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UNCLASSIFIED//COMSEC//CRYPTO
UNCLASSIFIED//COMSEC//CRYPTO
nsa
How to Encrypt
Everything That Moves
and Keep It Usable
Denis Gundarev, Application
Solutions Architect, VMware
dgundarev@vmware.com @fdwl
Delivered From: @FDWL
Dated: 20150722
Page 0
UNCLASSIFIED//COMSEC//CRYPTO
UNCLASSIFIED//COMSEC//CRYPTO
nsafdwl@E0D23:~# gpg –d message
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Hi %username%, my name is Denis Gundarev, I’m a Senior MTS/Architect at VMware
I hope you understand that the opinions expressed here represent my own and not
those of my employer.
All data and information provided in this presentation is for informational purposes
only.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iD8DBkjNWQIQFFxqRFCkjNWQIMEeCgg7y6IUikeCgg7yjNWQIW6eCgg7y3QE=
=aAhr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
FIPS 140-2
Compliant
&
Common Criteria
Certified
Certified Security
Worldwide recognition as the industry standard for App and Desktop
security
XenApp & XenDesktop are
Common Criteria
Certified
XenApp & XenDesktop are
FIPS compliant, simplifying
highly regulated compliance
FIPS Compliance Documents
http://www.citrix.com/about/legal/security-compliance/security-standards.html
Common Criteria Certificates
http://www.cesg.gov.uk/finda/Pages/CCITSECResults.aspx?post=1&company=Citrix+Systems+Inc&status=Certified&sort=name
Workspace PortalHorizon Clients
Virtual Desktops
RDS Hosted DesktopsRDS Hosted Applications
Horizon 6 Enterprise
App Volumes
Desktop PoolsApp Pools
Agenda
 Introduction to PKI
 TLS for you
 IPsec is your friend
 Security regulations in a real world
7
Introduction to Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI)
Certificates
Root Certification Authority
Subordinate Certification Authority
Certificate Certificate Certificate Certificate
Public Key Infrastructure
Privet! I will send you encrypted
message, use secret word “secret” to
decrypt it!
Hello x secret=
ЙЦГШЩЗЪФ
ЮБЬИЧЯЖД / secret
= Nice to meet you
ЙЦГШЩЗЪФ! ЙЦГШЩЗЪФ /
secret= HelloЮБЬИЧЯЖД!
Nice to meet
you x secret=
ЮБЬИЧЯЖД
Got It!
Symmetric Encryption
I want to send you a private message
but don’t want anyone else to read
it…
Hello x a12f2d8ac =
ЙЦГШЩЗЪФ
ЙЦГШЩЗЪФ! ЙЦГШЩЗЪФ /
privatesecret=
Hello
Got It!
Not a problem,
here’s my public
key – a12f2d8ac
Asymmetric Encryption
Howdy-doo!
hablemos español!
Here’s my ID, public
key and my
6bcfae6a
Privet! I want to speak privately with
Yosemite Sam. I can speak Russian,
Chinese, Spanish and English
here’s my random e77dfb41
Hmm, California,
USA, ok I trust your ID
Encrypt (convertir en
Español (E77dfb41 +
6bcfae6a))
Here’s pre-
master, en
español,
encrypted with
your private
Decrypt (pre-
master)
Lo tengo!
(Got it!)
𝑀𝐴𝐶 =
𝑏2 − 4𝑎𝑐
2𝑎
𝑀𝐴𝐶 =
𝑏2 − 4𝑎𝑐
2𝑎
es tan genial para
hablar en privado
sí, es difícil
hablar libre en
estos días
SSL/TLS Handshake
Hmm, California,
USA, ok I trust your ID
Just need to
see your I.D.
please.
Sorry, but
we don’t sell
beer to
Russians
20
I heard that self-
signed certificates
are not secure!!!
Keep Private Keys Private
 NTFS ACL
 Windows private key ACL
 Use Hardware Security modules
 Windows support out of the box
 Apache support
 Avoid using shared wildcard certificates
Subordinate Certification Authority
ESX Hosts Network equipment Users
Public Key Infrastructure
Root Certification Authority
Mobile devices
TLS recommendations
 Use TLS or DTLS for everything that moves over the wire
 RDP https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/ff458357.aspx
 XenDesktop http://blogs.citrix.com/2014/10/16/xenapp-and-xendesktop-7-6-security-fips-140-2-and-ssl-
to-vda/
 Horizon View https://pubs.vmware.com/horizon-view-60/topic/com.vmware.ICbase/PDF/horizon-view-
60-scenarios-ssl-certificates.pdf
 SQL Server http://blogs.msdn.com/b/sqlserverfaq/archive/2012/04/04/can-tls-certificate-be-used-for-
sql-server-encryption-on-the-wire.aspx
 LDAP http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/2980.ldap-over-ssl-ldaps-
certificate.aspx
 Use other encryption methods for other protocols
 SMB Encryption http://blogs.technet.com/b/filecab/archive/2012/05/03/smb-3-security-enhancements-
in-windows-server-2012.aspx
 Horizon View https://pubs.vmware.com/horizon-view-60/topic/com.vmware.ICbase/PDF/horizon-view-
60-security.pdf
TLS recommendations
 Disable weak ciphers and SSL 3.0
 Windows https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/245030
 Apache https://www.sslshopper.com/article-how-to-disable-weak-ciphers-and-ssl-2.0-in-apache.html
 Nginx https://raymii.org/s/tutorials/Strong_SSL_Security_On_nginx.html
 NetScaler http://www.antonvanpelt.com/make-netscaler-ssl-vips-secure/
 F5 https://support.f5.com/kb/en-us/solutions/public/13000/100/sol13171.html
 Use TLS internally
 Use an appropriate Certification Authority
 Switch to SHA256 - http://blogs.technet.com/b/pki/archive/2013/09/19/upgrade-certification-
authority-to-sha256.aspx
Know the difference
 Self-signed vs. preinstalled certificate
 Check the date/name
 Intended usage
 Make sure that you use correct templates
 Encryption vs. Obfuscation
 Unsecured private key = obfuscation
IPSec is
so 90s!!!
Demo time
FIPS/Common Criteria
 Remember who do you trust
 Certified software/hardware doesn’t secure you automatically.
 Security policy “System Cryptography: Use FIPS compliant algorithms for
encryption, hashing, and signing.” does not affect third-party and
breaks .net
 Certification may take years, release cycle usually shorter
Compliance
 A foolproof plan for security
 Nothing is foolproof to a sufficiently talented fool
 Standardized environments are easier to hack
 Additional budget for IT
 Enforcing documentation
 Just a checklist to impress auditor
your questions.
It’s now safe to ask

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How to encrypt everything that moves and keep it usable

  • 1. UNCLASSIFIED//COMSEC//CRYPTO UNCLASSIFIED//COMSEC//CRYPTO nsa How to Encrypt Everything That Moves and Keep It Usable Denis Gundarev, Application Solutions Architect, VMware dgundarev@vmware.com @fdwl Delivered From: @FDWL Dated: 20150722 Page 0
  • 2. UNCLASSIFIED//COMSEC//CRYPTO UNCLASSIFIED//COMSEC//CRYPTO nsafdwl@E0D23:~# gpg –d message -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi %username%, my name is Denis Gundarev, I’m a Senior MTS/Architect at VMware I hope you understand that the opinions expressed here represent my own and not those of my employer. All data and information provided in this presentation is for informational purposes only. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iD8DBkjNWQIQFFxqRFCkjNWQIMEeCgg7y6IUikeCgg7yjNWQIW6eCgg7y3QE= =aAhr -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
  • 3.
  • 4. FIPS 140-2 Compliant & Common Criteria Certified Certified Security Worldwide recognition as the industry standard for App and Desktop security XenApp & XenDesktop are Common Criteria Certified XenApp & XenDesktop are FIPS compliant, simplifying highly regulated compliance FIPS Compliance Documents http://www.citrix.com/about/legal/security-compliance/security-standards.html Common Criteria Certificates http://www.cesg.gov.uk/finda/Pages/CCITSECResults.aspx?post=1&company=Citrix+Systems+Inc&status=Certified&sort=name
  • 5.
  • 6. Workspace PortalHorizon Clients Virtual Desktops RDS Hosted DesktopsRDS Hosted Applications Horizon 6 Enterprise App Volumes Desktop PoolsApp Pools
  • 7. Agenda  Introduction to PKI  TLS for you  IPsec is your friend  Security regulations in a real world 7
  • 8. Introduction to Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
  • 10. Root Certification Authority Subordinate Certification Authority Certificate Certificate Certificate Certificate Public Key Infrastructure
  • 11.
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14. Privet! I will send you encrypted message, use secret word “secret” to decrypt it! Hello x secret= ЙЦГШЩЗЪФ ЮБЬИЧЯЖД / secret = Nice to meet you ЙЦГШЩЗЪФ! ЙЦГШЩЗЪФ / secret= HelloЮБЬИЧЯЖД! Nice to meet you x secret= ЮБЬИЧЯЖД Got It! Symmetric Encryption
  • 15. I want to send you a private message but don’t want anyone else to read it… Hello x a12f2d8ac = ЙЦГШЩЗЪФ ЙЦГШЩЗЪФ! ЙЦГШЩЗЪФ / privatesecret= Hello Got It! Not a problem, here’s my public key – a12f2d8ac Asymmetric Encryption
  • 16. Howdy-doo! hablemos español! Here’s my ID, public key and my 6bcfae6a Privet! I want to speak privately with Yosemite Sam. I can speak Russian, Chinese, Spanish and English here’s my random e77dfb41 Hmm, California, USA, ok I trust your ID Encrypt (convertir en Español (E77dfb41 + 6bcfae6a)) Here’s pre- master, en español, encrypted with your private Decrypt (pre- master) Lo tengo! (Got it!) 𝑀𝐴𝐶 = 𝑏2 − 4𝑎𝑐 2𝑎 𝑀𝐴𝐶 = 𝑏2 − 4𝑎𝑐 2𝑎 es tan genial para hablar en privado sí, es difícil hablar libre en estos días SSL/TLS Handshake Hmm, California, USA, ok I trust your ID
  • 17.
  • 18. Just need to see your I.D. please. Sorry, but we don’t sell beer to Russians
  • 19.
  • 20. 20
  • 21.
  • 22.
  • 23. I heard that self- signed certificates are not secure!!!
  • 24.
  • 25. Keep Private Keys Private  NTFS ACL  Windows private key ACL  Use Hardware Security modules  Windows support out of the box  Apache support  Avoid using shared wildcard certificates
  • 26. Subordinate Certification Authority ESX Hosts Network equipment Users Public Key Infrastructure Root Certification Authority Mobile devices
  • 27. TLS recommendations  Use TLS or DTLS for everything that moves over the wire  RDP https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/ff458357.aspx  XenDesktop http://blogs.citrix.com/2014/10/16/xenapp-and-xendesktop-7-6-security-fips-140-2-and-ssl- to-vda/  Horizon View https://pubs.vmware.com/horizon-view-60/topic/com.vmware.ICbase/PDF/horizon-view- 60-scenarios-ssl-certificates.pdf  SQL Server http://blogs.msdn.com/b/sqlserverfaq/archive/2012/04/04/can-tls-certificate-be-used-for- sql-server-encryption-on-the-wire.aspx  LDAP http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/2980.ldap-over-ssl-ldaps- certificate.aspx  Use other encryption methods for other protocols  SMB Encryption http://blogs.technet.com/b/filecab/archive/2012/05/03/smb-3-security-enhancements- in-windows-server-2012.aspx  Horizon View https://pubs.vmware.com/horizon-view-60/topic/com.vmware.ICbase/PDF/horizon-view- 60-security.pdf
  • 28. TLS recommendations  Disable weak ciphers and SSL 3.0  Windows https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/245030  Apache https://www.sslshopper.com/article-how-to-disable-weak-ciphers-and-ssl-2.0-in-apache.html  Nginx https://raymii.org/s/tutorials/Strong_SSL_Security_On_nginx.html  NetScaler http://www.antonvanpelt.com/make-netscaler-ssl-vips-secure/  F5 https://support.f5.com/kb/en-us/solutions/public/13000/100/sol13171.html  Use TLS internally  Use an appropriate Certification Authority  Switch to SHA256 - http://blogs.technet.com/b/pki/archive/2013/09/19/upgrade-certification- authority-to-sha256.aspx
  • 29. Know the difference  Self-signed vs. preinstalled certificate  Check the date/name  Intended usage  Make sure that you use correct templates  Encryption vs. Obfuscation  Unsecured private key = obfuscation
  • 30.
  • 33.
  • 34. FIPS/Common Criteria  Remember who do you trust  Certified software/hardware doesn’t secure you automatically.  Security policy “System Cryptography: Use FIPS compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing.” does not affect third-party and breaks .net  Certification may take years, release cycle usually shorter
  • 35. Compliance  A foolproof plan for security  Nothing is foolproof to a sufficiently talented fool  Standardized environments are easier to hack  Additional budget for IT  Enforcing documentation  Just a checklist to impress auditor
  • 36.
  • 37.

Editor's Notes

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