This document discusses the role of linguistic theory in countering violent extremism in the context of political Islam and the Arab-Islamic discourse. It argues that ongoing conflicts in the Middle East are centered around debates over how much Islam should structure societies and governance. It analyzes this issue from the perspectives of medieval Islamic scholars, modern philosophers of language, and suggests that promoting rigorous instruction in Islamic exegetical traditions combined with modern linguistic theory could help prevent violent extremism by addressing the existential crisis felt by many Muslims in the post-colonial era.

1. Masters
in
International
Development
|
PSIA
Islam
and
Politics
in
a
Changing
Middle
East
Name
:
Edwin
Johan
Santana
Gaarder
Student
number
:
100047222
Page
1
of
12
POLITICAL
ISLAM
AND
THE
PHILOSOPHY
OF
LANGUAGE
What
role
for
linguistic
theory
in
the
struggle
against
violent
extremism?
Arabo-­‐Islamic
discourse
–
the
vocabulary,
idioms
and
other
modes
of
signification
that
are
made
available
to
arabophone
Muslims
through
the
religious,
cultural
and
linguistic
environment
into
which
they
are
socialised
–
has
always
been
the
locus
of
intense
contestation.
Innumerable
conflicts
in
North
Africa
and
the
Middle
East
are
centred
on
the
issue
of
whether,
to
what
extent,
and
how
Islam
should
structure
the
way
societies
are
organised
and
governed,
whether
it
be
in
Mesopotamia
or
the
Maghreb,
the
Arabian
Peninsula
or
the
Levant.
These
dynamics
are
historically
determined
to
a
large
degree:
from
the
period
of
expansion
(7th
-­‐9th
centuries)
until
the
period
of
European
colonisation
(late-­‐19th
/
early-­‐20th
centuries)
and
thereafter,
Islam
has
played
a
central
role
in
the
lives
of
the
people
that
inhabit
this
region,
forming
the
basis
of
their
belief
systems,
their
moral
and
legal
codes,
their
cultures,
their
political
systems,
and
much
more.
Although
a
singular
noun
is
used,
it
is
obvious
that
‘Islam’
has
never
meant
the
same
thing
to
all
Muslims,
even
though
the
doctrine
of
tawhid1
–
translated
as
‘oneness’
and
understood
to
mean
the
monotheistic
belief
in
a
unique
and
indivisible
God
–
suggests
that
there
is
little
room
for
deviation
from
a
single,
absolute
and
transcendental
truth
established
by
the
Qur’an.
In
practice,
the
Islamic
community
(umma)
has
always
had
to
strike
a
fine
balance
between
its
belief
in
the
existence
of
revealed,
unambiguous
and
incontrovertible
Qur’anic
principles,
to
which
all
Muslims
must
adhere,
and
its
lack
of
agreement
over
what
these
principles
actually
are.
This
paper
will
seek
to
explain
this
aporia
–
which
is
at
the
heart
of
many
of
the
political
and
religious
conflicts
in
the
region
–
by
analysing
it
from
a
number
of
different
angles,
including
the
logocentric
approach
of
mediaeval
neo-­‐platonic
scholars,
the
salafi
approach
of
the
Hanbali
scholar
Ibn
Taymiyya,
and
the
structuralist
and
post-­‐structuralist
approaches
developed
by
20th
-­‐century
philosophers
of
language
like
Ferdinand
de
Saussure
and
Jacques
Derrida.
It
will
be
argued,
moreover,
that
the
ongoing
conflict
over
Arabo-­‐Islamic
heritage
is
a
struggle
over
the
‘meaning’
of
the
Qur’an
and
the
sunna,
an
attempt
to
establish
a
‘transcendental
signified’
that
is
the
subject
of
consensus
(ijma’)
and
can
thus
serve
as
the
basis
for
a
form
of
social
organisation
that
is
free
from
discord
(fitna).
Whereas
mediaeval
Sunni
scholars
were
generally
able
to
engage
in
such
epistemological
and
hermeneutic
debates
from
within
an
Islamic
caliphate
–
confident
that
fundamental
Islamic
precepts
would
be
protected
from
external
aggression
–
post-­‐colonial
Muslim
intellectuals
have
had
to
operate
in
a
climate
of
existential
crisis,
due
to
the
threat
of
interference
by
foreign
actors
in
their
countries’
internal
political,
economic
and
cultural
affairs.
Delegitimized
and
ridiculed
during
the
colonial
period,
undermined
by
the
economic
1
Derived
from
the
Arabic
root
‫ﺩد‬-­‐‫
ﻭو‐­-ﺡح‬

2. Masters
in
International
Development
|
PSIA
Islam
and
Politics
in
a
Changing
Middle
East
Name
:
Edwin
Johan
Santana
Gaarder
Student
number
:
100047222
Page
2
of
12
underdevelopment
that
is
almost
ubiquitous
in
the
region,
and
suppressed
or
manipulated
by
autocratic
governments
with
links
to
the
former
colonial
powers,
Islam
and
its
quest
for
‘meaning’
have
therefore
been
forced
to
abandon
the
confines
of
academic
speculation
and
have
instead
become
the
site
of
a
desperate
battle
for
relevance
in
a
world
dominated
by
Western
soft
and
hard
power.
This
paper
will
attempt
to
demonstrate
that
this
state
of
affairs
has
been
responsible
for
a
shift
in
many
Muslims’
relationship
with
Islam,
reducing
the
appeal
of
theory
and
increasing
the
relative
importance
of
praxis,
which
can
to
some
extent
explain
the
rise
of
activist
Islamism
in
both
its
moderate
and
violent
forms.
It
will
be
suggested,
therefore,
that
one
effective
way
of
preempting
violent
extremism
in
Muslim
societies
would
be
to
promote
more
widespread
and
rigorous
instruction
in
all
the
exegetical
traditions
that
have
arisen
from
within
Islam,
as
well
as
to
introduce
modern
linguistic
theory
into
schools,
universities,
mosques
and
kuttab
(traditional
Islamic
schools).
It
is
imagined
that
such
an
approach
–
if
coupled
with
the
establishment
of
inclusive
and
representative
political
regimes
–
could
lead
to
a
more
empowered
and
self-­‐critical
Islamist
movement,
one
that
is
able
to
tolerate
divergent
readings
of
the
Qur’an
and
the
sunna
without
sacrificing
the
unity
of
the
umma
or
faith
in
the
single,
absolute
and
transcendental
truth
of
revelation.
In
his
Introduction
à
la
Pensée
Islamique
Classique,
Mohammed
Arkoun
studies
the
implications
of
the
aforementioned
dilemma
on
mediaeval
Sunni
scholars,
identifying
the
debate
over
the
relative
merits
of
faith
and
reason
as
the
overriding
question
of
the
Age:
“aucune
intelligence
ne
pouvait
échapper
à
[…]
une
confrontation
entre
la
Vérité
éternelle
et
les
réalités
contraignantes
de
l’histoire
et
de
la
culture,
[…]
entre
la
foi
et
la
raison”.2
Arkoun’s
historical
account
of
epistemological
developments
within
Islam
cannot
be
reproduced
here,
but
it
will
be
useful
to
point
out
some
common
ideas
that
he
identifies
as
having
structured
mainstream
Sunni
thought
over
the
centuries,
focussing
in
particular
on
his
analysis
of
objective
and
subjective
sources
of
knowledge
in
the
Islamic
tradition.
These
two
sources
of
knowledge
correspond
to
revelation,
which
was
sent
down
(tanzil)
by
an
Infallible
Being
and
is
therefore
irrefutable,
and
the
logical
deductions
that
are
the
the
result
of
human
reflection
and
interpretation
of
the
sacred
texts.
It
is
interesting
to
note
that,
in
the
early
years
of
Islam,
the
second
source
of
knowledge
somehow
constituted
the
more
dynamic
intellectual
space,
in
which
reason
(‘aql)
and
the
cultural
inheritance
of
other
cultures
(especially
Greek
philosophy
or
falsafa)
were
used
to
enrich
the
Islamic
tradition
through
the
practice
of
kalam
(speculative
theology)
and
ijtihad
(interpretation
of
scripture).
The
use
of
reason
was
particularly
prominent
in
the
work
of
the
mu’tazilites
and,
to
a
lesser
extent,
of
the
ash’arites,
who
went
so
far
as
to
claim
that
2
Mohammed
Arkoun,
Essais
sur
la
Pensée
Islamique,
Paris,
France,
G.-­‐P.
Maisonneuve
et
Larose,
1973,
p.
18.
“No
single
intelligence
could
escape
from
the
conflict
between
eternal
Truth
and
the
constraining
realities
of
history
and
culture,
between
faith
and
reason”
[my
translation].
The
arabic
terms
translated
as
faith
and
reason
are
‘aql
and
naql.

3. Masters
in
International
Development
|
PSIA
Islam
and
Politics
in
a
Changing
Middle
East
Name
:
Edwin
Johan
Santana
Gaarder
Student
number
:
100047222
Page
3
of
12
“when
the
sense
of
the
transmitted
texts
conflicts
with
the
dictates
of
reason,
reason
should
be
given
precedence,
and
the
text
subjected
to
metaphorical
yet
rational
interpretation”.3
The
problem,
of
course,
and
the
reason
why
this
second
source
of
knowledge
was
eventually
relegated
to
an
inferior
position
in
the
hierarchy,
is
that
the
use
of
reason
leads
to
divergent
opinions,
whereas
the
doctrine
of
tawhid
suggests
that
there
is
only
one
absolute
and
indivisible
truth.
Ahmad
ibn
Hanbal
(790-­‐855
C.E.)
was
the
first
to
respond
to
this
paradox
and
reject
the
use
of
reason,
prioritising
what
he
would
call
the
‘obvious’
meaning
(zahir)
of
revelation
in
an
attempt
to
promote
consensus
and
prevent
schisms
within
the
umma.
The
Hanbali
approach
is
based
on
a
logocentric
conception
of
language,
which
attributes
a
signified
(‘idea’,
‘meaning’,
‘sense’)
to
each
signifier
(‘word’,
‘phrase’,
‘idiom’,
‘ideogram’),
and
which
finds
its
Western
equivalent
in
Plato’s
Theory
of
Ideas.
The
logocentric
conception
of
language
in
Islam
–
which
is
not
unique
to
the
Hanbalis,
but
finds
in
them
its
most
reductionist
manifestation
–
posits
that
there
is
a
meaning
that
exists
outside
or
behind
language
and
that
can
be
accessed
through
a
‘correct’
reading
and
understanding
of
authoritative
texts.
Yet,
the
question
remains:
what
is
the
‘correct’
interpretative
method
that
should
be
applied
in
order
to
understand
a
text
that
was
produced
in
a
different
context
than
that
of
the
reader,
that
is
to
say,
in
a
different
place,
at
a
different
time,
for
a
different
audience,
through
a
different
mode
of
communication
(oral,
not
written),
using
a
language
that
has
since
evolved
semantically
and
gramatically,
and
so
on?
Hanbal
based
his
arguments
on
the
repeated
claims
that
can
be
found
in
the
Qur’an
itself
that
a
language
(Arabic)
was
chosen
in
order
to
make
the
meaning
clear
and
ease
the
understanding
of
the
revelation
(Qur’an
12:2;
41:44;
43:3)
but
–
despite
the
fact
that
Qur’anic/standard
Arabic
has
changed
surprisingly
little
over
the
course
of
one
and
a
half
millenia
–
his
arguments
founder
when
confronted
with
continuing
disagreements
over
the
‘meaning’
of
revelation.
Post-­‐Saussurean
linguists
now
know
that
effective
communication
depends
more
on
societal
conventions
regarding
the
different
use
of
signs
in
different
contexts,
rather
than
on
reference
to
absolute
and
unchanging
‘meanings’
that
exist
independently
of
the
language
itself,
but
logocentric
Islamic
scholars
would
continue
their
search
for
‘meaning’
for
centuries,
resorting
to
a
number
of
different
techniques,
including:
etymologal
analysis
(ta’wil)
or
the
search
for
original
/
historical
meanings;
analogy
(qiyas)
or
the
use
of
comparison
for
the
purpose
of
explanation
or
clarification;
traditionalism
(taqlid)
or
systematic
reference
to
authoritative
precedents;
literalism,
or
the
search
for
obvious
meanings
(as
explained
above);
mysticism,
or
the
search
for
an
emotional
or
spiritual
understanding
of
God
through
ritual
practices;
and
rational
argumentation
or
personal
3
Yossef
Rapoport
and
Shahab
Ahmed
(eds.),
Ibn
Taymiyya
and
his
times,
Karachi,
Pakistan,
Oxford
University
Press,
2010,
p.
84.

4. Masters
in
International
Development
|
PSIA
Islam
and
Politics
in
a
Changing
Middle
East
Name
:
Edwin
Johan
Santana
Gaarder
Student
number
:
100047222
Page
4
of
12
opinion
(tafsīr
bir-­‐raʾy).
Ironically,
it
is
the
repeated
failures
and
periodic
reappearance
of
all
these
efforts
to
arrive
at
a
coherent
and
consensual
‘truth’
that
led
to
the
long-­‐term
development
of
Islam’s
rich
exegetical
tradition.
Constant
dialogue
and
exchange
–
incentivised
by
the
promise
of
ultimately
knowing
God,
a
single,
conclusive
and
absolute
Truth
–
led
to
a
keen
awareness
among
Islamic
scholars
of
the
contradictions
inherent
in
Arabo-­‐Islamic
discourse
and
the
need
for
caution
and
rigor
in
the
justification
of
philosophical
theories
and
political
acts,
implying
a
degree
of
openness
and
self-­‐criticism
that
is
less
common
in
modern
Islamist
discourse.4
In
the
words
of
Walid
A.
Saleh:
“Sunni
medieval
hermeneutics
was
premised
on
the
impossibility
of
ever
exhausting
the
meanings
of
the
divine
word,
and
contradictory
interpretations
were
not
a
sign
of
religious
heresy”.5
One
question
that
arises
from
all
of
the
above,
of
course,
is
whether
it
is
even
possible
to
access
objective
sources
of
knowledge,
in
Arkoun’s
sense,
without
resorting
to
individual
judgments
on
the
meanings
of
Qur’anic
language.
The
response
that
will
be
explored
here
was
developed
by
Ibn
Taymiyya
in
the
13th
and
14th
centuries
C.E.
and
is
noteable
in
part
due
to
the
influence
it
has
had
on
Islamists
and
Islamic
extremists
in
the
20th
and
21st
centuries.
It
has
been
analysed
in
depth
by
Walid
A.
Saleh
in
Ibn
Taymiyya
and
the
Rise
of
Radical
Hermeneutics,
in
a
chapter
on
the
mediaeval
author’s
short
treatise
entitled
An
Introduction
to
the
Foundations
of
Qur’anic
Exegesis.
Taymiyya’s
argument
is
as
follows:
Muhammad
not
only
proclaimed
the
Qur’an
to
the
Muslims
but
also
its
meaning
[…]
the
Prophet
is
presented
as
having
commented
on
the
Qur’an,
in
the
manner
of
an
exegete,
to
his
Companions
[…]
Ibn
Taymiyya’s
aim
is
thus
to
turn
the
commentary
literature
into
prophetic
knowledge,
and
as
such
interpretation
itself,
as
issuing
from
an
infallible
individual,
becomes
a
type
of
knowledge
that
is
in
agreement
with
his
definition
of
what
constitute
knowledge.
One
needs
only
to
verify
that
it
is
indeed
from
Muhammad
for
it
to
become
authoritative.6
This
argument
is
circular,
of
course,
and
does
not
resolve
the
hermeneutic
problem
that
has
been
described
above:
if
the
prophet
interpreted
his
own
message,
who
has
the
authority
to
interpret
his
interpretation?
If
the
pious
ancestors
(al-­‐salaf
al-­‐salih)
are
considered
to
be
the
only
ones
who
had
access
to
the
prophet’s
interpretations,
how
can
we
ensure
that
our
interpretations
of
their
interpretations
of
his
interpretations
are
correct?
Musnad
material
–
recorded
‘chains
of
transmission’
that
are
either
reliable
4
Another
irony,
of
course,
is
that
post-­‐modern
/
post-­‐structuralist
discourse
–
which
is
generally
sceptical
about
the
existence
of
‘God’
or
any
‘transcendental
truth’
or
‘grand
narrative’
–
has
completely
eliminated
this
incentive
towards
positive
knowledge.
The
challenge
faced
by
monotheists,
including
modern
Islamic
scholars,
is
to
counter
this
nihilistic
trend
by
convincingly
reinstating
the
notions
of
God
and
religious
truth
into
modern
life.
5
Rapoport
and
Ahmed
(eds.),
p.
139.
6
Ibid.,
p.
128.

5. Masters
in
International
Development
|
PSIA
Islam
and
Politics
in
a
Changing
Middle
East
Name
:
Edwin
Johan
Santana
Gaarder
Student
number
:
100047222
Page
5
of
12
(sahih),
unreliable
(da’if)
or
uncertain
–
suffers
from
similar
flaws
when
used
to
ascertain
the
‘true
meaning’
of
the
revelation:
the
nature
of
language
is
such
that,
in
the
manner
of
Chinese
whispers,
a
message
is
transformed
every
time
it
is
received
and
/
or
reproduced
by
an
individual
subject.
In
some
senses,
therefore,
one
could
claim
that
Ibn
Taymiyya’s
exegetical
approach
is
similar
to
the
post-­‐structuralist
position
on
the
endless
deferral
of
the
signified,
which
suggests
that
one
can
never
arrive
at
‘truth’
or
meaning
through
the
use
of
language.
“In
the
final
analysis”,
writes
Saleh,
“hermeneutics
to
Ibn
Taymiyya
is
not
a
repeatable
process
or
approach;
one
cannot
fathom
the
method
used
by
the
Companions
and
the
Successors
and
use
the
same
method
to
arrive
at
the
truth
again
and
independently”.7
Rather,
Taymiyya
held
that
“the
best
way
to
interpret
the
Qur’an
is
by
Qur’an”,
thus
acting
as
a
precursor
to
structuralists
and
post-­‐structuralists
like
Roland
Barthes,
who
claim
that
a
given
text
can
only
be
explained
through
the
use
of
the
text
itself.8
Another,
related
quandary
that
emerges
from
the
life
and
works
of
Ibn
Taymiyya
and
his
disciples
(both
mediaeval
and
modern)
concerns
the
relationship
between
theoretical
knowledge
–
as
established
by
the
Quran
and
the
sunna
–
and
praxis,
as
discussed
by
Caterina
Bori:
…association
with
the
Shaykh
seems
to
have
implied
not
only
loyalty
to
his
teachings,
but
also
a
dynamic
sharing
of
his
commitment
to
public,
direct
action
in
the
name
of
religion.
Some
well-­‐known
instances
include
Ibn
Taymiyya
and
his
jama’a
attacking
Damascus
wine
shops,
breaking
wine
jars,
pouring
wine
on
the
floor
and
censuring
wine
sellers.9
One
wonders
whether
the
direct
public
actions
described
above
were
based
on
a
meticulously
argued
legal
opinion
(fatwa)
following
the
application
of
the
exegetical
method
described
by
Saleh,
or
whether
Ibn
Taymiyya
was
willing
to
disregard
certain
Qur’anic
injunctions
(on
the
right
to
private
property,
for
example)
in
favour
of
others
(the
illegality
of
alcohol)
and
thus
to
act
on
the
basis
of
his
own
preferences,
without
having
recourse
to
explicit
statements
from
the
Quran
or
the
sunna
justifying
the
aforesaid
preferences
and
actions
(e.g.
the
destruction
of
wine
shops).10
In
fact,
it
would
seem
that
Taymiyya
was
willing
to
employ
some
“intellectual
creativity”
in
his
interpretations
of
the
Qur’an
and
the
sunna
–
albeit
from
within
the
stringent
literalist
7
Ibid.,
p.
143.
8
Vincent
B.
Leitch
(ed.),
The
Norton
Anthology
of
Theory
and
Criticism,
London,
W.W.
Norton
and
Company,
2001,
p.
1457.
9
Rapoport
and
Ahmed
(eds.),
p.
30.
10
Although
I
have
not
read
the
Quran
and
the
sunna
in
their
entirety,
a
quick
search
suggests
that
statements
on
the
illegal
nature
of
alcohol
in
Islam
are
formulated
as
commands
for
individuals
to
abstain
from
consumption,
rather
than
as
calls
for
activism
and
“moral
policing”
of
the
sort
practised
by
Ibn
Taymiyya
and
his
colleagues.

6. Masters
in
International
Development
|
PSIA
Islam
and
Politics
in
a
Changing
Middle
East
Name
:
Edwin
Johan
Santana
Gaarder
Student
number
:
100047222
Page
6
of
12
standards
that
he
had
set
himself
–
in
order
to
advance
his
own
political
agenda.11
The
most
famous
example
of
this
is
his
ruling
on
the
legality
of
armed
resistance
against
the
13th
-­‐century
Mongol
invasions
of
the
Levant,
which
has
been
discussed
in
depth
in
Ibn
Taymiyya
and
His
Times.12
Whereas
Ibn
Taymiyya
was
often
criticised
by
contemporaries
for
the
“excessive
features
of
[his]
personality:
his
choleric
moods,
his
fondness
of
supremacy
(riyasa),
his
contempt
for
his
fellow
‘ulama
and
his
rough
manners”,
his
willingness
to
instrumentalise
Islamic
teaching
in
order
to
urge
opposition
to
the
Mongols
ensured
that
“people
–
and
all
sorts
of
people
–
loved
him
and
supported
him
until
his
death”.13
In
other
words,
despite
his
literalist
and
seemingly
unforgiving
approach
to
Islamic
precepts,
it
seems
that
the
manner
in
which
he
chose
to
live
his
life
and
put
his
faith
into
practice
guaranteed
his
position
as
a
figure
of
public
reverence,
at
a
period
in
time
when
his
compatriots
were
faced
with
the
threat
of
external
aggression.
Given
all
of
the
above
(the
elusiveness
of
objective
knowledge,
the
slipperiness
of
‘meaning’,
the
centrifugal
tendencies
of
rational
thought,
the
limitations
of
literalism)
one
cannot
be
blamed
for
asking:
how
is
the
individual
Muslim
supposed
to
derive
a
praxis
and
a
political
position
from
Islamic
teachings,
which
are
meant
to
encompass
all
realms
of
human
life?
This
question
is
at
the
heart
of
a
movement
which
emerged
in
Egypt
in
the
first
half
of
the
20th
century
and
which
has,
since
then,
often
seen
fit
to
draw
inspiration
from
Ibn
Taymiyya.
The
originators,
theorists
and
practitioners
of
this
movement
–
known
as
Islamism
or
political
Islam
–
operated
in
a
context
that
was,
of
course,
fundamentally
different
from
that
of
Ibn
Taymiyya,
and
they
did
not
always
have
an
equally
firm
grounding
in
Islamic
scholarship
as
their
mediaeval
predecessors.
Both
Hassan
al-­‐Bann
and
Sayyid
Qutb,
for
example,
were
educated
at
the
Dar
al’Ulum,
“an
institution
founded
in
the
late
nineteenth
century
to
establish
something
of
a
middle
ground
between
al-­‐
Azhar
University
in
Cairo
and
modern,
secular
education,
although
it
gradually
veered
towards
the
latter”.14
Less
familiar
with
the
traditional
Islamic
disciplines
(which
were
the
realm
of
the
‘ulama),
exposed
to
external
cultural
influences
and
intimidated
by
the
technological
and
economic
superiority
of
the
Western
powers,
these
Muslim
intellectuals
began
to
seek
refuge
in
the
“word
of
God
[…]
without
the
mediation
of
present
or
past
scholars,
[…]
plain
Islam
as
it
was
understood
by
its
first
adherent,
Muhammad,
and
his
sincere
Companions”.15
Unlike
Ibn
Taymiyya,
however,
the
Islamists’
recourse
to
literalism
was
not
an
attempt
to
engage
with
and
challenge
other
11
Rapoport
and
Ahmed.,
p.
356.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.,
p.
37
and
p.
41.
14
Roxanne
L.
Euben
and
Muhammad
Qasim
Zaman,
Princeton
Readings
in
Islamist
Thought:
Texts
and
Contexts
from
al-­‐Banna
to
Bin
Laden,
Oxford,
United
Kingdom,
Princeton
University
Press,
2009,
p.
10.
15
Sayyid
Qutb,
cited
in
Euben
and
Zaman,
p.
15.

7. Masters
in
International
Development
|
PSIA
Islam
and
Politics
in
a
Changing
Middle
East
Name
:
Edwin
Johan
Santana
Gaarder
Student
number
:
100047222
Page
7
of
12
interpretative
practices,
but
was
rather
a
way
to
“sidestep
the
exegetical
tradition”
altogether,
to
“write
outside,
and
often
in
conspicuous
opposition
to,
any
such
framework”.16
For
Qutb
in
particular,
the
exegetical
tradition
is
an
unwelcome
distraction
from
the
existential
struggle
(jihad)
that
should
be
prioritised
by
all
Muslims,
a
struggle
to
protect
the
revealed
truth
of
Islam
from
the
myriad
threats
posed
by
the
modern
world
(jahiliyya).
By
using
the
word
jihad
–
which
simultaneously
invokes
the
psychological
struggle
of
individual
believers
and
the
Holy
War
that
must
be
waged
against
anti-­‐Islamic
forces
–
Qutb
makes
it
clear
that
the
ultimate
calling
is
to
revive
Islam
through
praxis
and
not
through
theory,
through
action
and
not
through
language,
using
the
sword
and
not
the
pen.
Although
his
work
is
“complex,
polyvalent
and
susceptible
to
multiple
readings”,
it
is
this
radical
emphasis
on
the
practice
of
Islam
that
has
inspired
a
number
of
violent
acts,
and
has
prompted
one
journalist
to
label
him
“The
Philosopher
of
Islamic
Terror”.17
Qutb’s
position
is
not
uncontested
within
the
realm
of
political
Islam,
though,
and
it
is
instructive
to
note
the
significant
differences
between
Qutb
and
other
members
of
the
Muslim
Brotherhood
such
as
Yusuf
al-­‐Qaradawi,
a
salafi
‘literalist’
and
a
sheikh
of
al-­‐Azhar
who
has
vigorously
opposed
the
“outright
dismissal”
of
“Islamic
history
and
civilization”
“at
the
hands
of
Islamists
like
Qutb”.18
Al-­‐Qaradawi’s
positions
are
indicative
of
what
can
be
achieved
through
religious
teaching
in
a
strong
institution
that,
despite
numerous
politically
motivated
encroachments
over
the
years,
has
maintained
some
independence
from
the
Egyptian
government.
These
positions
are
summarised
by
Mona
Hassan
in
Modern
Interpretations
and
Misinterpretations
of
a
Medieval
Scholar:
In
the
realm
of
politics
and
broader
social
interaction,
al-­‐Qaradawi
locates
the
origin
of
the
contemporary
malaise
of
Islam
in
the
mentalities
of
some
Muslim
groups,
ranging
from
the
constantly
beseiged,
the
literalist,
the
harsh
and
narrow-­‐minded,
to
the
excessively
traditionalistic.
Al-­‐Qaradawi
advocates
instead
that
Muslims
should
develop
a
depth
of
understanding
that
is
attuned
to
the
ways
of
the
world,
reflects
the
overall
aims
of
the
Shari’a
and
recognizes
the
importance
of
prioritization
and
balance.
Critically,
al-­‐
Qaradawi
urges
Islamists
to
break
out
of
an
isolationist
mode
(where
they
only
speak
and
write
to
one
another)
and
emphasizes
the
importance
of
engaging
in
sincere
and
productive
dialogue
with
other
groups,
such
as
secular
nationalists
[…]
local
regimes
[and]
Western
governments
and
intellectuals.19
By
recommending
that
Muslims
“develop
an
understanding
that
is
attuned
to
the
ways
of
the
world”,
al-­‐Qaradawi
seems
to
be
working
on
the
assumption
that
it
is
impossible
to
16
Euben
and
Zaman,
p.
16.
17
Berman,
cited
in
Euben
and
Zaman,
p.
129.
18
Euben
and
Zaman,
p.
17.
19
Rapoport
and
Ahmed.,
p.
353.

8. Masters
in
International
Development
|
PSIA
Islam
and
Politics
in
a
Changing
Middle
East
Name
:
Edwin
Johan
Santana
Gaarder
Student
number
:
100047222
Page
8
of
12
retrieve
the
“plain”
meaning
of
“the
word
of
God”,
“as
it
was
understood
by
its
first
adherent,
Muhammad,
and
his
sincere
companions”.
Instead,
one’s
understanding
needs
to
be
tuned
–
rather
like
a
radio
–
so
that
it
is
on
the
same
wavelength
as
the
rest
of
the
modern
world.
His
emphasis
on
the
“overall
aims”
of
the
shari’a
shows
a
willingness
to
engage
in
a
debate
over
differing
interpretations
of
what
those
aims
actually
are,
and
in
doing
so
he
declares
his
exegetical
strategy
to
be
one
of
“prioritization
and
balance”,
implying
that
one
must
use
reason
(‘aql)
to
evaluate
the
diverse
and
sometimes
conflicting
principles
in
the
Qur’an.
Lastly,
al-­‐Qaradawi
acknowledges
that
there
is
a
need
to
change
the
“harsh
and
narrow-­‐minded
[…]
mentalities”
of
those
who
inhabit
the
“isolationist
mode”,
where
opinions
and
interpretations
are
reinforced
through
endless
reiteration
by
conformist
members
“who
only
speak
and
write
to
one
another”,
leaving
beliefs
unchallenged
and
conclusions
unquestioned.
As
such,
he
inserts
himself
into
a
long
tradition
of
Islamic
scholars
who
considered
the
hard
(and
often
thankless)
quest
for
meaning
to
be
a
recurrent
duty,
one
that
can
only
be
enriched
by
“engaging
in
sincere
and
productive
dialogue”
with
groups
that
hold
different
opinions
and
beliefs.
In
al-­‐
Qaradawi’s
work,
the
‘other’
thus
becomes
a
mirror
of
the
self,
a
test
of
faith,
a
tool
for
self-­‐reflection
and
self-­‐criticism
that
can
lead
the
individual
to
a
more
sophisticated
understanding
and
a
more
refined
practice
of
Islam.
This
approach,
however,
presupposes
that
the
‘other’
is
willing
to
play
his
part
in
a
“sincere
and
productive”
dialogue,
which
is
not
always
the
case.
On
the
contrary,
“Western
governments
and
intellectuals”
have
historically
been
either
hostile
or
condescending
towards
Islamic
culture,
often
coopting
“local
governments”
in
their
imperialist
exploits,
as
Edward
Said
demonstrated
to
such
effect
in
his
post-­‐colonial
masterpiece:
Orientalism
(1978).20
It
is
important
to
recognise,
here,
that
the
experience
of
European
colonisation
in
the
regions
that
used
to
be
part
of
Ottoman
Empire
(or
other
Islamic
empires)
was
not
merely
a
matter
of
economic
and
political
subjugation
to
Western
powers,
it
also
entailed
a
profound
process
of
cultural
delegitimisation.
Frantz
Fanon,
an
expatriate
activist
of
the
FLN
in
Algeria,
described
this
process
as
follows:
Colonial
domination,
because
it
is
total
and
tends
to
oversimplify,
very
soon
manages
to
disrupt
in
spectacular
fashion
the
cultural
life
of
a
conquered
people
[…]
Every
effort
is
made
to
bring
the
colonized
person
to
admit
the
inferiority
of
his
culture
[…As
a
result,
the
native]
intellectual
throws
himself
in
frenzied
fashion
into
the
frantic
acquisition
of
the
culture
of
the
occupying
power
and
takes
every
opportunity
of
unfavorably
criticizing
his
own
national
culture.21
20
Vincent
B.
Leitch
(ed.),
pp.
1986-­‐2012.
21
Ibid.,
p.
1587.

9. Masters
in
International
Development
|
PSIA
Islam
and
Politics
in
a
Changing
Middle
East
Name
:
Edwin
Johan
Santana
Gaarder
Student
number
:
100047222
Page
9
of
12
In
other
words,
once
a
society
has
been
forced
to
incorporate
foreign
elements
that
–
through
economic
and
military
might
–
are
made
to
seem
superior,
it
becomes
increasingly
difficult
to
seek
solace
in
local
cultures,
which
have
been
violently
disparaged
and
discredited
by
the
the
local
intelligentsia
as
well
as
by
the
colonial
powers.
In
the
case
of
Islam,
the
challenge
is
to
retrieve
a
discourse
from
a
distant
past
and
reinstate
it
as
the
main
source
of
self-­‐identification
in
lands
that
are
no
longer
entirely
and
essentially
Muslim,
or
(to
use
Islamic
terminology)
where
the
integrity
of
the
umma
has
been
violated.
Although
is
true
that
Islam
has
been
able,
throughout
history,
to
accommodate
minorities
and
remain
open
to
outside
influences
(e.g.
Greek
philosophy,
Persian
political
theory)
the
difference
is
clear:
in
the
social
structure
of
the
former
Islamic
empires,
Sunni
Islam
occupied
a
hegemonic
position
and
syncretic
tendencies
were
rigorously
managed
by
the
religious
establishment;
in
a
post-­‐colonial
world,
by
contrast,
it
is
a
common
belief
that
Islam
must
regain
a
position
of
control
before
it
can
begin
to
engage
with
Western
culture,
otherwise
it
will
risk
being
undermined
by
jahiliyya.
Under
these
circumstances,
the
appeal
of
Qutb’s
uncompromising
calls
for
an
“Islamic
State”
(dawla
islamiyya)
become
easier
to
understand:
Muslims
will
only
be
free
to
choose
the
right
path
when
they
are
able
to
proclaim
“the
universal
freedom
of
every
person
and
community
from
servitude
to
any
other
individual
or
society,
the
end
of
man’s
arrogance
and
selfishness,
the
establishment
of
the
sovereignty
of
Allah
and
His
Lordship
throughout
the
world,
and
the
rule
of
the
divine
shari’a
in
human
affairs”.22
Qutb’s
radical
approach
gains
traction
from
the
sense,
not
uncommon
in
the
Muslim
world,
that
Islam
is
under
threat.
Although
there
is
some
disagreement
about
the
nature
of
this
threat,
different
jihadi
movements
have
capitalised
on
this
general
zeitgeist
in
order
to
attack
the
specific
‘enemies
of
Islam’
that
each
of
them
considers
to
be
most
pernicious.
In
the
case
of
al-­‐Jihad
and
al-­‐Jamaʻa
al-­‐Islamiya,
for
example,
the
military
regime
in
Egypt
of
the
60s
and
70s
was
identified
as
the
principal
target,
and
remained
as
such
even
when
their
members
joined
the
war
against
the
Soviet
Union
in
Afghanistan
in
the
1980s.23
In
the
case
of
Abdullah
Yusuf
Azzam,
by
contrast,
the
war
in
Afghanistan
was
the
beginning
of
a
pan-­‐Islamic
effort
to
expel
what
he
perceived
to
be
the
illegitimate
occupiers
of
Islam
lands,
which
included,
of
course,
the
Israelis
in
Palestine.
For
Usama
bin
Laden
–
who
learnt
the
ropes
of
jihad
from
Azzam
and
al-­‐Zawahiri
in
Afghanistan
–
the
decision
to
found
al-­‐Qa’ida
and
attack
the
United
States
of
America
was
based
on
what
he
perceived
to
be
the
invasion
of
Saudi
Arabia
by
American
forces
during
the
First
Gulf
War
in
1990.24
Many
efforts
have
been
made
to
identify
the
underlying
drivers
of
22
Sayyid
Qutb,
cited
in
Euben
and
Zaman,
p.
42.
23
Lawrence
Wright,
The
Looming
Tower:
Al-­‐Qaeda’s
Road
to
9/11,
London,
Penguin,
Kindle
Edition,
2011.
24
Cf.
Usama
bin
Laden,
Declaration
of
War
Against
the
Americans
Occupying
the
Land
of
the
Two
Holy
Places,
in
Euben
and
Zaman,
p.
436.

10. Masters
in
International
Development
|
PSIA
Islam
and
Politics
in
a
Changing
Middle
East
Name
:
Edwin
Johan
Santana
Gaarder
Student
number
:
100047222
Page
10
of
12
violence
in
these
men
and
their
associates,
but
the
explanatory
power
of
these
theories
is
limited
at
best:
rational
choice
theories,
for
example,
are
inconsistent
with
the
observation
that
violent
acts
are
often
counter-­‐productive
and
fail
to
bring
about
stated
goals;
socio-­‐economic
theories
struggle
to
account
for
the
fact
that
mujahideen
often
stem
from
middle-­‐class
backgrounds
and
are
quite
well
educated;
psychopathological
analysis
finds
that
“most
terrorists
do
not
meet
diagnostic
criteria
for
a
major
mental
illness
or
for
sociopathy”;
and
so
on
and
so
forth.25
This
paper
has
chosen
to
set
aside
scientific
theories
in
order
to
analyse
the
Arabo-­‐Islamic
discourse
that
has
been
hijacked
by
these
men,
a
discourse
that
was
developed
hundreds
of
years
ago
by
the
first
Muslims
and
their
successors,
by
mediaeval
Islamic
scholars
and
philosophers
like
Ibn
Taymiyya
who
lived
through
the
“Golden
Age”
of
Islam
and
contributed
to
the
rich
cultural
heritage
that
is
still
treasured
by
Muslims
today.
This
discourse,
I
would
argue,
has
been
used
to
generate
an
aura
of
heroism
and
authenticity
around
the
jihadi
movement
that
strikes
a
deep
chord
among
some
Muslims,
playing
on
their
fears
that
the
Islamic
way
of
life
is
becoming
increasingly
marginalized,
particularly
among
secular
elites.
This
fear
is
reinforced
by
the
equally
reductionist
discourse
that
is
employed
by
noteable
figures
in
the
West,
including
Geert
Wilders
in
the
Netherlands,
Marine
Le
Pen
in
France,
Anders
Breivik
in
Norway,
the
PEGIDA
movement
in
Germany
and,
of
course,
George
Bush,
the
founding
father
of
the
War
on
Terror.
By
using
phrases
like
“axis
of
evil”,
“you’re
either
with
us
or
against
us”,
“islamicization
of
the
West”,
“fascist
book”
and
so
on,
these
ideologues
accelerate
the
process
of
polarisation
and
mutual
essentialisation.26
In
the
words
of
Catherine
Belsey:
Society
blames
the
demons
it
has
created
for
its
own
inevitable
tensions,
and
allows
itself
to
believe
that
their
elimination
will
make
it
whole.
There
is
every
danger
that
in
the
21st
century
the
West
will
construct
as
its
antagonist
in
this
sense
the
Islamic
fundamentalist,
who
can
then
be
held
accountable
for
global
disunity.27
The
gathering
storm
of
Islamophobia
in
the
West,
however,
is
a
different
topic
altogether,
and
this
paper
will
now
conclude
by
returning
to
the
notion
of
Arabo-­‐Islamic
discourse
and
suggesting
some
remedies
that
might
serve
to
counter
the
radical
interpretation
of
Islamic
texts
that
have
been
adopted
by
violent
extremists.
To
begin
with,
it
is
essential
to
25
Jeff
Victoroff,
The
Mind
of
the
Terrorist:
A
Review
and
Critique
of
Psychological
Approaches,
The
Journal
of
Conflict
Resolution,
Vol.
49,
No.
1,
February
2005,
pp.
3-­‐42.
26
BBC,
Dutch
anti-­‐Islam
MP
Geert
Wilders
goes
on
trial,
4
October
2010,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-­‐europe-­‐
11464025,
(accessed
27
April
2015);
Henry
Samuel,
National
Front's
Marine
Le
Pen
to
prove
formidable
rival
to
Nicolas
Sarkozy,
The
Telegraph,
26
December
2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8225697/National-­‐Fronts-­‐Marine-­‐Le-­‐Pen-­‐to-­‐prove-­‐
formidable-­‐rival-­‐to-­‐Nicolas-­‐Sarkozy.html,
(accessed
27
April
2015).
27
Catherine
Belsey,
Post-­‐Structuralism:
A
Short
Introduction,
Oxford,
United
Kingdom,
Oxford
University
Press,
Kindle
Edition,
2002,
p.
94.

11. Masters
in
International
Development
|
PSIA
Islam
and
Politics
in
a
Changing
Middle
East
Name
:
Edwin
Johan
Santana
Gaarder
Student
number
:
100047222
Page
11
of
12
improve
the
quality
of
religious
education
in
Muslim
countries
so
that
young,
educated
Muslims
are
made
aware
of
the
wealth
and
diversity
of
the
Islamic
tradition.28
It
is
particularly
important
to
promote
the
teaching
of
mediaeval
Islamic
hermeneutics
and
the
politics
of
religious
dissent,
of
which
Ibn
Taymiyya’s
unconventional
Hanbalism
is
only
one
example.
In
the
long
term,
the
teaching
of
structuralist
and
post-­‐structuralist
linguistics
could
serve
to
further
encourage
interpretative
practice
and
tolerance
for
polysemy
within
Islam.
Secondly,
it
is
crucial
that
the
Islamist
movement
be
provided
with
a
safe
and
free
political
space
within
which
it
can
express
itself.
In
Egypt,
mosques
have
sometimes
found
themselves
playing
this
role,
but
even
these
sacred
spaces
have
been
subject
to
interference
by
successive
military
governments
over
the
last
fifty
years,
succumbing
to
the
megalomanic
growth
of
the
Egyptian
state
apparatus.
Ayman
al-­‐
Zawahiri
is
the
quintessential
example
of
how
such
trends
towards
totalitarian
control
can
lead
to
violent
outcomes:
persecuted,
imprisoned
and
tortured,
al-­‐Zawahiri
became
more
and
more
radical
over
the
course
of
his
life
and
is
now
the
nominal
leader
of
al-­‐
Qa’ida.29
Although
it
has
not
been
possible
to
explore
the
Arab
Spring
in
this
paper,
for
lack
of
space
and
time,
it
is
suggested
that
further
research
could
be
carried
out
in
Tunisia,
where
an
Islamist
government
conceded
defeat
in
the
2014
election
and
peacefully
handed
power
over
to
its
secular
opponents.
To
what
extent
has
this
peaceful
process
been
determined
by
a
reciprocal
recognition,
by
Islamists
and
secularists,
of
the
legitimate
discourse
mobilised
by
their
political
counterparts?
How
is
Arabo-­‐Islamic
discourse
employed
now
that
the
Islamists
are
in
opposition,
and
how
has
it
changed?
Lastly,
it
is
absolutely
paramount
that
Western
governments
revise
their
policies
towards
the
region,
in
order
to
address
the
siege
mentality
that
currently
prevails
in
the
minds
of
many
Muslims.
The
almost
compulsive
interventions
that
have
been
carried
out
over
the
last
hundred
years
–
the
economic
sanctions
against
Iran,
the
mismanaged
wars
in
Iraq
and
Afghanistan,
the
constant
support
for
autocratic
regimes
and
the
bungled
response
to
the
Israel
crisis
–
all
need
to
be
scaled
back
and
the
rhetoric
scaled
down
by
several
notches.
Only
when
when
the
religion
is
felt
to
be
free
from
physical
threats,
it
is
argued,
will
Islamic
discourse
shift
its
emphasis
back
again,
from
praxis
to
theory,
from
the
practice
of
war
(jihad)
to
the
philosophy
of
peace
(salaam)
which
is
at
the
root
(grammatical
and
philosophical)
of
Islam
itself.
28
Towards
the
end
of
a
class
on
Islam
and
Politics
taught
by
Stéphane
Lacrois
at
Sciences-­‐Po,
for
example,
the
author
of
this
paper
heard
North
African
and
Middle
Eastern
fellow
students
claim
–
more
than
once!
–
that
they
had
learnt
more
about
Islam
in
Paris
than
they
had
in
their
home
countries.
29
Lawrence
Wright,
The
Looming
Tower:
Al-­‐Qaeda’s
Road
to
9/11,
London,
Penguin,
Kindle
Edition.

12. Masters
in
International
Development
|
PSIA
Islam
and
Politics
in
a
Changing
Middle
East
Name
:
Edwin
Johan
Santana
Gaarder
Student
number
:
100047222
Page
12
of
12
WORKS
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Paris,
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G.-­‐P.
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BBC,
Dutch
anti-­‐Islam
MP
Geert
Wilders
goes
on
trial,
4
October
2010,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-­‐europe-­‐11464025,
(accessed
27
April
2015).
Belsey
C.,
Post-­‐Structuralism:
A
Short
Introduction,
Oxford,
United
Kingdom,
Oxford
University
Press,
Kindle
Edition,
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R.L.
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M.Q.,
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V.B.
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2010.
Samuel
H.,
National
Front's
Marine
Le
Pen
to
prove
formidable
rival
to
Nicolas
Sarkozy,
The
Telegraph,
26
December
2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/8225697/National-­‐Fronts-­‐
Marine-­‐Le-­‐Pen-­‐to-­‐prove-­‐formidable-­‐rival-­‐to-­‐Nicolas-­‐Sarkozy.html,
(accessed
27
April
2015).
Victoroff
J.,
The
Mind
of
the
Terrorist:
A
Review
and
Critique
of
Psychological
Approaches,
The
Journal
of
Conflict
Resolution,
Vol.
49,
No.
1,
February
2005,
pp.
3-­‐42.
Wright
L.,
The
Looming
Tower:
Al-­‐Qaeda’s
Road
to
9/11,
London,
Penguin,
Kindle
Edition,
2011.