This document provides background information on a thesis about the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's rhetoric and actions in parliament and professional syndicates from 1984-2010. The thesis will analyze whether the Muslim Brotherhood follows through on its public proclamations regarding democracy when participating in these organizations, or acts more in line with traditional views of Sharia law. It outlines the research question, relevance of studying this topic, methodology used, assumptions, and hypothesis that will be tested using primary sources on the Muslim Brotherhood's statements and actions during the time period.

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The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Rhetoric and Actions in Parliament and Professional
Syndicates from 1984-2010
George R. Burkes Jr.
U.S. Department of State
MSSI Class 2014
This thesis has been accepted by the faculty and administration of the National Intelligence
University to satisfy a requirement for a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence or Master of
Science and Technology Intelligence degree. The student is responsible for its content. The
views expressed do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence
University, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Community, or the U.S.
Government. Acceptance of the thesis as meeting an academic requirement does not reflect an
endorsement of the opinions, ideas, or information put forth. The thesis is not finished
intelligence or finished policy. The validity, reliability, and relevance of the information
contained have not been reviewed through intelligence or policy procedures and processes. The
thesis has been classified in accordance with community standards. The thesis, in whole or in
part, is not cleared for public release. I understand that this thesis was prepared under the
authorities of the Defense Intelligence Agency and that dissemination outside of official U.S.
Government channels, either in whole or in part, is prohibited without prior review and clearance
for public release as required by Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction DIAI 5400.005.

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Dedication –
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my wife, Eugenia. She gave me the time and
encouragement to pursue my goal. Thank you.
I would also like to thank my thesis chair, Colonel Anderson, and my reader, Mr.
Devillafranca for their suggestions and assistance. The Hughes Library at NIU was the best at
finding very difficult material in interlibrary loans. My translator at the State Department helped
greatly in determining value in the Arabic sources used.
Finally, a special thanks to my friend, Thomas J. O‟Brien who told me I could do this.

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Topic –
The topic of my thesis is the reconciliation of rhetoric of the leaders of the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and the actions of its members when they participated in the
People‟s Assembly (Majlis) of Parliament and professional syndicates between 1984 and 2010.
Even though membership in the Majlis during this time was dominated by the National
Democratic Party, participation for other political parties was opened to a degree under President
Mubarak (1981-2011). It took many years for the MB to decide to even compete in
parliamentary elections. When it did put forth candidates for parliament, it also involved the
organization in one of the few avenues of political participation available outside of parliament,
the professional syndicates.
Professional syndicates in Egypt protect the interests of their members and are modeled
after European syndicates that represent professions such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers.
They have also acted as an arena in which the less influential professionals can try to advance
their causes outside of government.1
Historical information regarding syndicates in Egypt will
be discussed in the introductory chapter as well as background information regarding the
participation of the Brotherhood.
Most information available through scholarly journals and books written about the
participation of the MB during this time period have been focused on the process involved in
getting members elected to Parliament and syndicates. Relatively little has been written about the
actions of the MB after joining those organizations. This is perhaps due to the fact that the MB
had a modest presence relative to total numbers of members in the Majlis. This changed with the
1
Robert Springborg, “Professional Syndicates in Egyptian Politics, 1952-1970,” International Journal of Middle East
Studies, (October 1978), 278.

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election of 2005, when 88 brothers were elected out of a total of 454 Members of Parliament
(MPs).2
The MB started gaining influence in the syndicates in 1984, when they won 7 out of 25
seats in the governing council of the Doctors syndicate.3
After this initial success, the influence
of the MB in syndicates continued to grow in the 1990s.
The general topics to be covered in this thesis will be social and economic issues. While
participation in the Majlis and professional syndicates was of little use to the MB in effecting any
major changes, it did allow for an outlet for political expression and a refinement of organizing
abilities that were put to use in the 2012 elections, when the MB elected 235 out of 498 members
to the Majlis.4
The MB has presented itself to Egypt, and the rest of the world, as a moderate and
practical organization since the mid-1970s. The leader, or Murshid of the organization at that
time, Hasan Isma‟il al-Hudaybi, established a concept of non-violence that has mainly continued
since that time. Additionally, even though the desire has been to have Islamic law as the source
of legislation, there is a belief that obedience to divine law is independent of the application of
state laws. God‟s law must be followed individually and even if Islam is the foundation of the
state, there is no guarantee that it will be a just system.5
The slogan of the MB, “Islam is the
answer,” has guided its participation in the Majlis and syndicates, and has affected much of its
action in those entities.
Relevance of the Research Question –
2
Samer Shehata, ‘’The Brotherhood Goes to Parliament,” Middle East Report, 240 (Fall, 2006), 33.
3
Ninette S Fahmy, “The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian Syndicates: An Alternative
Formula for Reform?” The Middle East Journal, 52, no. 4 (Autumn, 1998), 552.
4
Election Watch, Journal of Democracy, 23, no. 2 (April, 2012), 170.
5
Barbara H.E. Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and ideology (New York: Routledge, 2009), 151.

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Egypt is a country of great strategic importance to the United States. It is in the interest of
the U.S. to have a stable government in Egypt that remains at peace with Israel. It is also
important to maintain cooperation with Egypt regarding the prevention of terrorist groups in the
Sinai Peninsula from destabilizing the region.6
Since 1948, Egypt has received from the United
States more than 71 billion dollars in bilateral foreign aid, which includes Economic Support
Funds for sectors like health, education, and economic development as well as Foreign Military
Financing.7
It is imperative that stable relations with Egypt are maintained in order to facilitate
transit through the Suez Canal for U.S. warships and over flight rights for U.S. aircraft.8
As the
MB is a recently deposed political power in Egypt, a historical view of how it has participated in
the Majlis and professional syndicates is of interest to the intelligence community. An
understanding of how the MB has matched deeds with proclamations in the past will assist the
intelligence community in future analysis of how it is likely to govern in the future, if given the
opportunity.
Research Question –
This thesis seeks to answer the question – Does the Muslim Brotherhood attempt to
follow through on what it proclaims to the public when participating in the Majlis and
syndicates? When the MB espouses certain aspects of democracy, does it follow through on
those proclamations through its actions in the Majlis and influence in the syndicates, or has the
organization acted more in line with its traditionally held views of “Shari’a law?” This thesis
researches printed and electronic sources to identify actions taken in the Parliament. It also
6
Jeremy M. Sharp “Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations.” Congressional Research Service Report RL33003,
(December, 2012), 5.
7
Ibid, 14.
8
Ibid.

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researches speeches and interviews given to document to the extent possible the influence of the
MB in professional syndicates for the years 1984 -2010. The following inquiries will be
addressed in answering the research question.
Have members of the MB acted as a bloc when participating in the Egyptian Parliament
or professional syndicates?
If so, have those actions been in accordance with proclamations of the MB during the
time period analyzed?
Have MB members of Parliament and professional syndicates acted differently under
different general guides?
Methodology –
As this thesis analyzes how the MB has acted in the Majlis and policies that have
influenced the professional syndicates, it utilizes a qualitative research design with the single
case study approach of content analysis for the time period 1984-2010. Research is conducted
utilizing written proclamations and interviews of General Guides or Murshids of the MB as well
as statements released on behalf of the MB. Additionally, observations made by public media
and actions by syndicates under MB control are discussed. This should lead to reconciling
general themes espoused by the MB and patterns in its actions that will either contradict or
substantiate those themes.
Assumptions –
I start with the assumption that, because the MB had been a social movement for much of
its existence, the transformation into a political entity was made without a completely centralized

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plan from its leadership. As such, I also assume that there will be some discrepancy from what
the leadership of the MB proclaimed and how its members actually acted. The extent this
discrepancy may exist and any indication of a clear break with leadership regarding MB policy
will be analyzed. Utilization of the observations from printed media, memoirs, and newspapers
will assist in obtaining knowledge of the action of the participants.
Hypothesis -
All of the hypotheses presented will need to be viewed as degrees of what the evidence
indicates. The standard will be “more likely than not” and notable caveats will be discussed in
the empirical information obtained before a determination can be assessed.
My hypothesis is that the MB did not always act as a bloc in accordance with the
proclamations of its leaders in the Majlis nor did its members act in unison when participating in
syndicates. While it is assumed that the majority of the MB were supportive of the Murshids’
leadership and proclamations, actions may have been taken contrary to their edicts.
Alternate hypothesis number one – The MB did mainly abide by the proclamations of its
leaders in Parliament and acted in unison while participating in syndicates.
Alternate hypothesis number two – The MB acted uniformly in the Majlis and acted
dutifully in syndicates, but in one or the other acted apart from the proclamations of the MB
leadership.
Chapter Organization –
There will be four chapters to the thesis. The first chapter will be a historical introduction
to the MB and events that led to its eventual political aspirations in the 1980s. Historical

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development of the syndicates will also be discussed to give context to the political participation
of those organizations. The second chapter will concern the actions of the MB in the Majlis and
in the syndicates on social, foreign, and economic issues from 1984 through the beginning of
1996 when it was under the guidance of Umar al-Tilmisani and Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr.
The third chapter will cover the same issues through 2010 while under the guidance of Mustafa
Mashour, Ma‟mun al-Hudaybi, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, and Mohammed Badie. These two
chapters will incorporate proclamations and deeds of the MB as well as actions taken by the
Egyptian government at the same time to provide context. The final chapter will be conclusions
and policy recommendations.

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Literature Review –
The two seminal works regarding the early history of the MB are Mitchell‟s Society of
the Muslim Brothers and Lia‟s The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt. Both cover the
beginning and development of the organization in a thorough manner. The Mitchell book takes
the MB through the late 1960s. The Zollner book The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan Al-Hudaybi
and Ideology is the most recent and scholarly explanation of the decision by the MB to renounce
violence. It goes into great detail the theological discussion taking place in the prisons where
many of the Brothers were serving long prison sentences. It is excellent in explaining the
deflection of Qutub‟s more stringent writings without renouncing them outright.
Al-Awadi, Pargater, and Wickham are the best at integrating the MB into the social and
political events of Egypt. They each bring great context to the events and decisions made by the
leadership of the MB in different periods of its history. For Egyptian political history, Kassem
and Kienle present the changes in constitutional and electoral laws in good detail.
For Egyptian syndicates, the two best historical authors are Bianchi and Reid. They
develop the history and importance of professional syndicates in Egypt. For more current
material, Amani Kandil is the acknowledged expert. Her material is not readily available and
almost exclusively in Arabic, but she is the best place to gain knowledge of professional
syndicates from the 1980s forward.
Egyptian economics are very well covered by Utvik, Ates, and Oweiss. They explain the
Egyptian economy, including the shadow economy of Islamist finances and the MB participation
quite well.

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Chapter One
MB History and Entrance into Syndicates and the Egyptian Parliament
History of the MB through the early 1980s –
The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamic-oriented organization based in Egypt and has
existed for over eighty-five years. During that time, its members have been frequently harassed
and arrested by whatever government was in power. The eight leaders (Supreme Guides or
Murshids) of the MB collectively spent over ninety-two years in prison because of the
organization‟s differences with those governments. Numerous other MB members were
incarcerated for lengthy periods of time as well. The organization itself has occasionally been
dissolved and it was declared an illegal entity from 1954 through the ouster of President
Mubarak in 2011. Despite these setbacks, it not only persisted as an organization, but it also
eventually gained political positions in the Egyptian Parliament and professional syndicates
starting in the mid-1980s.
The MB was founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928 when several disaffected workers in a
labor force working for the British in Cairo approached him about collectively “working on the
road to action and …. service to the religion (Islam) of the nation.”9
Al-Banna was a recent
graduate of Dar al-„Ulm University in Cairo. It was considered to be a high-level training school
for teachers and included a modern curriculum, especially when compared to other schools at
that time. He was trained in a traditional religious education, but it was more secular than the
9
Richard P. Mitchell. The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 8

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famous Al-Azhar University10
. He had been working as an agent for the Young Men‟s Muslim
Association and he was interested in improving the lives of people by “teaching them the
objectives of religion and the sources of their well-being.”11
He decided that this could best be
achieved through “the path of true Sufism … with sincerity and work in the service of
humanity.”12
In a broad sense, the version of Sufism desired by the MB could be described as
“Muslims who take seriously God‟s call to perceive his presence both in the world and in the
self.”13
Al-Banna believed that one of the bigger threats to Islam was the fascination the educated
Egyptian youths had with European culture and habits.14
While there was no one specific vision
of exactly the type of Islamic society ultimately desired by the MB, there was an emphasis by the
group on action and organization over ideology.15
Al-Banna became the Murshid and the MB quickly established itself by developing direct
outreaches to mosques, coffeehouses, and private homes. Additionally, it built schools for boys
and girls as well as becoming involved in community service projects.16
This approach replicated
itself across the country and in a twenty year period, it became a national organization of social
and welfare institutions with an estimated membership of over three hundred thousand members
by 1946.17
The MB “established a network of branch offices throughout the cities and villages of
10
Al-Azhar is acknowledged as the greatest mosque-university in the Islamic world. Located in Cairo, it began
organized religious instruction in 978. It is a conservative institution that has historically tried to keep Islamist
activists and governments at a distance, though not always successfully. John L. Esposito, ed. The Oxford
Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) Vol. 1, 170-171.
11
Mitchell, 6.
12
Ibid.
13
Esposito, Oxford Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, 102-103.
14
Brynjar Lia. The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of and Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942
(Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998), 55.
15
Mitchell, 326.
16
Ibid, 8.
17
Ibid, 328.

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Egypt that was unified by a central headquarters in Cairo.”18
This became the basic structure of
the MB and members displayed considerable loyalty to their branch as well as the organization
as a whole. The local branch leader became a liaison between the members and the central
leadership.19
Participation in the MB consisted of a three-tiered membership structure. At the first level
were members considered to be “assistants,” only required to join as a member and pay dues.20
The second- level members were called “related” and needed to demonstrate knowledge of the
MB‟s principles, attend meetings on a regular basis, and swear an oath of obedience.21
The third-
level members were “active” and expected to immerse themselves entirely into the organization,
which included gaining a higher understanding of Islamic learning and obligations.22
The MB wanted to educate its members with a stringent knowledge of Islam that could
be shared through their outreach to the community. They believed that this would eventually lead
the population at large to desire Islam as the foundation for societal needs.23
The strategic
“operational principle” of the MB can be described as the “establishment of an Islamic social
order on the basis of the Shari’a.”24
The “tactical principle” of accomplishing this goal was
“seeking to do it nonviolently through the consciousness-raising of the Muslim masses and
advice to rulers.”25
Al-Banna imparted to the followers of the MB that they “are not a benevolent
18
Ziad Munson, “Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” The
Sociological Quarterly, 42, no. 4 (Autumn, 2001), 497.
19
Ibid.
20
Mitchell, 183.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham. The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2013), 23.
24
Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Egypt Islam and Democracy: Twelve Critical Essays (Cairo: American University in Cairo
Press, 1996), 39.
25
Ibid.

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society, nor a political party, nor a local organization having limited purposes. Rather, you are a
new soul in the heart of this nation to give it life by means of the Qur’an.”26
A noted expert on the MB, Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, has written about some of the
goals of the MB in this early period. The MB claimed to not desire power for itself, but wanted
to “facilitate a wider process of social reform.”27
The MB believed in the establishment of a legal
system “consistent with Shari’a law that would require the backing of a governmental
authority.”28
Shari’a law is a scholarly tradition of determining God‟s law through the Prophet
Muhammad and the body of the Prophet‟s revelations discovered throughout the years.29
There
was also an acknowledged but muted support by the MB for institutions such as parliament, an
independent judiciary, popularly elected rulers, and the rights of citizens under the law.30
In
regards to Shari’a, the MB was not interested in literal applications of the past, but rather the
desire for human reason or ijtihad, in “constructing laws relevant to the Muslim community in
modern times.”31
This did not address whether the ultimate authority was to be expressed by God
through Shari’a or through elected representatives.32
The MB also did not clearly indicate how it
would interact with Christians (Copts) and other Muslims who did not agree with its agenda.33
Because the MB was somewhat ambivalent towards parliament and political parties, it
decided candidates would be presented only when the time was right.34
The MB understood that
eventually it would have to participate in elections if it was going to exert any real influence on
26
Quoted in Mitchell, 30.
27
Wickham, 24.
28
Ibid.
29
Esposito, Oxford Encyclopedia, Vol. 2, 450.
30
Wickham, 24...
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid, 25.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.

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the functions of government.35
The MB finally chose to field candidates, including al-Banna, in
the national elections of 1942. Because the law at the time required national unity and did not
permit religious parties, an understanding needed to be reached between the MB and the
Government. Egyptian Prime Minister Nahhas met with al-Banna to convince him and the MB to
withdraw their candidates. Al-Banna agreed, while extracting concessions from Nahhas that
included the promise of freedom for the MB to carry on with its work and a curtailing of the
selling of alcoholic beverages to the greater public.36
Al-Banna and five other Brothers also ran
for office in 1945, but were defeated in what was widely considered to be a flawed election.37
While politics was an important avenue to be utilized in effecting change, it was not the only
way the MB pursued its cause. The Brothers strove for non-violent means to accomplish its
goals, but they were not above using violence when it was deemed necessary.
The MB was very concerned and apprehensive about what it thought of as the three
external archenemies of Islam. It considered the Jewish influence of Palestine, the perceived
crusade of the West against Islam and Communism to be the most important international threats
requiring the immediate attention of the MB. The Brothers considered the Jewish people or
Zionists to be virtually entwined in all three of these concerns.38
The MB was one of the first
organizations to send volunteers and military assistance to the Palestinian resistance in the 1940s,
even before Arab armies were sent to fight after the creation of Israel. Within Egypt, the MB was
very much concerned about the influence of the British, who had stationed troops in Egypt with
35
John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, “Democratization and Islam,” Middle East Journal 45, no. 3 (Summer
1991) 429.
36
Mitchell, 27.
37
Ibid, 33.
38
Ibrahim, 42.

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varying strength from 1882 until the end of 1954.39
The MB also had disagreements with the
Egyptian Wafd party, which consisted mainly of members of the political and economic elite.
When the Wafd party formed a government that cooperated with the British in World War II, its
popular support was diminished and violent clashes with the MB became more prevalent.40
The
willingness of the MB to use armed force led it to utilize a division that had been created within
its structure. This internal structure was to cause problems for the organization over parts of the
next three decades.
In its earlier years, the MB created a division known as the Rover Scouts, which was
essentially a mechanism used to build youthful and dedicated cadres to the cause.41
The aim of
the Rovers was to “raise the Islamic sports spirit in the souls of youth … and accustom them to
obedience and order.”42
Some members of the MB concluded that in order to fulfill the strategic
desire to create an Islamic order, the “execution involving uncompromising struggle (Jihad),”
must take place and they worked to have the Rovers evolve into a more militant wing or “Special
Apparatus.”43
The Special Apparatus has also been known as the “Secret Unit” or “Special
Organization.”44
Its members have included two men who later became Murshids of the MB.
Two events hastened the development of the Special Apparatus in the 1930s. The first
was an order issued by the Egyptian Royal Councilor, Ali Mahir Pasha. In 1939, it was decreed
that in response to the developing world war, all schools should teach students military drill and
maneuvers.45
The second factor assisting the growth of the Special Apparatus was the financial
39
Munson, 495.
40
Ibid.
41
Lia, 101.
42
Ibid, 102.
43
Ibid, 178.
44
Zollner, 12.
45
Lia, 179.

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contribution made by the German Legation in Cairo in the 1930s. The money given to the
Brothers by Germany was larger than subsidies made to any other anti-British activists at that
time.46
Even with training and money available, the Special Apparatus was somewhat dormant
during World War II. It did make contact with a group of officers in the Egyptian army in 1940
that encouraged the MB in its activities. These officers became the “Free Officers” that later led
the 1952 revolution.47
The MB, especially the Special Apparatus, expanded recruitment and
became much more active towards the end of the war and immediately after. This activity led to
the first dissolution of the MB as an organization. The Brothers, along with other organizations,
became involved in a series of violent acts (bombings and assassinations) that took place in
Egypt starting in 1945 and lasted off and on until the revolution in 1952. The struggle was not
only with the Egyptian government. There was also rejection of British influence and
competition for power with rival political entities, like the Wafd party.48
In late 1947, al-Banna ordered the Secret Apparatus to prepare for Jihad in Palestine.
When war broke out in 1948, after Israel became a nation, the MB dispatched fighters to assist
soldiers sent by the Arab League to Palestine. This involvement was not sanctioned by the
Egyptian government, but it was permitted, as long as the official training of volunteers was
conducted by an army officer.49
The MB assisted in some of the fighting, but one of the more
notable contributions it made involved an incident of running supplies to Egyptians trapped by
an Israeli military advance in the battle of Faluja. The MB requested that more volunteers be sent
46
Ibid.
47
Mitchell, 96.
48
Ibid, 60.
49
Ibid, 57.

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to help, but the Egyptian government refused.50
By now, the government was becoming more
wary of the MB because in 1947 a large cache of arms was found in the possession of the
Brothers on the outskirts of Cairo.51
Additionally, a jeep owned by the MB filled with explosives
was identified not long after the Cairo incident. The government became anxious about the
possibility that the MB was planning imminent revolution and, given the recent violence
committed by the MB in Egypt, it was decided that they should be dissolved by decree.52
Many members of the MB were imprisoned after the decree in December of 1948 in
order to try to dismantle the organization. This did not have the effect the government anticipated
and three weeks after Prime Minister al-Nuqrashi issued the decree, he was assassinated by the
Special Apparatus.53
His successor declared martial law and many of the MB were given military
trials, having been charged with membership in a terrorist organization.54
Al-Banna tried to
deescalate the situation by denouncing the violence and assassinations. He claimed the Secret
Apparatus had been designed to protect the national interests and not to overthrow the
government.55
This claim was somewhat disingenuous and seemed to indicate that “al-Banna
was either duplicitous in the violence or that he had lost control of the organization as Supreme
Guide.”56
Al-Banna was not one of the Brothers arrested and he “prophetically told his associates
that the failure of the government to arrest him was his official death warrant.”57
He was
assassinated in February, 1949.
50
Ibid, 58.
51
Ibid, 75.
52
Ibid.
53
Zollner, 13.
54
Ibid.
55
Ibid, 14.
56
Ibid, 15.
57
Mitchell, 71.

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For a number of years, it was generally believed that much of the organizational
capability of the MB was destroyed as a result of the raids and imprisonment of its members as
well as the death of al-Banna during this period. However, citing de-classified material from the
United States Department of State, Ziad Munson indicates the Brothers were actually somewhat
successful in surviving the repression.58
Files from the State Department at the time indicate
“reports of secret mass meetings, continued organizing in mosques, and the handing out of
pamphlets throughout Egypt.”59
The organizational structure of the MB that had developed over
the years provided a means to survive the attacks of the current and future regimes.60
The MB was now without a leader and facing persecution from the state. It was important
to them that they not be seen as a threat to the Egyptian political system in order to preserve the
remainder of the organization.61
They needed to choose a leader who was not attached to the
previous violence and who had connections with the existing political leaders. They chose Hasan
al-Hudaybi as the new Murshid. Al-Hudaybi was a judge of the Egyptian High Court whose
brother-in-law was the chief of the royal household.62
It was believed that this contact would
“narrow the rift between the Palace and the Brotherhood and hasten the return of their
organization to a state of legality.”63
At the time, al-Hudaybi was seen by the MB as nothing
more than a placeholder until the various factions that had developed in the MB (who did not
want to give up their power within the organization) could come to a decision on a new leader.
58
Munson, 499.
59
U.S. Department of State (USDS) 1954, Confidential Files, Egypt 1950-1954, Washington DC (cited in Munson,
499).
60
Ibid.
61
Zollner, 19.
62
Zollner, 20.
63
Sayed Khatab, “Al-Hudaybi’s Influence on the development of Islamist Movements in Egypt,” The Muslim World,
91, no. 3/4 (Fall 2001), 454.

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This assumption of temporary leadership was to prove false, and al-Hudaybi remained the
Murshid of the MB until his death in 1973.
Among his first acts as Murshid, al-Hudaybi replaced some of the senior members of the
MB with recent recruits into the organization who had a more moderate temperament. He also
created the post of vice-guide (Na’ib) and discredited the Special Apparatus along with the use
of force by the MB in general.64
He let it be known that “There is no secrecy in the service of
God, no secrecy in the Message, and no terrorism in religion.”65
He also indicated that violence
could not liberate Egypt and it was the duty of the MB to educate the people and prepare them
spiritually for an Islamic society.66
Al-Hudaybi tried to reach out politically to the monarchy, yet he also rejected the
parliamentary monarch system then in existence.67
His attempts to ingratiate himself with the
king did not please the younger members of the MB or the Special Apparatus that still held
influence in the organization despite al-Hudaybi‟s attempts to eliminate it.68
When Nasser and
the Free Officers took power in Egypt on July 23, 1952, al-Hudaybi declared the MB‟s support
for the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).69
The MB was glad to see the abolishment of
the monarchy and reduction of British power and influence in Egypt.
As previously mentioned, the Free Officers had a relationship with a segment of the MB
dating back to the early 1940s. Those members tended to be Brothers who were in the Special
64
Ibid, 455.
65
Quoted in Mitchell, 88.
66
Khatab, 456.
67
Zollner, 24.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid, 25.

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Apparatus and they supported Nasser and the revolution.70
Not all members of the MB did; some
of the newer members in the Guidance Council were opposed to Nasser. Al-Hudaybi agreed to
support Nasser but in return wanted him to reinstall civilian leadership, reform the army, and
instigate the redistribution of land.71
Additionally, he wanted the “introduction of an Islamic
constitution, with the Qur’an as its foundation” and direct involvement in any negotiations
regarding the withdrawal of all British troops from Egypt.72
Nasser was more interested in
deflecting any encroachment on his power and did not trust al-Hudaybi even as he sought
support from the Brothers for his leadership.
Nasser hoped to keep a distant, but cordial relationship with the Brothers. He wanted to
be able to co-opt them against other political parties by utilizing the internal strife that was
current in the MB and by playing all the various political parties against each other as well.73
He
was wary of the MB‟s ability to generate crowds and its capacity for violence.74
Nasser further
generated rifts in the MB by offering two cabinet positions to higher-ranking Brothers. There
were divided opinions in the Guidance Council as to whether the MB should be involved in the
government at this level. Al-Hudaybi was against the idea and expelled the two members under
consideration who subsequently joined the cabinet.75
The internal opposition within the MB to al-Hudaybi as Murshid and his leadership of the
organization continued when many of Brothers wanted to participate in political elections. Al-
Hudaybi was against the MB‟s becoming a political party. He wanted to avoid subjecting the
70
Omar Ashour, the De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamist Movements (London: Routledge,
2009), 42.
71
Ibid.
72
Zollner, 30.
73
Joel Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), 98.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid, 100.

21. Unclassified
20
Brothers to the supervision of the RCC.76
A Consultative Assembly of the Brothers was gathered
and it called on al-Hudaybi to resign. He did resign for a short period of time, during which the
MB registered with the government as a political party. A week after submitting his resignation,
and pressed by his supporters to return to the leadership, al-Hudaybi withdrew the registration of
the MB as a political party and instead “submitted a new application with the government that
redefined the Brotherhood as a religious association.”77
Relations between the RCC and the MB were good, until early 1954. All political
prisoners who had been arrested (including MB members) in the previous fifteen years were
released and there was even an investigation by the government into the murder of Hasan al-
Banna in an attempt to develop good will with the Brothers.78
In early 1953 the RCC banned all
existing parties and groups except the Society of the Muslim Brothers, as it had accepted the
petition of al-Hudaybi seeking to have the organization defined as a religious association. This
acceptance allowed the government to name three members of the Brotherhood to a
constitutional committee that was formed in December of 1952. The recognition gave the MB an
“unprecedented degree of political legitimacy.”79
These good feelings did not last long; the MB felt emboldened enough to propose to the
government that a secret advisory committee (that the Brotherhood would dominate) be
established to oversee and promulgate all legislation.80
The RCC saw this as a step too far and an
intrusion into its leadership of the revolution. Because Nasser had no intention of sharing power
with any groups, he announced the creation of the Liberation Rally. The purpose was to “create a
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Ibid, 101.
79
Gordon, 101.
80
Ibid.

22. Unclassified
21
government-supported „people‟s movement‟ with the purpose of generating „unity‟ in the
nation.”81
The Rally was meant to be the catalyst of a single political organization to replace the
previously banned political parties.82
The MB saw this as an attempt to subsume the organization
into the ranks of the revolution and resisted overtures to join. They were especially irritated with
the secular nationalist rhetoric of the Rally and they withheld their cooperation.83
In January 1954, a scuffle broke out between the MB and Liberation Rally students at
Cairo University. Vehicles were burned and weapons were found in the possession of both sides.
The authorities arrested over four hundred members of the Brotherhood the day after the clash.84
Two days after that, the regime outlawed the MB under terms of the decree banning all political
parties (citing the original petition by the MB to be registered as a political party).85
The
crackdown was aimed mainly at al-Hudaybi and not necessarily an attempt to destroy the MB.
The decree indicated that “The revolution will never allow reactionary corruption to recur in the
name of religion and allow none to play with the fate of the country for personal desires.”86
Soon
after, the RCC slowly started releasing members of the MB who were not closely affiliated with
al-Hudaybi.87
The regime was also dealing with a revolt within its ranks regarding the distribution of
governmental power as well as contending with rising tensions and demonstrations on university
campuses. Nasser was able to consolidate his control of the leadership of the RCC and on March
25, 1954, declared the revolution was over and “that the country would resume normal
81
Mitchell, 109.
82
Ibid.
83
Gordon, 101.
84
Ibid, 105.
85
Ibid.
86
Ibid.
87
Ibid, 106.

23. Unclassified
22
parliamentary life.”88
This promise did not materialize and it marked the beginning of an
institutionalized military rule in Egypt.89
Nasser also released the remaining MB prisoners by
revoking the 1953 ban on political parties.90
There were conditions set for the MB to return to
legal status. They had to cease proselytizing within the army and they needed to purge al-
Hudaybi and his followers from the Brothers.91
Even though there was dissension within the MB
regarding al-Hudaybi, he remained the Murshid and an antagonist of Nasser.
Nasser tried to establish himself in the eyes of the people as their natural leader. He set
about attacking the weaker political parties and silenced anti-government journalists while
purging student groups of agitators.92
Because the MB still had considerable support in the
country, he decided to engage them at a later date.
In the summer of 1954, al-Hudaybi took a step back from the general confrontation with
the RCC and left the country on a business trip. While he was gone, Nasser negotiated a treaty to
have all the remaining British troops withdrawn from Egypt.93
This was fiercely rejected by the
MB which did not like the conditions that were negotiated, among them a seven-year period in
which the British might return to Egypt in case of aggression in the Suez Canal zone.94
The treaty with Great Britain was formally signed on October 19, 1954. A week later, on
October 26, Nasser was giving a speech in Alexandria regarding the treaty when shots were fired
in his direction from a member of the MB.95
Nasser was not injured and this presumed
88
Mitchell, 130.
89
Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1990 (London: Routledge, 1993), 39.
90
Mitchell, 131.
91
Gordon, 106.
92
Hopwood, 40.
93
Zollner, 35.
94
Gordon, 178.
95
Hopwood, 42.

24. Unclassified
23
assassination attempt strengthened his image and made him very popular as he deliberately
exposed himself to large crowds around the country to exploit the incident.
A wave of arrests of MB members followed and only a few in the leadership managed to
flee to Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.96
Thousands of Brothers were arrested and charged as
terrorists aiming to overthrow the political system in an attempted coup d‟état. Seven of the MB
leaders, including al-Hudaybi, were sentenced to death. Six of the leaders were hanged and al-
Hudaybi had his sentence commuted to life in prison.97
It is estimated that approximately eleven-
hundred prison sentences were handed out and another one thousand Brothers incarcerated
without any charges being made against them.98
The Society of Muslim Brothers was officially
dissolved on December 5, 1954 and remained that way through 2010.
Until 1958, the MB was a fractured and hounded organization. They “lived in constant
fear of being arrested or spied upon.”99
In 1958, the government loosened the repression
somewhat. Many of the Brothers who had not been officially charged were released. Some other
lower-ranking members were released as well. Al-Hudaybi was pardoned, but put under house
arrest.100
From this time period and several years after, al-Hudaybi‟s influence within the MB
was shared with another supporter, Sayyid Qutb.
Qutb was one of those imprisoned in 1954 and a decided ideologue within the MB. While
in prison, he wrote several books. Two of those books, Signs Along the Path and Milestones had
profound influence on the growing Islamist movement in Egypt.101
His vision was much more
96
Zollner, 37.
97
Zollner, 38.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid, 39.
101
Sullivan, 43.

25. Unclassified
24
militaristic and called upon Muslims to undertake Jihad against their leaders because “they had
replaced God‟s law with man-made laws.”102
He defined Jihad as “a complete armed rebellion”
and “a declaration of the freedom of man from servitude to other men.”103
In Milestones, his
concept of “criticizing society where Allah is not held to be the sovereign being or His law is not
the sole authority in human life and society” resonated with the population. The book had six
printings within a month before it was banned by the government.104
Qutb also indicated there
was a distinction between believers and unbelievers. “The true Muslim is defined through active
engagement, which legitimizes violent resistance against what is seen as unjust rule.”105
Qutb
was charged with conspiracy to overthrow the government and hanged in August, 1966.106
The
regime began a renewed crackdown on the MB resulting in arrests, especially for those who
owned a copy of Milestones.107
Al-Hudaybi was again arrested and sentenced to death, but the
sentence was commuted to life in prison. Several years after Milestones was written, a book,
Preachers, not Judges, was released by the MB. It was attributed to al-Hudaybi, (but actually
written in conjunction with other high ranking Brothers) while they were in prison.108
While not directly refuting Qutb and his influence, the book was written mainly to
provide guidelines towards political moderation in a time of radicalism championed by Qutb and
aimed at continuous state persecution against the MB.109
The book endeavored to look at the
foundations of Islamic faith and undermine concepts that Qutb had put forth regarding radical
102
Ibid.
103
Quoted in Sullivan, Islam in Contemporary Egypt, 43.
104
Khatab, 464.
105
Khatab, 149.
106
Ibid, 470.
107
Zollner, 43.
108
Ibid.
109
Ibid, 149.

26. Unclassified
25
ideas of Jihad.110
One of the concepts was the idea that individuals have a greater freedom for
self-determination under the realm of God‟s supremacy. It argued that Islamic law was an
adaptable system of regulations derived through deductive reasoning. It also argued that
“obedience to divine law is independent of its application at a state level.”111
It further mentions
that “God‟s law must be followed individually … and even if Islamic law was the foundation of
a state, it is no absolute guarantee of a just system.”112
Al-Hudaybi indicated that “divine law is
superior to the contractual nature of a social and political structure among humans.”113
Nasser tried to benefit politically from these thoughts by incorporating the assistance of
religious leaders to prove that the values of Islam and socialism were similar. He encouraged
them to identify religious sanctions for the ideas of class solidarity and the power of the state.114
After the war with Israel in 1967, Nasser resorted to appealing to the Islamic values of the
population even more. Realizing the Brothers still had resonance with the population, he started
releasing many members of the MB from prison.115
Nasser began using Islamic slogans in
speeches to try and appease public sentiment regarding the disastrous outcome of the war. There
was a feeling among the population that Egypt‟s military weakness was a punishment from God
and that only a return to Islam would help in its war against Israel.116
Nasser died of a heart attack in 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, another
military man. Sadat granted a general amnesty to many of the MB in 1971 and allowed exiled
110
Ibid.
111
Ibid, 151.
112
Ibid.
113
Ibid, 144.
114
Hopwood, 97.
115
Sullivan, 44.
116
Ibid.

27. Unclassified
26
Brothers to return to Egypt.117
The atmosphere of embracing Islam continued under Sadat and it
was his intent to normalize relations with the MB in an attempt to stave off political intrusions
from Nasserites and Socialists.118
The MB also disliked Nasserites and Socialists because of their
secularism. Sadat continued gradually releasing Brothers from prison in stages through the
middle of 1975.119
He even allowed the MB to resume publication of its monthly magazine, al-
Da’wa (The Call).120
The ability to regularly publish and articulate its message to a wider
audience helped the MB in re-establishing itself in Egypt.
The MB was further encouraged by Sadat‟s foreign policy actions when he expelled
Soviet troops from Egypt in the months preceding the 1973 war with Israel. The Soviets had
acquired great influence with the Egyptian government under the Nasser regime, but were now
being marginalized. Sadat was not only angered by the Soviets sending military weapons and
equipment to India (before its war with Pakistan in 1971) instead of Egypt, he was also irritated
about the burgeoning U.S. – Soviet détente. He was especially concerned because of the close
ties between the U.S. and Israel.121
In the eyes of the Brothers, Sadat was now acting against the
acknowledged “archenemies” of Islam (and the MB). Those being Western (U.S.) influence,
communism, and Israel. While not displeased with the action of war with Israel, the MB did not
like the effect it had on Sadat and his overtures with the U.S. and Israel in the aftermath. The
early 1970s brought change to Egypt that was favorable to the MB. But, while Sadat was
coalescing a new government, the MB was also changing leadership.
117
Wickham, 30.
118
Sullivan, 44.
119
Wickham, 30.
120
Ibid.
121
Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years (New York: Palgrave, 2000) 124.

28. Unclassified
27
The Murshid of the MB, Al-Hudaybi, died in 1973 and was succeeded in that position by
Umar al-Tilmisani, the oldest member of the leadership in the Brothers at sixty-eight. He had
been al-Hudaybi‟s assistant on the Guidance Council of the MB and had contributed to the
writing of Preachers, not Judges. He spent seventeen years in prison, dating back to the mid-
1950s before being released by Sadat. The guidance of the MB during the tenure of al-Hudaybi
had profound implications for the organization going forward. His approach to missionary work
and recruiting members helped influence politics through social structures and institutions. It was
largely adopted as the strategy going into the future for the Brothers.122
By eventually becoming
the largest social movement in Egypt, the MB was able to find success in student unions,
professional organizations, and other civil institutions.123
Al-Tilmisani embraced his
predecessor‟s approach to “the gradualist approach of the Islamic reform to society and state.”124
He marginalized the Secret Apparatus as well as the radical ideas of Qutb. He also made it clear
that the Brothers rejected violent action against the state.125
This approach helped in initially
finding common cause with Sadat.
Even though the MB was not a legal organization, Sadat invited the leaders to assist in
drafting sections of a new constitution in 1971.126
While he was willing to stipulate to the MB
that “the principles of Islamic Shari’a are a primary source of legislation,” the Brothers wanted
them to be the sole source of Egyptian laws.127
This would be an ongoing point of contention for
the MB in the coming years. In 1976, Sadat initiated the concept of “platforms” within the ruling
party to serve the interests of different groups that could be established as a prototype towards
122
Zollner, 48.
123
Ibid, 49.
124
Wickham, 30.
125
Ibid.
126
Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 17.
127
Ibid.

29. Unclassified
28
having a multi-party structure in the future. The MB supported this idea and Sadat in the
parliamentary elections that year as it began to become more interested as an organization in
having a political role in the government.128
Six of the Brothers were actually elected to
parliament, although not as individuals affiliated with the MB.129
Some MB leaders predicted
that they would eventually be able to form a political party, but that was quickly deterred by the
passage of the Political Parties Act of 1977, that prohibited the forming of parties based on
religion.130
Working with members of parliament who were from the countryside and sympathetic to
their cause, the Brothers began lobbying the assembly to change laws in two fundamental areas.
They wanted the status of Shari’a changed from “a primary source” to “the primary source” of
legislation.131
They also wanted to repeal laws they felt violated the principles of Shari’a. One of
these pertained to the sale, production and distribution of alcohol. The Brothers and their allies
were also interested in establishing laws regarding Quranic punishments for crimes such as
murder and adultery. Additionally, they wanted to reconcile current laws regarding marriage and
divorce with Shari’a mandates.132
Sadat was not interested in allowing religious leaders or the MB to define the interest of
the state with Islam regarding legislation. He allowed their proposals to be introduced, but made
sure the legislation went nowhere. Sadat then used executive privilege to issue personal status
128
Ibid.
129
Wickham, 31.
130
Ibid.
131
Ibid.
132
Ibid.

30. Unclassified
29
laws that expanded the rights of women in marriage and divorce. This did not sit well with the
MB and was vehemently opposed.133
At the same time, the MB publication, al-Da’wah, began criticizing Sadat for not
effectively working on the problems of education, housing, transportation, and inflation.134
The
criticism turned into a major break with Sadat when he started turning to the West regarding
foreign policy and negotiating a peace treaty with Israel. Al-Tilmisani believed that the Camp
David peace agreement “fulfilled all Israel‟s demands and “should be fought to the end by all
Muslims.”135
The MB felt that the modern state of Israel was “based on the illegal and
illegitimate usurpation of Muslim territory and advocated Jihad to liberate the holy site of
Jerusalem.”136
More criticism from the MB towards Sadat was based on his crackdown on dissents,
especially after food riots across the country in 1977. It viewed Sadat as developing into more
and more of a dictatorial figure.137
Sadat became increasingly combative and insisted that there
should be a “total separation of religion and politics.”138
Yet this sentiment did not preclude
Sadat from amending the constitution in 1980 to actually define “the principles of Islamic
Shari’a as the chief source of legislation.”139
The Brothers would argue from this time forward
133
Ibid, 32.
134
Rubin, 17.
135
Raymond William Baker, Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt’s Political Soul (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1990), 255.
136
Wickham, 33.
137
Ibid, 32.
138
Quoted in Wickham, 33.
139
Ibid, 32.

31. Unclassified
30
that any revision of existing laws had to recognize the constitutional requirement of conforming
to Shari’a law.140
In 1981, Sadat attempted to clamp down on dissent behavior from any
perspective. He arrested over 1500 civic and religious leaders, including al-Tilmisani and other
MB members. He also closed down many publications, including al-Da’wah. An activist in the
radical Islamic group al-Jihad was enraged, and acting with others in the group, assassinated
Sadat in October, 1981.141
While the MB under Sadat made strides towards a more involved political
participation, its leaders continued to stay outside the formal system in order to operate as much
outside of state control as possible.142
They wanted to continue the social services that had
allowed them to develop a base of support among the population. While the MB was open to
creating a party for the Brothers when the timing was right, it did not want to replace the
outreach of its religious association.143
Sadat was replaced by his vice president and military
man, Hosni Mubarak. The pattern of interaction between Egyptian leaders and the MB
continued. Initially, there was cooperation with Mubarak followed by major differences. It is
under Mubarak that the MB decided to fully participate, to the extent allowed, in the political
arenas available to them. This participation will be explored in the following chapters.
140
Ibid.
141
Ibid, 33.
142
Ibid, 43.
143
Ibid.

32. Unclassified
31
Professional Syndicates in Egypt –
Egyptian professionals have strived since the early 20th
century to create syndicates that
would reflect their economic interests, raise professional standards, and influence the country‟s
politics in their favor.144
The desire of professionals to organize developed with the increased
interaction of Egyptians and Europeans in the late 19th
century. The first of the professional
groups to form a syndicate was the Lawyer‟s Syndicate in 1912. It is the oldest and most
established of Egypt‟s syndicates. Other leading professions, like doctors, journalists, and
engineers developed syndicates in the 1940s.145
The syndicates were influenced by three distinct branches of professionals in their
formulation. The more predominant members were European intellectuals residing in Egypt. The
next most influential were Egyptian professionals who had obtained a modern (mainly European)
education. Finally, there were professionals with only traditional apprenticeship training in Egypt
who did not possess higher education.146
Each profession had a traditional wing and a more modern wing that vied for influence
within the syndicates.147
For instance, the Lawyers‟ Syndicate included traditional lawyers who
practiced before Shari’a courts (generally small claims and family matters). They were
eventually subsumed by lawyers in the syndicate who strove to integrate the profession into more
political areas in Egyptian society. Likewise, the Physicians‟ Syndicate had recent graduates of
medical school practicing alongside assorted members whose primary jobs were barbers and
144
Donald M. Reid, “The Rise of Professions and Professional Organization in Modern Egypt,” Comparative Studies
in Society and History, (January, 1974), 24.
145
Reid, 24.
146
Ibid, 25.
147
Ibid.

33. Unclassified
32
holy men.148
The modern wing of the various syndicates tended eventually to have the most
influence as the professionals passed through several phases in order to become true syndicates.
The first of these phases was the establishment of university-level training. Professional
schools specializing in medicine, engineering, and law were all functioning by 1880.149
These
schools led to the development of specialized journals within the professions and grew in number
during the years of British influence from 1882 through 1922.150
This in turn led to the next
phase, which was developing the numbers of professionals that would warrant formulating a
syndicate. While there is no specific threshold for the number of members required, there should
be a sizable enough contingency to enter the final phase, which is actual syndication.151
After World War II, there was a dramatic increase in the opening of new universities and
the expansion of existing schools that set the stage for much larger numbers of professional
graduates.152
These graduates went on to establish professional syndicates. The models for these
syndicates were mainly drawn from the more traditional Ottoman-Egyptian guilds as well as the
influence of European learned societies and professional associations.153
Historically, indigenous
guilds served as links between the rulers and members of a profession. They helped arbitrate
disputes, control wages, and also supplied services to their members.154
By the end of the 19th
century, the central government took over those functions and the guilds disappeared.155
While
Europeans influenced the organization and formulation of the regulations of the burgeoning
148
Ibid, 26.
149
Ibid, 28.
150
Ibid.
151
Ibid.
152
Ibid, 37.
153
Ibid.
154
Ibid.
155
Ibid.

34. Unclassified
33
syndicates, there were still differences of perception between the view that syndicates were being
used as a tool of government and the view they were representing membership.156
There was no common denominator to explain which professions decided to organize
into syndicates.157
Their creation seems to have “reflected the nature of the existing relations
between those professions and the state.”158
While syndicates allowed professionals some aspects
of self-governing, the broader regulatory powers over them were still held by the ruling elite.
Government feared the connection between occupational organization and the potential for
political mobilization against it.159
Syndicates gradually developed political significance when on occasion they would
influence governmental policy decisions. For example, in the early 1960s, the Physicians‟
Syndicate successfully resisted the introduction of fully socialized medicine into Egypt. The
Journalists‟ Syndicate has been a consistently vociferous advocate of reducing censorship since
the 1950s.160
Other syndicates have sponsored debates and published commentaries regarding
topics such as school curricula and land ownership. The issues raised have mainly been
intermittent and covered a somewhat narrow range of subjects, but whenever the government has
expressed strong disapproval of their demands, the syndicates have generally ceased in pursuing
them.161
156
Ibid, 38.
157
Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers,
2001), 37.
158
Ibid.
159
Robert Bianchi, Unruly Corporatism: Associational Life in Twentieth-Century Egypt (New York: Oxford Press,
1989), 62.
160
Springborg, 279.
161
Ibid.

35. Unclassified
34
Membership in a syndicate was not considered a stepping stone to the cabinet or even
high level government posts, but it did make members visible to the ruling elite. It let policy
makers know who in the syndicates might have developed a following with their colleagues.162
Syndicates thus served as a vehicle for the regime to control behavior or mobilize support of the
professionals.163
They were also used for building patronage networks inside the ruling elite and
state bureaucracies.164
Yet, there have historically been mutual suspicions between Egypt‟s rulers
and heads of the syndicates leading to a frequent redefining of syndicate operations.165
The constitution of 1923 gave all Egyptians the right to association, but development of
professional syndicates was slow and through 1949, only eight had been formed.166
The
government of Zewar Pasha in 1925 passed a law constraining “all associations participating in
political activities.”167
Syndicates were obligated by law to inform the government of their
activities. The law also allowed Council Ministers the right to dissolve any organizations, if they
wanted.168
Syndicates at this time did not yield much influence.
When President Nasser came to power, he thought about abolishing syndicates
altogether or folding them into the labor movement at large. In the first years of his rule, he did
not want to have to contend with any powerful or centralized interest groups “until he was
confident that they would not be infiltrated by his enemies or manipulated by his rivals in the
army.”169
Two syndicates were actually dissolved in 1954 when dissention within the army led to
162
Ibid.
163
Ibid.
164
Bianchi, 91.
165
Ibid.
166
Helmut K. Anheier, ed. The Nonprofit Sector in the Developing World (New York: Manchester University Press,
1998), 128.
167
Ibid, 129.
168
Ibid.
169
Bianchi, 77.

36. Unclassified
35
the Lawyers‟ Syndicate and the Journalists‟ Syndicate to align with those in opposition to
Nasser.170
Law no. 8 was passed in 1958 and required all candidates running in the elections for
syndicate councils to be members of the ruling party of that time, the Arab Socialist Union.171
The leaders of the A.S.U. thought that the syndicates could be controlled by penetrating and
mobilizing them towards the socialistic views of President Nasser.172
Nasser used the law to
move army officers into influential positions in the syndicates. This was especially true for the
Engineers and Physicians Syndicates.173
The President also allocated himself the power to
dissolve syndicate councils at any time. This law was applicable until 1977, when it was
amended to require candidates to who ran for membership on the council to obtain approval from
the state‟s General Attorney.174
The law was not quite as effective as Nasser had hoped and he
came to the conclusion that “the syndicates either had to be abolished entirely or suppressed even
more ruthlessly.”175
In 1964, the Civic Association Code (Law no. 32) was passed to give government
officials the authority to reject the formation of organizations and the discretion to combine or
dissolve groups at any time.176
Among the requirements for forming a voluntary association
under this law (including syndicates) was the need for organizations to inform the government of
170
Ninnete S. Fahmy, “The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian Syndicates: An Alternative for
Reform?” The Middle East Journal, 52, no. 4 (Autumn, 1998), 555.
171
Ibid.
172
Bianchi, 93.
173
Reid, 55.
174
Fahmy, 555.
175
Springborg, 284.
176
Mohamed Agati, “Undermining Standards of Good Governance: Egypt’s NGO Law and its Impact on the
Transparency and Accountability of CSOs,” International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, 9, no. 2 (April, 2007), 58.

37. Unclassified
36
all their activities.177
This included notifying three government offices of the agenda and location
of any meetings and then promptly filing records of the proceedings.178
The law also closely
regulated the fundraising of all organizations. Many organizations that raised money overseas
were denied permits and only dues collected during local religious services were allowed without
government interference.179
Because syndicates were formed by professional business associates
that were wealthy enough to fund themselves through internal dues, government involvement in
their financial accounts was minimal.180
Limiting the funding of organizations, however, was not
the only means government had of controlling them.
Restrictions on the creation and activities of associations included the categories of
“national security, preservation of the nation‟s political system, support for social morals, and
opposition to the revival of previously dissolved associations.”181
The last category was used for
prohibiting the re-establishment of the Society of Muslim Brothers.182
However, because the
Brothers and other Islamic voluntary associations provided desperately needed social services,
the government did not seriously interfere with their activities.183
Law 32 also allowed the Ministry of Social Affairs to appoint a temporary board of
directors when necessary, prevent associations from affiliating with international organizations,
and suspend any internal organizational decision deemed in opposition to the law.184
Government manipulation also occurred when President Nasser intervened in syndicate elections
177
Vickie Langohr, “Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes,” Comparative
Politics 36, no. 2 (Jan. 2004), 193.
178
Ibid.
179
Ibid.
180
Ibid, 194.
181
Amani Kandil, “Defining the Nonprofit Sector: Egypt,” The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project
Working Paper No. 10 (May, 1993), 10.
182
Ibid.
183
Langohr, 193.
184
Ibid.

38. Unclassified
37
by officially endorsing favored candidates, postponing elections, and even extending or cutting
short council terms in office.185
Syndicates tried to be as effective as possible, given their
circumstances. They generally gave support to the regime whenever they sensed the possibility
of any liberalization in political or economic measures. They also tried to widen any autonomy
they had when the regime persisted in influencing their policies and elections.186
The
professional syndicates had more success in establishing “an autonomous space for their
members and in winning access to the center of power” under Sadat, but there were still major
disagreements with the regime that would develop during his presidency.187
Membership in professional syndicates quadrupled between 1963 and 1978, with most of
that growth accelerating under the Sadat regime.188
By the end of his rule, over 700,000
professionals had joined syndicates.189
In the 1960s, most new members were technicians and
civil servants. Growth among doctors and lawyers remained relatively stagnant.190
In the 1970s,
there was an infusion of university graduates into some of the more “elite” professions. Stability
was encouraged in the syndicates when legislation mandated that a greater continuity of
leadership be provided with longer terms for elected presidents and councils (from one and two-
year terms to three and four-year terms).191
There were differences in the development of certain
syndicates based on divergent strategies of building coalitions under Sadat‟s regime.
185
Fahmy, 555.
186
Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “Egypt Under Sadat: Elites, Power Structure, and Political Change in a Post-Populist
State,” Social Problems 28, no. 4 (April, 1981), 458.
187
Ibid, 459.
188
Bianchi, 94.
189
Ibid.
190
Ibid, 95.
191
Ibid, 96.

39. Unclassified
38
Engineers’ Syndicate
Under Nasser, the syndicate presidency had been passed back and forth between well-
connected army engineers. It provided few benefits to its members and many recent engineering
graduates did not bother to join.192
This started to change in the Sadat regime. In the latter part of
Sadat‟s rule the Engineers Syndicate was headed by Osman Ahmed Osman, who was actually a
member of the MB until the demands of business led him to leave the organization.193
Osman,
who was an in-law of Sadat, (one of his sons married one of Sadat‟s daughters) was determined
to shift the focus of the syndicate from politics to economic issues.194
He said the syndicate
“would change from an institution demanding privileges from the state … to a productive power
capable of active participation in solving society‟s problems by work and not talk.”195
Osman collected union dues in a more systematic way and invested the funds in
enterprises made possible by Sadat‟s economic policies.196
Osman also founded the Engineers‟
Bank and Engineers‟ Insurance Company. He also used the treasury to underwrite investments in
new companies like the Engineers‟ Company for Food Production and Engineers‟ National
Company for Soft Drinks.197
Not all investments panned out and the syndicate also made
dubious financial investments that led to corruption cases in the early 1980s. Osman believed
that the syndicate (especially the bank) could use its funds as it saw fit and that in the private
sector, “one took risks for profit, and a few mistakes were inevitable.”198
In addition, Osman
brought the syndicate more into line with the political policies of Sadat. The syndicate endorsed
192
Bianchi, 114.
193
Baker, 18.
194
Baker, 42.
195
Quoted in Baker, 42.
196
Baker, 42.
197
Ibid.
198
Quoted in Baker, 43.

40. Unclassified
39
the “warm peace” of normalized relations with Israel and even insured the Israeli embassy in
Cairo through the Engineers‟ Insurance Company.199
This cooperation with Sadat was not typical
of other syndicates.
Journalists’ Syndicate
The Journalists‟ Syndicate has historically been one of the most active in Egypt. Since its
beginning, different governments have tried to involve the syndicate in self-censorship and
professional discipline, but they have rarely succeeded.200
Regimes have always viewed them as
untrustworthy and depended on penal codes, censorship bureaus, and publishing bans to keep
them in line.201
Under the Sadat presidency, the syndicate was often in confrontation with the
regime.
During student uprisings in 1972-73, the Journalists‟ Syndicate issued a formal
declaration of support for the students and petitioned the government for greater freedom of the
press.202
Sadat vowed to crack down on dissidents who were “exploiting democracy” to
denigrate the regime and in February of 1973 stripped over one hundred writers and journalists
of their membership in the syndicate.203
Six of those members had been on the syndicate‟s
council and did have leftists and “Nasserite” leanings. The government hoped to gain influence
within the syndicate when elections were held in June that year. They were disappointed when
all of the seats were filled with journalists who had similar ideologies to those dismissed.204
Sadat offered a temporary olive branch by reinstating many writers and giving amnesty to
199
Ibid.
200
Bianchi, 106.
201
Ibid.
202
Beattie, 120.
203
Ibid, 121.
204
Ibid, 122.

41. Unclassified
40
students who had been arrested. This was done in the run up to the October 1973 war with Israel
and bought the regime some goodwill.205
The Sadat regime managed to get its preferred candidate elected to the head of the
syndicate in the mid-1970s, but this did not reflect the power held by Sadat in the organization. It
was common for syndicates to elect presidents who could work well with any particular regime
to try and advance the syndicate‟s material interests.206
It did not help Sadat when he brokered a
peace agreement with Israel. While the syndicate refrained from issuing public statements
regarding Sadat‟s visit to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords, it did issue a report against
the Israeli ambassador in Egypt and also encouraged Egyptian journalists to not travel to
Israel.207
Sadat instigated a concerted attack on the syndicate and announced that the press had
essentially become the Fourth Estate in Egypt with equal political powers. If that was the case,
then there was no reason for a syndicate to even exist to protect its rights.208
He hinted that he
would “transform the syndicate into a club for journalists.”209
In 1978 the government passed a
National Unity Law that it used against journalists who it deemed “defamatory to Egypt and a
threat to the security of the home front.”210
Sadat hoped to create a new generation of supportive
writers by adding journalists to newspaper staffs to try change the press from within. This did not
develop, as many of the new journalists turned against him.211
205
Ibid, 123.
206
Ibid, 243.
207
Beattie, 244.
208
Raymond William Baker, “Sadat’s Open Door: Opposition from Within,” Social Problems, 28, no. 4 (April, 1981),
382.
209
Ibid.
210
Beattie, 244.
211
Ibid, 245.

42. Unclassified
41
Lawyers’ Syndicate
Since early in the Nasser regime, the Lawyers‟ Syndicate has been in numerous
disagreements with the government. It was the most persistent critic of government policies.212
It
“expressed fully liberal ideas of free speech, the right of assembly, and a constitutional definition
of national interest.”213
It also embraced all political trends and acted to “safeguard the legitimate
rights of all political groups, including communist and Islamic radicals.”214
They conceived their
syndicate to be a national institution and not just a political or professional organization.
Among the issues the syndicate had with Sadat was the peace treaty with Israel, the
suppression of the press, and military basing rights for the United States.215
The syndicate
sponsored almost weekly meetings to discuss its opposition to the peace treaty and what it
perceived as anti-democratic measures by the regime.216
Sadat felt that he could no longer
tolerate the potential for an anti-regime coalition that the syndicate might promote and decided
he had to take them on to send a message to his opponents.217
He instigated a televised meeting
in which he lashed out against a small group of dissidents said to be controlling the syndicate. He
indicated that the syndicate should be purged. This in turn inspired a number of lawyers
(suspected to have been bribed by the regime) to break into the syndicate headquarters and
declare a vote of no confidence from the existing council.218
Sadat then got the People‟s
Assembly to dissolve the council and put in its place lawyers who were viewed as pro-regime.219
212
Bianchi, 99.
213
Baker, Sadat and After, 67.
214
Ibid.
215
Beattie, 249.
216
Ibid, 251.
217
Ibid, 265.
218
Ibid, 266.
219
Ibid.

43. Unclassified
42
In-fighting among members of the syndicate continued into the early years of the Mubarak
regime.
Entrance of the MB into the Parliament
After Sadat‟s assassination in 1981, Mubarak tried to avoid the cycle of protest and
repression from the previous regime.220
He indicated that he wanted a gradual increase of public
freedom and released in stages activists that Sadat had imprisoned.221
MB Murshid Al-Tilmisani
evaluated options available to the MB to assess how it could take advantage of the new political
climate.222
He decided that it would be irresponsible to not participate in the opportunity that
presented itself in the way of parliamentary elections. “Allah saw fit to find us a lawful way in
the views of officials… It was the opportunity of a lifetime; had the Brothers let it slip through
their hands they would have been counted among the ranks of the neglectful.”223
Al-Tilmisani further rationalized the participation of the MB by indicating that
they did not enter politics to gain power, but to spread the word of God.224
Because the National
Democratic Party (NDP) had such a stranglehold on the votes in the parliamentary election, the
number of members that the MB could expect to gain was quite small. Al-Tilmisani indicated
that the numbers were irrelevant as the MB could use the parliament as a pulpit to disseminate
their ideas to the public at large.225
By aligning itself with an existing political party, the MB was
able to have eight of its members elected to parliament in 1984. This election and entrance into
220
Wickham, 46.
221
Ibid.
222
Ibid.
223
Quoted in Wickham, 48.
224
Ibid.
225
Ibid, 49.

44. Unclassified
43
Parliament, as well as participation in professional syndicates, will be discussed in the next
chapter.

45. Unclassified
44
Chapter Two
The MB Enters Egyptian Politics: 1984-1996
When President Mubarak took office in 1981, he had only been participating in politics
since 1975. He was appointed to the position of Vice-President by Anwar Sadat.226
Mubarak had
been a career military man and was somewhat apolitical. He was not of the generation of Free
Officers who had taken power in 1952 and held no personal antagonism towards the MB.227
When he became President, Egypt was in turmoil because of the authoritarian policies of
President Sadat.228
Mubarak initiated a program of appeasement towards the opposition and the
MB in particular.229
Shortly after becoming President, he said “I believe democracy is the best
guarantee of our future … I totally oppose the centralization of power and I have no wish to
monopolize the decision-making because the country belongs to all of us.”230
He advanced a
quasi-liberal policy at that time by allowing more freedom of the press and a modest ability for
political parties and associations to organize to a greater extent than previously allowed.231
This
would all come to an end once he consolidated political power in the mid-1990s.
Neither President Mubarak nor the MB was in a position to enter into conflict with one
another in the early 1980s. The MB was now established as a moderate Islamic organization and
not viewed as a threat by Mubarak. As long as the MB did not directly challenge the regime, it
227
Ibid.
228
Ibid.
229
Joel Campagna, “From Accommodation to Confrontation: The Muslim Brotherhood in the Mubarak Years,”
Journal of International Affairs, 50, no. 1 (Summer 1996), 281.
230
Quoted in Kassem, 54.
231
Hala Mustafa, “The Islamist Movements Under Mubarak,” in The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist
Movements in the Contemporary Arab World, ed. Laura Guazzone (Lebanon: Garnet Publishing Limited, 1995), 166.

46. Unclassified
45
was welcome.232
The regime decided that any advantages gained politically by the MB from
giving it increased political freedom would be offset by the Brothers‟ having to compete with
secular parties. Mubarak also believed that, with greater exposure, the ideas of the MB would
have less appeal to the general public.233
Mubarak had two basic aims in dealing with the MB
(and Islamists in general): to create a balance of power between the secularists and the Islamists,
and to divide the moderate Islamists from the more militant ones.234
There was a difficulty in
this approach in that while different tactics were utilized by various Islamic groups, they tended
to have the same objective of establishing an Islamic state.235
One expert in the study of Islamic
groups, Dr. Ali al-Magli, turned the axiom of war by Clausewitz on its head. Dr. al-Magli
indicated that for the Islamic movement in general, “politics is an extension of war by other
means.”236
In the 1980s, Egypt had a number of Islamist groups encompassing views ranging from
the “excommunication” of Muslims not deemed religious enough (al-takfir), to those espousing
armed struggle (al-jihad) in the name of God, to those trying to persuade Muslims to abide by
the tenets of Islamic Law and apply them to everyday life (the MB).237
The MB saw Egyptian
society as “not completely Islamic and the world as un-Islamic.” The aim of the Brothers was to
change society and the world from within.238
To accomplish this, the MB needed to re-establish
itself.
232
Campagna, 282
233
Ibid
234
Mustafa, 177
235
Ibid, 178
236
Springborg, 220
237
Gehad Auda, “The ‘Normalization’ of the Islamic Movement in Egypt from the 1970s to the Early 1990s,” in
Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 376.
238
Ibid, 377

47. Unclassified
46
One organizational detail Murshid al-Tilmisani established in the early 1980s was
continuity and the succession of leadership. He wanted the position of Supreme Guide to go to
the oldest MB member of the Supreme Office of Guidance, unless it was declined.239
This
decision was followed by the Brothers and the average age of the Murshids (including al-
Tilmisani) upon taking over the leadership through 2010 was 73. They had collectively spent an
average of fourteen years in prison as well. Al-Tilmisani also instituted a policy of working with
other civic organizations. “We cooperate sincerely with others in matters on which there are (sic)
common agreement and sincerely excuse each other on matters of disagreement.”240
This
reflected not only the desire of entering politics, but expanding membership of the organization.
The MB was in a rebuilding mode after having a number of its members imprisoned
by President Sadat.241
Among the Brothers released in the late 1970s were some of the more
conservative elements who had participated in the Secret Apparatus and who were not inclined
towards politics. One in particular, Mustafa Mashour, would later become the Murshid of the
MB.242
This group focused on recruiting for the MB on university campuses because students in
that era had become more involved in domestic and international events.243
The MB found an Islamic element among the students who were already organized
and addressing conservative issues, such as the encouragement of female students to wear hijabs
(scarfed head cover), the segregation of the sexes in classes, and halting lectures at various times
of the day for prayer.244
These students had a slightly more proactive view of Islam than the
239
Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Egypt’s Islamic Activism in the 1980s,” Third World Quarterly, 10, no. 2 (April, 1988), 648
240
Interview of al-Tilmisani with Ibrahim, Ibid, 648
241
Hesham al-Awadi, “A Struggle for Legitimacy: The Muslim Brotherhood and Mubarak, 1982-2009,”
Contemporary Arab Affairs, 2, no. 2 (April/June 2009), 215.
242
Alison Pargeter. The Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition to Power (London: Saqi Books, 2013), 37.
243
Ibid.
244
Ibid, 38

48. Unclassified
47
public at large and bonded readily with the hawkish MB recruiters, especially given the honored
reputation the recruiters had gained in Islamic circles while they were imprisoned.245
This new
generation of MB members was “used to working openly and unconstrained, as opposed to past
members who were used to secrecy and the fear of imprisonment.” The newer members “were
also interested in moving slightly away from the more ideological and theological issues to more
socio-economic issues like poverty and corruption.”246
This group was willing to enter into what
were basically secular organizations, like professional syndicates, to expand the MB‟s influence
in society.
The decision by Murshid al-Tilmisani to participate in the political arena came at a
fortuitous time. Just after the assassination of President Sadat, there was a temporary clampdown
of the MB. The conservative members who did not view the participation in politics favorably
(including Mustafa Mashour) left Egypt for safer conditions in other Arab countries. This
allowed the reformist element of the MB (including the newer university graduates) to lobby for
direct engagement in Egyptian politics.247
Because the MB was an illegal organization, it could
not participate in parliamentary elections as an independent party.
Parliamentary Elections -
In 1983, the Majlis (People‟s Assembly) passed Electoral Law 114 in response to
public demand for a more proportional representation system in parliamentary elections. This
law stipulated that candidates were to run on party lists and there would be an exclusion of
anyone running as an independent.248
The law also specifically prohibited candidates of different
245
Ibid
246
Ibid, 43
247
Ibid, 45
248
El-Ghobashy, 378

49. Unclassified
48
parties running on the same list. This would prove to be a problem for many of the burgeoning
political parties allowed to participate by Mubarak. None of the newer parties had enough of a
following to get elected or influence elections on their own. An additional handicap was placed
upon candidates when a threshold of eight percent of the national vote was required for a party to
qualify for parliamentary representation. Any votes to opposition parties that fell short of this
percentage was automatically transferred to the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).249
Because the MB was an outlawed organization and had no political party, it decided
the best way to enter the Majlis was to cooperate and join forces with the recently re-constituted
Wafd Party. Even though the Wafd party was basically secular, the MB saw it as the best chance
of getting Brothers elected because the Wafd provided a legal vehicle to the election and the MB
provided the popular base and ability to get out the vote.250
In the 1984 Parliamentary elections,
the Wafd party gained fifteen percent of the national vote and fifty-eight seats in the Majlis
(eight of which went to MB members).251
The MB was now openly serving in the Majlis,
though as affiliated with the Wafd party. The new parliament was supposed to be constituted for
a five year period, but it came to a premature end. The 1983 electoral law was challenged by
candidates who were not allowed to run as individuals. It was claimed that they were denied their
constitutional right to nominate themselves in elections and that the law was “a breach of public
right, equality, and opportunity … as enshrined in the constitution.”252
As the Supreme Constitutional Court was evaluating the case, President Mubarak had
the Majlis pass another piece of legislation, Law 188 of 1986. This amended Law 114 by
249
Ibid
250
Ibid
251
Ibid
252
Kassem, 60.

50. Unclassified
49
maintaining the eight percent threshold and the party-list system, but it stopped the transfer of
votes that did not reach the threshold to the NDP. It also reserved forty-eight seats in Parliament
for candidates running as independents.253
Mubarak then dissolved the Majlis and set an election
for April, 1987.
The MB did not get along politically with the Wafd party in the 1984 Majlis. For the
1987 election, it decided to align itself with the Labor Party and the Liberal Party in what
became known as the Islamic Alliance (IA).254
This combination garnered sixty-two seats in the
new Parliament, with thirty-six going to the MB. This was the election in which the phrase
“Islam is the Solution,” was first used by the MB.255
In what was to be the nadir of elected
members from opposition parties in parliamentary elections for some time, the Wafd party itself
captured thirty-six seats.256
This election became notable for the IA placing several Coptic candidates on its list,
with one actually getting elected to the Majlis. The IA also went out of its way to show that it
wanted the implementation of Shari’a to take place at a gradual, but steady pace. It did not want
to be seen as trying to replicate the revolutionary manner of Iran in 1979.257
Another aspect of
this election that would repeat itself in the future, was the harassment (sometimes violently) of
MB candidates and poll workers by the regime. Just before the 1987 elections, approximately
two thousand members and supporters were arrested by the government.258
253
El-Ghobashy, 379
254
Kassem, 61
255
Ibrahim, Egypt’s Islamic Activism, 646.
256
Kassem, 61
257
Ibrahim, 647
258
Kienle, A Grand Delusion, 27

51. Unclassified
50
Another lawsuit was filed against the implementation of Election Law 188 from 1986
with many of the arguments used from the previous lawsuit against Law 114 from 1983.259
The
Supreme Constitutional Court ruled in May, 1990 that the 1986 electoral law (and essentially the
1984 law) was unconstitutional. Mubarak then issued a decree that abolished the party-list
system and declared an individual-candidacy system. He prematurely dissolved the Majlis again
and held elections in 1990.260
Because opposition parties had been having increased success in
the party-list system, many (including the MB) chose to boycott the 1990 elections because they
perceived the new election law as a governmental attempt to maintain political control of
Parliament.261
A spokesman for the MB, Ma‟mun al-Hudaybi (who would later become
Murshid), was quoted as saying the Brothers “refused to contribute to the creation of a false
democratic façade.”262
The elders in the MB also saw a need to curb the advancement of the
younger generation within the Brothers in what was perceived by the old guard as
overenthusiastic steps by the newer members politically.263
The decision to boycott the elections
was not something that the younger members of the MB embraced. They felt that the MB should
continue to build on its performance and plan to establish a political party.264
The Murshid was
persuaded by the younger MB members to field candidates for the next parliamentary elections.
The 1995 Parliamentary elections saw the MB field 170 candidates running as
independents because the MB was still not a legally recognized organization.265
The political
alliances between opposition parties that had been prevalent in the 1984 and 1987 elections was
marginal in 1995. The regime took unprecedented coercive actions against non-NDP parties and
259
Kassem, 61
260
Ibid
261
Abed-Kotob, The Accommodationists Speak, 328
262
Quoted in Campagna, 286
263
Auda, 389
264
Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, 144
265
Ibid, 170

52. Unclassified
51
individual candidates. Hundreds were harassed, and at least fifty people were killed; close to a
thousand were injured during voting.266
When the elections were over, only a single MB
candidate had been elected. He was removed from the Majlis the following year in 1996 for
having been a member of an illegal movement (the MB).267
This left the MB without any
representatives in Parliament from 1990 until the 2000 election. It did not, however, restrain the
organization from participating in the political environment in Egypt. It gained quite a bit of
influence in the professional syndicates during this time, which led to problems with the
Mubarak government.
Professional Syndicate Elections
When the MB maneuvered to gain seats on the boards of the syndicates in the mid-
1980s, it was with the understanding that it would not attempt to get its members elected to the
presidency of any of the professional organizations. Those positions were historically reserved
for individuals with close ties to the regime. Because of the contacts established with ministers
and other high officials, leaders of syndicates were able to offer their members increases in
pensions and other financial incentives.268
Mubarak allowed unhindered elections to take place in
syndicates because he hoped that “relatively free elections would divide the syndicates into rival
opposition groups and at the same time partially neutralize complaints about restrictions imposed
on the Parliament.”269
This did not turn out to be the case in the more influential syndicates.
The first syndicate to come under the influence of the MB was the Physician‟s
Syndicate. Historically, this syndicate had been limited in its societal role. It represented a varied
266
Ibid, 171
267
Ibid
268
Reinoud Leenders. “The Struggle of State and Civil Society in Egypt: Professional Organizations and Egypt’s
Careful Steps Towards Democracy,” Middle East Research Associates. Occasional Paper no. 26 (April, 1996), 13
269
Ibid, 16

53. Unclassified
52
combination of doctors in the public sector as well as military doctors and university medical
professors who had private clinics.270
The president of the syndicate was traditionally a military
officer and one of the few negative encounters the syndicate had with the government was in
1962. A non-military president of the syndicate objected to the nationalization of hospitals under
President Nasser and called for constitutional limits to Nasser‟s power.271
That president was
expelled from the syndicate, lost his teaching position at a university, and had property taken
away from him.272
Opposition to the president after this time was largely marginalized until the
Mubarak era, when the syndicate became much more politically involved.
In 1984, the MB launched a major campaign to entice syndicate voters to its
candidates. In the previous syndicate election, turnout was barely four percent of those eligible,
indicating the frustration and disinterest among voters.273
After that election, there was a large
expansion of new members experiencing competition for jobs, rising living expenses, and
diminishing salaries.274
Much of this can be attributed to a recessionary economy in the mid-
1980s in which the price of oil being exported from Egypt dropped from forty-one dollars a
barrel in 1980 to eight dollars a barrel in 1986.275
Before the 1984 election, MB members of the syndicate pledged to increase services
to the doctors in the organization. Dr. Issam Al-Aryan, who later served in the 1987 Parliament,
was the MB point man in the syndicate. He stated that “We provided social benefits for the
270
Fahmy, Politics of Egypt, 135.
271
Ibid.
272
Ibid, 136.
273
Leenders, 20
274
Amani Kandil, The Political Role of Interest Groups in Egypt: A Case Study of the Physicians Order, 1984-1995
(Cairo, 1996), 34
275
Nadia Ramsis Farah, Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development (Cairo: The American University
in Cairo Press, 2009), 80.

54. Unclassified
53
members and offered them vaccinations, durable goods, and affordable medical equipment.”276
The most important service provided by the MB was a subsidized health insurance program for
its members. It offered doctors and their families quality treatment at a reasonable cost.277
In
addition to the popular health insurance subsidy, the MB “organized massive sales of furniture,
gas ovens, washing machines, and other appliances … through interest-free instalments and low
prices.”278
There was also a program for interest-free emergency loans called the “Social
Solidarity System,” that was based on the Islamic principle of no interest owed on the loan.279
Craftsmen and traders could also set up exhibits at syndicate functions to display low-cost
merchandise to members.280
The MB gained seven of the twenty-five seats on the executive board of the
Physician‟s Syndicate and by 1990, it controlled twenty of the twenty-five.281
The only reason
the MB did not win all the seats was the organizational decision to accommodate views and
representatives of other groups.282
The number of new doctors coming into the profession
doubled between 1980 and 1988, but the number of them voting in syndicate elections
quadrupled.283
The MB set about winning other syndicate elections utilizing the same formula of
general voting apathy and promises of genuine assistance to those members. This advantage
allowed the MB to win elections in the Pharmacist‟s Syndicate and Scientist‟s Syndicate soon
276
Ibid, 35
277
Hesham al-Awadi, Struggle for Legitimacy, 217.
278
Al-Awadi, Struggle for Legitimacy, 217.
279
Amani Kandil, “The Nonprofit Sector in Egypt,” in The Nonprofit Sector in the Developing World: A Comparative
Analysis, ed. Helmut K. Anheier and Lester M. Salamon (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 142.
280
Ibid.
281
Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 186.
282
Ibid.
283
Ibid.

55. Unclassified
54
after the 1984 surprise showing.284
The MB ran in the Engineer‟s Syndicate in 1985, but did not
achieve success until the 1987 election when it won forty-five of the sixty-one seats on the
executive board.285
While the MB did not take over the Journalist‟s Syndicate, it did place a
younger member on the syndicate council. Muhammad „Abad al-Qaddus “received nearly two-
thirds of all votes cast and more than twice as many as the leading opposition.”286
He would be a
strong advocate for the MB and assisted in building alliances with the existing party system. The
most stunning success, and the one that shook the Mubarak regime, was when the MB took over
the Lawyer‟s Syndicate in 1992. It won fourteen of the twenty-four seats on the board.287
The
coalition of Brothers was headed by Sayf al-Islam Banna (son of the MB founder Hasan al-
Banna) and it was rumored that the MB paid the overdue membership fees of nearly 3,000
attorneys just before the election in order to help gain votes.288
Much of the money the MB used
for Parliament and syndicate elections became available through its participation in Islamic
investment companies and banks (described below).
The MB solidified the loyalty of future syndicate members within the university
system. The network of Brothers in syndicates organized lectures and connections with students
in the engineering and medical schools. They set up committees for the future members by
giving them informal membership and access to some of the syndicate facilities and clubs.289
This network also became a source of funding for student needs and activities on campus.290
284
Wickham, 186.
285
Ibid.
286
Bianchi, 114.
287
Leenders, 20.
288
Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, 196.
289
Al-Awadi, Mubarak and the Islamists, 70
290
Ibid

56. Unclassified
55
Even beyond these methods, the MB tried to broaden connections for further political
impact. In 1990, the MB who were in charge of their respective syndicate councils formed the
Committee for Coordinating Syndical Action. Its declared purpose was to protect syndicate
interests, but in reality it was another means of furthering the political impact of the Brothers.291
An expert on Egyptian syndicates, Amani Kandil, noted:
The Brothers in syndicates began to organize public functions that were attended
by people from outside the syndicate. They also used syndicates to form alliances
with each other in opposing regime policies. Further, they also used syndicates to
form alliances with political parties. Indeed, the syndicates‟ activism went outside
syndicates.292
The political actions taken by the MB in the early 1990s would lead to quite a bit of
pushback by the regime.
Conflict with President Mubarak -
The first major conflict with the government occurred in October of 1991,
when the Brothers criticized the Madrid peace talks regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict in
Palestine. The MB was highly critical of the talks and indirectly condemned the Egyptian
government‟s participation in the conference. The Supreme Guide of the MB at the time,
Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasr, stated “The eagerness many Arab leaders are
showing… for the sell-out of Palestine is alarming. If they take part in this conference …
they will be held responsible … for abandoning the Palestine issue … and will bear the
guilt of keeping them under occupation.”293
This stance led the regime to arrest and
torture members of the MB (including past members of Parliament) for opposing the
291
Ibid
292
Ibid, interview with author
293
Campagna, 286

57. Unclassified
56
government‟s part in the peace talks.294
Two other major events in 1992 would lead to
further crackdowns by Mubarak against the Brothers.
The first of these events occurred in February 1992, when the regime‟s
security forces raided the Salsabil Computer Company, which was co-owned by a senior
member of the MB, Khairat Al-Shatir.295
He and the other owners were charged with
belonging to a secret group and holding meetings within the company to plan an
overthrow of the government. The security forces claimed to have found documents
detailing the establishment of an Islamic state.296
The overall strategy was called the
“Consolidation Plan” and it purported to outline how the movement would consolidate
control over the state and society.297
The document indicated that in addition to its gains
in the professional syndicates, the MB wanted to target the army and police for greater
infiltration.298
The concerns of the regime grew when it was determined that the Salsabil
Company had sold many computers to the army and intelligence services.299
This event
was used as an excuse by the government to organize a campaign against other Islamic
economic interests.300
The concern of the government only grew later that year.
The event that really challenged the government happened in October 1992,
when a major earthquake hit Cairo. It occurred on a Thursday afternoon when most
government offices had closed for the weekend. There was virtually no response at all
294
Abed-Kotob, The Accommodationsts Speak, 336
295
Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy, 162
296
Ibid
297
Ibid
298
Nachman Tal. Radical Islam in Egypt and Jordon (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 58
299
Al-Awadi, 162
300
Ibid