% in 2045
• IEA’s NZE scenario shows “other
renewables” share of primary
demand increasing from 3% in
2021 to 41% in 2045 with solar
increasing from 1% to 21% and
wind increasing from 1% to 15%.
• OPEC scenarios all see only a 2
percentage point decrease in
oil’s share of primary energy
between 2021 and 2045.
• Natural gas’ share of primary
energy demand declines in all
scenarios except OPEC’s
reference and LF scenarios.
• Coal sees the sharpest decrease
in share of primary energy
between 2021 and 2045. Coal
shrinks from 26% of total primary
energy in 2021 to as little as 4%
in IEA’s NZE or as much as 17%
in IEA’s STEPS and OPEC’s
reference.
51
29% 31% 27%
20%
10%
29% 29% 29%
23% 23%
21%
16%
9%
24%
18%
25%
26% 26%
17%
10%
4%
17%
8%
16%
5% 5%
6%
8%
12%
7%
2% 3%
3%
4%
5%
3%
11% 9%
13%
18%
19%
10%
3% 3%
13%
24%
41%
11%
45%
30%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
IEA OPEC IEA STEPS IEA APS IEA NZE OPEC Ref OPEC AT OPEC LF
2021 2045
Oil Gas Coal Nuclear Hydro Biomass Other Renew Renewable and Nuclear (OPEC AT & LF)
World Primary Energy Fuel Share Outlook to 2045
Percent of total primary energy
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
52. Oil Demand in the Transportation Sector Plateaus for the
Next 20 Years in IEA STEPS and OPEC Reference, But
Peaks and Declines in IEA APS and NZE
• The transportation sector accounts for more than
50% of current oil demand.
• The pace of EV penetration into the global vehicle
fleet will greatly impact future oil demand.
• OPEC’s reference case assumes ~11% of the
global fleet will be EVs by 2035 and 21% by 2045
– up from 1% in 2021. This assumes that by 2045,
40% of total car sales will be EVs.
• By contrast, IEA’s NZE assumes that by 2030,
60% of all new car sales are electric (compares
with 35% in APS and 25% in STEPS). NZE also
assumes no new ICE light-duty vehicles will be
sold after 2035.
52
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Ref
Oil Product + Biofuel Demand in the Transportation Sector
(excl. bunkering)
Million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
53. 75% of Scenarios See Higher Oil Demand in the
Petrochemical Sector in 2045 vs. 2021
• Petrochemicals are used for plastics, fertilizers,
clothing, tires, and many other things used in
modern society.
• Petrochemical demand is set to continue to be a
significant portion of future oil demand and
demand growth.
• OPEC notes that the largest incremental demand
is expected in the Middle East where locally
sourced ethane and LPG will be used as
feedstocks. China and other Asian countries will
also see growth, but will primarily use naphtha as
a feedstock.
• Oil use as petrochemical feedstock falls in IEA’s
NZE Scenario due to alternative feedstocks and
increased recycling. However, petrochemicals still
account for more than half of oil demand in 2050 in
NZE.
53
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
2020 2030 2040 2050
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Ref
Oil Demand in Petrochemical Sector
Million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
54. IEA STEPS and OPEC Reference Show Higher Oil and Gas
Demand in 2045 vs. 2021 Driven By Non-OECD Countries
IEA scenarios show Chinese oil demand peaking ~2030, with 2045 levels below 2021’s
54
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Oil Demand: 2045 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Coal Demand: 2045 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Natural Gas Demand: 2045 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Fossil Fuel Demand: 2045 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
55. Nuclear, Hydro, Biomass, and Other Renewables See
Growth Across the Board Between 2021 and 2045
55
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Nuclear Demand: 2045 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
0
1
2
3
4
5
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Hydro Demand: 2045 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
0
5
10
15
20
25
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Biomass* Demand: 2045 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
*Includes traditional biomass
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
OECD Non-OECD China India Russia World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Ref
Change in Other Renewables Demand: 2045 vs. 2021
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
56. OPEC Members and Biofuels See Rising Share of Total
Liquids Supply By 2045 in STEPS, APS and OPEC Ref
US production is seen rising only in IEA STEPS
56
31.5 31.6
41.2
25.6
42.4
16.8 16.7
18.0
12.6
15.8
10.9 10.8
7.5
4.5
10.4
31.1 31.3
33.1
19.5
33.6
2.3 2.3
2.6
1.9
3.2
2.7 2.5
6.4
11.8
4.4
95.3 95.2
108.8
75.9
109.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
IEA OPEC IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC
Reference
2021 2045
Total OPEC Supply US Russia
Other Non-OPEC Processing Gains Biofuels
Liquids Supply Sources by Scenario
Million barrels per day
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
33% 33%
38%
34%
39%
18% 18%
17%
17%
14%
11% 11% 7%
6%
9%
33% 33%
30%
26%
31%
2% 2%
2%
3%
3%
3% 3% 6%
16%
4%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
IEA OPEC IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC
Reference
2021 2045
Total OPEC Supply US Russia
Other Non-OPEC Processing Gains Biofuels
Liquids Supply Sources by Scenario
% of total liquids supply
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
57. IEA APS Sees a Steep Drop in Liquids Supply By 2045
Despite Robust Growth in Biofuels
STEPS sees more robust growth in the Americas, biofuels and less steep decline in
Russia vs. OPEC’s Reference
57
-0.1
1.8
-1.9
-0.2
4.6
-3.4
-0.2
9.7
0.5
3.8
13.7
-10.5
-7.3
-2.7
-11.7
1.0
-6.4
-22.2
-5.9
-0.4
9.4
-19.1
0.3 0.0 0.3
2.8 2.8
-0.4
3.0
10.7
0.9
1.9
14.6
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
OECD OECD
Americas
OECD Europe Non-OECD Latin America Russia Total Non-
OPEC*
OPEC Processing
Gains
Biofuels World
IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC Reference
Liquids Supply by Source: 2045 vs. 2021
Million barrels per day
*Non-OPEC excluding processing gains
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
Note: These IEA regional supply estimates
do not include biofuels while OPEC’s do.
This difference in reporting contributes to
divergences in the regional data.
58. OPEC Market Share of Total Oil Production Rises From 35%
in 2021 to 41% in IEA and OPEC Scenarios
• IEA STEPS and OPEC Reference show OPEC
production higher in 2045 vs. 2021.
• While OPEC does not provide country-level
forecasts for OPEC members, IEA does provide
partial data.
• IEA STEPS forecast for 2045 shows OPEC
production at 5.3 mb/d higher than 2021 levels
driven primarily by increased output from:
• Saudi Arabia (+1.8 mb/d);
• Iraq (+1.3 mb/d);
• Venezuela (+1.1 mb/d);
• Iran (+0.9 mb/d); and
• UAE (+0.7 mb/d)
• IEA’s WEO notes that in its APS and STEPS
scenarios, OPEC members’ share of the global oil
market will continue rising to 43% by 2050 – its
highest level since 1979.
58
35% 35%
41% 41% 41%
65% 65%
59% 59% 59%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
IEA OPEC IEA STEPS IEA APS OPEC
Reference
2021 2045
OPEC Non-OPEC
OPEC and Non-OPEC Market Share of Global Oil Production*
% of global oil production
*Excludes biofuels and processing gains
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022
60. Additional Scenario Descriptions and Assumptions
BNEF
NZS Scenario consistent with limiting end-
century warming to 1.5°C and
achieving global net-zero emissions by
2050. IEEJ
Reference Incorporates past trends and expected impact
of current and expected policies.
Economic
Transition
Scenario (ETS)
A baseline assessment. Assumes no
further major climate policy
intervention.
Advanced
Technology
(ATS)
Energy and environmental technologies are
introduced to the maximum extent possible.
BP
Accelerated Broadly in line with IPCC 2°C. Total
final consumption peaks around 2030.
IPCC
ModAct NDCs are implemented. Current trajectory
leads to >2°C warming.
Net Zero Broadly in line with IPCC 1.5°C. Total
final consumption peaks in the early
2020s.
IMP-Neg
(2C)
Limits warming to 2C; higher deployment of
carbon capture technology.
New
Momentum
Follows the current trajectory of energy
policies. Total final consumption peaks
in mid-2040s.
IMP-Ren
(1.5)
Limits warming to 1.5C with greater emphasis
on renewables.
Equinor
Walls Current trends in market, technology
and policies.
IMP-LD
(1.5)
Limits warming to 1.5C with greater emphasis
on demand reduction.
Bridges Broadly consistent with IPCC 1.5°C.
IRENA
Planned Projects future trends based on current and
announced policies (including NDCs on
emissions reductions)
GECF
Reference
(RCS)
Current and likely policies. Energy
demand will rise by 29% by 2050.
Hydrogen (HS) Assumes aggressive hydrogen
development
1.5-S Scenario consistent with limiting end-century
warming to 1.5°C
Both the planned and 1.5-S were originally
published in the World Energy Transitions
Outlook 2021 and unchanged in the 2022
edition.
Energy
Transition
(ETS)
Consistent with IPCC 2°C.
60
* See descriptions of IEA and OPEC scenarios on page 35
61. Total Primary Energy Demand: 75% of Scenarios Show
End-Period Primary Demand at Higher Levels Than 2021
Excluding the IPCC IMP-LD outlier, the range between the high-low forecasts for 2050
would be 163 mboe/d (compared to the actual 2021 primary demand of 276 mboe/d)
61
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Reference
OPEC Advanced Technology
OPEC Laissez-Faire
IRENA Planned
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
GECF-RCS
GECF-HS
GECF-ETS
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
IEEJ Reference
IEEJ ATS
IPPC ModAct (3C)
IPCC IMP-Neg (2C)
IPCC IMP-Ren (1.5)
IPCC IMP-LD (1.5)
Total Primary Energy Demand Scenarios Through 2050
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
232
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, GECF 2022 Global Gas Outlook to 2050, Equinor Energy
Perspectives 2022, BNEF New Energy Outlook 2022, IEEJ Outlook 2023, IPCC Climate Change 2022:Mitigation of Climate Change
62. Total Liquids Demand: OPEC Ref, IEA STEPS, and IRENA
Planned (Base Case Scenarios) Show Plateauing Demand
While Most Others Show a Peak and Decline Before 2035
62
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, Equinor Energy Perspectives 2022, BNEF New
Energy Outlook 2022
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Reference
IRENA Planned
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
Total Liquids Demand Scenarios Through 2050
MBOE/D
92
63. 0
20
40
60
80
100
120
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Reference
OPEC Advanced Technology
OPEC Laissez-Faire
IRENA Planned
IRENA 1.5-S
GECF-RCS
GECF-HS
GECF-ETS
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
IEEJ Reference
IEEJ ATS
Oil Demand Scenarios Through 2050
Million barrels per day
92
Oil Demand: Most Scenarios Show a Peak and Decline In
Oil Demand in the 2020’s or 2030’s
However, several reference case scenarios show growth and a plateau at 100-105 mb/d
63
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, GECF 2022 Global Gas Outlook to 2050, BNEF New Energy Outlook 2022, IEEJ
Outlook 2023
64. Natural Gas Demand: Excluding the High Outlier, the Range
Between the High and Low Forecast is 5,100 bcm or ~25%
Larger than Today’s Global Gas Market
64
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Reference
OPEC Advanced Technology
OPEC Laissez-Faire
IRENA Planned
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
GECF-RCS
GECF-HS
GECF-ETS
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
IEEJ Reference
IEEJ ATS
IPPC ModAct (3C)
IPCC IMP-Neg (2C)
IPCC IMP-Ren (1.5)
IPCC IMP-LD (1.5)
Natural Gas Demand Scenarios Through 2050
Billion cubic metres
7157
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, GECF 2021 Global Gas Outlook to 2050, Equinor Energy
Perspectives 2022, BNEF New Energy Outlook 2022, IEEJ Outlook 2023, IPCC Climate Change 2022:Mitigation of Climate Change
65. Coal Demand: More than Half of All Scenarios Show Coal
Demand Falling By >50% By 2050
65
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Reference
OPEC Advanced Technology
OPEC Laissez-Faire
IRENA Planned
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
GECF-RCS
GECF-HS
GECF-ETS
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
IEEJ Reference
IEEJ ATS
IPPC ModAct (3C)
IPCC IMP-Neg (2C)
IPCC IMP-Ren (1.5)
IPCC IMP-LD (1.5)
Coal Demand Scenarios Through 2050
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
73
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, GECF 2021 Global Gas Outlook to 2050, Equinor Energy
Perspectives 2022, BNEF New Energy Outlook 2022, IEEJ Outlook 2023, IPCC Climate Change 2022:Mitigation of Climate Change
66. Fossil Fuels Share of Primary Energy: Around Half of All
Scenarios Have Fossil Fuels Accounting For More Than
50% of Total Primary Energy Demand in 2050
66
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Reference
OPEC Advanced Technology
OPEC Laissez-Faire
IRENA Planned
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
GECF-RCS
GECF-HS
GECF-ETS
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
IEEJ Reference
IEEJ ATS
IPPC ModAct (3C)
IPCC IMP-Neg (2C)
IPCC IMP-Ren (1.5)
IPCC IMP-LD (1.5)
Fossil Fuels Share of Primary Energy Scenarios Through 2050
% of Primary Energy
72 p.p.
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, GECF 2021 Global Gas Outlook to 2050, Equinor Energy
Perspectives 2022, BNEF New Energy Outlook 2022, IEEJ Outlook 2023, IPCC Climate Change 2022:Mitigation of Climate Change
67. Renewables Demand: the Range of the High-Low Forecasts
For Renewable Demand in 2050 is ~4 Times Greater than
Current Renewable Demand
67
0
50
100
150
200
250
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Reference
OPEC Advanced Technology
OPEC Laissez-Faire
IRENA Planned
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
GECF-RCS
GECF-HS
GECF-ETS
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
IEEJ Reference
IEEJ ATS
IPPC ModAct (3C)
IPCC IMP-Neg (2C)
IPCC IMP-Ren (1.5)
IPCC IMP-LD (1.5)
Renewable Demand Scenarios Through 2050
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
160
*Includes wind, solar, geothermal, modern and traditional bioenergy
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, GECF 2022 Global Gas Outlook to 2050, Equinor Energy
Perspectives 2022, BNEF New Energy Outlook 2022, IEEJ Outlook 2023, IPCC Climate Change 2022:Mitigation of Climate Change
68. Renewables Share of Primary Energy: A Third of Scenarios
Show Renewable’s Share of Primary Demand in 2050 at
~30% and Nearly Another Third Show the Share at ~50%
68
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Reference
OPEC Advanced Technology
OPEC Laissez-Faire
IRENA Planned
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
GECF-RCS
GECF-HS
GECF-ETS
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
IEEJ Reference
IEEJ ATS
IPPC ModAct (3C)
IPCC IMP-Neg (2C)
IPCC IMP-Ren (1.5)
IPCC IMP-LD (1.5)
Renewable Demand Share of Total Primary Energy Demand Scenarios to 2050
Share of Primary Energy Demand
71 p.p.
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, GECF 2021 Global Gas Outlook to 2050, Equinor Energy
Perspectives 2022, BNEF New Energy Outlook 2022, IEEJ Outlook 2023, IPCC Climate Change 2022:Mitigation of Climate Change
*Includes wind, solar, geothermal, modern and traditional bioenergy
69. Nuclear Demand: More than Half of All Scenarios Show
Nuclear Demand Increasing By >50% in 2050 Compared to
2021 Levels
69
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Reference
IRENA Planned
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
GECF-RCS
GECF-HS
GECF-ETS
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
IEEJ Reference
IEEJ ATS
Nuclear Demand Scenarios Through 2050
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day
25
*Differences in baselines may stem from different primary energy conversion efficiency assumptions.
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, GECF 2021 Global Gas Outlook to 2050, Equinor Energy
Perspectives 2022, BNEF New Energy Outlook 2022, IEEJ Outlook 2023, IPCC Climate Change 2022:Mitigation of Climate Change
70. Hydrogen Demand: Some Net Zero Scenarios See Low-
Carbon Hydrogen Market Expanding By 600x By 2050
70
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
IRENA Planned
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
GECF-RCS
GECF-HS
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
IEEJ ATS
IPPC ModAct (3C)
IPCC IMP-Neg (2C)
IPCC IMP-Ren (1.5)
IPCC IMP-LD (1.5)
Hydrogen Demand Scenarios* Through 2050
Million metric tonnes per year
618
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, GECF 2021 Global Gas Outlook to 2050, Equinor Energy Perspectives 2022, BNEF
New Energy Outlook 2022, IEEJ Outlook 2023, IPCC Climate Change 2022:Mitigation of Climate Change
Some scenarios only provide an outlook for low-
carbon hydrogen, while others include hydrogen
made from unabated fossil fuels. The current market
size for low-carbon hydrogen is negligible while “grey”
hydrogen’s market size is ~100 mtpa. We have
included all of these scenarios since most (if not all)
expect “grey” hydrogen to be phased out and replaced
by low-carbon hydrogen within the forecast period.
71. Electricity Generation: Most Scenarios Show Electricity
Demand Growing By ~80% By 2050, With More Ambitious
Net Zero Scenarios Showing Up to ~200% Growth vs. 2021
71
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Reference
OPEC Advanced Technology
IRENA Planned
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
GECF-RCS
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
IEEJ Reference
IEEJ ATS
IPPC ModAct (3C)
IPCC IMP-Neg (2C)
IPCC IMP-Ren (1.5)
IPCC IMP-LD (1.5)
Electricity Generation Scenarios Through 2050
TWh
39,285
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, GECF 2021 Global Gas Outlook to 2050, Equinor Energy
Perspectives 2022, BNEF New Energy Outlook 2022, IEEJ Outlook 2023, IPCC Climate Change 2022:Mitigation of Climate Change
72. Electricity Share of Final Demand: Many Scenarios Show
Electricity’s Share Growing from ~20% in 2021 to 30% in
2050, With More Ambitious Scenarios Showing ~50% Share
72
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
IEEJ Reference
IEEJ ATS
IPPC ModAct (3C)
IPCC IMP-Neg (2C)
IPCC IMP-Ren (1.5)
IPCC IMP-LD (1.5)
Electricity Share of Final Energy Demand Scenarios Through 2050
Share of final energy demand
39 p.p.
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, Equinor Energy Perspectives 2022, BNEF New Energy Outlook 2022, IEEJ Outlook
2023, IPCC Climate Change 2022:Mitigation of Climate Change
73. Carbon Dioxide Emissions: 40% of Scenarios Show at
Least a 40% Drop in Emissions by 2050
73
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
OPEC Reference
IRENA Planned
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
GECF-RCS
GECF-HS
GECF-ETS
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
BNEF ETS
IEEJ Reference
IEEJ ATS
IPCC IMP-Neg (2C)
IPCC IMP-Ren (1.5)
IPCC IMP-LD (1.5)
CO2 Emissions Scenarios Through 2050
Gt CO2/year
37
*IEA includes industrial process emissions which may contribute to their higher starting baseline.
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, OPEC WOO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, GECF 2021 Global Gas Outlook to 2050, Equinor Energy
Perspectives 2022, BNEF New Energy Outlook 2022, IEEJ Outlook 2023, IPCC Climate Change 2022:Mitigation of Climate Change
74. Carbon Capture: Carbon Capture Expands to ~6-8 Gt of CO2
per Annum in Many of the Ambitious Net Zero Scenarios
74
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
History
IEA STEPS
IEA APS
IEA NZE
IRENA 1.5-S
BP Accelerated
BP Net Zero
BP New Momentum
Equinor Walls
Equinor Bridges
BNEF NZS
IPPC ModAct (3C)
IPCC IMP-Neg (2C)
IPCC IMP-Ren (1.5)
IPCC IMP-LD (1.5)
Carbon Capture (including CCS, DACC, and BECCS)
Mt CO2/year
8400
Source: IEF, IEA WEO 2022, IRENA World Energy Transitions Outlook 2022, BP Energy Outlook 2022, Equinor Energy Perspectives 2022, BNEF New Energy Outlook 2022, IPCC Climate
Change 2022:Mitigation of Climate Change
76. Notes:
• Data in tables and charts may not sum due to rounding.
• Some divergences may be explained by different energy conversion
efficiency assumptions.
• To enable comparability between agencies, biofuels (volumetric equivalent)
were added to IEA regional oil supply data unless stated otherwise (slides 43
and 57).
• Processing gains were subtracted from EIA regional oil supply data to enable
comparability.
• Primary energy was converted from EJ per year to mboe/d by multiplying by
0.4825 mboed/EJ.
• In most instances in this report, oil is reported in energy equivalent units
(mboe/d) to allow for a comparison between different fuel types. These
figures are not directly comparable to the volumetric units (mb/d) for total
liquids. Total liquids include biofuels, coal-to-liquids, gas-to-liquids, and
processing gains while the reporting of oil on slides 37-40, 49-51, 54, 63 do
not include these other liquids.
76
77. Acknowledgements:
This report was prepared by the IEF, in consultation with the International
Energy Agency, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and
Resources for the Future.
The IEF would like to thank the IEA, OPEC, and RFF for their constructive
comments and insights into this document and the on-going dialogue that
underpins the trilateral programme of work.
77