Vincss JSC, a leader in automotive cybersecurity, highlights the significant risks in the smart car ecosystem due to the increasing complexity and volume of software in vehicles, which has risen substantially over the years. The document emphasizes the need for improved key management and cybersecurity practices to protect against escalating automotive cyber incidents and vulnerabilities. Vincss proposes employing FIDO2 technology to enhance security protocols in automotive systems, ensuring effective management throughout the vehicle lifecycle.

1. SECURING
SMART CAR ECOSYSTEM
WITH FDO
Simon Trac Do – Founder & CEO
VinCSS JSC., Vietnam
FIDO Munich Workshop 2024
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2. WHO WE ARE?
IoT Security
Automotive CyberSecurity
IT Security Services
VinCSS FIDO2 Ecosystem
FIDO2 Ecosystem
Founded 2008
100+
High-profile, globally recognized
experts
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3. SMART CAR ECOSYSTEM
A modern vehicle can contain up to 150 ECUs and
more than 100 million lines of software code.
which is projected to rise to 300 million lines of
code by 2030.
A modern vehicle contains more software than
Facebook without the backend code (62 million lines
of code). A vehicle also has more than double the
code of Microsoft Office 2013, over 6 times the code
of the Android OS, over 15 times the code of a Boeing
787
As more software is integrated into vehicles, the
risk of bugs and vulnerabilities increases, which
malicious attackers could exploit, potentially
leading to severe consequences for safety, privacy,
and vehicle operation.
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4. 339% growth in automotive cyber
incidents since 2018
145% growth in critical vulnerabilities
of OEM, Tier 1 & 2 Suppliers between
2019-2022
97% of attacks in 2022 were remote
Automotive hacks pose
a great and immediate
threat to the OEM,
suppliers, and
ultimately – the driver.
RISING AUTOMOTIVE RISKS
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5. 5
Automotive cybersecurity incidents have risen by
605% since 2016
As vehicles become increasingly connected and reliant on software, new vulnerabilities emerge, ranging from
unauthorized access to vehicle controls to personal data breaches.
• Help Net Security (2020) 'Automotive cybersecurity incidents doubled in 2019, up 605% since 2016', Help Net Security, 6 January. Available at:
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2020/01/06/auto- motive-cybersecurity-incidents/
• OODA Loop (2020) 'Automotive cybersecurity incidents doubled in 2019, up 605% since 2016', OODA Loop, 6 January. Available at:
https://www.oodaloop.com/briefs/2020/01/06/automotive-cyberse- curity-incidents-doubled-in-2019-up-605-since-2016/
• IBM (2023) New IBM Security X-Force Threat Intelligence Index is here: Gain insights into the cyberthreat landscape. Available at:
https://community.ibm.com/community/user/security/blogs/john-zorabedian1/2023/02/16/new-ibm-security-x-force-threat-intelligence-index
Over 470 million connected vehicles
are expected by 2025, significantly raising
cybersecurity
risks in the automotive industry
The transportation industry was the ninth most
targeted sector in 2022, accounting for 3.9%
of attacks among the top ten industries
By 2024, the automotive industry could face losses
of up to US$505 billion due to
cyberattacks

6. Since 2021, VinCSS has evolved to
become a frontrunner in automotive
cybersecurity, provide dedicated
services for this rapidly growing
industry
Our services are tailored to the
automotive development lifecycle,
ensuring comprehensive coverage
from design to implementation, and
ongoing monitoring
Our commitment to excellence is
evidenced by our achievement of the
UN R155 and R156 certifications
across multiple vehicle models and
markets
AUTOMOTIVE CYBERSECURITY SERVICES
V-Model development process used
in the automotive industry
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7. VINCSS IS AT THE FOREFRONT OF
DEPLOYING FDO GLOBALLY
FDO FOR CAMERAS
(12/2022)
FDO+MESH FOR
CAR PARK SENSORS (9/2023)
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FDO FOR NETWORKING DEVICES
(5/2024)

8. FDO IN
AUTOMOTIVE
• After three years of parallel R&D in the FDO sector
and providing services in the automotive
cybersecurity sector, we have realized that FDO
technology (including FIDO2) can be applied to
smart vehicle ecosystems and help massively
address the challenges and risks.
• Below is our perspective on a few use cases where
FDO can be applied in the automotive cybersecurity
field
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9. 9
USE CASE 01:
FDO FOR KEY MANAGEMENT IN OEM
● ECUs are the heart of a smart car, and the security
key is the method for controlling access/interference
with the ECU. However, the way OEMs currently
manage the keys throughout the vehicle's lifecycle is
inadequate, leading to many vulnerabilities and
significant risks.
● OEMs often use manual methods to manage keys
during the R&D phase, but as soon as they move into
production and aftersales, a Key Management
System (KMS) is needed due to the exponential
increase in the number of keys, which surpasses the
capabilities of manual methods.
● However, even when using a KMS, the current key
management at OEMs still does not meet practical
needs.
THE PROBLEM

10. 10
USE CASE 01:
THE KMS
Tier 1 Factory A
K1
K1 K2
K2
K1
1
2 6
7
3
4
4
VIN xyz
K VIN xyz
K VIN xyz
KMS Central
OEM
OEM
[K VIN xyz
]K1
[K VIN xyz
]K2
3
8
5
KMS Factory
ECU 1
K1
ECU 2
K2
Tier 1 Factory A
ECU 1
K1
K2
ECU 2
K2
VIN xyz
K VIN xyz
ECUs sent to OEM factory for
installation in vehicles
ECU keys and IDs sent to Tier
1 and loaded in ECUs
ECU keys and IDs
generated by
OEM KMS Central
8
5
7
ECU keys and IDs sent
to OEM KMS Factory
Vehicle’s key generated
by OEM KMS Factory
Vehicle’s key + VIN + ECU
ID sent to OEM KMS
Central
Vin and ECU IDs sent to
OEM KMS Factory
Vehicle’s key sent
• Encrypted w/ ECU 1’s key
• Encrypted w/ ECU 2’s key

11. 11
USE CASE 01:
REMAINS ISSUES
● Keys are provisioned to the ECU in an insecure manner, facing many risks of being exposed:
OEMs transfer keys by directly sending them to contractors without any encryption mechanism.
● Keys stored in the ECU usually lack an update mechanism when exposed. Once exposed, OEMs
often have to replace the part with new keys, which is very costly.
● Vehicles within the same model line often share a common set of keys. Generating keys for each
vehicle, if not well managed, can cause issues during after sales service (part
replacement/upgrade). Many OEMs use the same key set for development and production.
● Developers/technicians often require access to keys to diagnose ECU errors when there are
integration issues with the vehicle. Risk from 3rd party leaks!

12. 12
USE CASE 01:
WORK AROUND
• Establish KMS services to securely store and safely provide keys to contractors.
• Use SHE (Secure Hardware Extension) to encrypt keys before performing updates via UDS
(Unified Diagnostic Service).
• Upgrade in-vehicle networks to use CAN FD or Ethernet (instead of CAN BUS) to employ
encrypted communication methods, preventing eavesdropping by malicious ECUs (ECUs
maliciously embedded in the vehicle to eavesdrop on CAN messages during key updates at
service workshops).
However, synchronously applying all these solutions is currently quite costly, complex, and unfeasible
due to the varying development capabilities of contractors. If applied separately, these measures will
not ensure the elimination of key exposure risks.

13. 13
USE CASE 01:
FDO FOR KEY MANAGEMENT IN OEM
FDO FOR KMS
• VinCSS proposes using the FDO protocol with some
modifications to suit the operation within the vehicle
network. This solution also does not require upgrading
the vehicle network as the data is encrypted.
• FIDO Device Onboarding (FDO) is a protocol developed
by the FIDO Alliance that simplifies and secures the
onboarding process of IoT devices, providing a secure
method for transferring information during the initial
operation of IoT devices.
• If we consider ECUs, EoL Tools, and Diagnostic Tools as
edge devices, it is entirely possible to apply the FDO
protocol to onboard these devices with the necessary
keys when they are assembled in a complete vehicle
or when it is necessary to change/replace the keys in
the vehicle securely.

14. 14
Internet
Protocol
Internet
Protocol
TBOX
FIDO
Assets
FDO Protocol
Implementation
GW
FIDO
Assets
FDO Protocol
Implementation
ECUx
FIDO
Assets
FDO Protocol
Implementation
ECUx
FIDO
Assets
FDO Protocol
Implementation
ECUx
FIDO
Assets
FDO Protocol
Implementation
KMS Services
FDO Rendezvous
FDO Owner
CAN BUS
CAN BUS
CAN BUS
EOL Tools
Aftersale
Tools
IN VEHICLE
USE CASE 01:
FDO FOR KMS

15. 15
ECUx ECUx
No credentials
found
Assemble into vehicle and power up
Check credentials
Request Connect
Request Connect
Response
Response
Setup secure communication
Response
Exchange security keys
Response
Verity the client
USE CASE 01:
KEY MANAGEMENT IN OEM

16. 16
TRUST RELATIONSHIP OF A CHARGING STATION
AND TRUST CERTIFICATES MANAGEMENT
Charging
Station
Authorized Field
Technician
Remote attackers Counterfeited
Charging Station
Malware Remote attackers
Local attackers
Firmware
Developer
EV
Interoperable (PKI)
DISTRUST
DISTRUST
CPO Backend
PKI

17. 17
USE CASE 02:
FDO FOR SUPPLY CHAIN
● Complexity and Interconnectedness: The automotive
supply chain involves multiple stakeholders and
interconnected systems, creating numerous entry
points for cyber attackers.
● Legacy Systems and Software: Many automotive
systems are built on legacy technologies not designed
with cybersecurity in mind, making it challenging to
retrofit security measures.
● Lack of Standardization: The absence of industry-wide
standards complicates cybersecurity practices and
increases integration risks.
KEY CHALLENGES

18. 18
USE CASE 02:
FDO FOR AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY CHAIN
• Multi-Layered Security Approach
• Building a Culture of Cybersecurity
• Collaboration and Information Sharing:
• Compliance and Regulatory
Frameworks: Adhere to frameworks like ISO/SAE
21434, UN Regulation No. 155, AUTOSAR, and ISO
26262 to build a strong cybersecurity foundation.
• Embracing Emerging Technologies: Use
machine learning, AI-powered solutions, and
FIDO/FDO to solve cybersecurity challenges.
BEST PRACTICES

19. 19
USE CASE 02:
FDO FOR AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLY CHAIN
• FDO establishes a protected environment called ROE
(Restricted Operating Environment).
• The ROE is created on SoCs (System on Chip - e.g., from
Texas Instruments, STM) that support SecureBoot,
eFuse, and Flash Encryption or hardware devices
equipped with TPM (Trusted Platform Module).
• The purpose of ROE is to ensure the integrity of the
firmware (which contains FDO) as well as all the data
that the firmware processes. Additionally, this data is
strongly encrypted to prevent decryption and reverse
engineering of the firmware or installation of unofficial
firmware.
FIRMWARE SECURITY

20. Secure Firmware Automation Tool
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Factory
Firmware
OTA
Remote management Push OTA
notification
VinCSS IoT
Platform
Application
VinCSS FDO
Release a firmware
for a device
Car
Infotainment
Update firmware
Signed
Firmware
Signed
Bootloader
Bootloader
Public Key
Hash
Bootloader
Private Key
FDO
Manufacture
Private Key
VinCSS
Supply
Chain Tools
New
device
VinCSS
KeyStore
Sign the firmware with
the specific keys
Firmware
find appropriate keys
for device
false
Create new keys
Key block
sign firmware
burn
firmware
Data block
Store and perform
firmware versioning

21. 21
tunneling protocol VinCSS
IoT
Platform
register / manage
VinCSS
FDO
Car
Infotainment
speed sensor
Light sensor
Ultrasonic sensor
SENSORS SECURE ONBOARDING

22. Car
Infotainment
device attestation
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VinCSS
FDO
VinCSS IoT
Platform
register
ePayment
Car Service log
Firmware OTA
provide new secured device credentials
VinCSS
Key Store
generate keys
update services
Resell /
Repurpose
repurpose safely reset and clean data
Extension Modules
SMART CAR COMPONENT PROVISIONING

23. NEXT STAGES
1. Have a working FDO automotive use case in practice
for a vehicle model where we can access the
components as a Tier 1 level contractor and coordinate
completely with the OEM. VinCSS will coordinate as an
FDO vendor.
2. Work with a KMS vendor to add FDO support to their
product.
3. Learn from vendor-dependence lesson and find a
workaround solution for automotive like we did with
FDO for WIFI router.
4. Continue R&D for more FDO applications in the
automotive and IoT security domains.
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24. VINCSS INTERNET SECURITY
SERVICES JSC
• 20Ath Floor, Vincom Center Dong Khoi 45A Ly
Tu Trong Street, Ben Nghe Ward, Dist. 1, HCMC,
Vietnam.
• Email: v.office@vincss.net
• Website: www.vincss.net
THANK YOU!
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