IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science is an International Journal edited by International Organization of Scientific Research (IOSR).The Journal provides a common forum where all aspects of humanities and social sciences are presented. IOSR-JHSS publishes original papers, review papers, conceptual framework, analytical and simulation models, case studies, empirical research, technical notes etc.
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention (IJHSSI)inventionjournals
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention (IJHSSI) is an international journal intended for professionals and researchers in all fields of Humanities and Social Science. IJHSSI publishes research articles and reviews within the whole field Humanities and Social Science, new teaching methods, assessment, validation and the impact of new technologies and it will continue to provide information on the latest trends and developments in this ever-expanding subject. The publications of papers are selected through double peer reviewed to ensure originality, relevance, and readability. The articles published in our journal can be accessed online
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention (IJHSSI)inventionjournals
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention (IJHSSI) is an international journal intended for professionals and researchers in all fields of Humanities and Social Science. IJHSSI publishes research articles and reviews within the whole field Humanities and Social Science, new teaching methods, assessment, validation and the impact of new technologies and it will continue to provide information on the latest trends and developments in this ever-expanding subject. The publications of papers are selected through double peer reviewed to ensure originality, relevance, and readability. The articles published in our journal can be accessed online
Natasha Persun of Santa Fe Relocations showed the procedures for obtaining visas and immigrating whilst remaining within the legal requirements of destination countries. Singapore was taken as a specific example as it is the No 1 Expat location according to the most recent HSBC Expat Survey. The presentation examines the requirements you need to meet in educational, professional and employment categories.
a "get smart quick" guide for the learning about the ad industry and staying up to date with current events | made for vcu brandcenter communication strategists (by a vcu brandcenter communication strategist)
Chapter 19 Dualism and the MindBody Problem Chapter Out.docxcravennichole326
Chapter 19 Dualism and the
Mind/Body Problem
Chapter Outline
1. What Is the Mind/Body Problem?
2. Descartes’ Dualism
3. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory
4. Immortality of the Soul
5. Leibniz’s Law
6. Descartes’ First Argument for Dualism—The Indubitable Existence Argument
7. An Analogy
8. Propositional Attitudes and Aboutness
9. Descartes’ Second Argument for Dualism—The Divisibility Argument
10. Causality between the Physical and the Nonphysical
In this fourth part of the book, on philosophy of mind, I’ll discuss three problems—the
mind/body problem (Chapters 19– 23), the problem of free will (Chapters 24– 26), and
the problem of psychological egoism (Chapter 27). The mind/body problem and the
problem of free will both address the broad issue of how the mind is related to the physical
world of cause and effect. Are minds physical things (for example, are they identical with
brains?), or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events
outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will?
The last problem—the problem of psychological egoism—concerns the motives that drive
us to act. Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality,
selfish?
These three problems concern different stages in the causal chain that leads from genes
and environment, to the mind, and then to action:
The mind/body problem concerns the nature of the objects and events that exist at stage 2
in this diagram. What is a mind? What are beliefs and desires? The problem of free will
concerns the relation of stage 1 and stage 2. If our beliefs and desires are caused by the
genes we possess and the environments we have inhabited, how can we possess free will?
The problem of psychological egoism concerns the relationship of stages 2 and 3. If the
actions we perform are caused by the desires we have, won’t it be true that all action is
fundamentally selfish—aimed at satisfying the actor’s own desires, not at satisfying the
needs of others? These are preliminary statements of the three philosophical problems.
Each needs to be refined.
https://jigsaw.chegg.com/books/9780205974955/epub/OPS/xhtml/fileP7000478966000000000000000004F69.xhtml#P7000478966000000000000000004F72
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https ...
2 Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons Derek Parf.docxfelicidaddinwoodie
2
Divided Minds and the Nature of
Persons
Derek Parfit
Derek Parfit, who was born in 1942, has been a philosopher at All Souls
Coilege, Oxjord for many years. He has also taught frequently in the United
States. The main subjeas on which he has worked have been rationality,
morality, personal identity, and juture generations. These are the subjeas of
his book Reasons and Persons, publis hed by Oxford University Press in
1984.
It was the split-brain cases which drew me into philosophy. Our
knowledge of these cases depends on the rcsults of various psychological
tests, as described by Donald MacKay.! These tests made use of two
facts. We control each of our arms, and see what is in each half of our
visual fields, with only one of Ollr hemispheres. When someone's
hemispheres have been disconnected, psychologists can thus present to
this person two different written questions in the two halves of his visual
field, and can receive two different answers written by this person's two
hands.
Here is a simplified imaginary version of the kind of evidence that such
tests provide. One of these people looks fixedly at the centre of a wide
screen, whose left half is red and right half is blue. On each half in a
darker shade arc the words, 'How many colours can you see?' With both
hands the person writes, 'Only one'. The words are now changed to read,
'Which is the only colour that you can see?' With one of his hands the
person writes 'Red', with the other he writes 'Blue'.
If this is how such a person responds, I would conclude that he is
having two visual sensations - that he does, as he claims, see both red and
blue. But in seeing each colour he is not aware of seeing the other. He has
two streams of consciousness, in each of which he can see only one
colour. In one stream he sees red, and at the same time, in his other
stream, he sees blue. More generally, he could be having at the same time
two series of thoughts and sensations, in having each of which he is
unaware of having the other.
This conclusion has been questioned. It has been claimed by some that
there are not two streams of consciousness, on the ground that the sub-
dominant hemisphere is a part of the brain whose functioning involves no
The Daibutsu (Great Buddha) at Kamakura, Japan, construded in 1252, Derek Parfit s denial of
the concept of a person is remarkably similar to a central tenet of Buddhist philosophy (photograph by
Colin Blakemore),
20 Persons
consciousness. If this were true, these cases would lose most of their
interest. I believe that it is not true, chiefly because, if a person's
dominant hemisphere is destroyed, this person is able to react in the way
in which, in the split-brain cases, the sub-dominant hemisphere reacts,
and we do not believe that such a person is just an automaton, without
consciousness. The sub-dominant hemisphere is, of course, much less
developed in certain ways, typically having the linguistic ...
Natasha Persun of Santa Fe Relocations showed the procedures for obtaining visas and immigrating whilst remaining within the legal requirements of destination countries. Singapore was taken as a specific example as it is the No 1 Expat location according to the most recent HSBC Expat Survey. The presentation examines the requirements you need to meet in educational, professional and employment categories.
a "get smart quick" guide for the learning about the ad industry and staying up to date with current events | made for vcu brandcenter communication strategists (by a vcu brandcenter communication strategist)
Chapter 19 Dualism and the MindBody Problem Chapter Out.docxcravennichole326
Chapter 19 Dualism and the
Mind/Body Problem
Chapter Outline
1. What Is the Mind/Body Problem?
2. Descartes’ Dualism
3. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory
4. Immortality of the Soul
5. Leibniz’s Law
6. Descartes’ First Argument for Dualism—The Indubitable Existence Argument
7. An Analogy
8. Propositional Attitudes and Aboutness
9. Descartes’ Second Argument for Dualism—The Divisibility Argument
10. Causality between the Physical and the Nonphysical
In this fourth part of the book, on philosophy of mind, I’ll discuss three problems—the
mind/body problem (Chapters 19– 23), the problem of free will (Chapters 24– 26), and
the problem of psychological egoism (Chapter 27). The mind/body problem and the
problem of free will both address the broad issue of how the mind is related to the physical
world of cause and effect. Are minds physical things (for example, are they identical with
brains?), or are they nonmaterial? If your beliefs and desires are caused by physical events
outside of yourself, how can it be true that you act the way you do of your own free will?
The last problem—the problem of psychological egoism—concerns the motives that drive
us to act. Are people genuinely moved by the welfare of others, or is all behavior, in reality,
selfish?
These three problems concern different stages in the causal chain that leads from genes
and environment, to the mind, and then to action:
The mind/body problem concerns the nature of the objects and events that exist at stage 2
in this diagram. What is a mind? What are beliefs and desires? The problem of free will
concerns the relation of stage 1 and stage 2. If our beliefs and desires are caused by the
genes we possess and the environments we have inhabited, how can we possess free will?
The problem of psychological egoism concerns the relationship of stages 2 and 3. If the
actions we perform are caused by the desires we have, won’t it be true that all action is
fundamentally selfish—aimed at satisfying the actor’s own desires, not at satisfying the
needs of others? These are preliminary statements of the three philosophical problems.
Each needs to be refined.
https://jigsaw.chegg.com/books/9780205974955/epub/OPS/xhtml/fileP7000478966000000000000000004F69.xhtml#P7000478966000000000000000004F72
https://jigsaw.chegg.com/books/9780205974955/epub/OPS/xhtml/fileP7000478966000000000000000004F69.xhtml#P7000478966000000000000000004F74
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https ...
2 Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons Derek Parf.docxfelicidaddinwoodie
2
Divided Minds and the Nature of
Persons
Derek Parfit
Derek Parfit, who was born in 1942, has been a philosopher at All Souls
Coilege, Oxjord for many years. He has also taught frequently in the United
States. The main subjeas on which he has worked have been rationality,
morality, personal identity, and juture generations. These are the subjeas of
his book Reasons and Persons, publis hed by Oxford University Press in
1984.
It was the split-brain cases which drew me into philosophy. Our
knowledge of these cases depends on the rcsults of various psychological
tests, as described by Donald MacKay.! These tests made use of two
facts. We control each of our arms, and see what is in each half of our
visual fields, with only one of Ollr hemispheres. When someone's
hemispheres have been disconnected, psychologists can thus present to
this person two different written questions in the two halves of his visual
field, and can receive two different answers written by this person's two
hands.
Here is a simplified imaginary version of the kind of evidence that such
tests provide. One of these people looks fixedly at the centre of a wide
screen, whose left half is red and right half is blue. On each half in a
darker shade arc the words, 'How many colours can you see?' With both
hands the person writes, 'Only one'. The words are now changed to read,
'Which is the only colour that you can see?' With one of his hands the
person writes 'Red', with the other he writes 'Blue'.
If this is how such a person responds, I would conclude that he is
having two visual sensations - that he does, as he claims, see both red and
blue. But in seeing each colour he is not aware of seeing the other. He has
two streams of consciousness, in each of which he can see only one
colour. In one stream he sees red, and at the same time, in his other
stream, he sees blue. More generally, he could be having at the same time
two series of thoughts and sensations, in having each of which he is
unaware of having the other.
This conclusion has been questioned. It has been claimed by some that
there are not two streams of consciousness, on the ground that the sub-
dominant hemisphere is a part of the brain whose functioning involves no
The Daibutsu (Great Buddha) at Kamakura, Japan, construded in 1252, Derek Parfit s denial of
the concept of a person is remarkably similar to a central tenet of Buddhist philosophy (photograph by
Colin Blakemore),
20 Persons
consciousness. If this were true, these cases would lose most of their
interest. I believe that it is not true, chiefly because, if a person's
dominant hemisphere is destroyed, this person is able to react in the way
in which, in the split-brain cases, the sub-dominant hemisphere reacts,
and we do not believe that such a person is just an automaton, without
consciousness. The sub-dominant hemisphere is, of course, much less
developed in certain ways, typically having the linguistic ...
Chapter 7. The Mind-Body ProblemChapter 7. The Mind-Body Pro.docxspoonerneddy
Chapter 7. The Mind-Body Problem
Chapter 7. The Mind-Body Problem
Chapter 7
The Mind-Body Problem
During week 6 read the second half (Sections 6-end).
Copyright by Paul Herrick, 2020. For class use only. Not for distribution. This chapter: 32 pages of reading.
1. Are You Your Brain?
Sometimes we refer to our brains; other times we refer to our minds. BJ the Chicago Kid titled his second album In My Mind. But Screeching Weasel titled its third studio album My Brain Hurts. Are the mind and the brain two different things? Or are they one and the same? To put the question another way: Are thoughts, sensations, mental images, and such nothing more than physical events or processes of the physical brain? Are they just neurons (brain cells) firing or something like that? Or is the mind an immaterial, nonphysical entity distinct from the brain but interacting in some way with it? In philosophy, these and related questions make up the mind-body problem.
Since ancient times, the common view has been that the mind—the part of us that is conscious, that thinks, that makes choices, that bears moral responsibility—is immaterial and cannot be physically seen, touched, weighed, or otherwise directly detected by instruments. On this view, the mind--often called the “soul,” “spirit,” or “self”—is not the brain or any part of the body or any physical thing at all. However, since mind and body obviously interact, the common view has long been that the mind or soul can affect the body and the body can affect the mind. More specifically, the immaterial mind can cause changes in the physical body, through the interface of the physical brain, and the brain can cause changes in the mind.
In philosophy, this traditional view is called “mind-body dualism” (“dualism” for short) because it claims that mind and body are two distinct things. The common view is sometimes also called “mind-body interactionism” because it claims that mind and body, though distinct, interact. Philosophical dualists argue that the universe divides into two radically different kinds of substances—mindless matter and thinking mind or, as some prefer to put it, matter and spirit, or as still others put it, matter and consciousness.
Most religions of the world teach a dualist account of human nature. Each human being, they generally claim, is composed of an immaterial mind or soul joined to a material body. On the religious view, the mind, or soul, rather than the material body is the part that will be judged by God in the end. As the basis of moral responsibility, the soul is the root of one’s identity as a person. In other words, the soul is the true self; the material body is merely the soul’s temporary lodging place during its journey on earth. Most religions also teach a doctrine of immortality, or survival—the claim that the immaterial soul lives on in a higher realm after the death and disintegration of the material body.
If dualism is true and your immaterial mind, or soul, is the .
Chapter 7. The Mind-Body ProblemChapter 7. The Mind-Body Pro.docxrobertad6
Chapter 7. The Mind-Body Problem
Chapter 7. The Mind-Body Problem
Chapter 7
The Mind-Body Problem
During week 6 read the second half (Sections 6-end).
Copyright by Paul Herrick, 2020. For class use only. Not for distribution. This chapter: 32 pages of reading.
1. Are You Your Brain?
Sometimes we refer to our brains; other times we refer to our minds. BJ the Chicago Kid titled his second album In My Mind. But Screeching Weasel titled its third studio album My Brain Hurts. Are the mind and the brain two different things? Or are they one and the same? To put the question another way: Are thoughts, sensations, mental images, and such nothing more than physical events or processes of the physical brain? Are they just neurons (brain cells) firing or something like that? Or is the mind an immaterial, nonphysical entity distinct from the brain but interacting in some way with it? In philosophy, these and related questions make up the mind-body problem.
Since ancient times, the common view has been that the mind—the part of us that is conscious, that thinks, that makes choices, that bears moral responsibility—is immaterial and cannot be physically seen, touched, weighed, or otherwise directly detected by instruments. On this view, the mind--often called the “soul,” “spirit,” or “self”—is not the brain or any part of the body or any physical thing at all. However, since mind and body obviously interact, the common view has long been that the mind or soul can affect the body and the body can affect the mind. More specifically, the immaterial mind can cause changes in the physical body, through the interface of the physical brain, and the brain can cause changes in the mind.
In philosophy, this traditional view is called “mind-body dualism” (“dualism” for short) because it claims that mind and body are two distinct things. The common view is sometimes also called “mind-body interactionism” because it claims that mind and body, though distinct, interact. Philosophical dualists argue that the universe divides into two radically different kinds of substances—mindless matter and thinking mind or, as some prefer to put it, matter and spirit, or as still others put it, matter and consciousness.
Most religions of the world teach a dualist account of human nature. Each human being, they generally claim, is composed of an immaterial mind or soul joined to a material body. On the religious view, the mind, or soul, rather than the material body is the part that will be judged by God in the end. As the basis of moral responsibility, the soul is the root of one’s identity as a person. In other words, the soul is the true self; the material body is merely the soul’s temporary lodging place during its journey on earth. Most religions also teach a doctrine of immortality, or survival—the claim that the immaterial soul lives on in a higher realm after the death and disintegration of the material body.
If dualism is true and your immaterial mind, or soul, is the .
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 previewPrayukth K V
The IoT and OT threat landscape report has been prepared by the Threat Research Team at Sectrio using data from Sectrio, cyber threat intelligence farming facilities spread across over 85 cities around the world. In addition, Sectrio also runs AI-based advanced threat and payload engagement facilities that serve as sinks to attract and engage sophisticated threat actors, and newer malware including new variants and latent threats that are at an earlier stage of development.
The latest edition of the OT/ICS and IoT security Threat Landscape Report 2024 also covers:
State of global ICS asset and network exposure
Sectoral targets and attacks as well as the cost of ransom
Global APT activity, AI usage, actor and tactic profiles, and implications
Rise in volumes of AI-powered cyberattacks
Major cyber events in 2024
Malware and malicious payload trends
Cyberattack types and targets
Vulnerability exploit attempts on CVEs
Attacks on counties – USA
Expansion of bot farms – how, where, and why
In-depth analysis of the cyber threat landscape across North America, South America, Europe, APAC, and the Middle East
Why are attacks on smart factories rising?
Cyber risk predictions
Axis of attacks – Europe
Systemic attacks in the Middle East
Download the full report from here:
https://sectrio.com/resources/ot-threat-landscape-reports/sectrio-releases-ot-ics-and-iot-security-threat-landscape-report-2024/
LF Energy Webinar: Electrical Grid Modelling and Simulation Through PowSyBl -...DanBrown980551
Do you want to learn how to model and simulate an electrical network from scratch in under an hour?
Then welcome to this PowSyBl workshop, hosted by Rte, the French Transmission System Operator (TSO)!
During the webinar, you will discover the PowSyBl ecosystem as well as handle and study an electrical network through an interactive Python notebook.
PowSyBl is an open source project hosted by LF Energy, which offers a comprehensive set of features for electrical grid modelling and simulation. Among other advanced features, PowSyBl provides:
- A fully editable and extendable library for grid component modelling;
- Visualization tools to display your network;
- Grid simulation tools, such as power flows, security analyses (with or without remedial actions) and sensitivity analyses;
The framework is mostly written in Java, with a Python binding so that Python developers can access PowSyBl functionalities as well.
What you will learn during the webinar:
- For beginners: discover PowSyBl's functionalities through a quick general presentation and the notebook, without needing any expert coding skills;
- For advanced developers: master the skills to efficiently apply PowSyBl functionalities to your real-world scenarios.
Transcript: Selling digital books in 2024: Insights from industry leaders - T...BookNet Canada
The publishing industry has been selling digital audiobooks and ebooks for over a decade and has found its groove. What’s changed? What has stayed the same? Where do we go from here? Join a group of leading sales peers from across the industry for a conversation about the lessons learned since the popularization of digital books, best practices, digital book supply chain management, and more.
Link to video recording: https://bnctechforum.ca/sessions/selling-digital-books-in-2024-insights-from-industry-leaders/
Presented by BookNet Canada on May 28, 2024, with support from the Department of Canadian Heritage.
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportAlan Dix
Paper presented at SYNERGY workshop at AVI 2024, Genoa, Italy. 3rd June 2024
https://alandix.com/academic/papers/synergy2024-epistemic/
As machine learning integrates deeper into human-computer interactions, the concept of epistemic interaction emerges, aiming to refine these interactions to enhance system adaptability. This approach encourages minor, intentional adjustments in user behaviour to enrich the data available for system learning. This paper introduces epistemic interaction within the context of human-system communication, illustrating how deliberate interaction design can improve system understanding and adaptation. Through concrete examples, we demonstrate the potential of epistemic interaction to significantly advance human-computer interaction by leveraging intuitive human communication strategies to inform system design and functionality, offering a novel pathway for enriching user-system engagements.
PHP Frameworks: I want to break free (IPC Berlin 2024)Ralf Eggert
In this presentation, we examine the challenges and limitations of relying too heavily on PHP frameworks in web development. We discuss the history of PHP and its frameworks to understand how this dependence has evolved. The focus will be on providing concrete tips and strategies to reduce reliance on these frameworks, based on real-world examples and practical considerations. The goal is to equip developers with the skills and knowledge to create more flexible and future-proof web applications. We'll explore the importance of maintaining autonomy in a rapidly changing tech landscape and how to make informed decisions in PHP development.
This talk is aimed at encouraging a more independent approach to using PHP frameworks, moving towards a more flexible and future-proof approach to PHP development.
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 4DianaGray10
Welcome to UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series part 4. In this session, we will cover Test Manager overview along with SAP heatmap.
The UiPath Test Manager overview with SAP heatmap webinar offers a concise yet comprehensive exploration of the role of a Test Manager within SAP environments, coupled with the utilization of heatmaps for effective testing strategies.
Participants will gain insights into the responsibilities, challenges, and best practices associated with test management in SAP projects. Additionally, the webinar delves into the significance of heatmaps as a visual aid for identifying testing priorities, areas of risk, and resource allocation within SAP landscapes. Through this session, attendees can expect to enhance their understanding of test management principles while learning practical approaches to optimize testing processes in SAP environments using heatmap visualization techniques
What will you get from this session?
1. Insights into SAP testing best practices
2. Heatmap utilization for testing
3. Optimization of testing processes
4. Demo
Topics covered:
Execution from the test manager
Orchestrator execution result
Defect reporting
SAP heatmap example with demo
Speaker:
Deepak Rai, Automation Practice Lead, Boundaryless Group and UiPath MVP
Observability Concepts EVERY Developer Should Know -- DeveloperWeek Europe.pdfPaige Cruz
Monitoring and observability aren’t traditionally found in software curriculums and many of us cobble this knowledge together from whatever vendor or ecosystem we were first introduced to and whatever is a part of your current company’s observability stack.
While the dev and ops silo continues to crumble….many organizations still relegate monitoring & observability as the purview of ops, infra and SRE teams. This is a mistake - achieving a highly observable system requires collaboration up and down the stack.
I, a former op, would like to extend an invitation to all application developers to join the observability party will share these foundational concepts to build on:
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3DianaGray10
Welcome to UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series part 3. In this session, we will cover desktop automation along with UI automation.
Topics covered:
UI automation Introduction,
UI automation Sample
Desktop automation flow
Pradeep Chinnala, Senior Consultant Automation Developer @WonderBotz and UiPath MVP
Deepak Rai, Automation Practice Lead, Boundaryless Group and UiPath MVP
Le nuove frontiere dell'AI nell'RPA con UiPath Autopilot™UiPathCommunity
In questo evento online gratuito, organizzato dalla Community Italiana di UiPath, potrai esplorare le nuove funzionalità di Autopilot, il tool che integra l'Intelligenza Artificiale nei processi di sviluppo e utilizzo delle Automazioni.
📕 Vedremo insieme alcuni esempi dell'utilizzo di Autopilot in diversi tool della Suite UiPath:
Autopilot per Studio Web
Autopilot per Studio
Autopilot per Apps
Clipboard AI
GenAI applicata alla Document Understanding
👨🏫👨💻 Speakers:
Stefano Negro, UiPath MVPx3, RPA Tech Lead @ BSP Consultant
Flavio Martinelli, UiPath MVP 2023, Technical Account Manager @UiPath
Andrei Tasca, RPA Solutions Team Lead @NTT Data
1. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS)
Volume 10, Issue 5 (May. - Jun. 2013), PP 51-57
e-ISSN: 2279-0837, p-ISSN: 2279-0845.
www.Iosrjournals.Org
www.iosrjournals.org 51 | Page
Resolution of Some problems in the Identity Theory of Mind
Shanjendu Nath
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Rabindrasadan Girls’ College, Karimganj, Assam, India.
Abstract: The identity theory of mind came into existence as a reaction to the theory of Behaviourism. This
theory is advocated and developed by different philosophers beginning with Place, Feigl and Smart. According
to this theory, certain physical states of brain are identical to mental states. In others words, this theory holds
that the so-called mental phenomena like thoughts, feelings, wishes and the rest are identical with the bodily
states and processes. Thus to have some specific kind of thought is to have some kind of specific states and
processes of bodily cells, typically brain cells. When we say that someone is in a certain mental state, it implies
that in the cerebral cortex of the brain of that person, certain physical event is going on. The person concerned
may not be aware of the happenings of the brain but these two states are not merely correlated with each other
rather these two are one and the same event in the literal sense. Thus this theory asserts that everything mental
is physical. But though it speaks of mental states it does not assert that these are not physical.
Although this theory is better than dualism and Behaviourism, still it has its own problems. These problems are–
the problem of identity, the problem of co-existence and the problem of consciousness. But in this paper I will
discuss the problem of identity and the problem of co-existence and subsequently efforts will be made to solve
these problems from materialist point of view.
Keywords: Brain, Co-existence, Identity, materialist, Mind.
Introduction
The problem of mind-body relation is very old in the history of philosophy. Different philosophers
have given different theories for the solution of this problem but none is universally accepted. Among the
theories, the identity theory of mind occupies an important place in explaining this problem.
The Identity Theory of mind came into existence as a serious philosophical thesis in the late 1950‟s.
Although this theory was introduced by the psychologist E. G. Boring in 1933, it took a long duration of time to
be accepted as an alternative theory in philosophy. The pioneering works which deserve credit for the
acceptance of the philosophical version of this theory in philosophical domain were - U. T. Place‟s “Is
Consciousness A Brain Process?” (1956), Herbert Feigl‟s „The “Mental” and the “Physical” (1958) and in 1959
J. J. C. Smart‟s paper “Sensations and Brain Processes” (1959). Of these three papers, the earliest one was U. T.
Place‟s. Thus, he may rightly be said to be the fore runner of this theory next to Boring. All of these papers were
depending on the same basic position although the differences of them were remarkable in their details. But in
spite of their differences the area of agreement was sufficiently greater than that of their differences.
Being materialistic, this theory explained the problem and has given solution in a simple way and more
scientifically. The basic theme of the theory is –mental states and processes are identical with brain states and
processes. But in spite of this, this theory is not free from critics‟ eye sight. Critics have highlighted different
drawbacks of this theory. The profounder of identity theory also boldly faced the problems and have given
solution. But as the space of this paper is limited, so I will try to limit myself to analyse only two problems, viz.,
the problem of identity and the problem of co-existence. Finally effort will be made to give solution of these
problems.
This paper is divided into two sections. In the first section of the paper I will narrate the problem of
identity and the problem of co-existence. In the second section I will highlight the solution of the problems from
the materialistic point of view.
Section 1
1.1 The Problem of Identity
There is a serious objection against the mind-brain identity theory which has not been satisfactory
resolved. This problem concerns various non-intentional properties of mental states on the one hand and
physical states on the other. For example, after images may be green or purple in colour, but nobody could
reasonably claim that states of the brain are green or purple. Moreover, it may be the case that with a fair degree
of accuracy brain states are spatially located where mental states are traditionally assumed as non-spatial.
Another problem of the theory is that it fails to give a satisfactory answer to the question of the relation
and difference between mental and physical.
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Hillary Putnam challenges the identity theory from consideration of multiple realizibility. According to
him, „pain‟ is experienced not only by humans but by many different species of animal. But it seems unlikely
that all these diverse organisms with the same pain experience are in the same identical brain state. And if the
latter is the case, then pain cannot be identical to a specific brain state.
J. R. Searle puts forward certain problems for the identity theory. He states that identity theory violates
the principle of logic called “Leibnitz Law”. According to this law, any two things are called identical if and
only if all the properties which they bear are found common to both of them. This means that the properties
which we find in one thing are also the properties which we find in another thing. If this law is violated, that is,
if it is possible to show that the properties of mental state cannot be attributed to brain and vice-versa then it
refutes the identity theory. In this connection Searle cites an example-
“So I can say, for example, that the brain state that corresponds to my thought that it is raining is 3 cm
inside my left ear; but, according to the objectors, it does not make any sense to say that my thought that it is
raining is 3 cm inside my left ear. Furthermore, even for conscious states that have a location, such as pain, the
pain may be in my toe, but the brain state that corresponds to that pain is not in my toe, but in my brain. So the
properties of the brain state are not the same as the properties of the mental state. Therefore, Physicalism is
false”.
There is another objection against the identity theory. if the identity of mental states and brain states are
empirical one, that is if the identity is discovered empirically, for example, if it could be discovered on the
analogy with water and H2O, or lightning and electrical discharge, then it seems that there would have to be two
kinds of properties which will define the two sides of identity statement. And these two kinds of properties must
identify one and the same thing. Thus when it is said by the identity theorists that „lightning is identical with an
electric discharge‟ they must have to identify one and the same thing in terms of the properties of lightning and
the properties of electrical discharge, or when it is said that „water is identical with H2O molecules‟ has to
identify one and the same thing in terms of the properties of water and the properties of H2O. Thus when the
identity theorists claim that „pain is identical with a certain types of brain state‟ they have to identify one and the
same thing in terms of the properties of pain and the properties of brain-state. But problem arises if it is
believed that in the identity statement there are two sets of properties and these properties are independent. In
that case it appears that there are two different types of properties – mental properties and physical properties.
And this belief of two sets of properties takes us back into property dualism.
Again, if it is true that all mental states are brain states, then what appears is that brain states are of two
kinds – mental states and non-mental states. The mental states are of brain have mental properties and those of
non mental states of brain have only physical properties. If it is so, then it sounds like property dualism.
Another objection slightly more technical was labeled against the identity theory and this was the
accusation of „neuronal chauvinism‟. This objection really vibrated the identity theorists and they were indeed
forced to do some modification in their theory. This charge was highlighted by Searle and says-
“If the claim of the identity theorists was that every pain is identical with a certain kind of neuronal
stimulation, then it seems that a being that did not have neurons or that did not have the right kind of neurons
could not have pains and beliefs. But why cannot animals that have brain structures different from ours have
mental states? And indeed, why could not we build a machine that did not have neurons at all, but also had
mental states?”
Searle claims that facing this objection the identity theorists are bound to shift from what is called
„type–type identity theory to „token–token identity theory‟. Thus in order to establish this claim Searle explains
the distinction between type and token. Write the word “cow” three times: “cow” “cow” “cow”. A question
arises whether one word or three words are written. It is not debatable that here one type of word is written in
three instances, or three tokens of one word is written. By types he means abstract general entities and by tokens
he illustrates those which are concrete particular objects and events of those abstract generals. Thus when it is
said that „a token of a type‟ it means that it is a particular concrete example of abstract general type.
Let us now see how Searle proves that the identity theorists are moved from a type–type identity
theory to a token-token identity theory. According to him, it is the point of the type-type identity theory that
every type of mental state is identical to some type of physical state. Searle claims that by their own assertion it
is a bit sloppy of the identity theorists. Because the identity in question is not between abstract universal types
but between actual concrete tokens. What the identity theorists mean is that for every mental-state type there is
some brain-state type and thereby every token of the mental type is nothing but a token of the brain type. The
simple version of the token identity theorists, according to Searle, is-
“for every token of a certain type of mental state, there is some token of some type of physical state or
other with which that mental state token is identical. They, in short, did not require, for example, that all token
pains had to exemplify exactly the same type of brain states even though they were all tokens of the same
mental type, pain. For that reason they were called „token-token‟ identity theorists as opposed to „type-type‟
identity theorists.”
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Searle claims that token-token identity seems to be more plausible than type-type identity. In this
connection he cites an example that two persons may have same belief that „Denver is the capital of Colorado
but it is not necessary to suppose that they have exactly the same type of neurobiological state. The
neurobiological state of one‟s belief might be at a certain point of his brain and another‟s might be at another
point although they have the same belief.
Searle thinks that in giving examples the identity theorists are often found very weak and this is
unfortunate. Although they have given different examples, the favorite one is that pains are identical with C-
fibre stimulations. But in giving this example both „type-type‟ and „token-token‟ identity theorists differ in
certain extent. The former believes that every pain is identical with some C-fibre stimulation where as the latter
believes that not every pain but particular pain might be identical with particular C-fibre stimulation. Regarding
other pains they think that this might be identical with some other state of a brain or machine. But all these are
designated by Searle as „bad neurophysiology‟. In explaining the status of C-fibre Searle says that C-fibres are a
type of axon which carries certain types of pain signals to the brain. Pain mechanism is a complex one in the
brain and nervous system and C-fibre is just a part of this complex mechanism. Thus neurophysiologically it
would be ridiculous to think that except C-fibre stimulation, there is nothing in the pain. Thus there is a good
deal of debate centered round the question whether or not we would get such type of identity as exemplified by
the type-type identity theorists. Or is it token identity upon which we could hope for. Searle believes that in
between type and token identity, it is latter one which is more influential than the former.
In spite of its acceptability the token identity theorists have been facing another question and this is the
question of commonness. What common things are there in all of these tokens which make the same mental
state type? If it is believed by both X and Y that Denver is the capital of Colorado then apart from their brain
state what exact thing is common in them but again both X and Y have different types of brain states? There are
two answers that we find traditionally-one is from the dualist‟s quarter and another from type-type. But none of
these answers will do for the token physicalist. Because the whole idea of the token identity theorists is to
eliminate any type of irreducible mental properties and as such they cannot accept that the common thing in
between X and Y is same irreducible mental properties. Again, the token theorists cannot accept the view that
the same type of brain state is common in X and Y because it is this point disagreeing upon which there is move
from type identity to token identity. Thus the answer that a particular mental state type and certain brain state
type are identical cannot save the identity theorists from their downfall.
Soul Kripke also raised an objection against type-type identity theory from consideration of rigid
reference. The identity theorists claim that the identity of mental and brain states are contingent. But Kripke
argues that this identity is necessary, if true. He introduces two types of designators of entity, namely, rigid and
non-rigid designators and holds that rigid designators refer to the same entity in every possible world and
therefore identity of two entities referred by two rigid designators are necessary. Non-rigid or flaccid
designators may refer to different entities in different possible worlds and identities of their referents thereby are
contingent. The expression „Benjamin Franklin‟ which always refers the same person is a rigid designator. The
expression „The inventor of daylight saving time‟ which, according to him, is a non rigid designator, although
this expression refers to Benjamin Franklin in the actual world. In a possible world Benjamin Franklin may not
be the inventor of daylight saving time. Anybody else other than Benjamin, the actual inventor, might have been
the inventor of daylight saving time. On the other hand, it is not the case that someone else, other than Benjamin
Franklin, might have been Benjamin Franklin. It is due to this reason Kripke says that „Benjamin Franklin‟ is a
rigid designator, where as „the inventor of daylight saving time‟ is non rigid.
Thus with these two types of designators Kripke examines the mind-body identity statement. He claims
that if one term is rigid and another is non rigid in an identity statement, the statement is not necessarily true and
it might turn out to be false. Thus the statement „Benjamin Franklin is identical with the inventor of daylight
saving time‟ is true no doubt but this truth is contingent one because there may be a possible world where this
statement is false. Kripke says that a statement must be necessarily true if it is the case that both sides of the
identity statement are rigid and the statement is true. In this connection he cites the statement „Samuel Clemens
is identical with Mark Twain‟ and says that this statement is necessarily true because here both sides of the
above statement mean one and the same person. It is impossible to imagine that there is a world where Samuel
Clemens exists and also Mark Twain exists but they are not one and the same person but two different
individuals. This is also true in the case of words that name natural kinds of things, for example, the statement
„water is identical with H2O‟. Here both the expressions „water‟ and „H2O‟ are rigid and the stament is true,
therefore, this identity is necessary. Kripke finds the relevancy of this kind of argument in the case of mind-
body problem. He says that if it is found that both the expressions „mental state‟ and „brain state‟ refer rigidly
and the identity statement containing those expression is true then the statement must be necessarily true. Thus
„pain is equivalent to C-fibre stimulation‟ would have to be necessarily true if it is the case that pains were really
identical with C-fibre stimulations. Here all these depend on the condition that if it were to be true at all. But
Kripke claims that this statement is not necessarily true. Because it can be imagined that there exists pain
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without a C-fibre stimulation and also C-fibre stimulation without pain, although pains and C-fibre stimulations
have strict correlations in this world. Thus Kripke logically concludes that if the statement „pain is identical
with C-fibre stimulation‟ is not necessarily true on the ground mentioned above then it cannot true at all, and
hence it is false. His suggestion regarding identification of pains and neurobiological events is that there is a
hope for identity theory if it is really the identification of particular conscious mental states and physical events.
1.2 The Problem of Co-existence
Another problem that has been raised by the critics of the identity theory is the problem of co-
existence.
This problem is discussed by Shaffer (1994) from two standpoints: co-existence in time and co-
existence in space. According to him, if two things are really to be identical then they must fulfil the conditions
of co-existence in time and space. Two things which are apparently different may be one and the same; subject
to condition that they must exist at the same time and in the same space. For example, whether Mr. X and Mr. Y
are two different individuals can be assessed by ascertaining whether Mr. X existed in a particular location
where Mr. Y was absent or whether Mr. X existed in a particular time when Mr. Y was absent. A person who
was blamed for an offence can be declared innocent only by virtue of the fact that he was not there at the time of
the offence and hence he cannot be the offender. It is undoubtedly true that the person who stole the diamond in
Chicago and Mr. X are certainly not one and the same person if Mr. X was not in Chicago at the time when it
was stole.
Mental events and physical events are said to be identical if and only if they meet the conditions of co-
existence of both time and space. Now I will scrutinize the identity theory and see whether this theory fulfils the
condition of co-existence.
Shaffer admits that we have very little knowledge about the co-existence in time. So far we have facts
in our hands is only from the brain surgeon who is capable to stimulate the exterior part of the brain during
surgery. He says that in many cases at the moment of brain operation, a patient may be fully conscious as
because at that time only a local anaesthetic is necessary. Thus the brain patient may report the happenings of
different mental events, such as, memories, thoughts, and sensations etc. during the stimulation of the different
parts of the brain by the surgeon. Now question arises whether both physical events in the brain and mental
events occur exactly at the same time or not. It is certainly impossible at present to answer it rightly. To prove
that both physical events and mental events were not identical, it is only a very small gap in time is required. But
the more difficult task is to establish that there is really a small gap in that case. Supposing that a small time-gap
is established but yet it would not be correct to generalize that mental event and physical events are not
identical. At best it can be said that the mental event was not identical with just that physical event. Thus Shaffer
believes that as there is no possibility to have conclusive information from this sort of empirical work just
described, so for long time there is no fear of refutation for the identity theorists from this quarter.
So far I have discussed above the problem of co-existence of time as analysed by Shaffer and it is
evident from this analysis that identity between mental events and physical events cannot be fully accepted or
rejected outright. Now effort will be made to see whether co-existence in space is possible given the identity
theory. Shaffer is of the opinion that this task is also not so easy. It is very difficult to answer whether mental
events and physical events occur in the same space or not. Shaffer believes that there are mainly two reasons for
which the difficulty arises. These are:
1. Regarding knowledge of neurophysiology we are yet not fully aware. We are almost ignorant about the nature
and function of the brain for which it is not possible to localize the relevant physical events. At best we can say
that physical events are located in the brain and not much more than that known even up to present day. It may
be that in the near future we will be able to learn much more about that.
2. Regarding the location of mental events we are also not fully clear for which it is difficult to say that there is
identity in space of both mental events and physical events. It is very difficult to answer whether the mental
events, such as, thought, feelings and wishes occur in the brain or any other places. If someone thinks something
and if he is asked to answer the exact location where his thinking occurs then the obvious answer would be that
it occurs in the place wherever the person concerned is when he has that thought. If he is in the college when he
thinks, then his thought occurs in the college and nowhere else. But to ask the exact location of his interior part
of the body where his thought occurs, whether it is in foot or liver or heart or head, is utterly unnatural. Because
no one of these places is a location where thought occurs and therefore, preference of one place than another is a
wrong answer. But all these do not mean that other than foot, liver, heart or head, our thought occurs somewhere
else of our body. It is rather nonsense to say that somewhere else in our body the thought occurs. Someone may
point a place of his body and claim that on that point his entertaining thought was located. But this claim is
difficult to understand. Because it is certain that observing thoroughly the claimed point one would not be able
to see anything resembling a thought. In reply to this point the identity theorists may further claim that pain can
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be located in the body but it cannot be seen. But this claim paves the answer that pain can be felt by someone
but it is rare case that some one feels a thought in the body.
From the above analysis Shaffer says that as it is meaningless to say that in some point of body mental
events occur, so it proves that identity theory cannot be true. If it is claimed that physical events occur
somewhere within the body and if it is really true that these physical events are identical with mental events then
logically it might be concluded that these mental events must occur in some point within the body. But,
according to Shaffer, it is senseless to say that mental events occur here or there within the body because these
actually do not occur at any point within the body. Thus he says that as mental events fail to fulfil the condition
of co-existence in space and therefore in no way these can be identical with physical events. Shaffer says that
we are unable to find out the location of both mental events and physical events in our body. But these
inabilities in two cases are different. In the case of physical events, particularly of brain events, our knowledge
is not so enough. But it may be assumed that after some days we will be able to know the exact location of
relevant physical events. But this cannot be said in the case of mental events. There is no hope that in future our
knowledge about the location of mental events will increase. To discover the location of thought in our brain is
really a difficult task. There is no means by which we can find out the exact location of thought in our brain. It
may be that every event that occur in our brain is understood by means of x- ray or by other means, but these
means in no way can give us a glimpse about thought. To solve the problem it may be imagined that brain could
be enlarged or shrink where we can roam about freely but in that way also we will not be able to find out the
location of thought. It is only physical events that we will observe occurring in the brain. Thus Shaffer says,
“If mental events had location in the brain, there should be some means of detecting them there. But of course
there is none. The very idea of it is senseless”.
Section 2
2.1 Resolution of the Problem of Identity
So far I have delineated the problems of identity and the problem of co-existence that have been raised
by different thinkers against the identity theory of mind. Now I will try to resolve these problems from the
materialistic point of view.
. Searle points out that Identity theory violates the principle of logic. By this principle he means
„Leibniz‟s Law.‟
But in response to this objection they hold that this objection is based on the ignorance about the
details of the brain. When a person comes to know more and more about the brain, he will be able to attribute
perfectly and comfortably the spatial location of mental states and at the same time to attribute the so called
mental properties to the states of the brain. The identity theorist further says that in explaining the location of
the pain in the toe, the totality of the neuro-physiological aspect of having the pain should be taken into account.
This experience comprises the stimulation of the peripheral nerve endings in the toe up to the brain itself. Searle
thinks that the answer given by the identity theorist to the objection is a satisfactory one but there are more
serious objections which they have to face.
Searle raises another objection that the identity theory sounds like property dualism. But for the
identity theorists the problem is a decisive one. The whole point of their theory is to save materialism. The
central point of their theory is to show that mental states are really identical with the states of the brain, that is,
mental states are reducible to material states of the brain. But if this theory admits that mental states are
irreducible to brain states then the whole project of their theory fails and it will leave an irreducible mental
element for us. In order to avoid such consequence the identity theorists propose that without using any mental
predicates the phenomena in question can be specified. They can be specified in a topic–neutral vocabulary. In
explaining this specified topic-neutral vocabulary they say that instead of saying that „there is a yellow-orange
afterimage in me‟ it is better to say that “there is something going on in me that is like what goes on when I see
an orange”. Thus the second objection was supposed to be answered by rephrasing the identification of the
mental state in a „topic–neutral vocabulary. This topic–neutral vocabulary enables us to specify the mental
element in a non-mental, neutral vocabulary, e.g., „there is this thing going on in me‟. This statement can be
more specified in a neutral way without being committed to dualism or materialism. Here the thing in question
is a brain process. Thus in consistent with materialism, mental features can be specified by us.
Searle is not satisfied with this answer. He says that the answer given by the identity theorists fail to
convince the critics. To him, it is a fact that mental phenomena continue to have mental properties. This fact
does not change when we talk about mental phenomena without using a mental vocabulary. In this connection
he cites the example of yellow-orange after image and says that this image remains a qualitative and subjective
one and does not depend on our choice to mention those features. One may refuse to talk about airplanes and
can just say that there are some properties which belong to United Airplanes. But this refuse of airplanes in no
way eliminates the existence of airplanes.
We shouldbe focused on what exactly the identity theorist is proposing. He is not denying the
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existence of mental phenomena. What he suggests is to reject the dualistic framework, whether the Cartesian
type or property dualism type. To insist upon irreducible mental entities or properties is a sign for a kind of
spiritual quest that would never end. A more promising line of enquiry is the materliastic one and the dominant
epistemological perspective should come from third person perspective supplemented by the first person
perspective. The stance should not be that either this perspective or that.
The third objection comes from the accusation of „neuronal chauvinism‟. This objection comes from a
readiness to accept a stubborn dualism which the identity theorist is painstakingly advocating to drop.
The strength of Kripke‟s arguments rests on the assumption that the identity statement about mental
state and brain state does not contain two rigid designators. „Gold‟ is a rigid designator; „the yellow metal‟ is
not a rigid designator and „the element with atomic number 79‟ is a rigid designator. Hence, it is possible that
there is gold without being the yellow metals where as it is impossible for gold not to be the element with the
atomic number 79. Gold being the element with atomic number 79 is a scientific discovery. Now suppose that
the concepts „mental state‟ and „brain state‟ are well defined. Further assume that we have a scientific
breakthrough and the identity of mental state and brain state is discovered. In that case it would be impossible
for a mental state not to be a brain state. Expressions expressing those would be now regarded as two rigid
designators.
2.2 Resolution of the Problem of Co- existence.
Regarding the problem of co-existence J. A. Shaffer mentions that the co-existence is of two types: co-
existence in time and co-existence in space and he believes that the identity theory fails to convince us how the
conditions of co-existence in time and space can be met.
But in reply to the problem of co-existence it is believed by some supporters of the identity theory that
this objection can be met. They put forward two approaches in this connection. The first approach of them is
that this objection of co-existence begs the question. It is paradoxical to ask that if mental events and physical
events are really identical then mental events must occur in a location as the physical events occur and the
location of mental events must be exactly in the same location where physical events occur.
Secondly, to reply the objection of co-existence, the identity theorists approach that it is the whole body
where all the physical events occur and the occurrence takes place where the whole body is located. And the
mental events also occur in the location where the body is located and in no way it is located in any particular
part of the body. I think that the answer to the objection raised by Shaffer against the identity theory is
satisfactory.
Shaffer declares the impossibility of identity theory on the alleged ground that by analytic necessity
experiences are unlocated whereas neural events are located. These are located in part of the subject‟s neural
system. But David Lewis severely criticized this view and says that there is no strength in this argument.
According to Lewis, it is metaphysical prejudice to believe the principle that as experiences are unlocated so
these enjoy analytic or other necessity and as such this claim cannot be respected. He says that if there is a way
in which experiences are, by analytic necessity, unlocated, then this way is also irrelevant. Because in a primary
sense we regard only concreta as allocated somewhere and this is perhaps in our pre-systematic thought.
Abstracta are said to be located only in a derivative sense. These are located in concreta by the relation of
inherence. Thus Lewis says,
“But this possible source of analytic unlocatedness for experiences does not meet the needs of Shaffer‟s
argument. For neural events are abstracta too. Whatever unlocatedness occurs to experiences not because they
are mental but because they are abstract must occur as much as to neural events. So it does not discriminate
between the two.”
I. Conclusion
In modern period the mind –body problem was introduced as a problem by Rene Descartes. He tried to
solve the problem metaphysically and that is why failed to succeed in his mission. The theory of Behaviourism
also attempted to solve the problem by denying the mental episodes. Thus dualism is right when it holds that
mental items are inner but it is wrong when states that mental items are non-physical in nature. Similarly,
behaviourism is right in its materialism but wrong when this theory repudiates inner mental episodes. Thus here
identity theory is delightful synthesis of both dualism and behaviourism.
From the above analysis of the problems of the Identity Theory and their resolution I can conclude that
in spite of its limitations in describing the mind–brain relation, this theory is better than all other theories on this
issue. The profounder of this theory very logically answered the problems raised by the critics of the theory.
This theory attempts to solve the problem scientifically and that is why this theory is more acceptable.
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