This document discusses the response to Hurricane Katrina by federal, state, and local governments in 2005. It analyzes the response through the lens of intergovernmental relations and management. Some successes included the evacuation of over 1.2 million people from New Orleans before the storm. However, failures included the lack of coordination between agencies and levels of government. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) struggled to communicate and secure resources. Political disputes between state and federal authorities also delayed an effective response in the critical days following the hurricane. The document examines both successes and failures in order to understand lessons for improving intergovernmental cooperation during future disasters.

1. PHOTOGRAPH BY NOAA/ZUMA/CORBIS
Team Three Hurricane Katrina
Group Project
Carl Cahanin, Kelly Miller, & Pamela Portocarrero
Arrambide

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Introduction
As a federalist government system, power and authority are separated between
federal, state, and local governments by the 10th Constitutional Amendment (Jay, Goldman,
Hamilton, & Madison, 2008). This separation of power is intended to better serve citizens
by allowing local and state governments to have dominion over those activities that most
directly benefit and affect citizens (Conlan, 2006). However, the federalist system sets the
stage for political influence at multiple levels, restrictive administrative procedures,
financial, and procedures. In order to serve the citizens of a representative government, all
levels of government must communicate, cooperate, and collaborate. The interaction of
these is the study of intergovernmental relations (IGR) or intergovernmental management
(IGM).
In this paper our team will examine the concepts of IGR and IGM as it applies to the
federal, state, and local government’s response to the disaster left by Hurricane Katrina in
2005. The political, financial, administrative, and cooperative actions surrounding the
response to this natural disaster resulted in successes, many failures, and valuable lessons
learned.
Hurricane Katrina Impacts U.S. Gulf Coast States
In early August 2005, the National Hurricane Center in Miami began tracking a
powerfully building storm at the fringes of the Gulf of Mexico (Derthick, 2007). On August
24, 2005 the National Hurricane Center issued its first warning to state and local
governments with more urgent warnings issued as the storm gained power and its
imminent landfall on the U.S. Gulf Coast states became apparent (Derthick, 2007). On
August 28, New Orleans Mayor Nagin ordered a mandatory evacuation with an astounding

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number of residents successfully leaving the city and others being transported to the
Superdome (Derthick, 2007). Successful pre-planning by the state of Louisiana and the City
of New Orleans resulted in a mass evacuation of over 1.2 million residents leaving only an
estimated 70,000 residents inside the city when Katrina hit (Derthick, 2007).
As Hurricane Katrina passed through the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico, it built
up to a Category 5 hurricane, before weakening to a Category 4 to a Category 3 hurricane
with sustained winds of 125 – 140 miles per hour and 20 foot storm surges that flooded
coastal communities (History.com, 2009; Morris et al., 2007). During the storm, and soon
after its passing, the levee system designed to protect the City of New Orleans failed with
numerous breaches adding to the devastation inside the city (Morris et al., 2007). Already
vulnerable by its location inside the swamps of the Mississippi Delta and 80% of the city
sitting below sea level, poor urban planning, and unmet maintenance needs to aging levees.
New Orleans and the remaining city population were quickly flooded making accessibility
for assistance and rescue nearly impossible and dangerous (Derthick, 2007).
City officials and first responders used buses to get as many of the remaining
residents to safety inside the Superdome, a sanctuary that proved to be ill-equipped and
inadequate for this level of need (Derthick, 2007). As the storm passed, the
intergovernmental response to those left stranded is criticized as an even greater disaster
than the storm itself (Walters & Kettl, 2005; Morris et al., 2007; Derthick, 2007).
Applying the Concepts of Federalism and Political Influences on the Hurricane
Katrina Response
Ideally, the government’s response to a natural disaster should largely be controlled
by the local government, followed by state support and then the federal government as

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requested (Walters & Kettl, 2005). However, in terms of disaster response, since President
Coolidge the federal government has been steadily increasing its role in disaster response
beginning with the Mississippi River flooding in 1927 (Walters & Kettl, 2005). The Federal
Civil Defense Act defined what and how much aid the federal government could extend to
states while the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act set forth the steps in declaring a
disaster and the expected intergovernmental response (Walters & Kettl, 2005). President
Jimmy Carter created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979 with
the intent of creating a federal agency solely tasked with coordinating the federal
government’s assistance to state and local governments when disasters strike (Walters &
Kettl, 2005).
Hurricane Katrina was the first disaster since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001(Morris et al., 2007). After September 11, both federal and state governments devoted
considerable effort to emergency response planning with the passage of the Homeland
Security Act, The National Response Plan (NRP), and the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) (Hu, Knox, & Kapucu, 2014; Morris et al., 2007). The intent of all planning
and actions was to clearly define the role of each level of government when the next
disaster occurred. In the end, the failures can be attributed to a lack of intergovernmental
collaboration, communication breakdowns, political perceptions, and misunderstandings
of the role each government should have played (Walters & Kettl, 2005; Morris et al., 2007;
Lester & Krejci, 2007). Seeing the breakdown of local and state effectiveness, the federal
government attempted to preempt local and state authority by taking control of the
emergency response through FEMA and military response, an act prohibited by the Posse

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Comitatus Act of 1878 limiting the use of federal military forces for domestic activities
(Walters & Kettl, 2005; Morris et al., 2007; Derthick, 2007).
Funding the Preparation, Response, and Recovery of Hurricane Katrina
Federal funding has been invested in the City of New Orleans to protect it from the
inevitable natural disasters through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) despite its
poor location and unmanaged growth (Derthick, 2007). The port of New Orleans is a
significant point of entry and provides significant economic benefit to the entire country
(Derthick, 2007). The USACE had been working to fortify New Orleans since 1965 by
constructing a levee system and floodgates at a cost of $750 million (Derthick, 2007). The
USACE’s projects were still under construction when Katrina struck with projects
unfinished, maintenance lacking, and poorly designed structures in place (Derthick, 2007).
Beyond the physical construction aimed at protecting New Orleans, considerable federal
funding was invested in emergency response planning, training, and purchasing equipment
(Derthick, 2007; Morris et al., 2007). As the storm passed, considerable financial resources
were expended by all levels of government in search and rescue missions. As the
floodwaters receded, massive amounts of federal funding along with private donations and
aid from nonprofit organizations were contributed to the state and local governments for
rebuilding the Gulf Coast communities (ABC News, March 25, 2013).
Working through the Administrative Requirements to Prepare and Respond to
Katrina
As with most government endeavors, administrative procedures, tracking, and
reporting are a requirement. In preparing for Katrina, planning and assignment of roles
was an administrative necessity with chain of command and communication channels
established. Investments and training to enact NIMS in times of crisis were devoted at all

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levels of government. However, as the storm hit, these preparation plans were quickly
overwhelmed (Morris et al., 2007). Administratively, failures to properly request aid,
inability to make decisions, transmitting misinformation, and failure to forego
administrative protocol for things such as permits or licenses slowed the response and
ultimately extended human suffering (Derthick, 2007; Morris et al., 2007; ABC News, March
25, 2013).
Government Collaboration to Aid Communities Affected by Hurricane Katrina
One of the intentions of emergency planning is to assign roles and designate
established networks of cooperation so that these decisions are not left unanswered or
disputed during an ongoing emergency (Walters & Kettl, 2005). However, a lack of
coordination is blamed as the chief cause of the poor performance and chaos left in the
storm’s aftermath (Morris et al., 2007). In truth, the existing plans, which continue to assign
first response and authority to the local and state governments, assume these governments
are available to coordinate activities (Morris et al., 2007). As Katrina proved, both levels of
government were rendered incapable of adequately coping with the disaster, which
necessitated a larger federal response (Morris et al., 2007).
Morris et al. discuss Kettl’s theory of contingent coordination as a solution to future
coordinated responses (2007). In the contingent coordination theory, authorities establish
separate hierarchal structures functioning together as needed (Morris et al., 2007). This is
a key component of NIMS (Morris et al., 2007). If properly executed, both contingent
coordination and the principles of NIMS address the most prominent failures during the
Katrina response.

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Intergovernmental Successes and Failures
The response to Hurricane Katrina is widely acknowledged as a widespread
government failure. The massive destruction left in its wake made the response too
complex and too severe of an issue to be handled exclusively by local and state officials.
Katrina’s force required the joint efforts of local, state, and federal governments, along with
other agencies, armed forces, organizations, and individuals. This collaborative effort
needed to be present before, during, and after landfall in order to best serve the people of
New Orleans. While most of the government reports, media articles, and rhetoric overplay
the failures of the response, there were also successes, mostly driven by effective
intergovernmental collaboration. Simple examples of successes and failures in the
administrative impact of Katrina include the successful implementation of the Contraflow
evacuation plan countered with the failure to recover bodies for lack of a medical examiner
(Derthick, 2007; Morris et al., 2007). However, more extensive and complicated examples
of successes and failures require more attention.
In her article, Derthick (2007) begins by praising the exceptional efforts to evacuate
over one million people out of the greater New Orleans area days before Katrina made
landfall. Such a feat required careful planning and high levels of coordination between local
and state officials. All of the counties in the area had agreed to follow the plan and
extensive advertising and education efforts were in place. The plan had been shared with
as many area residents as possible. This resulted in 1.2 million people, out of 1.4 million, to
be evacuated out of the New Orleans metropolitan area before Katrina arrived (Derthick,
2007).

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The USACE levee system presents yet another example of intergovernmental
conflict and disagreement. The levee system was a joint project between the USACE and the
Orleans Levee District. While the levees’ failure to hold the waves is an engineering issue, it
was a direct result of poor collaboration and intergovernmental confusion as to who was
officially responsible for the performance of the levees. Both the USACE and the Levee
District could not agree on who was in charge of inspection, maintenance, and construction
(Derthick, 2007).
Unfortunately, more than 70,000 remained in the city either because they refused to
leave, were physically incapable, or lacked transportation (Derthick, 2007). An earlier
emergency exercise recommended a transportation plan for those physically unable to
evacuate the city. Unfortunately, Mayor Nagin of New Orleans failed to follow through with
the recommendations and there was no system in place to ensure such a plan was created
(Walters & Kettl, 2005). The National Response Plan (NRP) called for the joint response of
federal, state, and local governments in the case of a national emergency. However,
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Chertoff did not deem Katrina a
national emergency until several days after the hurricane hit (Walters & Kettl, 2005).
In the meantime, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries, and the National Guard were the dominant forces in the search and rescue efforts
and it is because of their success that nearly all who were left behind survived. When the
local police and fire department faced tens of thousands swimming on the flooded streets,
stranded on rooftops, going hungry and thirsty under freeway overpasses, they quickly
realized they were underequipped to deal with the disaster situation. The three units
mentioned above were successful in the collaborative efforts because they were familiar

9. 8
with the area, had performed many hurricanes exercises in the past, and were adequately
equipped for water rescue. Also, the National Guard was able to solicit the assistance of
other states through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which increased its
number of boats, helicopters, and man-power (Derthick, 2007; Morris et al., 2007).
At this point, Louisiana state officials were barely getting acquainted with important
emergency procedure documents, such as NRP and the NIMS, which outline the procedures
for action, resources and assistance request, and solutions during a national disaster. The
leadership hierarchy should have been assigned before disaster planning and training
began. Missing leadership and assigned agency response during the emergency created
confusion and stalled progress (Lester & Krejci, 2007). After exhausting all of its shelters
and the Superdome’s capacity, Louisiana Governor Blanco contacted Texas Governor Perry
to solicit help in housing evacuees from the city. Fortunately, Governor Perry obliged and
plans were made to transport those being rescued to Texas and other neighboring states.
However, this did not take place until a week after Katrina made landfall because of Mayor
Nagin’s failure to follow the recommendations of a joint emergency exercise months earlier
(Derthick, 2007).
Transporting evacuees became another failure. Even when Governor Blanco had
found a place where to relocate evacuees, transportation was an issue and it was FEMA’s
responsibility to address it. FEMA acts as a liaison between the states and the federal
government during a disaster (Derthick, 2007). During the consolidation of government
emergency management functions that followed 9/11, FEMA was incorporated into the
Department of Homeland Security (Derthick, 2007). During Katrina, FEMA was struggling
to communicate with the federal government and acquire the necessary supplies,

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resources, and even permission to carry on its functions (Derthick, 2007). FEMA failed to
secure buses for the transport of evacuees, it failed to provide survivors with food and
other supplies, and it delayed request for assistance to the Department of Defense
(Derthick, 2007).
Michael Chertoff, the Secretary of Homeland Security, along with Matthew
Broderick, head of the Homeland Security Operations Center, both failed by not seriously
acknowledging the validity of the reports received from New Orleans (Derthick, 2007;
Walters & Kettl, 2005). The armed forces appeared on Wednesday, two days after the
hurricane, and were able to take over FEMA’s function of delivering food and water to
Louisiana and Mississippi. The White House tried to take control of the situation by using
the military, to which Governor Blanco strongly objected. The posturing between state and
federal government delayed the assistance from Washington leadership (Morris et al.,
2007). When state and federal officials agreed to fly evacuees out of Louisiana, TSA’s
policies to screen passengers and DHS’s security procedures became obstacles in the
rescue efforts (Derthick, 2007). Law enforcement was also an issue, which was getting
exaggerated by the media and fueling the White House’s desire to deploy the military to
assist with the violence (Derthick, 2007). Again, the media had exaggerated the acts of
violence when in reality there was little need for force to be employed. Mississippi and
Louisiana governors refused to let the federal government takeover security through its
military and instead reached out to other states for help through the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact, which demonstrated a bright example of interstate
cooperation instead of opting for a centralized military takeover that would not have
guaranteed a positive outcome (Derthick, 2007).

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All authors in this module agree that the main reason for the response failures and
poor performance after the hurricane was due to ineffective collaboration. All involved
players should have been familiar with each other and each other’s practices, behaviors,
policies, and action plans, hence the need for emergency drills and exercises that include all
involved parties. Also, each agency and department official should have known their exact
role, task, responsibility, or at least the main mission, e.g. rescue people from rooftops, as in
the case of the Coast Guard. Even though the Coast Guard’s units came from all over the
country, they were able to work well together and with other agencies because of their
specific training and prior collaborations. Knowing the mission and goals allows for
individuals to still complete the task even in the absence of authority or leadership, like it
occurred during Katrina when all major communications broke down (Derthick, 2007;
Lester & Krejci, 2007; Morris et al., 2007; Walters & Kettl, 2005).
Demonstrated Limitations of IGM
When looking at the enormous depth of theoretical importance of collaboration
between all three levels of government when dealing with both terrorist attacks such as the
tragedy of 9/11 in New York City and the natural disaster such as Hurricane Katrina in the
City of New Orleans, one must know that collaboration is not simply a linkage between the
different levels, but a vehicle to transport the ideas, strategies, and most importantly a
unification between all IGM entities. In the case of Hurricane Katrina it is well noted that
ultimately there was a complete government system failure (ABC News, March 25, 2013;
Walters & Kettl, 2005; Lester & Krejci, 2007; Derthick, 2007) and there are multiple
demonstrated limitations affiliated with IGM, which will be discussed in this section.

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By both constitutional tradition and law, when natural disasters occur both local
and state governments are initially responsible for the emergency management for the first
48 to 72 hours and upon request the federal government will then provide relief (Walters
& Kettl, 2005; Derthick, 2007). However, President Bush opportunistically attempted
(Lester and Krejci, 2007) to offset this law which illustrates another demonstrated
limitation of IGM, collaborative inertia, which will be the next limitation discussed.
After the attacks of 9/11, the federal government reorganized the emergency
management functions when they created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). By
incorporating FEMA into the DHS cabinet-level department, FEMA lost direct linkage to the
White House along with funding through budget processes and necessary staff (Derthick,
2007). As previously discussed, the principle limitation is collaborative inertia or the
forming of a tilted equilibrium of power and in this case between state and federal
intergovernmental powers (Lester & Krejci, 2007; McGuire, 2006). This damaged the
response time, but it further weakened the structure when President Bush attempted to
use opportunistic federalism in order to, “expand federal authority by projecting the idea
that only a large and centralized federal response can accomplish the given task” as quoted
by Conlan (Lester & Krejci, 2007, p. 85). However, both Louisiana’s Governor Kathleen
Blanco (D) and Mississippi’s Governor Haley Barbour (R) respectably rejected President
Bush’s offers (Walters & Kettl, 2005).
The NIMS is intended to coordinate all emergency management functions between
local, state, and federal responders and IGM decision makers. Lester & Krejci appoint in
their thesis that the NIMS avoided the issues of both decision-making and leadership when
it comes to collaboration during natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina (2007). During

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a testing of NIMS in 2004, the Hurricane Pam exercise appeared effective and efficiently
planned out; however, in actuality it provided false senses of both of these important IGM
collaboration issues, decision-making and leadership, and cooperation (Lester & Krejci,
2007, p. 86). Throughout the literature it is apparent that the intergovernmental responses
were both uncoordinated and late. Planning issues related to resource allocation and a
significant lack of NIMS process training across all three intergovernmental levels rendered
any training arguably inefficient and ineffective which vividly illustrated IGM limitations.
IGM Lessons Learned
After the limitations and unfortunate failures that turned the rescue response into a
chess match, there were several lessons that could, and more so should, have been learned.
The first of these lessons learned is that both the local and state governments should have
more control over how the federal homeland security first-responder money should be
spent specifically in high-threat/high-risk population areas with Regional Logistic
Resource Centers (Walters & Kettl, 2005). This would increase response time and would
help level out the IGM fiscal equilibrium limitations. It is evident that state and local
governments do not respond to top-down authority; therefore, the next lesson learned is
collaboration between federal, state, and local governments is critical in the development
of planning for natural disasters (Lester & Krejci, 2007).
Proper mechanisms are critical to the success of collaboration, however, the IGM
issue of leadership limitation, as seen in NIMS, was pushed aside in an effort to maintain
cooperation. The lesson learned from this is that effective leadership can mitigate problems
and aid in overcoming the fundamental problems of coordination that ultimately plagued
NIMS (Lester & Krejci, 2007). Top level leadership needs to mitigate problems without

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obstructing functioning mechanisms. With these lessons, NIMS itself can become a
powerful and effective collaborative vehicle.
For efficient, effective, and mitigation of limitations there has to be a shared vision
and mission within IGM and to do this all three intergovernmental levels must act as a
team. In doing so the federal government has to freely provide resources to the state
government during emergencies, while at the same time the state government has to yield
authority and autonomy to the federal government during emergencies (Lester & Krejci,
2007). Furthermore, this cannot only be reciprocated at the organization level, it must be
reciprocated at the executive level as well between the governors and the President, with
constituent importance first and foremost and political party affiliation put aside.
Conclusion
As a lesson in intergovernmental management and relations, the response to the
disaster left by Hurricane Katrina demonstrates how quickly planning and cooperation can
disintegrate. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, our national, state, and local
governments recognized the need to participate in concerted planning and cement
collaborative relationships. Despite other significant storms, Katrina presented the first
colossal, widespread disaster suffered since the dedicated emergency planning and agency
reorganization efforts post-September 11, 2001. However, Katrina represents generally
accepted failures of intergovernmental management. Dissecting the failures in the storm’s
response will help identify communication breakdowns, political hurdles, streamline
administrative procedures, and provide incentive for greater cooperation.

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References
History.com Staff. (2009). Hurricane Katrina. Retrieved from
http://www.history.com/topics/hurricane-katrina
Jay, Goldman, Hamilton, & Madison (2008). The Federalist Papers. Oxford: OUP
Oxford.
McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative Public Management: Assessing What We Know and How
We Know It. Public Administration Review, 33.
NOAA, ZUMA, & CORBIS. (2005). Hurricane Katrina. Retrieved from
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/content/dam/news/2015/06/01/hurricanes
eason0601.adapt.768.1.jpg (Originally photographed 2005, August)