1. This study examines the relationship between a firm's headquarter location characteristics and its management team size and reputation (MS&R) using data from Taiwanese firms from 2006-2012.
2. The results show that firms located farther from urban centers, major transportation hubs like railway stations and airports, have smaller management teams and poorer reputations, as measured by the percentage of corporate and non-profit boards that managers sit on.
3. The study also finds that firms located in bigger cities have an advantage over those in northern cities in attracting general managers, but the opposite is true for high-reputation managers.
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance practices and financial performance of hotel and travel sector companies in Sri Lanka. It analyzes board structure components like board size, percentage of non-executive directors, insider ownership, and female director representation. The study finds a significant positive correlation between insider ownership percentage and return on equity (ROE). It also finds an inverse relationship between ROE and board size and percentage of non-executive directors. Descriptive statistics show on average boards have 9 members with 74% being non-executive directors and 8% female representation.
This document discusses a study on changes in board characteristics before and after the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
The study finds that average board size increased marginally after the crisis, rising from 9.66 members before to 9.8 members after. This suggests shareholders attempted to gain more control by increasing board influence. The study also found boards had more financial expertise after the crisis.
The document then examines the relationship between pre-crisis board size and firm performance during the crisis. It uses Tobin's Q and return on assets to measure performance for 2007-2008. This will help determine if larger or smaller boards beforehand correlated with better financial outcomes when the crisis hit.
Aloke Ghosh Speaks at Fox Business School, Temple University, PhiladelphiaProfessorAlokeGhosh
- The document examines the relationship between accounting losses/profits and CEO turnover.
- Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 1997-2007, it finds losses significantly increase the likelihood of CEO turnover within two years, with the probability increasing further based on the magnitude of the loss.
- Notably, it finds that accounting performance measures are no longer important predictors of turnover once an indicator for losses is included, suggesting losses dominate as a metric for judging managerial competence.
Brennan, Niamh [2006] Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Is there an E...Prof Niamh M. Brennan
Reflecting investor expectations, most prior corporate governance research attempts to find a relationship between boards of directors and firm performance. This paper critically examines the premise on which this research is based. An expectations gap approach is applied for the first time to implicit expectations which assume a relationship between firm performance and company boards. An expectations gap has two elements: A reasonableness gap and a performance gap. Seven aspects of boards are identified as leading to a reasonableness gap. Five aspects of boards are identified as leading to a performance gap. The paper concludes by suggesting avenues for empirically testing some of the concepts discussed in this paper.
Eyes on Hands off, The Ambiguous Role of Non-Executive Directors in Corporate...Ken Low
This paper investigates the relationship between non-executive directors (NEDs) and firm performance in top Malaysian companies. The study examines the relationship between firm performance and several corporate governance factors, including board size, proportion of NEDs, and NED remuneration. However, the study did not find significant correlations between these governance structures and firm performance. The inconclusive results suggest more analysis is needed to understand how corporate governance impacts performance in developing countries.
This document summarizes literature related to the relationship between human resources (HR) departments and line managers. It discusses 4 aspects presented in the literature: 1) causes of devolving HR responsibilities to line managers, 2) impact on HR and line managers, 3) problems created, and 4) remedies. Key points include that devolution creates both threats and opportunities for HR specialists, and tensions can exist between HR and line managers due to differing views of HR strategies and competencies. Developing high-quality relationships and improving manager competencies are important for addressing issues around devolution.
This document summarizes seven commonly held myths about boards of directors that are not supported by empirical evidence. The myths discussed include: 1) an independent chairman always provides better oversight; 2) staggered boards always harm shareholders; 3) directors meeting independence standards are truly independent; 4) interlocked directorships reduce governance quality; 5) CEOs make the best directors; 6) directors face significant liability risks; and 7) company failure is always the board's fault. The document reviews relevant research studies for each myth and finds mixed or inconclusive evidence regarding their impact. It concludes that more attention should be paid to the board process rather than just its structural features in evaluating governance quality.
CEO or Board Dominance? Uncovering the strategy-making ProcessSadegh Hashemi
Who should have the upper hand in strategic decision-making? CEO or board of directors? This is an important question both in practice and academia. It drove us to talk with 49 board members, CEOs, and top executives in 6 banks with different power structures to understand how CEO-Board power relations influence the strategy-making processes? Instead of linear explanations and prescriptions, we ended up with a multilevel contingency model to shed light on CEO-Board power relations. On August 2, 2021, together with prof. Taieb Hafsi, Dr. Mahdi Ebrahimi, and Amin Moeinian, we presented our research paper at the 81st Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (AoM) 2021, the most prestigious management conference in the world.
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance practices and financial performance of hotel and travel sector companies in Sri Lanka. It analyzes board structure components like board size, percentage of non-executive directors, insider ownership, and female director representation. The study finds a significant positive correlation between insider ownership percentage and return on equity (ROE). It also finds an inverse relationship between ROE and board size and percentage of non-executive directors. Descriptive statistics show on average boards have 9 members with 74% being non-executive directors and 8% female representation.
This document discusses a study on changes in board characteristics before and after the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
The study finds that average board size increased marginally after the crisis, rising from 9.66 members before to 9.8 members after. This suggests shareholders attempted to gain more control by increasing board influence. The study also found boards had more financial expertise after the crisis.
The document then examines the relationship between pre-crisis board size and firm performance during the crisis. It uses Tobin's Q and return on assets to measure performance for 2007-2008. This will help determine if larger or smaller boards beforehand correlated with better financial outcomes when the crisis hit.
Aloke Ghosh Speaks at Fox Business School, Temple University, PhiladelphiaProfessorAlokeGhosh
- The document examines the relationship between accounting losses/profits and CEO turnover.
- Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms from 1997-2007, it finds losses significantly increase the likelihood of CEO turnover within two years, with the probability increasing further based on the magnitude of the loss.
- Notably, it finds that accounting performance measures are no longer important predictors of turnover once an indicator for losses is included, suggesting losses dominate as a metric for judging managerial competence.
Brennan, Niamh [2006] Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Is there an E...Prof Niamh M. Brennan
Reflecting investor expectations, most prior corporate governance research attempts to find a relationship between boards of directors and firm performance. This paper critically examines the premise on which this research is based. An expectations gap approach is applied for the first time to implicit expectations which assume a relationship between firm performance and company boards. An expectations gap has two elements: A reasonableness gap and a performance gap. Seven aspects of boards are identified as leading to a reasonableness gap. Five aspects of boards are identified as leading to a performance gap. The paper concludes by suggesting avenues for empirically testing some of the concepts discussed in this paper.
Eyes on Hands off, The Ambiguous Role of Non-Executive Directors in Corporate...Ken Low
This paper investigates the relationship between non-executive directors (NEDs) and firm performance in top Malaysian companies. The study examines the relationship between firm performance and several corporate governance factors, including board size, proportion of NEDs, and NED remuneration. However, the study did not find significant correlations between these governance structures and firm performance. The inconclusive results suggest more analysis is needed to understand how corporate governance impacts performance in developing countries.
This document summarizes literature related to the relationship between human resources (HR) departments and line managers. It discusses 4 aspects presented in the literature: 1) causes of devolving HR responsibilities to line managers, 2) impact on HR and line managers, 3) problems created, and 4) remedies. Key points include that devolution creates both threats and opportunities for HR specialists, and tensions can exist between HR and line managers due to differing views of HR strategies and competencies. Developing high-quality relationships and improving manager competencies are important for addressing issues around devolution.
This document summarizes seven commonly held myths about boards of directors that are not supported by empirical evidence. The myths discussed include: 1) an independent chairman always provides better oversight; 2) staggered boards always harm shareholders; 3) directors meeting independence standards are truly independent; 4) interlocked directorships reduce governance quality; 5) CEOs make the best directors; 6) directors face significant liability risks; and 7) company failure is always the board's fault. The document reviews relevant research studies for each myth and finds mixed or inconclusive evidence regarding their impact. It concludes that more attention should be paid to the board process rather than just its structural features in evaluating governance quality.
CEO or Board Dominance? Uncovering the strategy-making ProcessSadegh Hashemi
Who should have the upper hand in strategic decision-making? CEO or board of directors? This is an important question both in practice and academia. It drove us to talk with 49 board members, CEOs, and top executives in 6 banks with different power structures to understand how CEO-Board power relations influence the strategy-making processes? Instead of linear explanations and prescriptions, we ended up with a multilevel contingency model to shed light on CEO-Board power relations. On August 2, 2021, together with prof. Taieb Hafsi, Dr. Mahdi Ebrahimi, and Amin Moeinian, we presented our research paper at the 81st Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (AoM) 2021, the most prestigious management conference in the world.
January 23rd, 2012
What Is CEO Talent Worth?
By Professor, David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Researcher, Corporate Governance Research Program, Stanford Graduate School of Business
January 24, 2012
The topic of executive compensation elicits strong emotions among corporate stakeholders and practitioners. On the one hand are those who believe that chief executive officers in the United States are overpaid. On the other hand are those who believe that CEOs are simply paid the going fair-market rate.
Much less effort, however, is put into determining whether total compensation is commensurate with the value of services rendered.
We examine the issue and explain how such a calculation might be performed. We ask:
* How much value creation should be attributable to the efforts of the CEO?
* What percentage of this value should be fairly offered as compensation?
* Can the board actually perform this calculation? If not, how does it make rational decisions about pay levels?
Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!
The effects of corporate governance on company performance evidence from sri ...Alexander Decker
This document examines the relationship between corporate governance and company performance in Sri Lanka's financial services industry from 2008-2011. It reviews literature showing mixed results on relationships between governance factors like board size/composition and performance measures like return on assets/equity. The study analyzes 20 randomly selected banks/insurers, finding no significant relationships between governance variables and performance. This is consistent with prior Sri Lankan research finding corporate governance does not affect financial performance metrics.
Typology of board strategic involvement EGOS 2021Sadegh Hashemi
Thanks to my amazing co-authors, Amin Moeinian, Prof. Taieb Hafsi, and Dr. Mahdi Ebrahimi, I’m delighted to have the chance to present our recent paper on “Board’s strategic involvement climate” at the European Group for Organizational Studies’ annual meeting. Despite the current Covid situation that has forced all conferences to be held virtually, EGOS 2021 was phenomenal in gathering scholars with “really” similar research interests and giving them a “meaningful” stage for discussing and sensemaking their recent works. Among 80 well-defined sub-themes, we targeted our research at sub-theme 17: “Boards Interaction and Decision-making: Inside the Black Box of Board Performance.” We proudly presented our findings besides 22 other impressive studies. If you are interested, please take a look at our presentation file.
Staggered Boards
Authors: Professor David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan,
Researcher, Corporate Governance Research Initiative
Stanford Graduate School of Business
This Research Spotlight provides a summary of the academic literature on how staggered boards impact shareholder value by insulating management from the pressures of capital markets.
It reviews the evidence of:
-Staggered board provisions in IPO charters
-The impact of staggered boards on merger activity
-The relation between staggered boards and market value
-Shareholder reaction to a decision to (de)stagger a board
-Firm outcomes following a decision to (de)stagger a board
This Research Spotlight expands upon issues introduced in the Quick Guide “The Market for Corporate Control.”
For an expanded discussion, see Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational Choices and Their Consequences (Second Edition) by David Larcker and Brian Tayan (2015): http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/books/corporate-governance-matters-closer-look-organizational-choices
Buy This Book: http://www.ftpress.com/store/corporate-governance-matters-a-closer-look-at-organizational-9780134031569
For permissions to use this material, please contact: E: corpgovernance@gsb.stanford.edu
This document summarizes research on the relationship between CEO performance, turnover, and corporate governance. Several key findings are discussed: early research found the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance was low, with bottom-performing CEOs only slightly more likely to be terminated; more recent studies using improved models found turnover is more closely linked to performance, with an estimated 40% of turnovers related to performance; certain governance attributes like independent boards and engaged directors are associated with stricter oversight of CEOs. The relationship between performance and termination remains complex to measure accurately.
Change Management And Offshore Outsourcing Aom ConferenceTR_Ramanathan
This document summarizes a study on how an IT organization managed change related to offshore outsourcing. It discusses:
1) The context that drove the need for change, including cost pressures and declining R&D productivity in the pharmaceutical industry.
2) How the company diagnosed the situation and planned for change, including creating a change management team and gaining support from senior managers.
3) How the implementation of outsourcing involved focusing on communication, starting with small pilot projects, and addressing resistance to change.
4) How institutionalization involved people gaining new skills but some having difficulty adapting, and the need for ongoing learning to ensure cost savings.
Board size, composition and the performance of private sector banks 2IAEME Publication
This document analyzes the relationship between board size, composition, and performance of private sector banks in India. It first provides background on corporate governance in Indian banks and reviews prior literature on the relationship between board structure and firm performance. The document then outlines the objectives, methodology, and variables of the study. Specifically, the study examines the relationship between board size and composition, meetings, and various performance metrics including return on assets, net profit margin, and interest spread for 8 major private sector banks over a 10-year period. The results of the analysis found a significant relationship between board composition and certain performance indicators in private banks, suggesting board composition impacts bank performance. The private banks were also found to utilize their asset and equity bases more efficiently
Professor Aloke (Al) Ghosh Presents at HEC Business SchoolProfessorAlokeGhosh
Professor Aloke (Al) Ghosh spoke at the HEC Business School, Switzerland in 2010. During this presentation, Professor Ghosh discusses managerial exposure to losses.
The document summarizes research on the impact of "say on pay" votes, which allow shareholders to vote on executive compensation. Studies have found that say on pay has a limited impact. It may reduce egregious pay practices but does little to lower overall pay levels. Say on pay improves dialogue between boards and shareholders but has not been shown to consistently influence pay amounts. While it increases accountability, concerns remain that it could expose companies to activists or make it harder to attract executive talent.
This document discusses alternative models of corporate governance beyond traditional public companies. It examines the governance features of family-controlled businesses, venture-backed companies, private equity-owned firms, and nonprofit organizations. For each model, it provides statistics on ownership structure, boards of directors, executive compensation, and impact on firm performance. Overall, the document finds that while alternative models face different issues than public firms regarding ownership and control, they can positively or negatively impact companies depending on specific circumstances.
This paper reveals the relationship of FTSE board and environment policy of t...Service_supportAssignment
This paper reveals the relationship of FTSE board and environment policy of their companies listed. According to Lovell and Liverman (2010) suggested that they are inspired in their reassessment of carbon trading procedures due to the lack of some world class standards and Also it is similarly deregulated by the deficiency of broadly recruited international standards or policy for intentional carbon reporting of carbon emission. Consolidating the analysis in regard to the investors’ wants for data has permitted the researchers for well understanding the various methods to evaluate the procedures that are used to develop the emission of carbon reports, and also hoping that the social world of monetary services mediators, controller and carbon consultancie
There is a large disconnect between public perception and corporate directors' views on CEO pay. While most of the public believes CEO pay is too high, directors believe it is appropriate. There is also disagreement on how to measure corporate performance and determine CEO contributions. Directors believe CEOs are responsible for 40% of company performance, but studies show it may be much lower. No standard model exists for determining the appropriate value sharing between CEO pay and shareholder returns. This lack of agreement means controversy over CEO compensation will likely continue.
Legal Termination and Performance Appraisal at Private Firms in KurdistanAI Publications
The key aim of this study is to examine the relationship between performance appraisal at private firms and legal termination in Kurdistan; the research intended whether staffs are terminated according to their poor performance after being assessed by performance appraisal management. The researcher applied quantitative method in this study to examine the collected data from four various private firms to find out whether employees are terminated based on their poor performance after being evaluated by performance appraisal management system. The researcher distributed a hundred questionnaires, though only 68 questionnaires were received. The findings of this study demonstrated that there is poor and weak association between the evaluation of performance appraisal and legal termination at private firms.
Performance changes and mgmt turnover khoranabfmresearch
This document summarizes a study examining the impact of mutual fund manager replacements on subsequent fund performance. The key findings are:
1) Funds with negative pre-replacement performance continue to underperform benchmarks post-replacement, but see improved relative performance compared to pre-replacement.
2) Replacing outperforming managers results in deteriorating post-replacement performance relative to pre-replacement.
3) Funds with poor pre-replacement performance see significantly declining asset inflows pre-replacement, providing evidence that manager replacements are important for advisors to reverse declining inflows.
Global competition for talent, outsourcing labor, compliance legislation, remote workers, aging populations – these are just a few of the daunting challenges faced by HR organizations today.
Yet the most commonly monitored workforce metrics do very little to deliver true insight into these topics. Leaders need to graduate from metrics to analytics, surfacing the important connections and patterns in their data to make better workforce decisions. By graduating from metrics to analytics, HR professionals and leaders can better understand the contributing factors that are impacting their organization, and take the right actions to implement programs that will provide a true competitive advantage.
Corporate Governance, Firm Size, and Earning Management: Evidence in Indonesi...IOSR Journals
Purpose –Thepurpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the corporate governance regulationsimplementation and firm size onthe earning management for food and beverages companies in Indonesian Stock Exchange. Design/methodology/approach –The multiple regression is utilized to test this relationship at 95% confidence.Corporate governance was proxied by board of director, audit quality, and board independence. Firm size was represented by natural logarithm of total assets. Earning management was measured by Jones model withdiscretionary accruals. Findings – Using data from the year 2005 annual reports of 51 food and beverages listed companies,including the composite index, the results showed that twoof the corporate governance variables, namely board of director and audit quality, as well as firm size are statistically significant in explaining earning management measured bydiscretionary accruals. Research limitations/implications – The regulations on corporate governance were implementedin 2005, but not all of food and beverages listed companies implemented the regulations in 2005. Practical implications – An implication of this finding is that regulatory efforts initiated after the1997 financial crisis to enhance corporate transparency and accountability did not appear to result on better corporate performance. Originality/value – This is one of the few studies which investigates the impact of regulatory actionson corporate governance on earning management immediately after its implementation.
This document provides a literature review on the role of governance in strategic decision making processes, with a focus on family businesses. It discusses how boards can contribute to strategy through knowledge, skills and networks. Boards can be involved in strategy at different levels, from evaluating proposals to shaping strategic decisions. The literature shows that factors like organizational norms, firm performance and history, and board processes influence board involvement in strategy. However, more research is needed on less formal governance mechanisms like advisory boards and how they function as a practice in strategizing for family firms.
The document discusses a study examining the impact of CEO resignations on company share price. It investigates whether forced CEO dismissals trigger abnormal returns for listed French companies. It also analyzes whether voluntary departures or unexpected CEO deaths result in negative abnormal returns, and how these market reactions are impacted by the qualities of the successor and company characteristics. The study aims to determine how CEO turnover in Pakistan affects firm performance and stock returns. Specifically, it examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on forced CEO turnover, and how firm size and interactions relate to positive and negative abnormal returns.
Este documento describe Microsoft Access, un programa de base de datos incluido en Microsoft Office. Access permite almacenar y organizar información en tablas, y crear formularios, informes y consultas para ver y modificar los datos. Ofrece ventajas como la administración gráfica de datos y la productividad, aunque también tiene limitaciones para procesamiento masivo de datos y ambientes corporativos.
Egipto se encuentra en el noreste de África, atravesado por el río Nilo. Su capital es El Cairo y su bandera contiene rayas rojas, blancas y negras con un águila dorada. Los antiguos egipcios construyeron grandes edificios como las pirámides y templos para enterrar a sus faraones y adorar a sus dioses. Creían en la vida después de la muerte y momificaban los cuerpos para preservarlos.
January 23rd, 2012
What Is CEO Talent Worth?
By Professor, David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan, Researcher, Corporate Governance Research Program, Stanford Graduate School of Business
January 24, 2012
The topic of executive compensation elicits strong emotions among corporate stakeholders and practitioners. On the one hand are those who believe that chief executive officers in the United States are overpaid. On the other hand are those who believe that CEOs are simply paid the going fair-market rate.
Much less effort, however, is put into determining whether total compensation is commensurate with the value of services rendered.
We examine the issue and explain how such a calculation might be performed. We ask:
* How much value creation should be attributable to the efforts of the CEO?
* What percentage of this value should be fairly offered as compensation?
* Can the board actually perform this calculation? If not, how does it make rational decisions about pay levels?
Read the attached Closer Look and let us know what you think!
The effects of corporate governance on company performance evidence from sri ...Alexander Decker
This document examines the relationship between corporate governance and company performance in Sri Lanka's financial services industry from 2008-2011. It reviews literature showing mixed results on relationships between governance factors like board size/composition and performance measures like return on assets/equity. The study analyzes 20 randomly selected banks/insurers, finding no significant relationships between governance variables and performance. This is consistent with prior Sri Lankan research finding corporate governance does not affect financial performance metrics.
Typology of board strategic involvement EGOS 2021Sadegh Hashemi
Thanks to my amazing co-authors, Amin Moeinian, Prof. Taieb Hafsi, and Dr. Mahdi Ebrahimi, I’m delighted to have the chance to present our recent paper on “Board’s strategic involvement climate” at the European Group for Organizational Studies’ annual meeting. Despite the current Covid situation that has forced all conferences to be held virtually, EGOS 2021 was phenomenal in gathering scholars with “really” similar research interests and giving them a “meaningful” stage for discussing and sensemaking their recent works. Among 80 well-defined sub-themes, we targeted our research at sub-theme 17: “Boards Interaction and Decision-making: Inside the Black Box of Board Performance.” We proudly presented our findings besides 22 other impressive studies. If you are interested, please take a look at our presentation file.
Staggered Boards
Authors: Professor David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan,
Researcher, Corporate Governance Research Initiative
Stanford Graduate School of Business
This Research Spotlight provides a summary of the academic literature on how staggered boards impact shareholder value by insulating management from the pressures of capital markets.
It reviews the evidence of:
-Staggered board provisions in IPO charters
-The impact of staggered boards on merger activity
-The relation between staggered boards and market value
-Shareholder reaction to a decision to (de)stagger a board
-Firm outcomes following a decision to (de)stagger a board
This Research Spotlight expands upon issues introduced in the Quick Guide “The Market for Corporate Control.”
For an expanded discussion, see Corporate Governance Matters: A Closer Look at Organizational Choices and Their Consequences (Second Edition) by David Larcker and Brian Tayan (2015): http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/books/corporate-governance-matters-closer-look-organizational-choices
Buy This Book: http://www.ftpress.com/store/corporate-governance-matters-a-closer-look-at-organizational-9780134031569
For permissions to use this material, please contact: E: corpgovernance@gsb.stanford.edu
This document summarizes research on the relationship between CEO performance, turnover, and corporate governance. Several key findings are discussed: early research found the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance was low, with bottom-performing CEOs only slightly more likely to be terminated; more recent studies using improved models found turnover is more closely linked to performance, with an estimated 40% of turnovers related to performance; certain governance attributes like independent boards and engaged directors are associated with stricter oversight of CEOs. The relationship between performance and termination remains complex to measure accurately.
Change Management And Offshore Outsourcing Aom ConferenceTR_Ramanathan
This document summarizes a study on how an IT organization managed change related to offshore outsourcing. It discusses:
1) The context that drove the need for change, including cost pressures and declining R&D productivity in the pharmaceutical industry.
2) How the company diagnosed the situation and planned for change, including creating a change management team and gaining support from senior managers.
3) How the implementation of outsourcing involved focusing on communication, starting with small pilot projects, and addressing resistance to change.
4) How institutionalization involved people gaining new skills but some having difficulty adapting, and the need for ongoing learning to ensure cost savings.
Board size, composition and the performance of private sector banks 2IAEME Publication
This document analyzes the relationship between board size, composition, and performance of private sector banks in India. It first provides background on corporate governance in Indian banks and reviews prior literature on the relationship between board structure and firm performance. The document then outlines the objectives, methodology, and variables of the study. Specifically, the study examines the relationship between board size and composition, meetings, and various performance metrics including return on assets, net profit margin, and interest spread for 8 major private sector banks over a 10-year period. The results of the analysis found a significant relationship between board composition and certain performance indicators in private banks, suggesting board composition impacts bank performance. The private banks were also found to utilize their asset and equity bases more efficiently
Professor Aloke (Al) Ghosh Presents at HEC Business SchoolProfessorAlokeGhosh
Professor Aloke (Al) Ghosh spoke at the HEC Business School, Switzerland in 2010. During this presentation, Professor Ghosh discusses managerial exposure to losses.
The document summarizes research on the impact of "say on pay" votes, which allow shareholders to vote on executive compensation. Studies have found that say on pay has a limited impact. It may reduce egregious pay practices but does little to lower overall pay levels. Say on pay improves dialogue between boards and shareholders but has not been shown to consistently influence pay amounts. While it increases accountability, concerns remain that it could expose companies to activists or make it harder to attract executive talent.
This document discusses alternative models of corporate governance beyond traditional public companies. It examines the governance features of family-controlled businesses, venture-backed companies, private equity-owned firms, and nonprofit organizations. For each model, it provides statistics on ownership structure, boards of directors, executive compensation, and impact on firm performance. Overall, the document finds that while alternative models face different issues than public firms regarding ownership and control, they can positively or negatively impact companies depending on specific circumstances.
This paper reveals the relationship of FTSE board and environment policy of t...Service_supportAssignment
This paper reveals the relationship of FTSE board and environment policy of their companies listed. According to Lovell and Liverman (2010) suggested that they are inspired in their reassessment of carbon trading procedures due to the lack of some world class standards and Also it is similarly deregulated by the deficiency of broadly recruited international standards or policy for intentional carbon reporting of carbon emission. Consolidating the analysis in regard to the investors’ wants for data has permitted the researchers for well understanding the various methods to evaluate the procedures that are used to develop the emission of carbon reports, and also hoping that the social world of monetary services mediators, controller and carbon consultancie
There is a large disconnect between public perception and corporate directors' views on CEO pay. While most of the public believes CEO pay is too high, directors believe it is appropriate. There is also disagreement on how to measure corporate performance and determine CEO contributions. Directors believe CEOs are responsible for 40% of company performance, but studies show it may be much lower. No standard model exists for determining the appropriate value sharing between CEO pay and shareholder returns. This lack of agreement means controversy over CEO compensation will likely continue.
Legal Termination and Performance Appraisal at Private Firms in KurdistanAI Publications
The key aim of this study is to examine the relationship between performance appraisal at private firms and legal termination in Kurdistan; the research intended whether staffs are terminated according to their poor performance after being assessed by performance appraisal management. The researcher applied quantitative method in this study to examine the collected data from four various private firms to find out whether employees are terminated based on their poor performance after being evaluated by performance appraisal management system. The researcher distributed a hundred questionnaires, though only 68 questionnaires were received. The findings of this study demonstrated that there is poor and weak association between the evaluation of performance appraisal and legal termination at private firms.
Performance changes and mgmt turnover khoranabfmresearch
This document summarizes a study examining the impact of mutual fund manager replacements on subsequent fund performance. The key findings are:
1) Funds with negative pre-replacement performance continue to underperform benchmarks post-replacement, but see improved relative performance compared to pre-replacement.
2) Replacing outperforming managers results in deteriorating post-replacement performance relative to pre-replacement.
3) Funds with poor pre-replacement performance see significantly declining asset inflows pre-replacement, providing evidence that manager replacements are important for advisors to reverse declining inflows.
Global competition for talent, outsourcing labor, compliance legislation, remote workers, aging populations – these are just a few of the daunting challenges faced by HR organizations today.
Yet the most commonly monitored workforce metrics do very little to deliver true insight into these topics. Leaders need to graduate from metrics to analytics, surfacing the important connections and patterns in their data to make better workforce decisions. By graduating from metrics to analytics, HR professionals and leaders can better understand the contributing factors that are impacting their organization, and take the right actions to implement programs that will provide a true competitive advantage.
Corporate Governance, Firm Size, and Earning Management: Evidence in Indonesi...IOSR Journals
Purpose –Thepurpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the corporate governance regulationsimplementation and firm size onthe earning management for food and beverages companies in Indonesian Stock Exchange. Design/methodology/approach –The multiple regression is utilized to test this relationship at 95% confidence.Corporate governance was proxied by board of director, audit quality, and board independence. Firm size was represented by natural logarithm of total assets. Earning management was measured by Jones model withdiscretionary accruals. Findings – Using data from the year 2005 annual reports of 51 food and beverages listed companies,including the composite index, the results showed that twoof the corporate governance variables, namely board of director and audit quality, as well as firm size are statistically significant in explaining earning management measured bydiscretionary accruals. Research limitations/implications – The regulations on corporate governance were implementedin 2005, but not all of food and beverages listed companies implemented the regulations in 2005. Practical implications – An implication of this finding is that regulatory efforts initiated after the1997 financial crisis to enhance corporate transparency and accountability did not appear to result on better corporate performance. Originality/value – This is one of the few studies which investigates the impact of regulatory actionson corporate governance on earning management immediately after its implementation.
This document provides a literature review on the role of governance in strategic decision making processes, with a focus on family businesses. It discusses how boards can contribute to strategy through knowledge, skills and networks. Boards can be involved in strategy at different levels, from evaluating proposals to shaping strategic decisions. The literature shows that factors like organizational norms, firm performance and history, and board processes influence board involvement in strategy. However, more research is needed on less formal governance mechanisms like advisory boards and how they function as a practice in strategizing for family firms.
The document discusses a study examining the impact of CEO resignations on company share price. It investigates whether forced CEO dismissals trigger abnormal returns for listed French companies. It also analyzes whether voluntary departures or unexpected CEO deaths result in negative abnormal returns, and how these market reactions are impacted by the qualities of the successor and company characteristics. The study aims to determine how CEO turnover in Pakistan affects firm performance and stock returns. Specifically, it examines the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on forced CEO turnover, and how firm size and interactions relate to positive and negative abnormal returns.
Este documento describe Microsoft Access, un programa de base de datos incluido en Microsoft Office. Access permite almacenar y organizar información en tablas, y crear formularios, informes y consultas para ver y modificar los datos. Ofrece ventajas como la administración gráfica de datos y la productividad, aunque también tiene limitaciones para procesamiento masivo de datos y ambientes corporativos.
Egipto se encuentra en el noreste de África, atravesado por el río Nilo. Su capital es El Cairo y su bandera contiene rayas rojas, blancas y negras con un águila dorada. Los antiguos egipcios construyeron grandes edificios como las pirámides y templos para enterrar a sus faraones y adorar a sus dioses. Creían en la vida después de la muerte y momificaban los cuerpos para preservarlos.
Exportez aux États-Unis pour accéder à l'un des plus grands et des plus riches marchés du monde.
Les États-Unis sont notre plus grand partenaire commercial ; ce marché regorge de débouchés pour des entreprises comme la vôtre. Découvrez comment vous pouvez accéder à l'une des plus grandes économies du monde.
Téléchargez le livre blanc gratuit d'EDC http://www.edc.ca/FR/Knowledge-Centre/Publications/documents/export-to-us.pdf pour vous renseigner sur les débouchés de l'exportation aux États-Unis.
Comment déterminer votre marché
L'entrée sur le marché américain
Les secteurs prometteurs
Les risques à prendre en considération
This study attempts to investigate the role of Corporate Governance in mitigating agency cost. For
this purpose a sample of 100 firms selected on the basis of 100 INDEX of Karachi Stock Exchange during the
period 2007 to 2011. To do so, alternative proxies for agency costs are employing: the ratio of total sales to total
assets (asset turnover) and the ratio of selling, general & administrative expenses (SG&A) to total sales.
Multivariate fixed effect regression is used to analyze the data. The explanatory variables include director
ownership, institutional ownership, ownership Concentration, board size, CEO/Chair duality, Non Executive
Directors, Debt Ratio, remuneration structure and board independence. The analysis is controlled for the
influence of company size. The results show that higher director and institutional ownership reduces the level of
agency cost. Smaller sized boards also results in lowering agency cost. Board independence has positive
association with asset utilization ratio. The separation of the post of CEO and chairperson and higher
remuneration lower agency cost. Bank debt constitutes one of the most important Corporate Governance devices
for Pakistani Listed Companies. Also, managerial ownership, managerial compensation and ownership
concentration seem to play an important role in mitigating agency costs
This document is a dissertation submitted by Mohit Kumar to Leeds University Business School in partial fulfillment of an MSc in Finance and Investment. The dissertation examines the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance during a financial crisis using a sample of 180 UK firms from 2009-2011. The dissertation includes an abstract, acknowledgements, table of contents, literature review on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, research methods and methodology, findings and conclusions.
An Exploratory Study Of Performance Management Systems And Their Influence On...Andrew Molina
The document discusses various performance management systems (PMS) and their influence on employee performance. It reviews several PMS approaches, including management by objectives, balanced scorecard, total quality management, and productivity measurement and enhancement systems. The literature suggests that an effective PMS should align individual goals with organizational objectives, provide continuous feedback, and involve employees in the design process. When implemented properly with the right design that considers both internal and external factors, PMS can help improve overall organizational performance by motivating employees and linking their work to strategic goals.
This paper examines how information asymmetry affects the relationship between board independence and firm value in Korean firms between 1999-2006. It finds that independent outside directors, who have no business or professional ties to the firm, are positively correlated with firm value, while "gray" outside directors are not. Additionally, the positive impact of independent outside directors on firm value is more pronounced when the firm has lower information transaction costs, as measured by market microstructure models and other proxies. The results suggest that higher information asymmetry weakens the monitoring role of independent directors.
Examining CEO Tenure- %22Short & Sweet%22 Vs %22Long & Illustrious%22Andrew Doyle
- The document examines the relationship between CEO tenure and firm performance, reviewing literature that finds both positive and negative relationships. It tests hypotheses about founder CEOs, internally promoted CEOs, and the relationship between tenure and compensation.
- Data is collected on 395 S&P 500 firms, including measures of firm performance, CEO tenure, compensation, and controls. Regressions are run to analyze the relationships between tenure and performance, and tenure and compensation.
- Preliminary results found some support for long tenures being beneficial, as increasing tenure was not found to adversely affect performance. The analysis sought to provide insights into when the agency problem between managers and shareholders is most pronounced.
This document provides a literature review on performance management systems. It summarizes several studies that have examined the impact and effectiveness of performance management. Some key findings include: successful performance management systems are linked to positive organizational outcomes like financial performance; measurement and goal-setting are associated with better company performance; training and development practices are strongly related to perceived organizational performance; and line manager involvement and buy-in is important for effective implementation of performance management systems. The literature review covers research from 1997 to 2012.
This paper provides an empirical investigation into the factors influencing board monitoring function
effectiveness in Anglo Countries in West Africa using Generalized Methods of Moment and other estimation
techniques. Introducing new dimension and proxies for key board attributes ignored in prior studies, we find that
board skills, independence and size play a dominant role in improving board monitoring effectiveness in these
countries. However, no evidence was found for board gender diversity affecting board monitoring effectiveness.
Consistent with prior studies board skills and independence by far have the strongest impact on board monitoring
function effectiveness
The aim of this study was to determine the link between multiple directorships (MDs) and cash holdings. This study used the source from the firm’s annual report, as these studies were secondary data. Smart PLS 3.0 was used to verify the secondary data collected. This study shows that the number of people holding MDs inside the institution is growing, and this has a great effect on the organization’s interests. In addition, the findings support the first theory, which promotes chief executive officers to hold varied directorships because they contain desired elements from the companies. This study is unique because it is the first in the Sultanate of Oman to investigate financial enterprise at the Muscat Stock Exchange with the goal of achieving certainty. It evaluates whether having executives with one or numerous directorships is advantageous for the organization and its stakeholders
Table of Contents1Introduction32Reflective Ob.docxmattinsonjanel
Table of Contents
1 Introduction 3
2 Reflective Observation 3
3 Abstract Generalisation 5
4 Application 6
5 Conclusion 8
6 References 9
Introduction
Nowadays, change is inevitable for most organizations, and applying effective organizational change could direct organizations to reach a competitive advantage (Armenakis & Harris, 2009; Clegg & Walsh, 2004). In most cases the effort in achieving success in organizations fails due to the lack of people’s commitment and misdiagnosis of change (Armenakis & Harris, 2009; Oreg, 2003). Therefore, in relation to my previous experience and relevant studies, I will argue that leaders support in leading the change, Human Resource Management (HRM) intervention and the process of building commitment in organizations will enhance the success probability of change. The outline of the reflective journal will be as follows. The first section will be highlighting reflective observations of these three topics, and the second section will give an abstract generalisation where it shows the relationship between these three topics in the change management context. Subsequently, the application of the principles in my future career will be discussed. Finally, conclusion will be provided in the final section. Reflective Observation
HRM planning and intervention are encompassing all steps of the change process framework adopted from Härtel and Fujimoto (2010). Molineux (2013) found that the implementation of systemic HRM is considered to have a strategic function in change management. The ideas of systemic HRM have not been applied in my organization where the HR practices are not integrated well. Strategic HRM intervention could enhance the change enablers in the organization in an effort to increase the probability of success (Al-Haddad & Kotnour, 2015). Jiang et al. (2012) in their research construct the HR system and define the relationships within the system which is influencing employees’ abilities, motivation and opportunities. The relationships within the HR system have gained comprehensive understanding of how the process works and how it aligns with business strategy. Nowadays, strategic HRM intervention from transactional to transformational activities has made HR professionals gain more strategic values which also relates to organizations’ performance (Buller & McEvoy, 2012). In my opinion, E-HRM and/or outsourcing HR role play important roles in supporting the shift, as it is provide time for HR practitioner to work more in strategic role. From my experience, the application of E-HRM is not as easy as it seems, due to the lack of knowledge, skills and readiness with new technology. Therefore, Parry (2014) suggests that organisations should carefully design and implement E-HRM to adjust with the condition of members in organizations.
The second topic is leading change. Leaders’ support in change process is needed to influence the willingness to change among employees (Bass, Avolio, Jung, & Berson, 20 ...
ERP Implementation-Critical Success Factors and Management InfluenceMatthew Pirie
This document summarizes critical success factors for ERP implementations discussed in academic literature. Key factors identified include strong top management support, a culture receptive to change, effective project management techniques, and creation of a skilled and diverse implementation team. The team should include internal staff from all affected departments as well as external consultants, and be led by a highly-placed executive project champion empowered to resolve issues. While having the right implementation team factors is important, success ultimately depends on strong and visible backing from top management throughout the project.
Behavioral Approach to Leadership Boundary Spanning Transaction Relationship ...IJASRD Journal
All of the organizations, before choosing of alternatives for improve of company performance, proposed for test and evaluation of the pattern of this research, and if they could not receive of suitable results from perform of it, in that case will be free for choosing and selecting another alternative. The term behavioral approach to leadership boundary spanning transaction relationship have declared that risk taking capability of the boundary spanning transaction relationship is the major factor for making distinguish between boundary spanning transaction relationship and workers. Since then, risk taking taken as one of behavioral approach to leadership boundary spanning transaction relationship's component into consideration. For these reasons, after determination of boundary spanning transaction relationship places for manufacturing organizations, the find of alternatives for perform of it is very important.
Running head NEEDS ASSESSMENT1NEEDS ASSESSMENT.docxSUBHI7
Running head: NEEDS ASSESSMENT 1
NEEDS ASSESSMENT 5
Needs Assessment
Nicholas J Ceo
American Military University
14 December 2017
A needs assessment is a systematic process of exploring the way things are at the present and the way they should be ideally. These factors are usually crucial in the performance at an individual level to the organizational level (Rouda & Kusy, 1995). A needs assessment is a continuous process of evaluation, with the objective of connecting the performance problems experienced in an organization and performance opportunities to human performance efforts that are specific. It also involves the process of differentiating the specific performance problems which will be solved through additional training from those that need other management measures. The main aim of this paper is to develop a needs assessment for MTS Systems Corporation.
The management problem at MTS is a human resources management problem One of the biggest challenges is the retention of workers who are skilled and talented. There are also generational differences amongst the work force, bringing with it a challenge in that the different groups respond differently to different situations, hence need to be handled differently. The management also has to deal with communication at the workplace and keeping the employees motivated in order to enhance performance. The performance of the company is impressive, with strong growth and revenue of around seven hundred and eighty million dollars. The bottom line is also very encouraging. This performance, however, is way below the expected performance which was projected to be over a billion dollars in revenue and a quarter billion dollars in profits. This goal hasn’t been achieved yet but based on the strong performance of the organization, together with good management, the target may be achieved.
The mission of the organization is to be a leader in innovation in the manufacture of measurement and testing solutions so as to enable the success of their customers. The mission is related to the desired performance in that it the mission statement will provide a drive for the staff to be the best in what they do, and in this way improving the performance of the organization as a whole. The management problems are experienced within the whole company and aren’t just experienced within specific departments.
In conducting a needs assessment, several steps will be followed. One will be performing a GAP analysis. This step will seek at establishing the actual level of performance of the organization and the employees in comparison to the standards which have been set (Rouda & Kusy, 1995). In order to do this, the current situation will be determined first. The skills, knowledge and abilities that the current employees have. This analysis ought to take into consideration the goals of the organization, the business climate and constraints, both internal and external. The desired si ...
A Study on the Impact of Manager’s Personality on the financial performance o...IRJET Journal
This document discusses a study on the impact of managers' personality traits on the financial performance of companies listed on the BSE 100 index in India. It aims to analyze the correlation between managers' characteristics like age, gender, experience, and tenure with companies' return on assets and return on equity. The study reviews previous literature on these relationships and outlines its research methodology, including objectives, hypotheses, sampling plan, and data analysis tools. Regression models will be used to analyze the relationship between financial performance indicators and managers' traits. The study is limited to BSE 100 companies from 2017-2022 but aims to contribute to understanding how management qualities influence organizational success.
The document discusses the findings of a survey on capital budgeting and capital structure decisions conducted by finance experts. Some key findings:
1) Most companies use discounted cash flow and net present value techniques for capital budgeting decisions, consistent with academic theory.
2) However, for capital structure decisions, companies rely more on informal rules of thumb rather than trying to minimize the weighted average cost of capital.
3) Firm size significantly impacts practices, with large firms more likely to use net present value and small firms relying more on simple payback period.
Human resource management has two main functions: overseeing human capital operations and managing employees. HR plays a vital role in strategic organization design and establishing effective policies to optimize costs. The document identifies two main management concerns at Watson Technologies: succession planning and diversity/inclusion. It recommends revising the succession plan to prepare future leaders through training and job rotation. It also suggests implementing diversity training, a managing by walking around program, and surveys to promote an inclusive culture and address communication barriers.
This study examines the impact of corporate governance and investor confidence on earnings management of firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. It uses annual data from 2015 for a sample of 408 Thai listed companies, excluding financial firms. Structural equation modeling is used to analyze the direct and indirect relationships between variables. Corporate governance factors examined include the largest shareholder, CEO duality, institutional ownership, board size, and auditor (Big 4 firm). Earnings management is measured using discretionary accruals. Investor confidence is represented by return on equity. The results found that the largest shareholder influences earnings management and investor confidence the most. Institutional ownership influences both earnings management and investor confidence. Having a Big 4 auditor influences investor confidence. However,
Does firm volatility affect managerial influenceAlexander Decker
This document discusses how firm volatility may affect managerial influence on firm performance. It develops a theoretical framework drawing from existing literature on group decision-making. The hypothesis is that the effect of managerial ability on firm value differs according to a firm's characteristics like risk and volatility. An empirical analysis tests this hypothesis using data on Korean firms from 1999-2008. Managerial ability is controlled by focusing on those who graduated from top universities. The analysis finds the influence of such managers on Tobin's Q (a measure of firm value) varies interactively with a firm's volatility, market risk, and return variability.
APA citations and references. No plagiarismTo prepare for the We.docxfestockton
APA citations and references. No plagiarism
To prepare for the Week 8 Shared Practice, reflect on your professional experience with leaders with whom you have interacted as a follower, colleague, or supervisor. Consider the strengths and weaknesses these professionals had with regard to leadership and management skills. How well did they perform their roles as managers and as leaders?
Then, identify from your professional experience a leader with whom you have interacted as a follower, colleague, or supervisor that matches only one of the following descriptions:
· He or she is a good leader lacking effective managing skills.
· He or she is a good manager lacking effective leadership skills.
· He or she is an effective leader and manager.
· He or she is a neither a good leader nor manager.
Once you have identified a leader from your professional experience that matches one of the descriptions listed above, do the following:
With these thoughts in mind:
By Day 3
Post:
· Without giving the actual name of the leader you have selected, identify his or her strengths and weaknesses as a leader and as a manager. Then distinguish his or her leadership skills from his or her management skills.
· Provide an analysis of the effect he or she had on the business environment where you worked at the time.
Select and share two lessons this experience has taught you about how you will balance leadership and management skills in your current position or when you have the opportunity in future positions.
Instructions
For this assignment, you will create a PowerPoint presentation prescribing a human resource and technology change map. Your goal is to assess human resource recruitment, onboarding, performance review, learning and development, and relationship management as they relate to deploying a new customer relationship management (CRM) software for either Walmart or Amazon. You will focus specifically on employees working in a global customer support call center with one domestic and two international locations. For each element of the human resource phase, noted above, you may consider employee qualifications, abilities, education, and evaluation.
Since this is a significant change for an organization, you should address how appropriate Human Resource management practices can address this disruptive change. Your recommendations should address how the recommended solutions will help your selected organization to use the new CRM to reach its strategic goals better as they relate to the corporate mission and vision.
Length: 8-12 slides; 100-150 words for notes
References: Include at least 5 scholarly resources.
Your presentation should demonstrate thoughtful consideration of the ideas and concepts presented in the course and provide new thoughts and insights relating directly to this topic. Your response should reflect scholarly writing and current APA standards. Be sure to adhere to Northcentral University's Academic Integrity Policy.
O R I G I N A L ...
Similar to Firm Headquarter Location and Management Team Reputation_TW_20131031_20140113 (20)
APA citations and references. No plagiarismTo prepare for the We.docx
Firm Headquarter Location and Management Team Reputation_TW_20131031_20140113
1. 1
Does Firm Headquarter Location Matter Management Team Size and
Reputation: Evidence from Taiwan Market
Abstract
This study explores whether or not the geography characteristics of a firm’s location
have impacts on the firm’s management team size and reputation (later denoted as MS&R) by
employing the hand-collected MS&R data in Taiwan market from year 2006 to 2012.
Empirical results of this study show that firm location characteristics, including distance and
non-distance related geography variables, have significant impacts on MS&R. A firm with the
headquarter location far from urban or major transportation stations (railway stations and
airports) would have small team size and poor management team reputation. Furthermore, the
results also reveal that a firm located in big five cities has more attraction than the north cities
for general managers while has the opposite effects for managers with high reputation quality.
The results are robust when controlling for other firm characteristics variables.
Keywords: Firm headquarter location; Management team size; Team reputation; Geography
characteristics
2. 2
1. Introduction
A firm’s operating performance and its competences are not only affected by
macroeconomic condition but also its top management team quality. Intuitively, managers
play the important role in a firm’s operating strategies and performance. Many studies
demonstrate that a firm’s management team quality affects its operating performance
(Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005), financial decisions
(Chemmanur et al., 2009), investment policies (Chemmanur et al., 2009), and credit risk
(Chen et al., 2011). Management team size and reputation are two main representatives of
management team quality (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). Though many studies have been
dedicated to investigate economic consequences of management team characteristics (e.g.
leverage ratio; dividend policy; credit risk), few studies explore the causes of management
team size and reputation, especially from the perspective of firm location.
Previous studies show that a firm’s location plays an important role in determining its
board structure, investment decision, and dividend policy. Knyazeva et al. (2011) find that
firm locate near local pool has higher proportion of independent board. John et al. (2011)
show that remotely located firms farther from shareholder, which increasing the information
asymmetry for investor to observe managerial investment decision and exacerbates
managerial agency problem.1
Furthermore, these remotely firms pay higher dividends tend to
decrease agency conflict. In other words, a remotely located firm that facing free cash flow
problem precommits to mitigate agency problem by the tool of dividends. Moreover, Francis
et al. (2012), Masulis and Mobbs (2011), and Knyazeva et al. (2011) also find that firm
location affects CEO (Chief Executive Officer) power and board composition. Yang and
Chen (2012) also demonstrate that Taiwanese firm location affects its board quality. The
above results show that a firm’s location affects its board structure, investment and dividend
1
Lang and Lizenberger (1989) and Smith and Watts (1992) also show that the distance far from urban for a
firm’s headquarter location exacerbates agency conflicts.
3. 3
policy. Management team quality is few discussed among the issues of firm location,
especially for Taiwan market.2
However, a firm’s location quality seems to have some
influences on its management team size and reputation. For example, General Motors (GM)
recently plans to open four new information technology centers in the U.S., which is intended
to improve GM‘s business processes and drive down costs. One of center candidate is Austin,
because Austin metropolitan area is home to a growing technology community that includes
the University of Texas at Austin and computer maker Dell Inc. The news reveals that a firm
considers the location when expanding its business due to the available human resources (e.g.
managers). Therefore, firm location seems to affect the availability and quality of managers
for a firm. Although there are many studies has been focused on local effect on board
composition, agency problem and dividend policy, few studies explore the firm location
effect on management team size and reputation.
There are many possible reasons for the local effect on management team size and
reputation, such as the availability of local manager pool relevant to the firm’s expertise. For
outside investors, local residents can acquire soft information about managerial decisions and
operating performance at lower costs (e.g., Petersen, 2004). Instead, non-local outside
investors would face more incomplete information and must take more efforts to monitor
managers effectively due to quite a long distance. For firm insiders, firms with far from large
pool of prospective managers have higher opportunity cost for potential managers to join this
firm. Consistent with the Petersen (2004), Loughran (2008) also demonstrate that costs in
generating information are higher for rural firms with few investors in their proximity, than
for urban firms with many nearby investors. In addition, firm location may also affect a
firm’s management team size and reputation because many studies demonstrate that
management team characteristics affect firm operating performance (Haleblian and
Finkelstein, 1993; Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005), financial and investment policies
2
Chen et al. (2013) show that U.S. firm location affects its management team quality.
4. 4
(Chemmanur et al., 2009), and credit risk (Chen et al., 2011).3
However, management team
size and reputation (later denoted as MS&R) are few discussed from the geography
perspective. This study basically follows Chemmanur et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2011), Chen
et al. (2013) to define a firm’s MS&R variables, which show the size of the management
team and management team members’ prestige.4
According the above discussion, firm location seems to affect its management team
(employees) composition. However, most of existing studies focus on local effect on board
composition, agency problem and dividend policy rather than management team
characteristics. Therefore, this study focuses on relationship between firm location and
MS&R.
Loughran (2008) demonstrate that an urban firms issues equity, by employing a
higher-quality underwriter than otherwise similar rural firm. Knyazeva et al. (2011) show that
a firm located in the larger local human resource (director) pool has better board quality
(measured as independent directors).5
Yang and Chen (2012) demonstrate that Taiwanese
firm location quality positively affects its board quality. Therefore, we can reasonably
hypothesize that a firm’s distance to urban negatively relates to its management team size and
reputation.
This current study collects different kind of geography variables, and employs a
hand-collected MS&R data of 9,040 annual Taiwanese observations from year 2006 to 2012.
3
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) show that the bigger the management team size, the higher performance they
are. Moreover, the percentage of management team members in core department also increases corporate
performance. Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) find that better MQ is positively related to IPO size and post-IPO
performance. Chammanur et al. (2009) explore that better MQ tend to lower leverage ratio, dividend payout
ratio, information asymmetry but higher investment level.
4
Chemmanur et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2011), and Chen et al. (2013) classify management team quality into
three dimensions: management expertise, management team structure, team size and reputation. Management
expertise means management team’s knowledge and prior experience; management team structure refers to
average team members’ tenure and team tenure dispersion; and management team size and reputation show the
size of the management team and management team members’ prestige.
5
For another perspective, Coval and Moswitz (2001) show that money managers prefer larger firms when
investing in remote stocks and smaller firms when investing locally. As a result, higher visibility seems to can
resist local manager pool to recruit, even for potential manager that they would have more willingness to ignore
opportunity cost. Hence, firm with more reputation would attract prospective manager and could break down
limited of distance.
5. 5
Empirical results of this study show that firm location characteristics, including distance and
non-distance related geography variables, have significant impacts on MS&R. A firm with the
headquarter location far from urban would have lower team size and poor management team
reputation, such as the low percentage of corporate boards (except their own firm) that
management team members sit on (later denoted as Board) and the low percentage of
non-profit corporate boards that management team members sit on (later denoted as BNP). In
addition, the firm with the headquarter location far from major railway stations and airports
also have lower team size and poor management team reputation. Furthermore, the results
also reveal that a firm located in big five cities has more attraction than the north cities for
general managers while has the opposite effects for managers with high reputation. The
results are robust under considering other control variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The section 2 describes various
measures of management team size, team reputations and firm quality. Section 3 presents the
theories and hypotheses. Section 4 summarizes other major variables used in the empirical
examinations. Section 5 presents and analyzes empirical results. Last, section 6 provides
concluding remarks.
2. Measures of management team size and reputation, and firm quality
2.1. Measures of management quality and reputation
As former remark, based on Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) and Chemmanur et al.
(2009), and Chen et al. (2011), a firm’s MQ are classified into three dimensions: management
expertise, management team structure, and management team size and reputation respectively.
In this paper, we focus on the third dimension on management team size and reputation.
Table 1 exhibits the variables of the management team size and reputation dimension. The
following Table 1 shows the classifications and definitions.
6. 6
[Insert Table 1 here]
The dimension we used is team size and reputation includes three variables. The first
one is the size of the top management team (TSIZE), which is measured by number of
managers with the position of vice president or higher. Management reputation in business
communities refer to images built up by members of the management team. Management
team members who serve as other firms’ board of directors (BOARD) or sit on non-profit
boards (BNP) might have higher visibility and greater impression on outsider. As a result, the
greater value of three variables, the better is the management team size and reputation.
2.2. Proxies for other aspects of firm quality
In purpose of dealing with the effect of firms’ location on MQ might be interfered by
other characteristics of firm quality, we use two control variables to descend the possible
effects. One is the firm size (Size), defining as the natural log of the firm’s net sales at the end
of a fiscal year. The other control variable is a firm’s operating cash flow (OCF), calculated
for the operating cash flow divide total asset.
2.3. Measures of firm location geography characteristics
Based on the measurement method of local human resource pool in Knyazeva et al.
(2011), Chen et al. (2013) and Yang and Chen (2012), this study employs distance and
non-distance related geography variables. The former category includes the variables of DIST,
DIST_TPE, DIST_MTRA, DIST_TRA, DIST_HSR, DIST_NAirport, DIST_Airport, Metro,
Five, and North. The DIST/ DIST_TPE variables are the distances in kilometers to the
located city hall/ the Taipei city hall. The DIST_MTRA/ DIST_TRA/ DIST_HSR variables
represent the distances in kilometers to the closest top-fifteen railway stations/ the closest
railway station/ the closest high-speed railway station. The DIST_NAirport/ DIST_Airport
variables represent the distances in kilometers to the closest international airports in north
7. 7
areas of Taiwan/ the closest international airports. The Metro/ Five/ North variables are
dummy variables that the values equal to one if the located city of firm headquarter has metro
system/ belongs to five big cities/ belongs to the north areas of Taiwan.
The latter category includes the variables of IND_D, Bank_D, PD, BS, and PI. Industry
density (IND_D) is the number of firms per unit squared kilometer. The Bank_D variable is
the percentage of banks in the same three-digit ZIP radius of the firm’s headquarters.
Population density (PD) is the population density of the county where the firm is
headquartered (in ten thousands). Bachelor's degree (BS) is the percent of total labor forces
people who have completed a Bachelor's degree in the county. The PI variable is the personal
income of the county where the firm is headquartered (in ten thousands).
Moreover, we measure firm headquarters locations reported in financial annual reports.
Headquarters locations are generally chosen in the early life of a firm. Furthermore, Pirinsky
and Wang (2006) argue that relocations of headquarters are infrequent. Therefore, we regard
firm location as a predetermined variable and treat the concentration of companies and
organizations in the firm’s vicinity as primarily a source of exogenous variation.
3. Theories and hypotheses
In this section, we introduce the main hypotheses on the firm location effect on its
management team size and reputation.
Main Hypothesis: Remotely located firms tend to have poor management size and reputation.
Knyazeva et al. (2011) argue that firms located near the urban have higher board quality
(independence), firm value, operating performance. Francis et al. (2012) demonstrate that
rural firms may have CEO turnover rate. Moreover, opportunity cost is considerable for
directors with full-time potions in distant locations. Hence, firms located far from urban
hardly recruit prospective managers and tend to have lower MS&R.
8. 8
Loughran (2008) demonstrate that an urban firms issues equity, by employing a
higher-quality underwriter than otherwise similar rural firm. Knyazeva et al. (2011) show that
a firm located in the larger local human resource (director) pool has better board quality
(measured as independent directors). Therefore, we can reasonably hypothesize that a firm’s
distance to urban negatively relates to its management team size and reputation.
4. Data and sample selection
4.1. Data sources and selection
The sample used in this study that the dependent variable, management team size and
reputation), is mainly hand-collected from Taiwanese Security and Exchange Commission
website. The relevance information of executive officers, including present professional title,
joining date, educational background, past experiences, outside positions, are disclosed in
financial annual reports and proxy statement. Moreover, data of computing the firm quality
and control variables are from TEJ.
The independent variables of corporate location, transportation, population density and
ZIP code are hand-collected from financial annual reports, and the websites of Chung-Hwa
Post Co. and Taiwan Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics. The sample of
this study includes only those firms whose data exist in both Taiwan SEC and TEJ. We take
away that firm is financial industries. After the above screening criteria, there are a totally
fifteen different kinds of geography characteristics data and 9,040 firm-year observations
from year 2006 to 2012 with both variables of MS&R and distance to city.
4.2. Geography variables
We use several measures for geography effect. We mainly estimate that distance of firm
headquarter (DIST) to local city hall in Taiwan by the tool of GoogleMap. Similarly, other
distance measures are also calculated by the tool of GoogleMap, including the DIST_MTRA,
9. 9
DIST_TRA, DIST_HSR, DIST_NAirport, and DIST_Airport variables. These variables are
belong to the measures of transportation, similar with John et al. (2011) and Yang and Chen
(2012).
Moreover, some non-distance related geography variables are also useful in evaluating
the remoteness of the firm, such as personal income (PI), population density (PD), firm
density (IND_D), and bank density (Bank_D). In addition, we also use percentage of people
who have earned Bachelor's degree (BS) to capture the level of education in the county. We
presume higher percentage of educated people indicate close to the metropolitan area.
4.3.Other Control Variables
This study uses the some firm characteristics variables as control variables and
demonstrates these variables in the following. Financial leverage (LEV) is defined as the ratio
of total debt book value (debt in current liability plus long-term debt) to asset market value
(sum of total debt book value and equity market value). Return on assets (ROA) is the ratio of
net income divided by total assets, representing a firm's profitability. Moreover we consider
the volatility of ROA which is measured by standard deviation of past 5-year ROA data.
INTANG is defined as intangible assets divided by total assets, and OCF is measured by
operating cash flow divided by total asset. However, most of firms are not with the relevant
scale of asset, we use firm size variable to control the difference which is measured by nature
logarithm of total asset.
The LNAT variable is defined as the log of the firm’s asset. Fage is the age of the firm.
R&D intensity (R&D) is defined as R&D related expenses divided by total asset. The data for
R&D related expense is collected from TEJ. Market-to-book (MB) is the ratio of firm’s
market equity value to book equity value ratio, which the higher ratio represent firm with
higher value added to the shareholder. INST is the ratio of institutional holding to total
outstanding shares. In this study we also consider the dividend yield (DY), due to higher
10. 10
dividend payout would affect firm asset value.
4.4. Summary statistics
Table 2 shows the sample distribution. The sample includes 9,040 annual firm
observations. Table 3 presents the summary statistics of MS&R variables, geography variable,
and control variables used in the empirical analyses. On average, 68.36% and 76.26% are
respectively located in top five cities and north cities, 9.43 kilometers is distance to local city
hall, and 12.36 and 29.98 kilometers to are the distances to major TRA stations and
international airport, respectively.
Moreover, the average size of a firm’s management team (TSIZE) is 9.27, on average,
1.82% of managers sit on non-profit boards (BNP), 28.99% serve as board members in other
companies (BOARD).
[Insert Table 2 here]
[Insert Table 3 here]
5. Empirical tests and results
5.1. Panel data analyses: Single variate analyses
This study employs Eq.(1) to explore the firm location effect on firm’s MS&R by using
9,040 Taiwanese firm-year observations from year 2006 to 2012. The fixed effects (industry
and year) and heteroskedasticity issues are considered in these results.
Reput = + + (1)
Reput= TSIZE, BNP, BOARD
LOC= Distance related variables v.s. Non-distance related variables
Where Distance related variables: DIST, DIST_TPE, DIST_MTRA, DIST_TRA, DIST_HSR,
11. 11
DIST_NAirport, DIST_Airport, Metro, Five, and North.
Non-distance related variables: IND_D, Bank_D, PD, BS, and PI
Table 4, 5 and 6 exhibit the results of firm location effect on managerial team size and
reputation, respectively. Panel A of Table 4, 5, and 6 respectively show that most of distance
related geography variables (DIST, DIST_TPE, DIST_MTRA, DIST_TRA, DIST_HSR,
DIST_NAirport, DIST_Airport) significantly and negatively relate to managerial team size
(TSIZE) and reputation (Board, BNP) while the dummy variables of major cities and metro
transportation (Metro, Five, and North) have the opposite impacts. The results reveal that
long distances to local city hall, major city, major railway stations, and international airports
unlikely attract managers with high reputation to join the firm. Moreover, the Five variable
significantly and positively relates to the management team size while the North variable
insignificantly relates to it. It reveals that a firm located in big five cities has more attraction
than the north cities for general managers. Furthermore, the results also reveal that a firm
located in the north cities has more attraction than big five cities for managers with high
reputation, measured by Board or BNP variables.
Panel B of Table 4, 5, and 6 respectively show that most of non-distance related
geography variables significantly and positively relate to managerial team size (TSIZE) and
reputation (Board, BNP). Especially, the empirical results point out that the BS variable and
local bank density are both positively related to the reputation of executive officer (BNP,
Board). It reveals that a firm’s location with higher educational or financial activity density
has bigger human pool and then attracts more talents to join the firm.
According the above discussions, these empirical results preliminarily confirm the main
hypothesis.
[Insert Table 4 here]
12. 12
[Insert Table 5 here]
[Insert Table 6 here]
5.2. Panel data analyses: Controlling for firm size and other variables
To tell apart the effects of management team size and reputation from those of firm size,
we add twelve control variables. This section employs Eq.(2) to explore the local effect on
management team reputation by using 9,040 Taiwanese firm observations from year 2006 to
2012. The fixed effects (industry and year) and heteroskedasticity issues are considered in
these results.
= + + + + + + !"# + $%&
+ '()* )+ + , " + - )* + "(
+ ().* + + (2)
Reput= TSIZE, BNP, BOARD
GEO= Distance related variables, Non-distance related variables
Where Distance related variables: DIST, DIST_TPE, DIST_MTRA, DIST_TRA, DIST_HSR,
DIST_NAirport, DIST_Airport, Metro, Five, and North.
Non-distance related variables: IND_D, Bank_D, PD, BS, and PI
Equation (2) explores the local effects on management team reputation with adding the
control variables. As above mentioned, we use the variables of TSIZE, Board, and BNP.
Table 7, 8, 9 present the empirical results of we used based on equation (2), which present the
location effect on TSIZE, Board, and BNP with control variables, respectively.
Panel A of Table 7, 8, and 9 respectively show that most of distance related geography
variables still significantly and negatively relate to managerial team size (TSIZE) and
reputation (Board, BNP) while the dummy variables of major cities and metro transportation
(Metro, Five, and North) have the opposite impacts. In addition, Panel B of Table 7, 8, and 9
13. 13
respectively show that most of non-distance related geography variables still significantly and
positively relate to managerial team size (TSIZE) and reputation (Board, BNP). These results
provide the more robust evidences for our main hypothesis.
[Insert Table 7 here]
[Insert Table 8 here]
[Insert Table 9 here]
6. Conclusion
This study explores whether or not the firm location geography effects on
management team size and reputation by employing the 9,040 firm-year observations of
hand-collected MS&R data from year 2006 to 2012. Empirical results of this study show that
firm location characteristics, including distance and non-distance related geography variables,
have significant impacts on MS&R. A firm with the headquarter location far from urban
would have small team size and poor management team reputation, such as the low
percentage of corporate boards (except their own firm) that management team members sit on
(later denoted as Board) and the low percentage of non-profit corporate boards that
management team members sit on (later denoted as BNP). In addition, the firm with the
headquarter location far from major railway stations and airports also have lower team size
and poor management team reputation. Furthermore, the results also reveal that a firm located
in big five cities has more attraction than the north cities for general managers while has the
opposite effects for managers with high reputation. Moreover, the results are robust when
controlling for other well-known variables.
14. 14
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.
16. 16
Table 1. Proxies of Management Team Size and Reputation
This study follows Chemmanur et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2011), and Chen et al. (2013) to
employ the variables of team size and reputation as the main proxies of management team
quality. The variables in each dimension are as follows.
Dimensions Measures Description
Team Size and
Reputation
TSIZE The number of executive officers (above vice president) on a
firm’s management team
BOARD The percentage of corporate boards (except their own firm)
that management team members sit on
BNP The percentage of non-profit corporate boards that
management team members sit on
17. 17
Table 2. Sample Distribution
The sample period is yearly between 2006 and 2012. During the sample period, the sample includes
9,040 annual firm observations. Tables reported are the numbers of pooled observations in the given
years. The located subsamples are sorted by Taiwanese cities and counties.
City/Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Taipei City 390 399 402 407 419 420 431 2,868
New Taipei City 225 228 233 239 242 247 259 1,673
Keelung City 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 28
Taoyuan County 147 153 157 163 166 168 171 1,125
Yilan County 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
Hsinchu City 100 107 108 110 113 113 114 765
Hsinchu County 51 57 62 61 65 65 67 428
Miaoli County 18 18 19 19 19 19 19 131
Taichung City 74 75 77 81 83 85 89 564
Nantou County 9 10 10 10 10 10 10 69
Changhua County 20 21 23 24 24 25 26 163
Yunlin County 9 10 10 10 10 10 11 70
Chiayi County 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 28
Tainan City 66 66 68 69 72 72 75 488
Pingtung County 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 39
Kaohsiung City 79 82 84 84 85 85 88 587
Taitung County 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
Total 1,203 1,241 1,268 1,293 1,324 1,335 1,376 9,040
18. 18
Table 3. Summary Statistics of Major Variables
This table presents the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum and minimum of major variables used in empirical
analyses. TSIZE is a firm’s management team size, defined as executive officers with a rank of vice president or higher. BNP
is the percentage of non-profit board management team members serve as. Board is percentage of other firms’ boards that
management team members serve as. The DIST/ DIST_TPE variables are the distances in kilometers to the located city hall/
the Taipei city hall. The DIST_MTRA/ DIST_TRA/ DIST_HSR variables represent the distances in kilometers to the closest
top-fifteen railway stations/ the closest railway station/ the closest high-speed railway station. The DIST_NAirport/
DIST_Airport variables represent the distances in kilometers to the closest international airports in north areas of Taiwan/ the
closest international airports. The Metro/ Five/ North variables are dummy variables that the values equal to one if the
located city of firm headquarter has metro system/ belongs to five big cities/ belongs to the north areas of Taiwan. Industry
density (IND_D) is the number of firms per unit squared kilometer. The Bank_D variable is the percentage of banks in the
same three-digit ZIP radius of the firm’s headquarters. Population density (PD) is the population density of the county where
the firm is headquartered (in ten thousands). Bachelor's degree (BS) is the percent of total labor forces people who have
completed a Bachelor's degree in the county. The PI variable is the personal income of the county where the firm is
headquartered (in ten thousands). ROA is the ratio of net income to book value of assets. ROAV is the volatility of ROA.
LEV is financial leverage, defined as the book value of debt divided by total asset market value. Fage is the age of firm.
INTANG is defined as intangible assets divided by total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio, defined as the market value
of equity divided by the book value of equity. LNAT is the natural logarithm of the book value of the firm’s assets at the end
of the fiscal year. R&D intensity (RD) is defined as R&D related expense divided by total asset. OCF is used by operating
cash flow divided by total asset. Dividend yield (DY) is dividend yield. INST and ODIR are the institutional investors’
holdings and the number of outside directors, respectively.
Variables Mean Median Std. dev Min Max
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Management Quality Variables
TSIZE 9.2659 8.0000 6.3447 1.0000 77.0000
BNP 0.0182 0.0000 0.0833 0.0000 1.0000
Board 0.2899 0.2500 0.2456 0.0000 1.0000
Variables Mean Median Std. dev Min Max
Panel B: Summary Geography Variables
DIST 9.4250 6.6000 8.2538 0.1000 98.7000
DIST_TPE 87.7544 37.0000 115.6706 0.2300 467.7000
Metro 0.4622 0.0000 0.4986 0.0000 1.0000
DIST_MTRA 12.3617 8.2000 17.0668 0.5500 97.4000
DIST_TRA 4.8582 3.8000 4.0255 0.1500 45.3000
DIST_HSR 10.0471 8.2000 8.5979 0.0000 116.0000
DIST_Airport 29.9816 22.1000 23.9031 3.9300 187.3000
DIST_NAirport 78.1057 25.1000 106.4149 3.9300 439.7000
Five 0.6913 1.0000 0.4620 0.0000 1.0000
North 0.7583 1.0000 0.4281 0.0000 1.0000
BS 0.3015 0.2955 0.1132 0.0778 0.5621
PI 39.7802 35.8283 8.2200 24.3559 52.4598
PD 0.4200 0.1887 0.3835 0.0064 0.9835
IND_D 217.6556 57.5781 257.8320 0.2816 615.9713
Bank_D 0.0171 0.0124 0.0148 0.0000 0.0494
Variables Mean Median Std. dev Min Max
Panel C: Summary Statistics of Control Variables
Fage 25.3232 23.2890 12.5790 0.2082 66.7151
ODIR 2.7264 3.0000 1.7208 0.0000 16.0000
OCF 0.0676 0.0676 0.1197 -0.9764 1.5692
LNTA 15.2151 15.0309 1.4446 9.7953 21.4384
INST 0.3632 0.3280 0.2261 0.0000 1.0000
LEV 0.2095 0.1795 0.1876 0.0000 1.7548
ROA 4.2701 4.6600 11.2959 -438.8600 85.7600
ROAV 5.5677 4.0118 5.8014 0.1109 191.7515
INTANG 0.0148 0.0049 0.0336 0.0000 0.4988
MB 1.7279 1.2800 3.0255 0.0700 192.9900
DY 3.6879 3.4300 3.4987 0.0000 47.4700
RD 0.0266 0.0109 0.0440 0.0000 0.6424
19. 19
Table 4. The Effects of Firm Location on Management Team Size
This table includes two panels, panel A and panel B. Panel A shows the results of ten different panel regression model with the variables of management team
size (TSIZE) as the dependent variable against various explanatory variables of distance-related geography characteristics variables (DIST, DIST_TPE,
DIST_MTRA, DIST_TRA, DIST_HSR, DIST_NAirport, DIST_Airport, Metro, Five, and North) using data of 9,040 annual firm observations from year 2006
to 2012. Panel B shows the results of five different panel regression model with the variables of management team size (TSIZE) as the dependent variable
against various explanatory variables of non-distance related geography characteristics variables (IND_D, Bank_D, PD, BS, and PI). The fixed effects
(industry and year) and heteroskedasticity issues are considered in these results. This table presents the model coefficients and Adjusted R-squared. The
t-statistics calculated by heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for each coefficient appears immediately underneath. The signs of “*, **, ***”
represent the significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A. The effects of distance-related geography characteristics variables on management team size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE
DIST -0.0358***
(-5.15)
DIST_TPE -0.0013**
(-2.46)
Metro 1.1245***
(7.97)
DIST_MTRA -0.0474***
(-6.07)
DIST_TRA -0.0056
(-0.38)
DIST_HSR -0.0278***
(-3.96)
DIST_Airport -0.0205***
(-7.76)
DIST_NAirport -0.0011*
(-1.87)
Five 1.0133***
(7.30)
North 0.1404
(1.00)
Constant 9.5446***
(50.10)
9.3219***
(51.09)
8.7262***
(49.39)
9.5798***
(50.98)
9.2334***
(49.09)
9.5299***
(47.72)
9.8218***
(49.70)
9.2900***
(51.18)
8.5055***
(44.85)
9.1001***
(45.74)
Observations 9040 9040 9040 9040 9040 7402 9040 9040 9040 9040
R2
0.0030 0.0014 0.0084 0.0037 0.0008 0.0020 0.0067 0.0011 0.0061 0.0009
20. 20
Table 4. The Effects of Firm Location on Management Team Size (Cont.)
Panel B. The effects of non-distance related geography characteristics variables on management team
size
Industry density (IND_D) is the number of firms per unit squared kilometer. The Bank_D variable is the percentage of banks
in the same three-digit ZIP radius of the firm’s headquarters. Population density (PD) is the population density of the county
where the firm is headquartered (in ten thousands). Bachelor's degree (BS) is the percent of total labor forces people who
have completed a Bachelor's degree in the county. The PI variable is the personal income of the county where the firm is
headquartered (in ten thousands).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE
BS 3.0325***
(5.30)
PI 0.0672***
(7.33)
PD 1.6527***
(7.99)
IND_D 0.0025***
(7.88)
Bank_D 20.0956***
(3.83)
Constant 8.2736***
(34.54)
6.5525***
(17.05)
8.5112***
(46.18)
8.6518***
(48.40)
8.8594***
(46.80)
Observations 9040 9040 9040 9040 9040
R2
0.0037 0.0079 0.0101 0.0102 0.0029
21. 21
Table 5. The Effects of Firm Location on Management Team Reputation (Measured by Board variable)
This table includes two panels, panel A and panel B. Panel A shows the results of ten different panel regression model with the variables of management team
reputation (Board) as the dependent variable against various explanatory variables of distance-related geography characteristics variables (DIST, DIST_TPE,
DIST_MTRA, DIST_TRA, DIST_HSR, DIST_NAirport, DIST_Airport, Metro, Five, and North) using data of 9,040 annual firm observations from year 2006
to 2012. Panel B shows the results of five different panel regression model with the variables of management team reputation (Board) as the dependent
variable against various explanatory variables of non-distance related geography characteristics variables (IND_D, Bank_D, PD, BS, and PI). The fixed
effects (industry and year) and heteroskedasticity issues are considered in these results. This table presents the model coefficients and Adjusted R-squared.
The t-statistics calculated by heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for each coefficient appears immediately underneath. The signs of “*, **, ***”
represent the significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A. The effects of distance-related geography characteristics variables on management team reputation (measured by Board variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Board Board Board Board Board Board Board Board Board Board
DIST -0.0022***
(-7.53)
DIST_TPE -0.0001***
(-3.78)
Metro 0.0322***
(6.06)
DIST_MTRA -0.0023***
(-6.78)
DIST_TRA -0.0035***
(-6.01)
DIST_HSR -0.0014***
(-4.90)
DIST_Airport -0.0006***
(-5.59)
DIST_NAirport -0.0001***
(-3.52)
Five 0.0235***
(4.19)
North 0.0330***
(5.20)
Constant 0.2901***
(39.15)
0.2773***
(38.85)
0.2557***
(35.57)
0.2874***
(39.09)
0.2862***
(38.29)
0.2870***
(37.35)
0.2878***
(37.91)
0.2766***
(38.84)
0.2533***
(32.24)
0.2445***
(29.29)
Observations 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036 7400 9036 9036 9036 9036
R2
0.0105 0.0068 0.0093 0.0097 0.0084 0.0064 0.0087 0.0066 0.0071 0.0082
22. 22
Table 5. The Effects of Firm Location on Management Team Reputation (Measured by
Board variable) (Cont.)
Panel B. The effects of non-distance related geography characteristics variables on management team
reputation (measured by Board variable)
Industry density (IND_D) is the number of firms per unit squared kilometer. The Bank_D variable is the percentage of banks
in the same three-digit ZIP radius of the firm’s headquarters. Population density (PD) is the population density of the county
where the firm is headquartered (in ten thousands). Bachelor's degree (BS) is the percent of total labor forces people who
have completed a Bachelor's degree in the county. The PI variable is the personal income of the county where the firm is
headquartered (in ten thousands).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Board Board Board Board Board
BS 0.1240***
(5.47)
PI 0.0024***
(7.37)
PD 0.0452***
(6.35)
IND_D 0.0001***
(6.10)
Bank_D 1.0787***
(5.87)
Constant 0.2314***
(23.77)
0.1741***
(11.89)
0.2505***
(33.55)
0.2550***
(35.21)
0.2509***
(33.60)
Observations 9036 9036 9036 9036 9036
R2
0.0085 0.0114 0.0098 0.0095 0.0092
23. 23
Table 6. The Effects of Firm Location on Management Team Reputation (Measured by BNP variable)
This table includes two panels, panel A and panel B. Panel A shows the results of ten different panel regression model with the variables of management team
reputation (BNP) as the dependent variable against various explanatory variables of distance-related geography characteristics variables (DIST, DIST_TPE,
DIST_MTRA, DIST_TRA, DIST_HSR, DIST_NAirport, DIST_Airport, Metro, Five, and North) using data of 9,040 annual firm observations from year 2006
to 2012. Panel B shows the results of five different panel regression model with the variables of management team reputation (BNP) as the dependent
variable against various explanatory variables of non-distance related geography characteristics variables (IND_D, Bank_D, PD, BS, and PI). The fixed
effects (industry and year) and heteroskedasticity issues are considered in these results. This table presents the model coefficients and Adjusted R-squared.
The t-statistics calculated by heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for each coefficient appears immediately underneath. The signs of “*, **, ***”
represent the significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A. The effects of distance-related geography characteristics variables on management team reputation (measured by BNP variable)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP
DIST -0.0002***
(-3.20)
DIST_TPE -0.0000***
(-3.02)
Metro -0.0087***
(-4.91)
DIST_MTRA -0.0001
(-1.06)
DIST_TRA -0.0007***
(-4.07)
DIST_HSR -0.0002
(-1.38)
DIST_Airport 0.0003***
(5.83)
DIST_NAirport -0.0000***
(-4.55)
Five -0.0211***
(-7.83)
North 0.0102***
(5.28)
Constant 0.0189***
(7.97)
0.0180***
(7.93)
0.0201***
(8.27)
0.0173***
(7.51)
0.0198***
(8.33)
0.0185***
(7.40)
0.0086***
(3.57)
0.0188***
(8.18)
0.0310***
(9.82)
0.0089***
(3.59)
Observations 8219 8219 8219 8219 8219 6732 8219 8219 8219 8219
R2
0.0008 0.0008 0.0029 0.0004 0.0013 0.0008 0.0057 0.0014 0.0135 0.0028
24. 24
Table 6. The Effects of Firm Location on Management Team Reputation (Measured by
BNP variable) (Cont.)
Panel B. The effects of non-distance related geography characteristics variables on management team
reputation (measured by BNP variable)
Industry density (IND_D) is the number of firms per unit squared kilometer. The Bank_D variable is the percentage of banks
in the same three-digit ZIP radius of the firm’s headquarters. Population density (PD) is the population density of the county
where the firm is headquartered (in ten thousands). Bachelor's degree (BS) is the percent of total labor forces people who
have completed a Bachelor's degree in the county. The PI variable is the personal income of the county where the firm is
headquartered (in ten thousands).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP
BS 0.0457***
(4.81)
PI 0.0003***
(3.17)
PD -0.0029
(-1.21)
IND_D -0.0000*
(-1.92)
Bank_D 0.2192***
(3.31)
Constant 0.0026
(0.79)
0.0050
(1.19)
0.0177***
(7.21)
0.0179***
(7.51)
0.0129***
(5.48)
Observations 8219 8219 8219 8219 8219
R2
0.0041 0.0011 0.0005 0.0007 0.0017
25. 25
Table 7. The Effects of Firm Location on Management Team Size When Controlling for Other Determinant Variables
This table includes two panels, panel A and panel B. Panel A shows the results of ten different panel regression model with the variables of management team size
(TSIZE) as the dependent variable against various explanatory variables of distance-related geography characteristics variables (DIST, DIST_TPE, DIST_MTRA,
DIST_TRA, DIST_HSR, DIST_NAirport, DIST_Airport, Metro, Five, and North) using data of 9,040 annual firm observations from year 2006 to 2012. Panel B
shows the results of five different panel regression model with the variables of management team size (TSIZE) as the dependent variable against various explanatory
variables of non-distance related geography characteristics variables (IND_D, Bank_D, PD, BS, and PI). ROA is the ratio of net income to book value of assets.
ROAV is the volatility of ROA. LEV is financial leverage, defined as the book value of debt divided by total asset market value. Fage is the age of firm. INTANG is
defined as intangible assets divided by total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio, defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. LNAT
is the natural logarithm of the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the fiscal year. R&D intensity (RD) is defined as R&D related expense divided by total
asset. OCF is used by operating cash flow divided by total asset. Dividend yield (DY) is dividend yield. INST and ODIR are the institutional investors’ holdings and
the number of outside directors, respectively.. The fixed effects (industry and year) and heteroskedasticity issues are considered in these results. This table presents
the model coefficients and Adjusted R-squared. The t-statistics calculated by heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for each coefficient appears immediately
underneath. The signs of “*, **, ***” represent the significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A. The effects of distance-related geography characteristics variables on management team size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE
DIST -0.0194***
(-3.05)
DIST_TPE -0.0012**
(-2.36)
Metro 0.9309***
(7.48)
DIST_MTRA -0.0405***
(-6.00)
DIST_TRA -0.0360***
(-2.65)
DIST_HSR -0.0365***
(-5.41)
DIST_Airport -0.0159***
(-6.63)
DIST_NAirport -0.0009*
(-1.67)
Five 1.0835***
(8.75)
North 0.1260
(0.95)
27. 27
Table 7. The Effects of Firm Location on Management Team Size When Controlling for
Other Determinant Variables (Cont.)
Panel B. The effects of non-distance related geography characteristics variables on management team
size
Industry density (IND_D) is the number of firms per unit squared kilometer. The Bank_D variable is the percentage of banks
in the same three-digit ZIP radius of the firm’s headquarters. Population density (PD) is the population density of the county
where the firm is headquartered (in ten thousands). Bachelor's degree (BS) is the percent of total labor forces people who
have completed a Bachelor's degree in the county. The PI variable is the personal income of the county where the firm is
headquartered (in ten thousands).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE TSIZE
BS 0.5770
(1.10)
PI 0.0393***
(4.89)
PD 1.0449***
(5.80)
IND_D 0.0016***
(5.90)
Bank_D 2.3615
(0.50)
Fage -0.0031
(-0.46)
-0.0065
(-0.95)
-0.0081
(-1.19)
-0.0084
(-1.24)
-0.0035
(-0.52)
ODIR 0.0283
(0.75)
0.0379
(1.01)
0.0414
(1.10)
0.0427
(1.14)
0.0294
(0.78)
OCF -0.1097
(-0.23)
-0.0018
(-0.00)
0.0711
(0.15)
0.0878
(0.18)
-0.1022
(-0.21)
LNTA 1.9457***
(27.43)
1.9374***
(27.40)
1.9381***
(27.43)
1.9407***
(27.45)
1.9491***
(27.50)
INST 0.4449
(1.43)
0.3354
(1.09)
0.2995
(0.97)
0.2880
(0.94)
0.4579
(1.48)
LEV -1.7136***
(-4.59)
-1.4869***
(-4.04)
-1.4510***
(-3.95)
-1.4604***
(-3.98)
-1.7221***
(-4.63)
ROA -0.0222***
(-3.90)
-0.0214***
(-3.74)
-0.0209***
(-3.63)
-0.0209***
(-3.63)
-0.0224***
(-3.94)
ROAV -0.0429***
(-4.39)
-0.0431***
(-4.40)
-0.0430***
(-4.39)
-0.0430***
(-4.40)
-0.0429***
(-4.39)
INTANG 14.8344***
(6.08)
14.5822***
(6.02)
14.2521***
(5.91)
14.2335***
(5.91)
14.8749***
(6.12)
MB 0.0528**
(2.56)
0.0496**
(2.47)
0.0483**
(2.44)
0.0480**
(2.44)
0.0530**
(2.57)
DY 0.0554***
(2.84)
0.0558***
(2.87)
0.0556***
(2.86)
0.0552***
(2.84)
0.0548***
(2.81)
RD 2.1078
(1.56)
1.9414
(1.47)
2.4413*
(1.87)
2.7838**
(2.14)
2.3255*
(1.75)
Constant -20.6198***
(-20.75)
-21.8196***
(-20.86)
-20.6997***
(-20.92)
-20.6502***
(-20.89)
-20.5361***
(-20.78)
Observations 8844 8844 8844 8844 8844
R2
0.1967 0.1988 0.2000 0.2003 0.1966
28. 28
Table 8. The Effects of Firm Location on Management Team Reputation (Board) When Controlling for Other Determinant Variables
This table includes two panels, panel A and panel B. Panel A shows the results of ten different panel regression model with the variables of management team
reputation (Board) as the dependent variable against various explanatory variables of distance-related geography characteristics variables (DIST, DIST_TPE,
DIST_MTRA, DIST_TRA, DIST_HSR, DIST_NAirport, DIST_Airport, Metro, Five, and North) using data of 9,040 annual firm observations from year 2006 to 2012.
Panel B shows the results of five different panel regression model with the variables of management team reputation (Board) as the dependent variable against
various explanatory variables of non-distance related geography characteristics variables (IND_D, Bank_D, PD, BS, and PI). ROA is the ratio of net income to book
value of assets. ROAV is the volatility of ROA. LEV is financial leverage, defined as the book value of debt divided by total asset market value. Fage is the age of
firm. INTANG is defined as intangible assets divided by total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio, defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value
of equity. LNAT is the natural logarithm of the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the fiscal year. R&D intensity (RD) is defined as R&D related expense
divided by total asset. OCF is used by operating cash flow divided by total asset. Dividend yield (DY) is dividend yield. INST and ODIR are the institutional
investors’ holdings and the number of outside directors, respectively.. The fixed effects (industry and year) and heteroskedasticity issues are considered in these
results. This table presents the model coefficients and Adjusted R-squared. The t-statistics calculated by heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for each
coefficient appears immediately underneath. The signs of “*, **, ***” represent the significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A. The effects of distance-related geography characteristics variables on management team reputation (Board)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Board Board Board Board Board Board Board Board Board Board
DIST -0.0015***
(-5.14)
DIST_TPE -0.0001**
(-2.19)
Metro 0.0217***
(4.09)
DIST_MTRA -0.0016***
(-4.92)
DIST_TRA -0.0033***
(-5.80)
DIST_HSR -0.0013***
(-4.34)
DIST_Airport -0.0004***
(-3.25)
DIST_NAirport -0.0001**
(-1.98)
Five 0.0192***
(3.42)
North 0.0260***
(4.09)
30. 30
Table 8. The Effects of Firm Location on Management Team Reputation (Board) When
Controlling for Other Determinant Variables (Cont.)
Panel B. The effects of non-distance related geography characteristics variables on management team
reputation (Board)
Industry density (IND_D) is the number of firms per unit squared kilometer. The Bank_D variable is the percentage of banks
in the same three-digit ZIP radius of the firm’s headquarters. Population density (PD) is the population density of the county
where the firm is headquartered (in ten thousands). Bachelor's degree (BS) is the percent of total labor forces people who
have completed a Bachelor's degree in the county. The PI variable is the personal income of the county where the firm is
headquartered (in ten thousands).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Board Board Board Board Board
BS 0.0708***
(3.10)
PI 0.0015***
(4.57)
PD 0.0244***
(3.43)
IND_D 0.0000***
(3.27)
Bank_D 0.4413**
(2.41)
Fage 0.0011***
(4.28)
0.0010***
(3.84)
0.0010***
(3.88)
0.0010***
(3.89)
0.0011***
(3.95)
ODIR -0.0079***
(-4.66)
-0.0075***
(-4.45)
-0.0076***
(-4.47)
-0.0076***
(-4.46)
-0.0077***
(-4.54)
OCF -0.0039
(-0.16)
0.0004
(0.02)
0.0006
(0.02)
0.0006
(0.03)
-0.0027
(-0.11)
LNTA 0.0412***
(18.25)
0.0413***
(18.36)
0.0415***
(18.46)
0.0416***
(18.50)
0.0415***
(18.46)
INST -0.0438***
(-3.35)
-0.0459***
(-3.50)
-0.0447***
(-3.41)
-0.0447***
(-3.40)
-0.0430***
(-3.29)
LEV -0.0751***
(-4.84)
-0.0687***
(-4.41)
-0.0716***
(-4.60)
-0.0724***
(-4.65)
-0.0750***
(-4.81)
ROA -0.0006*
(-1.81)
-0.0005*
(-1.77)
-0.0005*
(-1.78)
-0.0005*
(-1.79)
-0.0006*
(-1.85)
ROAV -0.0010**
(-2.08)
-0.0010**
(-2.08)
-0.0010**
(-2.06)
-0.0010**
(-2.06)
-0.0010**
(-2.12)
INTANG -0.0701
(-1.10)
-0.0747
(-1.18)
-0.0777
(-1.22)
-0.0770
(-1.21)
-0.0664
(-1.04)
MB -0.0001
(-0.22)
-0.0002
(-0.38)
-0.0002
(-0.34)
-0.0002
(-0.34)
-0.0001
(-0.20)
DY 0.0007
(0.78)
0.0006
(0.72)
0.0006
(0.69)
0.0006
(0.68)
0.0006
(0.70)
RD 0.2321***
(3.57)
0.2512***
(3.90)
0.2699***
(4.18)
0.2772***
(4.30)
0.2535***
(3.92)
Constant -0.3544***
(-10.60)
-0.3918***
(-11.25)
-0.3474***
(-10.44)
-0.3464***
(-10.41)
-0.3440***
(-10.33)
Observations 8840 8840 8840 8840 8840
R2
0.0671 0.0684 0.0674 0.0673 0.0668
31. 31
Table 9. The Effects of Firm Location on Management Team Reputation (BNP) When Controlling for Other Determinant Variables
This table includes two panels, panel A and panel B. Panel A shows the results of ten different panel regression model with the variables of management team
reputation (BNP) as the dependent variable against various explanatory variables of distance-related geography characteristics variables (DIST, DIST_TPE,
DIST_MTRA, DIST_TRA, DIST_HSR, DIST_NAirport, DIST_Airport, Metro, Five, and North) using data of 9,040 annual firm observations from year 2006 to 2012.
Panel B shows the results of five different panel regression model with the variables of management team reputation (BNP) as the dependent variable against various
explanatory variables of non-distance related geography characteristics variables (IND_D, Bank_D, PD, BS, and PI). ROA is the ratio of net income to book value of
assets. ROAV is the volatility of ROA. LEV is financial leverage, defined as the book value of debt divided by total asset market value. Fage is the age of firm.
INTANG is defined as intangible assets divided by total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio, defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of
equity. LNAT is the natural logarithm of the book value of the firm’s assets at the end of the fiscal year. R&D intensity (RD) is defined as R&D related expense
divided by total asset. OCF is used by operating cash flow divided by total asset. Dividend yield (DY) is dividend yield. INST and ODIR are the institutional
investors’ holdings and the number of outside directors, respectively.. The fixed effects (industry and year) and heteroskedasticity issues are considered in these
results. This table presents the model coefficients and Adjusted R-squared. The t-statistics calculated by heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for each
coefficient appears immediately underneath. The signs of “*, **, ***” represent the significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Panel A. The effects of distance-related geography characteristics variables on management team reputation (BNP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP
DIST -0.0001*
(-1.75)
DIST_TPE -0.0000**
(-2.14)
Metro -0.0096***
(-5.62)
DIST_MTRA 0.0000
(0.02)
DIST_TRA -0.0005***
(-3.10)
DIST_HSR -0.0001
(-0.43)
DIST_Airport 0.0002***
(5.85)
DIST_NAirport -0.0000***
(-3.48)
Five -0.0196***
(-7.97)
North 0.0072***
(3.84)
33. 33
Table 9. The Effects of Firm Location on Management Team Reputation (BNP) When
Controlling for Other Determinant Variables (Cont.)
Panel B. The effects of non-distance related geography characteristics variables on management team
reputation (BNP)
Industry density (IND_D) is the number of firms per unit squared kilometer. The Bank_D variable is the percentage of banks
in the same three-digit ZIP radius of the firm’s headquarters. Population density (PD) is the population density of the county
where the firm is headquartered (in ten thousands). Bachelor's degree (BS) is the percent of total labor forces people who
have completed a Bachelor's degree in the county. The PI variable is the personal income of the county where the firm is
headquartered (in ten thousands).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BNP BNP BNP BNP BNP
BS 0.0312***
(3.21)
PI 0.0001
(1.55)
PD -0.0046**
(-2.15)
IND_D -0.0000***
(-2.68)
Bank_D 0.1662***
(2.75)
Fage -0.0001
(-1.03)
-0.0001
(-1.08)
-0.0001
(-0.76)
-0.0001
(-0.71)
-0.0001
(-1.38)
ODIR -0.0007*
(-1.65)
-0.0007
(-1.56)
-0.0008*
(-1.78)
-0.0008*
(-1.83)
-0.0007
(-1.52)
OCF -0.0088
(-0.99)
-0.0084
(-0.94)
-0.0098
(-1.10)
-0.0100
(-1.12)
-0.0083
(-0.93)
LNTA 0.0009
(1.40)
0.0011*
(1.70)
0.0012*
(1.90)
0.0012*
(1.90)
0.0010
(1.60)
INST 0.0063
(1.22)
0.0071
(1.41)
0.0082
(1.61)
0.0084*
(1.65)
0.0069
(1.34)
LEV -0.0125**
(-2.38)
-0.0129**
(-2.44)
-0.0152***
(-2.89)
-0.0154***
(-2.90)
-0.0126**
(-2.43)
ROA -0.0002*
(-1.89)
-0.0002**
(-1.99)
-0.0002**
(-2.09)
-0.0002**
(-2.10)
-0.0002*
(-1.95)
ROAV -0.0003**
(-2.34)
-0.0003**
(-2.29)
-0.0003**
(-2.27)
-0.0003**
(-2.27)
-0.0003**
(-2.38)
INTANG -0.0036
(-0.15)
-0.0026
(-0.11)
0.0008
(0.03)
0.0014
(0.06)
-0.0020
(-0.09)
MB 0.0001
(0.48)
0.0001
(0.52)
0.0001
(0.66)
0.0001
(0.68)
0.0001
(0.53)
DY 0.0002
(0.58)
0.0001
(0.42)
0.0001
(0.35)
0.0001
(0.35)
0.0001
(0.44)
RD 0.1887***
(5.21)
0.2029***
(5.69)
0.2046***
(5.76)
0.2029***
(5.73)
0.1988***
(5.57)
Constant -0.0029
(-0.29)
-0.0024
(-0.24)
0.0027
(0.28)
0.0026
(0.27)
0.0021
(0.22)
Observations 8041 8041 8041 8041 8041
R2
0.0163 0.0146 0.0149 0.0151 0.0153