Expectations for COP 16 Tigere Chagutah, 29.09.2010
In this session <ul><li>Background </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Copenhagen 2009 and its outcomes </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Recen...
Background <ul><li>Copenhagen – Promised so much but delivered so little </li></ul><ul><li>Billed as the most important me...
What we saw <ul><li>Secret meetings, texts, and side deal-making </li></ul><ul><li>Documents leaked to the press </li></ul...
Copenhagen Accord <ul><li>The result was an insufficient, weak and superficial Copenhagen Accord – Ostensibly signaling en...
BONN III <ul><li>Outcomes of the 13th Session of the AWG-KP & 11th Session of the AWG-LCA are instructive </li></ul><ul><l...
BONN III Cont. <ul><li>Lack of political will and willingness to find common ground to move forward </li></ul><ul><li>Clim...
Managing Expectations <ul><li>Although it is clear that an effective, binding and just agreement is overdue there are clea...
Managing Expectations Cont. <ul><li>Noises from the UNFCCC Cont. </li></ul><ul><li>At Cancún governments can decide how an...
Managing Expectations Cont. <ul><li>Noises from Civil Society – Predictably diverse and Generally cautious </li></ul><ul><...
Managing Expectations Cont. <ul><li>Noises from Civil Society Cont. </li></ul><ul><li>The package must be built up piece-b...
Expectations for COP 16 <ul><li>Southern voices </li></ul><ul><li>Demands that developed countries should agree on aggrega...
Expectations for COP 16 Cont. <ul><li>Africa and the AOSIS demand that COP 16 should commission a technical paper on the s...
Expectations for COP 16 Cont. <ul><li>Real progress at Cancún requires a transparent, effective and efficient process </li...
Form of the Outcome <ul><li>3 possible types of form and legal nature of obligations </li></ul><ul><ul><li>A legally bindi...
In Conclusion <ul><li>Questions: </li></ul><ul><li>Are the current diminished expectation a Climb-down, Being realistic or...
Thank you… Tigere Chagutah, 29.09.2010
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in …5
×

Expectations for the 16th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

452 views

Published on

Published in: Technology
0 Comments
0 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

  • Be the first to like this

No Downloads
Views
Total views
452
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
2
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
2
Comments
0
Likes
0
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

Expectations for the 16th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

  1. 1. Expectations for COP 16 Tigere Chagutah, 29.09.2010
  2. 2. In this session <ul><li>Background </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Copenhagen 2009 and its outcomes </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Recent context </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Managing expectations </li></ul><ul><li>Southern expectations for COP 16 </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Negotiating tracks </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Form of outcome </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Conclusion </li></ul>
  3. 3. Background <ul><li>Copenhagen – Promised so much but delivered so little </li></ul><ul><li>Billed as the most important meeting post-WW II COP 15 capped off months of intensive lobbying, negotiation and engagement </li></ul><ul><li>Attended by a more than 115 heads of states and government, hundreds of government representatives and thousands of non-state actors, NGOs and climate activists </li></ul><ul><li>Expectations (among others) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Agreement on significant though insufficient emissions cuts </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Commitment to significant monetary transfers, led by the EU pledge </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Binding agreement on sufficient and sustained support for developing countries </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Agreement on joint, coordinated and responsible action from developed countries </li></ul></ul><ul><li>These aspects were needed to reach, not only a legal agreement, but one that would last and be effective </li></ul>
  4. 4. What we saw <ul><li>Secret meetings, texts, and side deal-making </li></ul><ul><li>Documents leaked to the press </li></ul><ul><li>Demonstrations </li></ul><ul><li>Arrests </li></ul><ul><li>Organisational chaos </li></ul><ul><li>Threats of, and boycotts </li></ul><ul><li>Interrupted meetings </li></ul>
  5. 5. Copenhagen Accord <ul><li>The result was an insufficient, weak and superficial Copenhagen Accord – Ostensibly signaling enhanced political will. </li></ul><ul><li>Truth is, the Accord was a document that was the result of an exclusive meeting of selected Heads of States, and it was only “taken note of” by the COP in Copenhagen not adopted due to lack of consensus. </li></ul><ul><li>Significantly privileges the 2°C goal and fleetingly refers to and delays action towards a 1.5°C goal which now commands wide support (107 countries and rising scientific base) </li></ul><ul><li>No peak emissions target – just that emissions should peak ASAP </li></ul><ul><li>Neither 2020 nor 2050 targets </li></ul><ul><li>General statements on, among other issues, use of markets, adaptation and deforestation </li></ul><ul><li>No surprise that only 55 countries met the January 31 deadline for submission of commitments. However, by 6 th of August 2010, 137 countries had expressed their support for the Accord </li></ul>
  6. 6. BONN III <ul><li>Outcomes of the 13th Session of the AWG-KP & 11th Session of the AWG-LCA are instructive </li></ul><ul><li>Negotiations went backwards, with the mitigation discussion becoming more polarized and developing countries criticising the apparent refusal of many of the developed countries to commit to a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. </li></ul><ul><li>After months of reducing the negotiating text to a manageable size, it ballooned </li></ul><ul><li>AWG-KP was presented with a text that contained re-inserted texts, increasing the number of options for negotiation </li></ul><ul><li>Fears of a retreat to the voluminous pre-Copenhagen text </li></ul>
  7. 7. BONN III Cont. <ul><li>Lack of political will and willingness to find common ground to move forward </li></ul><ul><li>Climate Action Network playfully, but poignantly, pointed out that “This is a recipe for recreating the Copenhagen [collapse] [circus] [ill-will] [rancor] [mess] [catastrophe] [ debacle]” </li></ul><ul><li>There were some inconsequential positives and moves towards positives for the most optimistic among us </li></ul><ul><ul><li>e.g. improvements in transparency of Fast start Financing (website, which however has incomplete information) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Modest agreement that a new finance fund is required and discussions on how the COP will exert its authority </li></ul></ul>
  8. 8. Managing Expectations <ul><li>Although it is clear that an effective, binding and just agreement is overdue there are clearly diminished expectations for COP 16 from all corners </li></ul><ul><li>Noises from the UNFCCC – couched and unambitious </li></ul><ul><li>A set of COP decisions which quickly operationalise key elements of the Bali Action Plan would be achievable at Cancún </li></ul><ul><li>“ Progress at Cancún would include a mandate to take the process towards an encompassing agreement with legally binding status, which would take time ” </li></ul><ul><li>Cancún is a place to take the next firm step </li></ul>
  9. 9. Managing Expectations Cont. <ul><li>Noises from the UNFCCC Cont. </li></ul><ul><li>At Cancún governments can decide how and when to capture promises on ways and means to launch a new wave of global climate action </li></ul><ul><li>There is no magic bullet. No one climate agreement will solve everything right now. To expect that is naïve . We need to keep walking in the right direction – including at Cancún </li></ul><ul><li>“ A good outcome of Cancún will be an operational architecture on climate change then we can decide on a treaty… It is more important to have realistic expectations” – Yvo de Boer, former Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC </li></ul>
  10. 10. Managing Expectations Cont. <ul><li>Noises from Civil Society – Predictably diverse and Generally cautious </li></ul><ul><li>A repeat of Copenhagen must be avoided and we should still push for an ambitious, effective and just deal at all costs </li></ul><ul><li>It is clear that the nothing is agreed until all is agreed, all or nothing, approach failed at Copenhagen </li></ul><ul><li>Cancún should put in place the key institutional and architectural arrangements for the comprehensive and ambitious legally binding outcome on issues such as mitigation, MRV, financial architecture, REDD-plus, technology, adaptation, capacity building and market mechanisms. </li></ul><ul><li>A more sequential approach should be adopted, with agreement on what is possible coming first and contentious issues dealt with later </li></ul>
  11. 11. Managing Expectations Cont. <ul><li>Noises from Civil Society Cont. </li></ul><ul><li>The package must be built up piece-by-piece </li></ul><ul><li>Logistical arrangements at Cancún could make for repeat of restriction and exclusion of civil society as seen in Copenhagen </li></ul><ul><li>We didn’t get progress in Copenhagen. We wont get progress in Cancún. We might not get progress in South Africa. The focus must shift to making progress chunk by chunk: we are close to agreement on REDD, Adaptation and Technology transfer we need to pursue these areas more vigorously at Cancún </li></ul><ul><li>The AWG-KP should set the scale of emission reductions of Annex I (countries) in the second commitment of the Kyoto Protocol, which should be ambitious, without being severely compromised by any loopholes. </li></ul>
  12. 12. Expectations for COP 16 <ul><li>Southern voices </li></ul><ul><li>Demands that developed countries should agree on aggregate reduction target of more than 40% below 1990 by 2020 and between 80 to 95% by 2050 </li></ul><ul><li>Developed countries should take on (by COP 17) new individual/legally binding quantified emission reduction commitments </li></ul><ul><li>There should be agreement that each developed country will produce a Zero Carbon Action Plan by 2012 </li></ul><ul><li>Developed Countries should clearly state that their emission reduction commitments will be subject to an effective measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) and compliance system within the Kyoto Protocol </li></ul><ul><li>Agreement on market mechanism rules that improve environmental integrity, prevent double counting, and strengthen the ability to transform economies </li></ul>
  13. 13. Expectations for COP 16 Cont. <ul><li>Africa and the AOSIS demand that COP 16 should commission a technical paper on the scientific, technical and socio-economic issues relating to temperature increase of 1.5°C to inform COP 17 decisions </li></ul><ul><li>Establish a mandate to agree equitable effort and a sharing approach between developed and developing countries by COP 17, consistent with the equity principles of the UNFCCC, the historical responsibility of developed countries, and the right to sustainable development of developing countries </li></ul><ul><li>There is disappointment with the slow progress of the AWG-KP, and in Cancún, the Kyoto Protocol must lead the way. There should be progress towards a second period of commitment and no attempts to do away with the Protocol or come up with legal instruments originating from the Copenhagen Accord </li></ul>
  14. 14. Expectations for COP 16 Cont. <ul><li>Real progress at Cancún requires a transparent, effective and efficient process </li></ul><ul><li>Kyoto Protocol process should draw conclusions before Cancún according to its mandate, and this should be the cornerstone of a meaningful outcome in Cancún </li></ul><ul><li>Outcomes in Cancun have to be a part of a comprehensive package. Developing of only ‘realistically achievable’ ideas chunk by chunk ideas will create confusion and distract attention from central issues. For instance, a regime for MRV of developing country actions cannot be pushed while circumnavigating enhanced commitments of developed country commitments and progress on other elements of the Bali Action Plan. </li></ul><ul><li>By Bonn III there was no consensus on the form of the legal outcome expected for Cancun (whether there be a set of COP decisions or a legally-binding treaty) </li></ul>
  15. 15. Form of the Outcome <ul><li>3 possible types of form and legal nature of obligations </li></ul><ul><ul><li>A legally binding outcome (treaty) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>COP Decisions (Not legally binding, but suitable for some issues) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>A combination of both </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Preferences expressed at Bonn III: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Developing countries generally advocated a legally-binding agreement respecting the two-track </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The EU preferred a single, legally-binding agreement, but added that it could be flexible on the form of the outcome, as long as it is legally binding </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Japan and the US said a legally-binding agreement should include all major emitters. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>AOSIS noted that the discussions had not reached any consensus and should continue in Tianjin, so that an agreement could be adopted in Cancún </li></ul>
  16. 16. In Conclusion <ul><li>Questions: </li></ul><ul><li>Are the current diminished expectation a Climb-down, Being realistic or Strategic Retreat? </li></ul><ul><li>What is possible at Cancún and in what form? </li></ul><ul><li>What would be priority issues within a sequential approach? </li></ul><ul><li>Is it too ambitious to target a treaty? </li></ul><ul><li>What would be a satisfactory outcome? </li></ul>
  17. 17. Thank you… Tigere Chagutah, 29.09.2010

×