5. Post-2008 Regime
• Banking career exit strategy
• Apr 2014: USA Volcker Rule s. 619 Dodd-Frank’s
Act proprietary trading ban
• An ex-banker can become an entrepreneur,
– funding and managing the venture, raising assets
• Regulatory and market headwinds
• High client risk aversion → less seed capital
• Safer products ↔ higher business costs, clearing fees
• Less leverage, cross-asset inflation yet limits to passive
11. Economics
• Demand for “cheap, liquid, Alpha”
– Prof. Fung: at what price? Capital formation?
– Intermediaries (advisors, FoF etc)
• Addressing fund market imperfections but layering
fees; down to 5% of industry AUM from peak 1/3
• Supply: market inefficiencies
– Hedge fund managers as innovators; never
too big to fail: LTCM; Pelaton
– Saviors: CTA: Mar 2020; +15% (2008)
12. Demand
• Mainstream: institutional investors
– Strategic asset allocation
– Diversified growth → %alternatives (PE, RE) →
% HFs → % ”strategies” → managers
• Classic: offshore investors
– “An investor domiciled in X buys into fund domiciled in
jurisdiction Y”
– KYC, 5AML, GACTA, PEP … ± 5k super-yachts
• New: retail investors
– Contemporary fund structures: UCITS, AIF
13. Supply: Fund Managers
• Start-up ventures, not (listed) companies
• Manager(s) ↔ Founders-owners; micro-enterprise
• Cash-flow, marketing sensitive
• Approved personnel in the regulated entity
• On-shore, taxed, more transparent; UK: authorised
by FCA, LLP (private agreements); staff, systems,
service contracts
• Off-shore Ltd, authorised by (e.g.) Guernsey FSC,
manages untaxed off-shore fund: corporate
“substance” and governance (NEDs)
14. Micro-Enterprises
• Owner/Manager’s business
• Staff <10: even the largest are still SMEs
• Median “fund” AUM <$50m, 1.1% fee
• Far less profitable business today; much higher
cost of seed capital
• Very few long-term survivors, “brands”
• Most new funds liquidated within 5 years - not
unlike any other start-up venture elsewhere
• Top 100 hedge funds AUM $1,8 tn (Jan 2021)
16. Performance Data
• Low data quality
• Vendors: HFR, Barclays, (Refinitiv, Morningstar)
• “boiler plate” + contact details
• Volunteered, self-reported performance estimates
(% ≠ NAV) for some fund share classes
• No standard fund identifiers (ISIN)
• Non-standard fund settlement; fund administrators
do not sell data
• Short time series; the largest/smallest/“defunct”
funds excluded – nb: survivorship bias
17. Strategy Labelling
• What exactly is an investment strategy?
• Descriptive taxonomies est. 1980s (!)
– No certification or labelling standards; elicited
by interviews and case studies
• Exposures vary across assets and time
• not all are hedged, or “absolute returns”
• Transparency: necessary, not sufficient
22. Case Study: CTA Exposure
• Choice: a fund, index fund or the alt Beta?
– Capacity? Fees? Influence? Brand: Winton vs AQR vs Palomar?
23. Data Quality
• Funds reference data (cheap)
• Offering memorandum, regulatory filings
• Business data (expensive)
• Due diligence: references, accounts, manager’s
own investment … private, lagged, stale
• Risk data (…)
• (weekly) NAVs → portfolio exposure and
(sometimes) holdings [→ real time: managed
accounts] – dare to overlay, hedge?
24. Practice
• Total risk management: exposure format
• Market, liquidity, operational - business venture
• Direct
• Fund Platforms
• Advised, non-discretionary: consultants (e.g.
Aurum, Albourne); outsourcing due diligence
• Segregated Managed Account
• Indirect
• Funds of funds
• Extinct: structured, capital protected fund notes
25. Perspective
• “Stay rich” during NIRP, pandemics etc
• Unique risk premia
– Zero Beta; NAV in gold or oil
• Negotiable investment and control terms
• Innovate, incubate, contract better