This document summarizes a forensic investigation report produced by the TPR Investigation Group. The report details a case involving a hard drive found disconnected from a computer in a university laboratory. The report is divided into three phases: case management, evidence analysis, and case completion. In the case management phase, procedures for acquiring and documenting evidence from the crime scene are described. The evidence analysis phase outlines the process for examining the hard drive back in the forensic lab to find user accounts, files, and other digital evidence. Several forms are used to document the analysis. The report findings in phase three identify partitions, operating systems, user accounts, and a timeline of activity found on the drive during examination.
This document discusses interactive analytics for human timescales using feature sequences to calculate non-additive metrics like instant overlaps between large user groups. It describes Yahoo's advertising data warehouse that handles petabytes of data daily and provides normalized views and analytics across systems in milliseconds. Custom algorithms like feature sequence encoding enable exact overlap calculations in under a minute for billions of user events, compared to 19 hours for existing approaches.
Modul ini membahas tentang wudhu sebagai persiapan ibadah dalam Islam. Wudhu merupakan kewajiban bagi setiap Muslim sebelum melaksanakan shalat atau ibadah lainnya. Modul ini menjelaskan pengertian, rukun-rukun, syarat-syarat, dan sunah-sunah dalam melaksanakan wudhu sesuai ajaran agama Islam.
The lesson plan summarizes a Mandarin Chinese learning class that will cover Chinese pinyin, characters, words, grammar, conversions, and culture. It includes reviewing past lessons, learning new characters and words, practicing greetings, asking questions about time, and discussing Chinese tea culture. The class aims to improve students' reading, writing, speaking and cultural understanding of Mandarin Chinese.
The document describes research conducted by L. Torres, H. Gonzalez, J. Ojeda, and J. Monguet from the Barcelona Tech School of Engineers. The researchers conducted a virtual ethnography of Web 2.0 tools and environments. They observed participants' use of blogs, communities, and other tools. Based on their findings, they developed a descriptive model of a personal learning environment within Web 2.0.
El sueño de Don Bosco a los nueve años le mostró que debía tratar a los niños con amor y paciencia en lugar de castigarlos. Una mujer misteriosa le indicó que debía tratar a las personas como ella trataba a los animales, convirtiendo a los animales fieros en corderos mansos. Esto le enseñó que la paciencia es el valor más importante para educar a los niños. Otro relato describe cómo una profesora logró que un grupo de estudiantes trabajara de forma unida persuadiéndolos de la importancia
iOS 7 introduces many UI changes, such as borderless buttons, translucent bars, and full-screen layout for view controllers. Using Xcode 5, you can build a project for iOS 7 and run it in iOS 7 Simulator to get a first glimpse of the way the app looks with iOS 7 UI.
1) Zaqueu era um chefe de coletores de impostos romano em Jerico, o que o tornava impopular entre seus compatriotas judeus.
2) Ao ouvir falar de Jesus, Zaqueu tentou vê-Lo, mas era pequeno e não conseguia por causa da multidão. Então subiu em uma figueira para ver Jesus quando Ele passasse.
3) Quando Jesus passou, chamou Zaqueu pelo nome e foi até sua casa, mostrando que não há pessoas "pequenas" ou "indignas" de receber a salva
This document discusses interactive analytics for human timescales using feature sequences to calculate non-additive metrics like instant overlaps between large user groups. It describes Yahoo's advertising data warehouse that handles petabytes of data daily and provides normalized views and analytics across systems in milliseconds. Custom algorithms like feature sequence encoding enable exact overlap calculations in under a minute for billions of user events, compared to 19 hours for existing approaches.
Modul ini membahas tentang wudhu sebagai persiapan ibadah dalam Islam. Wudhu merupakan kewajiban bagi setiap Muslim sebelum melaksanakan shalat atau ibadah lainnya. Modul ini menjelaskan pengertian, rukun-rukun, syarat-syarat, dan sunah-sunah dalam melaksanakan wudhu sesuai ajaran agama Islam.
The lesson plan summarizes a Mandarin Chinese learning class that will cover Chinese pinyin, characters, words, grammar, conversions, and culture. It includes reviewing past lessons, learning new characters and words, practicing greetings, asking questions about time, and discussing Chinese tea culture. The class aims to improve students' reading, writing, speaking and cultural understanding of Mandarin Chinese.
The document describes research conducted by L. Torres, H. Gonzalez, J. Ojeda, and J. Monguet from the Barcelona Tech School of Engineers. The researchers conducted a virtual ethnography of Web 2.0 tools and environments. They observed participants' use of blogs, communities, and other tools. Based on their findings, they developed a descriptive model of a personal learning environment within Web 2.0.
El sueño de Don Bosco a los nueve años le mostró que debía tratar a los niños con amor y paciencia en lugar de castigarlos. Una mujer misteriosa le indicó que debía tratar a las personas como ella trataba a los animales, convirtiendo a los animales fieros en corderos mansos. Esto le enseñó que la paciencia es el valor más importante para educar a los niños. Otro relato describe cómo una profesora logró que un grupo de estudiantes trabajara de forma unida persuadiéndolos de la importancia
iOS 7 introduces many UI changes, such as borderless buttons, translucent bars, and full-screen layout for view controllers. Using Xcode 5, you can build a project for iOS 7 and run it in iOS 7 Simulator to get a first glimpse of the way the app looks with iOS 7 UI.
1) Zaqueu era um chefe de coletores de impostos romano em Jerico, o que o tornava impopular entre seus compatriotas judeus.
2) Ao ouvir falar de Jesus, Zaqueu tentou vê-Lo, mas era pequeno e não conseguia por causa da multidão. Então subiu em uma figueira para ver Jesus quando Ele passasse.
3) Quando Jesus passou, chamou Zaqueu pelo nome e foi até sua casa, mostrando que não há pessoas "pequenas" ou "indignas" de receber a salva
This document is a report on cyber and digital forensics submitted by three students from G.H. Raisoni College of Engineering in Nagpur, India. The report discusses digital forensic methodology, tools used in digital analysis like Backtrack and Nuix, techniques such as live analysis and analyzing deleted files, analyzing USB device history from the Windows registry, and concludes that digital forensics is an evolving field with no set standards yet and constant updates are needed to investigate modern cyber crimes.
This document discusses digital evidence and its analysis methodology. Digital evidence includes information stored on electronic devices like computers, cell phones, hard drives, etc. It must be properly seized, secured and analyzed to avoid contamination. A bit-stream image of storage devices should be created and verified using hashing. Files, slack space and unallocated space are analyzed for keywords. File dates, names and anomalies are documented. The Information Technology Act of 2000 covers various cybercrimes and penalties.
This document proposes a framework for cross drive correlation using Normalized Compression Distance (NCD) as a similarity metric. The framework consists of the following sub-tasks:
1. Disk image preprocessing - Extracting data blocks from disk images without parsing file system data.
2. NCD similarity correlation - Calculating NCD scores between all pairs of data blocks to determine similarity.
3. Reports and graphical output - Generating reports on correlated drives and graphical representations of similarity scores.
4. Data block extraction - Extracting data blocks that satisfy a given similarity threshold for further analysis.
The framework aims to provide preliminary analysis of evidence spanning multiple disks in an automated manner without requiring in-depth
Computer forensics is the scientific process of preserving, identifying, extracting, and interpreting data from computer systems, networks, wireless communications, and storage devices in a way that is legally admissible. It involves using special tools to conduct a forensic examination of devices, networks, internet activities, and images in order to discover potential digital evidence. Common computer forensic tools are used to recover deleted files, analyze financial and communications records, and investigate crimes like fraud, identity theft, and child pornography.
The document provides an overview of a training on practical demonstrations of digital forensic tools. It introduces the instructor and their qualifications. The agenda includes an introduction to digital forensics, computer forensic processes, and demonstrations of forensic tools like FTK Imager and EnCase. Key points covered are the forensic investigation process of acquiring, analyzing, and reporting evidence from a computer, and types of data like active, latent, and archival that can be extracted.
This report summarizes the selection process for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST reviewed 15 initial candidate algorithms and selected 5 as finalists: MARS, RC6, Rijndael, Serpent, and Twofish. These finalists underwent further public analysis based on security, performance on software and hardware platforms, and other factors. Based on this analysis, NIST selected Rijndael as the AES due to its high security, efficient implementation across platforms, and simplicity of description.
05 Duplication and Preservation of Digital evidence - NotesKranthi
The document discusses best practices for preserving digital evidence from a crime scene, including:
1) Making bit-stream backups of storage devices before processing to avoid altering the original data.
2) Transporting the computer system securely to a forensics lab for further analysis.
3) Maintaining a detailed evidence notebook and chain of custody to document all evidence handling procedures.
This document provides an overview and outline of a thesis on single person pose recognition and tracking using a single camera. The thesis aims to improve the performance of an interactive spatial game controlled by human poses. Key areas discussed include background subtraction using mixtures of Gaussians, particle filtering for torso tracking, and classifiers for pose recognition. The experimental setup involves video recordings of people in different conditions for testing and training classifiers. The thesis contributes improvements to hand detection and adds a classifier to detect non-poses for better game control.
This document summarizes current digital forensic techniques and discusses challenges posed by new technologies. It describes standard techniques like imaging hard drives to gather evidence. Live acquisitions of volatile memory are also discussed. Solid state drives pose difficulties as their controllers can automatically delete data through garbage collection. Private browsers also aim to not store artifacts, complicating investigations. Overall, the document outlines investigative methods and how new technologies increasingly challenge examiners' ability to recover digital evidence.
This document is a master's thesis submitted by Amaury Van Bemten to the University of Liège in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master of Science degree in Computer Science and Engineering. The thesis explores using service discovery to apply policies in networks. It aims to enable sharing of resources across multiple subnets and define global access control rules. The thesis is divided into two parts - extending service discovery across routers, and implementing a graphical user interface for administrators to define security policies in the network.
Automated Live Forensics Analysis for Volatile Data AcquisitionIJERA Editor
The increase in sophisticated attack on computers needs the assistance of Live forensics to uncover the evidence
since traditional forensics methods doesn’t collect volatile data. The volatile data can ease the difficulty towards
investigation in fact it can provide investigator with rich information towards solving a case. Here we are trying
to eliminate the complexity involved in normal process by automating the process of acquisition and analyzing
at the same time providing integrity towards evidence data through python scripting.
This document provides an overview of computer forensics. It defines computer forensics as using analytical techniques to identify, collect, and examine digital evidence. The objective is usually to provide evidence of specific activities. Computer forensics is used for cases like employee internet abuse, data theft, fraud, and criminal investigations. The document outlines the history, approaches, tools, advantages, and disadvantages of computer forensics. It describes securing systems, recovering files, decrypting data, and documenting procedures used in investigations.
Software defined networks (SDNs) is one of the most emerging field and will cause
revolution in the Information Technology (IT) industry. The flexibility in the SDNs
make it most attractive technology to adopt in all type of networks. This flexibility in
the network made the SDNs more prone to the security issues so it is important to cater
these issues in start from the SDN design up-to the deployment and operations. This
Paper proposed a DNS based approach to prevent SDNs from botnet by applying one
million web database concept without reading packet payload. To do any activity, Bot
need to communicate with CnC and requires DNS to IP resolution. For any request
having destination port 53 (DNS) will be checked. The protocol will get all matching
traffic and will send it to 1Mdb. If URL Exists in 1Mdb then do not respond otherwise
send reply with remove flow and block flow to the controller. This approach will use
Machine learning algorithms to classify the traffic as BOT or normal traffic. Naive
Bayes Classifier is used to classify the data using python programming language. The
selection of dataset is very important task for machine learning based botnet detection
and prevention techniques. The poor selection of dataset possibly lead to biased results.
The real world and publically available dataset is a good choice for evaluation of botnet
detection techniques. To meet these criteria, publicly available CTU-43 botnet dataset
has been used. This dataset provide packet dumps (pcap files) of seven real botnets
(Neris, Rbot, Virut, Murlo, Menti, Sogou, and NSIS). We will use these files to generate
botnet traffic for evaluation and test our model. To generate normal traffic, we selected
ISOT dataset. This dataset provides a single pcap file having normal traffic and traffic
for weladec and zeus botnet.
Lecture 09 - Memory Forensics.pdfL E C T U R E 9 B Y .docxsmile790243
Lecture 09 - Memory Forensics.pdf
L E C T U R E 9
B Y : D R . I B R A H I M B A G G I L I
Memory Forensic Analysis
P A R T 1
RAM overview
Volatility overview
http://www.bsatroop780.org/skills/images/ComputerMemory.gif
Understanding RAM
• Two main types of RAM
– Static
• Not refreshed
• Is still volatile
– Dynamic
• Modern computers
• Made up of a collection of cells
• Each cell contains a transistor and a capacitor
• Capacitors charge and discharge (1 and zeros)
• Periodically refreshed
RAM logical organization
• Programs run on computers
• Programs are made up of processes
– Processes are a set of resources used when executing an
instance of a program
– Processes do not generally access the physical memory directly
– Each process has a �virtual memory space�
• Allows operating system to stay in control of allocating memory
– Virtual memory space is made up of
• Pages (default size 4K)
• References (used to map virtual address to physical address)
• May also have a reference to data on the disk (Page file) – used to
free up RAM memory
RAM logical organization
! Each process is represented by an EPROCESS Block:
Normal memory
• Each process is represented by an _EPROCESS block.
• Contained within each _EPROCESS block is both a pointer to the next process
(fLink – Forward Link) and a pointer to the previous process (bLink – Back Link).
• When OS is operating, the _EPROCESS blocks and their pointers come
together to resemble a chain, which is known as a doubly-linked list.
• Chain is stored in kernel memory and is updated every time a process is
launched or terminated.
• Windows API walks this list from head to tail when enumerating processes via
Task Manager, for example.
Not so normal
• Hides processes from windows API
• Known as Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM)
• Involves manipulating the list of _EPROCESS blocks to �unlink� a
given process from the list
• By changing the forward link of process 1 to point to the third process,
and changing the �bLink� of process 3 to point to process 1, the
attacker�s process is no longer part of the list of _EPROCESS blocks.
• Since the Windows API uses this list to enumerate processes, the
malicious process will be hidden from the user but still able to operate
normally.
P A R T 2
Introduction to Memory
forensics
Before & Now
! Traditionally
! We have always been told to �pull the plug� on a live system
! This is done so that the reliability of the digital evidence is not
questioned
! Now
! People are considering live memory forensics
" Data relevant to the investigation may lie in memory
" Whole Disk Encryption….
Challenges in traditional method
• High volume of data (Aldestein, 2006)
– Increases the time in an investigation
– Increases storage capacity needed for forensic images
– Number of machines that could be included in th ...
This document summarizes a thesis submitted by S M Udara Rusiri Siyasinghe for the degree of Master of Computer Science at the University of Colombo School of Computing in January 2013. The thesis proposes a new file system called SEFS (Self Expiring File System) that allows users to highlight interested files with expiration dates so that the files are automatically deleted or moved upon expiration. SEFS would be implemented as a user space file system using the FUSE framework for Linux to focus only on the file expiring behavior while reusing existing file system operations. The design and implementation of SEFS aims to help users protect privacy and save disk space by automatically removing unwanted files over time.
This document provides an overview of computer forensics, including key terminology, how data is stored and retrieved from hard drives, and the process of acquiring forensic images. It discusses the difference between visible and latent data, and explains that visible data is what the operating system is aware of, like documents, while latent data includes things like file slack, RAM, and deleted files. It emphasizes that a forensic examiner must acquire data in a way that does not alter any bits and uses techniques like hashing to prove the integrity of acquired images.
MIL-STD-498, dated 5 December 1994, is hereby canceled. Information
regarding software development and documentation is now contained in the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)/Electronics Industries Association (EIA)
standard, IEEE/EIA 12207, “Information technology-Software life cycle processes”.
IEEE/EIA 12207 is packaged in three parts. The three parts are: IEEE/EIA 12207.0,
“Standard for Information Technology-Software life cycle processes”; IEEE/EIA
12207.1, “Guide for ISO/IEC 12207, Standard for Information Technology-Software life
cycle processes-Life cycle data”; and IEEE/EIA 12207.2, “Guide for ISO/IEC 12207,
Standard for Information Technology-Software life cycle processes-Implementation
considerations.”
The presentation is all about computer forensics. the process , the tools and its features and some example scenarios.. It will give you a great insight into the computer forensics
This document is a report on cyber and digital forensics submitted by three students from G.H. Raisoni College of Engineering in Nagpur, India. The report discusses digital forensic methodology, tools used in digital analysis like Backtrack and Nuix, techniques such as live analysis and analyzing deleted files, analyzing USB device history from the Windows registry, and concludes that digital forensics is an evolving field with no set standards yet and constant updates are needed to investigate modern cyber crimes.
This document discusses digital evidence and its analysis methodology. Digital evidence includes information stored on electronic devices like computers, cell phones, hard drives, etc. It must be properly seized, secured and analyzed to avoid contamination. A bit-stream image of storage devices should be created and verified using hashing. Files, slack space and unallocated space are analyzed for keywords. File dates, names and anomalies are documented. The Information Technology Act of 2000 covers various cybercrimes and penalties.
This document proposes a framework for cross drive correlation using Normalized Compression Distance (NCD) as a similarity metric. The framework consists of the following sub-tasks:
1. Disk image preprocessing - Extracting data blocks from disk images without parsing file system data.
2. NCD similarity correlation - Calculating NCD scores between all pairs of data blocks to determine similarity.
3. Reports and graphical output - Generating reports on correlated drives and graphical representations of similarity scores.
4. Data block extraction - Extracting data blocks that satisfy a given similarity threshold for further analysis.
The framework aims to provide preliminary analysis of evidence spanning multiple disks in an automated manner without requiring in-depth
Computer forensics is the scientific process of preserving, identifying, extracting, and interpreting data from computer systems, networks, wireless communications, and storage devices in a way that is legally admissible. It involves using special tools to conduct a forensic examination of devices, networks, internet activities, and images in order to discover potential digital evidence. Common computer forensic tools are used to recover deleted files, analyze financial and communications records, and investigate crimes like fraud, identity theft, and child pornography.
The document provides an overview of a training on practical demonstrations of digital forensic tools. It introduces the instructor and their qualifications. The agenda includes an introduction to digital forensics, computer forensic processes, and demonstrations of forensic tools like FTK Imager and EnCase. Key points covered are the forensic investigation process of acquiring, analyzing, and reporting evidence from a computer, and types of data like active, latent, and archival that can be extracted.
This report summarizes the selection process for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST reviewed 15 initial candidate algorithms and selected 5 as finalists: MARS, RC6, Rijndael, Serpent, and Twofish. These finalists underwent further public analysis based on security, performance on software and hardware platforms, and other factors. Based on this analysis, NIST selected Rijndael as the AES due to its high security, efficient implementation across platforms, and simplicity of description.
05 Duplication and Preservation of Digital evidence - NotesKranthi
The document discusses best practices for preserving digital evidence from a crime scene, including:
1) Making bit-stream backups of storage devices before processing to avoid altering the original data.
2) Transporting the computer system securely to a forensics lab for further analysis.
3) Maintaining a detailed evidence notebook and chain of custody to document all evidence handling procedures.
This document provides an overview and outline of a thesis on single person pose recognition and tracking using a single camera. The thesis aims to improve the performance of an interactive spatial game controlled by human poses. Key areas discussed include background subtraction using mixtures of Gaussians, particle filtering for torso tracking, and classifiers for pose recognition. The experimental setup involves video recordings of people in different conditions for testing and training classifiers. The thesis contributes improvements to hand detection and adds a classifier to detect non-poses for better game control.
This document summarizes current digital forensic techniques and discusses challenges posed by new technologies. It describes standard techniques like imaging hard drives to gather evidence. Live acquisitions of volatile memory are also discussed. Solid state drives pose difficulties as their controllers can automatically delete data through garbage collection. Private browsers also aim to not store artifacts, complicating investigations. Overall, the document outlines investigative methods and how new technologies increasingly challenge examiners' ability to recover digital evidence.
This document is a master's thesis submitted by Amaury Van Bemten to the University of Liège in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master of Science degree in Computer Science and Engineering. The thesis explores using service discovery to apply policies in networks. It aims to enable sharing of resources across multiple subnets and define global access control rules. The thesis is divided into two parts - extending service discovery across routers, and implementing a graphical user interface for administrators to define security policies in the network.
Automated Live Forensics Analysis for Volatile Data AcquisitionIJERA Editor
The increase in sophisticated attack on computers needs the assistance of Live forensics to uncover the evidence
since traditional forensics methods doesn’t collect volatile data. The volatile data can ease the difficulty towards
investigation in fact it can provide investigator with rich information towards solving a case. Here we are trying
to eliminate the complexity involved in normal process by automating the process of acquisition and analyzing
at the same time providing integrity towards evidence data through python scripting.
This document provides an overview of computer forensics. It defines computer forensics as using analytical techniques to identify, collect, and examine digital evidence. The objective is usually to provide evidence of specific activities. Computer forensics is used for cases like employee internet abuse, data theft, fraud, and criminal investigations. The document outlines the history, approaches, tools, advantages, and disadvantages of computer forensics. It describes securing systems, recovering files, decrypting data, and documenting procedures used in investigations.
Software defined networks (SDNs) is one of the most emerging field and will cause
revolution in the Information Technology (IT) industry. The flexibility in the SDNs
make it most attractive technology to adopt in all type of networks. This flexibility in
the network made the SDNs more prone to the security issues so it is important to cater
these issues in start from the SDN design up-to the deployment and operations. This
Paper proposed a DNS based approach to prevent SDNs from botnet by applying one
million web database concept without reading packet payload. To do any activity, Bot
need to communicate with CnC and requires DNS to IP resolution. For any request
having destination port 53 (DNS) will be checked. The protocol will get all matching
traffic and will send it to 1Mdb. If URL Exists in 1Mdb then do not respond otherwise
send reply with remove flow and block flow to the controller. This approach will use
Machine learning algorithms to classify the traffic as BOT or normal traffic. Naive
Bayes Classifier is used to classify the data using python programming language. The
selection of dataset is very important task for machine learning based botnet detection
and prevention techniques. The poor selection of dataset possibly lead to biased results.
The real world and publically available dataset is a good choice for evaluation of botnet
detection techniques. To meet these criteria, publicly available CTU-43 botnet dataset
has been used. This dataset provide packet dumps (pcap files) of seven real botnets
(Neris, Rbot, Virut, Murlo, Menti, Sogou, and NSIS). We will use these files to generate
botnet traffic for evaluation and test our model. To generate normal traffic, we selected
ISOT dataset. This dataset provides a single pcap file having normal traffic and traffic
for weladec and zeus botnet.
Lecture 09 - Memory Forensics.pdfL E C T U R E 9 B Y .docxsmile790243
Lecture 09 - Memory Forensics.pdf
L E C T U R E 9
B Y : D R . I B R A H I M B A G G I L I
Memory Forensic Analysis
P A R T 1
RAM overview
Volatility overview
http://www.bsatroop780.org/skills/images/ComputerMemory.gif
Understanding RAM
• Two main types of RAM
– Static
• Not refreshed
• Is still volatile
– Dynamic
• Modern computers
• Made up of a collection of cells
• Each cell contains a transistor and a capacitor
• Capacitors charge and discharge (1 and zeros)
• Periodically refreshed
RAM logical organization
• Programs run on computers
• Programs are made up of processes
– Processes are a set of resources used when executing an
instance of a program
– Processes do not generally access the physical memory directly
– Each process has a �virtual memory space�
• Allows operating system to stay in control of allocating memory
– Virtual memory space is made up of
• Pages (default size 4K)
• References (used to map virtual address to physical address)
• May also have a reference to data on the disk (Page file) – used to
free up RAM memory
RAM logical organization
! Each process is represented by an EPROCESS Block:
Normal memory
• Each process is represented by an _EPROCESS block.
• Contained within each _EPROCESS block is both a pointer to the next process
(fLink – Forward Link) and a pointer to the previous process (bLink – Back Link).
• When OS is operating, the _EPROCESS blocks and their pointers come
together to resemble a chain, which is known as a doubly-linked list.
• Chain is stored in kernel memory and is updated every time a process is
launched or terminated.
• Windows API walks this list from head to tail when enumerating processes via
Task Manager, for example.
Not so normal
• Hides processes from windows API
• Known as Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM)
• Involves manipulating the list of _EPROCESS blocks to �unlink� a
given process from the list
• By changing the forward link of process 1 to point to the third process,
and changing the �bLink� of process 3 to point to process 1, the
attacker�s process is no longer part of the list of _EPROCESS blocks.
• Since the Windows API uses this list to enumerate processes, the
malicious process will be hidden from the user but still able to operate
normally.
P A R T 2
Introduction to Memory
forensics
Before & Now
! Traditionally
! We have always been told to �pull the plug� on a live system
! This is done so that the reliability of the digital evidence is not
questioned
! Now
! People are considering live memory forensics
" Data relevant to the investigation may lie in memory
" Whole Disk Encryption….
Challenges in traditional method
• High volume of data (Aldestein, 2006)
– Increases the time in an investigation
– Increases storage capacity needed for forensic images
– Number of machines that could be included in th ...
This document summarizes a thesis submitted by S M Udara Rusiri Siyasinghe for the degree of Master of Computer Science at the University of Colombo School of Computing in January 2013. The thesis proposes a new file system called SEFS (Self Expiring File System) that allows users to highlight interested files with expiration dates so that the files are automatically deleted or moved upon expiration. SEFS would be implemented as a user space file system using the FUSE framework for Linux to focus only on the file expiring behavior while reusing existing file system operations. The design and implementation of SEFS aims to help users protect privacy and save disk space by automatically removing unwanted files over time.
This document provides an overview of computer forensics, including key terminology, how data is stored and retrieved from hard drives, and the process of acquiring forensic images. It discusses the difference between visible and latent data, and explains that visible data is what the operating system is aware of, like documents, while latent data includes things like file slack, RAM, and deleted files. It emphasizes that a forensic examiner must acquire data in a way that does not alter any bits and uses techniques like hashing to prove the integrity of acquired images.
MIL-STD-498, dated 5 December 1994, is hereby canceled. Information
regarding software development and documentation is now contained in the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)/Electronics Industries Association (EIA)
standard, IEEE/EIA 12207, “Information technology-Software life cycle processes”.
IEEE/EIA 12207 is packaged in three parts. The three parts are: IEEE/EIA 12207.0,
“Standard for Information Technology-Software life cycle processes”; IEEE/EIA
12207.1, “Guide for ISO/IEC 12207, Standard for Information Technology-Software life
cycle processes-Life cycle data”; and IEEE/EIA 12207.2, “Guide for ISO/IEC 12207,
Standard for Information Technology-Software life cycle processes-Implementation
considerations.”
The presentation is all about computer forensics. the process , the tools and its features and some example scenarios.. It will give you a great insight into the computer forensics
1. 1 | P a g e
CE00267-7 Forensic
Investigation Project
TPR Investigation Report
By Paul Kevin Green, Ravindu Meegasmulla and Muhammad Taiyib Parvez
MSc Digital Forensics and Cybercrime Analysis
Staffordshire University
Award Leader: Hatem Tammam
Module Leader: Stilianos Vidalis
April 2013
Word Count – 5,265
2. 2 | P a g e
Key Acronyms
Term Use
HDD Explains media known as a Hard Disc Drive
CD Explains media known as a Compact Disc
DVD Explains media known as a Digital Versatile Disc
NTFS The file system use on the modern Windows operating systems –
stands for New Technology File System
OS A generic term used to explain the Operating Systems installed
on a machine
RAM Random Access Memory – the main area for devices to
temporarily store current processes
ROM Read Only Memory – permanent area of storage and used for
holding configuration details
SID Security Identifier – used on Windows to identify a user
MBR Master Boot Record – Used for indicating the primary partitions
VBR Volume Boot Record – Used for booting an OS from a volume
Form Abbreviations
Term Use
CEC1 Case Evidence Collection
CRR1 Case Report Request
CSR1 Case Scene Report
EAL1 Evidence Analysis Log
ETAG Evidence Tags
HDA1 Hard Drive Analysis
UIP1 Use ID Profile
3. 3 | P a g e
Case Summary
TPR Group was called to investigate a case involving a computer laboratory at Staffordshire
University where a single hard disk was located unplugged in a machine. The Forensic Manager was
contacted by a member of Staffordshire University to attend the K113 laboratory, located in the
building called the Octagon, to analyse and acquire the evidential media located at the scene.
When briefed by the universities representative, the description of the case was as below:
The employee attended the laboratory to set up the room for a class they were conducting that day
and found a single computer that would not boot into the operating system. Upon further
investigation the employee opened the computer case to find the hard disk disconnected from the
motherboard. After deeper analysis they found the disk drive to be of not the one previously
connected to the laboratories machine. At this point the employee then contacted TPR Group to
conduct an investigation into the owner of the disk drive.
The scope of the crime scene was the single desk holding the computer system, which can be seen in
the Case Report documentation. The investigative team attended the scene and acquired all
evidential media that was deemed to be of use and took it back to the forensic laboratory to further
investigation by the Forensic Examiner.
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Contents
Key Acronyms ........................................................................................................................... 2
Form Abbreviations.................................................................................................................... 2
Case Summary ........................................................................................................................... 3
Contents..................................................................................................................................... 4
1 Phase One - Case Management............................................................................................. 6
1.1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 6
1.2 Case Documentation .................................................................................................... 6
1.3 Procedures................................................................................................................... 6
2 Phase Two - Evidence Analysis.......................................................................................... 11
2.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 11
2.2 Analysis Process........................................................................................................ 11
2.3 Validation and Verification......................................................................................... 12
2.4 Partitions................................................................................................................... 12
2.5 Operating Systems ..................................................................................................... 13
2.6 User Accounts ........................................................................................................... 13
3 Phase Two - Findings ........................................................................................................ 17
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 17
3.2 Partitions................................................................................................................... 17
3.3 Operating Systems ..................................................................................................... 17
3.4 Structure of the Drive................................................................................................. 17
3.5 User Accounts ........................................................................................................... 17
3.6 Timeline of Drive ...................................................................................................... 19
4 Phase Three – Conclusion and Completion of Case ............................................................. 20
5 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 21
5.1 Mobile Forensics ....................................................................................................... 21
5.2 MBR Information ...................................................................................................... 21
5.3 User ID’s and SID’s................................................................................................... 21
5.4 Guidelines ................................................................................................................. 21
6 References........................................................................................................................ 22
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Appendix A Case Management ................................................................................................. 24
Appendix A.1 Authorisation Documentation .......................................................................... 24
Appendix A.2 Case Evidence Collection Form ....................................................................... 28
Appendix A.3 Crime Scene Management Diagrams................................................................ 31
Appendix A.4 Forensic Examiners Toolkit ............................................................................. 36
Appendix A.5 Questions for Cases......................................................................................... 38
Appendix B ACPO Guidelines – 2012 Edition............................................................................ 41
Appendix C Analysis Procedures............................................................................................... 42
Appendix C.1 Hard Drive Analysis Form ............................................................................... 42
Appendix C.2 Evidence Analysis Log Form ........................................................................... 43
Appendix C.3 User ID Profile Form....................................................................................... 44
Appendix D Analysis Process Diagrams..................................................................................... 45
Appendix D.1 Initial Analysis (MBR and VBR) ..................................................................... 45
Appendix E Findings ................................................................................................................ 48
Appendix E.1 Initial Acquisition............................................................................................ 48
Appendix E.2 Drive Structure................................................................................................ 52
Appendix E.3 Folder Structure............................................................................................... 55
Appendix E.4 Volume Creation ............................................................................................. 56
Appendix E.5 Timeline of File............................................................................................... 57
Appendix E.6 User Accounts................................................................................................. 60
Appendix E.7 Email.............................................................................................................. 63
Appendix E.8 Internet History ............................................................................................... 64
Figure 2.1 - Recycling Bin Naming Convention.......................................................................... 15
Table 2-1 - OS User Characteristics ........................................................................................... 14
Table 3-1 - Priority User Accounts............................................................................................. 18
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1 Phase One - Case Management
1.1 Introduction
The case in question, being managed by the TPR Group that has three members, has all agreed the
contract for team positions. The contract can be found attached to the report within the folder signed
at the start and end of the case. The case has three phases; Phase One – Case Request, Phase Two –
Case Analysis and Phase Three – Case Completion.
1.2 Case Documentation
1.2.1 Case Request and Authorisation
Prior to a case being created for a client, there must first be a consultation with the perspective
client to allow them to request the groups’ services. This consultation can be done using any
means, such as email or telephone.
Upon the client contacting TPR Group to handle a case, the Forensic Manager will create a
CRR1 form, initially starting the case. This then allows the Forensic Manager to formulise a
team to manage the investigation. The report will then be taken, by the Case Manager, to every
meeting to update TPR Groups’ records. Upon updating the report, the collected information
can be compiled and added to the case for the examiner to undertake a full investigation. The
report template can be located in Appendix A.1 and must be signed off by client to confirm the
investigation is being undertaken to their expectations.
To ensure that TPR Group has sufficient authorisation to access,assess,manage and acquire the
scene, including all evidence located at the scene the TPR Group Authorisation must be signed.
This document must be sign in ink and no photocopies are to be accepted. The template form
can be location within Appendix A.1. The authorisation documentation must state explicitly that
the group are entitled to access the machines and all hardware within them to be able to
successfully analyse the media. This must also state, with reference if needed the scope of the
scene in question.
1.3 Procedures
The following procedures have been agreed by the TPR Group with accompanying diagrams located
in Appendix A.3. These procedures are to aid the Case Manager so that they are able to successfully
manage the search and seizure team to acquire the evidence and pass this media onto the examiner to
analyse for evidential data.
1.3.1 Preparation
There are general guidelines that are to be followed through any seizure of evidence which are:
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A consultation with the Case Officer is required to determine the equipment required to
take to each individual crime scene, the list can be seen in Appendix A.4.
Ensure the team will have sufficient search and seizure authorisation to access and
acquire evidence, if not this must be obtained; including the scope to go beyond the
scene if needed.
If the evidence is unable to be removed from the scene, it must be copied whilst at the
scene where safe to do so.
Upon entering the vicinity of the scene, all witnesses, suspects and other individuals not
directly related to the crime must be moved to a safe and secure location, ensuring they
do not hold possession of evidence.
Solicit information from members of staff (administrators, witnesses etc.) where
possible.
All scenes must be searched thoroughly and systematically for evidence.
All first responders (Search and Seizure) should understand the ability to locate hidden
evidence, including digital and non-digital evidence.
At all times each examiner must abide by the following procedures, which are the TPR Groups
interpretation of the ACPO Guidelines located in Appendix B :
Do not go beyond the scope of the authorisation.
Keep the chain of custody up-to-date when working with evidential media.
Keep a record of all evidence obtained, including descriptions, any communications
related to the evidence and condition upon receipt.
The examination documentation should always be case specific to ensure that any other
case examiner could continue with the work at any point.
All Examination Reports completed should:
o Meet TPR Groups standards using the formalised templates.
o Address the needs of the company/person who requested them.
o Provide all relevant information in a concise and clear manner.
1.3.2 Assessing the Crime Scene & Managing
Upon entering the scene the following procedures are required to be followed. If at any time, a
member of the team is unsure, the Case Officer must be immediately contacted.
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The initial phase of any scene is to ensure that the scene is safe to enter, if the scene is deemed
unsafe by the Case Officer, the investigation will immediately stop, until it is made safe.
1. Ensure the scene and surrounding areas are safe to enter;
2. Contact the main scene contact and conduct brief.
3. Secure and protect the scene, ensuring no unauthorised personnel are located at the
scene.
Upon successfully taking control of the scene, it now needs to be managed to ensure that the
collection, preservation and acquisition of evidence takes place to procedure. For a
diagrammatic breakdown of the steps when attending a scene, see Appendix A.3.1.
1.3.3 Collection and Preservation
Upon entering the crime scene, the following procedures are to be followed to acquire evidence.
This phase has been split into two sections; Acquisition of the Scene and Device Acquisition.
The kit mentioned in Appendix A.4 must also be used at every scene.
1.3.3.1 Acquisition of the Scene
The Case Officer, or Case Supervisor, will do the initial scene walk over to assess vital
equipment with the client. This process will ensure that media that cannot be shutdown is
highlighted prior to any acquisitions. This will also assess the evidence volatility to ensure that
the most volatile evidence is to be secured and protected as a priority. The steps for the
acquisition of the scene can be seen in diagrammatic form in Appendix A.3.2.
Upon the Case Officer completing the initial scene walkover, the following procedure is to be
followed by the team entering, using the accompanying diagrams.
1. Check the surrounding areas and scene is still safe to enter;
a. If the scene is unsafe, leave immediately and contact the Case Officer, to
ensure it is made safe prior to continuing.
2. Ensure all documents are to hand, including copies.
3. Search and Seizure team walkover scene to locate evidence;
a. Location of volatile media highlighted by Case Officer,
b. Document every piece of evidence including location,
c. Photograph and sketch the scene prior to moving items, photos will be attached
to case documentation in electronic form.
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1.3.3.2 Device Acquisition
Upon locating the volatile media, the evidence acquisition is initiated. The following is to be
followed at every scene and is an overview of the diagrams and procedure located in Appendix
A.3.3 and Appendix A.3.4.
1. Secure devices of evidentiary value.
2. Assess the system status and acquire;
3. Check scene for further evidence
4. Document scene
5. Hand back to Case Officer
6. Case Officer to have final check of scene
7. Hand back to client
1.3.4 Questioning of Witnesses
Upon attending the scene, all witnesses should have been removed from the immediate scene
ready for questioning. There are several questions which are to be answered in relation to each
type of scene, found in Appendix A.5.
Each witness should be moved to a separate secure room to ensure that any talking and
swapping of evidential information is not undertaken. Ensuring that each witness is removed
from the immediate scene will ensure that they do not contaminate any of the evidence located
within the scene and the acquisition/examination teams are able to undertake their jobs
efficiently. The questions provided are a general overview and must be modified for each
individual scene.
1.3.5 Photography
When acquiring photographs of the scene, these will be stored in a manner relevant to the
evidential artefacts and provided to the case contact in digital form, not printed for economic
reasons. However, if requested they can be printed at no additional cost. For every photograph
taken, a digital copy will be saved in a photograph folder labelled with the evidence number.
1.3.6 Analysis and Examination
Upon all the evidence arriving at the forensic laboratory; the following procedures are to be
adhered to during analysis and examination phase:
Any and all examiners should review the legal documentation to ensure they are
authorised to perform analysis on the media, if not they must contact the Case Officer
for authorisation.
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Prior to starting any examination, the following should be considered:
o Are there any other forensic examinations scheduled to take place on this media
where it will be required?
o The priority this case has for information from the requestor.
o Are there any other evidentiary items which may offer a better choice for
evidence?
o A strategy must be agreed between the examiners undertaking the case and the
requestor, with all information documented and added to the case file.
If possible, examination should not be taken upon the original media and must be
conducted using forensically sound copies.
A Chain of Custody must be kept at all times with the evidence.
An Access Log must be kept for each individual piece of evidence to ensure an audit
trail can be followed.
Any examination undertaken should be taken in a systematically and logical manner.
o All examinations should be undertaken in a secure room with supervision if
required and note taking to ensure the same outcome can be accomplished by
another person.
The findings are to be confirmed using a spate forensic tool, if no difference is found no
additional documentation is required. If there are differences, they will need to be
pointed out and documented. This is to ensure evidence integrity and validation through
cross verification.
A template copy of the Evidence Log form can be found in Appendix A.2 which also
incorporates the Chain of Custody documentation for each piece of evidence.
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2 Phase Two - Evidence Analysis
2.1 Introduction
This section of the report will detail the processes to be undertaken during the analysis phase of the
investigation. This section has been divided into several sections to enable the procedures to be
clearly identified.
2.2 Analysis Process
As an investigation is required to be undertaken on all evidential artefacts acquired at the scene,
procedures and guidelines are required to be created so that all examinations are undertaken in a
similar method.
As mentioned previously, TPR Group will be following the guidelines set down by the Association
of Chief Police Officers that have been interpreted and expanded. Additionally, several documents
have been created to aid the examiner during the analysis of the media. These forms are:
Hard Drive Analysis (HDA1) – See Appendix C.1
Evidence Analysis Log (EAL1) – See Appendix C.2
User Identification Profile (UIP1) – See Appendix C.3
The HDA1 form details the key points that need to be done during the analysis of a disk drive that
contains or suspected to contain the Windows Operating system. On this form is a checklist that
details the steps taken by the examiner. This ensures that the important steps are not overlooked.
The EAL1 form is used to plan each time the evidence is analysed. This document would be agreed
with the Case Officer in advance so that when the examiner undertakes any analysis, they are aware
of what is needed to be completed prior to the evidence being resubmitted back to the store room.
The UIP1 form is used in conjunction with the two forms above to document any user profiles that
are present on the system. The form will be used to log the SID details that will be found during the
analysis of a suspect machine. The details found and inserted onto this form will form part of the
main section of the report when identifying user actions on the system.
When the evidence is being analysed, the chain of access must be kept up-to-date. This can be found
under the CEC1 form, found under Appendix A.2. On this form, the times, dates and persons
analysing the drive can be logged to ensure the integrity of the evidence throughout. It can then be
referred back to in a court of law to validate the times the drive was out of the evidence storage
room.
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2.3 Validation and Verification
Upon acquiring the drive in question, the evidence needs to be hashed to enable the integrity to be
validated throughout the analysis process. This can be completed using a forensic application during
the acquisition phase. A hash will be created of the evidence drive and this will be stored with the
files on the target drive. This hash can then be used as a validation technique when analysing the
evidence at any stage.
During the analysis of an artefact, to aid the examiner, file signature analysis can be completed. This
is the process of checking the validity of a file against the file signature stored within the first few
bytes of the file. The process will check whether the signature has been edited from the original, if it
has this could have been a method used to hide data.
By undertaking a file signature analysis, it is possible to eliminate known good files, for example,
those that have not been altered since installation. This can be done by using add-ons within the
forensic application to remove the files from view to save the examiner analysing files that have no
evidential value.
2.4 Partitions
The following section details the procedures relating to the location of partitions on the evidence
drive. Detailed here will are steps that are taken during the initial analysis with the evidence. The
diagrammatic representation of the process can be found in Appendix D
2.4.1 Locating the MBR
Part of the examination process is locating partitions on the storage device which can be
accomplished via a number of methods. The first method is to locate the MBR and within the
MBR will be a series of four partition tables. Typically the MBR would be located at the first
sector of the drive, as this is where the booting process will locate the instructions for booting
the device. However, if no MBR is present this would indicate that the drive is a non-bootable
drive.
2.4.2 No MBR
If the device is a non-bootable drive, then the partition analysis would need to be undertaken
using a different approach. This would be to locate the VBR, which on a non-bootable drive
should be stored in the first sector, the same place as where the MBR would be.
Upon locating the VBR, the backup VBR will then be located and is typically stored in the last
sector of the volume. The location of these elements can be undertaken using EnCases’ Disk
view application. Using this it is possible to view the entirety of the disk in one sector chunks
which can easily be scrolled through to locate the first and last sectors of the volume.
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2.4.3 Additional Partitions
If additional partitions tables are available, by analysing the MBR, then these will be analysed
individually to that of the main partition. This is as to concentrate the work onto the main
storage area that the user may have used for installing applications and actions undertaken on
the computer system.
2.4.4 Unallocated Space
When the drive is being analysed, there may be segments of the drive that are unallocated,
which is known as unallocated space. Unallocated space on the drive is the area of the drive that
has not been used, or contains files that have been deleted but not yet overwritten. This can be
analysed to identify remnants of lost or deleted files.
Using forensics tools, it is possible to analyse the unallocated space and rebuild parts of files,
with the possibility to rebuild complete files. However, complete files can only be rebuilt if the
cluster the file was using has not been overwritten since deletion.
2.5 Operating Systems
Upon locating the MBR, this indicates that the storage device in question is the primary booting
device. If this was not the main booting device this may indicate that the device in question in an
additional storage device attached to the system and only a VBR would be located.
If the device is the main bootable device, the operating system can be identified by locating the
primary partition, within the partition table entries, marked as active with hexadecimal 80 at byte
offset 446. The primary partition will then need to be analysed to locate the type of partition to
identify the file system. After locating the file system type, this will then narrow down the type of
operating systems available to be used. As an example, if the NT file system was located, this may
indicate that the operating system would be a Windows based operating system.
Once the primary partition and file system are identified, the starting sector can be located where the
partitions storage space begins. This could then be analysed to indicate the type of operating system
in question on the storage device. The structure and partition types can be located in Appendix D.1.
2.6 User Accounts
On a primary storage device, there will need to be an OS in which there will be user accounts to
access the OS. The types of user accounts and locations will depend upon the type of OS in question.
On a typical Windows based system, the user accounts would be in a similar location to all
variations of the OS, and this is normally located with the main C: drive under a folder call
‘Documents and Settings’ or ‘Users’ for the newer variations.
However, if the drive in question is not the primary bootable drive, this would indicate that there
may not be any user profiles stored on this drive, unless the user has redirected their account profiles
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to a secondary drive. In this instance, there may not be a standard location where the profile details
are stored.
2.6.1 Profile Characteristics
The characteristics of a profile will depend entirely upon the OS that has been used. The OS
type can be narrowed down by the type of file system in use.
A typical Windows based system would carry similar characteristics across all versions and as
previously mentioned the locations are typically standard. Additionally, by identifying the
location folder, the folders within can also be quickly identified, see Table 2-1.
Table 2-1 - OS User Characteristics
OS Version User Root Folder Typical sub folders
Windows 2000
Windows XP
C:Documents and
SettingsACCOUNT NAME
My Documents
My Music
My Pictures
Desktop
Cookies
Favourites
Windows Vista
Windows 7
Windows 8
C:UsersACCOUNT NAME Documents
Desktop
Favourites
Music
Pictures
However, in the later versions of Windows, the typical folders (Music, Documents etc.), have
been relocated to a directory called ‘Libraries’ which contains all folders for all users. This has
been done to enable a better sharing platform within the Windows OS.
An additional file that is of interest to an examiner is the NTUSER.DAT file which contains all
the users’ personalisation settings for both software installations and OS modifications. Upon
the user logging onto a system, this file becomes merged with the registry key
HKEY_CURRENT_USER to keep a record of modifications.
2.6.2 Windows Recycling Bin (Recycler)
On every device a folder will be located to keep track of deleted items. This folder, dependent
upon the OS version, will be named either Recycling Bin or Recycler. This folder is stored in
the root directory of every partition and contains deleted data by the user until emptied.
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The folder itself contains a folder for each user that logs onto the system, and this folder is
named using the users’ SID to uniquely identify the files deleted by a user. This SID will also
be used on additional storage devices that are not the primary drive. Using this information, an
examiner will be able to indicate which users have used and deleted files on the system.
Within each user folder, located in the recycling bin folder, are the files are stored when deleted
and use a standard naming convention to aid restoring if needed. The naming convention is as
shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 - Recycling Bin Naming Convention
(Microsoft Support, 2007)
2.6.3 E-Mail Activity
Email recovery is dependent upon the type of email system used. If using an application such as
Outlook, then the email activity would be stored within the configuration files stored in the
folder ‘AppData’ in the user profile.
However, if the user has been using an online email system such a Gmail, Hotmail or
Outlook.com then the emails would not be stored locally. Due to this the emails may not be able
to be fully recovered. To overcome this, the internet history and cookies could be used to
identify commonly used sites and highlight email addresses stored within those files.
2.6.4 Internet Activity
As can be seen from Table 2-1, a folder within every user account contains all the cookies used
when the user has browsed the internet. However, in later versions this folder has been
relocated to a folder within the hidden ‘AppData’ folder that is also located within every user
account folder.
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This has been done to ensure that all the users’ data is secured within the user profile so that it
cannot be accessed by another profile without administrative privileges. If the drive in question
is not that of a primary drive, then there may not be many internet related files stored on the
drive due to the issue of the user profile not being located on that drive.
The internet history will depend upon the browser that has been used, such as Internet Explorer,
Google Chrome or Mozilla Firefox. The most common browser, by installation, is Internet
Explorer as this comes standard with all versions of Microsoft Windows. The internet history is
typically stored under the users’ folder and located within the ‘AppData’ folder, similar to that
of the cookies location. Within that folder will be the browser configuration folder that will then
contain the cookies and browsing history.
2.6.5 Personal Account Files
Within a user account directory are several important sub folders that can be used to identify the
type of user, their activities and the files they store. Under the main user directory within a
Windows system would be the folders such as Downloads, Documents, Pictures and Music.
Within these folders would be the personal documents that relate to a user. Analysing these
folders, it would be possible to locate possible pictures of users, documents they have created
and the timeline of possible events.
A timeline can be created of file creation and modification by analysing the metadata of each
file. The metadata can be used to determine when a file had been created and the user account
that created the file, with the retrospective details for modification.
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3 Phase Two - Findings
3.1 Introduction
This section of this report will detail all the findings during the analysis of the evidential artefacts.
The initial steps, as per procedure, are to locate the partitions and boot records.
3.2 Partitions
During the initial analysis it was noted that the main drive itself is not of a bootable kind, as this can
be confirmed by the lack of an MBR in sector 0 of the drive. In the place where the MBR was to be
expected, the VBR had been located. By locating only a VBR, this indicates that the drive in
question is that of a secondary drive on a computer system.
3.2.1 VBR Analysis
Upon locating and analysing the VBR, located in sector 0 of the drive, it is noted that the drive
in question was formatted with the file system type NT, see Appendix E.2. Within the VBR it
can be seen that the entire drive is of the same partition with no additional partitions. This can
also be noted by the presence of a backup VBR located in the last usable sector of the drive, see
Appendix E.2.2.
Located in the first three bytes of the VBR it is noted that the bytes per sector are 512 and the
sectors per cluster are 8, confirmed in Appendix E.2.
3.3 Operating Systems
During the analysis of the drive, it was confirmed by the examiner that no operating system has been
installed onto this drive. The drive in question, confirmed to have the NT file system, does not
contain an MBR and therefore is a non-bootable device. However, if the drive were to have
contained remnants of an MBR, it would have indicated there may have been an OS at some point.
3.4 Structure of the Drive
The drive is structured in a way that the user has been saving files directly to the drive. It can be seen
there is no direct root folder of the drive and all folders are stored directly under the main volume.
This can be seen from Appendix E.3 which documents the top level folder structure.
3.5 User Accounts
As the drive in question is that not of an operating system drive, there is no user accounts folder.
Due to this factor it is not possible to identify usernames of users that have accessed the system.
However, it is possible to identify the SID of accounts that has accessed the drive. This can be done
by analysing the $MFT and $Recycler folder. Within Appendix E.6, are the accounts that were in
use on the volume, along with the breakdown SID information.
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3.5.1 Identified User SID Accounts
Table 3-1 shows the accounts that have been highlighted to be owners or creators of folders
located within the root of the drive. This can be confirmed from the analysis undertaken on the
folder creation and permissions shown in Appendix E.6.3. The user accounts highlighted below
indicate two users, who access the machine in two methods which are local and domain access.
Table 3-1 - Priority User Accounts
Name SID
S-1-5-21-1077148053-4198568005-59594
Domain Users S-1-5-21-1077148053-4198568005-513
Olga Angelopoulou S-1-5-21-725345543-1532298954-1003
None S-1-5-21-725345543-1532298954-513
Using the information above, it is indicated that the owners of the drive are that of either of the
account SID’s above. The SID that has a name alongside has been highlighted due to the fact
that several additional files have been noted to have been created under this username.
3.5.2 Profile Characteristics
As there are no user profiles on the volume, there is very little to indicate the characteristics of a
user. However, the characteristics found are that the drive was used by the indicated SID’s for
external storage.
3.5.3 E-Mail Activity
Using the above SID’s and names, a search was undertaken to highlight possible email
addresses and emails. After the initial analysis, two folders were highlighted, one deleted and
one live. Both of these folders were named ‘Email’ which indicated that these folders contained
possible emails.
Upon analysis of the live folder this was deemed to be empty and contained no files. The folder
that was deleted contained two sub folders that contained emails for a username of ‘oangelop’,
as can be seen from Appendix E.7. This username is a shortened version of the username, Olga
Angelopoulou, highlighted during the SID analysis. After analysing the folders, the permissions
were again checked with the owner of the folder being that of the SID for the unknown account
in Table 3-1.
3.5.4 Internet Activity
As the drive is that not of an operating system volume, there are no folders that stores cookies
or other internet related files. Typically the internet files on a Windows system, as the drive is
an NT file system, are stored under the user account folder to keep those files secure to that
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user. After undertaking several searches for web addresses, there were several results that had
been highlighted for searches of the internet. The majority of the searches were for that of
general use and searches relating to files stored on the drive. Several of the results have been
indicated in Appendix E.8.
3.5.5 Personal Account Files
Upon analysing the drive structure, it was indicated that a two users had been using the drive to
store files outside of their normal computer system. This was indicated by the presence of
folders called ‘Docs’ and ‘Email’. Analysing the docs folder indicated this was a storage
repository for documents that have been created, downloaded or copied. Within the deleted
Email folder, several emails containing pictures were found along with a folder with several
additional picture files.
3.6 Timeline of Drive
Upon analysing the drive, the volume was created in 2004 when the volume was formatted with the
NT file system, as seen from Appendix E.4. Since this date the drive has had steady use with files
being created and stored, as seen from Appendix E.5. However, upon analysing the entire timeline of
the drive, it is seen that there has been files with dates prior to that of 2004. Analysis of these files
indicated they were copied from another source and saved to this drive by the user. The files located
date back towards the early 1990’s.
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4 Phase Three – Conclusion and Completion of Case
Concluding the analysis phase of the investigation, it was deemed that the drive in question is not a
booting drive and rather a storage drive, in the form of wired or caddy. This finding posed several
issues for the investigation as not being able to indicate it was an OS volume meant the analysis had
to indicate the creators and owners of folders stored within the volume.
By analysing the folders, both live and deleted, it was possible to find information relating to SID’s
that have access the drive. By also analysing the permissions of these folders it was possible to
pinpoint the actual creators and owners of these folders.
To conclude the findings of the investigation, it has been highlighted that the drive was used for
secondary storage only and not of OS use which means it is not possible to pinpoint a single owner
of the drive without access to a machine or domain of the same ID. However, the analysis indicated
that four SID’s were the primary users’ and can be pinpointed as the owners, or past owners of the
drive.
The drive was formatted with NTFS in 2004, but does contained files dated previous to this, which
indicated that the drive was used prior to this and was formatted since to be used again. However,
the ownership could have changed which may have caused the formatting to be undertaken.
The owner of the drive cannot be completely verified without the original computer that the drive
was used with. This means that further investigations need to be undertaken to highlight possible
computers or networks where the drive would have been used. It was also indicated that the drive in
question was used in conjunction with Glamorgan University which could be a starting point to
undertake further investigation.
Once a network is located with the same domain identification, the computers and users’ could be
located and then their computers analysed. Due to the lack of user information on the drive it is not
possible to identify who the actual volume creator is. However, due to the creation date stamps it is
indicated that the possible creator is that of one of the SID’s. The information regarding the findings
of SID’s through the investigation can be found in Appendix E.6 which states the different areas that
user ID’s were found. This also indicates the specific creators and owners of folders on the drive.
As can be indicated from the findings in phase 2, the drive does not contain an operating system due
to the lack of an MBR and that only a VBR is found on the drive as see in Appendix E.2. The
outcome of this indicated that the drive only contained a single partition, proved by the findings in
Appendix E.4.
Upon the analysis being completed, the Case Officer has now taken control of the report and will
submit it to the client upon agreeing the conclusions.
21. 21 | P a g e
5 Bibliography
5.1 Mobile Forensics
http://www.cftt.nist.gov/AAFS-MobileDeviceForensics.pdf
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-101/SP800-101.pdf
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistir/nistir-7387.pdf
5.2 MBR Information
http://superuser.com/questions/420557/mbr-how-does-bios-decide-if-a-drive-is-bootable-or-not
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc940349.aspx
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=wuUuTXMkNx8C&pg=PA72&lpg=PA72&dq=mbr+partition+
popularity&source=bl&ots=QanCnIdhMD&sig=_731e1jnYlKChbxBJRu8BuuTCVY&hl=pt-
PT&ei=RpGgTb7EGY6FtgfMy7meAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&redir_esc=y#v=onepage
&q&f=false
http://thestarman.pcministry.com/asm/mbr/mystery.htm
5.3 User ID’s and SID’s
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/136517/EN-US
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/243330
5.4 Guidelines
ACPO Guidelines - http://library.npia.police.uk/docs/acpo/digital-evidence-2012.pdf
22. 22 | P a g e
6 References
Police.uk (2012) ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence: March 2012. [Online] Available
from: http://library.npia.police.uk/docs/acpo/digital-evidence-2012.pdf. [Accessed: 14th
March 2013]
Microsoft Support (2007) How the Recycling Bin Stores File. [Online] Available from:
http://support.microsoft.com/kb/136517/EN-US. [Accessed: 17th
March 2013]
23. 23 | P a g e
Appendices
The follow section of this report documents all additional appendices that are attached to this case.
24. 24 | P a g e
Appendix A Case Management
Appendix A.1 Authorisation Documentation
TPR Group: Case Request Report
Case Request Report CRR1
Case number TPR _ _ _ _ _ _ / _ _ - _ _ - _ _ Critical Urgent Standard
Case officer Date & Time call
received
_ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _
_ _ : _ _
Client Name Company Name
Contact Email Address Contact Phone No
Fax No
Alternative Mobile No
Addressof incident Address1
Address2
County
Postcode
Country
Size of organisation Small / Medium / Large National / International
Nature of incident
Date of incident: _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _
Number of Items
involved
Isolated / Un-isolated network
Operating system used
within the organisation
Windows / Unix Based / Mac OSX / Mobile
OS / Other……………………………
Shared devices /
Personal
Is the scene safe Yes / No If No please state:
Client Signature Name Printed
Date _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _ Time (HH:MM) _ _ : _ _
25. 25 | P a g e
Case Request Report Initial Meet
Case number TPR _ _ _ _ _ _ / _ _ - _ _ - _ _ Date _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _
Case officer Time _ _ : _ _
Client Name Company Name
Contact Email Address Contact Phone No
Fax No
Alternative Mobile No
Any Additional new
information
Name of persons who
have access to items
Usernames for items involved (if relevant) Account passwords (if relevant)
Client Signature Date _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _
Case Officer Signature Date _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _
26. 26 | P a g e
TPR GROUP
AUTHORISATION FOR RELEASE, ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS
OF ALL RELATED MEDIA DURING THE FORENSIC INVESTIGATION
Please carefully read and understand this authorisation form to enable the release of information,
documentation and media for the reported case, then sign and date.
I Authorise any representative of the TPRGroupto enterthe scene of the incident;forthe purpose
to examine;andextractif required,mediarelatedtothe reportedcase.
I Authorise any representative of the TPRGroupenteringthe scene of the incidentto;photograph,
documentandreportall relevantdetailsrequiredforinvestigation.
I Authorise any representative of the TPRGroupto gather additional informationfromwitnessesat
the scene of,or relatedthe incidentwhenreasonable andrelevant.
I Authorise all mediaand evidencecollected,includingdocumentationfoundorcreated,tobe
releasedtorelevantorganisations if foundtobe relatedtoterroristorillegal activity.
I Authorise all mediaand evidencecollected,includingdocumentationfoundorcreated,tobe
releasedtorelevantorganisationsuponrequestbyanylegallyauthorisedparties.
Thisform isvalidupuntil the pointthe case is releasedfromTPRGroupat whichtime release
documentswill be signed,andall case materialstothe authorisedpersonbelow,ortheir
representative,if legallypossible.
TPR Representative:
__________________________ ____________________ _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _
PrintName Signature Date Signed
The ClientsAuthorisedRepresentative:
__________________________ ____________________ _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _
PrintName Signature Date Signed
__________________________ _____________________________________________
Position within Organisation Organisation
27. 27 | P a g e
TPR Group: Case Scene Report
CLIENT AUTHORISATION
Signature Date _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _
TPR DETAILS
Enter Date _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _ Enter Time _ _ : _ _ (HH:MM)
Case No
TPR _ _ _ _ _ _ / _ _ - _ _ - _ _ Case Manager
Is the scene safe toenter? Yes /No (state why)
TEAM ATTENDING– (Crossout blankboxes)
Name Position Time
(HH:MM)
Signature
_ _ : _ _
_ _ : _ _
_ _ : _ _
_ _ : _ _
_ _ : _ _
ENTRANCE& EXITS
Numberof Exits Are any Fire Exits Yes /No
SCENE DOCUMENTATION
PanoramicPhoto Yes /No Witnesses Yes /No SecuredWitnesses Yes /No
CCTV Available Yes /No
CCTV
Acquirable
No / Yes--> CCTV Evidence No Case No
+
_ _ _ _
Draft Blueprintof Scene
TPR STAFFDETAILS
ExitDate _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _ ExitTime _ _ : _ _ (HH:MM)
Signature
Case Officer Client
28. 28 | P a g e
Appendix A.2 Case Evidence Collection Form
TPR GROUP
Investigations Unit
This form is to be used for only one piece of evidence
Fill out a separate form for each piece of evidence.
Case number TPR _ _ _ _ _ _ / _ _ - _ _ - _ _ Evidence number Case No
+ _ _ _ _
Case Manager Original / Duplicate Original No
_ _ _ _
Evidence Type
Evidence
Location:
Vendor Name Model No Serial No Additional Notes
Description of evidence:
Evidence
Recovered By
Date
_ _ / _ _ / _ _ _
_
Time
(HH:MM)
_ _ : _ _
Signature
29. 29 | P a g e
Investigations Unit
This form is to be used for only one piece of evidence
Fill out a separate form for each piece of evidence.
Case number TPR _ _ _ _ _ _ / _ _ - _ _ - _ _ Evidence number Case No
+ _ _ _ _
Case Manager Original /Duplicate Original No
_ _ _ _
Evidence Type
Evidence
Location:
Vendor Name Model No Serial No Additional Notes
Description of evidence:
Evidence
Recovered By
Date _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _ Time (HH:MM) _ _ : _ _
Signature
CHANGE OF CUSTODY
This form is to be used for only one piece of evidence
Fill out a separate form for each piece of evidence.
Who To Reason Comments Authorisations Signatures Date & Time
From
_ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _
_ _ : _ _To
From _ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _
_ _ : _ _To
From
_ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _
_ _ : _ _To
From
_ _ / _ _ / _ _ _ _
_ _ : _ _To
Additional Page Signature: __________________________ Page ___ Of ___
Initial ___ ___
31. 31 | P a g e
Appendix A.3 Crime Scene Management Diagrams
Appendix A.3.1 Attending the Crime Scene
Receive Call
Create Case
Request
Report (CRR1)
Enough
Information
Contact Client
for more
information
No
Team Brief to go
over case details
Yes
Complete the following:
- Decide required tools & equipment
- Decide Team roles and responsibilities
Attend the Scene
and meet contact
(or representative)
Complete the following:
- Case Request Report (CRR1)
- Ensure Authorisation is signed by client
Team Scene Brief
Team ready to
enter
Case Officer to
acquire required
information
No
Is scene/
perimeter safe
Enter and Secure
scene
Yes
Make
scene safe
No
32. 32 | P a g e
Appendix A.3.2 Acquisition of the Scene
Acquisition of Scene
Secure scene
Complete the following:
- Ensure scene is safe to enter, if not make
safe – contact case officer
- Take suspects/witnesses to secure location
for questioning
Initial scene
walkover (Search &
Seizure Team)
Complete the following within Case Scene
Report (CSR1):
- Note entrances/exits
- Document area of scope
- Photograph entire scene (panoramic view)
Locate items for
seizure within scope
of authorisation
Item Acquisition
Preserve and
Protect volatile
items
- Use Volatile Item List (VIL)
- Work in spiral from most volatile
- Ensure items collected are in scope
Appendix A.3.3 Device Acquisition
1. Secure devices of evidentiary value.
2. Assess the system status;
a. If the system is live;
i. Collect write block, if none available contact Case Officer,
ii. Set up Forensic Acquisition Workstation,
33. 33 | P a g e
iii. Connect Write blocker,
iv. Connect evidential device,
v. Start acquisition of volatile media,
vi. Confirm acquisition,
vii. Follow the procedure for the specific device and Operating System
type.
b. If the system is switched off;
i. Do not turn it on
ii. If the device is not openable, acquire entire device if possible
iii. If not possible, can the storage media be removed,
1. No, then image at the scene as a live system
2. Yes, acquire media if possible and continue
iv. Bag and Tag the evidence,
v. Store for transportation,
vi. Check for other evidential media within device and acquire,
vii. Close device and document
3. Check scene for further evidence
4. Document scene
5. Hand back to Case Officer
6. Case Officer to have final check of scene
7. Hand back to client
34. 34 | P a g e
Write Blocker
Available
Seek guidance of
Case Officer for next
step
No
Set up Forensic
Acquisition
Workstation
Yes
Can the item be
opened
Is the storage
item removable
Yes
Any other
evidential media
in item
Connect write
blocker, if available
Connect evidence
drive
Start acquisition of
volatile media
Confirm acquisition
Secure Item of
Evidential Value
Is the Item liveNo
Non-live Acquisition
Procedure
Live Acquisition
Procedure
Yes
Is scene clear of
evidence
Final Scene Check
then have team
brief
Hand back scene
Item Acquisition
Yes
Store for
transportation
No
Follow procedure
for specific Device
and Operating
System type
Complete the following:
- Start Case Evidence Collection form (CEC1)
- Tag all additional items including cables
- Photo item, including peripherals (ETAG)
- Locate power sources
Remove
storage device
– Bag and
complete CEC1
Yes
Acquire entire
item – Bag and
complete CEC1
No
Close item and
complete CEC1. Ensure
entire form complete
No
Complete the following at each stage:
- Document external evidence drive (CEC1)
- Document acquisition machine (CEC1)
- Document & Photograph current state
- Document Current running applications
Can item be
shutdown safely
Acquire live
storage device
No
Yes
Complete the following:
- Photograph scene, document state the scene
will be left in and complete (CSR1)
Yes
35. 35 | P a g e
Appendix A.3.4 Device Specific Acquisition
Device Type
Desktop Server
Acquire volatile
memory
Mobile
Preserve battery
(add additional
power if needed)
Can volatile
memory be
acquired
Acquire volatile
memory
Yes
Place device in
faraday bag
Acquire storage
devices
Document
Can storage
devices be
acquired
Yes
Pull the plug (from
reverse of machine)
No
No
36. 36 | P a g e
Appendix A.4 Forensic Examiners Toolkit
Appendix A.4.1 Specialist Forensic Hardware
All of the following equipment will be taken to every crime scene.
Check Item
Network Cables (Multiple) – Both straight through and crossover
Floppy Drive (External with USB connector)
CD/DVD Drive (External with USB Connector)
Hard Drives (Several Sizes) – with SATA, PATA, IDE connectors
EnCase Acquisition Kit
Digital Camera & Backup photographic device
Connection Cables (USB, HMDI, Firewire, VGA, IDE, etc.)
Female-Male Cable Convertors for all above
Compact Discs (CD) spindle with several discs
Digital Versatile Discs (DVD) spindle with several discs
Acquisition Machine with forensic software as below & Backup
Network Detector
Network Blocker
Internet Dongle
Write Blocker
Battery Power backup device
XRY Mobile Acquisition Kit
Card Reader
Mouse Giggler
Second Monitor
External Hard Disc Caddy (2.5inch and 3.5inch)
Appendix A.4.2 Specialist Forensic Software
Check Item
LinEn Disc or USB
EnCase 6 & 7
Linux Bootable
Personalised Windows Operating System Backup
Personalised Mac OS Backup
Forensic Tool Kit 4
Micro Systemation XRY (Latest stable version)
Backup of Forensic Software & Licences
37. 37 | P a g e
Appendix A.4.3 General Forensic Equipment
Check Item
Seizure Bags
Tags
Cable Ties
Archival- grade permanent marker
Voice Recorder
Magnifying Glass
Tools (Nonmagnetic and magnetic)
Straight head, Philips Screwdrivers and specialist head variations
Pliers
Wrench
Anti-static wrist band
Power Extension leads (5m, 10m, 15m, 20m, 25m)
Dust Brush
Gloves
Mirror
Faraday Bag
Evidence Forms
Keyboard
Mouse
Authorisation / Warrant
Identification
Bubble Rap
Certifications (Copies)
Contact Numbers
Photo Card & Numbers for photographing evidence
38. 38 | P a g e
Appendix A.5 Questions for Cases
Appendix A.5.1 Initial Contact Questions
Company and Contact Details
What is your name and position?
Are you in charge of day to day activities at the location of the device?
If not, do you have enough technical knowledge to answer preliminary questions
that are used to assess the situation for TPR to prepare for your specific case?
What is the name of and nature of the Company?
What is the Size of company?
How many people are employed
Over how many sites does the company span
What is the location of the company the enquiry is regarding, and who is the person in
charge?
Incident details
What is the nature of your call, and when did the incident occur?
Were there other members of staff or civilians involved?
If so who are they?
What is their position or authority at the time of the incident?
Device details
What are the devices?
Where is or are the devices in question located within the company?
Is the device(s) connected within a networked environment
If so what is the size of the network?
Is the device(s) isolated?
Do you know the Operating system of the machines?
39. 39 | P a g e
Explain that the devices in question should not be used for any reason at all, as any potential
evidence may be destroyed or changed.
Stop any persons from accessing the scene with any electronic devices.
Appendix A.5.2 At the Scene Questions
Initial questions
Is the computer networked to external sources?
To a server?
Intranet?
File server?
What access rights does this particular user hold?
To the internet?
Through a wireless connection?
Wired connection?
Security measure in place
Preliminary questions
Has anything changed from the last time we talked?
If so add these details to the CSR1 form.
Has anyone been or had access to the computer?
If so add these details to the CSR1 form.
Appendix A.5.3 Witness Questioning
The following questions are not case specific and must be tailored to suit each individual case
which will be managed and prepared by the Case Officer.
Before conducting an interview the case officer must explain the purpose of the interview and
introduce themself to the witness. Throughout the interview case office must be polite to the
witness and the punctuality is important all the time.
What are your role and responsibilities?
Who is your supervisor?
40. 40 | P a g e
Is there anyone else has the authorisation to this department except you?
What are the procedures relating to the IT equipment within this department?
What are the administrative passwords?
Are there any security measures currently in place protecting this equipment?
Explain the crime scene according to your knowledge?
Who did you contact first after seeing the incident?
Is there any wireless connection?
Would you provide your contact details?
41. 41 | P a g e
Appendix B ACPO Guidelines – 2012 Edition
The ACPO Guidelines is a document developed by 7Safe in conjunction with the Association of
Chief Police Officers. Within this document are four principles that are used as a guide which are:
Principle 1:
No action taken by law enforcement agencies, persons employed within those agencies or their
agents should change data which may subsequently be relied upon in court.
Principle 2:
In circumstances where a person finds it necessary to access original data, that person must be
competent to do so and be able to give evidence explaining the relevance and the implications of
their actions.
Principle 3:
An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to digital evidence should be created and
preserved. An independent third party should be able to examiner those processes and achieve the
same level.
Principle 4:
The person in charge of the investigation has overall responsibility for ensuring that the law and
these principles are adhered to.
The above principles were taken directly from the ACPO Good Practice Guide for Digital Evidence
document, (Police.uk, 2012).
42. 42 | P a g e
Appendix C Analysis Procedures
Appendix C.1 Hard Drive Analysis Form
TPR Group
Examination Process Procedure – Windows
Upon successful acquisition of the storage device, the drive is then required to be duplicated onto a
sterile storage drive.
This drive is then to be analysed and not the original artefact. The drive is then to be analysed using
the following procedure:
Task Notes Completion
Verify drive image against original hash ☐
Locate Master Boot Record ☐
Locate Volume Boot Record ☐
Locate Backup Sectors ☐
Locate Logical Size of Disc (Sectors) ☐
Locate Physical Size of Disc (Sectors) ☐
Locate Hidden Sectors ☐
Locate Operating System Version ☐
Locate Useful Windows Files (SWAP etc.) ☐
Locate Installed Applications ☐
Locate Unallocated Space ☐
Locate Deleted Artefacts ☐
Complete File Signature Analysis ☐
Complete Hash of Every File ☐
Complete Keyword Search`1 ☐
Search for File Types ☐
Search for Emails ☐
Search for Email Addresses ☐
Search for Internet History ☐
Search for Folder Structure ☐
Search for Timeframe of Artefacts ☐
43. 43 | P a g e
Appendix C.2 Evidence Analysis Log Form
TPR Group – Evidence Analysis Log
Date Time Case Number Investigator
_ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ TPR _ _ _ _ _ _ / _ _ - _ _ - _ _
Requirements:
Notes
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________
44. 44 | P a g e
Appendix C.3 User ID Profile Form
TPR Group – User ID Profile
User ID (SID)
Alias (Name of
Account)
Location Found
Description ____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
User ID (SID)
Alias (Name of
Account)
Location Found
Description ____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
45. 45 | P a g e
Appendix D Analysis Process Diagrams
Appendix D.1 Initial Analysis (MBR and VBR)
Locate MBR
Is MBR Present?Go back to stage 4 No
Locate first partition
entry
(Byte offset 446)
Yes
Is it in use?
The drive, partition
may have been
formatted,
undertaken
partition recovery.
Or this partition has
not been used.
No
Locate the partition
type by referring
the manual of types
(Byte offset 450)
Yes
Document:
- Type of partition
- Starting and ending clusters
Locate the next
partition, if
applicable
None available
46. 46 | P a g e
Identify File System
Is it NT
Follow Windows
analysis steps
Yes
Is it UFS
No
Follow Unix analysis
steps
Yes
Is it HFS/HFS+
No
Follow Mac/iOS
analysis steps
Yes
Is it FAT
No
Identify the
version of FAT
Yes
Undertake Analysis
using procedure
Locate type of
partition and
research for
instructions
No
Appendix D.1.1 Partition Tables
Bytes
Offset
Name Description
446 Boot This will be either hexadecimal 80 for an
Active partition of 00 for non-active
447 Start Head This is the starting head for the partition
448 Start cylinder and
head
Starting cylinder (10 bytes) and sector (6
bytes)
450 Partition Type This will stipulate which type of partition
this is
451 End Head This is the ending head for the partition
452 End cylinder and
head
Ending cylinder (10 bytes) and sector (6
bytes)
454 Relative Sector Number of sectors prior to the start of the
partition
458 Total Sectors Total number of sections within the partition
47. 47 | P a g e
Appendix D.1.2 Partition Types (File Systems)
Hexadecimal
Code
Partition Type
00 Unused Partition Entry
01 FAT 12
04 FAT 16
06 FAT 16B
07 NTFS
A8 UFS
AF HFS (HFS+)
48. 48 | P a g e
Appendix E Findings
Appendix E.1 Initial Acquisition
Case Creation Details
Accessing the drive for acquisition
49. 49 | P a g e
Identification of the drive in question.
Confirmation that the drive was write blocked to prevent alteration.
50. 50 | P a g e
Parsing the details of the evidence drive.
Adding the acquisition files to the case.
51. 51 | P a g e
Acquisition details regarding the actual acquisition.
Evidence added ready for analysis.
52. 52 | P a g e
Hash confirmation of the drive confirming no alteration has occurred during acquisition.
Appendix E.2 Drive Structure
The following details are regarding the drive in question and the acquisition machine. The first two
tables below detail the serial numbers for the evidence drives, the file system types and the drive
specification details.
The third table details the acquisition with regards to the storage locations, verification hashes and
whether the drive was write blocked during acquisition.
Serial Number 9683-E291
Full Serial Number 29683F09683E291
DriverInformation NTFS3.1
File System NTFS
Sectorsper cluster 8
Bytespersector 512
Total Sectors 37,190,412
Total Capacity 19,041,488,896 Bytes(17.7GB)
53. 53 | P a g e
Total Clusters 4,648,801
Unallocated 18,930,753,536 Bytes(17.6GB)
Free Clusters 4,621,766
Allocated 110,735,360 Bytes(105.6MB)
Volume Name Data Area
Volume Offset 0
Drive Type Fixed
Name TPR000001-27-02-13-0003
Actual Date 04/03/13 16:43:04
Target Date 04/03/13 16:43:04
File Path D:CasesTPR000001-27-02-13EvidenceTPR000001-27-02-13-0003.E01
Case Number TPR000001-27-02-13
Evidence Number TPR000001-27-02-13-0003
ExaminerName P.Green
Notes InvestigationinForensicLaboratorycomputersystem
Label FastBloc
Model _FE_v2,_Guidance
Drive Type Fixed
File Integrity CompletelyVerified,0Errors
AcquisitionMD5 824d4cc6e7aaae196a0f662d5c8a862e
VerificationMD5 824d4cc6e7aaae196a0f662d5c8a862e
AcquisitionSHA1 c168adaabd6acf4d0f699c1caf32569ef7f6a320
VerificationSHA1 c168adaabd6acf4d0f699c1caf32569ef7f6a320
GUID d7d9cd26b0c1574bb7bd071f04d12c7a
EnCase Version 6.19.4
SystemVersion Windows7
Write Blocked Fastbloc
Neutrino False
Is Physical False
RaidRHS False
RaidStripe Size 0
Error Granularity 64
ProcessID 0
Index File D:CasesTPR000001-27-02-13IndexTPR000001-27-02-13-0003-
d7d9cd26b0c1574bb7bd071f04d12c7a.Index
AcquisitionInfo False
Sources False
Subjects False
ReadErrors 0
MissingSectors 0
DiskElements False
CRC Errors 0
Compression Good
Total Size 19,041,490,944 Bytes(17.7GB)
Total Sectors 37,190,412
DiskSignature 00000000
Partitions Valid
54. 54 | P a g e
Appendix E.2.1 Volume Boot Record
55. 55 | P a g e
Appendix E.2.2 Backup Volume Boot Record
Appendix E.3 Folder Structure
└─TPR000001-27-02-13-0003
├─$Extend
├─b3020c27961fa086e56fff75
├─b7a4536994c56db768be6df31111da80
├─Docs
├─e5bfa4a130271a7db945be5d16d0
├─Email
├─Email
├─msdownld.tmp
├─MSIb03d4.tmp
├─MSIbdd2c.tmp
├─MSIefae2.tmp
├─MSOCache
├─RECYCLER
├─SystemVolume Information
├─Temp
├─webmail
└─Lost Files
56. 56 | P a g e
Appendix E.4 Volume Creation
The following table documents the creation, access and modification dates of the $MFT which is
created when the drive is formatted with the NT file system.
Bookmark Type Notable File
Comment $MFT Creation
Page Break False
ShowPicture True
Entry Selected False
File Offset 0
Name $MFT
In Report True
Description File,Internal,Hidden,System
Is Deleted False
Last Accessed 16/06/04 09:18:24
File Created 16/06/04 09:18:24
Last Written 16/06/04 09:18:24
Entry Modified 16/06/04 09:18:24
File Acquired 04/03/13 16:43:04
Logical Size 5,931,008
InitializedSize 5,931,008
Physical Size 5,931,008
StartingExtent 0TPR000001-27-02-13-0003-C786432
File Extents 1
Permissions True
References 1
Physical Location 3,221,225,472
Physical Sector 6,291,456
Evidence File TPR000001-27-02-13-0003
File Identifier 0
Code Page 0
Hash Properties False
Full Path TPR000001-27-02-13TPR000001-27-02-13-
0003$MFT
Is Duplicate False
Is Internal True
Is Overwritten False
BookmarkPath Drive SpecificationsNoName
BookmarkStart 3,221,225,472
BookmarkSector 6,291,456
Notable False
Excluded False
Sequence ID 1
TPR000001-27-02-13TPR000001-27-02-13-0003$MFT
$MFT Creation