Global negotiations doha2012p4_associations

Global Climate Negotiations
Doha COP-18 Negotiations Result in
“Doha Climate Gateway”

Negotiations from 26 November to 8 December 2012

Brief Assessment: 11 December 2012

Arthur Lee

© 2012 Arthur Lee Photos by Arthur Lee excepted where noted 1

Summary Assessment of the Doha Climate Gateway: Kyoto Protocol and
Flex Mechanisms Extended; New Market Mechanism Deferred

 Kyoto Protocol is extended from 2013 to 2020 with emission reductions submitted by nations with roughly 14% of global
emissions (according to an EU press statement). Carry-over of emissions allowances is allowed, though most nations
have declared not to use them in the second period. Access to the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms is allowed only to those
nations agreeing to the second commitment period. Australia and Kazakhstan have now signed up to the second period.

 Clean Development Mechanism’s (CDM) 2% share of proceeds that goes to the Adaptation Fund is maintained at 2%.
However, the transfer of emissions allowances in Joint Implementation projects (conducted between Annex I nations) will
now be subject to the same 2% proceeds going to the Adaptation Fund. The CDM will continue to be in effect with no
gap as of 1 January 2013.

 Long Term Cooperative Action (LCA) track, which developing nations did not want to close, is now closed with several
issues deferred to future negotiations in the technical bodies of the Convention, called the Subsidiary Body on Scientific
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI). For example, new market
mechanism modalities and procedures are now deferred to SBSTA negotiations. Non-market approaches will also be
considered in a new work program under SBSTA.
 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
and its first legal instrument, the Kyoto Protocol, have
had slow, long term impacts on government policies

Source: IISD news coverage
around the world in the last 18 years. The formal
continuation of the Kyoto Protocol into a defined
second commitment period, with all its flexibility
mechanisms and the institutions established both
under the KP and the UNFCCC means that markets and
policies driven by them will continue. The carbon
markets may not increase levels of activities or carbon
prices, but the markets will still likely limp along as
emission reductions are continuing to be required.

© 2012 Arthur Lee 2

Summary Assessment of the Doha Climate Gateway: To Consider Loss
and Damages; Durban Platform to Begin Discussion of Scope and
Structure.
 The issue of “loss and damages” will be taken up for future negotiations in a new institutional mechanism under the
UNFCCC with modalities and procedures to be elaborated at COP19 Warsaw. These negotiations will likely enter into
issues such as: the risk of slow onset events (e.g., sea level rise) and extreme events; non-economic loss and
damages; impacts of climate change integrated into climate-resilient development processes; and how impacts of
climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility.

 With the closing of the LCA track, nations will now focus negotiations towards “a protocol, another legal instrument or an
agreed outcome with legal force” to be completed by COP21 in 2015, and to come into force by 2020. The Ad Hoc
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) is the single track of negotiations under the UN
Framework Convention with a negotiating text to be prepared by May 2015 to be ready for completing negotiations at
COP21. Therefore, elements of the draft negotiating text will have to be considered at COP20.

 In 2012, the ADP has begun considering these elements: (a) Application of the principles of the Convention; (b) Building
on the experiences and lessons learned from other processes under the Convention and from other multilateral
processes, as appropriate; (c) The scope, structure and design of the 2015 agreement; (d) Ways of defining and
reflecting enhanced action. It will also consider, in 2013, ways to increase “ambition” of emissions reductions before
2020 in a second work stream.

 With numerous contentious issues deferred,
including even “settled” text on shared vision
with its issues of historical responsibility, the
negotiations going forward will again be fraught
with difficulties. Continuing issues such as loss
and damages, long term finance, technology
development and transfer with its intellectual
property rights protection issue, will still pose
enormous challenges to future negotiations of
the Durban Platform.


Doha Climate Gateway (Details 1 of 7)
Extending the Kyoto Protocol to 2020
 After the last three days of almost round-the-clock negotiating sessions stretching to Saturday night 9 pm, the nations of
COP18 Doha agreed to a package of decisions which is now called the “Doha Climate Gateway,” building on the Durban
Platform of Enhanced Action from COP17 Durban. This summary describes and assesses select issues that were of
interest to me as an official Business and Industry NGO (BINGO) observer.

 At Doha, the most important single decision that needed to be agreed to by all Parties who ratified the Kyoto Protocol, is
the extension of the Kyoto Protocol. At COP17 Durban, nations agreed that the Kyoto Protocol will have a second
commitment period to begin 1 January 2013 but they could not agree to an end date. At COP18 Doha, nations finally
agreed to a second commitment period ending in 2020. Several nations have withdrawn from while others elected to
enter into the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period. Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia withdrew.

 Australia and Kazakhstan have submitted quantified emission limitations and reduction commitments (QELRC) to the
second commitment period. Australia committed to 99.5 per cent of 1990 levels over the eight year commitment period
(2013-2020), which Australia states is consistent with its Cancun pledge of 5% reduction of emissions by 2020 based on
year 2000 emissions with the option to move to 15% or 25% reductions if certain conditions are met. Kazakhstan
submitted a QELRC of 95% of 1990 level for the period 2013-2020, with a pledge to reduce 7% by 2020.

Connie Hedegaard European Commissioner for Climate Action, and Zhenhua Xie, Minister/Vice-Chairman National
© 2012 Arthur Lee Development and Reform Commission, China. Source: IISD news coverage 4

Kyoto Protocol Goes to Second Commitment Period
 The negotiations to extend the Kyoto Protocol to 2020 was greatly hampered by the issue of “carry-over” of unused
emissions allowances (“assigned amount units” or AAUs) in the first commitment period. Although the final agreement
allows Parties to use such AAUs in the second commitment period, the European Union, Australia, Japan, Norway,
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Monaco inserted political declarations into an annex of the KP decision that they will not use
or purchase any carry-over AAUs.

 Ukraine made an opposing statement, reflected in the footnote to its QELRC, that there “[s]hould be full carry-over and
there is no acceptance of any cancellation or any limitation on use of this legitimately acquired sovereign property.”

 Australia’s statement is nuanced. The statement declared: “Australia will not purchase AAUs carried over from the first
commitment period. Australia will adhere to arrangements in other countries relating to the transfer of AAUs under any
arrangement that Australia may have linking our emissions trading scheme with any other scheme including the
European Union emissions trading scheme. Imported AAUs will continue to be ineligible for surrender for compliance by
liable entities in Australia's emissions trading scheme.” This would mean companies in Australia will not be able to
purchase any AAUs carried over from the first commitment period for compliance with the Australian scheme.

© 2012 Arthur Lee Connie Hedegaard submits the EU’s written consent to amend the Kyoto Protocol. Source: IISD news coverage 5

Long Term Cooperative Action Track Closes
 To close the negotiating track under the Bali Action Plan called “Long Term Cooperative Action,” nations agreed to a few
easy issues in order to advance other tracks of negotiations. Nations agreed to a shared vision in two relatively simple
statements: “Decides that Parties will urgently work towards the deep reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions
required to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to attain a global
peaking of global greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, consistent with science and as documented in the
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, reaffirming that the time frame for
peaking will be longer in developing countries; …”

 This shared vision avoids any discussion about peaking year and pathways for emissions reduction. The statement then
further reaffirms what has already been agreed in previous negotiations: “Also decides that Parties’ efforts should be
undertaken on the basis of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and the
provision of finance, technology transfer and capacity-building to developing countries in order to support their mitigation
and adaptation actions under the Convention, ….”

© 2012 Arthur Lee Photo: Arthur Lee 6

Long Term Cooperative Action Track Closes
 Nations also agreed to put several contentious issues into the standing subsidiary bodies under the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change for future negotiations, effectively deferring these issues for the future.

 Nations decided “to establish a work programme under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to
continue the process of clarifying the quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets of developed country Parties
with a view to: (a) Identifying common elements for measuring the progress made towards the achievement of the
quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets; (b) Ensuring the comparability of efforts among developed country
Parties, taking into account differences in their national circumstances; …”

 Nations also decided “to establish a work programme to further the understanding of the diversity of the nationally
appropriate mitigation actions [for developing nations] … under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, with a view to
facilitating the preparation and implementation of those nationally appropriate mitigation actions,…”

© 2012 Arthur Lee Source: Webcast video of the stocktaking informal plenary 7

New Market Mechanism Deferred to SBSTA Negotiations
The negotiations for a new market mechanism was deadlocked at COP18 Doha. No progress could be made. Therefore, the
President of COP18 proposed that the modalities and procedures of how such a new mechanism could work to the
Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), considering these elements:
 (a) Its operation under the guidance and authority of the Conference of the Parties;

 (b) The voluntary participation of Parties in the mechanism;

 (c) Standards that deliver real, permanent, additional, and verified mitigation outcomes, avoid double counting of effort and achieve
a net decrease and/or avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions;

 (d) Requirements for the accurate measurement, reporting and verification of emission reductions, emission removals and/or
avoided emissions;

 (e) Means to stimulate mitigation across broad segments of the economy, which are defined by the participating Parties and may
be on a sectoral and/or project-specific basis;

 (f) Criteria, including the application of conservative methods, for the establishment, approval and periodic adjustment of ambitious
reference levels (crediting thresholds and/or trading caps) and for the periodic issuance of units based on mitigation below a
crediting threshold or based on a trading cap;

 (g) Criteria for the accurate and consistent recording and tracking of units;

 (h) Supplementarity;

 (i) A share of proceeds to cover administrative expenses and assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to
the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation;

 (j) The promotion of sustainable development;

 (k) The facilitation of the effective participation of private and public entities;

 (l) The facilitation of the prompt start of the mechanism;.

Tech Transfer; Aviation and Marine Fuels emissions, CCS
 Developing nations were successful in retaining language in the LCA agreement to “request the Technology Executive
Committee, in elaborating its future workplan to initiate the exploration of issues relating to enabling environments and
barriers” to technology development and transfer.

 This language will again be used as a way to allow discussion of intellectual property rights negotiations, which
developed nations oppose, as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is not deemed to be the appropriate
venue for such negotiations.

 The Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technology Advice (SBSTA) will continue to ask the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to report on their progress of implementing
efficiency standards and working towards a global market-based mechanism. No other language could be negotiated at
COP18, thus no new development on a potential tax on emissions from these sectors.

 Carbon capture and geological storage (CCS) was considered in the COP18 negotiations under the CDM. Projects that
cross national boundaries are to be deferred until negotiations resume in 2016. A global carbon reserve was considered
briefly for negotiations but was also deferred until 2016. Such a reserve would have raised costs for CCS projects.

© 2012 Arthur Lee Photo: Arthur Lee 9

Durban Platform to Consider Elements
 The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) is the single track of negotiations under
the UN Framework Convention with a negotiating text to be prepared by May 2015 to be ready for completing
negotiations at COP21 December 2015. Therefore, elements of the draft negotiating text will have to be considered at
COP20.


© 2012 Arthur Lee Deputy Special Envoy Jonathan Pershing and Special Envoy Todd Stern, United States, Source: Webcast video of COP18/CMP8 closing plenary 10

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Long Term Impacts

 The impacts of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change have been accumulating over the
long term, and in the last decade have driven national policies (draft or passed), regulatory regimes,
even the IMO and ICAO, and projects that include but not limited to the following:
– EU Emissions Trading Scheme and the associated monitoring scheme.

– National legislations in the EU that implemented the EU ETS in early 2000’s to 2005

– Stimulus money in the EU and US for CCS and renewable energy technologies

– Senate and other Congressional bills (USA) over the last several years

– New Zealand’s implementation of an emissions trading scheme that caps emissions including carbon content of fuels, which remains
in place though New Zealand will not enter the second commitment period of the KP.

– Australian National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting System (NGERS)

– Australian Clean Energy Futures Bills (passed recently)

– California’s AB32 and implementing regulations

– Various discussion papers and policies being considered in the larger rapidly developing nations (the BASIC nations of Brazil, South
Africa, India, and China).

– Kazakhstan imposes emission limits and initiates a national emissions trading scheme as it enters the second period of the KP.

– Changes to international shipping and aviation energy efficiency and operational efficiency standards

– Clean Development Mechanism projects

 Long term impacts can continue to accumulate as the negotiations drive more developing nations to
enact laws and regulations for GHG monitoring, reporting, verification, and on technology transfer
criteria, and also adaptation actions affecting infrastructure, land use, and access to resources.

Global Negotiations and Parallel to the History of the
Scientific Assessments
 The current climate change negotiations by over 190 nations is part of a process that has gone on since the early 1990’s, in parallel to the
development of four scientific assessments carried out by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which began in 1988 and
culminated in the first global scientific assessment of 1990. The current UN negotiation round is called “COP17,” hosted by South Africa. The
IPCC has begun convening several hundred scientists, engineers, technologists, and economists for the next three years to conduct the Fifth
Assessment.

IPCC UNFCCC
“Policy-Relevant, Not Policy “Common But Differentiated
Prescriptive Science” Responsibilities”

1990 First Assessment Report
1992 Rio Summit: UNFCCC signed
“…emissions resulting from human activities are substantially
increasing the atmospheric concentrations…”

1995 Second Assessment Report 1994 UNFCCC entered into force
“…balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence
on global climate …”
1995 COP1: Berlin Mandate provided differentiated
approaches for Annex I and non-Annex I (“developing”)
2001 Third Assessment Report countries
“…new and stronger evidence that most of the warming
observed over the past 50 years is attributable to human
activities.” COP3 negotiations resulted in the
1997 Kyoto Protocol

2007 Fourth Assessment Report 2005 Kyoto Protocol entered into force
“Most of the observed increase in globally averaged COP/MOP 1 held in Montreal, Canada
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to
the observed increase in anthropogenic (human) greenhouse
gas concentrations. “ 2009 Copenhagen Accords; 2010 Cancun Agreements; 2011
Durban Platform; 2012 Doha Climate Gateway


“SideLights”
IPIECA, Chevron, Shell, Statoil, ENI, QatarGas and RasGas in Side
Event
 IPIECA Side Event “The Expanding Role of Natural Gas,” 30 November, 2012 at COP18 Doha.

Photo: Helen Murphy, IPIECA


“SideLights”
Chevron, Green Gulf Launch Solar Test Facility 2 Dec 2012
 The Qatar National Vision 2030 calls for 1.8 Gigawatts of Solar Energy, or approximately 16% of its energy generation
portfolio. To support the first step in this effort, Chevron and partner Green Gulf launched the Solar Test Facility on 2
December 2012 with Her Highness Sheikha Moza bint Nasser, the queen of the Emir, who in her role as the Chairperson
of the Qatar Foundation officially launched the generation of the facility. Five Ministerial-level Qatar officials also joined
the event, including the President of the COP-18, His Excellency Mr. Abdullah bin Hamad Al-Attiyah, and Christiana
Figueres, the Executive Secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. U.S. Ambassador to Qatar
Susan Ziadeh also attended. Sheikha Moza opens solar test facility

 The Solar Test Facility is seven acres of test site supporting approximately 200 kW of solar photovoltaic systems and
200 kW of solar thermal systems, plus testing a mini smart-grid with battery storage. Around 20 PV products will be
evaluated, including crystalline silicon, thin film, and concentrating PV. Several solar thermal collectors and applications
will be tested, including solar cooling and desalination. Operating parameters such as tracking, cleaning frequencies and
system scales will also be studied.


“SideLights”
Chevron, Green Gulf Launch Solar Test Facility, 2 Dec 2012

Photo: Aisha Al Musallam / HHOPL
Christiana Figureres, UNFCCC. Photos: Arthur Lee

Photos: Arthur Lee


“SideLights”
Carbon Capture and Storage Association and University of Texas Side
Event
 Capacity Building and Education Perspectives, Undergraduate and Graduate Training in Research and Applications of
CCS. Moderated by Katherine Romanek (UT Austin, left). Luke Warren CCSA, second from left. Tim Dixon IEAGHG,
third from right.

Photo:s Arthur Lee

Appendix
Brief History of Global Climate Negotiations

© 2012 Arthur Lee Photos by Arthur Lee excepted where noted 17

Global Climate Change Negotiations:

Background and Brief History

Arthur Lee
Observer from the Business & Industry NGO Community

Updated: December 2012

All photos by Arthur Lee except where noted.
© 2012 Arthur Lee

Primer on the UNFCCC and the Complex Negotiations (1 of 10)

This primer is to provide a brief, high-level description of selected
history and the complexity of the process of these UN negotiations.

The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is an
international treaty that was signed by President George Bush in

Photos by Arthur Lee
1992 at a summit at the Rio de Janeiro. The international treaty is
called a Framework for good reasons. It is only a framework and
details were left to be further negotiated over time. The UNFCCC
was ratified by over 184 nations in 1994 and came into force as
international law at that time.

The UNFCCC recognizes the science of climate change, talked
about “preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system,” and sets out a framework for nations to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions voluntarily. The UNFCCC sets out two
subsidiary negotiating bodies called:

Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI)

Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice Photo: Screenshot from UNFCCC webcast
(SBSTA)

..that convenes twice a year to negotiate all kinds of details in rough
categories according to its names. In practice, the thousands of
negotiators who come to the SBI and SBSTA meetings complete
their negotiations of each set of details and then towards the second
meeting (end of the year) join the Conference of Parties (COP) to
table their completed texts to the ministers who attend the COP,
where the ministers then make their decisions. At each COP, there
are always decisions made.



From the Berlin Mandate to the Kyoto Protocol

At COP1 Berlin, Parties to the Convention agreed to the Berlin
Mandate, which mandated a roadmap to completing negotiating a
Protocol by COP3 at Kyoto.

In December 1997 at COP3 at Kyoto, the over 184 nations after long
two weeks of round-the-clock negotiations came up with the Kyoto
Protocol, which was a legally binding international treaty. In 2005, it
entered into force when a threshold number of nations and their
emissions were accounted – 55 nations with at least 55% of
emissions – submitted their instruments of ratification to the United
Nations.

In these negotiations, the importance of having texts, and making
progress towards texts, is paramount. Each decision, whether it is a
relatively simple one to a complex text of the Kyoto Protocol, can still
represent years of negotiating efforts. For example, the Marrakech
Accords that set out the first complete set of rules and criteria for the
clean development mechanism (Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol) took
at least two years to complete. After they were completed,
negotiations in subsequent years then turned to operationalizing the
CDM Executive Board and its “modalities and procedures,” which
means in practice what the Executive Board does, how it does its
work, and its membership and processes. In many ways, that is still
going on in the current negotiations with the focus on streamlining,
reforming, and refocusing geographically its modalities and
procedures.

Other mechanisms, such as the Joint Implementation provisions
(Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol), took another two years of
negotiations before a Joint Implementation Steering Committee
(JISC, similar to the function of the CDM Executive Board) was
operationalized with modalities, procedures, and getting the
members in place to actually start doing any work of reviewing and
approving Joint Implementation projects.



From COP13 or CMP3

 The Conference of Parties (COP) when serving as the Meeting of the
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol is called COP/MOP or CMP (short).
COP13 in Bali was also the meeting of CMP3.

 The CMP decides on issues negotiated specifically under the Kyoto
Protocol, such as the Clean Development Mechanism.

 For example, with Canada’s withdrawal from the KP in 2011, both
the US and Canada will become observer states in the CMP
negotiations because they are not Parties to the KP.

 In 2007, with lack of sufficient progress since the entry into force of
the Kyoto Protocol (since 2005), the nations which are “Parties” to
the Kyoto Protocol again negotiated in a two-week period, round-the-
clock, and with great emotional outbursts, settled on the Bali Action
Plan. The Bali Action Plan put all Parties on a negotiating roadmap
towards COP15 to complete negotiations about two major issues:

– The continuation (or not) of the Kyoto Protocol. Certainly in
the minds of developing nations, there was no question that
the KP must continue

– The beginning of negotiations about “long term cooperative
action” which numerous nations, including the US, EU,
Australia, Canada felt would be the way towards a new
comprehensive agreement for all nations

 For these two purposes, two plenary bodies are used to negotiate
such issues.

– Ad Hoc Working Group on the Further Commitments of the
Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)

– Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action
(AWG-LCA)


COP15 or CMP5 at Copenhagen

 For over two years and amidst numerous added negotiating rounds,
the more than 100 nations met and finally tried to fashion several
texts for negotiations at COP15 Copenhagen. However, as we all
know now, agreement was never reached for the “further
commitments of the Kyoto Protocol” and the LCA negotiations
yielded a three page document, which was never completely agreed
in plenary by the entire COP17 body at Copenhagen, became this
“political agreement” called the Copenhagen Accord. Given all the
reviews of failure given by observers and the media with high
expectations, this was a remarkable political agreement personally
negotiated between several heads of governments, including the
Presidents of the US, China, Brazil, and Prime Minister of India, but
sidelining the European Union leaders.

 In hindsight, the key success of the Copenhagen Accord was that the
negotiations themselves compelled a number of nations to pledge a
series of commitments and actions, not necessarily targets with time
tables, that would show to the world that these nations can take on
such responsibilities. Outside of the Copenhagen Accord, there were
also decisions that continued the negotiating tracks of a large
number of decisions, including a decision text that kept alive the CCS
in CDM issue. Other decision texts kept alive the issues of sectoral
credit trading and longer term future of additional market
mechanisms



COP16 or CMP6 at Cancun

 The Copenhagen Accord never received formal recognition by the
entire body of the COP. However, throughout 2010 and into the
COP16 negotiating sessions, negotiators met to parse out all the
elements of the Copenhagen Accord and set them up for formal
negotiations and codifications as decisions by the supreme body of
the UNFCCC, the COP. Therefore, at COP16, again with round-the-
clock negotiations and on the verge of failure throughout two-weeks,
the Cancun Agreement was reached.

 While this sounds impressive, it is in practice a series of decisions
codified by the AWG-LCA that flesh out slightly the commitments
made by nations in the Copenhagen Accord, including the Green
Climate Fund. COP16, as with other COPs, also saw a series of
other decisions that continued life in CDM “rulemakings” and, in fact,
put much more positive life into the CCS in CDM issue. CCS was
finally decided by the COP that it will be allowed as an eligible project
technology for the clean development mechanism, and that a whole
set of modalities and procedures will have to be elaborated and
approved by COP17. The COPs have also compelled, through a
series of decisions over time, two other UN treaty agencies, the
International Maritime Organization and the International Civil
Aviation Organization, to establish new efficiency standards, ship
design and operational standards, and a push towards market-based
mechanisms for these tow international sectors of commerce.



COP17 or CMP7 Durban

After over 70 hours of round-the-clock negotiations at the end, and
setting the record for the longest COP negotiations (to early Sunday
morning after two weeks), negotiators from over 180 nations agreed
to mandate the negotiations in the next four years towards a
“protocol, legal instrument, or an agreed outcome with legal
force” applicable to all Parties under the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change.

The negotiators further agreed to set a second commitment period
of the Kyoto Protocol from 1 January 2013 to either end of 2017 or
end of 2020, with the end date to be negotiated at COP18 Qatar.
All commitments already pledged by nations under the Kyoto
Protocol (KP) will be translated into quantified emission limitation
and reduction commitments (QELROs) by COP18.

At COP16 Cancun, Japan, Canada, and Russia stated they will not
sign onto a second commitment of the Kyoto Protocol,

Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on 13 Dec 2011.

Australia is prepared to consider submitting information on its
QELRO … following the necessary domestic processes …

Photos: Screen shots of the webcast between 2:30 and 3:30 am Sunday 11 Dec. European Commissioner Connie Hedegaard and India’s
Minister Jayanthi Natarajan confronted each other’s point of issue on “legal outcome.”


Cancun Agreement is made effective with a series of decisions at COP17.

The negotiators agreed to a whole series of decisions negotiated
via multiple tracks, including the operationalization of the Green
Climate Fund, which is likely to be the center piece for the transfer
of monies and the source of funds for a large number of mitigation
and adaptation actions in the future.

At Cancun, nations agreed to the establishment of a Green Fund
with a fast start of $30 billion by 2012 and long term mobilization of
$100 billion per year by 2020, which could include private sector
funding. The Fund will be staffed by people from multilateral
development banks, World Bank, and Global Environment Facility.
At COP17, the Republic of Korea, Germany and Denmark agreed
to contribute to the start-up cost of the Green Climate Fund.

Decisions were reached on: Photo from UNFCCC webcast
Operationalizing the Adaptation Committee and formulating
the information for national adaptation plans

Agreeing to the modalities and procedures of the
Technology Executive Committee with a network of regional
technology centers

Agreeing to the modalities and procedures for conducting
CCS projects in the developing world under the Clean
Development Mechanism.

Decision was reached favorably for nations and business
representatives who support market-based mechanisms. There
will be a new market-based mechanism in the long term action
framework, which will continue to be negotiated.

© 2012 Arthur Lee Photo Arthur Lee 25

At a crucial period 2:55 am to 3:40 am Sunday morning, 11 December 2011, the
Durban Platform was agreed (COP-17)..

Photo: IISD coverage of COP17.

Doha Climate Gateway: Kyoto Protocol and Flex Mechanisms Extended; New
Market Mechanism Deferred

 Kyoto Protocol is extended from 2013 to 2020 with emission reductions submitted by nations with roughly 14% of global
emissions (according to an EU press statement). Carry-over of emissions allowances is allowed, though most nations
have declared not to use them in the second period. Access to the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms is allowed only to those
nations agreeing to the second commitment period. Australia and Kazakhstan have now signed up to the second period.

 The Clean Development Mechanism’s (CDM) 2% share of proceeds that goes to the Adaptation Fund is maintained at
2%. However, the transfer of emissions allowances in Joint Implementation projects (conducted between Annex I
nations) will now be subject to the same 2% proceeds going to the Adaptation Fund. The CDM will continue to be in
effect with no gap as of 1 January 2013.

 The Long Term Cooperative Action track, which developing nations did not want to close, is now closed with several
issues deferred to future negotiations in the technical bodies of the Convention, called the Subsidiary Body on Scientific
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body on Implementation (SBI). For example, new market
mechanism modalities and procedures are now deferred to SBSTA negotiations. Non-market approaches will also be
considered in a new work program under SBSTA.

© 2012 Arthur Lee Photo Arthur Lee 27

Doha Climate Gateway: To consider loss and damage; Durban Platform to begin
discussion of scope and structure

 The issue of “loss and damages” will be taken up for future negotiations in a new institutional mechanism under the
UNFCCC with modalities and procedures to be elaborated at COP19 Warsaw. These negotiations will likely enter into
issues such as: the risk of slow onset events (e.g., sea level rise) and extreme events; non-economic loss and
damages; impacts of climate change integrated into climate-resilient development processes; and how impacts of
climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility.

 With the closing of the LCA track, nations will now focus negotiations towards “a protocol, another legal instrument or an
agreed outcome with legal force” to be completed by COP21 in 2015, and to come into force by 2020. The Ad Hoc
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) is the single track of negotiations under the UN
Framework Convention with a negotiating text to be prepared by May 2015 to be ready for completing negotiations at
COP21. Therefore, elements of the draft negotiating text will have to be considered at COP20.



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